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**Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian
and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations,
including special economic assistance**

Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel

Report of the Secretary-General**

Summary

The General Assembly, in its resolution 56/217 of 21 December 2001, requested the Secretary-General to submit at its fifty-seventh session a comprehensive, updated report on the safety and security situation of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel and on the implementation of the resolution, including the progress made by the Secretary-General in pursuing accountability and assessing responsibility for all individual security incidents that involve United Nations and associated personnel at all levels throughout the United Nations system, as well as an account of the measures taken by Governments and the United Nations to prevent and respond to such incidents.

The present report outlines the threats against the safety and security of United Nations personnel over the past year as well as an update on implementation of the initiatives approved during the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly. As these initiatives are to be implemented over the course of the 2002-2003 biennium, this report is a progress report on actions that have already been taken and an indication of what remains to be done.

* A/57/150.

** This report was delayed because of difficulties in obtaining accurate data regarding the status of detained staff members from United Nations agencies, programmes and funds.

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 56/217 of 19 February 2002, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its fifty-seventh session a comprehensive, updated report on the safety and security situation of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel and on the implementation of the resolution, including progress made by the Secretary-General in pursuing accountability and assessing responsibility for all individual security incidents that involve United Nations and associated personnel at all levels throughout the United Nations system, as well as an account of the measures taken by Governments and the United Nations to prevent and respond to such incidents.

2. This report has been prepared in consultation with the members of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) to cover the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002.

II. Threats against United Nations personnel

3. Over the past decade threats against the safety and security of United Nations personnel have escalated at an unprecedented rate. At the same time, United Nations personnel are operating in more dangerous environments and in greater concentrations than ever before. The challenging and, far too often, hazardous environment in which United Nations personnel are compelled to operate has taken its toll. Since 1 January 1992, 214 civilian United Nations staff members have lost their lives through malicious acts. Only 22 perpetrators of attacks on United Nations staff have been brought to justice, a mere 7 per cent of those responsible. During the current reporting period, 7 staff members made the ultimate sacrifice in pursuit of the goals of the United Nations system in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. Another three lost their lives in helicopter accidents in Georgia and Sierra Leone (see annex I). In addition, between 1 January 1994 and 30 May 2002, there have been 70 instances of hostage-taking or kidnapping involving 258 United Nations personnel; during the reporting period four of those personnel were taken hostage in two separate incidents period in Somalia and Guyana. At present 39 personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system remain in detention at various locations throughout the world (see annex II). Personnel of the United Nations continue to experience an unprecedented number of incidents of rape and sexual assault, armed robbery, attacks on humanitarian convoys and operations and harassment.

4. Many of the instances of threats against United Nations personnel occurred in the West Bank and Gaza. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) indicates that during the reporting period there was an increase in the number of violent incidents directed against United Nations and humanitarian personnel. In a number of instances UNRWA personnel were verbally abused, threatened, physically assaulted and shot at. What is of particular concern is that ambulances and medical personnel have not been exempt from attack. On a number of occasions, UNRWA ambulances were attacked, resulting in death and injury to personnel.

5. Armed robbery poses a serious threat to United Nations staff and operations around the world. During the reporting period, two armed robberies of significant United Nations assets took place in Yugoslavia and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The office of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, was burglarized after the recent volcanic eruption, resulting in a loss of over US\$ 220,000.

6. Over the past year, there has been an increase in terrorist-related threats against United Nations personnel and installations in the field, including threats to use mail bombs and/or chemical/biological weapons. Since 1 October 2001, United Nations offices around the world have received numerous bomb threats and 12 threats of chemical/biological contamination. All these incidents proved to be hoaxes, but resulted in serious disruption to the work of the offices and mental anguish on the part of staff members involved. Whereas threats to United Nations personnel were once perceived to be the result of internal or country-specific grievances, terrorist-related activities add an international dimension to threats against United Nations personnel.

7. This is the first report on security of United Nations personnel since the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Although the full ramifications of that incident are yet to be understood, what is clear is that the world has become a relatively smaller place, in which events in one part of the world have significant consequences in other parts. Moreover, the threats against United Nations personnel immediately became more acute and tangible, as their status as representatives of the international community became even more pronounced. Against this background, the initiatives taken by the General Assembly during the fifty-sixth session to reinforce the United Nations security management system assume even greater importance to enable the organizations of the United Nations system to respond to any event wherever and whenever it may occur.

III. Arrest, detention and other restrictions

8. In accordance with prior practice, the present report provides information regarding cases of arrest and detention and cases of staff members who are missing or whose whereabouts remain unknown, some for almost 20 years. Based on information provided by the United Nations agencies, programmes and funds, a consolidated list of staff members under arrest and detention or missing and with respect to whom the United Nations and the specialized agencies and related organizations have been unable to exercise fully their right to protection is set out in annex II.

9. According to information provided by UNRWA, in the Gaza Strip a total of 15 staff members were arrested and detained by the Palestinian Authority during the reporting period. With the exception of one staff member who hanged himself while in custody, all others were eventually released. The Israeli authorities detained only one staff member and he was released without charge. In the West Bank, 74 arrests by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were recorded during the reporting period; the Palestinian authorities detained 19 staff members; four staff members were arrested in Jordan and three in Lebanon. All were subsequently released. As at 30 June 2002, 19 staff members remained in detention, of whom 18 were detained by the Israeli authorities and one by the Palestinian authorities. Regrettably, UNRWA was not

always provided with adequate or timely information by the relevant authorities on the reasons for the arrest or detention of its staff members. In the absence of such information, it was not possible to determine whether there were circumstances that would warrant UNRWA asserting its right to functional immunity.

10. Throughout the reporting period, UNRWA staff experienced considerable difficulties and delays due to closures. UNRWA vehicles within Gaza and the West Bank were stopped at IDF checkpoints and roadblocks, often for extended periods of time. While passing through checkpoints, UNRWA staff were abused and even physically assaulted. There was also a significant increase in the incursions by both IDF and the Palestinian Authority into UNRWA installations, resulting in substantial damage.

IV. Current security management system

A. Arrangements at headquarters locations

11. In order to assist me in the fulfilment of my obligation for the security of United Nations system personnel, I have appointed a full-time United Nations Security Coordinator, Mr. Tun Myat, at the Assistant Secretary-General level. This appointment will provide the essential focus and leadership of United Nations efforts to strengthen security coordination and management and to sustain the initiatives aimed at increasing the efficacy of the security management system. Mr. Myat has assumed his duties in the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, which is also being reinforced to undertake the additional responsibilities.

12. Although the recruitment of additional staff for the Office of the Security Coordinator is under way, the lack of office accommodation and the budgetary restrictions on the leasing/renovation of premises has considerably delayed the process. The headquarters of the Office were shifted to a temporary location, which could not accommodate all proposed staff, in September 2001 and will relocate to a permanent site in November 2002. As a direct result, the Office has been unable to implement many of the initiatives I have requested, such as undertaking compliance and inspection missions or increasing the pace of security and stress management training. There is an obvious and direct correlation between the deployment of well-trained security staff and enhanced staff safety and security, underlining the urgency for the Office to become fully staffed and operational as soon as possible.

13. Despite the shortfalls, the strengthening of the Office of the Security Coordinator has substantially improved its ability to implement its mandate. It has effectively led the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, comprised of representatives of the United Nations and its agencies, programmes and funds, to endorse and support the initiatives of the Secretary-General to reinforce staff security. With the additional support at the Office of the Security Coordinator, the link between Headquarters and the field is stronger than ever before. During the reporting period, staff of the Office of the Security Coordinator from Headquarters staff led broad-based inter-agency security assessments of Somalia and West Timor, conducted eight independent, individual country security assessments and undertook five security budget review missions. At the same time, the Office executed 21 security training missions in 17 countries, undertook eight field security support

missions, conducted two investigative missions and managed two hostage incidents, one of which required deployment of an experienced hostage negotiator from the Office to the field.

B. Arrangements in the field

14. In the field, the Office of the Security Coordinator has concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the recruitment and administration of the 100 Professional level field security officers and 200 local level support staff approved by the General Assembly. These field security officers and support staff are funded and managed centrally by the Office of the Security Coordinator. As at 30 June 2002, 98 field security officers had been recruited and were in the process of deploying to their duty stations of assignment. Because the need for field security officers exceeds the number of positions available, a number of the officers have been given regional responsibilities for several countries. The Office will closely monitor the effectiveness of these arrangements and report to the General Assembly in the context of the next proposed programme budget.

15. To manage the field security officers, the Office of the Security Coordinator is implementing the concept of a "Corps of Field Security Officers". These officers are an integrated network of professional security officers, selected on the basis of predetermined, inter-agency agreed qualifications, experience and competencies. Candidates who are considered qualified for these positions are placed on the Office's security officer roster and are available for rapid assignment as part of the Corps of Field Security Officers. In order to ensure consistency in the recruitment of single-agency security officers, those organizations that require such staff may also make use of the security officer roster. In addition, if requested and on a reimbursable basis, the Office will recruit, through UNDP, and manage single-agency security officers. WHO has chosen to avail itself of this option at two duty stations. The Field Security Officers recruited for this purpose are part of the Corps of Field Security Officers but will be assigned to provide security for a specific project within the country, for example, polio eradication teams.

16. While the current system has enabled the Office of the Security Coordinator to implement the mandate entrusted to it in a timely manner, for the future, in order to ensure that field security officers of the highest quality are recruited, subject to the identification and availability of funding, the Office is considering establishing a competency assessment methodology for the selection of field security officers, similar to the one used to select resident coordinators.

17. Each duty station has been given a budget covering the operational costs of the field security officer. Any security-related costs at the duty station which are not part of the standard field security officer budget (such as funding requirements to implement minimum operating security standards) continue to be shared by the organizations present at the duty station.

18. During the humanitarian crises of the past two decades, lack of adequate security for the maintenance of humanitarian operations has been the single most inhibiting factor to the United Nations and its NGO partners providing assistance to civilians in need. Thus, operational security has become an integral element of humanitarian intervention. While there is little that can be done to reduce the level

of threat in insecure environments, the United Nations and the humanitarian community have undertaken efforts to reduce the level of risk to which staff are exposed through the provision of appropriate mechanisms and resources, foremost among which is the services of a professional field security officer.

19. Given the rapid onset and unpredictable nature of crises, it is often difficult to respond to field security needs within the parameters of the regular budget. For this reason, the Trust Fund for Security of Staff Members of the United Nations System was established and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, as the focus of the United Nations security management system, determines where and how extrabudgetary contributions for security of staff can be used most effectively. As at 31 July 2002, contributions to the Trust Fund, totalling \$1,689,421, had been received from the following Member States: Canada (\$126,339), Japan (\$1,068,467), Monaco (\$10,000), Netherlands (\$50,531), Norway (\$71,970), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (\$202,314) and the United States of America (\$159,800).

20. Apart from the above-mentioned contributions to the Trust Fund, contributions totalling \$2,927,667 have also been pledged/received by the Office's implementing partners for security-related activities from the following Member States: Netherlands (\$906,000), Sweden (\$377,714), United Kingdom (\$1,071,429) and United States (\$572,524). These additional funds were generated by the generous contributions of Member States to the United Nations consolidated appeals. The Office of the Security Coordinator coordinates with implementing partners such as UNDP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to ensure that funds are utilized expeditiously; this includes deploying additional field security officers and meeting minimum operating security standards requirements for countries included in the consolidated appeals.

C. Accountability

21. In section VIII of its resolution 56/255 of 24 December 2001, the General Assembly noted with concern the lack of an accountability and responsibility mechanism in the area of field security, and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly at its fifty-seventh session a comprehensive report on the establishment of a clear mechanism of accountability and responsibility, including such provisions as its scope, depth and common standards and methods of enforcing them in an inter-agency structure.

22. In response to that request, an inter-agency Working Group was convened in February 2002 to prepare a proposed system of accountability for security management. The report of the Working Group was subsequently considered by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network at its meeting in Vienna from 13 to 17 May 2002 and by the High-level Committee on Management. The document identifies all the actors of the United Nations security management system and outlines the responsibilities of each. It also identifies a number of mechanisms to ensure accountability. The final report is being submitted as a separate report to the General Assembly through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

D. Minimum operating security standards

23. As a result of the mandates entrusted to the United Nations, personnel of the organizations are facing increased risk of murder, kidnapping and serious assault while working in many operational areas throughout the world. In response to these risks and in order to determine a minimum requirement for the field security management system and provide a mechanism to increase the security consciousness of personnel, reduce risk and establish standard field-based criteria to implement responsibility and accountability, the concept of minimum operating security standards (MOSS) was developed. Using a baseline MOSS determined by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, all duty stations are required to establish and implement a minimum set of security standards. MOSS is divided broadly into four sections: security planning, training of staff, telecommunications and security equipment.

24. First and foremost, MOSS should be regarded as an enabling mechanism that ensures, as far as possible, the ability of the organizations to implement mandates while reducing risk in the operational area. It is the responsibility of each agency to provide the resources required to ensure that their operations are MOSS-compliant at each duty station. All duty stations are expected to be MOSS-compliant by 1 January 2003 or to provide an implementation plan, with a set date, by which the duty station will become MOSS-compliant.

E. Aviation safety and security standards

25. Since 1 January 1992, 28 staff members have lost their lives in aircraft. Of these, 23 were flying on aircraft chartered or operated by organizations of the United Nations system. This is a matter of serious concern to me and to the members of the Chief Executives Board. Work has already started on an inter-agency basis to develop aviation safety and security standards which will be adhered to by all organizations of the United Nations system.

F. Security and stress management training; security publications/information

26. Providing staff with the basic skills and knowledge to participate effectively in the United Nations security management system has proved to be one of the best possible means of reducing risk. Thus security training is now mandatory for all personnel of the United Nations system. Security training constitutes an integral part of MOSS and therefore is an integral part of the accountability process. In addition to the security training conducted by the United Nations agencies, the Office of the Security Coordinator has continued to conduct its personal security awareness and stress management training at many duty stations. During 2001, 3,854 United Nations system staff received this training in Lebanon, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Indonesia, East Timor, Kenya, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Thus far in 2002, 843 staff have benefited in Jamaica, Cameroon, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Plans for the remainder of 2002-2003 include training to be given at approximately 35 duty stations, subject to completion of the recruitment of staff of the Office of the Security Coordinator.

27. In recognition of the fact that security training is integral to maintaining the minimum operational security standards of a duty station, the Office of the Security Coordinator, with the support of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, is developing a security training programme for staff serving at high-risk duty stations. The programme will be implemented by the field security officer at each duty station and will conform with the minimum operational security standards in effect. This initiative will provide a model or baseline field security training programme, which each field security officer will then modify to reflect the specific security requirements of the country. A training of trainers seminar will enhance the field security officers' training skills and provide them with appropriate training methodologies to maximize the staff learning process.

28. The Office of the Security Coordinator has also facilitated security training exercises for the quarterly emergency field coordination training seminars, organized by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, to improve the field coordination skills of the staff of all United Nations organizations of the United Nations system. Staff members of NGOs that work in partnership with United Nations system organizations have had the opportunity to participate in security training programmes.

29. In addition to the induction and specialized training which is given to all field security officers, the Office of the Security Coordinator, for the purpose of developing standardized security operational procedures, organized a workshop for all chief security officers at peacekeeping missions.

30. The entire security and stress management training programme undertaken by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has been funded by extrabudgetary contributions provided to the Trust Fund for the Security of Staff Members of the United Nations System.

31. In order to ensure that the system-wide security and stress management training is appropriate and effective, consideration is being given for the Office to undertake a review of security training to evaluate its impact and effectiveness.

32. In addition to security training, the Office is developing a series of security publications to be provided to all staff members. In cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a CD-ROM on basic security awareness is being prepared and will be available on 1 January 2003. It will provide each staff member with the facility to complete the programme on a computer.

33. Currently, there is no standardized automated reporting system for the field to report security incidents involving United Nations staff. Reports received must be manually processed and statistical information must be extracted and compiled manually. Consideration is currently being given to adopting an automated system developed by UNICEF which will permit the rapid completion of a standardized report in the field and its transmission to the Office of the Security Coordinator, where it will be automatically received and entered into the database, as required. This information will be able to be easily accessed and detailed statistics regarding the various types of security incidents will be available for each country and region. Security focal points at each agency headquarters will have the capability to access information regarding their agency at any time.

G. Stress management

34. Stress counselling has been recognized by the organizations of the United Nations system as an area which requires close inter-agency coordination and action. As part of the strengthening of the Office of the Security Coordinator, additional stress counsellors are being recruited to enhance the ability of the organizations to respond to critical incidents. Four full-time stress counsellors have been authorized for the Office. These individuals work closely with the stress counsellors assigned to peacekeeping missions, UNHCR and the World Food Programme. In addition, UNICEF expects to recruit a stress counsellor to assist its staff members who are exposed to critical incidents. The increase in the number of stress counsellors in the United Nations system will permit a more effective response to the needs of staff.

H. Security collaboration between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations

35. In recent years, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have increasingly been working in close cooperation with the agencies, programmes and funds of the United Nations system at many duty stations. The independence and diversity of mandates of these organizations may give them greater flexibility than the United Nations in certain circumstances but may in some cases leave them more vulnerable to insecurity. The relationship between these various actors, often in crisis situations, has serious security implications as the actions of one group may impact upon the operational security of another. In order to provide a framework for such relationships, a set of guidelines entitled United Nations/NGO Security Collaboration has been developed.

36. These guidelines, the result of extensive inter-agency consultation, outline the best practices for security collaboration between the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations. The guideline is not legally binding but is to be implemented at the discretion of the designated official and security management team, who are responsible and accountable for all aspects of security management at the duty station. The guidelines, which provide for greater interaction, sharing of resources and training capacities, as well as promoting common security standards and ground rules, are consistent with efforts to reinforce the security management system and with the commitment of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations at Headquarters to firmly establish security as an integral aspect of operations.

V. Observations and recommendations

37. **The goal of the United Nations security management system is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security and safety of staff as a high priority. The initiatives undertaken during this past year represent a significant step in that direction. As a result of enhanced training and security management, as well as through the institution of initiatives such as the minimum operational security standards, fatalities among United Nations personnel appear to be decreasing. Although much still remains to be done to mitigate, reduce**

and manage threats and risks to United Nations personnel, I am optimistic that we are on the right track.

38. It is of great concern, however, that perpetrators of acts of violence seemingly operate with total impunity. According to information available, of the 214 deaths of United Nations staff, only 22 perpetrators have been apprehended for the deaths of 15 staff members. That is 7.1 per cent of the number of United Nations staff who have lost their lives. Of these, only nine perpetrators have actually been sentenced or, in one instance, executed. In many instances, the killers are known to the Member State involved, yet no action has been taken against them. Member States must take stronger action to ensure that the perpetrators of attacks against United Nations personnel are brought to justice. There is no doubt in my mind that the strongest deterrent to attacks on United Nations personnel is the swift application of justice by Member States, and I must once again call upon those States to take this responsibility seriously.

39. Despite efforts made at the field level to improve staff security through the implementation of minimum operational security standards, there are some instances where United Nations efforts are frustrated. For example, in some Member States, international organizations are not permitted to equip themselves with any form of communications equipment, despite the poor quality of local communications and the often difficult driving and road conditions. This remains a serious concern for the health and safety of staff members. I appeal to all Member States that have implemented such restrictions to lift them immediately in the interest of the safety and security of staff.

40. The implementation of preventive risk management is one of the most effective means of protecting staff. Through security and stress management training, staff members will become better informed and more security-conscious so that they may operate in hazardous areas more safely. This will enhance the ability of the organizations to fulfil their mandates. To this end I wish to reiterate my appeal to all Member States to contribute generously to the Trust Fund for the Security of Staff Members of the United Nations System to ensure the continuity of security and stress management training.

41. In conclusion, I am pleased that the steps taken thus far to reinforce the safety and security of United Nations staff have produced tangible results. I am confident that staff are now better prepared to face the insecurity that all too often accompanies human suffering. However, since I put forward my programme to reinforce staff security awareness two years ago, the threats that United Nations staff face have increased exponentially. Moreover, the nature of the threat has changed and has become more indiscriminate and difficult to predict. The situation is further compounded by the United Nations strong stand against terrorism, which underlines the need for additional reinforcement of the security management system. There is a critical need for an enhanced emergency response capacity, improved monitoring, and for more efficient, automated, information systems to cope with the influx of security-related information. With this in mind, I am asking the newly appointed United Nations Security Coordinator to prepare, in consultation with the agencies, programmes and funds of the United Nations system, a plan for the further reinforcement of the United Nations security management system, which I shall submit to the General Assembly in due course.

Annex I

Civilian personnel who have lost their lives during the reporting period (1 July 2001-30 June 2002)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Nationality/agency</i>	<i>Date/place of incident</i>	<i>Cause</i>	<i>Legal action</i>
Lhomme, Jean-Pierre	France/UNDP	5 July 2001 Bangui	Gunshot	No
Bintu, Deo Bimenyimana	Democratic Republic of the Congo/MONUC	27 September 2001 Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo	Gunshot wounds	No
Abrashkevich, Andrei	Russia/UNOMIG	8 October 2001 Kodori Valley, Georgia	Helicopter accident	Not available
Khvichia, Lali	Georgia/UNOMIG	8 October 2001 Kodori Valley, Georgia	Helicopter accident	Not available
Atanassov, Dimitar	Bulgaria/UNV	7 November 2001 Freetown	Helicopter accident	Not available
Manlan, Kassi	Côte d'Ivoire/ WHO	20 November 2001 Bujumbura	Assault with a deadly weapon	Yes
Berbati, Vlora	Kosovo/UNMIK	5 January 2002 Peja, Kosovo	Gunshot wounds	Yes
Ali, Hassan Sheikh	Somalia/UNICEF	25 February 2002 Mogadishu	Gunshot wounds	No
Salman, Bahjat	Iraq/UNOHCI	8 April 2002 Baghdad	Gunshot wounds	No
Aalimi, Shah Sayed	Afghanistan/FAO	10 April 2002 Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan	Gunshot wounds	No

Annex II

Consolidated list of staff members under arrest and detention or missing and with respect to whom the United Nations and the specialized agencies and related organizations have been unable to exercise fully their right to protection, as at 30 June 2002

<i>Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Place and date of incident</i>
Benoit Ndejeje	UNDP	Detained in Kigali since 11 November 1994.
Jean-Marc Ulimubenshi	UNHCR	Detained in Butare, Rwanda, since 15 November 1994.
Jean Chrisostome Muvunyi	UNHCR	Detained in Butare, Rwanda, since 9 January 1995.
Mathieu Nsengiyaremye	UNHCR	Detained in Cyangugu, Rwanda, since 12 February 1995.
Luc Birushya	UNDP	Detained in Kigali since 13 March 1995.
Fulgence Rukindo	Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda	Detained in Kibuyu, Rwanda, since 17 June 1995.
Joseph Munyambonera	UNHCR	Detained in Kigali since 19 October 1995.
Andre Uwizeyimana	UNHCR	Detained in Butare, Rwanda, since 29 December 1995.
Victor Niyomubyeyi	UNHCR	Detained in Rwanda since October 1996.
J. Baptiste Sibomana	OHCHR field operation in Rwanda	Detained in Rwanda since March 1997.
Berhanu Gebremedhin	UNHCR	Detained in Addis Ababa since 24 June 1997.
Felicien Murenzi	UNHCR	Detained in Gitarama, Rwanda, since 3 July 1997.
Jean Bosco Nzarubara	UNHCR	Detained in Butare, Rwanda, since 12 October 1997.
Edison Ndagijimana	UNHCR	Detained in Ruhango, Rwanda, since 15 April 2001.
Khaled Salamer Al Jundi	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 22 June 2001.
Muzammi Khan	UNHCR	Detained in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, since September 2001.
Nidal A/Fattah Nazzal	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 17 October 2001.
Gertrude Nyamoya	WHO	Detained in Bujumbura since 21 December 2001.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Place and date of incident</i>
Nidal Abed Al Ahmar	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 10 January 2002.
Jamal Ghabax	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 8 February 2002.
Issa Ibrahim Ali Wadi	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 4 April 2002.
Rashad Yousef Ibrahim Hamdan	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 6 April 2002.
Asraf Abu Mu'Alah	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 7 April 2002.
Tahir Mustafa	UNOCHA	Detained in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, since 9 April 2002.
Mohammad Awad Abu El Izz	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 13 April 2002.
Azzem Atallah	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 13 April 2002.
Shadi Fawzi Busbkar	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 13 April 2002.
Thomas Kifle	UNHCR	Detained in Tesseney, Eritrea, since 16 April 2002.
Bassen Nabil Ibrahim Jarrar	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 18 April 2002.
Nofal A/Hakim	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 2 May 2002.
Ahmad Sweilem	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 2 May 2002.
Khalil Badee	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 16 May 2002.
Rami Jawabreh	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 28 May 2002.
Zerrin Taimoor Ibrahim	UNHCR	Detained in Mosel, Iraq, since 1 June 2002.
Yase Ibrahim Hatab	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 2 June 2002.
Jihad Mohamad Al-Saleh	UNRWA	Detained in Lebanon since 3 June 2002.
Abdoulaye Diallo	UNFPA	Detained in Côte d'Ivoire since 6 June 2002.
Isabelle Masika Diatsuka	WHO	Detained in Kigali since 17 June 2002.
Orlando Reyes	UNIKOM	Detained in Kuwait since 27 June 2002.