

Forty-fourth session
Item 63 (h) of the provisional agenda*

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

International arms transfers

Report of the Secretary-General

CONTENTS

	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	2
II. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS	3
Colombia	3
Ecuador	9
Finland	10
France (on behalf of the Twelve States members of the European Community	12
Norway	13
Poland	14

* A/44/150.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 7 December 1988, the General Assembly adopted resolution 43/75 I entitled "International arms transfers", paragraphs 1 to 4, of which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Expresses its conviction that arms transfers in all their aspects deserve serious consideration by the international community, **inter alia,** because of⁸

"(a) Their potential effects in areas where tension and regional conflict threaten international peace and security and national security^a

"(b) Their known and potential negative effects on the process of the peaceful social and economic development of all peoples;

"(c) Increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking,

"2. Requests Member States to consider, inter alia, the following measures relating to these concerns:

"(a) Reinforcement of their national systems of control and vigilance concerning production and transport of arms;

"(b) Examination of ways and means of refraining from acquiring arms additional to those needed for legitimate national security requirements, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region;

"(c) Examination of the ways and means of providing for more openness and transparency with regard to world-wide arms transfers;

"3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to take into account the above-mentioned matters in its deliberations on the issue of conventional disarmament;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views and proposals of Member States on the matters contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution and to collect all other relevant information for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session."

2. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 7 February 1989, requested all Member States to submit their views and proposals as well as any other relevant information on this matter by 1 July 1989. To date the Secretary-General has received replies from Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, France, Norway and Poland. The replies are reproduced in section II of the present report.

. II. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

COLOMBIA

[Original: Spanish]

[5 May 1989]

1. The **Government** of Colombia is convinced that the problem of arms transfers in all **its aspects merits** serious consideration within the framework of the United Nations as it is maintained through a complex network of commercial and political international relations which involve the responsibility of all States.

2. The Secretary-General's studies, *in particular* those on "**The economic and social consequences** of the arms race and military expenditures", on "The relationship **between** disarmament and development", on "Conventional disarmament" and on "**The relationship between disarmament and international security**", have presented a vivid picture of the **enormous** scale of the arms race, the catastrophic destruction modern weapons can cause and the pernicious consequences of the illicit **arms trade** for international **peace** and security.

A r m s t r a n s f e r s s e c u r i t y

3. The active **race** to accumulate **more and more** sophisticated and destructive **weapons**, whether through production or import, **affects** all aspects of international relations in *the most* dangerous manner, and constitutes one of the greatest obstacles to the establishment of a peaceful **system** of international **relations** based on justice, equality, independence and co-operation.

4. The arms **race**, in which the militarily and economically **most** powerful States, the main political-military alliances and, directly or indirectly, the whole world participate, **has** profound political, economic, social and psychological repercussions **for** mankind.

5. International **arms** transfers occupy a pre-eminent place in the **arms race**, particularly that in conventional weapons, and thus create a climate **more** conducive to armed confrontation by preparing the world for conflict rather than for building **peace**. **Moreover**, arms transfers help shape the **vicious** circle of suspicion and fear which leads to the arms race and make **more difficult** efforts to **guarantee** international **security**, especially through the **system** provided for in the United Nations Charter for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

6. Although **arms** transfers are not the principal cause of conflicts nor control of such transfers **the** only solution, recent history has shown that **arms** transfers increase the possibility of armed confrontation, prolong and intensify conflicts and interfere with their peaceful solution.

7. The transfers of **convontional** weapons, which fuel regional conflicts, called by **some** "***low-intensity wars**", have enabled the great Powers to intervene politically in other States with minimum risk to themselves and **immeasurable** cost

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in death and destruction for the countries in conflict. In addition, **arms** transfers which serve the interests of rivalry **between** the great Powers entail the **risk** that a critical situation in some region of the **world may** turn into a direct confrontation between them. Moreover, the pressures they exert through **arms** transfers, utilised as a political **or** economic instrument, reduce *the* freedom of action of the parties in conflict to find a possible solution.

8. In **the** 1980s the **arms** trade has continued to operate freely throughout the length and breadth of the world. The **few** restrictions **some** States placed on it in past **eras** *have* been significantly weakened **for** the sake of political and economic strategies, to the detriment **of** international peace and security.

9. Nor have the **1980s** **witnessed** a decrease in the **efforts** to develop new types of weapons which contribute to keeping the dynamics of the arms **race** **vigorous**. **Moreover**, a greater number of **countries** are now designing, producing and deploying new and even **more** lethal weapons, many **of** which are transferred to third world countries.

10. Similarly, the lack of control over military technology has enabled various highly **militarized** countries - **some** of **them** in areas where tensions or conflicts exist - to acquire technology **for** the production of weapons of increasingly destructive power. **Some** countries have also acquired launching **systems** capable of transporting nuclear, chemical and other weapons of **mass** destruction over great distances.

11. This dangerous **convergence** in the transfer of arms **with** indiscriminate effects, the consequent proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and the capacity **of** a growing **number** of countries to launch **them** **merits** the priority attention **of** the international community.

Arms transfers and the developing world

12. The third world has been the **scene** of the wars waged since the Second World **War** and of the conflicts and wars still going on. These conflicts have generated a continuous demand for various kinds of **arms** and military equipment from which few of the supplying countries have resisted the **temptation** to profit.

13. The third world has provided the theatre in which new technologies have been tested under real rather than simulated conditions, with the aggravating factor that the new technologies applied to the **arms** transferred, *in* addition to increasing their range and destructiveness, entail greater risk for **the** civilian population because of their indiscriminate **effects**.

14. Countries with border or **racial** conflicts **or** **internal** struggles which, faced with security imperatives, **need** arms for their defence, fall *an* **easy** prey to **arms** producers, distributors or intermediaries who are governed by the inexorable laws **of** commerce and are not exactly moved by humanitarian considerations. Moreover, those countries **may** find themselves tempted to use the **arms** which to **some** of them **may** seem **more** attractive than peaceful **means** of solving disputes.

15. **Even on the basis** of the limited data available, **it** is estimated that about 75 per cent of total **arms** exports go to the **developing** countries. Given the volume and **the increase** in unit value of the **arms** exported, this represents a heavy flow of wealth from the poor to the rich **countries**, **which** is particularly prejudicial as it entails a **massive** loss of foreign exchange, the scarcity of which is one of the **most** serious obstacles to economic growth and development in the third world.

Arms transfers, development and security

16. It is **clear** that the conventional **arms race** absorbs many of the resources, both national and international, which **would otherwise** be directed **towards** social welfare and economic development. The **size of** the **resources** necessary to maintain, increase and update present weapons arsenals, **in** both the producing and the importing countries, is the most obvious aspect of the negative effects of the **arms race on** world prospects **for** economic growth and its serious **consequences**, in particular, for the economic and social development of the developing countries.

17. Conventional **arms** and **arms** transfers are also responsible for the militarisation of our societies. On these **arms** falls a large share of responsibility for the moral, social and **human costs** which **must** be added to the **economic** burden of **conflicts** and wars and the preparations **for** them.

18. Conventional **arms** also **attract to research** and development a **growing** number of scientists and technicians who then have a special interest in the continuation of their specialised **work**. A hierarchy is thus created **which** can interfere with the **efforts of those who wish to limit arms production programmes**.

19. Expenditures on conventional armaments are several **times** greater than on nuclear weapons. In **terms of** cost, conventional **arms** and the labour and scientific and technical resource? tied up in their production and maintenance represent an enormous financial burden and therefore constitute a drain on the resources of the countries producing them. These countries then depend on the continued export of the arms in order to compensate **for** the costs of **production** and balance their payments. The **mere fact** that the countries producing **arms have** a surplus to sell constitutes a factor **which** promotes **arms** transfers and stimulates unrestrained competition to **meet** the demand or create it.

20. **Arms** imports **create** dependence in the recipient **countries**. The suppliers generally finance their **arms** sales through loans granted for the purpose which create financial and even political obligations in the recipient countries. Military aid also creates obligations and political dependence. **In both cases**, the recipient countries remain tied to the suppliers, generally on a long-term basis, because of their debt and the need to obtain spare parts **and** continued supplies.

21. Although arms imports are justified, **or said to be justified**, by the strengthening of security for national defence, that **motive** cannot be attributed to the exporting countries. Their security is not increased by the trade, nor do the economic benefits derived from the sales appear at present to be enough to compensate **for** or justify the **military costs more than marginal'y**. Nor does the acquisition of arms **seem** to compensate the recipient **countries in terms of**

security, particularly when it is taken into account that it is **mostly** the **arms** received which have contributed to generating the wars and conflicts which the world has endured in recent decades, and that the resources diverted from the tasks of economic and social development help accentuate non-military threats to security.

22. The military industry which is now developing in a number **of** developing countries is a specific response to the security problems those countries face in their international or regional relations. Nevertheless, although such industries **may** constitute a source of foreign exchange savings and military import substitution, they **entail** the commitment of a large share of future tax revenues and do not constitute an appropriate response to present international circumstances. Consequently, the medium- and long-term effects and consequences this allocation of budget revenue has or **may** have are detrimental to the peaceful process of economic and social development because it commits resources which could otherwise be used to satisfy national needs.

23. The military equipment is in any case doubly paid for - although this is less true in the industrialised countries - by ordinary citizens who have not been consulted **on** their loss in health services, educational opportunities and uncontaminated water, better food, adequate housing, industrial development and so **on**.

24. There is a tendency for the developing countries to emulate the developed countries in military equipment more than in economic growth and standards of living. Nevertheless, the developing countries largely depend on imports, **while** the **industrialized** countries are not only relatively independent when it comes to increasing their arsenals, but derive advantages - material or political - from the sale or transfer of **arms**.

The illicit arms trade

25. The growing illicit **arms** trade is an integral part of arms transfers involving a dangerous interaction between war, terrorism, subversion, crime and the narcotics traffic with the appetite for power and **money**, ideologies, propaganda and oracular pronouncements which traverse seas and continents and adapt themselves to the **most** varied and heterogeneous situations and special circumstances.

26. Colombia **has** often warned the international community of the consequences of the illicit arms trade as a phenomenon which further aggravates tensions, **threatens** the domestic security of States as well as regional security, and strengthens the forces opposed to the disarmament process. It has also called attention to the cutthroat competition **in** the arms trade and the alarming indifference **of** the States in which arms are freely sold, transferred and supplied, thus leading to the consolidation of a market in which criminals, terrorists and narcotics dealers with unlimited economic resources can acquire all the equipment needed to carry out their deadly purposes.

27. **In** spite of the consequences to which **many** countries have fallen victim because of **the** illicit arms trade, we know more about its impact on our societies than about the way in which it is conducted. Given the clandestine character of

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the trade, in order to understand its nature better we must examine the cases in which these transactions have come to the knowledge of Governments or the public.

28. The illicit trade comprises those transactions which are conducted in violation of national or international law or established procedure and in which the Governments or individuals involved would be liable to punishment or sanctions.

29. The illicit trade, by definition, is conducted in the shadows, and generally involves arms or military equipment which has been obtained by irregular procedures and is likewise supplied in an irregular manner.

30. Some forms of the illicit trade can be called "**the** grey market in arms", depending on the **nature** of the arms or military equipment transferred or the character of the **transaction**. For example, a transferred product falls into the grey area when it has both civil and military applications and is supplied to countries subject to "embargoes" or to groups or individuals in the knowledge or suspicion that it is intended for violent purposes.

31. Examination of the problem of the illicit arms trade and its origins, and evaluation **of** its consequences for international, regional and national peace and security and ultimately for the preservation of human rights, constitutes a basic and urgent task.

32. Colombia considers that the United Nations, whose essence and goal is peace, security and the economic and social progress of States, as well as the realization of human rights, can make a positive contribution to dealing with the problem of illicit arms traffic and eliminate a threat which knows no ideological, territorial or legal frontiers and may constitute a hidden form of intervention.

Principles and **necessary components** of measures for the
regulation and control of **international** arms transfers

33. Consideration of the principles which are to govern measures for making regulation and control of international arms transfers feasible must be based on the premise that weapons are instruments **of war** which are designed and produced to kill and destroy, and hence their use is a violation **of** the right **of** every human being to life itself, in the following sense:

(a) Arms transfers prevent the full enjoyment of the right of every human being to the basic necessities and to a decent life;

(b) Arms transfers distort the right of every human being to all-round development;

(c) Arms transfers impinge on the right of peoples to self-determination;

(d) There also exists the fundamental principle of State responsibility under international law, a responsibility which is a corollary to the well-protected right to sovereignty. Every State has a duty to respect international norms within

its own boundaries. (Therefore, no State ~~may~~ participate in or *ignore* breaches of such norms, or disregard its responsibility);

(e) International **arms** transfers play a preponderant role in the basic problem of security facing many countries. One such problem is protecting their economic, political and social development **from** both internal and external threats - **from** the threats inherent in the process of national construction and from those originating at the international level, where the use of force and intimidation continue to be part of the diplomacy of force, especially by nations which wield economic, technological and **military** power.

34. Measures to counteract the problems inherent in international **arms** transfers **must** be considered in the broader context of international security, which includes the peaceful solution of regional conflicts, negotiations **for** nuclear disarmament, **strict** interpretation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adoption **of** the Convention on Chemical Weapons, negotiations to reduce the level of conventional weapons and, above all, respect for the international norms embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

35. An examination of measures to deal with the problem of international arms transfers must take into account the following⁸

(a) The measures must contribute to the process of conventional disarmament, to a reduction in threats to security - both military and non-military - to confidence-building and, in particular, to a reversal of the trend which makes **arms** transfers an instrument of violence and a lucrative business)

(b) Because **of** the particularly harmful characteristics of the illicit trade in **arms**, **measures** to eliminate it and the human rights violations it brings with it deserve attention on a priority **basis**;

(c) The production and supply of and trade in weapons of **mass** destruction and their launching **systems**, and the transfer of such technology, must be banned as a first step **in** their total **elimination**;

(d) The **arms** trade, while it is one of the world's **most** lucrative businesses, goes far beyond the realm of trade. Therefore, its serious implications *for* world, regional and **national** politics must be assessed in addition to its effects on international trade relations)

(**e**) Consideration must be given to how **arms** transfers affect relations between the civilian and military sectors in general and **relations** between the Government and the armed **forces** in particular]

(f) **Arms** transfers create interdependences between suppliers and recipients which impair the autonomy of efforts to reduce arms levels and the freedom of action of parties to a conflict seeking to resolve their controversies peacefully. Therefore, the circumstances of such interdependences and their impact on potential measures to regulate and control **arms** transfers must be examined)

(g) The transfer of **arms**, whether they are supplied through sales, donations, exchange or the whole **range** of transactions - legal or illegal - in which Governments and military industries, agents or intermediaries participate, involves both suppliers and recipients. Regulation and control of **arms** transfers necessarily entail taking into account the role played by all those involved in such transactions;

(h) In order to control arms transfers and, in particular, to prevent illicit trafficking, countries will have to adopt strict regulations, or strengthen existing ones, concerning the production, supply, acquisition and transport of **arms** and military equipment;

(i) States must examine ways and means of refraining from acquiring **arms** additional to those needed for legitimate security requirements. The forum provided by regional mechanisms might facilitate agreements to this end;

(j) In seeking ways of ensuring **greater** openness and transparency and confidence-building with regard to world-wide **arms** transfers, procedures must be elaborated for obtaining the necessary information on military expenditures, the production of **arms** and military equipment and all **arms** transactions, including those involving dual-purpose equipment. This information should be supplemented by a register of end-use declarations, which should be a requirement in any transaction.

36. In deciding on the principles and norms to govern international arms transfers, **Member** States should also decide on sanctions to be applied to States which violate **them**. One such sanction might be payment into a United Nations fund for disarmament and development, by the supplier country or countries, of the value of arms captured in an illicit transaction. Colombia believes that there should exist an institution which would in addition keep files on claims concerning illicit transfers **of arms** seized in cases where illegality has been proved.

37. The group **of** experts which will carry out its work under United Nations auspices in accordance with General Assembly resolution **43/75** I should recommend a programme of action and a timetable for its phased implementation by Member States.

ECUADOR

[Original: Spanish]

[12 June 1989]

1. Ecuador, a country which has a pacifist tradition, is of practically no importance in the world **arms** market and has a transparent policy on the **matter**, strongly agrees that international **arms** transfers in all their aspects should be continuously examined by the international community in all multilateral disarmament forums. It further supports the conduct of those **specialized** studies which such **forums** decide to carry out with a view to updating information on the subject and its true implications, in order to provide a clearer vision of the mechanisms required for the effective control and monitoring of such arms transfers.

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2. In this connection, moreover, support must be given to the implementation of unilateral, bilateral and regional initiatives designed to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, in support of and in conformity with multilateral initiatives.

3. Among the mechanisms which the international community might adopt in order to improve the control of international arms transfers, the possibility of establishing a register of such transfers should not be discounted. This suggestion has already been put forward by other countries in the interest of obtaining reliable, up-to-date knowledge of these transfers. It will call for the firm participation of arms suppliers and recipients, whose support of this initiative for peace and international security must be given priority over other matters of unilateral interest.

4. Ecuador further believes that treatment of this subject by the international community must be considered not only as an inescapable moral duty, but also - in the light of the critical economic situation currently facing the world - as a necessity. The international community must not turn its back on the fact that most international arms transfers are made to developing countries. Under pressure because of internal or bilateral conflicts, these countries find themselves devoting huge sums to building up their arsenals, beyond acceptable limits, instead of using their resources to obtain the productive assets which the logic of social and economic development would dictate.

5. Similarly, it must be taken into account that arms in huge quantities are most commonly shipped to areas of conflict in various parts of the world, thereby increasing the potential risk to international peace and security. As a result, these conflicts are aggravated, to the detriment not only of the parties involved, but also of the other countries in the conflict area and, in many instances, of the international arms suppliers themselves.

6. The declining demand in the international arms market since 1980 - linked chiefly to the world-wide economic recession, external debt and the drop in oil prices - must not serve as a justification, year after year, for deferring consideration of a subject so vital to the international community. It is important that the United Nations initiate serious negotiations at the earliest possible date with a view to achieving the goal desired by the vast majority of nations in this matter.

FINLAND

[Original: English]

[17 July 1989]

1. The production, import, trade, procurement and possession of firearms and ammunition in Finland is allowed only with a permission granted for that purpose.

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2. Finland does not acquire arms material beyond her own national security requirements. The defence industries existing in Finland have been established in order to provide the necessary material for the Finnish defence forces.

3. The Finnish Government maintains strict control over export of arms. All exports require a permission granted by the Government, (If the exported material only includes samples or small quantities, the export licence may be granted by the Ministry of Defence. For firearms and ammunition which are not regarded as war material the export licence is granted by the Ministry of the Interior.)

4. Export licence cannot be granted if national regulations, based on binding resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, prohibit arms export to a certain country.

5. In cases where such regulations apply, Finland follows the principle according to which exports to States at war or involved in a military conflict or to areas where there is a serious and obvious risk of armed conflict or to régimes with serious human rights violations are not permitted.

6. The exporter is required, with certain exceptions, to produce an end-user certificate, issued by the competent authorities of the recipient country, stating that the material in question will not be re-exported. As an additional means of control, the Finnish authorities require, within a month after the date of export, a document, issued by the customs authorities of the recipient country, confirming that the material in question has been imported into that country.

7. In the light of the above, the Government of Finland considers that the matters dealt with in General Assembly resolution 43/75 I have been duly taken into account as far as arms exports of Finland are concerned.

8. With the aim of further promoting international co-operation for limiting arms transfers and thus strengthening international peace and security the Government of Finland would like to propose the following:

(a) With reference to paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 (b) of the said resolution, the Government of Finland would consider it useful that a study be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations on the effects of international arms transfers. Such a study could provide the basis for further international action in this field;

(b) As regards paragraph 1 (c), the Government of Finland proposes that the Secretary-General be informed of all arms transfers in the Member States. The Secretary-General should be provided with information on the quantity and quality of the exported material, its value and the recipient countries. This information could be collected and published annually by the United Nations. National legislation concerning arms transfers in each country should also be made public. Further, it should be considered whether a reporting arrangement should cover the transfers of technology necessary for arms production;

(c) With reference to paragraph 2 (b), Finland considers that the United Nations should encourage its Member States to refrain from arms transfers to conflict areas and to countries at war;

(d) With **reference to** paragraph 2 (a), Finland would like to note *that* an **arrangement** for **reporting** and publishing information **envisaged** under paragraph 1 (c) would also serve the purposes of openness and **transparency**.

FRANCE

(on behalf of the Twelve States members of the European Community)

[Original: English]

[24 July 1989]

1. During the past **20 years** the **need** for increased restraint and greater transparency *in* the field of international **arms transfers** has been repeatedly invoked by a growing number of States in the context of **the** debate on disarmament. Proposals have been introduced in the **General Assembly** at various times on **this issue**. It has also been addressed in the Final **Document** of the Tenth Special Session, the **first** special **session** of the **Assembly** devoted to disarmament,
2. The Twelve believe that an **increased** restraint in **the field** of **arms transfers** by all members of the international community is also a factor towards **promoting** international **security** and peace at a **lower level** of **armaments**.
3. The search for greater **transparenc**" and **openness** in **this**, as in all military matters, would also help to generate confidence and remove **misperceptions**, thus easing international and regional tensions and thereby contributing to the promotion of disarmament and **arms control**.
4. The **Twelve** consider that the issue of international **arms transfers** and their political, economic and security implications call for **the** greatest attention of **the** international community.
5. Against this background, the **Twelve** have contributed to the adoption at the forty-third session of the **General Assembly** of resolution **43/75 I**, co-sponsored, among **others**, by five members of the Twelve. In adopting that resolution the Assembly underscored the need for **Member States** to examine the **means** to promote **more** restraint, openness and transparency in the field of international **arms transfers**, in line with the constant endeavour of the Twelve,
6. The **Twelve** also consider it important that **the** Disarmament Commission at its 1989 substantive *session*, in **accordance** with Assembly resolution **43/75 I**, held a discussion *on* the issue of international **arms transfers** in **the course** of its deliberations on conventional disarmament,
7. The **Twelve** have **welcomed** the fact that the Secretary-General, in pursuance of the above-mentioned **resolution**, has been **requested to carry out**, with the assistance of governmental experts, a study on **ways and means** of promoting transparency in international **transfers** of conventional **arms** on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, also taking into consideration the **views of Member States** as well as **other relevant** information, including that on the problem of illicit **arms trade**.

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8. It ~~is~~ the view-of the Twelve that the question of international **arms** transfers should be pursued on the ~~basis~~ of a gradual approach, aimed first of all at identifying and alarifying its implications and its dimension.

9. The Twelve are **convinced** that *new* and imaginative efforts also in the field of **arms** trade *are* required if the level of **conventional** *armaments* is to be lowered throughout the world. Restraint in **arms** trade and refraining from acquiring **arms** additional to those **needed** for legitimate national security requirements could **contribute** towards **achieving** this goal,

10. At the same ~~time~~ the Twelve wish to point out that the submission of **views** and **proposals** to the **Secretary-General** and the forthocming study on ways and means of promoting **transparency** in international transfers of **conventional arms** are in no way **meant** to limit the inherent right of any Stat8 to **self-defence** and to **protect** its own security, in conformity with **Article 51** of the Charter of the United Nations.

11. **An** increasing restraint of a universal and non-discriminatory character **might** **prove** acceptable to both producing and recipient **countries** and **would** certainly help to expand international confidence.

12. In addition, **Governments** that are the main suppliers and buyers of armaments should consult on how to strengthen their co-operation with the aim of constraining international illicit trade in **conventional armaments** and of identifying possible **measures** to halt it,

13. The Twelve are confident that along these lines and on the basis of **General** Assembly resolution **43/75 I**, it will **prove** possible to promote *greater* restraint **together** with openness and transparency in international arms transfers on a universal and non-dieariminatory basis. Furthermore, it **is expected** that in the framework of **the** implementation of the resolution a new pattern of behaviour as regards international **arms** transfers **may emerge** and, thus, greatly **benefit** world peace and stability.

NORWAY

[Oriqinalr English]

[13 July 1989]

1. The adoption of **resolution 43/75 I** entitled "International **arms transfer**" at the forty-third session of the **General** Assembly is an expression of the world community's concern about the increasing scope of **arms** exports. The resolution outlines **some** of the **most** significant problems associated with international **arms** transfers and, it is to be hoped, marks a new beginning for United Nations involvement in this area. The planned study will **provide** a good basis for **further** efforts.

2. Future measures limiting international arms transfers should be designed with greater openness and transparency in order to facilitate a better international control. In many ways the international community is in the process of reshaping its ideas as far as international arms transfers are concerned. Issues relating to arms trade policies are now being discussed in many countries. In several cases remedial action is being taken to hinder clandestine trade and strengthen national control of arms exports.

3. Nations have a legitimate need for arms to protect their national security. A major objective should therefore be to limit the acquisition of arms extending beyond legitimate national security requirements. The issue of international arms transfers concerns all the nations of the world, developed and developing alike. Third world countries are also heavily engaged in trade in arms. This places a heavy burden on fragile economies and diverts resources from development objectives.

4. Arms acquisitions are normally the responsibility of a country's Government. Government responsibility regarding both the export and the import of arms must be strengthened in order to gain better insight into and control of international arms transfers. Exporting countries should consider whether or not they have a sufficiently developed system of export control. The introduction of analyses on the impact of arms could be another means of restricting arms trade to a necessary minimum.

5. In recent years, Norway has significantly strengthened its export control régime regarding arms transfers, including services and technology. Control of arms transfers by Norway aims, in particular, at preventing export to countries at war or threatened by war, or where civil war is in progress, or to countries where serious violations of human rights are taking place. In practice an even stricter policy is followed. Norway primarily exports arms to allied countries and to other closely aligned nations, including neutral countries in the Nordic area and in Western Europe.

6. Arms exports should also be considered in relation to the reliability of the export control legislation of the importing countries. Norway is concerned with preventing unwanted re-export, whether this concerns goods produced in Norway or the sublicensing of Norwegian technology. In the light of this, it is generally required that the end-user is a Government or acts on behalf of one.

POLAND

[Original: English]

[25 July 1989]

1. The Government of Poland invariably supports the efforts of the United Nations in the sphere of further reduction of uncontrolled arms sales and United Nations activities to render the debate on this issue more open,

2. Poland notices a coherent relationship between the problems of arms trade and weapons production. Therefore, Poland supports every activity which halts the

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expensive arms race and tends towards reducing its negative impact on the economies of States, particularly those of developing countries,

3. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, including Poland, have in the past often declared themselves in favour of a reduction in the levels of armaments and arms sales and against the transfer of armaments to conflict areas. Poland would be ready to participate in possible negotiations on the matter on a regional, for example European, scale.

4. It should also be emphasised that the amount of arms that Poland purchases has always been determined by rational requirements of defence adequate to the real threat present at different times of its recent history.

5. Poland attaches great importance to effective limitations on the international trade of components used for the production of armaments. In this area, Polish regulations impose, inter alia, restrictions on dual-purpose chemicals, which could be used directly or indirectly for chemical weapons purposes.

6. The Government of Poland declares its full readiness to continue its support for the efforts of the United Nations to eliminate threats resulting from international arms transfers, while simultaneously taking note of the complexity and sensitiveness of this issue, especially as regards the establishment of effective control or settlement of such a dangerous phenomenon, which has for many years poisoned international relations and destabilised the delicate texture of peace and world security,
