



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/44/396
18 July 1989
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

Forty-fourth session
Item 63 (f) of the preliminary list*

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Objective information on military matters

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/44/50/Rev.1.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 7 December 1988, the General Assembly adopted resolution 43/75 G, entitled "Objective information on military matters", the relevant paragraphs of which read as follows :

"The General Assembly,

"...

"3. Recommends that those States and global, regional and subregional organizations which have already expressed support for the principle of practical and concrete confidence-building measures of a military nature on a global, regional or subregional level should intensify their efforts with a view to adopting such measures;

"4. Recommends also that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should implement the international system for the standardised reporting of military expenditures, with the aim of achieving a realistic comparison of military budgets, facilitating the availability of objective information on, as well as objective assessment of, military capabilities and contributing to the process of disarmament;

"5. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General before 30 April 1989 measures they have adopted towards these ends, for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

"6. Also invites all Member States also to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on ways and means of further consolidating the emerging trend towards greater openness in military matters, specifically with regard to the provisions of objective information on military matters, for consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its 1990 session;

"7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled 'Objective information on military matters'."

2. Pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution, the Secretary-General in a note verbale dated 3 February 1989 invited all Member States to inform him of measures they had adopted in application of the above-mentioned resolution as well as their views on that matter. To date replies have been received from the following countries : Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France (on behalf of the Twelve States members of the European Community), German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These are reproduced in section II below. Other replies will be published as addenda to the present report.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[10 May 1989]

1. The **Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic** is of the opinion that, in *today's world, security must* increasingly be guaranteed by non-military means. The stockpiling of weapons as a security measure must be replaced by a **strengthening of confidence, providing an opportunity to reduce the level of military confrontation**. Confidence must be translated into mounting mutual openness and **glasnost** in military affairs and *lower* levels of troops and weapons.

2. The consolidation of the current trend towards openness will mean greater predictability in military affairs, a closing of the gap between imagined threats and the actual correlation of military potentials, and will *provide* an objective starting-point from which to **reach** agreement on radical measures to limit and reduce **weapons** to no more than reasonable levels for defence. Openness should also facilitate the **objective definition and verification** of such levels.

3. **Positive** trends in the international situation as a whole and the field of disarmament *in particular* make it both possible and essential to transform openness in military affairs into a universally accepted norm which **must** extend to all components of military potentials without exception.

4. At present, it is important to ensure that openness moves from the realm of intention *into* the realm of practical action. To that end, the USSR and other States of the socialist fraternity are taking significant steps. Unfortunately, a **number** of their proposals, including calls for exchanges of information on chemical and conventional weapons, have **yet** to receive a positive and practical response from those to whom they were addressed. Nevertheless, *since* the adoption of General Assembly resolution 43/75 G, the USSR and *its* allies have taken further significant steps towards **openness**.

5. Thus, the January 1989 statement by the Committee of the Ministers of Defence of the Warsaw Treaty member States **gave** the first official detailed information on the military potential of the State; parties to the Warsaw Treaty. It would be useful if the *provision* of such information on a reciprocal and regular basis became common practice.

6. A thoroughgoing analysis of the true correlation of Warsaw Treaty and NATO forces formed the basis of far-reaching proposals for step-by-step reductions in **armed** forces and armaments in Europe, put forward at the Vienna talks by the Warsaw Treaty States. The nature of the reductions should result in the formation of purely defensive military structures in Europe.

7. It is also important to work out a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures, which would permit further agreement on measures to

ensure greater openness and predictability in the military field, on exchanges of information, and on verification.

8. In the European context, in addition to regular exchanges of information on armed forces, including forces based around the periphery of Europe and their activities, such measures would include: exchanges of information on the structure and content of military budgets] agreements not to increase armed forces or to establish new military bases in foreign countries; the establishment of observer posts at agreed locations in the zone of application of the confidence- and security-building measures; the establishment of special operational communication links among interested countries) improved conditions for inspections and greater scope for the use of observers; use of the latest technical means of verification; establishment of a centre to reduce the risk of war and prevent surprise attacks in Europe; and the development of contacts between political and military representatives, in particular meetings of ministers of defence and the commanders-in-chief of the military alliances to discuss urgent issues.

9. The major unilateral reduction in troops and weapons which the USSR is making in a move to reorganize its armed forces along purely defensive lines will be carried out openly, in the presence of foreign representatives where appropriate. The same conditions will apply to the planned withdrawal of some Soviet troops and military hardware from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia.

10. A major step towards openness was taken during the visit of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. M. S. Gorbachev, to the United Kingdom in April 1989. For the first time, the USSR released information on the strength and composition of its armed forces.

11. Steps are also being taken to extend openness to other categories of weapons. The USSR has proposed a multilateral exchange of information in order to speed up agreement on a convention to prohibit chemical weapons, and invites foreign representatives to visit a number of important chemical-weapons installations.

12. A major element in the development of greater openness has been the harmonised procedures for the submission of information under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The Byelorussian SSR is involved in the submission of such information.

13. The Soviet Union has declared that it will soon publish information on its defence budget. At the Berlin session of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in April 1989, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in the interest of further enhancing glasnost in the military field, advocated the continuation of efforts to elaborate criteria for a comparison of military budgets, making use of the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditure as adopted by the United Nations.

14. Parallel with unilateral, bilateral and regional efforts to bring about openness and exchange objective information on military matters, the United Nations can play an important role *in* developing openness as a means of building confidence among States, contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. This would be in keeping with the emerging trend to assign the Organization a greater role in the disarmament process. A certain amount of preliminary work in this area is already being accumulated. In particular, the preparation and distribution by the Secretary-General and national groups of an *evaluation* of the impact on international security of the potential military applications of science and technology developments, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 43/77 A, will contribute to the enhancement of glasnost in this important area.
15. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 43/75 I, work is beginning on the study of ways and means of providing for more openness with regard to world-wide arms transfers. The establishment of an international register of transfers *can* play a significant role in this area. The Byelorussian SSR supports the establishment of such a *register*,
16. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 41/59 N and 42/38 C, one of the nuclear Powers - the USSR - is already providing the Secretary-General with data on the nuclear *explosions* which it conducts. It is regrettable that the other nuclear Powers have not yet ventured to display such openness.
17. States are increasingly adopting the practice of informing the United Nations about negotiations which they conduct outside the framework of the Organisation.
18. The establishment, under United Nations auspices, of an organ to arrange for effective international verification in the broad context of both disarmament and the prevention of military conflicts would give a significant impetus to greater openness in military affairs. The Byelorussian SSR hopes that ~~the~~ study undertaken in accordance with General Assembly resolution 43/81 B will contribute to progress in this field.
19. There is no doubt that a significant step *in* strengthening stability, predictability and the development of openness could be the establishment, in accordance with the Secretary-General's initiative, of a multilateral centre for reducing the danger of nuclear war.
20. In the opinion of the Byelorussian SSR, a more systemic approach to the question of openness in the military field - ~~for~~ example, by the formulation within the Organisation of objective criteria and parameters for openness to promote practical disarmament - would be consonant with the goals of strengthening and developing the role of the United Nations. The United Nations Disarmament Commission could deal with that issue at its 1990 session.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Original: English]

[20 April 1989]

1. The Caechoslovak Socialist Republic is *an active* advocate of reduction of military expenditures, proceeding on the **basis** of **the** fact that arms spending in the world is constantly increasing and stimulating the **arms race**, while constituting an immense financial burden for nations of all countries and thus slowing **down** their economic and social development. In 1973 the **Government** gave its consistent support to the proposal of the Soviet Union for a 10 per cent reduction *in* the military budgets of the **permanent** members of **the** Security Council and use of the **resources** thus released, *inter alia*, for purpose of assistance to developing countries.
2. **Czechoslovakia's** initiatives along **this** *line* found their reflection in the appeals of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty addressed to the States of the North Atlantic Treaty **Organization** from 1983 to 1988, particularly in the proposal to declare on the basis of reciprocity a one to two-year moratorium on increases in the military *spending* of both pacts.
3. At the present stage of historical development, given the awareness of the irrationality of a world war that can never become an instrument of the solution of disputes, Caechoslovakia, together with the other socialist countries, is paying the utmost attention to *the* actual reduction of military budgets. Along with dynamic development of international relations, **science** and technology, a *new* political thinking is asserting itself both in the sphere of limitation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and at the Vienna talks on conventional **disarmament** and on **confidence-** and security-building measures in Europe. **Most** of the Ministers of Foreign *Affairs* expressed in their statements at these talks the view that it is necessary to eliminate such military potentials and structures which enable the conduct of **offensive** operations and to build confidence in the military **sphere** at a qualitatively new level. Caechoslovakia welcomes the process of military **détente** and is taking an active part therein, as peaceful stability in Europe means greater security for Caechoslovakia, too.
4. The recent announcement of the Committee of the Defence Ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty entitled "**On** the comparative strength of armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Treaty **Organization** and the North Atlantic Treaty **Organization** in Europe and in the adjacent seas and oceans" is a significant joint contribution of the Warsaw Treaty **States** to greater openness in the **consideration** of issues relating to military-strategic balance, thus making it possible to assess the real balance of forces as well as the consequences of the cuts as they will make themselves felt in reduction of military spending.
5. The sincerity of the States parties to **the** Warsaw Treaty is best evidenced by the concrete measures adopted in 1988 and 1989 toward making unilateral reductions in their armed forces, armaments and military expenditures. Czechoslovakia has actively joined in these initiatives. The decision of the National Defence

Council, entitled "On reduction in the numbers of troops and armaments and on organisational changes in the Csechoslovak People's Army", which was published on 28 January 1989, has met with general approval and has been well received internationally. On its basis, the number of troops in combat units will be decreased by 12,000 and the number of tanks, armoured carriers and combat aircraft by 850, 165 and 51, respectively. Some 20,000 soldiers are being transferred to military construction units. Our defence expenditures are to be curtailed by 15 per cent. For Csechoslovakia, these are certainly not just token numbers. Other measures, too, are being taken to enhance the defence-oriented nature of our armed forces.

6. The above measures fit into the comprehensive foreign policy initiative of Csechoslovakia that was announced last year by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Miloš Jakeš. Its military component constitutes an essential pre-condition for building and consolidating mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations between neighbouring States - members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on one side and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the other. Csechoslovakia is taking measures aimed at the gradual implementation of this initiative, which envisages the establishment of a zone of confidence, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations along the line of contact between Warsaw Treaty and NATO States, thus according with the Soviet proposals declared by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, from the rostrum of the forty-third session of the General Assembly on 7 December 1988.

7. Csechoslovakia considers objectivity of information on military matters a most important, complex and at the same time also highly timely issue. The methodology underlying the international system of reporting of military expenditures as applied by the United Nations from 1980 is, in principle, acceptable for Csechoslovakia.

8. The Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty confirmed in the final communique from its latest session, which took place in Berlin on 11 and 12 April 1989, that the participants in the session have advocated, in the interest of further enhancement of public knowledge in the military sphere, continuation of the efforts at elaborating criteria for comparison of military budgets with use being made of the standardised international system of reporting of military expenditures which has been adopted in the United Nations.

FINLAND

[Original: English]

[26 April 1989]

1. The Government of Finland welcomes efforts aimed at greater openness in military matters and believes that openness contributes to increased confidence and security in international relations. Thus, in Finland's view, the flow of objective information on military matters should, whenever possible, be increased.

2. In this respect, Finland fully supports United Nations efforts, inter alia, by participating on an annual basis in the international system of standardised reporting of military expenditure. In Finland, military expenditures are published, in detail, as part of the state budget. In the past two years, Finland has also published a résumé of the plans concerning future activities and finances in the defence sector. It includes summaries of the plans of the Ministry of Defence, the defence forces and of the research institutes under the Ministry of Defence.

3. Finland regards the two sets of negotiations concerning military security, held within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as important new forums for enhancing greater openness and an improved flow of objective information on military matters. Finland welcomes both negotiations and will continue its active participation in the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe as well as in the information meetings of the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe.

FRANCE (on behalf of the Twelve States members of the European Community)

[Original: English]

[24 July 1989]

1. The Twelve States members of the European Community remain convinced that a better flow of information on military capabilities would help to relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional and subregional level. Such a flow is an important prerequisite for the conclusion of verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements. The need for a better flow of objective information on military capabilities is reflected in General Assembly resolution 43/75 G, among whose sponsors were members of the Twelve. Extensive, objective and publicly available information on these matters is provided consistently by members of the Twelve.

2. That resolution calls unequivocally upon all States to use the international system for the standardised reporting of military expenditures established through General Assembly resolution 35/142 B. This reporting matrix provides a universal framework whereby States with different social and economic systems can supply information about their military spending in a comparable and non-prejudicial form. It is an important first step towards greater openness and transparency in the military field. An increasing number of States have provided annual reports on military expenditures in conformity with the standardised reporting system. The Twelve, who have consistently provided the Secretary-General with the information requested in the questionnaire, continue to regret that not all States have produced such reports and call upon all States to do so and to make every effort to increase openness and transparency in military matters.

3. The Twelve wish again to reiterate the importance they attach to the application of the reporting system by the broadest possible number of States, from all regions and whatever their budgeting and accounting system,

4. In this context, the Twelve can take satisfaction from the way in which the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has been implemented since it came into force in January 1987. All participating States have taken seriously the obligations entered into; annual calendars of military activities have been exchanged as required, details of such activities notified and arrangements made for their observation where necessary. The agreements reached in Stockholm marked a significant *step* towards greater military transparency and the breaking down of barriers of mistrust between States.

5. The Twelve believe that the objective of the *present* negotiations on **confidence-building** in Vienna should be to build upon and *expend* the results of the notification and observation modalities, and the strengthening of the on-site **challenge** inspection provisions. The Twelve hope it will also be possible to agree on arrangements for the exchange of information on the size, composition, location and equipment holdings of the armed **forces** of the participating States, including exchange of information on major conventional weapons deployment programmes. The Twelve also welcome the prospect of a seminar to exchange views on military policy and doctrine. Such measures would greatly advance *the* cause of openness and predictability about military activities in Europe and add a new dimension to the process of confidence-building begun at Stockholm.

6. The Twelve States members of the European Community look forward to carrying forward work on this subject at the 1990 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. They expect work on this subject to be productive and are ready to participate actively in it.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

[Original: English]

[25 May 1989]

1. The Government of the German Democratic Republic favours greater openness in military matters. Openness must be viewed as a natural and indispensable rule in relations between States and as the basis of a concrete and verifiable disarmament *process*. It is an important means for reducing distrust and fears of threat, strengthening mutual **confidence** and promoting the disarmament *process*. The German Democratic Republic therefore considers it important to extend confidence-building measures in individual fields of military activity on the basis of reciprocity to all military activities that directly affect the security of individual States and/or coalitions of States,

2. In connection with the negotiations on the **reduction** and restructuring of armed *forces* and armaments down to levels of reasonable sufficiency of a purely defensive nature, transparency and improved information on military matters are a significant factor for ensuring confidence and predictability as well as verification of agreements reached and, consequently, for enhancing stability and security in a **bilateral**, regional and universal framework,

3. Jointly with the other Warsaw *Treaty* States the GDR undertook a **series** of far-reaching initiatives in these key areas, on which it **reported** fully to the United Nations,

4. The GDR **attaches** special importance to greater stability in Europe **and**, in this context, to cutbacks in armed forces and armaments.

5. The Statement by the Committee of the Ministers of Defence of the Warsaw Treaty States on the relative strength of the armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe and adjacent sea areas was published in January. It is striking proof of **the Warsaw Treaty States'** interest in **openness** and objective information on military matters, **The** document **provides** a *realistic* survey of the military potentials of both alliances in Europe. **Some 500** data relating to 26 categories of forces and armaments disclose both the overall strength of the two alliances and that of each of their national components. This complex and detailed comparison illustrates the actual correlation of forces **as** it has **grown over** the years. It shows that considering all **categories** of armed forces and armaments there is approximate military parity between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO **in** Europe. The Warsaw Treaty **States** have thus once **again** shown their readiness for a common serious analysis of the security situation of both alliances.

6. The disclosure of detailed information on the correlation of *forces* was motivated by the **desire.. reflected** in the principles underlying the Warsaw Treaty States' joint military **doctrine** as announced in Berlin in 1987, to do everything in order to facilitate, on a **realistic** basis, a start on conventional disarmament.

7. Like the USSR and other socialist States the GDR decided at the **beginning** of this year to make unilateral cuts in its armed forces, armaments and military budgets. Accordingly, the National People's Army of the GDR will be reduced by 10,000 **troops** by the end of 1990, **i.e.** some 6 per cent of its total strength. **Similarly**, spending on national defence will be cut by 10 **per cent**, six armoured **regiments** and one air force *wing* will be disbanded and 600 tanks and 50 fighter aircraft decommissioned. The tanks will either be converted to **economic use**, **i.e.** in open-cast lignite mining, forestry and transport, **or** they will be **scrapped**,

8. This unilateral step of the GDR illustrates that it is aware of the special responsibility it has at the sensitive dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It thus **also** takes account of what was agreed at the International **Conference** on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, **i.e.** that States should continue to assess their political and security requirements and the level of **their** military spending, taking into account the need to keep these expenditures at the lowest possible level.

9. The reductions being undertaken by the GDR are **part** of the implementation of the Warsaw Treaty States' joint military doctrine. They are tailored to make the defensive **character** of the National People's Army even more pronounced and to do better justice to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defence purposes. **For** instance, the motorized infantry units will no longer have armoured regiments. On balance, the armed forces of the GDR will in future have fewer tanks and fighter aircraft but more anti-tank and **anti-aircraft** means.

10. The Soviet Union will withdraw from the territory of the GDR four tank divisions, one air-assault brigade, five training regiments and 11 independent battalions. This move also covers 24 tactical missile launchers.

11. However, drastic steps in scaling down military confrontation, building confidence *and* enhancing security are possible only if the reduction of forces and armaments is governed by the principle of reciprocity. What is needed is a substantive contribution of NATO. Increased military expenditures and plans for a new turn of the arms spiral, including the design and deployment of new nuclear missiles in the immediate neighbourhood of the GDR, are a disservice to European security.

12. Today, hopes for more concrete results in the field of disarmament are pinned on the recently begun negotiations on conventional armed forces and on further confidence- and security-building measures in Europe. The negotiating concept tabled by the Warsaw Treaty States focuses on the need to redress existing imbalances on both sides and to make deep cuts in forces and armaments in Europe to a level considerably below those ceilings that will be reached by correcting the asymmetries. The objective is a state of affairs where the military alliances are only left with the capacity to defend themselves rather than to launch surprise attacks and large-scale offensive operations.

13. As regards confidence- and security-building measures, new ones should be agreed upon that effectively complement the Stockholm Document and include independent operations of air and naval forces while limiting military activities in Europe in terms of scope, number, nature and area. Corresponding proposals were put forward by the GDR together with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Vienna early in March of this year during the negotiations on security- and confidence-building measures among CSCE States,

14. Finally, the GDR seeks to encourage mutual information and verification as elements of trust, predictability and the monitoring of compliance with obligations assumed.

15. It attaches special importance to the central European area and is strongly in favour of the creation in central Europe of both a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and a chemical-weapon-free zone as well as a reduction of those conventional armaments which are capable of offensive operations, because this would lessen the danger of military confrontation and give all of Europe greater stability.

16. The German Democratic Republic fully meets its obligations concerning the implementation of confidence-building or verification measures. In 1988, it received 117 observers from 27 CSCE participating States at three manoeuvres and, for its part, sent 30 observers to 15 military exercises. Furthermore, it agreed in 1988 to have on the territory of the GDR two inspections, which were requested by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States on the basis of the verification provisions contained in the Stockholm Document. Both inspections confirmed compliance with the obligations assumed.

17. As provided for in the **Stockholm Document**, an annual survey in **1988** of the notifiable military **activities** scheduled to take place on **GDR** territory in 1989 was submitted to all **CSCE** participating States within the period stipulated,

18. A move that furthered the implementation of **the INF Treaty** was the early withdrawal of Soviet **shorter-range** missiles from **GDR** territory. In compliance with its obligations under *the Treaty* **the GDR** took care that the United States was able to carry out eight inspections on **GDR** territory in an orderly fashion,

19. Openness, confidence-building and verification are matters of great importance for the prohibition of **chemical weapons, armaments in space and nuclear-weapon tests**. The **GDR** takes account of this fact through its participation in the corresponding activities of the **Geneva Conference on Disarmament**.

20. At the present stage, special importance is attached to confidence-building measures designed to facilitate the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons. The **GDR** is among the more than 50 States that have declared that they do **not** possess chemical weapons. The cessation of the production of such weapons and the start of their destruction would have a **very favourable impact on the atmosphere at these negotiations**. The **GDR** commends what the **USSR** has done in this area. By contrast, the development of **new chemical weaponry** such as binary weapons is detrimental to an early ban on these means of mass destruction and encourages their further proliferation,

21. **The GDR** has come out in favour of an exchange of data relevant for a convention on chemical weapons and, in **September 1988**, submitted corresponding national data. In **October 1988**, a national trial inspection was performed at the pharmaceutical plant "**Arzneimittelwerk Dresden**" to test verification provisions worked out to this day in **Geneva**. The **GDR** also stated its **readiness** to have an **international** trial inspection,

22. The **GDR** believes that on balance such steps are apt to move the negotiations forward and to ensure that the future convention will take better account of practical requirements and can be put into practice expeditiously.

23. As regards a nuclear-test ban the **GDR** welcomes those activities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America which are designed to improve the exchange of information on matters relating to such tests. It supported **General Assembly resolution 42/38 C**, in which the Assembly called for the transmission of data on nuclear explosions. However, such activities must not be an end in themselves. Rather, they must pave the way to the early implementation of a complete test ban. The **Geneva Conference on Disarmament** could make a major contribution to this end, as a first step by working out a comprehensive verification system,

24. Also as regards the prevention of an arms race in outer space progress in that respect would be encouraged through more openness in matters of outer space and through the setting up of an international inspectorate.

25. It appears **necessary**, as a general rule, to **devote** greater attention to the qualitative aspects of the **arms race**. Therefore, in accordance with **General Assembly resolution 43/77 A**, the GDR considers **it** imperative **for States** and for the United Nations to **assess** the potential impact of future developments in science and **technology** on international security. This should lead to preventive action to ensure **that science** and technology do not **serve** the **arms race** but rather disarmament and social and economic development.

26. The International **Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development** advocated **openness** with regard to military spending and its reduction. Special importance is attached in this connection to the activities undertaken in the framework of the United Nations concerning the reporting on military budgets and the elaboration of principles to govern their reduction,

27. At the recent **Berlin** session of the Foreign Ministers' committee of the Warsaw Treaty **States** the QDR, like the other States Parties to the **Warsaw Treaty**, advocated the **continuation** of efforts to elaborate criteria for a comparison of military budgets, making use of the international system for the standardised reporting of military expenditure as adopted by the United **Nations**.

HUNGARY

[Original : English]

[30 April 1989]

1. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic continues to attach paramount importance to the supply and flow of objective military information **as** well as to its role in promoting confidence and disarmament. Guided by this spirit, **it** voted last **year** in favour of **General Assembly resolution 43/75 G**, and once again takes the opportunity to set out its **views** on the subject.

2. While the danger of military confrontation has been reduced by political **détente** in the wake of favourable changes in international relations, one cannot yet speak of comparable military **détente**. Nevertheless, developments in recent years such as the announcement of unilateral disarmament measures by States **members of the Warsaw Treaty**, the successful outcome of the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons, the conclusion of the Vienna follow-up meeting and the subsequent **start** of new European talks **on** conventional disarmament and on confidence- and security-building measures hold out the hope of a more relaxed military atmosphere **emerging** in the foreseeable future.

3. It is a strange contradiction of our time that in the era of an informational revolution, international access to and the exchange and flow of information are far from being revolutionary, and it is particularly true as regards military information. A reason for this lies in the fact that inter-state relations **were** overburdened by **ideological** considerations during the past decades, while the interdependence or mutual dependence of countries with different social systems was an objective reality. The elimination of this unwholesome relationship requires,

among other things, that military openness be treated as a **natural and immanent norm** of inter-State **relations**, as a means **and a basis of a real and verifiable** disarmament **process**. Hope for this is afforded by the *fact that* today hardly any State denies the indispensable role played by the **multilateral** flow of objective military information in strengthening **confidence** and security or in the **verification of compliance** with disarmament **agreements**.

4. The publication by **the States members of the Warsaw Treaty** of data on their armed forces has given evidence of the new **political thinking**. That step was guided by an intention *to demonstrate*, by a complex **presentation** of military *forces in Europe*, their commitment to **increasing military openness** and enhancing *confidence*.

5. The Hungarian **Government** is seeking to promote the cause of military openness, as is **evidenced** by the fact that its **representative**, in his **statement in the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly** last November, came out in favour of **releasing data** on armaments and armed **forces**, military **budgets**, and the main **characteristics of the** internal structures and the operation of the two systems of alliance, **Acting in that Spirit**, Hungary is taking steps to join in the United Nations international system for the standardised reporting of military expenditure and to publish the principal figures of its **defence** budget,

6. Last fall, the military manoeuvre of allied **forces** that took place in the territory of Hungary in the presence of numerous foreign military observers in conformity with the Stockholm agreement did a good service to the cause of military openness as well as to that of confidence-building, the objective of that agreement. The presence of foreign military **experts** provided a good opportunity for mutual **communication**. Also, its **usefulness** and the need for more frequent meetings were spelled out last summer at the **Budapest** round-table conference, where high-ranking diplomats, representatives of the military and prominent figures of **scientific** life exchanged views on questions of conventional disarmament. Such developments of military diplomacy can also make a contribution to a gradual elimination of the atmosphere of distrust,

7. The Government of Hungary, which declared last year the country's chemical **weapon-free** status, accords priority to the complete prohibition of this type of weapons and to the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons under international control. **Accordingly**, its **representatives** have taken an active part in drafting a relevant convention at the **Geneva Conference on Disarmament**. As part of that effort, *Hungary* has also held a "national trial inspection" to study problems of verification. Publication of the **experience** gained, together with other "**national trial inspection**" experiences, can become a major source of confidence-building and thus contribute to an early elaboration of a **comprehensive** agreement on chemical weapons.

8. Military **openness** and confidence-building are similarly **promoted** by the announcement that Hungary stands ready to receive foreign **observers** to inspect the unilateral reduction of Hungarian **armed** forces and the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops.

9. The Hungarian Government does not regard these steps as an end to the process, but believes that States should exert further efforts, within national and international frameworks, to widen the scope of military openness.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[6 April 1989]

1. The Soviet Union regards greater openness in the military sphere as a potent factor in the strengthening of universal security, the importance of which is growing immeasurably during the shift to true disarmament that is now under way. The abolition of unnecessary secrecy should increase the degree of predictability in international affairs, reducing and ultimately eliminating the probability of misinterpreting States' actions and intentions, and thereby enhancing trust between them. By revealing the true correlation of forces, glasnost on the subject of military potential paves the way for agreement on radical measures to limit and reduce armaments, and substantially increases opportunities to give effect to the principle of rational sufficiency for defence.
2. On the basis of such an understanding of the role of objective information on military questions, the Soviet Union believes it essential to try to make openness in this area a norm of international life extending to every aspect of States' military potential, as called for in resolution 43/75 G. It is, for its part, prepared to lend every assistance in the attainment of this goal.
3. The USSR is at present working steadily towards the creation of a firm legal foundation for the policy of glasnost in both its domestic and international affairs. Constitutional enabling machinery for the formulation and adoption of strategic foreign policy decisions is being developed. It assumes a democratic procedure for selecting the best course, applied by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in full accordance with the will of the people as expressed by similar democratic means in conditions of complete glasnost.
4. Such matters as military budgets, the use of forces beyond the country's borders and new military construction will also be subject to constitutional and legal review.
5. The Soviet Union intends to do more to promote greater openness internationally, to consolidate the transition to a business-like, factual discussion of the practical aspects of this question in the interests of furthering the disarmament process. This has been the aim of a series of new steps it has taken recently.
6. The statement issued by the Committee of the Ministers of Defence of the Warsaw Treaty member States in January 1989 provided the first official detailed information on the military potential of each of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, including the military potential of the USSR in Europe, and a thorough

discussion of the real **correlation** between Warsaw Pact and NATO troop numbers and weapons in Europe and the surrounding waters,

7. The Soviet approach to the problem of revealing imbalances and asymmetries is that **the objective truth must be visible**. *Knowledge* of how matters really stand is vital to the success of the talks on conventional forces in Europe. At the same time, **it** is important to avoid a fruitless argument about numbers which may rest on different approaches to the evaluation of the **correspondence** of forces. The talks should give priority to the creation in Europe of the kind of military structures that would be able to cope with **inherently defensive** assignments,

8. In accordance with this approach, the USSR and its allies have put forward proposal⁸ in Vienna Calling for a **three-stage** reduction in **forces** in Europe to a level sufficient only for defence. During **the first stage**, imbalances and asymmetries both in numbers of troops and in principal weapons would be eliminated. The States **parties** to the negotiations would bring **their** conventional **forces** and weapons down to equal collective **ceilings**¹⁰ to 15 per cent below current Warsaw Pact and NATO levels. Definitions would be worked out for each **weapon⁶ category**, including a list of the specific **systems** belonging within them, as would Counting **rules** for a **standardized** exchange of information. Such information could be submitted in respect of each individual State party, including details of troops in the territory of any other State party in the **zone** covered by the agreements. The information submitted could be subject to **either** general or **selective** verification,

9. The USSR and its allies are in favour of *agreeing, in the context of a new generation* of steps to build confidence and security, *on* moves to increase openness and the predictability of military activities, **exchanges** of information, and monitoring and verification **measures**. Specifically, the following might be considered:

1. Regular (not less *than once per year*) exchanges of information including data on the **number, structure and disposition** of land, naval and air forces, **giving** detail down to the brigade/regiment or equivalent level (air regiment/squadron, naval subdivision or operational group).

2. The submission as a goodwill gesture of additional information on force components and military events not covered by agreed confidence-building and security measures.

3. Periodic discussion and comparison in a variety of **forums** (*conferences, symposiums and seminars*) of *the* political, military and technical aspects of military doctrines and **other** matters relating to States parties' military policy and military-cum-political alliances.

4. Expanding and rounding out the practice of reciprocal visits by military delegations and individual military representatives and exchanges of military personnel, including military diplomatic representatives of the States parties.

5. Bilateral and multilateral consultations, held **regularly** (or at the request of any State party) on problems *that can be dealt with in the context of the objectives and purposes of the talks on confidence-building and security measures.*

6. Use of the latest technical facilities for **automatic (remote) monitoring** (automatic **recording systems**) to verify compliance with the confidence-building and security measures adopted.

7. The **establishment** of a centre to reduce the military **risks** and prevent surprise attacks in **Europe**; this could be of *an* informational and consultative character.

8. The **establishment** of a special communications system to help clarify situations giving rise to doubts or fears *on either side.*

10. **The USSR** has provided detailed information *on its unilateral reductions in the Soviet Armed Forces and its regrouping of Soviet forces in the territory of the European allies along exclusively defensive lines.* *An* timetables for the withdrawal of Soviet **troops** and military technology are agreed with the **German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia** and Hungary, they will be brought to the attention of the international public at large. The unilateral reductions will also **affect** the Soviet military budget and output of **weapons** and military technology, **amounting**, respectively, to 14.2 per cent and 19.5 per cent.

11. **The** cuts in Soviet **troops** and armaments will take place in an atmosphere of **glasnost and openness**. This implies the presence of foreign representatives, including representatives of the mass media, **at related events.**

12. In the near future, information on the Soviet Union's defensive potential will be supplemented by information on its armed forces and armaments in the **Far East**. Extensive **glasnost** will also be the setting for the forthcoming 75 per cent cut in Soviet forces in Mongolia, and the winding up of the Soviet air group deployed there. It has already been announced that, by agreement **between the Governments of the USSR and Mongolia**, three full divisions, including two tank divisions, two air divisions and a number of **individual units** will be withdrawn from Mongolia to the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1990. **Of these, one** tank division and a **number** of individual air and other units will be withdrawn **between** May and August 1989.

13. In the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons, **the Soviet Union** favours an exchange of data in order to hasten agreement on a convention. **It** is prepared to act on the basis of **complete** reciprocity, going to unprecedented lengths of openness and abandoning the secrecy of the past. Its approach to these subjects was presented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. **E. A. Shevardnadze**, at the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons (January 1989).

14. Among other things, visits to sites to be covered by the future Convention will make for better-informed participants in the talks. The Soviet Union plans to invite **participants** to a factory producing key precursor substances in the town of

Dzerzhinsk for an international test **inspection** and to a chemical-weapon destruction facility in the **Chapaevsk** district, and to hold a seminar for pooling experience in the destruction of chemical weapons,

15. **Recognizing** the important role played by the United Nations in promoting the reduction of military budgets, the USSR will, at a time it will announce, when conditions are right for a realistic comparison of military budgets, begin to use the standardised United Nations reporting system for information on its military expenditure. It affirms its willingness to take part in current United Nations efforts to study systematically a variety of problems relating to the formulation, presentation and comparison of military budgets,

16. The USSR is also open to constructive international dialogue on how to ensure greater openness about arms sales and transfers. It voted in favour of resolution 43/75 I, "International arms transfers", which, inter alia, calls for the Secretary-General to carry out under United Nations auspices, with the assistance of governmental experts, a study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of arms, believing that this might constitute a first step towards agreed limitations on and reductions in such transfers.

17. The Soviet Union attaches exceptional importance to the role of the United Nations in disarmament, and believes that the Organisation has a tangible contribution to make in bringing about greater openness in military matters. Accordingly, it will continue to encourage multilateral discussion of this topic at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the 1990 session of the Disarmament Commission, and elsewhere.
