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GENERAL ASSEMBLY

**Forty-first session**

Agenda items **21, 47, 54, 55, 60,**

62, 68, 126 and 141

INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF PEACE

CESSATION **OF** ALL NUCLEAR-TEST EXPLOSIONS

PREVENTION OF AN **ARMS** RACE IN OUTER SPACE

**IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

RESOLUTION **40/88** ON THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION

AND PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS

GENERAL AND COMPLETE **DISARMMENT**

**REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE**

RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY

**THE** GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS **TENTH**

SPECIAL SESSION

**REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE**

DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING

OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON

STRENGTHENING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE IN

**INTERNATIONAL** RELATIONS

ESTABLISHMENT OF **A** COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM

OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE **AND** SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL

Forty-first year

Letter dated 23 October 1986 from the Permanent Representative of  
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations  
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement made by Mr. M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on Soviet television.

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English

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I should be grateful if you would arrange for distribution of this text as an **official** document of the General Assembly under items 21, 47, 54, 55, 60, 62, **58**, 126 and 141 of its agenda, and of the Security **Council** 1.

(Signed) **A. M. BELONOGOV**  
Deputy Head,  
Delegation of **the** USSR  
**to** the forty-first session of **the**  
United Nations General Assembly

ANNEX

Statement made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Soviet television  
on 22 October 1986

Good evening Comrades.

We meet again, and again on the same topic - Reykjavik. This is a highly serious topic. The outcome of my meeting with the President of the United States shook the entire world. In the ensuing days many new matters requiring evaluation have emerged, and I would like to share them with you today.

At the press conference at Reykjavik I said, as you will recall, that we would be returning again and again to the meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States.

I am convinced that we have not yet grasped the full importance of what took place. We will, though - if not now, then later - understand the full significance of Reykjavik and pass proper judgement on both the achievements and advances and the wasted opportunities and losses.

With all the drama of the talks and their outcome, the meeting in Reykjavik - maybe for the first time in decades - actually carried us a long way towards nuclear disarmament.

It is still my belief that as a result of the meeting we have reached a higher plane, not only in analysing the situation but in defining the objectives and framework of possible accords on nuclear disarmament.

Finding ourselves a few steps away from practical agreement on such a difficult and vitally important problem, we are all immeasurably more aware of the danger the world is in and more keenly sensitive to the need for immediate answers. Most important of all, we now know that averting the nuclear threat is a real possibility.

I would point out that only very recently the Soviet programme for the eradication of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was being described by many "pillars" of world politics as an illusion, an impossible dream.

Here, truly, is a case when past experience is not an advantage or a source of counsel, but a burden hampering the search for solutions.

But Reykjavik did not only engender hopes; it illuminated difficulties on the road to a nuclear-free world,

Without understanding that fact, the outcome of the Iceland meeting cannot be properly evaluated.

The forces **opposing the** trend towards disarmament are mighty. **We sensed that** at **the meeting** itself, we **sense it now**. **A great deal** is now being said about **Reykjavik**.

Realistically minded people regard the meeting in Iceland as a **major** political event .

They **welcome the fact that** , as a **result**, we have been able to carry **the campaign** against nuclear weapons into qualitatively different terrain. The outcome of **Reykjavik**, as **the Soviet leadership** sees it, is encouraging for **anyone** hoping for a **breakthrough to** better things.

Interesting assessments are being offered in Government, public and scientific circles in most countries. The opportunities revealed are being described as an **answer to** mankind's **yearnings**.

It is generally held that the meeting raised the Soviet-American dialogue **and the** East-West dialogue as a whole, to a new level.

The dialogue **has** moved forward from dull technical calculations and numerical comparisons to new parameters and **measurements**.

From this vantage we **can see new** prospects of resolution for the problems which, today, **seem** so intractable; **security**, nuclear disarmament, preventing further twists in the arms race, and **arriving at** a **new** understanding of **the** opportunities opening up before mankind.

**Discussion** around **the** world on the results of **the** meeting is, one might say, still **in** the early stages. I think - no, I **am convinced - that** it will grow. As we see it, general efforts **by nations**, politicians and the public to **capitalize on the** opportunities **that** opened up at the Reykjavik meeting will **grow** also.

**The route** to a settlement of **the** crucial problems on which **the** very fate of **mankind** depends **was** mapped **out** in **Reykjavik**.

**But the time** since Reykjavik has also brought other things to light.

The circles that **have** connections with militarism and earn profits from the arms race are clearly frightened. They are doing their **utmost** to **come** to grips with the **new** situation and, **by** co-ordinating their activities, to mislead people wherever **possible:** to **get** control **of** the **mood in** large sectors of **the world community**, stifle their yearning for peace and prevent **Governments** from taking clear positions at this decisive, historic **moment**.

These circles **have** political power, economic levers and powerful information media at their disposal. We **must not** exaggerate their strength, **but it must not be** underestimated either. All the signs are that **the** battle will **be** hard fought.

A regrouping of forces has begun among those opposed to **détente** and disarmament, and feverish efforts are being **made** to throw up enough obstacles to derail the **process** begun in Reykjavik.

In **the circumstances**, I think we must go back to the issues which figure so prominently on the **agenda** as a result of the Iceland meeting.

Our point of view, which I described an hour **after the meeting** ended, has not changed. I think it necessary to **say so** not only to confirm the evaluations we made **before**; I do **so to draw** your attention to the leap-fropping and disarray we are **observing**. This may **have** been brought **on by** confusion and desperation or it may be a premeditated move to dupe ordinary people.

**Various accounts are given of the goals set for the meeting.** The first harsh denunciations of Reykjavik have quickly given **way** to rapture.

A frantic campaign has **begun** to claim credit for other peoples' proposals.

The main forces have been thrown into the defence of **the SDI that was disgraced** in Reykjavik. All in all, these are hectic days in **Washington**.

What is **this**: a pre-election gambit that depends **on success** at Reykjavik? Or **is** this the unpredictable policy for the **years to come**?

This matter **must be** seriously studied.

It **has not** escaped our attention that **some** political circles are trying to steer discussion **on the outcome** of the meeting in particular directions.

**If** the main features of the campaign I will say only this. There is a desire to whitewash the disruptive position **taken by the** United States Administration, which went unprepared to the meeting - I still say, with old **baggage** - and, **when** there was no avoiding tire issue **and the** situation demanded **clear** replies, threw away the opportunity to conclude the meeting with an accord.

There is a desire, in the new post-Reykjavik situation, to force the USSR **back** to the old approaches, back to fruitless numerical discussions, wandering round in circles with no way **out**.

Obviously **there** are a fair few **politicians** in the West who **find** that the **Geneva** talks suit **them** as a screen, **but not as a forum** for seeking accords.

What used to be carefully **concealed is** now becoming clearer: there are powerful forces in American and **Western** European ruling circles **that are bent on** undermining the nuclear disarmament process; **one** or **two** are **back** to asserting **that** nuclear weapons are almost **a** blessing.

A half-truth, **they say, is the most** dangerous kind of lie. It is very alarming that not only the right-wing information media but highly placed figures in the American Administration **have begun to** adopt such tactics - tactics of outright deception.

I have already had an opportunity to tell you how things went at Reykjavik. We went to the **meeting** with constructive proposals, the most radical in **the** history Of Soviet-American negotiations, for reducing armaments. Those proposals take the interests of **both** sides into **account**.

I said so in Iceland, on the eve of the meeting, in a conversation with **the** leaders of that **country**. The proposals **were** handed to the United States President half-way through **my** first conversation with him.

Far-reaching and interrelated, **they** constitute a complete package and are based on our programme, announced **on** 15 January, for eradicating nuclear **weapons by the year 2000**.

First. Cut all strategic **weapons**, without exception, by half.

Second. **Completely** eliminate Soviet **and** American medium-range missiles in Europe **and** make an immediate start on negotiations on **such** missiles in **Asia**; also **on** missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometres, whose number we proposed to freeze forthwith.

Third. Harden **the** terms of the **ABM** Treaty and begin on full-scale negotiations for a complete ban on nuclear **tests**.

The discussions in Reykjavik evolved on the basis of the Soviet proposals, <sup>55</sup> I related in detail in **my** earlier **statements**.

After a hard struggle and bitter arguments **there** occurred an encouraging narrowing of our differences on two out of the three areas **under** discussion.

The logic of the **negotiations** led the sides to define **specific** periods for **the** eradication of strategic offensive weapons. President Reagan and I reached agreement that Soviet and American **weapons** of this kind **can** and should **be** completely eradicated **by** 1996.

We also reached accord on the complete eradication of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, and radical cuts in missiles of this type **in** Asia.

We regard **these** agreements **between the** USSR and **the** United States as being of pivotal importance: **they** showed **that** nuclear disarmament is possible.

That is **the** first half of the truth **about Reykjavik**. There is, however, **the** other half. That, as I said, is that the Americans threw **away an** historic agreement which seemed to be within arm's reach.

Now the United States<sup>5</sup> Administration is doing its **utmost to** convince people that the opportunity to emerge triumphant with concrete agreements was missed owing to Soviet obstinacy over the "strategic defence initiative" programme.

It is even said that we led the "resident into a trap, putting forward "breathtaking" proposals for reductions in strategic offensive weapons and medium-range missiles and then, as an ultimatum, demanding a retreat from SDI.

The essence, **though**, of **our** position and proposals **was this**: we want to **reduce** and **then** completely abolish nuclear weapons, and are **resolutely opposed** to another phase in the **arms** race, taking weapons **into space**.

Hence we are against **SDI** and for a tougher **ABM** Treaty.

It is clear to **every** sober-minded person that if we start on deep cuts followed by the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to rule **out any** possibility for either **the Soviet** or **the American side** to gaining unilateral military superiority.

We see the main danger of **SDI** lying precisely in the transfer of **the** arms race to a new sphere and the desire to get into space with offensive weapons, thereby **winning** military **superiority**.

**SDI has** become **the** main obstacle to **ending** the arms **race** and eliminating nuclear weapons and progressing towards a nuclear-free **world**.

For Mr. **Shultz**, the United **States** Secretary of State, to tell the American people that **SDI is** a sort of "insurance policy" for **America is**, to say the least, an attempt to deceive **the** American people.

**SDI** in actual fact is not strengthening **America's** security! **Instead**, by opening up a new stage in **the** arms race, it is destabilising **the** military and political situation and thereby **weakening the security of both the** United States and everybody else.

The **Americans must know this**.

They **must also know that the** United **States** position on **SDI** announced in **Reykjavik** fundamentally contradicts **the** **ARM** Treaty. Article XV does indeed allow withdrawal from the treaty, but only under **certain circumstances**, namely if "extraordinary events have **jeopardized** its (a Party to **the** treaty's) supreme interests". There were **no such circumstances** and there are **none** now. Clearly, **the** elimination of nuclear weapons, if it **began**, would **make the occurrence of such** extraordinary **events even** less probable. This is logical.

Article XIII of **the** **ARM** Treaty makes another provision: **the Parties must** "consider, as appropriate, possible proposals **for** further increasing the viability of this Treaty". The United **States, on the** other hand, **is** seeking to vitiate the treaty **and** render it meaningless.

These are all quotations from a document signed by the supreme representative of the United States.

Many tales have been invented to **enhance the** prestige of **SDI**. **One is that the** Russians are terribly afraid of it. Another is that **SDI was what brought the** Russians to the Geneva talks and **then to Reykjavik**. A third is that **SDI is** America's only salvation from **the** "Soviet threat". A fourth is that **SDI** will give **the** United States a great technological lead over **the Soviet Union** and other **countries**, and so **on** and so forth.

Now, knowing the problem, I can say only one thing: the continuation of the SDI programme will draw the world into a new stage of the arms race and destabilize the strategic situation.

Everything else that is attributed to SDI is, by and large, extremely dubious - attractive packaging to sell this suspicious and dangerous item.

The President, defending the position which thwarted agreement in Reykjavik, asks rhetorical questions: "Why do the Russians so stubbornly demand that America forever remain vulnerable to a Soviet missile strike? Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain defenceless forever?"

I confess, I am amazed by such questions. They seem to imply that the American President can make his country invulnerable, provide it with a sure defence against a nuclear strike.

Rut as long as nuclear weapons exist and the arms race continues, he does not have that ability. Nor, of course, do we.

If the President is relying on SDI, he is wasting his time. The system might be effective if all missiles are eliminated. Rut then, you ask, why have an anti-missile defence at all? Why build it? I leave aside the money squandered, the cost of the system - according to some estimates it will amount to several trillion dollars.

We are still trying to persuade America to abandon this dangerous course. We are trying to convince the American Administration to seek invulnerability and defence by other means - by completely eliminating nuclear weapons and setting up a comprehensive system of international security to rule out war of any kind, whether nuclear or conventional.

Up to now, however, the SDI programme remains an integral part of United States military doctrine.

The Defense Directive for 1984-1983 - still operative - which emerged from the Pentagon at the beginning of the Reagan presidency, calls openly for the development of space-based systems, including the means to destroy Soviet satellites, and accelerated work on anti-missile defence systems for the territory of the United States with the possible withdrawal of the country from the ABM Treaty.

The directive emphasizes the need to channel the military rivalry with the USSR into new areas, rendering all previous Soviet defence spending pointless and making all Soviet weapons obsolete. Again, as you can see, this is a ghost-hunt, as former President Nixon put it, a plan to exhaust the Soviet Union.

The current Administration is a slow learner.

Isn't this why they so stubbornly cling to SDI? The plans for "Star Wars" have become the main obstacle to an agreement eliminating the nuclear threat. It is useless for Washington now to make out that we are moving towards an agreement.

To eliminate nuclear weapons as a means of deterring American aggression and in exchange face a threat from outer space - only political simpletons could agree to that. There are no political simpletons in the Soviet leadership.

It is not easy to accept that, because of all this, a unique chance to spare mankind from the nuclear threat has been missed. with this specifically in mind, I said at the press Conference in Reykjavik that we did not consider the dialogue finished and hoped that, when he got home, President Reagan would consult Congress and the American people and take the decisions which must logically follow frost what was achieved in Reykjavik.

Something completely different has occurred. In addition to distorting the entire picture of the negotiations in Reykjavik - I will return to this point. The past few days have seen action taken which, to a normal human being, appears simply barbarous after such an important meeting between the top leadership of two countries.

I am referring to the expulsion from the United States of 55 more Soviet embassy and consulate employees. We, of course, will take countermeasures, very strong measures, you might say, as between equals. We do not intend to let this outrage pass. But something else interests me now.

What kind of Government is this) what can it be expected to do in other cases or in the international arena? How far does its unpredictability go?

Not only, it seems, does it have no constructive proposals on key disarmament questions, it does not even want to maintain the necessary atmosphere for a normal continuation of the dialogue. Washington turns out not to be ready in either case.

The conclusion seems obvious. It is confirmed by a good deal of experience. Every time there is a gleam of hope on the major issues in Soviet-American relations, issues which affect the interests of all mankind, we get a provocative incident designed to thwart the possibility of a positive outcome and poison the atmosphere.

So which is the true face of the American Administration? Is it in favour of results and solutions, or does it ultimately want to destroy anything that can serve as a basis for making headway and deliberately rule out any kind of normalization?

A very unattractive picture is emerging of the Administration of a great country; one that is quick to carry out disruptive and destructive acts. Either the President cannot handle his entourage, which literally breathes hatred towards the Soviet Union and anything that might bring international affairs into calmer waters, or this is what he himself wants. In any case, no one is controlling the hawks in the White House. And that is very dangerous.

As for informing the Americans about Reykjavik, what has happened - in exactly the same vein as what I have already mentioned - is that the facts have been hidden from them. The Americans have been told the half-truth I spoke of earlier. The

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accounts suggest that the United States, acting from a position of strength, almost forced the Soviet Union into **agreement on American terms**.

The day is not **far off, so** they say, **when the United States** will get its own **way**; it only **has** to keep up **the pace** of the military build-up, forge ahead with the **"Star Wars"** programme and step up **the pressure in** all directions.

The past **few days have seen a great cause** drowning in petty politicking, **as the United States** sacrifices the vital interests of its people, its allies and **international** security as a whole to the arms manufacturer.

What **a lot has** been said **about** the openness of **American** society, freedom of information, diversity of opinion, and the way **everyone** can see and hear **what he** likes.

Pointing **out the differences between** our systems in **Reykjavik, the President said** to me **"We recognize the freedom of the press and the right to listen to any point of view."** Those were his **exact words**. **But** what are **things** like in reality?

Here's the very latest fact.

I **am** told that our **Novosti** Press Agency put **out** English versions **of** my press conference **in Reykjavik and my statement** on Soviet television and **sent them to many countr** lee, including **the United States**.

Well, the leaflet containing those texts **has been** held up for several days **now in American Customs**. It is being kept away from the American reader. **So much for the "right to hear any point of view"!**

Then **again, on the subject** of humanitarian issues, I **said to the President - take the** cinema, for example. **A great many American** films are shown on Soviet screens. **Through them, Soviet people can** get **an** idea of the American way of life and how Americans think.

But practically no Soviet films are screened in "free America". The President avoided the issue and, **as usual in such cases, took cover behind** private enterprise, which **as** he put it, could do as it liked.

I also talked **about** American books published in our country and Soviet **books** published in **the United States: the ratio is about 20 to 1**.

I brought up the question of radio **broadcasts** with the President. Here, too I said, we are at a disadvantage. **You have the Soviet Union** surrounded **with a** network **of transmitters and** from other countries you **relay anything that comes into** your head, **24 hours a** day, in many of the languages **spoken in** the Soviet Union. America, on the other hand, **uses the** fact that we are not close neighbours to **fence** itself **off** from our **medium-wave broadcasts** - all **their radios** are that sort. The President had no answer to that either.

Then I suggested; **What about this - we stop jamming the "Voice of America", and You give us the chance to lay on radio broadcasts to the United States from your territory or somewhere nearby, so that they reach your population? The President promised to think about it.**

**In the same way as the United States is becoming an increasingly closed society, people there are being craftily but effectively cut off from objective information. That is a dangerous development.**

The American people **need to know the truth about what** is happening in the Soviet Union, **the real** essence of Soviet foreign policy and our real intentions, not to mention the truth about **the** world situation as a whole.

I would call this exceptionally important **in the** present state of affairs.

And now for how the **outcome of Reykjavik is being** presented in the United States. It took only a **few hours, or at most days**, for everything discussed at Reykjavik to start being enveloped in a cloud of fictions and fantasies. People **are** trying to destroy **the** seeds of trust before **they** germinate.

The President stated **a day or two ago that** only ballistic missiles had **been the subject** of an agreement, and his aides said outright that **bombers** and all cruise missiles **were** unaffected.

The Secretary of State gave a different **account**, namely **that the** understanding involved all strategic weapons. Incidentally, **he** attended **my** talks with the President, **as** did **our Minister** for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shevardnadze.

**A spokesman** for the White House, Mr. **Speakes**, said **that Ronald Reagan had** perhaps **been** misunderstood and had never agreed to eliminate all nuclear **weapons**.

There have **even been** straight forward distortions.

For example, it is being asserted that **the** United States President did **not agree** at the meeting to **the** Soviet proposal for the complete destruction of all Soviet and American strategic offensive **weapons by 1996 - as if it had not been possible to reach a common view on our proposal.**

With all solemnity, as a participant in **the** talks, I affirm **that the** President did agree, **though without any** great **enthusiasm**, to **the** elimination of all **strategic** offensive weapons - and I **emphasize** all, **not just** some individual categories. And they were to be eliminated precisely in **10 years, in two** stages.

The interpretations offered of the discussion **on nuclear tests** are **also far** from **the truth**. **The** unilateral approach of **the** United States to this **question** is being presented as if the Soviet Union was in complete agreement. That **was not** and could not have **been the case**.

The problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe **is** also being incorrectly presented. People are not satisfied with removing it from **the package** proposed **by the** Soviet side.

They are beginning to **portray** our agreement to freeze the number **of** missiles with a range of less than **1,000** kilometres as "**recognition**" by the Soviet Union of the "**right**" of the United States to deploy that **category** of **American** missiles in Western Europe.

When you see such interpretations, you begin to doubt, yourself, **what we** were talking about in **Reykjavik**. Was it really **about averting** the nuclear threat and reducing and eliminating **nuclear** weapons, or **was it about increasing** the threat still further, diversifying nuclear arsenals and turning not just the planet but outer space, **the** universe, into a theatre for military confrontation? **But you see,** comrades, that is how it has turned out.

The prospect of a possible Soviet-American understanding **has** scared **some** people **so much** that they **have** promptly **set** about raising **quite** impossible **obstacles** and **inventing** "**prior** conditions".

**One** of the President's aides has gone so far as to say **that** before **agreeing** to nuclear disarmament, **the** United States "**must** set **changes** in the political climate in the Soviet Union".

This is all irresponsible, extremely irresponsible.

When such presumptuous demands were **made** 70 or 40 years ago, they could still be **taken** for thoughtlessness or blindness to history, but now they indicate a **complete** failure to understand **reality**.

The problem of **conventional** armaments is also **described** as a "prior condition". It is **serious enough** in **itself**.

The assertion that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact States have a "lead" in conventional arms is still common currency in the West. That, allegedly, is why the North Atlantic Treaty **Organization (NATO)** constantly has to build up its nuclear potential.

Of course, there is **no such** imbalance. After Reykjavik, Mr. Shultz and Mr. Reagan publicly admitted the fact for the first **time**. **But the essence of the** problem is not simply to maintain parity. We do not want the arms race to shift from the nuclear sphere to conventional armaments.

I would remind you that our January proposal for the elimination of nuclear **weapons by** the end of **the** century also included provisions for **the** destruction of chemical **weapons** and **deep cuts** in conventional arms.

We have reverted to this question **several** times **since** January. The **proposals** of the Warsaw Treaty countries were set out in their most detailed form this summer in Budapest. We **transmitted them** to the other side, that is to the members of NATO.

To **date,** there **has been no** reply.

Every **day** since Reykjavik **shows** clearly that **the** matting in Iceland was **the** touchstone for the **true** purpose **of** politicians' words and **declarations**.

What a lot has **been** said about **the** need to **free** ourselves from **the** nuclear nightmare and **how** easy it would be to breathe in a nuclear-free world, if only the USSR and USA would **break** the deadlock!

But all it took **was** a ray of hope, and **many** who only yesterday **were** cursing nuclear weapons and swearing their **commitment** to the idea **of** a nuclear-free world scattered into the bushes.

Voices in **Western** Europe can **even** be heard saying that it will **be** hard **to** give up **American** nuclear **weapons** and **missiles**.

The **problem** is, obviously, that **those** who make policy in the **West** do not think **of** nuclear **weapons** as a defensive matter at all. Otherwise, it **is** hard to explain **why** they **are** now looking for reasons to keep **the** missiles, or why support is being **voiced** for the SDI programme at government **level**.

Both we and the **West** European public **have** food for thought there.

**More** refined manoeuvres are being staged **alongside** the frontal **attacks**. **Is** it **not** possible, people **ask**, to take up the more advantageous proposals **from** the **negotiating** table, ignoring those which, for various **reasons**, are **not** to their **taste**?

**They** say that the difficulties in Reykjavik arose **because** **we**, the Soviet side, put our fundamental proposals **forward** as a **package**. **But** a package is a balance of interests and concessions, a balanced easing of anxieties, **an** interdependent combination of security **interests**. It is **as** if everything were **on** one pair of scales - **the** two dishes have to be made to balance,

That is probably why people **in** the **West** want to **take** this **fair**, logically sound presentation of an overall understanding to **bits**, without doing anything to re-establish the balance of **concessions**.

All the proposals that we made in Reykjavik are objectively related to central strategic weapons **systems**. Our concessions are also part of the package. If there is no **package** deal, **there** will be no concessions either.

This is the reality of our national security. **But** such an approach safeguards the security both **of** the **USA** and of all other countries.

That is why we attach such importance to strengthening **the** Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. **NO** **attempt** to infringe it is **being** made **on** our part. **On** the contrary, **we** are against revising, amplifying or doing anything **else** to it, never mind substituting something different, **as** the President said - perhaps **by** mistake - in Reykjavik.

I have **to admit**, I was startled when he set **out during the meeting** to persuade **the Soviet side, and me personally not** to treat the **ABM Treaty** as "holy writ". How would you have us treat treaties? Like scraps **of** paper?

International order and **basic** stability cannot **be** safeguarded **without** strict adherence **to** treaties, especially **such** a fundamental **one**. Otherwise, the world will **be dominated by** caprice and **chaos**.

I will **say it once again**: if people **choose SDI** over nuclear disarmament, only one conclusion is possible - they are trying to **use this** military programme to invalidate the **axiom** of modern international relations that **was** contained in **the** clear, simple words to **which the** President of **the USA** and I put **our signatures last** year. The words were **these**: **a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought**.

**In conclusion** I will say **this**: **the Soviet Union put the greatest good will** into its proposals. We are **not** withdrawing **those** proposals: **everything that we have said in substantiating and elaborating them remains valid**.

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