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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION:
ADVISORY BOARD ON DISARMAMENT STUDIES

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on the activities of the Institute.

ANNEX

Report of the Director of the United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The first report of the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on the activities of the Institute was submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37/99 K, section IV, of 13 December 1982 (A/38/475, annex).
2. The present report relates to the subsequent activities of the Institute, during the period from September 1983 to August 1984.
3. An account of the activities of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, functioning in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR and dealing with such issues as the draft statute of the Institute, the research programme and financing of the Institute's work, is contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/39/549).

II. COMPLETED PROJECTS

A. Reports requested by the General Assembly

1. Establishment of an international disarmament fund for development

4. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37/84 of 9 December 1982, UNIDIR has prepared a study on the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development, which has been submitted to the General Assembly (A/39/229).
5. In order to carry out its mandate, UNIDIR established a steering group to guide the investigation. This group was composed of the following members: Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan), Gheorghe Dolgu (Romania), Sergio de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil), Edgar Faure (France), Sten Lundbo (Norway) and Ibrahima Sy (Senegal).
6. The UNIDIR report deals with the following areas:
 - (a) Objectives of the fund;
 - (b) Resources of the fund;
 - (c) Distribution of resources;
 - (d) Structure of the fund;
 - (e) Process of establishing the fund;
 - (f) Conclusion.
7. The report identifies three objectives of the fund. First, the establishment of the fund would result in effectively linking disarmament and development. While the link is generally accepted from a theoretical and normative point of view, efforts towards disarmament on the one hand and development on the other remain

separate, and no results have been derived from their complementarity. The setting up of an institution which by its title and function would encompass both disarmament and development would thus have a political and symbolic impact as regards combining these two major concerns.

8. The second objective would be to set in motion a process for the transfer of disarmament resources to development. Large amounts are spent on armaments which absorb 5 per cent of the world's gross national product, whereas much smaller resources are used for official aid for development. The issue is thus one of ensuring the transfer of the first flow to the second, and it would seem that measures and initiatives related to establishing a fund would make it possible to start off a movement in this direction.

9. Lastly, there is reason to hope that the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development would have a positive influence on the climate of international relations.

10. The report states that it would seem desirable that all States should contribute to the fund and that a system should be established whereby the main responsibility for mobilizing resources should lie with some of them. It would thus be possible to uphold the concept of States bearing the main responsibility, which can be defined on the basis of juridical facts (membership in the Security Council) but also on the basis of armaments data or of economic considerations. Without underestimating the serious difficulties involved in determining and defining the principal categories of contributors, the following categories may be mentioned: (a) the States permanent members of the Security Council and (b) the major military Powers.

11. On the method by which contributions are to be determined, the report describes several possibilities, such as levying a tax on armaments or the allocation of a part of resources saved as a result of disarmament measures, and concludes that in the present circumstances, the voluntary contributions method, in line with a negotiated programming of the fund's resources, would make it possible, at least at an initial stage, to launch a process for transferring resources from disarmament to development.

12. The report considers that since the recipients of the resources to be distributed by the fund are principally the developing countries, priority categories should be established among them, just as categories of contributors have been suggested. Relatively simple categories should be established for this purpose, and it is suggested that the following three categories should be distinguished;

(a) The least developed countries, whose capacity for benefiting from the resources of the fund stems from the extent and the urgency of their development needs;

(b) The countries which reduce their military expenditures and thus make an effort towards disarmament. Just as the most heavily armed countries have been included among the contributors, it seems logical to include among the recipients the least heavily armed countries and those which endeavour to ensure their

security by non-military means, by maintaining friendly and peaceful relations with their neighbours and, more generally, with other States;

(c) The countries which are themselves making an especially outstanding development effort and which therefore deserve to be encouraged.

13. The report says that two considerations should govern the structure of the fund:

(a) Inasmuch as one of the functions of the fund is to give tangible expression to the link between disarmament and development and to testify to a commitment of the international community in that regard, the fund must be sufficiently visible and, for the same reasons, have some degree of autonomy;

(b) On the other hand, the development of an excessive administrative and bureaucratic apparatus merely to administer modest resources should be avoided.

14. If the resources at the disposal of the fund are large, an autonomous institution to administer it can be considered. In such a case, the principle of universality of participation, equitable representation of contributors and recipients, and the involvement of administrators with experience in the field of disarmament and of development should be borne in mind.

15. In the initial phase, and in particular if the resources of the fund remain limited, the fund could be linked to an existing development assistance organization.

16. According to the consultations held on that subject in UNIDIR, it appears that the international economic organization which seems most capable of administering the fund is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which has a highly qualified administration with an adequate action capability for discharging the new tasks which administration of the fund would involve and great experience in the field of development assistance.

17. The report says that it would seem advisable to establish the fund without necessarily waiting until resources are released through ongoing disarmament measures. It could conceivably be established with the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly, followed by the opening of a special account. Should that happen, the fund would have the status of a subsidiary organ of the Assembly. However, this method should be used only if the fund is to be financed solely through voluntary contributions. A non-binding recommendation would not provide a basis in law or a political basis for the generation of other than voluntary resources. All the same, a resolution appealing to Member States to contribute resources to the fund might lay down rough guidelines both with regard to the categories of contributors and with regard to the criteria on which contributions should be based. The fund could also be based on an international agreement committing States to provide resources to it.

18. The report draws three basic conclusions:

(a) The establishment of a disarmament fund for development is desirable as a means of giving tangible expression to the recognized link between disarmament and

development and starting the process of transferring to development the resources that are now allocated to armaments;

(b) The fund should be established phase by phase, both in terms of the procedures for mobilizing its resources and in terms of its administrative structure;

(c) Nevertheless, the fund should not be established unless it is assured of adequate resources from the very first phase.

2. South Africa's nuclear capability

19. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 38/181 A of 20 December 1983, the Institute has prepared a report on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability, which has been submitted to the General Assembly (A/39/470).

20. The report provides, in a concise and factual manner, data and information on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability. It focuses on the following aspects that are indicative of South Africa's nuclear capability:

- (a) Uranium resources and production;
- (b) Uranium enrichment;
- (c) Nuclear energy research;
- (d) Nuclear power facilities;
- (e) The nuclear policy framework.

21. Recent developments relating to safeguards in South Africa are also presented.

22. The report was prepared in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

23. Publicly available information emanating mainly from governmental sources or international organizations was used in the report.

24. The following broad findings were apparent:

(a) The uranium production for South Africa and Namibia* has increased by about 50 per cent since the figure given in the Secretary-General's report to the

* References to Namibia in the report reflect the fact that South Africa continues its illegal occupation and exploitation of that country and its resources, and does not imply acceptance of the existing status of Namibia.

General Assembly (from 1978 to 1982) entitled "South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field (A/35/402 and Corr.1);

(b) A pilot enrichment plant has been in operation for 8 to 10 years providing highly enriched uranium for the SAFARI-I reactor and for other purposes that are not known. Operating experience is obtained which is of importance for developing the enrichment technology further and for preparing the operational phase of a semi-commercial enrichment plant, which is approaching the completion stage;

(c) The first reactor - Koeberg-I - of the Koeberg nuclear power plant started operations in March 1984 and a second reactor - Koeberg-II - is expected to be completed in 1984;

(d) Research and development on fuel technology to enable South Africa to manufacture its own nuclear fuel is in progress. A hot-cell laboratory is under construction at Pelindaba;

(e) A decision has been taken to establish a new nuclear research centre. No programme for this centre has been published;

(f) A new legislation was enacted and institutional restructuring took place aimed at strengthening the control and management of South Africa's nuclear programme;

(g) South Africa has stated its readiness to resume discussions with the IAEA secretariat on safeguards in respect of its semi-commercial enrichment plant, but not its pilot enrichment plant. It has also announced its nuclear export policy;

(h) South Africa continues to have a technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

B. Studies within the programme approved by the Board of Trustees of the Institute

1. Assumptions and perceptions in disarmament

25. This is a comprehensive study on the subjective factors in disarmament as they appear in the context of relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and is the first of three UNIDIR studies in this field (see para. 64 below).

26. Decisions to agree on measures of disarmament and arms control depend on specific assumptions regarding the future behaviour of the partners, and so does reluctance or refusal to engage in any such process. This study, by Professor Daniel Frei, explores the future scope for disarmament by analysing what the Governments believe about their respective adversary's aims, motives, capabilities and intentions. The purpose of the study is to provide a comprehensive and sincere survey on Soviet and United States assumptions and

perceptions. Thus it offers an indispensable contribution for understanding the dynamics of Soviet and American armaments and disarmament. The analysis is based on published documents and discussions with officials in both Moscow and Washington.

27. The study finds that a comparison of United States and Soviet views reveals both striking similarities and contrasts. For instance, both sides assert their interest in fair and equal steps towards disarmament, while accusing the adversary of aiming at one-sided advantages and superiority.

28. Such mirror images may partly be explained by psychological factors shaping all perceptions among human groups. More unfortunately, however, they also reflect a real conflict and they originate in fundamentally irreconcilable convictions deeply embedded in political and philosophical beliefs.

29. Regarding the possibilities of changing and improving perceptions, the study states that hostile views, to the extent they directly originate in fundamental beliefs can neither be "rectified" nor expected to be simply abandoned. They reflect a real diversity of interests and being persistent beliefs, they will continue to impede disarmament.

30. On the other hand, there are secondary cognitive reinforcement mechanisms which shape perceptions and reinforce hostile views. These cognitive mechanisms have detrimental consequences for the progress of disarmament since the hostile view each side holds about the adversary impedes and may even prevent negotiations. But these secondary cognitive mechanisms are amenable to change, and this is an area where concrete efforts need to be examined.

31. Any practical conclusion from the analysis of Soviet and United States perceptions with regard to disarmament has to take into account that the real conflict of interest cannot be simply wished away. To a considerable extent, the hostility and mismatch of perceptions result from the irreconcilable contradiction separating the two worlds. It would therefore be naive to hope for harmony and disarmament by pleading for the replacement of "misperceptions" by "realistic" perceptions. In spite of this reservation, several practical implications emerge from the analysis: the fundamental incompatibility existing between the two views should be taken seriously; the public at large, especially in the West, should be made more cognizant of these incompatibilities; the growth of empathy should be promoted; awareness of how and why the adversary feels threatened is needed; the multitude of existing disarmament forums should be used to develop empathy; the number of bilateral and multilateral negotiation forums should be increased; the "dramaturgy" of non-negotiating as part of the negotiation process should be understood; empathy should not only be felt, but also signalled to the adversary; the adversary's empathy should be stimulated by appropriate behavioural and verbal gestures; assumptions should be made as explicit as possible; contacts should be established among military experts of the two sides; talks should be arranged about assumptions regarding the adversary found in textbooks and manuals used in military education; intellectual energies should concentrate on issues outside the fundamental incompatibility of views; both sides should refrain from presenting disarmament proposals that touch on central beliefs held by the adversary, should be aware of their own cognitive patterns shaping their views of the adversary,

should review periodically the view of the adversary and compare it with alternative views and should be aware of their own acts and words that may trigger undesirable cognitive processes in the views evolved by the adversary; the cognitive "margin of safety" in the worst-case approach should be reduced to the minimum tolerable range; incentives to resort to worst-case assumptions could be defused by reducing the degree of secrecy; confidence-building measures for mitigating suspicions regarding offensive conventional postures, "blitzkrieg"-type planning and nuclear pre-emption should be studied and negotiated; as conflictive perceptions are ultimately caused by a fundamental conflict, it is imperative to find appropriate political methods for constraining and solving international conflicts.

2. Comprehensive study on chemical weapons

32. In a period when the focus is on details, often technical, relating to negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention banning chemical weapons, UNIDIR has frequently received requests for information of a more general nature relating to these weapons. The study just completed arose from such needs to give a short but rather comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of chemical weapons.

33. The study, prepared by Ricardo Frailé, discusses chemical weapons in the context of international security, with a description of efforts to ban chemical weapons, beginning with the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, its interpretation by different States parties and its importance for progress towards a comprehensive ban on the stockpiling, production and use of chemical weapons. Different kinds of chemical weapons are listed, their effects described and the consequences of new technologies in the field are given. Issues relating to the proliferation of chemical weapons and its implications are dealt with.

34. The use of chemical weapons and the law of war are examined, based on analyses of the various instances in which chemical weapons have been resorted to. Questions related to verification and control are presented with due account of the more recent proposals and initiatives in the Conference on Disarmament.

35. This study - a comprehensive source of reference and background material - is intended for all those who deal with or are interested in the efforts under way to ban chemical weapons.

3. The strategic and political impact of new technologies in conventional armaments

36. The past few years have been characterized by important technological advances in conventional weapons resulting in the production of sophisticated weapons such as precision guided munitions (PGM), remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) etc. The strategic and political implications of these developments have already been felt and have resulted in the development of new military doctrines and political strategies.

37. This UNIDIR study, prepared by Yves Boyer, deals with the many problems related to emerging technologies in the field of new conventional weapons. One of the main issues the study deals with is the possibility that the new, so-called "intelligent" weapons would be able, in future, to raise considerably the nuclear threshold.

38. That idea has already been advanced and has provoked wide discussion. The study does not concentrate on the purely military and strategic aspects of this doctrine, but analyses it from the point of view of eventual implications for arms control in Europe.

39. The study stresses that the "intelligent" weapons are expensive and that not all States can afford them. This problem concerns the developing countries especially, where the distinction between those who are able to afford these arms and those who are not has consequences for regional security.

40. The study concludes that it would be dangerously unrealistic to think that these new technologies will enable the central military blocs to solve their disputes by military means.

4. Study on negotiated reductions of nuclear weapons

41. The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies requested UNIDIR, in December 1983, to carry out a study on the conditions and possibilities of negotiating reductions and limitations of intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons categories, including the possibility of merging negotiations on the two nuclear weapons categories.

42. A research paper on the subject was prepared, at the request of UNIDIR, by Professor Curt Gasteyger, which traced the origin of the deadlock in bilateral Soviet Union/United States negotiations and presented the various options for resumption of the negotiations, as were put forward by officials or in academic circles.

43. UNIDIR convened a group of experts to discuss these issues of nuclear disarmament in their personal capacity. They included Mr. Rolf Berg, Dr. Evghny Bougrov, Mr. Yves Boyer, Professor Curt Gasteyger, Mr. Milhjan Komatina, Mr. Maynard Glitman, Professor Hans Maretzki and Dr. Friedrich Ruth. The meeting took place at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 16 and 17 April 1984.

44. The research paper by Professor Gasteyger and the conclusions drawn by the Director of UNIDIR following the discussions in the group were presented to the Advisory Board at its meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, from 30 April to 4 May 1984.

5. Conceptual issues related to European security, arms control and confidence-building measures

45. This study forms part of the Institute's activities within the field of regional disarmament and deals with the prospects for arms control in Europe. It was submitted to members of the Board in connection with the discussions it held at its December 1983 session on the issue of United States-Soviet Union bilateral talks on nuclear weapons. It deals with the historical background to the START and INF negotiations, the points of contention between the different sides and the possibilities for progress. It also examines the prospects for mutual force reductions and confidence-building measures and traces the course of negotiations on the subject. The study is based on official documents and a survey of the current literature.

46. The aim of the study is to try and gain an understanding of the underlying forces responsible for the current situation, and the author, Marek Thee, examines the relationship between deterrence, stability and security. He concludes that the debate on European security needs to transcend the simple issues of counting the numbers of weapons deployed and arrive instead at a better understanding of the deep structures of the arms race and of our predicament in the nuclear age. He points to the need to re-examine the dynamics of confrontation, both in their material setting and in the ideological-doctrinal superstructure. European security - as reduction of armaments on a larger scale - needs a basic shift in attitudes and thinking, and sufficient political will to change direction.

6. The right to peace

47. For several years now, the right to peace has been a topic of discussion in different United Nations bodies, especially those concerned with human rights. The purpose of this UNIDIR study, prepared by Nicolae Ecobescu, is to pave the way for a comprehensive tackling of the problems of the right to peace.

48. The right to peace is considered as a collective right, having as subjects States and peoples, and also as a human right of the individual. It belongs to the third generation of rights, along with the right to development. The right to peace is analysed in the context of fundamental rights and duties of States, and of the rights of peoples on one hand and in the context of human rights on the other.

7. Security of States and the lowering of the levels of armaments

49. This is a continuing project, the objective of which is to analyse prevailing security doctrines and policies of different countries and groups of countries. In addition to the studies mentioned in the earlier report of the Director of UNIDIR (see A/38/475, paras. 63-66), a study on Austria's security policy by Hanspeter Neuhold and Heinz Vetschera was completed this year.

8. Symposium on environmental warfare

50. UNIDIR, together with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and in co-operation with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), organized a select symposium on environmental warfare which was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 24 to 27 April 1984.

51. The participants at the symposium included internationally known technical and legal experts. Special attention was devoted to the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

52. The final session of the symposium was open to members of the diplomatic missions in Geneva.

53. The papers presented at the symposium have been published by SIPRI as a volume entitled "Environmental Warfare - A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal".

9. Denuclearization of the Balkans

54. This is a continuing project (see A/38/475, paras. 110-116); it will consist of papers from the viewpoint of the different States involved - Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey.

55. The study on the Romanian perspective on the denuclearization of the Balkans has been completed.

III. CURRENT ACTIVITIES

A. Limitation of military uses of outer space

56. Recently the prospect of expansion of the armaments race into outer space has become a topical subject in both official circles and in the academic community. The Conference on Disarmament is dealing with it as well and, beside presentations of views and positions, a number of delegations have submitted specific proposals.

57. This study will deal with the military uses of outer space and their implications for disarmament. The project has three objectives:

(a) A factual presentation and description of current and possible new military activities in outer space, their technical capabilities, characteristics and limitations;

(b) An examination of these implications for disarmament efforts;

(c) The impact of new military activities in outer space on existing conventional law and possible new domains for regulation, and the obstacles to negotiations in this field.

B. International law of disarmament

58. This UNIDIR project aims at producing a treatise on the law of disarmament which would represent a reference work of scientific merit and a practical working tool meant for all those who have responsibilities in the field of disarmament or are interested in it, government officials, academics, journalists, students etc. It will not only analyse positive law but will also give a presentation of theses and arguments brought into the controversial issues relating to the international law of disarmament. The study will focus mainly on the provisions of existing treaties relating to disarmament and it will also examine aspects relating to humanitarian law and other sources of law which may be relevant.

59. The study will consist of five parts. The first will place the law of disarmament in the general framework of international law and will define disarmament in relation to other concepts such as sovereignty, security, development and human rights. The second part will deal with conventional law regarding various types of weapons: nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, radiological weapons, conventional weapons etc. The third part will deal with various spaces: Antarctica, outer space, the ocean floor and sea-bed, nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. The fourth part will deal with machinery for deliberations and negotiations and, finally, the fifth part will consider trends as they emanate from the work of the United Nations in this field and, in particular, the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2).

C. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

60. UNIDIR is preparing two studies dealing with this issue:

(a) Non-proliferation régime - trends and prospects: this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the existing non-proliferation régime and the various elements which comprise it such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons, regional treaties such as the Tlatelolco Treaty, the IAEA safeguards and other measures such as supply restrictions, security assurances and "nuclear umbrellas". The provision of the Treaty and questions such as the possible extension of its coverage and ways to strengthen it will be discussed. The IAEA safeguards are also examined in the light of possible ways in which methods adopted by the Agency can be used to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. Due attention will be given to the necessity for full implementation of the provisions of the eleventh preambular paragraph and article VI of the Treaty;

(b) International nuclear commerce and the NPT régime: this report examines the commercial pressures on the NPT régime which arise from the present slow down in the nuclear industry. While many studies are available on the link between security and nuclear proliferation, very few are available on the effects of developments in the nuclear trade on the NPT régime. Trends in the production and trade of nuclear technology show that as a result of increasing commercial competition, the international rules of nuclear trade are not always followed. An understanding of the reasons for the changes in the international nuclear trade and its effects on the NPT régime will be an aid to strengthening the NPT régime.

61. In brief, the latter study will (a) survey the safeguard measures of recent nuclear sales, (b) study the role of sellers, buyers and the international régime when sales and safeguards have been negotiated as well as their roles in cases when no agreement on safeguards has been achieved, (c) evaluate the NPT safeguards régime in relation to recent trends in nuclear sales and (d) make proposals for improving the NPT régime in this regard.

D. Studies on verification

62. Within the Institute, three studies are presently under way on issues of verification:

(a) Verification by seismic means of a comprehensive test ban;

(b) Verification of possible confidence-building and disarmament agreements in the context of Europe;

(c) Analysis of the positions taken by a number of countries on issues of verification within the multilateral negotiating body.

E. Nuclear-test ban

63. This study is to be of an informative nature and should draw on available information and also take into account the non-proliferation aspect of the problem.

F. Subjective factors in disarmament: perceptions, concept formation, styles of arguments, implications

64. As mentioned above, the first study within this project, entitled "Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament", has been completed. The other two studies within this project are:

(a) Concept formation: a synoptical analysis of central strategic terms in Chinese, English, French and Russian: an important question in connection with strategic doctrines refers to the degree of congruity or incongruity existing between strategic doctrines evoked by the major Powers. For conceptual and linguistic reasons there are fundamental differences in seemingly identical strategic concepts mainly between the United States and the Soviet Union. Certain key strategic terms used in American, English, Chinese, French and Soviet strategic doctrines will be examined with regard to their conceptual and linguistic implications;

(b) Styles of arguments: an analysis of arguments against disarmament proposals: numerous proposals put forward for disarmament measures are often evaluated as being "impractical". This raises the question of what "impractical" means. Critical arguments against disarmament proposals themselves merit a serious study. This UNIDIR study will gather and analyse proposals by the Soviet Union and the United States and the reactions to them and attempt to make a distinction between perceived and real obstacles.

G. Dependence on arms transfers

65. The transfer of arms from producing to recipient countries is a significant factor of international life. The proposed study will focus on the dependence of States on their sources of armaments and the arms producers' dependence on their clients. Interdependence not being totally avoidable, excessive dependence will most certainly be viewed as undesirable. Perceptions of the problem will be explored, through which a greater understanding of the dependence involved in arms transfers can be obtained.

66. A preliminary study examines various kinds of political interactions between States such as arms transfers, military alliances and pacts and also the degree of dependence caused by inferior military capabilities. Extensive data based on published sources is included.

67. The study has been prepared as a presentation of the general framework for the in-depth study under way on arms transfer dependence. The structure of dependence and interdependence as presented in the study is of particular interest.

H. Security of States and the lowering of the levels of armaments

68. This is a continuous project and two new studies have been included: (a) the Soviet concept of security and (b) the concept of non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

I. Disarmament

69. This project is envisaged as a general analysis of the field of disarmament, defining it in the general context of international relations, presenting its goals, principles and institutions, as well as the efforts to reach its objective, including national and international machinery for disarmament. The discussions within the Institute on the first draft indicated the need for more conceptualization and it was decided to continue work on the subject.

J. Arms control

70. This is a study on the concept and practice of arms control in its relation to disarmament. It is part of the larger project on disarmament mentioned above and it was initiated to elucidate some of the aspects that would be dealt with under disarmament.

K. Conferences/colloquia/symposia

71. Preparations continue, taking into account the comments of the Board of Trustees on the two conferences/colloquia/symposia: (a) Security and disarmament in Europe and (b) Africa: disarmament-development-security.

L. Fellowship programme

72. UNIDIR has a fellowship programme funded by the Government of Norway to enable scholars from developing countries to do research on disarmament and related international security issues at the Institute. Researchers from India and the United Republic of Tanzania are doing work at the Institute under the programme.

IV. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

73. UNIDIR continued to develop and maintain close relations with other organs and organizations of the United Nations system interested in disarmament.

74. In particular, close relations are maintained with the Department for Disarmament Affairs. UNIDIR staff have participated in such activities initiated by the Department as the inter-agency consultation on disarmament and development and the regional conferences within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, New Delhi, 22 to 26 August 1983 and Leningrad, 11 to 15 June 1984. In carrying out a number of studies as, for instance, "The Establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development" and "South Africa's Nuclear Capability", UNIDIR has invited and obtained the active participation of the Department.

75. The Institute worked closely with other agencies such as IAEA, the International Labour Organisation, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations University on projects of common interest.

76. Consultations were held with the Organization of African Unity on such projects as the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (South Africa's nuclear capability) and the convening of a regional conference/symposia on Africa: disarmament-development-security.

77. Relations with other research institutes continue to expand. The joint UNIDIR/SIPRI symposium on environmental warfare, organized in co-operation with UNEP, in which members of the diplomatic community in Geneva have also participated, constitutes a positive experience.

78. The staff of the Institute and researchers participating in the UNIDIR programme have addressed conferences of non-governmental organizations, academic audiences and representatives of the mass media on subjects within the Institute's purview. A number of written contributions have been made to some specialized publications.

79. Press conferences and individual interviews were given in Geneva, New York and other cities. As a contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign launched by the United Nations, UNIDIR prepared and published, in co-operation with the Information Service of the United Nations Office at Geneva, a short guide entitled "Sources of information on Disarmament and Related Issues" and distributed widely some of its publications prepared for mass readership.

80. The Institute's role in its relationship with non-governmental organizations and the media is based on its mandate to provide the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race and disarmament.

V. CONCLUSIONS

81. The Institute has carried out its activities on the basis of General Assembly resolutions and of the programme approved by the Board of Trustees.

82. The two reports requested by the General Assembly - the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development (A/39/229) and South Africa's nuclear capability (A/39/470) - have been prepared and submitted to the Assembly.

83. UNIDIR has completed, with very limited means at its disposal, a number of research projects. They are in line with the objectives of the Institute.

84. Regional organizations and national governments have shown interest in developing contacts and sought the support of UNIDIR for activities in the field of international security and disarmament.

85. Continuous efforts should be made to strengthen the scientific capacity of the Institute.

86. In order to succeed, the Institute has to have its statute approved and the material conditions for work assured.
