



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/39/348  
31 August 1984

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-ninth session  
Item 65 (c) of the provisional agenda\*

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Study on conventional disarmament

Report of the Secretary-General

1. On 12 December 1980, the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/156 A by which it approved the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts. The Assembly agreed that the Disarmament Commission should work out the general approach to the study, its structure and scope and requested it to convey to the Secretary-General the conclusions of its deliberations, which should constitute the guidelines for the study. By its resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish the Group of Experts to carry out such a study. The General Assembly extended the mandate of the study by resolution 38/188 A of 20 December 1983 and requested the Secretary-General to submit the final report at its thirty-ninth session.

2. Pursuant to the above-mentioned resolutions, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit herewith to the Assembly the study on conventional disarmament.

\* A/39/150.

ANNEX

Study on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament  
relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL .....		6
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL .....		7
<u>Chapter</u>		
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1 - 47	12
II. NATURE, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE	48 - 103	25
A. Nature and causes of the conventional arms race ....	48 - 77	25
B. Impact and trends of technological developments ....	78 - 89	36
C. Social, economic and political effects .....	90 - 98	39
D. Consequences for international relations, peace and security .....	99 - 103	40
III. CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT: PRINCIPLES, APPROACHES AND MEASURES .....	104 - 180	42
A. Principles of conventional disarmament .....	104 - 106	42
B. Types of approaches to conventional disarmament ....	107 - 143	42
1. General perspective .....	107 - 113	42
2. Effective use of international machinery in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations .....	114 - 118	44
3. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations, parallel actions by mutual example, unilateral initiatives .....	119 - 122	46
4. Regional approaches and their relation to global aspects of conventional disarmament .....	123 - 127	47
5. Mutual and verifiable arms limitations and reductions .....	128 - 133	49
6. Enhancement of international stability and security: military aspects .....	134 - 139	50
7. Modalities of limitations and reductions (qualitative/quantitative, weapons/forces ...)	140 - 143	52

CONTENTS (continued)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
C. Possible concrete measures .....	144 - 180	53
1. General perspective .....	144 - 149	53
2. Reductions in military <u>matériel</u> .....	150 - 151	54
3. Reductions in personnel .....	152 - 154	55
4. Reductions in military expenditure .....	155 - 158	56
5. Reductions and restrictions on military deployments .....	159 - 162	57
6. Restraints on militarily-relevant research, development and testing .....	163 - 164	58
7. Supplier and/or recipient agreements on reductions of international arms transfers ....	165 - 169	59
8. Confidence-building measures .....	170 - 176	60
9. Public information .....	177 - 180	61
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	181 - 201	62
Notes .....		69
ANNEXES		
I. GUIDELINES FOR THE STUDY ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT .....		71
II. WORKING PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION .....		74
A. Working paper submitted by India .....		74
B. Working paper submitted by China .....		75
C. Working paper submitted by Denmark .....		77
D. Working paper submitted by the German Democratic Republic .....		80

FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The present study was carried out by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981.
2. While the subject of conventional arms and armed forces, in its widest sense, has been accorded attention in other contexts in the United Nations - such as studies on regional disarmament, the economic and social consequences of the arms race and the relationship between disarmament and development - this study constitutes the first effort at a comprehensive consideration of the subject as a whole.
3. In their report, the experts make it abundantly clear that, because of the nuclear threat to the human race as a whole, measures of nuclear disarmament must continue to have the highest priority. Yet the report also notes that since the end of the Second World War, over 20 million people have lost their lives in some 150 armed conflicts and current trends do not give any reason to believe that there will be a decrease in the incidence and severity of such engagements. Over four fifths of the world's total expenditure for military purposes is spent on conventional arms and armed forces.
4. As I have remarked on previous occasions, the situation relating to conventional arms is a source of increasing concern. The resources devoted to huge arsenals, nuclear and conventional, restrict the amount of funds that can be devoted to science, education, environmental protection and development, which are of great importance to the future of the inhabitants of developed and developing countries alike. Furthermore, the apprehensions of many nations concerning their security are such that they feel impelled to spend valuable resources, which most can ill-afford, for defence purposes rather than on pressing social and economic needs. At the same time, therefore, as efforts are made towards achieving nuclear disarmament, the broad international community, both outside and within the United Nations, should focus additional efforts on the need to find effective measures of conventional disarmament in order to assist in diverting the sinews of war towards the better goal of social and economic progress.
5. It should be noted that the observations and recommendations contained in the present report are those of the members of the Group of Experts. I wish to take this opportunity of thanking them for their valuable efforts in preparing this report, which was adopted by consensus on 23 June 1984 and which is hereby submitted for the attention of the General Assembly.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

23 June 1984

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces, which was appointed by you in pursuance of paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981.

The experts appointed in accordance with the General Assembly resolution were the following:

Mr. M'hamed Achache  
Director of International Political Affairs  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Algeria

(First and second sessions)

Mr. Alexander Akalovsky  
United States Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
Washington  
United States of America

(Fourth to seventh sessions)

Mr. Ahmed Attaf  
Director of International Political Affairs  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Algeria

(Third to seventh sessions)

Mr. Claudio Bay-Rossi  
First Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of Italy  
to the United Nations  
New York

(Fifth to seventh sessions)

Mr. François Bureau  
Research Fellow in Strategic and  
Arms Control Affairs  
University of the Sorbonne  
France

(First to fourth sessions)

His Excellency  
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar  
Secretary-General of the United Nations  
New York

Mr. Hervé Cassan  
Professor of International Law  
University of Paris  
France

(Fifth to seventh sessions)

Mr. J. Chandoga  
Head of the Section on Disarmament  
Department of International Organizations  
in the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
Czechoslovakia

(Sixth and seventh sessions)

Mr. Antonio Ciarrapico  
Minister Plenipotentiary  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Italy

(First to fourth sessions)

Mr. Milutin Civic  
Colonel  
Federal Secretariat for National Defence  
Yugoslavia

Mr. Vicente Espeche Gil  
Minister Plenipotentiary  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship  
Argentina

Mr. Charles C. Flowerree  
Ambassador  
Former Representative of the United States  
of America to the Committee on  
Disarmament in Geneva

(First to third sessions)

Mr. Ferenc Gyarmati  
Counsellor  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Hungary

Mr. Wolf-Eberhard von dem Hagen  
Colonel  
Military Adviser to the Delegation of the  
Federal Republic of Germany to the  
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

Mr. Kashi Prasad Jain  
Director (Disarmament)  
Ministry of External Affairs  
India

Mr. Miloslav Jezil  
Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Czechoslovakia

(Third to fifth sessions)

Mr. A. R. Kamazima  
Brigadier  
Army Headquarters  
United Republic of Tanzania

Mr. Teruo Kawakita  
First Secretary, Delegation of Japan to the  
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

Mr. Ahmed Tawfik Khalil  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of Egypt  
to the United Nations  
New York

(Seventh session)

Mr. Y. V. Korneyev  
Engineer Major-General  
Ministry of Defence of the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics

(Fifth to seventh sessions)

Mr. Hans Maretzki  
Professor Doctor  
German Democratic Republic

Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin  
Ambassador  
Head of the Permanent Delegation to the  
Conference on Confidence- and Security-  
building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

Mr. Jorge Morelli-Pando  
Ambassador  
Ministry of External Affairs  
Peru

Mr. Amre Moussa  
Deputy  
Permanent Representative of Egypt  
to the United Nations  
New York

(First to sixth sessions)

Mr. Sa Benwang  
Ministry of National Defence  
China

Ms. Amada Segarra  
Ministry of Foreign Relations  
Ecuador

Mr. John Simpson  
Senior Lecturer in Politics  
University of Southampton  
United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland

Mr. Milan Stembera  
Ministry of Defence  
Czechoslovakia

(First and second sessions)

Mr. M. O. Sule  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Military Adviser  
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the  
United Nations  
New York

Mr. Nana S. Sutresna  
Ambassador  
Director-General for Political Affairs  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Indonesia

Mr. B. M. Tatarnikov  
Major-General  
Department of International Organizations  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics

(First to fourth sessions)

Mr. Sergio Martins Thompson-Flores  
Ambassador  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Brazil

The report was prepared between July 1982 and June 1984 during which period the Group held seven sessions, the first from 12 to 16 July 1982, the second from 6 to 17 December 1982, the third from 11 to 22 April 1983, the fourth from 18 to 29 July 1983, the fifth from 5 to 16 September 1983, the sixth from 23 January to 3 February 1984, and the seventh from 11 to 23 June 1984. All sessions were held in New York, with the exception of the second session which was held at Geneva.

The members of the Group of Experts wish to express their gratitude for the assistance which they received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations. They wish, in particular, to thank Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Derek Boothby, who served as Secretary of the Group and Mr. Nazir Kamal, who served as Consultant to the Secretariat.

Although individual members might, on certain points, have preferred views to be expressed in a different manner, it is with satisfaction that I am able to

inform you, on behalf of all members of the Group, that the report as a whole has been adopted by consensus.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) S. G. MELLBIN  
Chairman of the Group of Experts  
on All Aspects of the  
Conventional Arms Race and on  
Disarmament relating to  
Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### General Assembly resolutions, guidelines set by the Disarmament Commission

1. By its resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980, the General Assembly approved, in principle, the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis. It also agreed that the Disarmament Commission, at its session in 1981, should work out the general approach to the study, its structure and scope and requested that the Commission's conclusions should be conveyed to the Secretary-General to constitute the guidelines for the study. The Secretary-General was requested to submit his final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, in 1983.
2. Pursuant to that resolution, the Disarmament Commission considered the matter during its session from 18 May to 5 June 1981, during which time intensive discussions and consultations revealed a significant divergence of views. It became clear that it was not possible at that stage for the Commission to reach agreement.
3. By its resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish the Group of Experts in accordance with the provisions of resolution 35/156 A and requested the Disarmament Commission at its 1982 session to complete its consideration of the general approach to the study, its structure and scope and to transmit the conclusions to the Group of Experts. The Assembly also agreed that the Group of Experts should pursue its work after the above-mentioned session of the Disarmament Commission, taking into consideration such conclusions as the Commission might submit to it and, if necessary, the deliberations of the Commission at its 1981 substantive session. Resolution 36/97 A also reiterated the request that the Secretary-General should submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.
4. In 1983 the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session containing a letter from the Chairman of the Group of Experts to the effect that, owing to the very wide area embraced by the study and the sensitivity of the issues involved, the Group of Experts needed more time to complete its work (A/38/437). By its resolution 38/188 A of 20 December 1983, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue the study and to submit the final report to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.
5. At its 1982 session, the Disarmament Commission agreed upon a text entitled "Guidelines for the study on conventional disarmament", which is reproduced in annex I.
6. With these guidelines in mind this report is presented in four chapters. Following the introduction in chapter I, the nature, causes and effects of the conventional arms race are considered in chapter II. Chapter III describes principles, approaches and measures of conventional disarmament, and chapter IV contains the conclusions and recommendations of the Group of Experts.

Relevant principles derived from the Final Document

7. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), adopted by consensus by the Assembly in 1978 at its first special session devoted to disarmament and solemnly reaffirmed at its twelfth special session, in 1982, the second special session devoted to disarmament, represents the international disarmament strategy for the international community.
8. The principles derived from the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session which provide the perspective on and address the subjects of the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament contain the following main elements:
- (a) The existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race pose a threat to the very survival of mankind. (Preamble)
- (b) The accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. (Para. 1)
- (c) The continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind. (Para. 2)
- (d) The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds pose incalculable threats to peace. (Para. 11)
- (e) Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The choice is either to halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation. (Para. 18)
- (f) The goal of disarmament efforts in this nuclear age is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Negotiations should take place towards that end. Negotiations on partial and more comprehensive measures should be conducted concurrently. (Paras. 19 and 38)
- (g) General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. (Para. 111)
- (h) Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. (Paras. 45 and 46)

(i) Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a worldwide basis. Progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned. (Paras. 54 and 55)

(j) Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the needs of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the same principle, and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right. (Paras. 22 and 81)

(k) Further international action should be taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be excessively injurious, cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. (Para. 23)

(l) All States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (Paras. 58 and 59)

(m) A more stable situation in Europe should be achieved at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity as well as undiminished security of all States with full respect for security interests and independence of States outside military alliances. (Para. 82)

(n) Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. (Para. 31)

(o) Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons taking into account the need of States to protect their security and bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. (Para. 83)

(p) Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament. (Para. 84)

(q) Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis and/or through parallel actions based on a policy of mutual example would contribute to the curbing of the arms race. (Para. 89)

(r) The dynamic development of détente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions conducive to the efforts of States to end the arms race, which has engulfed the world, thus reducing the danger of war. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other. (Para. 3)

(s) All States Members of the United Nations should stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any States, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent rights of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter. (Para. 26)

(t) In order to facilitate the process of disarmament it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States, including commitments to confidence-building measures. (Para. 93)

(u) The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. (Para. 29)

#### Objectives and purposes of the study

9. Primarily, the study seeks to identify practical approaches and realistic measures that could lead to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and that could contribute to promoting the primary objective of international peace and security.

10. Accordingly, the study addresses:

(a) The present state of the conventional arms race;

(b) The nature and fundamental causes of the accumulation of arms and armed forces beyond the legitimate needs of self-defence;

(c) The adverse social, economic and political effects arising from these developments;

(d) The consequences for international relations, peace and security;

(e) Various types of approaches and measures to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces;

(f) Specific recommendations on principles and practical measures that might be adopted to promote disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.

11. The hope, therefore, is that the study will help set in motion a process out of which a consensus on concepts and approaches might, in time, emerge without prejudice to other efforts currently under way and on the basis of generally recognized principles, including, in particular, those contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session. The aim is to single out areas in which negotiations likely to lead to genuine results may be held, inasmuch as the way to achieve the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons is through negotiation and the reaching of agreements.

12. The study recognizes that the use of nuclear weapons represents an infinitely greater prospect of incalculable harm to the future of the human species than the use of conventional arms, and in fact poses a threat to the very survival of mankind. This was illustrated in the first United Nations study on nuclear weapons (1967) which stated that:

"... the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered". 1/

Paramount importance in international negotiations must therefore be given to measures aimed at preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons. However, progress in limiting conventional weapons and reducing armed forces, in particular among States with the largest military arsenals, would facilitate progress in the limitation of nuclear weapons and their subsequent elimination.

13. Another purpose, no less important, is to contribute to the World Disarmament Campaign launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and to inform and encourage public opinion in favour of disarmament. This study will, it is hoped, assist the Secretary-General in his efforts to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, in the context of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament. The study will also encourage Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament in order to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments.

### Definition of conventional weapons

14. It is not easy to give a short and precise definition of the conventional weapons and armed forces which form the subject-matter of this study. In fact, whereas strict and unambiguous definitions would be needed when negotiating a treaty, what is required here is rather a broad characterization of the subject which focuses attention on the main issues, but which is at the same time comprehensive enough to encompass all that is pertinent.

15. The main focus in a study of conventional disarmament must clearly be those conventional weapons and forces which constitute the bulk of the global military build-up and those which figure prominently in contemporary armed conflicts and in assessments of the military power of States. The main focus, in short, is the land, sea and air forces, and other kinds of armed services, and their weapons, and military technology together with equipment and facilities. However, no weapons or military means in general should be excluded from the field of conventional disarmament except those weapons which are dealt with in other contexts, namely, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, radiological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In practice, the term "conventional weapons" has acquired both inclusive and exclusive meanings: on the one hand, it points to certain broad categories of weapons whilst, on the other, it denotes weapons that are not of certain specified types, deemed "weapons of mass destruction". Both meanings must be retained in this study to make it both focused and comprehensive.

16. Faced with a similar problem of characterizing the field it would cover, the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments, in a resolution adopted in August 1948, advised the Security Council that the Commission considered:

"... that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". 2/

17. This approach in which conventional weapons are understood to mean all weapons other than weapons of mass destruction has been adopted in all subsequent work on disarmament in the context of the United Nations. With further elaboration, it is also suitable for the purposes of this study.

18. First, it is evident that "weapons" or "armaments and armed forces" must be understood as "means of warfare" in the widest sense. They include forces, weapons and weapon systems as well as all other military equipment and military facilities.

19. Second, the notion of "mass destruction" was characterized by the Commission both in terms of the physical principles on which the weapons are based and in terms of the scale of the destructive effect of the weapons. This apparent ambiguity should not be misunderstood. It implies that new types of weapons with similar destructive effect might in the future be recognized as weapons of mass destruction, whatever the physical principles on which that effect is based,

although up to now no such weapons have been identified. But it does not mean that weapons hitherto regarded as weapons of mass destruction become conventional or "ordinary" means of warfare simply by manufacturing smaller warheads: nuclear, chemical and similar weapons retain their character as weapons of mass destruction, however small their size. The fact that certain conventional weapons, in particular area munitions, such as cluster bombs, fuel-air explosives and incendiaries, might cause loss of life and/or destruction on a scale comparable to that of chemical munitions and even of the smallest types of nuclear explosives should not be permitted to blur the fundamental qualitative distinction between weapons of mass destruction and other types of weapons. Nor is this essential distinction affected by the fact that conventional munitions have been used on occasion for purposes of mass destruction, e.g. the use of bomber aircraft for carpet bombing in the Second World War.

20. Another apparent complication arises from the existence of dual-purpose equipment, i.e. artillery, missiles, aircraft, etc., designed to be used both with nuclear (or chemical) and with conventional high-explosive munitions. In one sense, it is the warheads, and not the carriers and the associated equipment and forces, which are weapons of mass destruction; and yet it is the complete weapon system that has to be taken into account. Similarly, while in some instances it is possible to identify certain units of armed forces as serving with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, others as serving with conventional weapons, and yet others that may be trained and equipped to use both, there are many whose skills and deployment are intended to provide support services to all. Examples of such military personnel are those employed in communications, administrative, logistic, basic training, medical, dental and physical security functions. In practice, however, limitations, reductions and prohibitions of dual-purpose equipment and forces could be agreed upon during negotiations either in the context of conventional disarmament or in the context of disarmament relating to weapons of mass destruction.

21. Finally, it bears underlining that for the purposes of this study the term "conventional" also covers types of weapons which encompass radically new techniques arising from qualitative technological advances but which are not weapons of mass destruction, such as laser-guided, particle-beam or other directed energy systems. "Conventional" weapons should not be understood restrictively as referring only to orthodox or traditional weapons.

22. In brief, therefore, the formulation of the Commission on Conventional Armaments, as quoted in paragraph 16 above, remains the basis for the present analysis it being understood that it is taken as a broad characterization of the subject of this study rather than as a definition in a formal sense.

#### Brief historical background since 1945

23. The year 1945 was selected as the starting point for the study for three important reasons. First, it was the year that saw the end of a global conflict which took, it has been estimated, more than 50 million lives all of which, except for the grave tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were as a result of the use of conventional weapons. Secondly, 1945 saw the appearance and use of nuclear weapons

whose dark shadow has since hung over mankind and which continue to be the first ever and greatest threat to the survival of the human race. Thirdly, 1945 also saw the birth of the United Nations Organization designed first and foremost, as stated in the opening words of the Preamble to the Charter:

"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind ...".

24. The question of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces was taken up by the United Nations, concurrently with the question of nuclear weapons and atomic energy, during the first session of the General Assembly in 1946. The issue became a subject of negotiations in the following year when the Security Council, to which the General Assembly had referred the matter by a resolution that was passed unanimously, established a Commission on Conventional Armaments. The Commission envisaged "a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, in order to make possible the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources pursuant to Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations". Armaments and armed forces were to be regulated and reduced to the extent "consistent with and indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security". Fundamental differences of approach within the Security Council, however, marred the Commission's work from the start. At the General Assembly's request, the Security Council formally dissolved the Commission in 1952; the question of conventional disarmament was then considered along with the question of nuclear disarmament by a newly established Disarmament Commission and, from 1954, also in its five-Power Sub-Committee comprised of Canada, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Within the General Assembly the issue of conventional armaments was taken up annually in the framework of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. However, the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee failed to reach any agreement and the latter did not reconvene after its 1957 session. Towards the end of 1959, decisions were taken both within and outside the United Nations leading to the resumption of negotiations on disarmament. On 20 November 1959, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 1378 (XIV), in which, inter alia, it expressed "the hope that measures leading towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time". Separately, a Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNDC), comprised of Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Poland, Romania, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, convened at Geneva in March 1960 but it, too, failed to achieve any success and ceased to function at the end of June 1960. Subsequently, in September 1961 a statement containing agreed principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations on disarmament was issued jointly by the Soviet Union and the United States for circulation to all States Members of the United Nations at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. That statement, inter alia, made it clear that the goal of disarmament negotiations should be to achieve general and complete disarmament, under strict and effective international control. Thus, both nuclear and conventional disarmament measures were seen in that context. In resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, the General Assembly welcomed the joint statement and recommended that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based on the principles set out therein.

25. With the establishment in 1962 of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva, negotiations took place, inter alia, on a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, but without any result. The focus remained on the priority task of nuclear disarmament and the question of conventional armaments received little attention. The situation remained unchanged when ENDC was expanded and converted into the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1969; this remained the case even when a further enlargement of the membership of CCD took place in 1975.

26. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was an ever-increasing accumulation of weapons, both nuclear and conventional. The fact that the existing nuclear-weapon States were increasing their nuclear-weapon stockpiles heightened the general concern about the maintenance of international security. This, together with the possibility that additional States would resort to the development of nuclear weapons as a means of strengthening their security, raised the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, qualitative and quantitative refinements to conventional weapons were being made, stockpiles were growing and the expenditure of resources on arms increased. Mounting concern at the direction of these trends led to the convening of the tenth special session of the General Assembly in 1978, the first special session devoted entirely to the subject of disarmament. This session identified priorities in disarmament negotiations as: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

27. The effort to deal with the issue of conventional armaments outside the United Nations framework has been mainly on a regional basis and, on the whole, the results have been meagre. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, not itself a disarmament document, laid down provisions for security in the broadest sense. Disarmament is not on the agenda of the first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The negotiations on mutual reductions of forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, begun at Vienna in 1973, remain inconclusive, although there has been some progress. Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of military activities in the Indian Ocean and, separately, on the question of conventional arms transfers, begun in 1977, have been suspended since 1979. At the regional level outside Europe, the peace-zone proposal for the Indian Ocean has made no headway, even though more than a decade has passed since it gained recognition as an important security measure.

28. Although Latin America is one of the least-armed regions in the world, eight Latin American States - Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela - signed the Declaration of Ayacucho in December 1974. The States concerned undertook to establish conditions permitting effective limitation of armaments and ending the acquisition of arms for offensive purposes, so that all possible resources might be devoted to the economic and social development of the Latin American countries. The Declaration has been reaffirmed in subsequent meetings and could be the basis for significant progress.

29. At the global level, the only substantive agreement in the area of conventional armaments is the recent Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects which was opened for signature in 1981. This Convention and its three Protocols provide new rules for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from injury or attack under various conditions by means of: (a) fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body by X-rays; (b) land-mines and booby-traps; and (c) incendiary (flame or heat) weapons. The Convention is an important step forward in the humanitarian area but it cannot be regarded as a measure of actual arms limitation or disarmament. Even so, it represents an advance on which there might be further improvement.

30. To sum up, the results of disarmament efforts devoted to conventional weapons, both inside and outside the United Nations framework have been meagre. In the absence of any significant curbs, the massive and competitive accumulation of conventional weapons, in particular by States with the largest military arsenals, has proceeded with only brief periods of abatement since the end of the Second World War and in recent years there has been a marked upward spiral in the conventional arms race, especially in its qualitative aspect.

#### Perspectives on the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament

31. The period since 1945 has seen remarkable scientific and technological change. The store of human knowledge has probably increased at a faster pace than during any other era, as has mankind's capacity and ability - particularly in a technological sense - to change the conditions in which human beings live. At the same time, the world's population has risen from some 2.5 billion to 4.7 billion and politically the world has changed significantly as many nations have gained their independence from colonialism or have otherwise achieved Statehood.

32. It has been estimated that throughout this period of uneasy peace the world has consistently devoted between 4.5 to 7 per cent of its GNP to military expenditure. Furthermore, in the past two years world military spending has been rising - in real terms - at about 5 per cent per year, well above the post-war trend. <sup>3/</sup> By far the largest proportion of total expenditure is attributable to the Soviet Union and the United States and their allies.

33. This persistent expenditure on arms and armed forces constitutes what is widely known as the arms race, the form and effects of which have been described and documented in many publications, including previous United Nations studies, as follows:

"The arms race involves, willingly or unwillingly, the militarily and economically most powerful States and the main political-military alliances, and, indirectly, the whole world, and has profound political, economic, social and psychological impacts on humanity. The intensive race to accumulate ever more sophisticated and destructive weapons and the elaboration of methods and means for their use affect in a most dangerous way every facet of international relations and constitute major obstacles to the establishment of a system of international relations based on justice, equality, independence and co-operation." <sup>4/</sup>

34. In a subsequent study the wider political implications of the arms race were described as follows:

"The arms race, of course, is primarily an expression of deeper political differences between States, but, as armaments accumulate, military security becomes both an intensifying concern and a more elusive state while at the same time the difficulty of resolving the underlying political issues is magnified by States. But the dilemma is that the process - the competitive accumulation of armaments - has taken such a firm root in the political, social economic and cultural fabric of societies that the growing insecurity it breeds simply generates a demand for more armaments." 5/

35. In terms of the threat posed by the world-wide arms race, the existence and possibility of use of nuclear weapons places in jeopardy the very survival of mankind. This underlines the primary importance of effective measures of nuclear disarmament and of the prevention of nuclear war so fully recognized by the United Nations General Assembly in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session. At the same time, there is a pressing need for measures to halt the conventional arms race. Since the Second World War, there has been an almost uninterrupted series of wars which have been fought with conventional weapons and which have caused untold suffering and destruction. Casualties, direct and indirect, have been in the millions. In some cases there have been serious possibilities that conflicts or crises might have escalated into nuclear war. In fact, the present international climate of insecurity and confrontation both aggravates and is aggravated by the ongoing arms race in nuclear and conventional weapons.

36. Another important reason for taking up the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces is the cost of the arms race. Military expenditures were estimated to be approaching \$US 800 billion in 1983, depending on the method of calculation, 6/ and are likely to exceed that figure in 1984. At least four fifths of that amount, it is generally believed, are absorbed by conventional arms and armed forces, the vast majority being borne by the States with the largest military arsenals and other militarily significant States. This huge consumption of material and technical as well as human resources for potentially destructive purposes is in stark contrast to the urgent need for social and economic development, for which many of these resources might otherwise have been used.

37. These factors together with the complexities of the present world situation demand effective measures aimed at eliminating the threat of war, easing tensions between nations and strengthening international and national security.

38. Though differing in scale, arms races are not new phenomena in the history of the world. But, in the present era for the first time an arms race has acquired a truly global character. The contemporary accumulation of arms, both nuclear and conventional, also undermines international peace and security, reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts and jeopardizes the security of all States.

39. Progress towards conventional disarmament cannot proceed very far in the absence of substantial progress in nuclear disarmament. Conventional disarmament in isolation would perpetuate existing asymmetries in the security of States in favour of those States which possess nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. In certain areas limitations and reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces without accompanying reductions or elimination of nuclear capabilities in the region would leave non-nuclear-weapon States at a disadvantage. The conventional disarmament process should not jeopardize the security of any State and it should be aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament. In fact, that conventional disarmament should be pursued in conjunction with nuclear disarmament is a fundamental principle which has been reiterated by the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and the guidelines of the Disarmament Commission for this study (see annex I).

40. Conventional arms development takes place in a small but growing number of States. However, the largest producers and suppliers of weapons to others bear a special responsibility. Even so, recent years have witnessed the acquisition of weapons beyond the needs of self-defence by many other States and it has to be recognized that, in accordance with paragraph 28 of the Final Document, all States have a duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. There is much that the States with the largest military arsenals could do to curb the conventional arms race by way of agreements amongst themselves and to exercise extreme restraint in projecting their military strength beyond areas of their territorial concerns. However, this by no means absolves all other States from discharging their responsibilities towards reversing the conventional arms race.

41. As far as global and regional aspects of conventional disarmament are concerned, both should be taken up simultaneously. As the conventional arms race is global in character, this factor must be taken into account in adopting approaches to conventional disarmament. This is not to overlook the existence of local and regional aspects or to make light of the role these aspects play in exacerbating the conventional arms race, but only to put the accumulation of arms in perspective. Local and regional aspects also play an important role in the context of the conventional arms race and it is mainly in this context that the regional approach assumes considerable importance. Clearly, just as there are significant differences in factors affecting each region, so the approaches selected will differ: thus, for instance, approaches in Europe, which contains the largest regional concentration of conventional arms and armed forces and large numbers of nuclear weapons as well, will not necessarily apply elsewhere although experience gained in Europe may be useful in other regions too.

42. Regional disarmament is a necessary complement to global measures and an important constituent in the step-by-step approach to global disarmament. In particular, it can facilitate global negotiations aimed at general and complete disarmament through promoting security, mutual confidence and co-operation among States. Regional restraint in the production, acquisition and accumulation of conventional weapons can also contribute to world-wide disarmament in the conventional field.

43. A number of proposals have been, and are being, considered within the United Nations framework which have a bearing on the question of conventional forces and armaments. Among these have been proposals for the limitation and reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments, proposals for limitations of, or reductions in, military expenditure, proposals relating to international arms transfers and proposals for non-stationing of weapons of any kind, including anti-satellite weapons, in outer space.

44. Another line of action pursued has been to adapt and expand the international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts by prohibitions, or restrictions on use, of certain conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Prohibitions of this type were included in the Hague Conventions at the turn of the century, in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and in the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. However, in general, it can be said that progress has been slow and inadequate.

45. The reversal of the arms race is closely interrelated, inter alia, with the strengthening of international security and the attempt to make international relations more predictable, the concept of establishing trust among States, the willingness of States to settle their disputes by peaceful means and ultimately with the possibilities for normalization or stabilization of the relations of States with their neighbours or potential adversaries. Furthermore, political divisions between States often become integrally bound with the pressures of a competitive accumulation of arms, sometimes leading to the outbreak of armed conflicts and further worsening of relations. The interference of those States with the largest military arsenals can greatly deepen local conflicts and plunge regions into protracted turmoil. In regions which may be regarded as strategically or economically sensitive, such turmoil can be a source of considerable threat to international security.

46. Expenditure on conventional arms ensures the continued diversion of increasingly vast amounts of scarce resources for military purposes and this deprives the world of the means of alleviating human misery and strengthening mankind's material prospects. The deterioration of the human and material condition is a major source of increased social and political instability in the world.

47. The principal purpose of disarmament efforts is to increase the security of all States. At each stage of the process it is necessary to provide at the very least for their undiminished security. It is only when the framework of the effort to reverse the conventional arms race is defined in terms that ensure security of States at the lowest possible levels of armaments that it will be possible to obtain the widest consensus among States. It is, therefore, essential that the various approaches and proposals for reversing the arms race and for seeking conventional disarmament should reflect and produce effects that accord with these abiding concerns. A major principle in this context is the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence as provided in the Charter of the United Nations and States cannot be expected to reduce significantly their

armaments without the establishment of a climate of greater security. It therefore follows that the provision of enhanced security must be a basic element of negotiations towards the achievement of conventional disarmament, as part of a process of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

## CHAPTER II

### NATURE, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE

#### A. Nature and causes of the conventional arms race

48. The present arms race that began after 1945 has assumed a world-wide character affecting all major regions. The nuclear-weapon States and the two military alliances account for the overwhelming proportion of armed forces and weapons in the world. Furthermore, most of the world's armaments and combat equipment are produced in a small number of countries and, while other countries and regions are acquiring weapons at an increasing rate, by far the largest part of the weapons produced remain in the arsenals of the producing States themselves. These countries also carry out most of the world's military research and development, although the two most powerful States are far ahead of the others in this respect. Nearly all technological innovation in weaponry takes place in five or six countries. The pace of the arms race and the rate of obsolescence of weapons throughout the world are heavily influenced by these few countries.

49. The roots of the present arms race are many and complex. To a large extent they can be found in political and socio-economic differences between the countries from the two groups of States which later came to form the two main alliances. In political terms, the tensions between East and West still constitute the central feature of the present arms race. Behind the arms build-up in the world there is also a complex tangle of criss-crossing conflicts and confrontations, some related to specific situations existing in particular regions and some domestic in origin. Many of these conflicts tend to be drawn into the East-West context, sometimes through the political sympathies or at the initiative of the countries concerned, or sometimes at the initiative of countries of the two groups. This tends to exacerbate both these conflicts themselves and East-West tensions.

50. Attempts to preserve existing relationships in the world, or to change those relationships in favour of one State or a group of States at the expense of another are also contributing factors to the arms race; in effect, this is detrimental to the security of all countries.

51. In withdrawing from their colonial possessions, the former colonial Powers left behind a legacy of problems which have aggravated tensions and have further complicated the present arms race. In some places, the process of achieving independence is not entirely complete and in these instances racial and colonial domination as well as the denial of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence constitute a factor for the acceleration of the arms race and hence threaten regional stability and international peace and security. There are some regions where force levels are comparatively minor and where the primary security

concerns of States are not the forces of other countries of the region, but acts of colonialism, imperialism, interference or intervention, originated by extra-regional States. In other regions primary security concerns continue to be force levels, massive arms supplies, the perpetuation of conflicts, and practices and/or threats of interference and intervention, in particular armed intervention, by some States within the region. In all cases these factors, inter alia, seriously endanger international peace and security and adversely affect prospects for halting and reversing the arms race.

52. In the area of the greatest accumulation of weapons, namely, Europe, the military situation has been relatively stable. However, owing to the awesome character of the arsenals available to the countries involved, and to the political and military conditions in the region, any armed conflict is capable of igniting a global nuclear conflagration.

53. Underlying the global arms build-up is the perception of fundamental political, social and ideological differences and of basic conflicts of interest. Instances of hostile or aggressive conduct, the development and introduction of new and modern weapons or increase in military budgets and forces have frequently led to a perception of danger and have induced other States to take countermeasures. In turn, these are often perceived as threatening or hostile or as attempts to achieve military superiority or to dominate over others. In some cases, counter-weapons have been developed or preventive action has been taken not in response to actual conduct but in anticipation of possible steps by the other side. Finally, there are also entirely different types of causes, such as the existence of internal pressures for weapons and forces emanating from military and civilian establishments. Once an arms race as all-encompassing as the present one is under way it continues largely of its own momentum, all the while creating new grounds for fear and recrimination. In practice, it is impossible in every case to separate all these different factors and determine their relative importance.

54. One of the most basic problems underlying the arms race has been ineffective implementation and use of the system of collective security envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. Member States have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence until the necessary international measures can be brought to bear on the situation, but in the absence of an effective guarantee of their security nations have sought security in their own military forces or in those of allies.

55. A large number of armed conflicts have occurred since the end of the Second World War. The exact number depends on the criteria used and several lists using different methods have been drawn up. A widely recognized source shows 120 armed conflicts, including those involving sub-national groups, in the period 1945-1976. <sup>7/</sup> By now, the number of armed conflicts since 1945 has probably risen to over 150. More than half of the Member States of the United Nations have participated in one or more of these conflicts, which were fought in the territories of over 71 States. The developing world has been the stage, and indeed the victim, of almost all of these armed conflicts, many of which might have escalated to situations dangerous for world security. A large majority of them have been marked by various forms of involvement, including intervention, sometimes

at the invitation of one or both parties, on the part of developed countries, varying from covert assistance or limited logistic support to full participation.

56. It has been estimated that over 20 million people have died in these conflicts. A conservative estimate of human losses since 1960 puts the figure at about 11 million. <sup>8/</sup> Moreover, the heavy death toll presents only a partial view of the magnitude of human suffering caused by these conflicts. Nor do current trends give any reason to believe that there will be a decrease in the incidence and severity of armed conflicts.


57. If current trends continue it is inevitable that there will not only be more and continued human suffering but also a continual rise in the world's military expenditure, to the further detriment of social and economic development in the world. As a general rule, acute political conflicts often lead to substantial increases in military expenditure. The costs of attendant preparations for war and supporting military action, and the subsequent costs of replacing lost equipment and damaged installations, are very high indeed. Moreover, the social and economic penalties are rarely, in this modern interdependent world, limited to the participants themselves.

58. The conventional arms race endangers international security in a number of ways. First, in heightening military confrontation and increasing political tensions, it can enhance the possibility of armed conflict between the major Powers, a development that could lead to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, it threatens to increase the incidence and severity of armed conflicts in different regions of the world. Thirdly, it increases global and regional political tensions in different regions and in the world as a whole and thereby impedes the progress of international society towards a more stable world order. Fourthly, it leads to the diversion, in increasing amounts, of scarce resources, both human and material, that are urgently needed to improve the material well-being and the general welfare of mankind.

59. As shown in figure 1 below, except for brief periods of relative stability, the world's military expenditure has been alarmingly on the increase since after the end of the Second World War and has probably quadrupled over what must be regarded historically as a relatively short time-scale. Currently, as indicated in paragraph 36, the world's total military expenditure is estimated to be in excess of \$US 800 billion a year. During the 1970s, it increased in real terms at an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent. In recent years, the rate of increase has been much higher. Over the past 10 years alone, the world's military expenditure has totalled more than five thousand billion dollars at 1980 prices. If recent trends should persist, the world's military expenditure could reach or exceed one thousand billion dollars a year, in current dollars, well before 1990.

60. The numbers, costs and capabilities of conventional weapons and armed forces at present in the world are very difficult to measure with accuracy. Statistics released by Governments often have differing bases of calculation and variations in definition and concepts make comparability a task to be undertaken with great caution, particularly in the area of international comparisons of financial cost. Many countries decline to make available detailed statistics of expenditure,

Figure 1. WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 1949-1982  
(Billion United States dollars, in constant (1978) prices  
and exchange rates)



Source: Adapted from World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook, 1981,  
p. 3.

matériel and personnel on a regular basis on the grounds that to do so would endanger national security. Other countries release much more information. In any event, the complexities of individual national budgetary systems are such that it is impossible to determine with clarity the full-range of military activities and expenditures that are included. In some cases substantial amounts of military expenditure may be hidden under civilian items, e.g., much military R and D may be shown under science and technology development in the civilian side of a country's budget. The level of military expenditures alone does not necessarily relate to operational availability and efficacy of armed forces and weapons which vary widely from country to country and even within different units of one national force. This arises from a wide range of factors, such as the nature of the weapons and equipment, technical proficiency, logistic support, the length of service of individuals in the armed forces, morale, training, the qualities of organization and leadership and so on. Thus, comparison and judgement of conventional arms and armed forces are often very subjective; this itself becomes part of the problem in that a nation's assessment of its needs for weapons and military personnel to a large extent arises from its perception of threat to national security and interests represented by the military strength of potential adversaries.


61. However, for the purposes of this study general data is sufficient to illustrate the size of the problem and so the information given in this subsection may be taken as a very general guide. According to SIPRI, about 70 per cent of the world's military expenditure can be attributed to six main military spenders (alphabetically, China, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America) of which the largest share is by the two major military Powers. The levels of military expenditures of different categories of countries are shown in figure 2 on the following page.

62. A significant proportion of military expenditure is consumed by personnel costs, notwithstanding the fact that there are wide variations in pay, allowances and personnel support services from country to country. The world's armed forces at present are estimated to total more than 25 million military personnel. <sup>9/</sup> That total excludes para-military forces, reservists and non-military personnel engaged directly or indirectly in military-related activities, whose number considerably exceeds the numbers of military personnel. Rather than decreasing during periods of comparative peace as was generally the case up to the Second World War, the size of the world's regular forces has increased by more than 30 per cent over the past 20 years.

63. The weapons and equipment available for use are extensive in numbers, variety and efficacy. Among the militarily-significant States there has been a strong shift to weapons of high technology and correspondingly high cost in recent years. Conservative estimates indicate a total conventional weapons inventory which includes over 140,000 main battle tanks, over 35,000 combat aircraft, over 21,000 helicopters, over 1,100 major surface warships and over 700 attack submarines. <sup>10/</sup>

64. The cost of major weapons of more recent origin has increased dramatically when compared to weapon types produced in earlier decades, owing to vastly increased complexity. There has also been a substantial rise in the lethality of

**Figure 2. WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 1974-1983**  
World total and selected categories of countries  
(\$US billion - 1980 prices and 1980 exchange rates)



Source: derived from SIPRI Yearbook 1984, Appendix 3A.

Note: Not all experts in the Group accept the information given above.

such weapons, as demonstrated in recent armed conflicts in different regions of the world.

65. Apart from the increasing development and production costs of major weapons, the costs of operating them and keeping them at operational condition have also risen sharply and in some cases astronomically. Whilst some, usually smaller, weapons are now designed to be more easily maintained at operational condition by simple replacement of faulty components in the field, this is often not the case with more major weapons in that major upkeep and repair requires more extensive, technical facilities with all the support infrastructure demanded by such arrangements.

66. As previously shown, the countries of the two major alliances account, together with other militarily significant States, for the major share of the world's military expenditure and the world's military arsenal. Such a huge military build-up cannot but affect the security situation also of countries outside the immediate environment of alliance States. This implies that the present overall security situation of various regions cannot easily be regarded in isolation, but must also be seen as part of the continuing problem of ensuring and further strengthening international security.

67. The subject of arms transfers is a wide one. International arms transfers cover a wide range of forms extending from normal trade to outright gifts. Arms transfers are important in the context of the conventional arms race but are not at the centre of conventional disarmament problems. Many aspects can be argued as having validity, such as the acquisition of certain arms for legitimate needs of self-defence or that being involved in an alliance system inevitably carries with it internal arrangements for such matters as the transfer of arms, support and training. The situation is therefore complex and a variety of factors, domestic and external, act and interact to account for arms transfers.

68. The full extent of arms transfers is impossible to establish, due to the lack of complete information and the different methods used for compiling and valuing the transfers themselves. Many nations restrict disclosure of information on military sales or purchases. Even among the sources that do make reasonable comprehensive estimates there are sometimes wide variations. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) compiles available statistics of arms transfers to developing countries showing amounts and values of the deliveries of four categories of "major weapons", namely aircraft, missiles, armoured vehicles and ships. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) attempts to include all statistics on transfers of weapons, ammunition, support equipment and spare parts but acknowledges that some of its data is based on hard information and some on uncertain estimates. Numbers of weapons actually supplied are often difficult to calculate and even if a price may be reliably reported in one case it will not necessarily apply in another as weapons may be transferred on highly concessional terms. Prices may also be affected by such factors as production offsets, commodity barter, quantities bought and discounts, varying purchaser requirements for training and maintenance, differing amounts of spare parts and ammunition ordered, or a supplier's interest in making a transfer for political reasons.

69. From 1972, when the world total of arms imports stood at \$20.3 billion measured in constant 1981 values, the global arms trade has progressively expanded in real terms. By 1982 the total was estimated by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to be \$34.3 billion. The distribution was as follows:

Figure 3. REGIONAL/SUB-REGIONAL ARMS IMPORTS

(Billions United States dollars - constant 1981 prices)


<u>Region/Sub-region</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1982</u>
Europe	5.7	6.3
Middle East	3.91	14.4
Africa	1.0	5.1
North America	0.4	0.6
Latin America	0.8	2.6
South Asia	0.7	1.7
East Asia	7.6	3.4
Oceania	0.2	0.2

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982 (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency - April 1984), pps. 53-56.

70. Data from SIPRI, although containing certain differences, nevertheless confirms the general sense of ACDA estimates.

Figure 4. SHARES OF WORLD EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS


Shares of world exports of major weapons, 1978-82



Source: derived from  
SIPRI Yearbook 1983,  
Table 11.1,  
p.269.

According to SIPRI, during the five-year period 1978-82, the Soviet Union and the United States accounted for about a third each of total arms exports of major weapons. In all, some 90% stemmed from six countries.

Shares of world imports of major weapons, 1978-82



Source: derived from  
SIPRI Yearbook 1983  
Table 11 A.1,  
pp. 290-291.

According to SIPRI, the largest group of importers of major weapons is comprised of the industrialized countries themselves, whose imports totalled almost as much as the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia combined. The largest single region importing major weapons has been the Middle East (Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates), which experienced persistent conflicts or threat of conflict throughout the period.

71. On the supply-side, one of the important factors accounting for arms transfers is the continuous escalation of the arms race and military build-up by the major Powers, practices of confrontation and attempts to exert influence in various parts of the world. However, increased reliance on arms supplies as an instrument of foreign policy is also influenced by the nature of the situation in any region where influence is sought. Disputes between States or ambition on the part of one or more of them can make arms supply seem the most effective way of gaining influence in such a region. In this sense, disputes or conflicts of interest between other States have contributed to the need for arms transfers. The extension of arms supply is often a means of establishing or sustaining political influence in recipient States. In many cases, it is also related to economic purposes, such as ensuring the supply of raw materials and commodities from recipient States.

72. A factor important in some cases is the sale of weapons by the major suppliers partly for the purposes of improving the balance-of-payments position as a whole or its improvement vis-à-vis some of the major recipients. The largest part of arms transfers is commercial in nature, rather than by grants-in-aid or by easy credits, although this does not apply uniformly to all supplier States. It may also be mentioned that information on conventional arms transfers under alliance arrangements is in some cases difficult to obtain.

73. A salient feature of the transfer of arms by the major suppliers in the developed world has been the shift in recent years from the transfers of surplus or outdated weapons to the transfer of up-to-date weapons, in some cases even at the expense of domestic procurement. SIPRI's arms trade registers 11/ - covering major weapons on order or being delivered in 1981 - identified approximately 1,100 separate arms transfer agreements of which 94 per cent were for new weapon systems, 2 per cent for second-hand weapons, and 4 per cent for refurbished weapons. One of the reasons for this development is that for some States the research, development and production costs of certain new weapon-systems are so high that producers often seek external purchasers in order to defray some of the expense. Further extension of production lines plays a part in reducing unit costs to the armed forces of the producing countries concerned as well as helping to finance further research and development efforts. It also eases the subsequent problems of manufacturing the necessary spares through the life of the weapon and its associated equipment. Also, modern weapons are being transferred because the production facilities for those of previous generations have been closed down.

74. There is a significant technological aspect to the competitive sale of arms by some of the major suppliers. Arms sales can be very important for the capacity of particular segments of the arms industry to sustain the technological momentum that is now necessary to stay in the market and, even more important, to prevent a backward slide to a position of military inferiority vis-à-vis other major producers of weapons.

75. On the demand side of arms transfers, among the most important factors is the fact that many recipient States do not produce major weapons and therefore have to import them to satisfy legitimate needs for self-defence and/or for acquiring military capability. Arms may be imported in response to more specific stimuli such as territorial disputes between neighbouring States; ambition for local or

regional dominance, including colonial or foreign domination, on the part of one or more regional or extra-regional States; the perception of military power as an essential symbol or attribute of sovereignty; the climate of insecurity; and, generally speaking, the increased uncertainty about the future of regional and international stability. Major civil strife involving sub-national groups can also contribute significantly to the demand for weapons. In addition, in a general sense, the political importance (or dominance) of armed forces in some States could also be regarded in some cases as an important factor for the increased demand for weapons, as could the importance attributed to increasing military budgets in other States. As shown earlier, purchasing countries often seek to acquire the most modern and efficient weapons available and these often involve specialized training and maintenance requiring closer liaison with supplier countries, sometimes to the extent of instructor and technical personnel on loan. However, the most sophisticated conventional weapons systems often remain in the producer countries and on security grounds are not subject to transfer, except to close allies and friends.

76. Finally, arms transfers are but one aspect of the wider phenomenon of activities and arrangements which serve military-related purposes. These include arrangements in the framework of alliances or for military co-operation such as gifts, off-sets, deployments, co-production, standardization and technical co-operation; the training of military personnel in the use of transferred weapons; the construction of a variety of military facilities; the transfer of information of military value; the loan of military advisers for assistance in the modernization of force structures and in the planning and conduct of armed conflict; the transfer of military technology; and the transfer of such equipment and technology which could have military application.

77. Various forms of arms transfer and related arrangements constitute an important element of the phenomenon of the global arms race and of the present military reality. It is, however, difficult to quantify many of these aspects adequately because of data problems and also because some of them are inherently hard to quantify, such as the value of the transfer of military information including all types of military intelligence, and the sharing of the evaluation of the performance and behaviour of military hardware and/or the application of tactical doctrines in combat. Even so, it is clear that arms transfers are taking place in numerous ways on a significant scale and that the trade in major weapons is only one aspect of a multifaceted phenomenon.

#### B. Impact and trends of technological developments

78. Governmental decisions regarding arms build-up are closely linked with the development of military technology; indeed, technology affects in a highly significant way the course and pace of the arms race. It continually fuels the arms race by making possible the development of new types or new versions of existing types of weapon-systems and by creating a climate of uncertainty between rivals about the future.

79. On the one hand, the progress of science and technology has been highly beneficial to mankind and the solution to many of mankind's problems depends on

continued advances in science and technology. Although there is research and development which is either specifically military or specifically civilian, it is often difficult to determine in advance whether scientific R and D will be used for either or both civil and military applications. On the other hand, far from being used only for peaceful purposes, great effort continues to be invested in harnessing science and technology for military purposes; the peaceful benefits that arise from this research are incidental although sometimes by no means negligible. To ensure that the ever-growing power accruing from the development of science and technology is concentrated on making advances beneficial to mankind, there is a strong case for diverting scientific and financial resources away from dedicated military R and D and towards more constructive and peaceful ends.

80. Massive military R and D facilities are at present intricately linked with the arms race. Probably more than half a million scientists and engineers (or as much as 20 per cent of the world's highly skilled scientific manpower) are employed in these establishments, and funds probably well in excess of \$35 billion (approximately one quarter of the world's total expenditure on scientific research and development) are consumed by these establishments every year. <sup>12/</sup> Although more countries are now producing sophisticated weapons, qualitative development in conventional arms currently takes place primarily in a small number of developed countries.

81. As a result of the investments in the military R and D effort, the pace of technological progress in the military sector has been spectacular in recent years. The special momentum thereby given to the current arms race must therefore be regarded as one of its fundamental characteristics and one which make it increasingly dangerous.

82. The nature of the military R and D process with its long lead-times creates uncertainty about the future military capabilities of potential adversaries. This has led to States developing new weapons on the "action-reaction" assumption that others are also engaged in this process, even though there will often be no tangible information on this during the early stages of the research and development work on such national projects.

83. Military relationships are therefore no longer assessed merely in terms of the forces and weapons existing at any particular moment in time, since this can change significantly over a relatively short period because of qualitative improvements produced through the R and D process. This, inter alia, makes it very difficult to establish sustainable criteria for defining "balance".

84. The extreme technical complexity and sophistication that characterize modern weapon-systems largely account for the dramatic rise in their cost of production and maintenance. Since the end of the Second World War several new generations of major weapons have appeared, each one significantly more costly than its predecessor, covering aircraft, tanks, ships and missiles. In real terms such modern weapons are between 2 and 10 times more expensive than those built at the end of the Second World War. <sup>13/</sup> The United States XM-1 tank, at a present cost of over \$2.5 million, is at least six times more expensive than the Sherman tank. More specifically, the latest aircraft can be over four times more costly than those of comparatively recent origin; for example, the estimated cost of a modern, sophisticated long-range bomber is \$200 million.

85. Rapid advances in many areas of science and technology, especially in electronics, telecommunications, computers and directed energy such as laser beams, have made possible the development of highly complex weapon-systems. These advances have pushed conventional warfare towards increased automation. Fundamental changes in the character of war are already under way as the uses that can be made of these advances are better understood and they are increasingly integrated in weapon-systems and in more elaborate command, control, communication and intelligence systems.

86. Technological developments have greatly improved the performance of weapons. The destructive effects and lethality of weapons also greatly increase the human and economic costs of armed conflicts. One major trend is the ongoing development of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and vehicles, including remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), as well as long-range cruise missiles with multiple conventional warheads and other highly effective conventional weapons, such as weapons with onboard guidance systems, which could fundamentally change the character of conventional warfare. These weapons are able to deliver lighter but more effective warheads over greater distances at a high level of accuracy. More than in combat aircraft, there has been a quantum leap in the development of missile technology and still further qualitative improvements seem to be in the offing.

87. Another current trend is the prospect of significant increases in spending for military uses of space in the next few years. Whilst space technology has produced certain significant security benefits in the sense of improved national technical means of verification, it now seems highly possible that, unless agreements can be reached with a view to using outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, inter alia, by the prohibition of stationing of weapons of any kind, including anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), an intensified arms race in space might ensue. Such a development would extend the dimensions of the arms race and add significantly to the climate of military insecurity.

88. Finally, another way in which the R and D effort conflicts with the prospect of successfully negotiating disarmament agreements arises from the need to retain the scientific expertise and knowledge accumulated by the members of a successful team. There is often a natural tendency on the part of individuals to wish to leave a particular area of scientific research if the project becomes, or is likely to become, part of forthcoming negotiations that may lead to the halting of the project. Therefore, in order to keep the team together, there can sometimes be internal pressure to remove the project from the negotiating agenda.

89. In general, the increasing sophistication of weaponry in the arms race demonstrates the use that is being made of scientific and technological progress for non-peaceful purposes. As long as the arms race continues, it will not be possible for international society to ensure that the resources devoted to science and technology, particularly the valuable resource of highly trained scientific and technical manpower, are used only for peaceful purposes. A major initiative to turn R and D efforts away from military purposes would do much to slow the pace of the competitive development of ever-improving weapons and thus create conditions more conducive to agreements on measures of disarmament, including conventional disarmament.

### C. Social, economic and political effects

90. As noted in paragraph 16 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. The colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.

91. The recently updated United Nations report entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures 14/ contains much useful data and informed comment drawing attention to the extremely harmful effects of the arms race on the conduct of human affairs.

92. In general, probably 500 million or more people in the world either have no jobs or are not fully employed. The figure for those unemployed or underemployed in developing countries exceeds 450 million people (this excludes China and other centrally-planned economies). Of those who live in urban areas, as many as 250 million people live in slum conditions. One out of every 10 persons living in the world suffers from either hunger or malnutrition. Almost one fourth of mankind exists in conditions of dire poverty, spread over all continents and mainly concentrated in the developing countries. That the world's social and economic conditions are distressingly poor appears self-evident and that these conditions have been deteriorating in recent years while the world's military expenditure has been increasing substantially is an alarming development that does not augur well for the future of mankind.

93. Poor social and economic conditions in the world, especially over large parts of it, are a source of injustice and can be viewed as a matter of strategic concern from the point of view of international peace and security. Apart from strong humanitarian concerns, there are cogent political considerations for engaging in the task of improving the world's social and economic conditions. The economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of a new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. It is difficult to conceive of a peaceful world unless, inter alia, social and economic conditions are made decent and relatively stable. And, since the mitigation - not to mention, the elimination - of these conditions requires a major reallocation of the world's resources towards peaceful purposes, the conventional arms race comes directly into the picture as a most significant drain of those resources.

94. Even though in recent years there have been some signs of reduction in the rate of increase, it has been estimated that by the year 2000 the world population will have increased to some 6 billion people from its present 4.7 billion. The pressures that will be placed on the planet's resources will therefore be considerable and constantly growing. Only in conditions of international peace, security and human development in all its aspects can there be optimum use of those resources needed to provide for a dignified quality of life for the coming generations.

95. The arguments that increased military expenditure generates employment and that it spurs scientific and technological development are essentially misleading. Whatever the short-term effects of military expenditure may be, they cannot be regarded as legitimate justification for continuing the arms build-up or for maintaining high levels of military investment. The problems that might have to be faced in shifting resources from the military to the civilian sector are vastly outweighed by the benefits that would accrue to international society from the reduction of armaments and military expenditure under agreed and effective measures of verification. The most important of these is that new possibilities, which are currently foreclosed, would open up for making international society more prosperous.

96. The arms race has to be seen as both cause and effect of the confrontation in international politics. Increased confrontation has, inter alia, an adverse domestic impact to the detriment of stable political and socio-economic development of many countries. That must be regarded as one of the effects of the arms race - not that the arms race creates political polarization, but that it contributes to its negative consequences for national societies.

97. Another significant domestic political effect of the arms race and high levels of military expenditure is that they exacerbate the problem of allocating scarce resources between the civilian and military sectors of the economy. The arms race strengthens the domestic military-industrial sector and gives this sector the opportunity for exercising disproportionate influence over policy-making, which often tends to be in the direction of increased military expenditure or increased reliance on military power.

98. The arms race and the continuing increase of military expenditure have significant social, economic and political effects and these interact with problems of inflation and recession that beset most countries. The diversion of increasing amounts of resources towards military expenditure diminishes resources available for social welfare and productive investment purposes and thus may heighten social tensions over the issue of the allocation of resources. A heightening of social tensions produces political effects that have an adverse impact on political stability.

#### D. Consequences for international relations, peace and security

99. Rather than improving security between countries, massive efforts to develop or acquire arms often undermine the very security they are intended to generate. The strong often become stronger but do not feel more secure, while the weak become more susceptible to external pressures and interference, and therefore are less secure. Countries that take part in the acquisition of arms beyond the very minimum needed to achieve legitimate self-defence pay a heavy economic price. In the absence of general and complete disarmament, countries enjoy the right to maintain force for legitimate self-defence. However, it is exceedingly difficult to determine what constitutes the minimum level of arms for legitimate individual and collective self-defence, especially in situations that are susceptible to change over relatively short periods of time.

100. The preoccupation of States with the military aspects of national security gives vigour to the arms race and encourages belief in the utility of military force. The availability of arms as a factor in a given international situation often increases the danger that the option of force will be used rather than a peaceful settlement. Thus, the risk of conflict sharpens and all too often the effectiveness of modern weapons is brought to bear with ruthless severity on human life and property. The use of massive arms supply to certain States, based on their perceived security needs, as a lever to extract concessions from States in relation to international disputes in which they are involved, can be counter-productive and adversely affect the prospects for international peace and security.

101. The escalation of the arms race renders international political relations more rigid and increases the level of confrontation, thus endangering further the security of all States, particularly those States who are not members of alliances. In such circumstances, the benefits of progress in conformity with the aspirations of peoples are often postponed or opposed and solutions to many international disputes are also delayed or prevented.

102. A meaningful system of security that can generate sustainable peace in the world cannot be achieved by manipulation of the arms race and the military situation. The arms race, especially in view of the nature of the military R and D process, cannot be expected to generate enhanced international security; technological developments in the military field often aggravate the situation and have harmful effects on the security of nations. There is a clear need to move towards collective security as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and to seek other collateral ways of promoting détente, effective disarmament and co-operation among States. Also, the significance of the disarmament effort should therefore be assessed more broadly and fundamentally in terms of its relevance to the establishment of a better world order as a whole.

103. History indicates no instance in which a permanent, positive effect on a nation's security has ever been drawn from a massive accumulation of weapons. The arms race is a divisive factor in relations among States which stands in sharp contrast to the compelling political, social and economic needs for international co-operation. Directly and indirectly, the arms race damages international stability and undermines the prospects of peace and international security and human well-being in all its aspects. Thus, there are strong arguments that the international machinery offered by the United Nations should be used to find a collective security approach in which there would be significant reductions of arms and armed forces in the world to the levels necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and to contribute to United Nations peace forces.

### CHAPTER III

#### CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT: PRINCIPLES, APPROACHES AND MEASURES

##### A. Principles of conventional disarmament

104. The basic principles which should guide the efforts of States in the pursuit of conventional disarmament can be found in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament. This study contains and extends those principles. The Final Document identifies priorities for negotiations on disarmament, as described in paragraph 8 (h) of this study. The Final Document also stresses the relationship between disarmament efforts and efforts to strengthen international peace and security and build confidence among States, as well as efforts to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

105. The Final Document places conventional disarmament efforts in the context of general and complete disarmament. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control will permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. This is the objective and status of conventional disarmament. This implies that conventional disarmament should be pursued as a global process, including efforts at multilateral, bilateral or regional levels.

106. At each stage of the disarmament process the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces, so that at no stage does any State or group of States gain any unilateral military advantage and so that security is assured equally for all States. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of States with the largest military arsenals. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the same principle of undiminished security of the parties and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security.

##### B. Types of approaches to conventional disarmament

###### 1. General perspective

107. As long as States have to rely primarily on their armed forces (either alone or with those of their allies) as the ultimate means for defending their interests and for protecting their security, disarmament is bound to be considered very

cautiously or even seen by some States as a process fraught with dangers and uncertainties. Therefore it is important that at no stage should any State or group of States gain unilateral advantage and that security should be ensured equally for all States. When contemplating a specific disarmament measure each State has to weigh carefully, on the one hand, the benefits to be derived from it, and, on the other, the risks inherent in the limitations which the adoption of that measure would impose on its ability to resort to force if all else fails. Other parties will view that same measure in essentially similar terms, but, when security is perceived as dependent primarily on military strength vis-à-vis potential enemies, what seems beneficial for the security of one party may be perceived as a security risk by others and vice versa. It is for this reason that it is so difficult to design measures of disarmament which all the parties concerned will regard as compatible with their security requirements. The achievement of disarmament objectives greatly strengthen international peace and security, as has been recognized by all States. But the process of disarmament is composed of measures each of which, if it is militarily significant, tends to be viewed with uncertainty and even apprehension by participants - the more so, the more acceptable it is to others. The disarmament process must overcome these doubts and measures must be designed with this aim in view so that greater trust and confidence is continuously built among States. The failure to do so has been one of the important reasons why disarmament, so persistently called for and so long pursued, has progressed so little.

108. The universal recognition that disarmament would strengthen international security is thus of little avail when a workable disarmament programme is to be drawn up. In that endeavour the key problem is how to design a programme and its individual steps and how to combine these steps with simultaneous measures in other fields in such a way that each of the States concerned will regard each step as being, on balance, beneficial from the point of view of its own and mutual security. This is the requirement referred to in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as "the principle of undiminished security of the parties" (para. 22) or as the need "to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage" (para. 29).

109. While recognizing the right and need of each State to security, it is important to stress that undiminished security of States is an essential requirement of disarmament negotiations. It is not possible, however, to keep wholly apart the strengthening of international security which is, ultimately, the purpose of disarmament, and the strengthening of national security which is its prerequisite. Developments throughout the world have become narrowly interconnected. This is particularly true at the most basic level: with the advent of nuclear weapons survival cannot be taken for granted and disarmament has become a task in which States can only succeed together or fail together. The maintenance of international peace and security has become essential for the security of each State and, conversely, without adequate security for each, there is no security of the whole. These various aspects have been discussed in the report of the Secretary-General on The Relationship between Disarmament and International Security. 15/

110. The appropriate approach would be to provide security through collective arrangements such as the system contained in the Charter of the United Nations, in which the Security Council has responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and is mandated to take enforcement action if need be. If the collective security system set out in the Charter of the United Nations could be fully implemented so as to provide a reliable basis for the security of States, disarmament would be much simpler to achieve.

111. A number of other approaches have also been pursued with the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. These comprise efforts to settle disputes by peaceful means, efforts to strengthen détente and co-operation and build confidence among States and efforts, at all levels, to reduce the incidence of armed conflict. These endeavours are of the utmost importance in their own right and as ways to eliminate some of the underlying causes of the arms race. They can be both supplements to and incentives for disarmament measures. But they cannot be substitutes for disarmament.

112. As it is, States can be expected to take the approach of relying on their own forces throughout most or all of the disarmament process. In this situation States are bound to demand that each step in the process of arms limitation and disarmament be based on reciprocity and on a careful balance of obligations in the disarmament process itself. In this perspective disarmament measures may seem attractive to some States only when they are completely sure that all others will comply with them. Where mutual trust and confidence is lacking the importance of verification provisions in disarmament agreements increases. In this situation every effort should be made to develop appropriate verification methods and procedures. These should be non-discriminatory, should not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development, and should be satisfactory to all parties concerned.

113. A difficulty with this approach is that the security of the parties is highly sensitive to perceived or existing imbalances, sometimes stemming from possession by one party of types of forces or weapons not possessed by another, in particular nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. To create a basis of greater security in which competitive arms acquisition can be avoided and force levels can be reduced, it is therefore important in disarmament efforts to pay particular attention to those weapon systems and those components of the military force postures which are perceived as particularly threatening and which therefore contribute most to overall insecurity.

## 2. Effective use of international machinery in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations

114. A corner-stone of the international machinery for settling disputes and maintaining international peace and security is the system of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the powers vested in the Security Council with its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and its mandate for taking enforcement action if need be. In fact, the concept of maintaining or restoring international peace and security by

military means, embodied in Chapter VII of the Charter, has not been applied in practice. In some conflict situations peace-keeping operations have been agreed upon with the parties concerned to maintain or promote peaceful conditions which offer the possibility of political settlement. Under the Charter States have an obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful means and this principle has been elaborated in detail in the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes adopted by the General Assembly at the thirty-seventh session in 1982 (resolution 37/10). However, in practice they have felt it necessary to retain the means for self-defence as an ultimate recourse.

115. As regards the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the more effective use of the international machinery available as established by the Charter for this purpose, it has long been recognized that it has a vital role to play in the disarmament process. It is, in fact, implicit in the Charter. Similarly, as stated in the joint American-Soviet Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961 and also in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, held in 1978, each step in the disarmament process should be accompanied by measures designed to strengthen institutions to maintain peace and to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

116. In this regard, it is appropriate also to draw attention to the request to the Security Council by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (resolution 37/119) to study as a matter of high priority the question of the implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter with a view to strengthening international peace and security.

117. Together with increased efforts towards the timely and peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, greater efforts are needed to alleviate or remove the underlying causes of conflicts. In contributing to a climate of trust and a pattern of mutually beneficial relations among States such efforts would facilitate progress in disarmament and would improve the prospects for the effective functioning of the system for the maintenance of international peace and security of the Charter of the United Nations. These tasks lend themselves to global as well as regional efforts in varying combinations. They include the consolidation and expansion of détente, the strengthening of international co-operation in all its aspects, effective steps towards the elimination of underdevelopment and of oppression in all its forms, and the establishment of international relations on a more equitable basis. These have been central endeavours of the United Nations so far and there have been important achievements in several of these areas.

118. The elaboration of international law in specific functional spheres and the development of norms for the international conduct of States, both of which have also been enduring endeavours of the United Nations, are an integral part of the development of international trust and co-operation. In fact, such agreements and norms of conduct, and general confidence that they will be respected, are the bases on which a lasting détente can be built.

3. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations, parallel actions by mutual example, unilateral initiatives

119. Conventional disarmament negotiations do not have the same features as negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In most cases disarmament negotiations on conventional weapons and armed forces demand a multilateral context. Whether to conduct such negotiations bilaterally or multilaterally and whether to pursue them in a regional or in a global framework will depend, among other things, on the nature of the subject-matter, including its political and technical characteristics. The definitive solution to the major problems of conventional disarmament has to be found in a global context, as implied in the goal of general and complete disarmament, but on the way to this goal substantive negotiations should also be envisaged as appropriate in bilateral, regional or other contexts that are not global in scope.

120. Regarding the participation of States in negotiations the primary considerations should be the character and scope of the measures envisaged, and the States to which they should apply. Some measures would apply to all States. Others might apply to particular groups of States, such as the Soviet Union and the United States, the member States of the two major alliances or the States with the largest military arsenals and other militarily significant States; in these cases, whereas only a limited number of countries are directly affected, the measures might nevertheless have global implications. In other cases, measures might be applicable to the States of a given region, the most heavily armed States in a critical area, or two or more neighbouring States. In the latter instances the primary effects of the measures would be regional and, under certain conditions, they may also have effects at the global level.

121. Where an issue is of direct concern to a number of countries multilateral negotiations between them might sometimes be combined with bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, in some cases, multilateral negotiations may require simultaneous bilateral or multilateral consultations between certain interested States. In others, negotiations might be initiated between some States and later be extended to an increasing number of countries. Generally, the need to involve more countries will tend to become more pronounced as advances are made towards general and complete disarmament. In this context, the role of the Conference on Disarmament is of the greatest and unique significance. While States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, the ultimate success of the effort to halt, reverse and abolish the arms race would depend on the active involvement of all States.

122. One should not underestimate the potential value for conventional disarmament of actions other than negotiations and formal agreements, such as parallel actions based on a policy of mutual example as well as unilateral initiatives, as contributions to the process of achieving agreed disarmament measures. Such steps may be particularly valuable for easing tensions, initiating the resumption of stalled negotiations, preventing the further deterioration of a military situation, testing each other's interest in negotiations and, generally, for improving the environment for negotiations for arms limitation and disarmament.

4. Regional approaches and their relation to global aspects of conventional disarmament

123. It is generally recognized that within the purview of global disarmament efforts there is considerable scope for regional initiatives and for practical action on a regional basis. In fact, the fundamental concept of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as regards disarmament approaches and disarmament machinery is that of diversity of means and unity of purpose, with the United Nations having a central role and a primary responsibility, and facilitating and encouraging all disarmament measures, be they unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral (para. 114). The study of the Secretary-General on All aspects of Regional Disarmament, while stressing the need for harmony between regional efforts and global programmes and priorities, noted that the inclusion of a regional aspect in the approach to disarmament is of particular importance as regards the cessation of the conventional arms race. It stated that "the ubiquity of conventional weapons and armed forces, their technical and functional diversity and the central role of conventional forces in the security perception of the countries in a region make the question of conventional disarmament highly complex and the possible approaches highly dependent on regional conditions". 16/ Conventional disarmament, the study found, is a field in which the scope for regional initiatives is virtually unlimited.

124. A regional approach to disarmament, far from being inconsistent with global efforts, can supplement and assist them if pursued with the wider aims fully in mind. While it should be stressed that disarmament assumes a particular urgency in some regions, there is a need in all regions for measures of disarmament which would both strengthen regional security and improve the prospects for progress in disarmament at the global level, provided certain conditions are present. In some regions, the continued arms build-up is a major factor endangering international peace and security. In other regions, where the level of armaments is less, the existence of tension and conflict may nevertheless constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. The establishment and reinforcement of military bases and/or foreign military presence forcibly imposed on colonial and other territories, the persistence of colonialism as well as attempts by States to deny the rights of peoples freely to determine their own future as well as their systems of social and economic development constitute a source of danger for the regions concerned and are incompatible with regional disarmament measures, in the context of general and complete disarmament. Priority should therefore be given, inter alia, to the eradication of these factors, to the settlement of disputes by peaceful means through negotiations, and to the promotion of self-determination and respect for territorial integrity of States. Such factors would be taken fully into account in a regional approach. Furthermore, it might be possible in some cases to reach agreement on a regional basis on measures more far-reaching than those which could be implemented at that time on a global basis. In other cases, initiatives taken in one region, suitably modified, might be valid models for other regions or give impetus to global efforts along similar lines.

125. In some cases, efforts have been or are being made to develop and/or adopt measures conducive to keeping regions from becoming involved in confrontations originating outside them. In that context, and without prejudice to the inherent

right of States to individual or collective self-defence, particularly in situations of tension, mention has been made of: arms limitation and reduction; non-introduction or withdrawal of certain types of weapons; non-introduction or withdrawal of foreign military advisers and other forms of military assistance or presence; refraining from the staging of military manoeuvres and shows of force; non-establishment of new bases, withdrawal or non-reinforcement of existing bases; avoidance of either the threat of or recourse to covert or overt interventions; avoidance of attempts to foment or exploit internal difficulties of individual countries or regions.

126. The importance of the regional dimension in conventional disarmament derives above all from the fact that the security concerns of States, and to some extent even their concepts of security, differ from region to region although certain concepts for resolving political differences and achieving disarmament may be applicable to all regions; military stability and the relative strength of opposing forces are of major concern in some regions. This is particularly true in Europe where there is the largest accumulation of weapons and where the two major alliances directly confront each other. Negotiations on disarmament questions in Europe have pursued the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of the parties. The ongoing negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe have encountered significant difficulties but are continuing. This approach may be of assistance in other regions. However, the approach to disarmament which has been tried in this situation may not be completely applicable or may not be the most effective in other regions due to, inter alia, factors listed in paragraph 124. In some cases, initial efforts might perhaps more usefully focus on regional co-operation and all types of confidence-building measures, while in other areas such efforts might focus on the settlement of disputes by peaceful means in order to enhance regional co-operation and all types of confidence-building measures. In all cases, efforts should focus on measures to keep the region from becoming involved in confrontations originating outside the region. All such efforts might enhance prospects for disarmament.

127. It is evident that disarmament efforts in individual regions of the world should be consistent with efforts towards general and complete disarmament. Moreover, if disarmament was approached solely in a regional context in total disregard of conditions and developments in other regions and globally, it might not even serve its immediate purpose of enhancing security in that region itself. It might also entail a risk of losing sight of global priorities and of the special responsibility of States with the largest military arsenals in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. In many regions, it would be difficult to conceive that major steps relating to disarmament or security might be taken without the active co-operation or the tacit accord of outside powers that have a significant influence on the security situations in the respective regions. This in itself would ensure the insertion of regional disarmament measures into a wider context. In accordance with this, all regional measures which have been adopted so far, including the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe - although

the latter is not in itself a measure in the field of disarmament - have, as a matter of course, been designed not only with regional purposes in mind but also as contributions to global security and as means to promote disarmament in a wider framework through partial, geographically limited measures.

5. Mutual and verifiable arms limitations and reductions

128. Disarmament through agreed limitations and reductions, based on reciprocity and adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, is the approach which has been most consistently pursued in the past by various groups of States. As disarmament achieved in this way presupposes the consent of all the parties concerned, it may be safely assumed that any disarmament measure actually adopted will meet the requirement of ensuring security for each party - at the minimum, undiminished security and, if possible, strengthened and even enhanced security. In practice, efforts towards mutual and verifiable arms limitations and reductions have always been aimed at some sort of approximate equality: equality in the reductions or limitations imposed, or equality in the military force that each is allowed to retain. Negotiated mutual limitations and reductions can then lead to a more stable situation at a lower level of military potential, characterized by approximate equality and parity.

129. The core concept of this approach is that of preserving peace and security through a carefully designed balance of military forces at substantially lower levels and adequately verified. Effective verification of disarmament agreements assumes particular importance in this context because of the need for each party to have confidence that commitments under the respective agreements are being observed by all parties. What is needed are appropriate methods and procedures of verification which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

130. The concept of a balance of forces implies that mutual and verifiable arms limitations and reductions are most readily applicable in a context involving two States or two groups of associated States. In multilateral contexts it is more difficult to devise a set of force levels which could represent a military balance acceptable to all parties concerned. Sometimes negotiations could be facilitated by being limited to a particular geographical area. Thus far, multilateral negotiations have more often dealt not with quantitative limitations and reductions but rather with qualitative limitation, i.e. with the complete abolition of specified types of weapons, either globally, as in the case of chemical and biological weapons, or regionally, as a step towards global prohibition, as in the case of nuclear weapons in Latin America. In the case of conventional weapons and armed forces, such qualitative limitations might take the form of global or regional agreements to prohibit certain types of weapons altogether, or they might consist in limitations on the technical performance and mission capability of weapons and forces. Such qualitative restrictions will be considered later.

131. Negotiations on mutual and verifiable limitations and reductions in conventional weapons and forces aimed at a more stable situation at a lower level

of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States, is a feasible approach, particularly in the context of East-West relations. In any such negotiations the security interests and independence of third parties need to be fully respected and taken into account. The application of the same or similar approaches to conventional arms limitations and disarmament could be considered by countries in other parts of the world.

132. Negotiations to establish a more stable situation at lower levels of military potential can, however, meet with difficulties which must be openly recognized if they are to be overcome. They arise from the fact that to translate equality, parity or balance into numerical ratios of forces and armaments in concrete situations, a variety of factors relating to the composition of the forces and the characteristics of the armaments of the different parties, to geography and so forth have to be taken into account. Thus, in any negotiation on limiting or reducing specific categories of weapons or forces, the military significance of such categories cannot be viewed outside the context of these factors, in particular the overall military capabilities of the States involved. These factors are often difficult to assess in an objective way and the negotiating parties are likely in many cases to assess them differently. Such differences in assessments might result in further complications.

133. Negotiations on arms limitations and reductions could also meet with problems arising from the great disparities in military potential between various States, for example between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, or even between the nuclear-weapon States themselves. These disparities give rise to differing security concerns and would emphasize the need for all these factors to be taken into account in the resolute pursuit of the disarmament process.

6. Enhancement of international stability and security:  
military aspects

134. Under present circumstances, in the midst of an ongoing arms race and an unfavourable international climate, disarmament is particularly necessary, though difficult. In order to stimulate the disarmament process, attention should be given to all its aspects, including approaches which would enhance international stability by diminishing the risk of war and reducing mutual fears, thus promoting the security of States. In this context it is useful to explore approaches which address security-related elements such as military postures, activities and force deployments which other States could consider as being particularly threatening. In analysing these elements one should, of course, bear in mind that military and technical capabilities must be seen in the context of political decisions, military strategies and doctrines. These, in turn, are based on national conceptions of security interests, some of which may not be compatible with the security interests of other States and international stability. In this context, the particular problems posed by the existence of nuclear weapons must also be taken into account, in particular the basic disparity in military capability between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Those problems, as well as the political aspects of security problems, are, however, considered elsewhere in the study and

what is dealt with here is primarily the military aspects of international stability and security in so far as conventional forces and armaments are concerned.

135. In this regard it would be highly advisable if States, in exercising their legitimate right to protect their security, on their own or together with allies, sought to avoid military activities, deployments and procurement decisions which others might regard with apprehension and perceive as adversely affecting their security and which could prompt them to a military build-up. Thus States might seek to put greater emphasis in their overall military posture on forces which in terms of equipment and deployment would be perceived as defensive.

136. This could be accomplished in several ways. It could be done on a purely national basis or through attempts to promote restraint by mutual example. In either case it would mean exercising self-restraint in the production and modernization of conventional weapons and in manpower programmes and selecting among alternative ways of satisfying security requirements those that would appear least provocative to others. The most effective approach, however, would be through negotiated agreements on a bilateral, multilateral or regional basis. This approach would appear to be particularly applicable in the case of attempts to reduce existing military capabilities. It is therefore important that States engaged in conventional disarmament negotiations examine the possibility of dealing first with those elements of their overall military postures or with those weapon systems which might cause most concern to the parties. Initial consultations on these issues by interested parties, undertaken in the context of specific regions or situations, may focus on identifying such elements and thereby stimulate negotiations and facilitate agreement on the most effective steps for reducing the level of conventional forces while enhancing stability.

137. Stability and security in the purely military sense considered here do not, of course, require exact equality in every type of conventional weapons and forces between the States concerned or exact parallelism in their force structures. What is required is rather an overall force balance which gives a feeling to each party that its defence capabilities are sufficient to oppose any attack and which thus enhances stability. Such an overall balance would be promoted by reducing those weapons perceived by the parties concerned as the most threatening. This would facilitate a lowering by the parties of their defence requirements and could lead to a sustained disarmament process involving significant reductions in the levels of armaments.

138. It would be difficult if not impossible to categorize in a general way and in all cases different types of conventional forces and armaments as being in and of themselves threatening or non-threatening, more destabilizing or less destabilizing, offensive or defensive, since the military effectiveness of any particular force element or weapon system depends not only on its technical characteristics but also on the specific military and geographic context in which they are deployed. Therefore, any discussions of reductions in the levels of particularly threatening force elements and weapon systems can only be undertaken within the framework of the relevant specific military context with due regard for geographical and other factors.

139. Consultations and negotiations on various types of disarmament measures can be based on such an approach. For example, preliminary consultations and negotiations on quantitative reductions of armed forces and armaments on this basis could lead to agreements according to which different parties would not necessarily reduce the same types of weapons. As regards qualitative limitations, initial discussions about the character of existing or projected weapons systems in specific situations or regions could substantially assist in negotiations aimed at forestalling the development of new types of armaments or the introduction of existing types into new areas and situations. Negotiations on limitations on deployments of forces or armaments could also utilize this approach so that agreed restrictions or reductions in this field would also lead to enhanced military stability and to greater international security. Similarly, negotiations on confidence-building measures can benefit if the parties focus discussions on the military activities of various types of forces perceived by them as particularly threatening.

7. Modalities of limitations and reductions (quantitative/qualitative, weapons/forces ...)

140. The limitation and reduction of conventional arms and armed forces can be either quantitative or qualitative, or both, and these can relate either to weapons or manpower or the deployment of weapons and forces, or all of them. Although in the long-term the effort to limit and reduce must lead to substantial disarmament, and ultimately to general and complete disarmament, short-term efforts can be directed towards breaking the momentum of the arms race or, at a minimum, towards easing political tensions and lowering the danger of conflict. In general, the modality adopted as a short-term measure at a particular time, or with respect to a particular region, must be influenced by the characteristics of the military situation and by the principal factors responsible for raising the danger of war or the level of political tensions. Or, the adoption of a particular modality may also be influenced by what seems to be a more feasible proposition at a particular time or with respect to a particular region. While the choice of approach may be determined by the conditions prevailing at a particular time or place, it should be pointed out that as far as the eventual goal of reversing the arms race with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament is concerned, all the modalities mentioned earlier should be attempted. Briefly, a particular modality may be taken up only as a short-term measure which in time must be supplemented by other modalities. It is in this perspective that the usefulness of particular modalities may be discussed.

141. Together with attempts to halt the quantitative growth of arsenals and armed forces through agreements on ceilings and reductions, there is a need to deal with the qualitative aspects of the conventional arms race. Indeed, the rapid pace of technological innovation and the rapid dissemination of the latest types of military equipment, while they reflect the sense of insecurity prevailing in the world today, also constitute a major factor further aggravating the apprehensions of States about their security and inducing them to ever renewed military efforts. Qualitative limitations of armaments, including new potentially threatening types developed on the basis of modern technology, must therefore be a central feature of efforts to halt the global arms race, although qualitative and quantitative

limitations will have to be further integrated if the arms race is to be effectively curbed.

142. Quantitative limitations and reductions can either relate to only one or several categories of weapons or forces. Qualitative restrictions, too, can either relate to only one or several categories of weapons or forces, but the restrictions introduced can vary according to the criteria adopted. Qualitative restrictions can also relate to weapons with certain capabilities or characteristics which may not currently exist but which are being developed. In addition, qualitative restrictions could either relate to the production and/or deployment of certain weapons, or even to their testing and development. A qualitative restriction that extends to the testing and development of certain weapons would be a significant way of also controlling the R and D process. With regard to personnel, quantitative restrictions could apply either in terms of a ceiling on the overall size of regular forces or in terms of limits on the deployment of specific military formations.

143. Other modalities which could be of significance, especially from the standpoint of reducing the danger of war and facilitating regional disarmament efforts are the establishment of demilitarized zones along the frontiers of neighbouring States, limited disengagement of forces in areas of tension, the withdrawal of weapons or forces perceived to be threatening from frontier regions in such areas, and mutually agreed restrictions on land, naval and air deployments in specified areas. Other measures of importance would be the renunciation of all policies which represent, or are perceived to represent, a serious threat to efforts aimed at the reduction of the danger of war and the promotion of regional disarmament such as: the threat or use of force in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, the search for spheres of influence, policies of military intervention or invasion and territorial expansion, the deployment of forces in foreign territories without the consent of the States involved, the establishment of foreign military bases and/or foreign military presence forcibly imposed on colonial and other territories and the denial of peoples' rights to self-determination.

### C. Possible concrete measures

#### 1. General perspective

144. The process of halting and reversing the arms race is a complex one, involving many interrelated steps. But it is important that this process as a whole be conceived in terms of the goal of general and complete disarmament. It should be an integrated process based on a step-by-step approach; thus, it would not be a collection of isolated measures. Such measures, if they remain isolated, would offer little hope of effectively stemming the arms race. This would be even more the case if some States were to use those measures to seek advantage over others, or through their actions, perpetuate ongoing arms competition in some areas of military activity.

145. Progress in curbing the nuclear arms race would facilitate the conventional disarmament effort - directly and indirectly - for example, by improving relations among the nuclear-weapon States. In the absence of tangible progress in dealing with the nuclear arms race, several States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, might hesitate to move far in the direction of conventional disarmament. It is evident that there is a relationship between progress in reducing conventional weapons and armed forces among nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned, taking into account the special responsibility of States with the largest military arsenals, and progress in the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. This underlines the importance of implementing the Programme of Action laid down in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session.

146. One important step towards conventional disarmament could be for the States with the largest military arsenals to initiate negotiations with a view to agreeing, depending on the specific situation, not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments or to reduce those forces and armaments, either in general or in specified areas, whether in terms of quantity or quality, or to contain them within agreed ceilings. Such agreements, together with such agreed verification procedures as may be required, could provide the basis for further negotiations on reductions in personnel and conventional weapons. Agreements should, in every case, be so designed that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage and that the security of States be enhanced.

147. Agreements of this type should be urgently sought and could be concluded at the global level and also on a regional or a bilateral basis. They would be of great significance in reducing international tension and the risk of war, especially in regions where there may be a high degree of tension. The nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, and other militarily significant States should facilitate the attainment of such understandings and should also refrain from actions that might hamper progress towards that objective.

148. Furthermore, agreements not to increase armed forces and conventional armaments or agreements to reduce those forces and armaments may be restricted to specific types of armed forces and/or specific types of weapons or they may be applied simultaneously to all armed forces and all types of weapons. In some cases, the disbanding of whole military units together with their equipment and weapons might be a practicable way of making progress in conventional disarmament.

149. A process of universal relaxation of tension is indispensable to the process of disarmament, including conventional disarmament. Progress towards universal détente and progress in disarmament are of fundamental significance and would mutually complement and strengthen each other. All States and regions should be encompassed in a process of universal détente and should contribute to that process.

## 2. Reductions in military matériel

150. Reductions in military matériel in all areas of the world where there are major concentrations of forces and armaments could offer substantial benefits to

the States concerned, and indeed to all States, and therefore are a matter of urgency. Reductions in military matériel by the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies in NATO and in the Warsaw Treaty Organization are particularly important. Meaningful reductions by these States could enhance security in Europe and elsewhere and might also encourage reductions by other States in other regions of the world. Negotiations should include consideration of numerical reductions in specified categories of major weapons such as armour, artillery, aircraft or warships, depending on the circumstances. An agreed figure of weapons to be reduced from agreed categories of weapon-types could either leave open to each side the exact mix of weapon-types to be reduced, or exact figures of each weapon-type could be predetermined, though the former method would seem to be an easier approach. Initial agreements could be substantial or modest but they should serve two purposes: first, they should be so designed as to increase confidence on both sides and to facilitate the next effort, and second, they should give impetus to efforts to curb the arms race in its other aspects.

151. States, particularly the States with the largest military arsenals, could begin consultations bilaterally or multilaterally and within their respective regions, together with extra-regional States when necessary, on ways of limiting and reducing their arsenals of conventional weapons. Wherever applicable in such consultations, proper attention should be given to the problem of how to deal with military matériel which is conventional in nature but is being used or has the potential for being used in connection with nuclear weapons. A process of limitation and reduction may also be initiated through parallel actions based on a policy of mutual example. In view of existing differences in the size of military arsenals, force structures and other factors, including particularly the characteristics of geographical location, it may be appropriate in the process of those consultations to examine and discuss the question of establishing agreed ratios, which could be the subject of negotiations among interested States, for determining the proportions of limitations and reductions to be made by them.

### 3. Reductions in personnel

152. Limitations and reductions in armed forces is an important aspect of conventional disarmament. It may be achieved through agreed ceilings or reductions in overall personnel figures or by the disbanding of a number of military units. In practice, a variety of complex factors have to be taken into account if the agreed measures are to achieve their objective, such as the definition of military personnel, the possible role of forces stationed in areas not covered by the agreement and the possible role of reinforcements in cases where the agreement does not deal with limitations in weapons and equipment or with the repositioning of military matériel.

153. Reductions in armed forces derive their importance from the broad relationships such measures have with many others. As much as perceptions of conventional threat may be derived from the numbers and operational availability of weapons, it is often the numbers of personnel serving in the armed forces, both combat and support, which give rise to apprehension and suspicion between States. Reductions in armed forces could result in reduced deployments, reduced ability to

take large-scale offensive action, reduced overall military effectiveness, and reduced military budgets. The extent of the effects of reductions would depend on factors such as the military training and reserve programmes, rapid mobilization capabilities and the equipment that the units of the parties to agreements would be allowed to retain.

154. As in other areas of disarmament, a particular responsibility for achieving substantial reductions in personnel falls on the States with the largest military arsenals. Even so, personnel reductions could be applicable to other countries as well, particularly those with the largest armed forces and those in regions where dangerously explosive situations may exist or where there may be large concentrations of forces and armaments. Concrete results in the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe could prompt further progress in Europe and would be a truly significant development in the field of disarmament. Initiatives aimed at reductions of armed forces and armaments elsewhere would also be a great contribution to disarmament.

#### 4. Reductions in military expenditure

155. The reduction of the military budgets of States, especially those States with the largest military expenditures, has for long been the subject of deliberations and proposals at the United Nations. In 1973, for the first time the question was inscribed as a specific item on the agenda of the General Assembly and subsequently various approaches have been suggested and developed but none of them has so far found sufficient support for effective implementation. Proposals have included a reduction by 10 per cent, or reductions in absolute terms, in the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and for utilization of a part of the funds thus saved for economic assistance to developing countries. Another proposal has been to measure and compare military budgets as a basis for negotiating agreements for their reduction. A third approach suggested has been parallel actions by mutual example.

156. The benefits of reductions in military expenditures are twofold: on one hand, they could lead to worthwhile measures of arms limitation and encourage the maintenance of international security at lower levels of military capability; on the other hand, reductions in military expenditures could have far-reaching beneficial effects on domestic, social and economic conditions and on the global economic situation. The transfer of funds and conversion of resources ensuing from reductions in military expenditures could improve the prospects for development and healthy economic growth in the countries concerned, and contribute to bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

157. Reductions in military expenditures could be implemented through agreements, directly negotiated between the parties concerned, to cut expenditures by certain amounts or in certain proportions. The approach according to which reductions could take the form of parallel actions by mutual example has been put forward with the intention, inter alia, to obviate various technical difficulties involved in measuring and comparing military expenditures and their reduction.

158. The problems involved in negotiating agreements on reductions in military expenditures have been studied by the United Nations in a series of expert studies (see A/S-12/7 and earlier documents). These have highlighted the difficulties of interpretation, measurement and comparison of data on military expenditures and have led to the development of a standardized reporting instrument based on a breakdown into different types of expenditures which could become comparable. The studies have also pointed out that these difficulties stem from both the lack, in some cases, of sufficient information and the difficulty in verifying such information and have stressed that serious efforts should be made to reduce these problems.

##### 5. Reductions and restrictions on military deployments

159. In the context of conventional arms limitation and reductions, military deployments should be understood in their widest sense, including manoeuvres, installations, bases and the different types of geographical disposition of forces. Restrictions and reductions on military deployments are only a partial and preliminary measure, but they can contribute significantly to confidence-building and to conventional disarmament efforts. Especially in cases where the military situation is tense, these measures may prove to be valuable steps towards diminishing the instabilities inherent therein, in reducing the risk of war and in contributing towards curbing the arms race. Such measures could also promote a situation conducive to reinforcing respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, restrictions on the deployment of existing weapons could make it easier to forestall the deployment of additional types, currently deployed in other areas or under development.

160. Alongside other attempts to curb the arms race, efforts could be directed at reaching agreements on restrictions on such military deployments as are perceived to be particularly threatening by those concerned. Restrictions could be imposed either on all forces so perceived or on a proportion of them sufficient to ease tension and to enhance stability in the present military situation significantly. Restrictions could also take the form of an agreement on limits on the types and numbers of armed force components to be deployed in specified areas. Particular attention should be given to those forces, be they ground, air or naval, and/or weapons systems that might be perceived as being particularly threatening as possible means in the early stages of an attack. Which particular forces belong in this category would have to be negotiated among the countries concerned. Restrictions could also take the form of demilitarized or partly demilitarized zones established in areas where States have territorial or other disputes that might lead to armed confrontation and conflict.

161. Particular attention should be given to armed forces deployed in foreign territories. Consideration of possible arrangements for restricting and reducing military deployments should take due account, as factors contributing to instability, tensions and the arms race, of the negative effects arising from the existence of military deployments which support foreign occupation, colonial domination, denial of the right of peoples to self-determination, violation of territorial integrity and the perpetuation of racism. Furthermore, depending on

the conditions in each region, States may in certain cases commit themselves not to enter into arrangements involving the establishment of foreign bases and the deployment of foreign forces on their territories and not to join existing or future alliances. However, it has to be recognized that in the view of some States such a commitment would significantly limit their options in regard to the right of individual and collective self-defence and that it may not be acceptable to those States, except in the context of wider agreements or guarantees.

162. The applicability of the above approaches in particular situations or regions, the specific modalities to be adopted and the measures to be undertaken would, of course, depend on the character of the problems peculiar to that situation or region, including concrete political, military and geographical aspects:

In Europe, where there is a vast accumulation of military force and where the two major alliances directly confront each other, agreements on reductions and restrictions on military deployments, by diminishing the possibilities of a surprise attack, could contribute to confidence and enhanced military stability, thus diminishing the risk of the outbreak of a conflict.

Also in other situations or regions where the level of armaments is very high, reductions and restrictions on military deployments could greatly contribute to confidence and to diminishing the risk of the outbreak of hostilities.

In some other situations or areas, where the level of armaments is less but where tensions may be high and a potential for conflict may exist, the existence of tension and conflict would also constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. In these cases as well, measures of reduction and restrictions on military deployments by States in the region and, where they are involved, by extraregional States could contribute to strengthening confidence and international peace and security.

6. Restraints on militarily-relevant research, development and testing

163. There has been for many years a growing emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the arms race. In this connection, much attention has been given to the fact that a substantial proportion of all research and development resources in the world has been allocated to military purposes. Thus it might be considered that restraints on the military use of research and development could constitute an essential aspect of the effort to curb the arms race.

164. In this context, the General Assembly, in its resolution 37/99 J of 13 December 1982, inter alia, being aware of the fundamental importance of research and development for peaceful purposes and of the inalienable right of all States to develop, also in co-operation with other States, their research and development for such purposes, requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts to carry out a comprehensive study on the scope, role and direction of the military use of research and development, the mechanisms involved,

its role in the overall arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and its impact on arms limitation and disarmament, particularly in relation to major weapons systems, such as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with a view to preventing a qualitative arms race and to ensuring that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes. It is hoped that meaningful and concrete measures of restraint in this area would be greatly facilitated by that study.

7. Supplier and/or recipient agreements on reductions of international arms transfers

165. In considering possible measures that might limit or reduce any kind of international conventional arms transfers, it is necessary to bear in mind the reasons why the attempts made in the past have been unsuccessful and to recognize the sensitivities that exist, for it is these failures and sensitivities that underlie the difficulties in reaching agreements on this matter.

166. Experience has shown that for any proposed measure concerning arms transfers to receive serious consideration, several concerns must be met. First, all countries must be satisfied that the proposals are not discriminatory; this entails even-handedness for arms suppliers and arms recipients alike; it also may necessitate discussion of all aspects of arms transfers and production, including as appropriate arrangements such as co-production, standardization, technological co-operation, off-set cost arrangements and other relevant financial agreements within or outside military alliances. Secondly, as stated in paragraph 85 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, consultations should be based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Thirdly, there are also concerns, on the one hand, about the sufficiency of data on the production and transfer of arms and, on the other, about the security aspects of providing such information.

167. As the Soviet Union and the United States account for the larger part of arms transfers, they could consider the question of reopening their talks on the limitation of conventional arms transfers.

168. Possible agreements to restrain the transfer of arms, in the first place between major suppliers and recipients, would have to give particular attention to those weapon systems the characteristics and quantities of which are perceived as threatening to the security of other countries. Various proposals aimed at establishing an effective basis for such arrangements that have already been put forward in previous years could be taken into account. It would be necessary to ensure that supplier countries which may not join in such arrangements would not simply expand their transfers to fill any "vacuum" arising from agreed restraints

in arms transfers. That objective would be best served by participation of both suppliers and recipients in agreements on arms transfer restraints.

169. Separately, recipient countries could negotiate local agreements on arms-import restrictions. Appropriately fashioned, such agreements could enhance, inter alia, by reducing the involvement by extraregional States, the security situation in the respective regions. Such actions are applicable in varying degrees to almost all areas of the world but would be particularly appropriate in areas of tension or regions in which there is already a high concentration of weapons. In addition, agreements between recipients could be strengthened by corresponding agreements with or between suppliers.

#### 8. Confidence-building measures

170. Although confidence-building measures, whether military or non-military, cannot serve as a substitute for concrete disarmament measures, they can play an important role in progress towards disarmament in that they can encourage a climate of trust and international co-operation, whether they are taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. By assisting in the development of an improved climate of international relations, they can help to create conditions conducive to the adoption of measures of limitation of conventional arms and armed forces and disarmament.

171. Confidence-building measures were the subject of a comprehensive study submitted by the Secretary-General in 1981. <sup>17/</sup> The study showed that there is a wide range of measures which could be implemented with a view to strengthening international peace and security and building confidence among States. It stressed in particular that security conditions differ between regions and the importance of taking this into account in considering confidence-building measures.

172. These measures can be grouped into several broad categories: political, military, economic, social, cultural, legal and other types of measures designed to enhance respect for the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, to enhance co-operation, to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Being defined in terms of aims that are closely related or mutually reinforcing, the boundaries between these different categories are not always sharp. There is also overlap between confidence-building measures and arms limitation measures and other measures in the field of disarmament and between confidence-building measures and concrete measures in the field of strengthening détente and co-operation among States.

173. An important category of confidence-building measures consists of measures relating to the military aspects of security. These include exchange of information and communication, notification and mutual observation of military activities, measures to facilitate verification and other similar measures. A related group consists of measures which constrain military activities in certain respects in order to alleviate fear and remove sources of tension and in particular to diminish the possibility of surprise attack. This category does not differ in principle from disarmament measures involving constraints on deployment.

174. Certain confidence-building measures relating to the military aspects of security have been implemented in Europe since 1975, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). These include prior notification of military manoeuvres, exchange of observers, etc. At the same time the participants declared that they would duly take into account and respect their common objective of confidence-building when conducting their military activities.

175. The Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which commenced at Stockholm on 17 January 1984 according to the decision taken at the CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid aims at undertaking, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations. Thus the Conference will begin a process the first stage of which will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

176. In other regions as well, there is scope for adopting measures to build confidence among States and enhance regional security. In some cases, the measures adopted or envisaged in Europe, suitably modified to reflect the different security conditions, might constitute an example. In other cases the adoption of measures relating to political, economic or other aspects of security might be a more urgent task. It follows from the nature of the confidence-building process itself that measures designed for one region will not necessarily serve a useful purpose in others and that they may differ, depending on the situations existing in respective regions.

#### 9. Public information

177. Public opinion has a very important role to play in the quest for disarmament. Indeed, without an enlightened and determined commitment by the public in all countries the prospects for disarmament would be bleak. In this context, the principal role of the United Nations is to provide accurate information on the armaments race and disarmament and to promote a sound understanding of the issues involved and of the different points of view as a basis for effective political action for disarmament.

178. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session set out, in paragraphs 99 to 105, specific measures designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it. These measures are being developed and extended within the compass of the World Disarmament Campaign, launched by the General Assembly at the outset of the second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982. The objectives and activities of the World Disarmament Campaign are described in the report of the Secretary-General (A/37/548).

179. In addition, the United Nations could disseminate more vigorously the ideas and approaches that have been developed in the field of disarmament, particularly

those of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, taking into consideration the expert studies carried out by the Secretary-General on a wide range of subjects relating to disarmament. It should continue to use to the full the resources available to the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Paragraph 105 of the Final Document encourages Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments; the United Nations should seek more actively to collect and to publicize information provided by Governments on the danger of the escalation of the arms race, including the acquisition, dissemination and deployment of arms and their new qualitative characteristics, and on the effects of the arms on the security of States, international peace and security and social and economic conditions in the world. The need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be emphasized. Finally, the United Nations could encourage the important work in these matters of non-governmental organizations and research institutes.

180. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on conventional arms limitations and disarmament, as the conventional arms race contributes significantly to tension and insecurity throughout the world, increases the risk of war, including the risk of nuclear war, and absorbs the greater part of global arms expenditures. Therefore, the need for effective measures of conventional arms limitation and disarmament, and the need for redirecting the resources released by such measures, should be clearly articulated in the process of disseminating information to the public. In this connection, the special responsibility of States with the largest military arsenals has already been emphasized, as has the need for negotiations to be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. There is also a necessity to bring to the public's attention, for instance by means of the World Disarmament Campaign, the approaches and measures to achieve conventional disarmament. It is hoped that the comments made in this study will be helpful in this regard.

#### CHAPTER IV

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

181. The study has discussed in broad terms, for the first time in a United Nations context, the nature, causes and effects of the conventional arms race and has addressed principles, approaches and measures for conventional arms limitations and disarmament. This, in itself, is useful in that such an exercise assists in identifying possibilities for progress in the field of conventional arms limitations and disarmament as well as difficulties that might be encountered in negotiations.

182. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive

weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Thus, the existence and the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons pose a unique danger to the very survival of the human race. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, which was solemnly reaffirmed at the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, second special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1982, therefore states that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. At the same time, there is a pressing need for measures to halt and reverse the conventional arms race and prevent conventional war. A large number of armed conflicts have occurred even since the end of the Second World War in 1945, involving a death toll of many millions of people, and there are no signs that there will be a decrease in the incidence and severity of such engagements. Under these circumstances, it is clear that negotiations for limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued. This was also recognized by the General Assembly in the international disarmament strategy set out in the Final Document.

183. The accumulation and increasing sophistication of conventional arms has a global character with varied implications for all regions of the world. Furthermore, the prospects foreshadowed by advanced, emerging or other high technologies seem likely to create new complications for the disarmament process. In exercise of the inherent right of all States to protect their security and in the continued absence of a fully functioning system of international collective security, States rely on their own national means of self-defence, either alone or in co-operation with other States. The development and acquisition of military capabilities have varied widely from region to region and country to country, but the overwhelming proportion of armed forces and weapons are maintained by a small number of States of military significance. According to one estimate world annual military spending, in 1983 United States dollars, exceeds \$800 billion, at least four fifths of this amount being expended on conventional arms and armed forces. Some 70 per cent of this global total is attributable to a small number of States and the largest share to the USSR and the United States. Furthermore, nearly all technological innovation in weaponry takes place in a small number of countries. It should be recalled that according to the Final Document States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in the process of conventional armaments reductions.

184. The present conventional arms race is closely related to the political tensions and differences between East and West. It is also related to tensions, conflicts, and confrontations in other parts of the world, including situations arising from foreign occupation, colonial domination, denial of the right of peoples to self-determination, racism and intervention. These conflicts and confrontations tend, in many cases, to be drawn into the East-West context. The conventional arms race generates mistrust and apprehension and sometimes arises from, and on other occasions can lead to, actions perceived by others as threatening or hostile or as attempts to achieve superiority or domination. In other words, in one form or another tensions and the arms race have a mutually reinforcing effect.

185. The global expenditure on arms and armed forces represents a massive consumption of resources for potentially destructive purposes in stark contrast to the urgent need for social and economic development, for which many of these resources might otherwise have been used. In a world in which hundreds of millions suffer from hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy and ill-health, the consumption of resources on such a scale for accumulation of arms runs counter to the objectives of promoting social progress and better standards of life set out in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations. This led earlier United Nations studies to conclude that the world is faced with a choice between a continued arms race or a more stable and balanced social and economic development, for the two are in conflict and cannot go together.

186. Disarmament is not merely to be considered as an end-state or a product: it is also a process - a process of negotiations on partial measures to be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and to be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The purpose of disarmament efforts is to increase the security of all States and it is now universally accepted that the accumulation of arms, which is a major element in the arms race, decreases international security. The process of conventional arms limitations and disarmament should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily-significant countries. However, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. This is particularly true in view of the nature and ferocity of conventional war fought with modern weapons and because conflict in one area can easily spread to a wider area and might even escalate into nuclear war, quite apart from the risk that nuclear war may break out in various other ways. Concrete measures of conventional arms limitation and disarmament would do much to reduce distrust and fear among nations and thus would have a positive effect of their own on international relations; in turn, such a development could improve prospects for measures of nuclear disarmament and therefore international security in its broadest and most significant sense. It follows that progress in nuclear arms limitations and disarmament should not serve to stimulate the conventional arms race.

187. To turn the present conventional arms race towards the process of disarmament it is important that States should endeavour to reduce the problems posed by fear, distrust and misperception. To a very great extent the reversal of the arms race will depend on the readiness of States, on the one hand, to refrain from taking actions such as military aggression, intervention, occupation and all other actions in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and, on the other hand to co-operate with each other in the interests of peace and mutual security. Negotiations are the classic approach to resolving international problems and conventional arms limitations and disarmament are no exception to this rule. Accordingly, States should endeavour to establish appropriate conditions for, and engage in, dialogue with a view to achieving success in negotiations.

188. The problem of the conventional arms race is urgent and requires concrete steps to be taken in the field of conventional disarmament. Because the subject is very broad and politically sensitive, however, the Group refrains from making specific proposals concerning the precise subject, framework and timing of future

negotiations or other actions that could be taken. This notwithstanding, the Group has identified, particularly in chapter III, the following subjects which, depending on particular circumstances, could be the object of consultations and negotiations:

- (a) Non-increase, reductions or agreed ceilings in specified categories of major weapons and/or in numbers of military personnel;
- (b) Qualitative restrictions on armaments (e.g. restraints on weapons and equipment perceived as being particularly threatening);
- (c) Reductions and restrictions on deployments of different types of armed forces (e.g. restraints on military presence and activities in specified areas, especially when perceived as being particularly threatening; withdrawal of specified force components from agreed areas; demilitarized zones);
- (d) Measures aimed at ensuring that outer space is used solely for peaceful purposes;
- (e) Restrictions on or reductions in military budgets and expenditure;
- (f) Quantitative and/or qualitative limitations on arms transfers;
- (g) Additional restrictions on those weapons which may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects;
- (h) Confidence-building measures of all types which could promote conventional arms limitation and disarmament;
- (i) Measures to keep regions from becoming involved in confrontations or disputes originating elsewhere, e.g. restraints on different forms of extra-regional military presence, involvement or activities, due consideration being given to the inherent right of States to individual or collective self-defence;
- (j) Reversal or curtailment of military activities which adversely affect the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development and hinder the struggle for self-determination, and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation.

In some cases an individual measure may need to be supplemented by others. All measures should be so designed that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage and that the security of States be enhanced. Any arms limitation and disarmament agreements should be accompanied by verification measures the forms and modalities of which should depend on and be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the relevant agreements. States should provide relevant information whenever required for negotiation and implementation of specific agreements. Progress towards disarmament, including conventional disarmament, would be facilitated by strict compliance by States with their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force as set forth in

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and by steps reinforcing this commitment.

189. Depending on the circumstances, deliberations and negotiations could take place in connection with or outside the United Nations; actions might be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally, between individual States or groups of States. It should, however, be kept in mind that States Members of the United Nations are under an obligation to strengthen the role of the Organization and that the United Nations offers a variety of organs for pursuing issues relating to arms limitations and disarmament. When the issues are considered outside the United Nations, the obligations of participants under the Charter of the United Nations should be borne in mind together with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session.

190. Progress in arms limitations and disarmament will to a large extent depend upon the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and States members of the two main alliances. In view of their significant roles in world affairs, action by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to improve their mutual relationship would facilitate practical steps of conventional arms limitations and disarmament, not only between themselves and their allies but also to some extent in other regions of the world. Taking into account recent technological developments, all States, in particular the United States and the Soviet Union, should make the utmost efforts with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space.

191. The negotiations in Vienna on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe have now been under way for over 11 years. It would be a considerable achievement if the States involved would put to good use the results of their thorough examination of all relevant aspects of the military situation in the area concerned in order to arrive at specific agreements on substantial reductions and other measures of disarmament in that area.

192. As Europe is a region having the largest accumulation of weapons and forces, an early and successful outcome at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, at present taking place at Stockholm, would be a meaningful contribution to the process of disarmament and would also represent a significant contribution to European security as well as to international peace and security in general.

193. While some States have a special responsibility, there is an urgent need for all States to explore what each and every one of them might be able to do in the way of initiating or facilitating efforts aimed at conventional arms limitations and disarmament. This would particularly apply in the case of regional approaches, where the responsibility of States in their particular regions is self-evident. All States should therefore give consideration to evolving measures which would be conducive to conventional arms limitations and disarmament in their own particular circumstances. Regional or sub-regional organizations or arrangements can make a valuable contribution to the process of conventional arms limitations and reductions in their areas. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held, where appropriate conditions exist, for the

consideration of different aspects of conventional arms limitations and disarmament. Initiatives such as those envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho referred to previously in this report could be considered in this context. All extra-regional States should refrain from activities which would undermine the effectiveness of regional arrangements. Regional and extra-regional States which are parties to such arrangements would, in fully discharging their obligations, including any provisions therein pertaining to verification, be contributing to the goals of disarmament. Endeavours by States in a region should be given the whole-hearted support of extra-regional States.

194. Notwithstanding that negotiations are the most important method for achieving disarmament, parallel actions by mutual example and/or unilateral initiatives may be impulses for progress in disarmament efforts and should therefore be considered where conditions permit. A variety of measures may be possible that could contribute to easing tensions, initiating or pursuing negotiations, preventing the deterioration of a military situation and, generally, for improving the environment for negotiating conventional arms limitations and disarmament.

195. One feasible approach to such negotiations would be to aim at lower levels of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as of undiminished security of all States. However, difficulties could be encountered in attempting to translate equality, parity or balance into numerical terms, particularly as the negotiating parties are likely in many cases to make differing assessments. The problems arising from the great disparities in military potential between various States, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, should also be taken into account. It is important that no State or group of States should be able to derive unilateral military advantage and that the security of all States should be not only maintained but enhanced and it follows that the process of disarmament should be, in itself balanced. There might be advantages in exploring additional avenues in the search for approaches to equity at a successively lower level of armaments as a basis for conventional arms limitations and disarmament efforts.

196. One possible avenue might be to deal in a negotiating process first of all with those force components or types of armaments which could be considered by the parties concerned as having a particularly threatening effect. If such an approach were taken, the prospects for conventional arms limitations and disarmament might be significantly enhanced.

197. Confidence-building measures can play an important role in progress towards disarmament in that they can encourage a climate of trust and international co-operation. A wide range of measures - political, military, social, economic and legal - was identified in the comprehensive study submitted by the Secretary-General in 1981. States should explore the possibilities for enhancing the prospects for disarmament through such measures as are appropriate to the differing characteristics and needs of various regions in the world. In the European context it would be an important achievement if the first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe were to produce substantial results so as to pave the way for a second stage which should be devoted to concrete disarmament measures.

198. Arms transfers have considerable implications for conventional disarmament. The subject of arms transfers is complex and arouses many concerns, particularly among States without indigenous arms production facilities and/or with a legitimate need to import arms for self-defence. Hence, limitation of transfers of major weapons must take place with due regard to the right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples, including those under colonial or foreign domination, and the obligations of States to respect that right. Major suppliers and recipients should engage in consultations to explore possible bases for reaching agreements to restrain the transfer of arms. The Soviet Union and the United States could consider the question of reopening their suspended talks on the limitation of conventional arms transfers. However, any arrangements among a limited number of suppliers to restrain transfers would have little lasting value if other supplier States were to respond by expanding their arms production and transfer activities and recipient States were to provide them with opportunities to do so by actively seeking additional arms from these other suppliers. Thus although a possible USSR-United States arrangement on arms transfers could be an important component of any process of conventional arms limitations and disarmament, any such arrangement would need to be accompanied by wider supplier/recipient negotiations, perhaps on a regional basis.

199. An enlightened and determined commitment by the public in all countries is essential for substantial progress in conventional arms limitations and disarmament. The principal role of the United Nations in building such a public commitment is to provide accurate information and to promote a sound understanding of the issues involved and of the different points of view as a basis for effective political action for disarmament. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Conventional disarmament is, however, also a priority item as the conventional arms race contributes significantly to tensions and insecurity in the world, increases the risk of war - including nuclear war - and absorbs the greater part of global arms expenditures. Therefore, it is also necessary to bring to the public's attention in a balanced, factual and objective manner, e.g. by means of the World Disarmament Campaign, the approaches and measures by which conventional arms limitations and disarmament may be achieved. It is hoped that the analysis and comments made in this study would be helpful in this regard.

200. The contemporary conventional arms race is characterized by a number of interactive elements the full extent of which it is difficult to assess: it is part of the overall accumulation of arms, including nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; it is global in scope in that there is now virtually no part of the world or even outer space which might not be drawn into a war; and modern conventional weapons, particularly those based on very advanced technologies, possess highly destructive capabilities, increasing lethality and in certain cases can create complex problems of verification. Given the complexity of the subject, the Group has not been able to deal in depth with all the elements set out in the guidelines for the study agreed by the Disarmament Commission: for instance, the elaboration of a factual account of all aspects of the conventional arms race; the international transfer of conventional weapons; and the impact of emerging,

advanced or other high technologies upon the arms race. Furthermore, there remains the need for thorough consideration of future developments in the conventional arms race and the dangers that they may pose for international security. Another important issue emerging from the Group's work is the need, with a view to arriving at concrete arrangements through negotiations, to explore more thoroughly the approaches to negotiating agreements in the field of conventional arms limitations and disarmament, taking into account the various characteristics of the military forces concerned and paying special attention to those force components that might be perceived by the parties concerned to be particularly threatening.

201. It is the hope of the Group that this study will assist the international community in its search for effective measures of conventional arms limitations and disarmament.

#### Notes

- 1/ Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons, report of the Secretary-General, 1967. Subsequently published in 1970 in Basic Problems of Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.I.14), p. 79.
- 2/ S/C.3/32/Rev.1; reprinted in The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), p. 28.
- 3/ SIPRI Yearbook, 1984, p. 13.
- 4/ A/36/597 (The Relationship between Disarmament and International Security (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.4), para. 8).
- 5/ A/36/356 (The Relationship between Disarmament and Development (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1), para. 45).
- 6/ The calculation of world military expenditure is of necessity imprecise due to such variables as differences in exchange rates, secrecy of information, problems of deciding how to allow for differences in the system and costing of military production and difficulties in how to allow for price changes in the civilian and military sectors of the economy. A useful reference point may be SIPRI Yearbook, 1984, p. 64, which gave a figure of \$750-800 billion for the year 1983, measured in 1983 dollars.
- 7/ Istvan Kende, Journal of Peace Research, vol. XV, No. 3 (1978), reprinted in Problems of Contemporary Militarism, edited by Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, 1980 (New York, St. Martins Press), p. 261.
- 8/ Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1982, (World Priorities, Leesburg, Virginia, United States), p. 15.
- 9/ Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1982, p. 7.

Notes (continued)

- 10/ Statistics derived from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1982-1983.
- 11/ SIPRI Yearbook, 1982, p. 177.
- 12/ A/36/356, (The Relationship between Disarmament and Development, para. 407).
- 13/ James Fallows "High-Tech Weaponry", The Atlantic Monthly, May 1981.
- 14/ A/37/386 (Economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.2)).
- 15/ A/36/597 (The Relationship between Disarmament and International Security).
- 16/ A/35/416 (Study on all aspects of Regional Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2), para. 198).
- 17/ A/36/474 (Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3)).

\*  
\* \* \*

Citing of data in the study does not necessarily mean endorsement by all members of the Group

ANNEX I

Guidelines for the study on conventional disarmament\*

1. The General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session, adopted resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980, in which it approved in principle the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis. The General Assembly also agreed that the Disarmament Commission should work out the general approach to the study, its structure and scope, and requested the Disarmament Commission to convey to the Secretary-General the conclusion of its deliberations which should constitute the guidelines for the study.
2. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981, in which, *inter alia*, it requested the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in 1982 to complete its consideration of the general approach to the study, its structure and scope and to transmit the conclusions of its deliberations to the group of experts.
3. In fulfilment of this task, the Disarmament Commission has agreed that the following text should constitute the guidelines for this study.
4. The general approach of the study should take full account of the following provisions and principles:
  - (a) The causes of the arms race in conventional weapons are of fundamental significance;
  - (b) The provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are of primary importance, particularly those related to principles, priorities and progress in conventional disarmament;
  - (c) Among genuine measures of disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
  - (d) Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special

---

\* Previously printed in Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-12/3), annex III.

responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. Other militarily significant States are also important in the context of achieving conventional disarmament. The contributions of all States in this regard are invaluable in lessening world tensions;

(e) Consideration of the question of the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons should take into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right of self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security so that no individual State or group of States should obtain advantage over others at any stage;

(f) Negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should have at each stage the objective of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces;

(g) The study should analyse the global dimension of the arms race in the conventional field and take due account of its regional aspects;

(h) The study should promote conventional disarmament within the context of general and complete disarmament in seeking appropriate ways and means conducive not only to intensifying ongoing, but also initiating new negotiations that would produce concrete results in the field of conventional disarmament. The study should also draw attention to the growing dangers of the arms race in the field of conventional disarmament;

(i) Agreements on reductions of armaments and armed forces should include appropriate provisions for verification;

(j) The group of experts should be guided by the principle of consensus in its reporting, with sufficient flexibility to allow the reflection of differing viewpoints.

5. The scope and structure of the study should contain the following conceptual and/or practical elements:

(a) The identification of the nature of the conventional arms race within the context of the global arms race, and its principal underlying causes;

(b) A factual account of all aspects of the conventional arms race on the basis of available data, particularly the size of conventional arsenals, local production, the capabilities and effects of present weapon systems and their relationship with other categories of weapons;

(c) The international transfer of conventional weapons, including regional aspects and military alliances;

(d) The impact of the accumulation of conventional armaments in the regions which constitute major areas of continuing tension and crisis in the world, and in regions with large concentrations of conventional weapons and armed forces;

(e) The use or threat of use of conventional arms against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of any State and for intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States;

(f) The impact of technological advances and research and development upon the conventional weapons arsenals of States, and upon the arms race in the fields of conventional and other categories of weapons;

(g) A description of the relevant social, economic and political effects of the conventional arms race and its consequences for the international situation, taking into account the need for and the beneficial effects of disarmament measures in this field;

(h) The contribution of confidence-building measures to further progress in conventional disarmament.

6. In addition to other sources, it is recommended that the group of experts should make full use of the studies by the Secretary-General already completed or in preparation, and should take into account four working papers submitted to the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/27, 28, 33 and 34). These papers are attached at Annex A.

7. In their findings, the members of the expert group should include their assessments of the effects of the conventional arms race on the prospects for disarmament. Following the guidelines set out above, they should also identify areas in which measures to curb the conventional arms race and to achieve conventional disarmament ought to be pursued and make recommendations accordingly.

ANNEX II

Working papers submitted to the Disarmament Commission

A. Working paper submitted by India\*

1. In the present situation of the grave dangers posed to the very survival of mankind by the continuously escalating arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and the lack of any meaningful progress in deliberations and negotiations in the field of disarmament, only a global approach to the problem can ensure right direction and correct priorities with respect to disarmament questions, including that of limitation and reduction of conventional weapons.
2. Such a global approach to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons must be pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. The achievement of nuclear disarmament has been accorded the highest priority, and the achievement of nuclear disarmament measures can, under no circumstances, be predicated upon progress in conventional disarmament. Attempts at promoting such concepts as a "balance" or "linkage" between nuclear and conventional weapons would be misleading. The highest priority in disarmament negotiations has always been the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Any approach to the question of limitation and reduction of conventional weapons, therefore, must not lose sight of this correct and comprehensive perspective.
3. A United Nations study on "all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces" can be undertaken only after the general approach to the study and its structure and scope have been fully discussed and agreed upon.
4. Any proposal for such a study would clearly need to take into account the primary responsibility for disarmament that rests with States having the largest military arsenals. The vast proportion of conventional weapons, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, are produced, developed, retained and deployed by the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. Progress in measures relating to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons between such States and their alliance arrangements would constitute the indispensable first step towards strengthening peace and security in the world.
5. In a United Nations study on conventional disarmament, while discussing the question of international trade in conventional weapons (or, conventional arms transfers, as it is now euphemistically called), all kinds of military alliance arrangements pertaining to conventional weapons would need to be carefully gone into: e.g., gifts, off-sets, deployments, prepositioning, co-production, standardization and technological co-operation. It would be one-sided to consider merely those transfers of conventional arms that affect the non-aligned and developing States which have only recently emerged from alien and colonial

---

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/CN.10/27.

domination and continue to struggle in order to safeguard their hard-won independence. Furthermore, such a study should not limit itself to the superficial aspects of arms transfers but must address the underlying causes that lead to acquisition of arms by States. Consideration of the question of the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons should, therefore, be based on the principle of ensuring the security of all States.

6. None of the alliance arrangements pertaining to conventional weapons can be considered as either sacred or beyond the pale of an objective, comprehensive study on conventional disarmament. No Article of the Charter of the United Nations can be invoked to prevent a probe into various military alliance arrangements, including military doctrines regarding conventional weapons; nor can shelter be taken behind the argument of lack of effective verifiability.

7. Any partial, discriminatory study of conventional disarmament, besides being seriously flawed, would lack credibility and serve no useful purpose.

#### B. Working paper submitted by China\*

All the wars and armed conflicts that have broken out in various parts of the world during the more than three decades since the Second World War have been fought with conventional weapons. The super-Powers have always regarded nuclear and conventional armaments as two inseparable components of their overall military strength. Nuclear weapons serve primarily as a deterrent and a means of blackmail while conventional arms have invariably been used in actual aggression. This is particularly true of the hegemonist super-Power that has been using tanks, aircraft, artillery and warships rather than nuclear weapons in its military aggression. That is why China is in favour of giving equal importance to conventional and nuclear disarmament. It would be beneficial to world peace and the security of the small and medium-sized countries if corresponding progress could be made in conventional disarmament while striving for nuclear disarmament.

To give due consideration to conventional disarmament does not detract from the importance of nuclear disarmament; much less does it imply any failure to recognize the destruction entailed in a nuclear war, or disagreement with the priority given to nuclear disarmament. Serious efforts should be made to promote substantial progress in genuine nuclear disarmament.

The super-Powers should therefore drastically reduce their nuclear armaments. We are opposed to the possession of nuclear weapons by the racist régime of South Africa and the Israeli expansionists. We believe that pressing for corresponding progress in conventional disarmament would constitute a serious test for the super-Powers, which are neither willing to reduce their nuclear weapons nor ready to cut back their conventional arms. The cause of overall disarmament only stands to gain therefrom.

---

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/CN.10/28.

The following proposals are submitted regarding the principles and steps of conventional disarmament studies:

1. In order to enhance the security of all countries, a basic principle should be laid down regarding conventional disarmament, namely that the two super-Powers possessing the largest arsenals have a major responsibility with regard to conventional disarmament. To begin with, they should undertake to desist from military intervention, whether direct or indirect, and the threat of force against other countries. They should withdraw all their occupation forces from abroad, dismantle all their foreign bases and terminate all forms of overseas military presence. Meanwhile, the reduction of armaments might begin with heavy or sophisticated equipment such as tanks, aircraft, artillery and warships. When these cutbacks have gone far enough, the other militarily significant countries should join them in further reducing their respective conventional arms according to a reasonable ratio and an agreed schedule.

2. Conventional disarmament should be closely linked with the safeguarding of international peace and security and with the combat against hegemonism. Conventional disarmament should serve to strengthen rather than weaken the sovereignty, independence and security of small and medium-sized countries. Pending the elimination of the threat posed by the super-Powers and the effective curtailment of expansion by the aggressive forces supported by the super-Powers, the problem for most of the small and medium-sized countries without adequate defence power is not to reduce, but to maintain and strengthen their necessary defence capabilities.

3. While formulating disarmament measures of a general nature, attention should also be given to partial measures, particularly regional measures. Zones of peace and neutrality should be established wherever feasible in accordance with local conditions and the desire of the countries concerned. The main criterion for a zone of peace is to prevent the establishment of any form of dominance and hegemony by any country in such a zone or in nearby areas that are of direct military strategic importance to such a zone, to withdraw all occupation forces, to dismantle all foreign military bases, to terminate all forms of foreign military presence and to eliminate all foreign aggression, expansion, interference and control.

4. Feasible international supervision should be prescribed for all conventional disarmament agreements.

5. Studies on the various aspects of the question of conventional disarmament are necessary for they will play a useful role in promoting such disarmament. The idea of a group of experts to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations is also feasible. These studies should focus on the crux of the matter - the conventional arms race. Emphasis should be placed on investigating and verifying how the super-Powers are engaged in the conventional arms race and how they resort to such arms for expansion and aggression, and on exploring, on the basis of the findings, possible ways of putting an end to their conventional arms race.

C. Working paper submitted by Denmark\*

1. In its resolution 35/156 A the General Assembly approved in principle the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis. At its thirty-sixth session, in resolution 36/97 A, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish the Group of Experts. It further requested the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in 1982 to complete its consideration of the general approach to the study, its structure and scope and to transmit the conclusions of its deliberations to the Group of Experts. The General Assembly also agreed that the Group of Experts should pursue its work after the above-mentioned session of the Disarmament Commission, taking into consideration such conclusions as the Commission may submit to it and, if necessary the deliberations at the substantive session of the Commission in 1981, in particular those reflected in paragraph 21 and annex III of the report on that session.

2. The discussions of this subject at previous sessions of the Disarmament Commission and in the First Committee of the General Assembly have been useful. It is important that discussions be continued on the problems of conventional disarmament in general and on approaches and priorities in this respect. Indeed, the main purpose of an in-depth expert study of the entire question of conventional disarmament is to assist the Commission and other relevant bodies in their task. With this in mind the study should provide a comprehensive factual assessment of the conventional arms buildup and of the problems it gives rise to and should help clarify the issues in conventional disarmament, elaborate adequate concepts and seek balanced and mutually acceptable approaches which can facilitate the achievement of practical results.

3. The Danish delegation has previously submitted its views on the general approach, structure and scope of the study. 1/ It was in particular suggested that the study should comprise the following:

- In view of the long-standing tradition for consensus-reporting in United Nations studies, this principle should also guide the expert group.
- It should be guided by the principles and perspectives set forth in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.
- It should seek to ascertain the facts of the conventional arms buildup, the risks and costs involved and the prospects for disarmament, including the size of present conventional arsenals, the capabilities and effects of present weapon systems and foreseeable developments.
- It should examine the difference in importance and implications of the conventional weapons and forces existing in various parts of the world.

---

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/CN.10/33.

- It should take fully into account existing relationships between conventional arms buildup and the development of the nuclear arms race.
- It should draw, as appropriate, upon the results of the study of all aspects of regional disarmament and on other relevant studies by the Secretary-General.
- It should consider the general principles and guidelines which are applicable to conventional disarmament.
- It should seek out areas in which measures to curb the conventional arms race and to achieve conventional disarmament are most urgent and seem most feasible.
- It should take into account throughout the principle that the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, of the right of each State to protect its security, of the special responsibility of States with the largest military arsenals in pursuing conventional armaments reductions, and, generally, of the need to achieve an acceptable balance of the responsibilities and obligations of all States in the disarmament process. 2/

4. In the opinion of the Danish delegation, however, the report of the 1981 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, particularly paragraph 21 and annex III, provides an acceptable and sufficiently detailed basis for the work of the Group of Experts in so far as the general approach, structure and scope of the study are concerned. It would be a mistake to confine too narrowly the mandate of the Group when its purpose is to reassess in depth the whole area of conventional disarmament and when the tradition of consensus-reporting and the geographical balance in the composition of the Group already ensure that the resulting report will not be partial or one-sided. Instead, the Disarmament Commission should avail itself of the present opportunity to offer guidance to the Group regarding the problems most in need of careful analysis and the approaches most conducive to concrete achievements. The following remarks are intended in this sense.

5. The discussions so far indicate that the issues relating to priorities and to the directions to be given to the study are among the most difficult and sensitive. This emphasizes the need for the study to open with a balanced factual assessment of all the aspects of the conventional arms race, including the size of conventional arsenals, their proliferation, vertical and horizontal, the capabilities and effects of present weapon systems and foreseeable developments. Such an assessment covering the risks, threats and costs inherent in the current arms buildup, but attentive to the reasons why States acquire arms, is crucial for the overall balance and thus for the credibility and usefulness of the study. It seems to be the only way of approaching on a realistic basis and in the right perspective a number of issues, such as the relationship between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the most heavily armed countries, the relative importance to be given to global and regional approaches and the importance to be ascribed to the question of arms transfers in

general and to each of its many different forms in particular. Without the basis provided by a global and comprehensive assessment of the conventional arms race neither the urgency nor the feasibility of specific disarmament steps can be adequately dealt with, and specific issues will be parcelled out for separate consideration, thus losing the comprehensive perspective which was a central theme emerging from the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

6. Considerations of national security policy lie at the heart of the problem of disarmament. This is particularly true of conventional disarmament as limitations on conventional arms and armed forces in most cases have a direct impact on the immediate security situations and security perceptions of the countries concerned. In fact, preservation or enhancement of the security of each of the States concerned is both the main requirement for making disarmament agreements possible, and their main purpose. The key problem is to find ways in which States can protect their security without engaging in an arms race which only leads to greater insecurity for all. This problem ought to be the focus throughout the conceptual part of the study.

7. The report of the Secretary-General on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, prepared by a group of experts, identified two approaches to achieve security without reliance on a continuous buildup of armaments. One is through agreements among States for mutual regulation, limitation and reduction of their armaments and armed forces. The other is to provide security through collective arrangements, such as the system based on the organs and bodies of the United Nations, primarily the Security Council with its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and its mandate for taking enforcement action if need be. As regards the former the study stresses the need for a suitable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations and for agreements, as appropriate, on verification. It further emphasizes the fact that in the disarmament process particular attention should be paid to reduction of those weapon systems which are particularly destabilizing or which contribute most to overall insecurity. This is one suggestion which seems worth examining in greater detail, both in general terms and in terms of the particular sources of instability in each region. By enhancing security and promoting military stability, shifts towards force structures which are more unambiguously defensive in character might be a feasible way of halting the arms race globally or in particular regions. More generally, recent studies on disarmament conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, and particularly those on regional disarmament, confidence-building measures, disarmament and international security and on disarmament and development contain concepts and recommendations which it would be fruitful to examine specifically in their application to conventional disarmament.

8. This context of the right of each State to security and of promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level also provides the proper perspective for the consideration of a number of relevant issues such as the role of verification, the contribution that effective and militarily significant confidence-building measures can make, and the different approaches to disarmament and enhanced security that have been envisaged or implemented in particular regions.

9. Finally, when it comes to practical conclusions, the study should seek to identify areas in which measures to curb the conventional arms race and to achieve conventional disarmament are most urgent and seem most feasible. The preceding analysis of the character of the arms race on the one hand, and of possible concepts and approaches on the other, should provide a framework for this part of the study which is both balanced and realistic.

D. Working paper submitted by the German Democratic Republic\*

I. INTRODUCTION

1. According to the relevant resolutions, the General Assembly agreed in principle that the Disarmament Commission should work out the general approach to the study, its structure and scope, and requested the Disarmament Commission to convey to the Secretary-General the conclusions of its deliberations, which should constitute the guidelines for the study.

II. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE STUDY

2. The study should be made in the context of the current situation in the field of disarmament, and of the importance of disarmament for international peace and security and for détente. A genuine and effective process of disarmament is imperative. In this respect the study should aim:

(a) To promote disarmament relating to conventional armaments and contribute to concrete actions in this field;

(b) To inform about the growing danger of the arms race in the field of conventional armaments and about effective ways and means which lead to conventional disarmament.

3. The study should be carried out on the basis of the following principles:

(a) The relevant provisions of the Programme of Action in connection with the principles and priorities set out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are of primary importance and should be strictly observed;

(b) Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons and to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved. However, parallel to nuclear disarmament, it is necessary for world peace and security to arrive at effective measures of conventional disarmament;

---

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/CN.10/34.

(c) The contribution of all countries to conventional disarmament is necessary, first of all by the freezing and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the States permanent members of the Security Council and the countries which have military agreements with them;

(d) Based on the principle of undiminished security of all States and their right to self-defence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, disarmament measures should be adopted so that no individual State or group of States would obtain advantage over others at any stage. In this context, negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should aim at promoting or enhancing stability at lower military levels;

(e) Agreements on reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments should include provisions for verification in such agreements, bearing in mind paragraph 31 of the Final Document;

(f) The study should take into account the importance of reaching concrete results in the limitation and eventual cessation of the arms race in the field of conventional armaments on a global as well as a regional and bilateral basis and, to that end, of initiating concrete negotiations at the earliest possible date;

(g) The work on this study should not delay ongoing or new negotiations on disarmament problems and should not in any way interfere with these negotiations;

(h) The study should be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis;

(i) The expert group should be guided by the principle of consensus.

### III. SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

4. The scope and structure of the study should include the following elements:

(a) A description of the relevant political, social and economic effects and consequences of the conventional arms race on the international situation and the need for and effects of disarmament measures in this field. Particular attention should be given to:

(b) The analysis of proposals and suggestions made by States in the field of conventional disarmament and on recommendations for their implementation;

(c) The question of international conventional arms transfer;

(d) The analysis and elaboration of measures which can facilitate disarmament, e.g. non-use of force, confidence-building measures, non-expansion of military alliances.

Notes

1/ Papers were submitted to the second and third substantive sessions of the Disarmament Commission in documents A/CN.10/13 and A/CN.10/25.

2/ A/CN.10/25, para. 10.

-----