



Distr.: Limited  
14 December 2018  
Arabic  
Original: English

# الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ



## مؤتمر الأطراف

الدورة الرابعة والعشرون

كاتوفيتسه، ٢-١٤ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٨

البند ١٠ (ب) من جدول الأعمال

المسائل المتعلقة بالتمويل

المسائل المتعلقة باللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل

## المسائل المتعلقة باللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل

مقترح من الرئيس

مشروع المقرر -/م أ-٢٤

## تقرير اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل

إن مؤتمر الأطراف،

إذ يشير إلى المادتين ٤ و ١١ من الاتفاقية،

وإذ يشير أيضاً إلى الفقرة ١١٢ من المقرر ١/م أ-١٦، وإلى الفقرتين ١٢٠ و ١٢١ من المقرر ٢/م أ-١٧، وكذلك إلى المقررات ٥/م أ-١٨، و ٧/م أ-١٩، و ٦/م أ-٢٠، و ٦/م أ-٢١، و ٨/م أ-٢٢، و ٧/م أ-٢٣،

١- يرحب مع التقدير بتقرير اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل (لجنة التمويل) المقدم إلى مؤتمر الأطراف في دورته الرابعة والعشرين، ويحيط علماً بالتوصيات الواردة فيه<sup>(١)</sup>؛

٢- يؤيد خطة عمل اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل لعام ٢٠١٩<sup>(٢)</sup>؛

(١) FCCC/CP/2018/8.

(٢) FCCC/CP/2018/8، المرفق السادس.



الرجاء إعادة الاستعمال



- ٣- يرحب مع *التقدير* بتقييم فترة السنتين لعام ٢٠١٨ وبالعرض العام لتدفقات التمويل المتعلق بالمناخ اللذين أنجزتهما اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالشؤون المالية، وبخاصة الموجز والتوصيات كما وردت في المرفق<sup>(٣)</sup>؛
- ٤- يشجع اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل على أخذ أفضل المعلومات العلمية المتاحة بعين الاعتبار في إنجاز تقييم فترة السنتين والعرض العام لتدفقات التمويل المتعلق بالمناخ المقبلين؛
- ٥- يطلب إلى اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل أن تستخدم في تقييم فترة السنتين والعرض العام لتدفقات التمويل المتعلق بالمناخ مصطلحات التمويل المتعلق بالمناخ المستخدمة في أحكام الاتفاقية وفي اتفاق باريس، حسب الاقتضاء؛
- ٦- يعرب عن تقديره للمساهمات المالية التي قدمتها حكومات ألمانيا وبلجيكا وجمهورية كوريا وسويسرا والمملكة المتحدة لبريطانيا العظمى وأيرلندا الشمالية والنرويج وكذلك المفوضية الأوروبية، دعماً لعمل اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل؛
- ٧- يرحب بمنتدى اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل لعام ٢٠١٨ الذي تناول هيكلة تمويل أنشطة مكافحة تغير المناخ، مع التركيز على تحسين أوجه التعاون واغتنام الفرص، ويحيط علماً بالتقرير الموجز عن المنتدى<sup>(٤)</sup>؛
- ٨- يعرب عن امتنانه لحكومات جمهورية كوريا والنرويج وهولندا على ما قدمته من دعم في سبيل إنجاح منتدى اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل لعام ٢٠١٨؛
- ٩- يرحب بقرار اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل بشأن موضوع متداها لعام ٢٠١٩ وهو تمويل أنشطة مكافحة تغير المناخ والمدن المستدامة؛
- ١٠- يطلب إلى اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل أن تعرض بوضوح ودقة، كل أربع سنوات وكجزء من التقييم الذي تجريه كل سنتين ومن عرضها العام لتدفقات التمويل المتعلق بالمناخ، المعلومات المتاحة ذات الصلة بالفقرة ١(ج) من المادة ٢ من اتفاق باريس، بما في ذلك الإشارة إلى المادة ٩ منه؛
- ١١- يشجع اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل على الإسهام في الورقة التقنية بشأن مصادر الدعم المالي التي تضعها اللجنة التنفيذية في آلية وارسو الدولية المعنية بالخسائر والأضرار المرتبطة بتأثيرات تغير المناخ<sup>(٥)</sup>؛
- ١٢- يؤكد الولايات المنصوص عليها في الفقرة ٣(د) من المادة ١١ من الاتفاقية وفي المقررات ١٢/م-٢ و ١٢/م-٣ و ٥/م-١٩ و ١/م-٢١؛
- ١٣- يطلب إلى اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل أن تعد، كل أربع سنوات، تقريراً عن تحديد احتياجات البلدان النامية الأطراف فيما يتعلق بتنفيذ الاتفاقية واتفاق باريس، كي ينظر فيه مؤتمر الأطراف، ابتداءً من دورته السادسة والعشرين (تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ٢٠٢٠)، ومؤتمر

(٣) <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2018%20BA%20Technical%20Report%20Final.pdf>

(٤) FCCC/CP/2018/8، المرفق الثالث.

(٥) FCCC/CP/2018/8، الفقرة ١٤(ز).

الأطراف العامل بوصفه اجتماع الأطراف في اتفاق باريس، ابتداء من دورته الثالثة (تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ٢٠٢٠)؛

١٤ - يطلب أيضاً إلى اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل أن تتعاون في إعداد التقرير المشار إليه في الفقرة ١٣ أعلاه، حسب الاقتضاء، مع الكيانات التشغيلية للآلية المالية ومع الهيئات الفرعية والهيئات المنشأة، ومع القنوات الثنائية والمتعددة الأطراف، ومع المنظمات المراقبة؛

١٥ - يطلب أيضاً اتخاذ إجراءات اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل المطلوب اتخاذها في هذا المقرر رهناء بتوفر الموارد المالية.

١٦ - يطلب إلى اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل أن تقدم إلى مؤتمر الأطراف في دورته الخامسة والعشرين (تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ٢٠١٩) تقريراً عما أحرز من تقدم في تنفيذ خطة عملها؛

١٧ - يطلب أيضاً إلى اللجنة الدائمة المعنية بالتمويل أن تنظر في الإرشادات المقدمة إليها في المقررات الأخرى ذات الصلة الصادرة عن مؤتمر الأطراف.

## Annex

### Summary and recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows

[English only]

#### I. Context and mandates

1. The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) assists the Conference of the Parties (COP) in exercising its functions with respect to the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, inter alia, in terms of measurement, reporting and verification of support provided to developing country Parties, through activities such as the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows (BA).<sup>1</sup>
2. Subsequent to the 2014 BA, the COP requested the SCF to consider: the relevant work of other bodies and entities on measurement, reporting and verification of support and the tracking of climate finance;<sup>2</sup> ways of strengthening methodologies for reporting climate finance;<sup>3</sup> and ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate finance, including private finance mobilized by public interventions, to assess how adaptation and mitigation needs can most effectively be met by climate finance.<sup>4</sup> It also requested the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, when developing the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support, to consider, inter alia, information in the BA and other reports of the SCF and other relevant bodies under the Convention.
3. The COP welcomed the summary and recommendations by the SCF on the 2016 BA, which, inter alia, encourages Parties and relevant international institutions to enhance the availability of information that will be necessary for tracking global progress on the goals outlined in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. The COP requested the SCF, in preparing future BAs, to assess available information on investment needs and plans related to Parties' nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans.
4. The 2018 BA provides an updated overview of climate finance flows in 2015 and 2016 from provider to beneficiary countries, available information on domestic climate finance and cooperation among Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties), and the other climate-related flows that constitute global total climate finance flows. It also includes information on trends since the 2014 BA. The 2018 BA then considers the implications of these flows and assesses their relevance to international efforts to address climate change. It explores the key features of climate finance flows, including composition and purposes. It also explores emerging insights into their effectiveness, finance access, and ownership and alignment of climate finance with beneficiary country needs and priorities related to climate change. It also provides information on recent developments in the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance flows at the international and domestic level, and insights into impact reporting practices.
5. The 2018 BA includes, for the first time, information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, including methods and metrics, and data sets on flows, stocks and considerations for integration. It also discusses climate finance flows in the broader context.
6. The 2018 BA comprises this summary and recommendations, and a technical report. The summary and recommendations was prepared by the SCF. The technical report was

<sup>1</sup> Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 121(f).

<sup>2</sup> Decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 71.

<sup>3</sup> Decision 5/CP.18, paragraph 11.

<sup>4</sup> Decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 11.

prepared by experts under the guidance of the SCF and draws on information and data from a range of sources. It was subject to extensive stakeholder input and expert review, but remains a product of the external experts.

## II. Challenges and limitations

7. The 2018 BA provides an updated overview of current climate finance flows over the years 2015 and 2016, along with data on trends from 2011 to 2014 collated in previous BA reports. Due diligence has been undertaken to utilize the best information available from the most credible sources. In compiling estimates, efforts have been made to avoid double counting through a focus on primary finance, which is finance for a new physical item or activity. Challenges were nevertheless encountered in collecting, aggregating and analysing information from diverse sources. The lack of clarity with regard to the use of different definitions of climate finance limits the comparability of data.

8. **Data uncertainty.** There are uncertainties associated with each source of data which have different underlying causes. Uncertainties are related to the data on domestic public investments, resulting from the lack of geographic coverage, differences in the way methods are applied, significant changes in the methods for estimating energy efficiency over the years, and the lack of available data on sustainable transport and other key sectors. Uncertainties also arise from the lack of procedures and data to determine private climate finance; methods for estimating adaptation finance; differences in the assumptions of underlying formulas to attribute finance from multilateral development banks (MDBs) to members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), minus the Republic of Korea; the classification of data as ‘green finance’; and incomplete data on non-concessional flows.

9. **Data gaps.** Gaps in the coverage of sectors and sources of climate finance remain significant, particularly with regard to private investment. Although estimates of incremental investments in energy efficiency have improved, there is still an inadequate understanding of the public and private sources of finance and the financial instruments behind those investments. For sustainable transport, efforts have been made to improve public and private investment in electric vehicles. However, information on sources and instruments for finance in public mass transit remains unreported in many countries. High-quality data on private investments in mitigation and finance in sectors such as agriculture, forests, water and waste management are particularly lacking. In particular, adaptation finance estimates are difficult to compare with mitigation finance estimates due to the former being context-specific and incremental, and more work is needed on estimating climate-resilient investments.

10. The limitations outlined in paragraphs 8 and 9 above need to be taken into consideration when deriving conclusions and policy implications from the 2018 BA. The SCF will contribute, through its activities, to the progressive improvement of the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance information in future BAs to help address these challenges.

## III. Key findings

### A. Methodological issues relating to measurement, reporting and verification of public and private climate finance

#### 1. Developments in the period 2015–2016

11. Following the recommendations made by the SCF in the 2016 BA, the 2018 BA identifies the improvements listed in paragraphs 12–16 below in the tracking and reporting of information on climate finance.

**(a) Annex II Parties**

12. Revision of the biennial report (BR) common tabular format (CTF) tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) has facilitated the provision of more qualitative information on the definitions and underlying methodologies used by Parties included in Annex II to the Convention (Annex II Parties) in the documentation boxes in the BR3 CTF tables. The BR3 CTF tables submitted as at October 2018 suggest some increase in the provision of quantitative information, including information on public financial support in CTF table 7(b) and climate-related private finance in the BRs.

**(b) International organizations**

13. Making data available on private shares of climate co-finance associated with MDB finance and reporting on amounts mobilized through public interventions deployed by other development finance institutions (DFIs) included in the regular OECD-DAC data collection process.

14. Facilitating the increased transparency of information through biennial surveys to collect information from OECD-DAC members on the measurement basis for reporting (i.e. committed, disbursed or “other”), and on the shares of the activity reported as mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting to the UNFCCC.

15. Institutionalizing the mitigation and adaptation finance tracking and reporting, and ongoing efforts aimed at better tracking and reporting on projects that have mitigation and adaptation co-benefits (i.e. cross-cutting) among MDBs.

16. Measuring and reporting on impact is now common practice among multilateral climate funds, and there is now growing interest in this field by MDBs and the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), which are also undertaking work on methodologies for impact measuring in the light of the Paris Agreement. The ongoing efforts of MDBs to develop additional metrics that demonstrate how MDB financing supports climate-resilient development pathways are an important step in this direction.

**(c) Insights into reporting by Annex II Parties and non-Annex I Parties**

17. Notwithstanding the improvements in methodologies for reporting climate finance via the BR3 CTF tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b), some reporting issues persist that complicate the aggregation, comparison and analysis of the data. The current “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”<sup>5</sup> were designed to accommodate reporting on a wide range of climate finance instruments and activities. This required a reporting architecture that was flexible enough to accommodate a diversity of reporting approaches. In some cases, limited clarity with regard to the diversity of reporting approaches limits comparability in climate finance reporting.

18. The current “UNFCCC biennial update reporting guidelines for Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention”<sup>6</sup> for reporting by non-Annex I Parties on financial, technical and capacity-building needs and support received do not require information on underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used in generating the information. Nevertheless, the provision of such information is useful.

**(d) Insights into broader reporting aspects**

19. Notwithstanding ongoing efforts to make information on domestic climate-related finance available through biennial update reports (BURs), published climate public expenditure and institutional reviews, and other tools, collecting and reporting domestic climate-related finance is often not undertaken systematically, thereby limiting the availability of information.

20. There are significant data gaps on climate finance flows in the context of cooperation among non-Annex I Parties.

<sup>5</sup> Decision 2/CP.17, annex I.

<sup>6</sup> Decision 2/CP.17, annex III.

## 2. Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: methods and metrics

21. Ongoing voluntary efforts to develop approaches for tracking and reporting on consistency of public and private sector finance with the Paris Agreement are important for enhancing the collective understanding of the consistency of the broader finance and investment flows with Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.

22. Some financial actors, such as MDBs and bilateral DFIs, have started to develop approaches for tracking the integration of climate change considerations into their operations. However, there was no publicly available information on the progress made on this matter at the time of preparation of the 2018 BA. Ongoing work for developing climate-resilience metrics is important for enhancing understanding of the consistency of multilateral and bilateral development finance with the Paris Agreement.

## B. Overview of current climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016

### 1. Global finance flows

23. On a comparable basis, climate finance flows increased by 17 per cent in the period 2015–2016 compared with the period 2013–2014. High-bound climate finance estimates increased from USD 584 billion in 2014 to USD 680 billion in 2015 and to USD 681 billion in 2016 (see figure 1). The growth seen in 2015 was largely driven by high levels of new private investment in renewable energy, which is the largest segment of the global total. Despite decreasing technology costs (particularly in solar photovoltaic and wind power generation), which means that every dollar invested finances more renewable energy than it previously did, a significant number of new projects were financed in 2015. In 2016, a decrease in renewable energy investment occurred, which was driven by both the continued decline in renewable technology costs and the lower generation capacity of new projects financed.<sup>7</sup> However, the decrease in renewable energy investment in 2016 was offset by an 8 per cent increase in investment in energy efficiency technologies across the building, industry and transport sectors.

24. The quality and completeness of data on climate finance has improved since the 2016 BA. Methodological improvements in estimating finance flows have changed the comparative basis against previous estimates. In particular, 2014 estimates for energy efficiency have been revised downward owing to a more accurate bottom-up assessment model being employed by the International Energy Agency. This has resulted in a revised estimate of USD 584 billion from USD 741 billion for total global climate finance in 2014. In addition, data coverage in sustainable transport has improved, with estimates for public and private investment in electric vehicle sales in 2015 and 2016.

#### (a) Flows from Annex II Parties to non-Annex I Parties as reported in biennial reports

25. Climate-specific finance reported in BRs submitted by Annex II Parties has increased in terms of both volume and rate of growth since the previous BA. Whereas the total finance reported increased by just 5 per cent from 2013 to 2014, it increased by 24 per cent from 2014 to 2015 (to USD 33 billion), and subsequently by 14 per cent from 2015 to 2016 (to USD 38 billion). Out of these total amounts, USD 30 billion in 2015 and USD 34 billion in 2016 were reported as climate-specific finance channelled through bilateral, regional and other channels; the remainder flowed through multilateral channels. From 2014 to 2016, both mitigation and adaptation finance grew in more or less equal proportions, namely by 41 and 45 per cent, respectively.

#### (b) Multilateral climate funds

26. Total amounts channelled through UNFCCC funds and multilateral climate funds in 2015 and 2016 were USD 1.4 billion and USD 2.4 billion, respectively. The significant increase from 2015 to 2016 was a result of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) ramping up

<sup>7</sup> Approximately 52 per cent of the decrease in 2016 was due to reduced technology costs in solar photovoltaic and wind energy.

operations. On the whole, this represents a decrease of approximately 13 per cent compared with the 2013–2014 biennium and can be accounted for by a reduction in the commitments made by the Climate Investment Funds, in line with changes in the climate finance landscape as the GCF only started to scale up operations in 2016.

**(c) Climate finance from multilateral development banks**

27. MDBs provided USD 23.4 billion and USD 25.5 billion in climate finance from their own resources to eligible recipient countries in 2015 and 2016, respectively. On average, this represents a 3.4 per cent increase from the 2013–2014 period.

28. The attribution of MDB finance flows to members of OECD-DAC, minus the Republic of Korea, is calculated at up to USD 17.4 billion in 2015 and USD 19.7 billion in 2016 to recipients eligible for OECD-DAC official development assistance.

**(d) Private climate finance**

29. The most significant source of uncertainty relates to the geographic attribution of private finance data. Although efforts have been made by MDBs and OECD since the 2016 BA to estimate private climate finance mobilized through multilateral and bilateral institutions, data on private finance sources and destinations remain lacking.

30. MDBs reported private finance mobilization in 2015 was USD 10.9 billion and increased by 43 per cent the following year to USD 15.7 billion. OECD estimated USD 21.7 billion in climate-related private finance mobilized during the period 2012–2015 by bilateral and multilateral institutions, which included USD 14 billion from multilateral providers and USD 7.7 billion from bilateral finance institutions. It is estimated that, in 2015, USD 2.3 billion was mobilized through bilateral institutions. The Climate Policy Initiative estimated renewable energy flows for new projects ranged from USD 2.4 billion in 2015 to USD 1.5 billion in 2016; this was, however, a significant underestimation given the underlying reporting approaches.

**(e) Recipients**

31. A total of 34 Parties included in Annex I to the Convention provided information on recipients in the BR3s, while 16 out of 40 BURs submitted as first or second BURs as at October 2018 include, to varying degrees, quantitative information on climate finance received in the 2015–2016 period. Therefore, at the time of the preparation of the 2018 BA, it is not possible to present a clear picture of climate finance received on the basis of the information included in national reports submitted to the secretariat.

32. Other sources of information provide insights on recipients. For example, of the bilateral finance reported to OECD-DAC, national and local governments received 51 and 61 per cent of bilateral climate-related assistance in 2015 and 2016, up from 43 and 42 per cent in 2013 and 2014, respectively. The remainder was received by international organizations, non-governmental organizations and public and private sector organizations from the support-providing countries. No information is available on the channels of delivery for 91–97 per cent of the other official flows of a non-concessional nature in the period 2015–2016. Of the total climate finance committed by MDBs from their own resources, 72 per cent was channelled to public sector recipients in 2015, and 74 per cent in 2016. Adaptation finance, in particular, went predominantly to public sector institutions: 90 per cent in 2015 and 97 per cent in 2016.

**2. Domestic climate finance**

33. Domestic climate expenditures by national and subnational governments are a potentially growing source of global climate finance, particularly as, in some cases, NDC submissions are translated into specific investment plans and domestic efforts to monitor and track the domestic climate expenditures are stepped up. However, comprehensive data on domestic climate expenditure are not readily available, as these data are not collected regularly or with a consistent methodology over time within or across countries. Of the 30 countries that reported data on climate expenditures included in the 2016 BA, 19 countries provided such data in 2015 or 2016, with the 2015 data for 5 countries being included in the



2016 BA. Four countries reported expenditure of USD 0.335 billion in their BURs, while seven countries published climate public expenditure and institutional reviews amounting to USD 16.5 billion.<sup>8</sup> In two other countries, updated data are available amounting to USD 49 billion. In total, this brings domestic public climate finance estimates for the period 2015–2016 to USD 67 billion.


**3. Flows among countries that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, recipients eligible for official development assistance and Parties not included in Annex I**

34. Information on climate finance flows among non-Annex I Parties is not systematically tracked, relying on voluntary reporting by countries through the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and DFIs through IDFC that are based in countries that are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (non-OECD). Total estimates of such flows amounted to USD 12.2–13.9 billion in 2015 and USD 11.3–13.7 billion in 2016. This represents an increase of approximately 33 per cent on average from the 2013–2014 period, driven primarily by non-OECD member institutions of IDFC increasing finance significantly to other non-OECD members. New multilateral institutions include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank. Together, they provided USD 911 million to renewable energy projects in 2016. The AIIB portion of this amount included outflows that may be attributable to OECD-DAC members that are shareholders in AIIB.

---

<sup>8</sup> This includes Hebei Province in China, reporting an expenditure of USD 6.1 billion in 2015.

Figure 1  
**Climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016**  
 (Billions of United States dollars, annualized)



*Abbreviations:* BEV = battery electric vehicle, BUR = biennial update report, CPEIR = climate public expenditure and institutional reviews, CPI = Climate Policy Initiative, IEA = International Energy Agency, I4CE = Institute for Climate Economics, MDB = multilateral development bank, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.

<sup>a</sup> Value discounts transport energy efficiency estimates by 8.5 per cent to account for overlap with electric vehicle estimates.

<sup>b</sup> From members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), minus the Republic of Korea, to OECD-DAC recipients eligible for official development assistance. Refer to chapter 2.5.2 of the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report for further explanation.

<sup>c</sup> Estimates include private co-financing with MDB finance.

#### 4. Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: data sets on flows, stocks and integration

35. The 2018 BA includes information on available data sets that integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes

and that include information that may be relevant to tracking consistency with Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.

36. Across the financial sector, both the reporting of data on financial flows and stocks consistent with low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient pathways, and the integration of climate considerations into decision-making are at a nascent stage. The data sets available on bond markets are the most advanced, with regular and reliable data published based on green bond labelling and analysis of bonds that may be aligned with climate themes. Less information is available on bonds that may be inconsistent with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient pathways. Other market segments lack completeness of coverage and reporting quality across peer institutions. With regard to integrating climate change considerations into investment decision-making, some market segments such as listed corporations and institutional investors are participating in emerging reporting initiatives, including through target-setting processes, that will likely improve the availability of data over time. Other market segments such as insurance companies participate in comprehensive and regular survey reporting on climate integration into governance and risk-management processes. Other market segments, particularly in banking, insurance and financial services, lack breadth of coverage in reporting or are at an early stage of considering how to report data.

### C. Assessment of climate finance flows

37. An assessment of the data underlying the overview of climate finance flows presented offers insights into crucial questions of interest in the context of the objective of the Convention and the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement. Development banks, DFIs and multilateral climate funds play a vital role in helping countries to deliver on their NDCs. The key features of a subset of these different channels of public climate finance for beneficiary countries are summarized in the figure below, including the areas of support (adaptation, mitigation or cross-cutting) and the instruments used to deliver climate finance.

Figure 2

#### Characteristics of international public climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016

	Annual average USD billion	Area of support				Financial instrument		
		Adaptation	Mitigation	REDD-plus <sup>a</sup>	Cross-cutting	Grants	Concessional loans	Other
Multilateral climate funds <sup>b</sup>	1.9	25%	53%	5%	17%	51%	44%	5%
Bilateral climate finance <sup>c</sup>	31.7	29%	50%	–	21%	47%	52%	<1%
MDB climate finance <sup>d</sup>	24.4	21%	79%	–	–	9%	74%	17%

*Note:* All values are based on approvals and commitments.

*Abbreviations:* MDB = multilateral development bank.

<sup>a</sup> In decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, the Conference of the Parties encouraged developing country Parties to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking the following activities: reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

<sup>b</sup> Including Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme, Adaptation Fund, Bio Carbon Fund, Clean Technology Fund, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Program, Global Climate Change Alliance, Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, Green Climate Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, Partnership for Market Readiness, Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience, Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, Special Climate Change Fund and United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries.

<sup>c</sup> Bilateral climate finance data are sourced from biennial reports from Parties included in Annex II to the Convention (that further include regional and other channels) for the annual average. Information related to the United States of America is drawn from preliminary data provided by the United States. The thematic split and the financial instrument data are taken from data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), referring only to concessional flows of climate-related development assistance reported by OECD-DAC members. Section C of the summary and recommendations and chapter III of the technical report uses 'bilateral finance' to refer only to concessional flows of climate-related development assistance reported by OECD-DAC members.

<sup>d</sup> The annual average and thematic split of MDBs includes their own resources only, while the financial instrument data include data from MDBs and from external resources, due to the lack of data disaggregation.

38. Overall, trends in climate finance point to increasing flows towards beneficiary countries. Bilateral climate finance flows, and those channelled through MDBs, have increased since the 2016 BA, whereas flows from the multilateral climate funds have fluctuated, having decreased in 2015 before rebounding in 2016, although the average remains lower than in the 2013–2014 period, which reflects changes in the climate finance landscape.

39. When considering these flows in aggregate, support for mitigation remains greater than support for adaptation across all sources (noting, however, measurement differences). Bilateral finance flows from OECD-DAC providers had the greatest proportion intended for adaptation (29 per cent) in the period 2015–2016, followed by multilateral climate funds (25 per cent) and MDBs (21 per cent). However, the 2018 BA finds an increase in public climate finance flows that contributes towards both adaptation and mitigation from both bilateral contributors and multilateral climate funds. This makes it more difficult to track the progress made in ramping up adaptation finance. When, however, considering flows based on other groupings, there are variations in the composition of the types of support.

40. Grants continue to be a key instrument for the provision of adaptation finance. In the period 2015–2016 grants accounted for 62 and 94 per cent of the face value of bilateral adaptation finance reported to OECD and of adaptation finance from the multilateral climate funds, respectively. During the same period, 9 per cent of adaptation finance flowing through MDBs was grant-based. Mitigation finance remains less concessional in nature, with 25 per cent of bilateral flows, 31 per cent of multilateral climate fund approvals and 4 per cent of MDB investments taking the form of grants. These figures, however, may not fully capture the added value brought by combining different types of financial instruments, or technical assistance with capital flows, which can often lead to greater innovation or more sustainable implementation.

41. With regard to geographic distribution, Asia remains the principal recipient region of public climate finance flows. In the period 2015–2016, the region received 31 per cent of funding from multilateral climate funds, 42 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD and 41 per cent of MDB flows (including to the Pacific region). The Latin America and Caribbean region and sub-Saharan Africa each secured 22 per cent of approvals from the multilateral climate funds in the same period. Latin America and the Caribbean received 17 per cent of MDB financing and 10 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD, whereas sub-Saharan Africa received just 9 per cent of MDB financing but 30 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD.

42. With regard to flows to the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS) in the period 2015–2016, funding directed at the LDCs represented 24 per cent of bilateral flows, whereas that directed at SIDS accounted for 2 per cent of such flows. Of the bilateral finance provided to the LDCs and SIDS, around half was earmarked for adaptation. Similarly, 21 per cent of finance approved by multilateral climate funds went to the LDCs and 13 per cent to SIDS, and more than half of this finance was focused on adaptation. MDBs channelled 15 per cent of their climate finance to the LDCs and SIDS. The percentage of adaptation spending to these countries (41 per cent) is twice their climate finance spending overall.

43. The management of climate finance, as well as the development and implementation of the projects that it supports, necessarily entails costs. The degree of such costs, which are often recovered through mechanisms such as administrative budgets and implementing agency fees, varies across institutions. Among the major multilateral climate change funds, fees account for between 1 and 9 per cent of total fund value, ranging from USD 65,000 to USD 1.2 million per project. Although these costs tend to decrease over time as management and disbursement mechanisms become more streamlined, there is evidence to suggest that the alignment of administrative functions between funds (e.g. the Global Environment Facility administration of the Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund) offers the best opportunity to keep administrative costs down. This is essential in order to retain the trust that providers and recipients place in the funds.

44. The push to diversify modalities of access to climate finance continues. Institutions in beneficiary countries are increasingly able to meet fiduciary and environmental and social safeguard requirements for accessing funds. There has been a notable increase in the number of regional and national implementing entities to the multilateral climate funds, despite large amounts remaining programmed through multilateral entities.

45. Ownership remains a critical factor in the delivery of effective climate finance. A broad concept of ownership encompasses the consistency of climate finance with national priorities, the degree to which national systems are used for both spending and tracking, and the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. There have been a number of efforts to build capacity to access and make strategic choices about how to use finance and oversee implementation. With regard to the role of governments, while there has been greater commitment by ministries of finance and planning to integrate climate finance into national budgetary planning, this is often not done fully. National-level institutions in beneficiary countries are playing a greater role in managing climate finance, particularly through domestic tracking systems. NDCs for which further financial resources need to be found are emerging as a platform that governments can use to stimulate engagement and strengthen national ownership of climate finance.

46. Mechanisms for monitoring the impact of climate finance have improved, albeit not uniformly. Thus, although the reporting of results (in terms of outputs) has increased, it is difficult to assess properly the quality of the impacts achieved (i.e. outcomes). These impacts are, moreover, presented in a multitude of formats. The reduction of GHG emissions remains the primary impact metric for climate change mitigation. Core mitigation-related multilateral funds are expected to reduce GHG emissions by over 11 billion tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (t CO<sub>2</sub> eq), with reported reductions already approaching 37 million t CO<sub>2</sub> eq. GHG reduction results are complemented by other quantitative data, such as the number of beneficiaries and the renewable energy capacity installed. The metrics, benchmarks and frameworks for monitoring the impact of mitigation projects continue to evolve, thereby helping to inform investment decisions.

47. Discussion on impact measurement of adaptation projects continues to be focused on the number and type of people that benefit from them, although the nature and extent of their beneficial effects are still difficult to quantify, both directly and indirectly. Adaptation finance channelled through core multilateral climate funds has so far reached over 20 million direct beneficiaries. The target for the combined number of direct and indirect beneficiaries is 290 million. Further work is necessary to develop adaptation and resilience metrics that can capture the whole spectrum of sectors receiving support and the many different approaches used, while allowing for aggregation of data and comparability between projects and funds.


48. The extent of co-financing remains important for the mobilization of private finance, but is challenged in terms of the availability of data, definitions and methods. Research suggests that multilateral climate funds can perform on a par with DFIs with regard to private co-financing ratios. The degree to which such finance can be mobilized, however, is often heavily influenced by the investment conditions in a country, which are in turn created by the policy and regulatory frameworks in place.

#### **Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: climate finance in context**

49. Climate finance continues to account for just a small proportion of overall finance flows (see figure 3); the level of climate finance is considerably below what one would expect given the investment opportunities and needs that have been identified. However, although climate finance flows must obviously be scaled up, it is also important to ensure the consistency of finance flows as a whole (and of capital stock) pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement. This does not mean that all finance flows have to achieve explicitly beneficial climate outcomes, but that they must reduce the likelihood of negative climate outcomes. Although commitments are being made to ensure that finance flows from DFIs are climate consistent, more can be done to understand public finance flows and ensure that they are all consistent with countries' climate change and sustainable development objectives.

50. Awareness of climate risk in the financial sector has increased over the past few years. Positive developments are being seen in the sector, particularly with regard to the investment and lending policies of both public and private sector actors, and with regard to regulatory and fiscal policies and the information resources that guide decision-making.

Figure 3  
**Climate finance in context**



*Note:* All flows are global and annual for 2016 unless stated otherwise. Energy investment needs are modelled under a 2 °C scenario. The representation of stocks that overlap is not necessarily reflective of real-world overlaps. The flows represented are not representative of all flows contributing to the stocks presented. Data points are provided to place climate finance in context and do not represent an aggregate or systematic view. Climate finance flows are those represented in section B of the Summary and Recommendations and as reported in chapter 2 of the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report. Investment in renewable energy overlaps with this estimate of climate finance flows.

*Source:* See figure 3.9 in the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report.

## IV. Recommendations

51. The SCF invites the COP to consider the following recommendations:

### Chapter I (methodologies)

(a) *Request* developed country Parties and *encourage* developing country Parties, building on progress made so far and ongoing work, to continue enhancing the transparency, consistency and comparability of data on climate finance provided and mobilized through public interventions, and taking into consideration developments in relevant organizations and institutions;

(b) *Encourage* Parties providing climate finance to enhance their reporting of climate finance provided to developing country Parties;

(c) *Invite* Parties, through their board memberships in international financial institutions, to encourage continued efforts in the harmonization of methodologies for tracking and reporting climate finance among international organizations;

(d) *Encourage* developing country Parties, building on progress made so far and ongoing work, to consider, as appropriate, enhancing their reporting on the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used in generating information on financial, technical and capacity-building needs and support received;

### Chapter II (overview)

(e) *Encourage* Parties, building on progress made so far, to enhance their tracking and reporting on climate finance flows from all sources;

(f) *Encourage* developing country Parties that provide support to report information on climate finance provided to other developing country Parties;

(g) *Encourage* developed countries and climate finance providers, as well as multilateral and financial institutions, private finance data providers and other relevant institutions, to enhance the availability of granular, country-level data on mitigation and adaptation finance, inter alia, transport, agriculture, forests, water and waste;

(h) *Invite* private sector associations and financial institutions to build on the progress made on ways to improve data on climate finance and to engage with the SCF, including through their participation in the forums of the SCF with a view to enhancing the quality of the BA;

(i) *Request* the SCF to continue its work in the mapping of available data sets that integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes, and to include information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement in future BAs;

### Chapter III (assessment)

(j) *Invite* Parties to strive for complementarity between climate finance and sustainable development by, inter alia, aligning climate finance with national climate change frameworks and priorities, as well as broader economic development policies and national budgetary planning;

(k) *Encourage* developing countries to take advantage of available resources through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to strengthen institutional capacity for programming their priority climate action, as well as tracking climate finance, effectiveness and impacts;

(l) *Encourage* developed countries and climate finance providers to continue to enhance country ownership and consider policies to balance funding for adaptation and mitigation, taking into account beneficiary country strategies, and, in line with the mandates, building on experiences, policies and practices of the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, particularly the GCF;

(m) *Encourage* climate finance providers to improve tracking and reporting on gender-related aspects of climate finance, impact measuring and mainstreaming;

(n) *Invite*, as in the 2016 BA, multilateral climate funds, MDBs, other financial institutions and relevant international organizations to continue to advance work on tracking and reporting on impacts of mitigation and adaptation finance;

(o) *Encourage* all relevant United Nations agencies and international, regional and national financial institutions to provide information to Parties through the secretariat on how their development assistance and climate finance programmes incorporate climate-proofing and climate-resilience measures, in line with new available scientific information;

(p) *Request* the SCF, in preparing future BAs, to continue assessing available information on the alignment of climate finance with investment needs and plans related to Parties' NDCs and national adaptation plans;

(q) *Request* the SCF, in preparing the 2020 BA, to take into consideration available information relevant to Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.

---