

مؤتمر نزع السلاح

مذكرة شفوية مؤرخة ١٥ أيلول/سبتمبر ٢٠١٧ موجهة من البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية كوريا إلى الأمين العام لمؤتمر نزع السلاح

تهدي البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية كوريا لدى مكتب الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الدولية الأخرى في جنيف تحياتها إلى الأمين العام لمؤتمر نزع السلاح، السيد مايكل مولر، وتشرف بأن تُحيل إلى الأمانة وثيقة الإحاطة التي قدمها ممثل عن جمهورية كوريا بشأن "التهديد النووي والصاروخي من الشمال وموقف جمهورية كوريا العسكري لمواجهة"، في مؤتمر نزع السلاح يوم ٣٠ آب/أغسطس.

وستكون البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية كوريا ممتنة للأمانة إذا تفضلت بالمساعدة في إصدار هذه الوثيقة وتعميمها باعتبارها وثيقة رسمية من وثائق مؤتمر نزع السلاح.

وتعتزم البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية كوريا لدى مكتب الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الدولية الأخرى في جنيف هذه الفرصة لتعرب مجدداً للأمين العام لمؤتمر نزع السلاح عن فائق احترامها وتقديرها.



الرجاء إعادة الاستعمال

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Nuclear and Missile Threat from the North and ROK Military Countering Posture

2017.08.30



대한민국 국방부
Ministry of National Defense

Agenda

- I . nK's Provocations**
- II . nK Nuclear Threat Assessments**
- III. nK Missile Threat Assessments**
- IV. ROK Military Countering Posture**

InK Provocations

3

nK Provocations (1950s)



nK's Invasion; Korean War (1950.6.25.)



Occupation of Seoul in 3 days since the beginning of the war (1950.6.28.)



nK Tanks in Seoul (1950.6.28.)



Destroyed Han-gang bridge and displaced civilians

nK Provocations (1960s~1980s)



**President Assassination Attempt
(1968.1.21.)**



**Digging tunnels for Invasion
(1974.11.15.)**



**Axe-murder incident in Panmunjom
(1976.8.18.)**



**Terror Attack in Burma Killing Cabinet
members(1983.10.9.)**

nK Provocations (1990s~2010s)



**Infiltration of Armed Spy in Gangneung
(1996.9.18.)**



**Torpedoing of ROKN Corvette Cheonan
(2010.3.26.)**



Shelling of YP-do (2010.11.23.)



Residents of YP-do evacuated via ships

II . nK Nuclear Threat Assessment

- **Development Progression**
- **Threat Assessment**
- **Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine**

Development Progression



1950s~1960s

1954, Established "Nuclear Weapons Division" under MPAF
 1959.09, nK-USSR Nuclear Power Agreement
 1965, Introduced Research-purpose nuclear reactor;
established basis for the nuclear development

1970s~1980s

1970, Nuclear Physics Department made in University of Kim Il-sung
 1980.07, Began Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor(25MWt) Construction
 1986.10, Yongbyon Reactor Operational, **Plutonium Production**

1990~2005


1992.01, Signed IAEA Nuclear Safeguard Agreement
 1993.03, NPT Withdrawal Claim / '94.10., Geneva Agreement
 2002.10., US Special Envoy visit to nK, nK admitted **the Highly Enriched Uranium Program (HEU)**
 2005.05., Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor withdrew 8,000 spent fuel rods

2006 ~

2006.10.9, **1st Nuclear Test**
 2009.5.25, **2nd Nuclear Test**
 2013.2.12, **3rd Nuclear Test**
 2016.1.6. / 9.9, **4th / 5th Nuclear Test**

YONHAP NEWS

Threat Assessment



Nuclear Material

- **Plutonium (Pu) : Suspected of in possession of ~50kg**
 - * Considering their nuclear development progress, ~6kg or less is enough to produce a nuclear weapon
- **Highly Enriched Uranium program has also made a substantial progress**

Miniaturization

- **Considering precedent of other nuclear powers' miniaturization timing (2~7 years) and nK's 1st Nuclear test in 2006, nK's miniaturization technology should be considerably matured**
- ※ **nK is expected to attempt at securing 'de-facto nuclear state' status through nuclear capability sophistication via additional nuclear tests and increase in its nuclear arsenal**

nK Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine



「Solidification of Nuclear State Status Act ('13.4.1.)」

- Defined nuclear use by 'Nuclear weapon can only be employed by the final order from the supreme commander';
Created legal basis for KJU' s nuclear control (Article 4)
- Article 2 and 5 of the same act defines the purpose and conditions of nuclear weapons and its use – it also includes the possibility of nuclear use against non-nuclear states
 - * Clearly state the possibility of nuclear attack against ROKUS Alliance through the premise of: 'Nuclear weapons will not be used as long as there are no participation to invasion or act of aggression against the North Korea'

III. nK Missile Threat Assessment

- **Program Development**
- **Threat Assessment**

Program Development



1970s~1980s

1976~1981, Introduced USSR SCUD-B and Reverse Engineering
 1984.04, First ever nK SCUD-B Missile Test Launch
 1988, **Fielded SCUB-B/C Missile**

1990s

1990, First ever Nodong Missile test launch
 1998, **Fielded Nodong Missile**
 1998.08, Test launch of Daepodong 1

2000s

2006.07, Daepodong 2 Test Launch
 2007, **Fielded Musudan Missiles**
 2009.04, Long Range Missile(Improved Daepodong 2) Test Launch


2010 ~

2012.12, Long-range Missile Test Launch
 2016.02, Long-range Missile Test Launch
 2016.04~10, Musudan Missile Test Launches (8 times)
 2016.08. / 09, Nodong Missile Test Launch
 2017.04 / 07, **ICBM Range Ballistic Missile(Hwasung-14) Launch**

Threat Assessment (1 / 2)



■ **nK** is in possession of ~1,000 Ballistic Missiles

SRBM	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• KN-02 (range: 120km) / Fielded• SCUD (range: 300~1000km) / Fielded	
MRBM	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Nodong Missile (range 1,300km) / Fielded	
IRBM	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Musudan (range 3,000km<) / Fielded	
ICBM	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Daepodong 2 (range 10,000km<) / test launched• Hwasung-13 (range unknown) / in development• Hwasung-14 (range ~8,000km) / test launched	
SLBM	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Pukkuksong (Polaris) (range ~2,000km) / test launched	

13

Threat Assessment (2 / 2)



- **Under KJU control, nK conducted total of 38 test launches with 58 ballistic missiles fired**
 - * 12 launches with 17 projectiles in this year alone, 6 launches since the new administration (05.10.)
- **Latest Hwasung-14 launch in July 28th showed Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missile that is capable of reaching the continental US**
- **Since 2014, nK conducted ground and under-water ejection test of SLBM; also in development of Gorae-class submarines**
 - * nK is expected to field SLBM within 1 to 3 years through additional testing of missiles and long-range submarine operations capabilities
- ※ **nK is also expected to focus national effort to secure re-entry vehicle and terminal guidance technology to complete its ICBM development**

IV. ROK Military Countering Posture

- **Basic Concept**
- **ROK-US Alliance Capabilities**
- **ROK's Independent capabilities**

Deterrence and Response Concept against the North



Basic Concept

Effective deterrence and response to nK nuclear and missile threats through the ROK-US alliance capabilities and ROK's independent capabilities

① Alliance Capabilities

- Utilization of all factors of DIME under the Tailored Deterrence Strategy
- Concept of ROK-US Alliance Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)


② ROK's Independent Capabilities

'Korean Conventional Triad' of deterrence including Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR

ROK-US Alliance Capabilities (1 / 2)



● Alliance Tailored Deterrence Strategy(TDS)




- ROK-US Combined deterrence and response strategy most optimized to the KORPEN situation in consideration of characteristic of nK regime and nK nuclear and WMD threats
- Military factors such as US nuclear umbrella, ROK-US conventional strike forces, and MD combined with ROK-US DIE factors to deter and respond to North Korea's nuclear and WMD threats

ROK-US Alliance Capabilities (2 / 2)



● Concept of ROK-US Alliance Comprehensive Counter Missile Operations (4D)




- 4D concept is applied to the Alliance decision making, planning, command and control, exercise and training, and capability development
 - * THAAD deployment to USFK is a part of capability development measures for the ROK-US alliance missile defense capability

ROK's Independent Capabilities (1 / 3)



Kill Chain




- System to quickly detect and identify crucial HPT within the nK missile area of operations such as TEL and command post in order to make timely decision and to strike
- Improve detection, identification, and strike capabilities in and against entire area of North Korea

ROK's Independent Capabilities (2 / 3)



KAMD




- **Missile Defense focused on terminal-phase lower atmosphere with overlapping capabilities in consideration of strategic environment on KORPEN**
- **Continue to improve detection, defense, and intercept capabilities**

ROK's Independent Capabilities (3 / 3)



KMPR



- Delivering punishment and retaliation to nK leaderships via focused strike in case of nK nuclear use
- Maximize punishment and retaliation capabilities via development of high-powered warhead and organizing specialized elite forces