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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 55

Question of Cyprus (A/3120 and Add.1, A/3204 and Add.1, A/C.1/788, A/C.1/789, A/C.1/L.168 to A/C.1/L.171) (*continued*):

- (a) **Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus;**
- (b) **Complaint by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus**

1. Mr. KHOMAN (Thailand) expressed his delegation's concern at a disagreement between Members of the United Nations which had every reason to be on friendly terms. Thailand entertained good relations with each of the three nations concerned and would not be able to take the side of one party against the others. It was to be hoped that a compromise solution would be found.

2. The situation in Cyprus did not really constitute an international dispute; but the differences of opinion which had come to the fore might affect the co-operation of the three States in the international field.

3. Thailand was concerned with the welfare of the people of Cyprus and hoped that their legitimate aspirations to self-government would be realized. A solution, however, would not be found by violence. On the contrary, violence would prolong the disorder and retard progress towards a favourable solution. Judging by the recent example of the Gold Coast, now Ghana, it was permissible to have confidence in the United Kingdom and to hope for a solution which would satisfy the aspirations of the people of Cyprus.

4. The concern of Greece was equally understandable, and co-operation with Greece could well bring benefits to the people of Cyprus. To accomplish that end, however, an atmosphere of calm and mutual co-operation would indubitably first have to be restored. Lastly, the interests of the Turkish population could not be neglected and would have to be protected, particularly as it constituted a minority.

5. Clearly, a solution could be found only through negotiations animated by good will and mutual understanding. Thailand was not willing to support any draft resolution which would constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State. He hoped, however, that a resolution adopted by a large majority of the Members of the General Assembly, if not unanimously, would affirm the desire to see peace and tranquillity restored in Cyprus through negotiations between the parties concerned, bearing in mind the interests of all, and particularly the various components of the population of Cyprus.

6. Mr. TSIANG (China) recalled that his delegation had always recognized the competence of the United Nations to consider the question of Cyprus. However, he doubted the efficacy of a long debate. The question of Cyprus could and should be solved by direct negotiations between the three Governments concerned. As each of them was democratic, there were grounds for reasonable optimism as to the outcome.

7. The principle of the self-determination of peoples was obviously applicable to Cyprus. Any denial of that right was doomed to fail. Fortunately, the United Kingdom realized that fact. However, self-determination could only be implemented under conditions of peace and order. Nobody could invoke the principles of the United Nations Charter to obtain a right while at the same time opposing those principles by resorting to terrorism. Also, the rights of the Turkish minority deserved consideration, and there was no doubt that Greece was prepared to take those rights into account.

8. Cyprus was an island of strategic importance not only for Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, but for all countries throughout the world. Any settlement which ignored that fact and did not afford security to the parties concerned would have no chance of success. In the circumstances, the greatest service the United Nations could render would be to bring about negotiations in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. His delegation was ready to support any draft resolution favouring that method. It doubted the wisdom of any substantive draft resolution.

9. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that Cyprus was a Non-Self-Governing Territory under British administration. Under Article 73 of the Charter, the United Kingdom was under an obligation to promote the well-being of the Cypriot people, by taking due account of their political aspirations, developing self-government and assisting them in the progressive development of their free political institutions. The United Kingdom had not fulfilled its obligations in that regard. Its Government had declared repeatedly that it had no intention of granting the people of Cyprus the right to self-determination. In fact, Cyprus was a flagrant example of colonial domination. The British administration was acting with brutality. There was a continuing conflict between an administration wishing to uproot the people's national feelings

and the people who wished to preserve their traditions. The situation was particularly deplorable with regard to education. Most of the elementary schools were closed. The majority of the pupils were not being taught, and more than 80 per cent of the teachers were out of work.

10. The Cypriot people had recently been claiming their right to self-determination with greater insistence. The United Kingdom had replied by an intensification of repression and by appointing Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, the notorious former Governor-General of Kenya, to the governorship of Cyprus. The island had become a concentration camp. The repression practised by the United Kingdom in Cyprus obviously constituted a violation of the United Nations Charter, and action consistent with the principles of the Charter should be taken without delay to enable the Cypriot people to exercise their right to self-determination.

11. In connexion with the problem of Cyprus, a whole array of imperialist combinations were being built. Proposals had been made to divide the island, to place it under the trusteeship of the Council of Europe, or to integrate it into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which would mean a transfer of authority from the United Kingdom to the United States. That last prospect was obviously the worst.

12. Some representatives had asserted that the General Assembly should not discuss the problem. The representative of the United States, in particular, had suggested (851st meeting) that there should be direct negotiations outside the United Nations. However, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom had already negotiated at the London Conference of 1955,¹ which, to the obvious satisfaction of the United Kingdom, had completely failed. Those who asserted that the United Nations was not competent to discuss the question, were indeed sacrificing the vital interests of the people of Cyprus to imperialist objectives.

13. The imperialist Powers wished to retain a military base on Cyprus from which they could launch land or sea attacks or occupy Middle East territories in which their positions might be threatened. On 16 August 1956, the Governor of Cyprus had said that the United Kingdom needed Cyprus as a base for troop concentrations. Shortly afterwards he had signed an order providing for French and United States troops to be stationed on Cyprus if necessary, and everyone knew that Cyprus was the base from which the Franco-British forces had launched their expedition against Egypt.

14. The United Kingdom was not alone in denying the Cypriots their right of self-determination. The policy was supported by the United States, which was in favour of making Cyprus a NATO military base. The *News Chronicle* had stated that the transformation of the British military base on Cyprus into a NATO base was the key to the problem. All such plans were manifestly contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter; they violated the people's right of self-determination and made any solution of the problem impossible. There could be no hope of imposing a solution from outside. If the people of Cyprus was to exercise its right of self-determination, the first and essential requirement was the withdrawal of all foreign armed

forces and the liquidation of the military bases on the island.

15. The Franco-British aggression against Egypt had profoundly affected the peoples of the Middle East. It had revealed the falsity of the propaganda claims that colonialism had become enlightened. In that connexion, the Eisenhower Doctrine presented a special danger. It was designed to establish United States control over the Middle East, in order to further the interest of the oil companies, by means of a network of NATO military bases equipped with nuclear weapons. Cyprus would naturally play an important role as a support base.

16. The problem of Cyprus must therefore be considered in terms of the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East. The presence of Western armed forces on Cyprus was a threat to the security of the Middle East. Any satisfactory solution of the problem would have to take into account the interests of the Cypriots and the security of all the Middle East Powers.

17. The British colonial administration was undoubtedly guilty of having aroused hostility between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus in order to play the role of umpire. The two communities had always lived in peace until the Cypriots had begun to struggle against colonial domination and the United Kingdom had resorted to the classic method of "divide and rule". Although there were 3,500 police and 15,000 British troops on the island, the United Kingdom had recruited an emergency police force from among the Cypriots of Turkish origin in order to carry out reprisals and repress the Cypriot independence and freedom movements. They had soon attained their objective. Hatred and antagonism between the two populations, fomented by the colonial administration, enabled the United Kingdom to maintain and extend its hold.

18. The General Assembly could not allow the abuses of British policy to go unproved. It was the duty of the United Nations to take action to enable the people of Cyprus to exercise its right of self-determination. The USSR delegation would therefore vote in favour of the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.168) which expressed the wish that the people of Cyprus be given the opportunity to determine their own future by the application of their right to self-determination. It reserved the right to state its views on the other draft resolutions at a later stage.

19. Mr. PEREZ PEREZ (Venezuela) said that the differing views presented by the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey were all worthy of consideration. The situation was obviously complex, and the interests involved were very different. In the circumstances, it would be difficult for the General Assembly to adopt either the Greek draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.168 and A/C.1/L.170) or the United Kingdom draft (A/C.1/L.169). Venezuela, for its part, could not support them.

20. His country, which maintained cordial relations with the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, considered that negotiations could only be resumed in a favourable atmosphere. In particular, any undue haste was likely to worsen the situation. The General Assembly would therefore be well advised to adopt a resolution recommending that the parties concerned resume negotiations, with a view to achieving a solution acceptable to all, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

¹ Conference on Eastern Mediterranean Problems and the Cyprus Question, held at London from 29 August to 7 September 1955, between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

21. His delegation appealed to each of the three parties concerned to support a draft resolution along those lines. It reserved the right to comment later on the draft resolution submitted by Panama (A/C.1/L.171).

22. Mr. KIZYA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the question of Cyprus was before the United Nations for the third time and no solution had yet been found. However, the United Nations could not ignore a crime committed against a people struggling for its freedom.

23. The competence of the United Nations to discuss the matter had been challenged, but the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 2 and Article 55 of the Charter, which related to the equal rights of peoples and to the principle of the right of self-determination of peoples, and General Assembly resolution 637 (VII) of 16 December 1952, removed any doubt on that score.

24. Although the just struggle of the Cypriot people was dismissed by the United Kingdom as acts of violence committed by extremists, and although the repressive military operations were termed "police measures", the fact was that the real aim of the British colonial administration was to crush the Cypriot people's independence movement.

25. The Cypriots were subject to a military dictatorship. As the Greek representative had said, Cyprus had become a concentration camp. A state of siege had been proclaimed and arbitrary rule prevailed throughout the administration. The Governor, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, had instituted a veritable reign of terror, so harsh that even British newspapers criticized it.

26. The United Kingdom delegation's claim that its Government was not opposed to self-determination for Cyprus (847th meeting) was not convincing. In the 1955 negotiations between representatives of Cyprus and the British authorities, the latter had given no indication of good will. Later, Archbishop Makarios had been deported and the result had naturally been to harden the people of Cyprus in their struggle.

27. The draft constitution for Cyprus,² hurriedly drawn up in London in 1956, did not recognize the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination. Not only did it provide that the Governor should retain control of external affairs, defence and internal order, but he was also given supervisory powers over broadcasting and the functioning of the courts and could also annul or suspend the constitution.

28. The Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus had lived in peace for three centuries and the sudden deterioration in their relations was due solely to the divisive policy which the United Kingdom applied in order to maintain its hold. The United Nations should put an end to that dangerous game and enable the Cypriot people to exercise its right of self-determination.

29. The peoples of the Middle East regarded Cyprus as a pistol aimed at the heart of the Arab world. The recent aggression against Egypt was proof of the correctness of that view. In the present situation, the United States was anxious that the British base on Cyprus should be transformed into a NATO base, to enable it to carry out a policy of military intimidation in the area.

30. The question of Cyprus was therefore essentially a question of the heroic struggle of the Cypriot people

to achieve self-determination. But the question had become an international one and constituted a threat to international peace and security. The only acceptable solution was to permit the Cypriots to make a free choice and to free them from their present rule. He hoped that the General Assembly would adopt a resolution to that end, on the basis of the principles stated in the Charter.

31. Mr. GABRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that he was glad the parties concerned had presented their respective cases with moderation. The high standard of the debate on the question of Cyprus was to be regarded as an encouraging sign.

32. The course of events was well known. The desire expressed by the people of Cyprus to determine the status of their territory had prompted Greece to intercede with the United Kingdom Government. The negotiations which ensued had led to the London Conference, which had unfortunately proved fruitless.

33. There was nevertheless one encouraging factor: the recognition by the United Kingdom that the principle of the self-determination of peoples applied to Cyprus. While that recognition was qualified by certain conditions which diverged widely from the Greek view of the case, it nevertheless gave ground for continued hope that future negotiations would be successful.

34. It was impossible to emphasize too strongly, however, that even interests as important as those of the Turkish minority and of the strategic location of Cyprus should not interfere with the application of the principle of self-determination of peoples.

35. Consequently, the draft resolution submitted by Greece (A/C.1/L.168) appeared reasonable. It seemed a difficult matter, however, to give any final opinion on the contents of the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.169) until more information was available. Those were the considerations that would determine the vote of his delegation.

36. Mr. NOVITSKY (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the question of Cyprus was a colonial question which had already come before the United Nations, but which had not been examined owing to the pressure exercised by the colonial Powers on the grounds that no constructive solution could be found unless it was sought outside the United Nations.

37. No one could fail to be aware of the very special interests of those Powers in Cyprus. In October 1956 Cyprus had been used as a military base against Egypt. As early as January 1956, 2,000 British parachutists had been landed in Cyprus in preparation for possible future action against Jordan. Moreover, the United Kingdom representative did not conceal that Cyprus was necessary to the United Kingdom for the pursuit of its colonial policy. Official British *communiqués* and press reports had constantly emphasized the island's importance for the fulfilment of the United Kingdom's obligations to NATO and to the members of the Baghdad Pact and also for the protection of the United Kingdom's Middle East oil interests. The United Kingdom newspapers' references to Cyprus as a shield or a fire brigade should not be allowed to obscure the fact that that fire brigade had served as the base from which Egypt had been set alight.

38. In order to protect those interests, the United Kingdom had made a show of negotiating; but those negotiations had led to the arrest and exile of Archbishop Makarios and his aides, while the nationalists were branded as terrorists, a word which was called into

² Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Cmd. 42.

play when a colonial Power found it necessary, as for example in Kenya, to exterminate peaceful populations.

39. The situation had become very serious; the blood of innocent people was being shed; the lives of peaceful people were in danger. According to the reports of witnesses, Cyprus had become a barbed-wire island where insecurity and dread reigned supreme: a vast concentration camp.

40. The documents published and the facts mentioned by the Greek delegation (849th meeting) showed that by the end of 1956 several thousand persons had been arrested, and had been subjected to inhuman treatment, torture and privations of every kind. By various acts and decrees, the United Kingdom Government had sought to legalize its actions. Thus, under a cloak of alleged legality, the Governor had successfully flouted the principle of the inviolability of the human person, had ordered arrest and imprisonment on mere suspicion, had denied the inalienable right of self-defence, and in that manner had placed the people of Cyprus under completely arbitrary rule.

41. For example, the emergency powers conferred upon the Governor in 1939 had been restored. Unrestricted search, absolute censorship of Press and radio, supervision of ports and meetings, limitation of property right, a system of ransom, day and night raids on towns and villages, and the expulsion of families—all that was the daily fare of the inhabitants of Cyprus.

42. Such a situation constituted a serious violation of the Charter, to which the United Nations could not remain indifferent; it should call upon the United Kingdom to respect the right of self-determination of the people of Cyprus.

43. So-called constitutions of the type proposed in 1956, which were designed merely to perpetuate the colonial régime, offered no solution to the problem. Nor would a solution be reached by converting the island into a bastion of imperialism, a NATO base, in order to enable the United States to realize its aggressive designs in the Middle East.

44. The question of Cyprus called for an urgent solution which could not be found unless the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination was recognized and applied forthwith.

45. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan) said that in participating in the discussion his delegation was guided only by the principles of right and the desire to maintain peace. Jordan had a deep admiration for the Greek people, whose history had much in common with that of the Arab world. The Arabs had reproduced the legacy of Greek culture and transmitted it to the world. The Greeks and Arabs lived in the same region in an atmosphere of assistance and friendship.

46. The position of Cyprus made it a strategic area of the first importance. Indeed, it was sufficient to recall that France and the United Kingdom had made use of that geographical position in launching their attack on Egypt, in order to realize what a threat that island might represent to its neighbours, the Arab States.

47. It was tragic to witness the condemnation of a nation which was merely showing its desire to throw off foreign rule. It was tragic to see a religious leader such as Archbishop Makarios accused of terrorism and sent into exile. Come what might, however, the national movement would take its course. It had been born out of foreign domination and would not perish.

48. The function of the United Nations was not confined to dealing with a question when it had reached crisis proportions. The problem at issue was a serious one; it involved the recognition and application of the principle of the self-determination of peoples; and under Article 55 of the Charter, among others, it was the bounden duty of the United Nations to deal with that problem. No conditions could be attached to that inalienable right. Whether the people of Cyprus wanted complete independence or preferred to join another nation was a matter for that people and for them alone. Means of protecting the rights of the Turkish minority should be considered, but that minority's existence could not be permitted to obstruct realization of the will of the great majority of the population. There was every reason to think that, when the colonial system had been abolished, the people of Cyprus would inhabit their native land in an atmosphere of peace and understanding.

49. Jordan hoped that the Members of the United Nations would view the situation in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In that spirit it would support any draft resolution designed to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriot people.

50. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) believed that the reason why the question of Cyprus had reappeared on the General Assembly's agenda was that the people of the island had been denied their most fundamental rights. Since the General Assembly's tenth session the situation had deteriorated considerably. The partisans of the national movement had been exiled or executed, the powers of the police had been strengthened, and hatred had thrived accordingly. An overwhelming majority of the population categorically refused to live under United Kingdom colonial domination any longer. Clashes and skirmishes were taking place between the nationalists and the United Kingdom forces every day. The British authorities were trying to strangle the movement by violent reprisals, but such attempts were fruitless and merely intensified the Cypriots' desire for independence.

51. The right to self-determination had been recognized as a principle by the League of Nations. It was now embodied in the United Nations Charter. Cyprus possessed that right equally with every other territory. The occupying Powers which had succeeded one another on the island had never managed to reduce or assimilate the predominately Greek population. The Cypriot people now demanded union with Greece. Their right to that course could not be denied, least of all on the grounds of military strategy now advanced by the United Kingdom.

52. A peaceful solution was not unattainable, but a system of martial law, imprisonment, deportations and massacres merely retarded a settlement. The Czechoslovak delegation believed that it was the duty of the United Nations to help the Cypriot people to secure their independence.

53. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) was glad that the First Committee had at last embarked on consideration of the question of Cyprus, which, owing to pressure exerted by certain Powers, had hitherto been evaded. It would seem that discussion of the application of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter in that connexion must henceforth be pointless, as three nations had already taken part in negotiations with a view to settling the problem, and had thereby confirmed its international character.

54. Poland had, for its part, repeatedly expressed itself in favour of respect for the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. Once more, his delegation would express its sympathy for the struggle of the population of Cyprus. The United Kingdom had formally ceased to deny the right of that population to self-determination, but was merely postponing its implementation on the pretext, the validity of which he could not accept, of strategic considerations. As for the constitution which the United Kingdom had proposed to the population of Cyprus, it ignored their political aspirations, and its rejection was entirely justified.

55. Independence was the only solution to the problem. Of course the interests of the Turkish minority should be given proper consideration.

56. With regard to the complaint presented by the United Kingdom (A/3204 and Add.1), it was particularly unfortunate that the national liberation movement should have been described as "terrorism". That term had been used all too often to describe such movements. The time had come for the General Assembly to support the just demands of the population of Cyprus for the independence which it had fully merited.

57. Mr. SARDER (Turkey) said that the question of Cyprus was, as the majority of speakers had recognized, so complex that generalization and simplifications might cause confusion that would delay a solution.

58. Almost all representatives who had spoken in the debate had emphasized the necessity of preserving the friendly relations and the alliance between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. His delegation was in full agreement with that opinion, but, when confronted with tactics clearly indicating the presence of mental reservations, it was unfortunately compelled to put the sincerity of its Greek friends to the test.

59. His delegation had not been surprised to hear the representative of the Soviet Union and his political followers object to the idea of trying to find a solution outside the United Nations, among friends and in the absence of a Soviet representative, in an atmosphere free from Soviet intervention.

60. The implications of the Soviet Union's move were so transparent that they must be apparent to the Greek delegation also.

61. He reserved his delegation's right to speak on the draft resolutions when they were taken up by the Committee.

62. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) thanked all the delegations present for their concern over the fate of a small people which was suffering and struggling for freedom, but felt that some of the speeches made called for clarification.

63. The United Kingdom representative had seen fit to take the permanent representative of Greece, Mr. Palamas, to task for having provided the international community with evidence on the real situation in Cyprus. It should be noted that all the communications presented had been founded on fact and that it was always open to the United Kingdom Government, if it challenged their veracity, to provide proof of their inaccuracy.

64. As for the speech made by the representative of France (852nd meeting), it was easy to see he was representing not liberal France, but France at grips with the grave problem in Algeria. Even so, the French delegation could draw a comparison which would help it to understand the complaints made by Greece. In Algeria, France had offered an unconditional armistice,

which meant that if the Algerians accepted it, they would be free to return to their homes. The Cypriot insurgents, without being asked, had themselves offered and put into effect a three-week armistice to facilitate the opening of negotiations. The reply had been a proclamation, whose title "Terms of Surrender", spoke for itself. The comparison between the attitude of the two Governments was eloquent enough to require no further comment.

65. The Australian representative had (849th meeting) used hard words about Greece, and it would not be pointless to recall the visit of two of his fellow-countrymen, Mr. Dastan, M.P., and Professor Kuckley of the University of Sydney, to Cyprus, where they had spent a week. At Athens, where they had broken their journey to London, they had held a press conference, which had provided a most severe criticism of British policy in Cyprus. They had spoken of torture, concentration camps, the determined attitude of the people, and the attitude of many Turkish Cypriots, who did not want the island to be divided and loved their Greek compatriots. They had spoken of Archbishop Makarios' prestige, which was the key to any solution. Finally, they had talked of an invitation to a cease-fire, after the offer of a solution providing for a plebiscite at a prescribed date. It might be hoped that, if that evidence did not satisfy the Australian representative, he would vote for the establishment of a neutral fact-finding committee.

66. Some speakers had countered the Greek argument by raising the question of distance. In point of fact, distance was not of great importance, particularly in the case of an island which was linked to several countries by the same means of communication. Nevertheless, it was untrue to say that, while the distance from Cyprus to Turkey was 40 miles, the distance from Cyprus to Greece was 700; the nearest Greek coast was in fact 140 miles from Cyprus. The distance from Cyprus to Athens was 510 miles and from Cyprus to Ankara was 288 miles.

67. The population was 80.2 per cent Greek and 17.9 per cent Turkish. The distribution of land ownership had been mentioned. It had been claimed that the Turks owned nearly 50 per cent of the arable land. Account should also be taken of the land used as pasture and forest. Apart from that, although there were no very accurate British statistics on the subject, the general statistics showed that the figures were very different from those cited in the statements that had been made: Greek Cypriots owned 78.4 per cent of the arable land, Turkish Cypriots 19.3 per cent, and others 2.3 per cent. Moreover, the rural population was 81 per cent Greek and 17 per cent Turkish. It was therefore untrue to say that the Greeks were to be found chiefly in the towns and the Turks in the country. According to the latest statistics, which dated from 1934, the value of property owned by Turks in the towns was 19.9 per cent and that of arable land 18.7 per cent. It would appear that there again a fact-finding committee could make a valuable contribution. Lastly, it should be noted, again according to British statistics, that Greeks and Turks were scattered throughout the island.

68. Regarding the question of competence, the watchword of the colonial Powers, it should be recalled that Cyprus was a Non-Self-Governing Territory and that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter could only apply to the national territory of each State. Under certain basic legislation, Cyprus was not part of British national territory. Moreover, Article 2, paragraph 7,

could only be considered in conjunction with Article 10, which said that the Assembly was competent on all questions within the scope of the Charter. The right of self-determination of peoples could not be excluded from that category. Moreover, the practice of the General Assembly showed that it understood the Charter in that sense. It would in any case be absurd to consider the colony of Cyprus and the district of Manchester on the same footing. To those arguments should be added the existence of Article 73, under which the interests of the colonial peoples were paramount over those of the administering Power. If Cyprus, which was called a colony by the United Kingdom Government itself and was the subject of reports to the United Nations under Article 73, was not a territory to which the provisions of the Charter applied, it might well be asked to which territories those provisions did apply.

69. It had been argued that the Treaty of Lausanne³ had to some extent excluded the application of the right of self-determination in the case of the people of Cyprus. It should, however, be noted that under article 16 of that Treaty, Turkey had renounced all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the Treaty and the islands other than those over which its sovereignty was recognized by the Treaty. The same article provided that the future of those territories and islands was being or would be settled by the parties concerned. The position taken by Turkey had been reinforced by the concurrent statements of Ismet Pasha at the Lausanne Conference.⁴ It seemed curious therefore for Turkey now to invoke the Treaty of Lausanne in order to justify its interference in the Cyprus question.

70. The Greek delegation wished to re-emphasize that it had no ambitions to annex Cyprus. It was merely carrying out the mandate entrusted to it by the people of Cyprus who wished to obtain their freedom in application of the Charter. The Charter, in the Articles to which he had referred, was explicit in that respect and Article 103 needed no commentary. Moreover, Article 2, paragraph 2, called upon Member States to show good faith. There could therefore be no question of frustrating the right of self-determination by a fantastic interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne. In any case, even if the Treaty of Lausanne could really be interpreted in that sense, the colonial Powers' argument that the right of self-determination was only applicable in the case of territories whose future had never been the subject of contractual arrangements

³ Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Turkey, signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXVIII, 1924, pp. 11 ff.

⁴ See *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), Cmd. 1814.

could not be accepted, for it would be tantamount to abolishing that right in practice.

71. Greece's right to intervene in the case had been challenged. It was in fact a duty, the duty of collective vigilance which, under the Charter, was incumbent on all Members of the United Nations.

72. The Turkish representative had sought to strengthen his case by commenting (848th meeting) on passages from Greek newspapers criticizing Turkey. The Greek delegation could reply by quoting volumes of quotations from Turkish newspapers attacking Greece. It was to be regretted, however, that the Turkish representative had not mentioned the fact that the Greek articles were actually written in reply to insults in the Turkish press, and that he had not mentioned in his survey of relations between the two countries the incidents at Istanbul and Izmir on 6 September 1955. Those incidents had naturally created a deep impression on Greek public opinion. However, the Greek Government, in order to maintain calm, had not published full details of that terrible day.

73. With respect to the textbooks which the Turkish representative had mentioned (843rd meeting), it was to be noted that in 1950, when relations between the two countries had been excellent, the books in question had caused no concern because no one had been looking for hatred at that time. It would therefore seem that the Turkish minority, which was one of Cyprus' assets, should, instead of dividing the two countries, attempt to unite them and become a force making for friendship between them.

74. Turkey had put forward strategic and demographic objections to the Greek argument. The strategic objections could be eliminated by a military status established through mutual alliances or the United Nations. Greece possessed islands which were much closer to Turkey and which had been demilitarized. The Turkish minority could obtain privileges guaranteed by the United Nations itself. In the circumstances, the quasi-systematic spirit of opposition to any logical solution which the Turkish representative's speech had demonstrated, was incomprehensible. It had been said that if the British left Cyprus, Turkey would carry out a military occupation of the island. That was not to be taken seriously. Turkey's able statesmen knew that in the day of the United Nations such attempts would fail and cost them dear.

75. Greece genuinely desired the friendship of Turkey and of the United Kingdom. The British press frequently revealed the true opinions of the British people which was opposed to the policy now being carried out on the island.

76. But if the price of that friendship was to be the betrayal of their Cypriot brothers, the Greeks would not hesitate and would continue the struggle, regardless of the possible consequences.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p. m.