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*Chairman:* Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

**AGENDA ITEM 22**

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/3366, A/3470, A/C.1/783, A/C.1/784, A/C.1/L.160 to A/C.1/L.164) (*concluded*)**

1. Mr. COMAY (Israel), using his right to reply to certain comments made during the debate concerning the application of disarmament to the problems of the Middle East, said that, while the United Nations had been discussing disarmament for a decade without positive results, the emphasis had shifted within the previous two years. The watershed was the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers, held at Geneva in 1955. Until then, the various disarmament proposals had consisted of comprehensive plans involving all the major elements of disarmament. Since that time, however, there had been a number of proposals of a limited or partial nature, put forward in the hope that agreement on some initial step might open the way for a global plan.
2. None of the limited proposals had been accepted, perhaps because of the one basic feature they had in common: they focused attention on the agreement of the "Powers principally concerned" to limitations which would apply to their own forces and weapons. Yet, the search for some progress should not be confined exclusively to that type of limited agreement.
3. In the view of the Government of Israel, the United Nations should not ignore the possibility of an agreed scheme for arms limitation in respect of a local situation of conflict—a situation which might involve the interests of the great Powers, but in which the parties principally concerned were a group of smaller countries.
4. The Israel-Arab conflict would provide an appropriate local setting for such a scheme for the following reasons. It was the most critical and explosive local conflict now confronting the United Nations. Unrestrained arms supply had played a conspicuous part in

causing the conflict, yet the special complexities regarding nuclear weapons did not arise at all as far as the States within the area were concerned. In fact, the States concerned were unable to produce even conventional weapons of the heavier types, which had to be supplied from the outside. In that area, inspection and control would be relatively simpler than in territories having dense populations and highly developed economies. Finally, the countries in the area were on the whole poor and backward and could not afford the present forced pace of rearmament.

5. The suggested scheme could take the form of a convention worked out with the assistance of the Disarmament Commission, between Israel and those Arab States which were in conflict with it, and it could be endorsed by the United Nations and guaranteed in any appropriate way. It could and should also reaffirm a complete renunciation of war and a renewed pledge to refrain from active hostility on land, on sea and in the air. It was no solution to demand, as the representative of Iraq had done in the course of the debate (826th meeting) that Israel, and Israel alone, should be denied the means of self-defence.

6. It would be premature to put forward a detailed scheme at the present stage, nevertheless, the Government of Israel would gladly co-operate in any attempt to produce a local arms-limitation plan which would reduce tension and relieve economic strain. Israel had no aggressive designs against any country; if its neighbours shared that view, there might be a single, constructive approach to two of the major problems which had been before the United Nations almost since its inception—the Arab-Israel conflict and the need to make a positive start with the actual process of halting and reversing rearmament.

7. Mr. DE GRIPENBERG (Finland) expressed his delegation's fervent hope that the Disarmament Commission would soon find the way to an international agreement concerning the cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons. His delegation was fully aware of the extreme complexity of the problems involved, but it felt that it would not be beyond human ingenuity to find means of escaping the perils which threatened humanity. In that respect, the Finnish delegation fully associated itself with the draft resolution put forward by the USSR to the effect that test explosions of nuclear weapons should be discontinued forthwith (A/C.1/L.160). If, however, the Disarmament Commission should not find it possible, within a reasonable time, to reach an international agreement on that point, the Finnish delegation was in favour of an agreement on a moratorium in the testing of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the representative of Sweden (824th meeting), or of an agreement on establishing a system of registration of test explosions as had been proposed in the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway (A/C.1/L.162).

8. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia) said that the need for, and in fact the possibilities of, practical steps in the

19. A number of draft resolutions were before the Committee. Operative paragraph 2 of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) recommended that all the proposals on disarmament should be referred to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. He recalled in that connexion that his country had found it impossible to make itself heard in the Disarmament Commission for eighteen months — from 1954 to the middle of 1956. Finally, India had been able to present its proposals to the Commission.<sup>1</sup> The proposals had been circulated to Governments of Member States and a summary (DC/98) had also been transmitted with the Commission's report to the General Assembly (A/3470). The Indian Government had therefore expected that its proposals would not have been regarded as a memorial, but would have been discussed — either at that meeting of the Disarmament Commission or at a later stage. But it was only Mr. Moch, the representative of France, who had at least given consideration to the Indian proposals.

20. He wanted to say that he had not spoken from a written script when he had addressed the Disarmament Commission; hence, no one had any idea of what his Government had intended to say. But the answer to his speech had been circulated before he had begun to speak. Now, in politics, intelligent anticipation was regarded as a piece of wisdom — provided it was anticipation and it was intelligent. However that might be, the reply made by Mr. Moch at the 58th meeting of the Commission was in fact an acceptance of the Indian proposals, in principle at least.

21. The Government of India, however, was mainly concerned with the United Kingdom proposal to limit nuclear weapons tests.<sup>2</sup> In that connexion, it was to be remembered that, when through its Prime Minister, the Government of India first made the announcement of its policy regarding test explosions to the Indian Parliament in 1954, it had not asked for the abandonment of nuclear weapons tests; it had asked for the suspension of the tests. When the suggestion had been made, it had been received not only with ridicule, but also with a great deal of political recrimination. Now the moment had come when the discussion of the cessation or suspension of tests, of removing those matters from a state of anarchy, had become respectable.

22. The discussion of the question of nuclear weapons tests had begun to gather momentum outside the confines of the United Nations. There were in the outside world millions of people whose fortunes were affected by the problems now under consideration, and the time was rapidly coming when world public opinion would have to be listened to more carefully with regard to the action to be taken. India had hoped, when the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission had been established, that Canada would be able to make a very great contribution to that organ's work because it understood the various points of view and would provide a bridge between them. India had not given up that hope.

23. In his statement in the Commission, Mr. Moch had opposed the proposal for the suspension of nuclear tests. Mr. Anthony Nutting, then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, speaking at the 75th meeting of the Sub-Committee, had also said that the suspension of tests was not possible because all explosions could not be detected. The evidence given

was the findings of some scientists. The Indian Government could not accept the view that it was possible to explode nuclear weapons secretly. Mr. Moch's argument in the Disarmament Commission was that, while it was not possible to conceal the explosion of a megaton bomb, the detonation of a kiloton bomb could be concealed. In Mr. Krishna Menon's view, that was an *ex parte* statement. Assuming that it was correct, however, the further argument was that the kiloton bomb could trigger a hydrogen bomb, and therefore any agreement about suspension which enabled the concealment of an explosion of a kiloton bomb really reduced the question of suspension to nothing. The French representative had gone on to say that the same argument extended to intercontinental missiles. However, those arguments were unconvincing. The Indian Government had the most positive and rational reasons to maintain its objections to the proposal which had been put forward as a substitute for the suspension of tests.

24. In the first place, to regulate tests and to say that one could kill so much, that one could pollute so much, and no more, was a way of licensing evil. All weapons of mass destruction were nothing but undiluted evil. It would be immoral to give the seal of the United Nations to something that should be eliminated.

25. The whole of the disarmament discussion had revolved around the argument about which came first: the act of throwing away the arms, or the establishment of the machinery for discovering whether or not they had been thrown away.

26. If it were possible to set up the machinery for inspection and control beforehand, then the whole problem of disarmament would be solved, and only minutiae, only technical details, would remain. But once the problem was put in the form of regulation and limitation, the Governments would be in an impasse. From a practical point of view, that proposal ran contrary to the other disarmament proposal, which had been put forward as something that would be easily possible without danger to the two contending parties which were now in possession of weapons of mass destruction; and unless it could be conclusively proved by scientific opinion independent of particular Governments that any large-scale deviations were possible, such a position would have to be accepted.

27. The Indian Government had set out a large number of reasons for the cessation of tests. The main reason that had been put forward in 1956, apart from the political aspect of disarmament, was the humanitarian one — namely, that the effects of radiation were such that if there were any more explosions than were being held at present they would be to the injury to mankind not only of the present generation but of succeeding ones. The only answer that came forward at that time of any weighty character was the book issued by the United Kingdom Government which contained the conclusions of the United Kingdom Medical Research Council.<sup>3</sup> That report said that those who were responsible for the conduct of affairs had to think very long and very deep before they committed themselves to consequences which were both unknown and ungovernable. If that argument alone stood the test, the question would have to be asked whether the Governments of 1957 had the right to release forces whose consequences were unknown and ungovernable. Further-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 58th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 56th meeting.

<sup>3</sup> Medical Research Council, *The Hazards to Man of Nuclear and Allied Radiations* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, June 1956), Cmd. 9780.

more, the authority of the distinguished United States scientist who testified before the House Government Operational Sub-Committee of the United States Congress could be cited. Dr. Ralph E. Lapp had told the Sub-Committee, on 20 June 1956, that a progressive increase in such tests would release enough dangerous radiation by 1962 to give everyone in the world the maximum possible amount. In addition, the British report said that the damage to genetic materials was cumulative and irreparable. Furthermore, the United States National Academy of Sciences stated that, thirteen months after the hydrogen bomb tests in Bikini in 1954, the contaminated water-mass of the Pacific Ocean had spread over one million square miles.

28. The United Kingdom representative had said time and time again in the General Assembly that ionizing radiation was nothing new, that it was in the air, in food, etc. That was a very poor argument. A certain amount of carbon dioxide was also taken in by breathing, but there was no justification for having to breathe in a chamber full of carbon dioxide.

29. There had been no danger from radio-active strontium in the world at all before the first atomic explosion. As a member of the United States Congress had said, the unique nature of the hazard was indicated by the fact that one ounce of radio-active strontium, or about a teaspoonful, contained the equivalent of the maximum permissible amount for every person on the earth.

30. Colonel Victor Burns of the United States Army told the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States that an atom bomb produced coagulation of the tissues and the mechanical destruction of the colloid in the retina by converting the tissue fluids into steam and thereby exploding the retina. That was the prospect of atomic explosions.

31. There was enough evidence to show that the continuation of experimental explosions had polluted the air with radio-active substances. Mere limitation of explosions was going to give that evil a longer span of life and the moral backing of the United Nations, which it should never have.

32. The whole disarmament problem was affected by reciprocal fear and suspicion; therefore, if there was fear of non-detection, it might be impossible for one party or the other to subscribe to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

33. The Chairman of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago Inc. had stated that no country today could explode a sizable nuclear weapon — that only applied to hydrogen weapons — without the knowledge of the outside world. The resulting earth-shock and airborne radio-activity would testify unambiguously to the existence of a nuclear explosion. The test of any weapon too small to be detected would be of comparatively minor military interest.

34. What India asked was a moratorium on tests, not their abolition, because the latter could only come with a prohibition of tests. The maintenance of the moratorium would be guaranteed, not by reliance on any nation's word, but by the objective impossibility of acting in secret.

35. From the point of view of the Indian Government, everything possible should be done, not as a substitute for what was necessary, but as the beginning of what was necessary. In this stricken world, any little step that was taken, such as the announcements by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom that

they were going to reduce their forces by a certain number, would stimulate public opinion and arouse hopes.

36. Referring to the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162), he quoted from *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* to the effect that a world-wide nuclear test ban agreement would not need verification by international inspection because tests could not be concealed.<sup>4</sup> His Government was not opposed to inspection; along with other States which had participated at the African-Asian Conference, held at Bandung in 1955, the Indian Government subscribed to disarmament under proper international inspection and control. Nevertheless, it was true that explosions could at present be detected without resort to international inspectors.

37. He agreed with the statement made by the representative of France in the Disarmament Commission that the prohibition of weapons was closely related to the suspension of tests. In fact, there would be no meaning in suspending tests unless there were a prohibition of weapons. The suspension of tests would be beneficial, and was indeed imperative, both in order to arrest the dangers of ionizing radiation on mankind and in order to contribute towards reversing the process of competitive armaments.

38. His Government deeply regretted the fact that Japan had co-sponsored the three-Power draft resolution. Japan had been the worst victim of the effects of radiation and perhaps had done so in the hope that anything that limited those effects was better than nothing at all.

39. The Government of India was deeply concerned that proposals were going around the world for the distribution of atomic weapons of a junior character as part of the conventional equipment of armies. The danger in such distribution was that it might be carried out in more than one military alliance and that atomic weapons might thus come to be used even in the case of the type of small fracas that might take place anywhere. In view of such a development, either vast steps would have to be taken in the way of disarmament or the position would be reached where no step at all would be possible.

40. With regard to the reduction of armed forces, he noted the common spheres of agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. He found it, however, very difficult to speak of 2.5 million troops — the envisaged level of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union — as a small army. It was also very difficult for him to understand why the United Kingdom — which was only one-fourteenth of the size of India, had the benefit of isolation by sea, and had a very law-abiding population and innumerable friends in the world — should have an army of 750,000, unless it was to be deployed for colonial purposes.

41. He disagreed with the position put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom that the proposal on aerial inspection, made originally by President Eisenhower and responded to in a limited form by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, was an unsuitable suggestion. In the opinion of the Indian delegation, that proposal represented a considerable advance, since it had removed one of the gulfs dividing the two sides. The United States had done very considerable educative propaganda on the question of aerial inspection. In the opinion of the Indian Government, aerial inspection

<sup>4</sup> Vol. XII, No. 6 (June 1956), p. 186 *et seq.*

direction of adequately safeguarded disarmament were greater than ever. There seemed to exist now a sufficient consensus of opinion to warrant early agreement on and implementation of at least the first phase of disarmament. The goal for immediate, though limited, disarmament should not be lost while the endeavours to reach agreement on general disarmament were continuing.

9. Although the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway was a step in the right direction, unfortunately it did not come close enough to the heart of the problem. As had been pointed out by the representative of Sweden (824th meeting), the crux of the matter in the field of nuclear test explosions was that the extent of the harm being done to humanity by the continuation of nuclear tests was not known, although it was a well-known scientific fact that every increase in the amount of radiation was harmful. The three-Power draft resolution was based on the approach that nuclear test explosions should be limited or curtailed after the facts of radiation were established, and not before that was done. That approach was a rather unscientific and dangerous one.

10. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/L.160), on the contrary, called for the cessation of tests of nuclear weapons forthwith. That was a practical step which was desired by all the peoples of the world and one which could be implemented without delay. On a number of earlier occasions, the Government of Indonesia had called for the immediate discontinuance of such experimental explosions.

11. He realized that suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons would also mean a suspension of experimental explosions for peaceful purposes, at least until an international control system had been established and the facts concerning the radiation situation were known. Certainly Governments, especially those of the under-developed countries, wanted to see progress in that field, but not progress at any cost — not at the cost of the annihilation of mankind. Furthermore, cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons would have the additional benefit of accelerating the search for that formula which would permit tests for peaceful scientific purposes under international control.

12. If the Committee were to express the view that the three-Power draft resolution might be too limited while the Soviet draft resolution might go too far, a compromise acceptable to all parties concerned might be found by taking a temporary step such as that suggested by Sweden, in other words, an agreement by the States concerned on a moratorium in the testing of nuclear weapons until the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had reported its findings, and the General Assembly had acted upon them.

13. Turning to the second draft resolution introduced by the USSR (A/C.1/L.161), the Indonesian delegation had some doubts as to the usefulness of convening a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, as called for in paragraph 3 of that draft. However, there would be no objection if, in the opinion of the members of the Disarmament Commission, the calling of a special session was warranted by new developments. Furthermore, the recommendation in the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) that the Sub-Committee prepare a progress report for consideration by the Disarmament Commission not later than 1 August 1957 responded to the general desire to

achieve early progress in agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament.

14. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) considered the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) to be the happy result of a long period of incubation. The nature of the draft was such that no procedural difficulties arose in making observations on the problem as a whole, because operative paragraph 2 covered all the proposals before the Assembly and, what was more, paragraph 4 asked for transmission of the records of the Committee's meetings to the Disarmament Commission.

15. The Committee would do injustice to itself and to world public opinion if it did not realize that each year meetings on disarmament had taken place in the context of greater armaments than in the previous year, of newer weapons of destruction, of new fears and, in most years, of increasing tension. It had been the hope of his Government some months ago that, in view of the improved conditions in the world, it would have been possible to make a long stride towards the objective of world disarmament, as an intermediate step toward the final outlawing of war. Unfortunately, the developments in the Middle East, the situation in Hungary and the re-emergence of the phraseology of the "cold war" had intervened in the meantime to mar that movement toward the relaxation of tension. Nevertheless, the twelve-Power draft resolution, which was sponsored on a representative basis, gave some indication of the gravity with which the problem was considered in spite of the adverse factors previously mentioned.

16. The debate itself on disarmament had begun under good auspices. His Government desired to express its appreciation of the opening statement of the representative of the United States (821st meeting), who had said that he would look more to the future than to the past. That approach might yield better results in the Disarmament Commission also, if it were possible to adopt it there. Too much insistence had prevailed in the past. It was not possible, in the context of social and political affairs, to look in two directions at once.

17. The Indian Government also wanted to express its appreciation of the fact that, in spite of the existing tensions, an exchange of thoughts and communications had taken place between the two great Powers which were principally concerned in regard to disarmament. The same appreciation should be expressed for the work of Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President of the United States for Disarmament, who, on every possible occasion, kept the Indian Government closely informed and expressed willingness to respect the views of others. The same applied to the different Soviet representatives who had participated in the work of the Sub-Committee, and also to the representatives of the Canadian Government in London and in Ottawa. For all those reasons, it had been possible for the Government of India to implement its desires to do its best in the field of disarmament.

18. The contribution made by the United States to the peaceful use of atomic energy should also be remembered, together with the response of the Soviet Union in connexion with the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the co-operation of many other countries which had assisted in furthering the solution of the problem of disarmament in many indirect ways. The problem of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was by no means the same as the problem of disarmament, but both required similar methods of international co-operation.

could be tried out in a limited area, to be determined through discussion. People were always willing for other people's countries to be inspected, but unless Governments were willing to have their own countries inspected, the proposal did not carry conviction. He suggested that, when the Disarmament Commission took up that question, it should consider the contribution made by the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Anthony Eden, who had submitted a definite suggestion for a pilot experiment in international inspection (DC/71, annex 19).

42. The Government of India was deeply concerned that the Disarmament Commission should speed up its work. It was accordingly in favour of more frequent meetings of the Disarmament Commission and of enabling non-members who had proposals to make to participate, as was the practice of the Security Council. A suggestion to that effect had been made by the delegation of India in 1954, in the form of a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.100/Rev.1) which had been referred to the Disarmament Commission by General Assembly resolution 808 B (IX). That submission had been repeated before the Disarmament Commission, but the representative of India had never been questioned or examined; nor had there been any debate on the matter.

43. The delegation of India had been happy to join with others in sponsoring the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163). It should not be forgotten, however, that the draft resolution was of a procedural nature. It depended entirely upon the Sub-Committee in the first instance, and upon the Disarmament Commission itself, to see to it that the draft was not left in cold-storage. From the statements (821st meeting) of the representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union, it was quite obvious that both those countries which, between them, had power over the survival of the world, were anxious at the present time to make progress on steps that were possible. The Indian delegation was therefore glad to join in sponsoring the draft resolution which excluded matters of difference between the various parties. He felt that whatever proposals there were of a serious character should go to the Disarmament Commission. But, at the same time, if the Commission, as a result of that procedure, became a kind of general receptacle that merely turned the problem around in the hope that some pattern would be presented, that would, in his opinion, not do justice to the intent and the purpose of the draft resolution.

44. He wished to express his Government's appreciation to the five Powers which had great responsibility in the field of disarmament for allowing the initiative in the matter to gather momentum. The Indian Government had believed that, in view of the "cold-war" situation, the consequences of the developments in the Middle East and Hungary, and the atmosphere generated in the General Assembly, any attempt at a positive solution of any problem at the present time would probably have the reverse effect. The Indian delegation had been briefed accordingly. Now that agreement could be obtained to confer on disarmament matters, it was a great advance.

45. The Government of India, as a country outside the realm of the powerful, was grateful to have been permitted to assist in the process and would try through all possible channels, including those of countries which were close to it politically or geographically, to convey

such ideas or contributions as it could make towards the problem of disarmament.

46. Mr. SAWADA (Japan) observed that it was generally agreed that it was an impossible proposition to work out in the First Committee a detailed programme of disarmament. It was therefore appropriate that the General Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee at an early date to give prompt attention to all the proposals which had emerged from the discussions, with a view to finding a basis of agreement. He accordingly trusted that the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) would be upheld unanimously.

47. Referring to the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162), he noted gratefully the warm support extended to that proposal by many representatives. The proposal was a substantive one, moderate and reasonable enough to be accepted by all the States concerned. His delegation considered the overwhelming support for the three-Power draft resolution tantamount to its acceptance by the General Assembly. Nevertheless, having carefully weighed the prevailing situation in the First Committee, and with a view to ascertaining the course of action which would best serve the objectives of the draft resolution and at the same time facilitate the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, the Government of Japan had finally decided in favour of the twelve-Power draft resolution. He wished to have it recorded that it was the strong desire of his Government that the problem of advance registration of all nuclear test explosions and the study of the actual and expected radiation situation of the world should be given urgent and immediate attention by the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. His delegation would accordingly vote for the twelve-Power draft resolution of which Japan had the honour to be a co-sponsor.

48. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) pointed out that the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) was co-sponsored by nations of diverse points of view. All of the members on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission were among the co-sponsors. The draft was a product of the conciliation and spirit of compromise which, he hoped, would accompany the future efforts. It was deliberately non-controversial. It referred a number of previous and recent proposals to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for study. He believed that those bodies, expressly created for that purpose, were the best organs in which to continue the detailed and technical discussions which were necessary. He believed that the unanimous adoption of the draft resolution would help to set the stage for successful negotiations.

49. He thought that the proposals that the United States had presented on 14 January 1956 (A/C.1/783) could serve as a sound basis for progress. The United States would continue its search for even modest steps which could be agreed upon and which would help to reverse the trend towards greater and greater stockpiles of arms.

50. Turning to the other four draft resolutions which had been submitted in the course of the debate, he stated, with regard to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.160), that the United States favoured the limitation and ultimate elimination of nuclear-weapons testing as a part of a safeguarded system of disarmament. It opposed a prohibition of weapons testing that did not at the same time strike at the heart of the

problem, which was the continued production of nuclear weapons themselves.

51. The United States was prepared to give its full endorsement to the proposal contained in the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162). Although the proposal was only a preliminary step, it was both realistic and constructive. The United States was ready to participate in any registration system upon which the States concerned could agree.

52. With regard to the suggestion, made by several delegations, that a special session of the General Assembly should be convened to consider the question of disarmament, the United States had long held that, after agreement among the major armed Powers had been achieved, the subject of disarmament should be considered by a general conference of wide international participation. It would be premature to decide upon the convening of such a conference or of a special session of the General Assembly at the present time. The progress that had been made so far in disarmament unfortunately did not justify doing so. But the Disarmament Commission could consider the advisability of such a recommendation.

53. The United States Government believed that any changes in the membership of the Disarmament Commission which had been proposed in the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.164) should correspond to and be conditional upon changes resulting from the proposed enlargement of the Security Council. In that connexion, he noted that the participation of other States in the consideration of the disarmament question was assured in two ways: first, in the debates of the General Assembly, and, secondly, in the Disarmament Commission, which often heard representatives of States which were not members of the Commission.

54. With regard to the proposal to enlarge the Sub-Committee (A/C.1/L.164), he believed that an increase in the membership of that body would be an unfortunate departure from the sound principle that agreement in the first instance must be achieved among the major armed Powers.

55. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) pointed out, with regard to the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163), that the original authors of that draft had made a great effort to meet the different views expressed in the Committee, and he hoped that the draft resolution would receive unanimous support in the Committee. That would be a good omen for the discussions in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee during 1957. It was in those bodies, and especially in the private discussions of the Sub-Committee, that there was the greatest chance of resolving the difficulties that still prevented the conclusion of a disarmament agreement.

56. Although a unanimous decision by the Committee would be welcomed by his delegation, it would be unrealistic to suggest that agreement on that largely procedural draft resolution meant that all the outstanding problems had been solved. He hoped that those problems would be cleared up in the forthcoming meetings of the Sub-Committee.

57. The United Kingdom Government hoped that during 1957 the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee would move beyond abstract discussion of rival plans and would begin to concentrate on specific problems. For example, it felt that the Sub-Committee should give detailed attention to the problem of reduction in armaments. In relation to some of the most

modern weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, there was an opportunity to act while they were still only in the development stage, an opportunity which might never recur. Reductions in military manpower without reductions in armaments provided no real security. Furthermore, progress in reduction of the nuclear threat must be related to progress in conventional disarmament. The United Kingdom Government would be ready to offer certain specific suggestions in the Sub-Committee on the way in which reductions in armaments could be related to reductions in military manpower.

58. Secondly, his delegation suggested that the Sub-Committee should pay detailed attention to the unresolved questions of control. In particular, it believed that the Sub-Committee should explore further the idea of conducting practical experiments in both ground and air control in mutually agreed areas of the world. In that connexion, he assured the representative of India that the United Kingdom Government's desire to experiment in the techniques of control had not dwindled in any way, provided, of course, that those experiments were carried out in areas where all the parties concerned had given their consent. An interesting suggestion in this respect had been made by the representative of Israel at the present meeting.

59. To the representative of the Soviet Union he wished to say that the United Kingdom Government had no intention of proposing control without disarmament. It only wanted to speed up a solution of the unresolved questions of control so that world-wide disarmament could become a fact more quickly.

60. Thirdly, his delegation considered that the Sub-Committee should give urgent attention to the question of nuclear test explosions. It was well aware of the widespread concern felt about this subject. It appreciated the anxiety in Japan, which would certainly be taken into consideration. It was ready to support the draft resolution introduced by the three Powers (A/C.1/L.162) suggesting an agreement on the registration of all nuclear test explosions. That was only a first step. The next logical step would be limitation, which in turn should lead to the cessation of all tests. In that connexion, he wished to emphasize that, contrary to the suggestion made previously by the representative of India, the United Kingdom Government had not advocated limitation of tests as a substitute for cessation or suspension of tests. It had already been indicated in the Franco-British plan (DC/83, annex 2) how such tests might be first limited and eventually prohibited as part of a disarmament plan. In addition, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had repeated in the House of Commons on 22 January 1957 that the United Kingdom Government was also ready to consider separately from any disarmament agreement the possibility of limiting nuclear test explosions. The United Kingdom Government hoped to be able to develop certain views on that complicated problem in the Sub-Committee.

61. With regard to the proposals to enlarge the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, the United Kingdom Government fully agreed that every Government must have an adequate opportunity to express its views on disarmament. It had always stressed that, before any general disarmament convention was signed, a world disarmament conference must be held. The difficulty in making progress on disarmament was not due to any shortage of views; it was due to the complexity of the subject and the fact that it so directly affected the vital interests of every



State. Moreover, the great Powers had a special responsibility in this matter, a fact recently emphasized by the Prime Minister of India in his letter to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom delegation believed that at the present stage it would not be fruitful to enlarge the discussions in the Sub-Committee.

62. As for the Disarmament Commission itself, his delegation felt that the membership of the Commission should continue to follow the membership of the Security Council. When agreement was reached on enlarging the Security Council, the Commission would also be enlarged. In the meantime, the rules of procedure of the Commission provided adequate opportunity for any country to be heard when its interests were especially affected. His delegation was accordingly against the proposal to change the membership of the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee at the present time.

63. In conclusion, he wished to say that he shared the view of the Soviet Union representative that the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) was a positive development. He also hoped that the same good will and co-operation which had created it would be evident in the detailed discussions in the Sub-Committee. The United Kingdom, for its part, approached the discussions with an ardent desire for progress and with renewed hope.

64. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) commenting on the five draft resolutions which had been submitted, stated that his delegation would be constrained to abstain in the vote on the Soviet Union draft resolution calling for the immediate cessation of all atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (A/C.1/L.160), in view of the divergence of opinion as to whether such cessation was practical at the present time.

65. His delegation would also abstain in the vote on the second Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.161) on the ground that paragraph 2 thereof was already covered by operative paragraph 2 of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163), while paragraph 3 of the former was also embodied in operative paragraph 5 of the latter.

66. His delegation would vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162), although it believed that the draft should have gone a little further. In that respect, he wished to present a verbal amendment to the draft resolution and proposed that between the words "for" and "registration" in paragraph 1, the word "advance" should be inserted.

67. His delegation would also vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the twelve Powers (A/C.1/L.163), which, he was happy to note, contained some of the recommendations made by his delegation in the course of the debate.

68. With regard to the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.164) ...

69. The CHAIRMAN intervened to suggest that it might be unnecessary for the representative of the Philippines to refer to the other draft resolutions, since it was apparent that approval of the twelve-Power draft resolution would be contingent upon and linked to the fact that the other draft resolutions would not be voted upon, but referred directly to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

70. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) concluded by stating that if the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.164)

was put to a vote, he would be obliged to vote against it, since it departed from the original principle governing the composition of the Disarmament Commission.

71. Mr. MOCH (France), in commenting on certain references to himself made by the representative of India, recalled that that representative had had an opportunity of making a statement to the Disarmament Commission after which, he, the representative of France, had replied.<sup>5</sup> He had been able to reply immediately after Mr. Krishna Menon's statement in the Commission because he had studied the same question and had anticipated from the representative of India's previous statements the points which were going to be made and had not, therefore, felt the need to ask for a delay of two or three days before replying to him.

72. At the 58th meeting of the Disarmament Commission, he had stated that the total amount of radiation as the result of the explosion of nuclear bombs since 1945, until June 1956 was lower than the amount which man had added to natural radio-activity with instruments which he had been using for sixty years. On the basis of a report of the United Kingdom Medical Research Council, he wished to point out that, unless there were a considerable increase either in the power or in the number of the explosions, there was no danger in continuing the tests.

73. With regard to the possibility of controlling the cessation of explosions, he emphasized that there were at least two types of explosions which could not be detected from afar. The first type was the small explosion of the order of magnitude of a kiloton, which was sufficient to perfect the manufacture of much more powerful bombs. The second type of explosion which could not be controlled was a powerful explosion carried out under water, in remote seas and at such great depths that no radio-active fall-out could get into the atmosphere. That was why he had said that it was probable that uncontrolled tests of the two types mentioned would be sufficient for a country with enough technicians to perfect the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

74. Furthermore, he wished to repeat that even airplanes could not be detected by the most modern radar equipment if those airplanes were flying high enough. *A fortiori* stratospheric rockets could not be detected by any kind of radar. On the other hand, there were explosions which should be not only authorized but encouraged, and if possible, carried out on an international scale because they had considerable scientific interest, such as those which had been carried out by the Russian scientist I. V. Kurchatov.

75. Those were some of the problems arising in connexion with the complex question of the prohibition of test explosions. It was because of that complexity that technical questions could not be usefully discussed before large assemblies. The number of members of the Disarmament Commission should therefore not be increased.

76. Mr. PERERA (Ceylon) suggested that, in the discussions of the various proposals referred to it under the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163), the Disarmament Commission might give priority to the proposal made by the Soviet Union on 17 November 1956 to the effect that a conference should be convened of the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India (A/3366, para. 30). Such a conference had been pro-

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 58th meeting.

posed by the President of the Swiss Confederation. If convened, it could facilitate the reaching of agreements on questions related to the problem of disarmament.

77. With regard to the draft resolution which provided for an increase in the membership of the Disarmament Commission (A/C.1/L.164), the delegation of Ceylon had no illusions regarding in whose hands lay the ultimate decisive power in matters of disarmament. Nevertheless, disarmament was a subject which touched the peoples of the world at large. The Soviet draft resolution was thus in accord with his delegation's own views, because some emphasis had been given to the representation of countries from Africa and Asia. The draft resolution dealing with the cessation of nuclear weapons tests (A/C.1/L.160) met the requirements of his delegation. He appreciated the draft resolution submitted by the three Powers (A/C.1/L.162), although perhaps it did not go far enough. His delegation would accordingly support those drafts.

78. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) expressed his conviction that the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) which among its co-sponsors, included the members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, would be unanimously approved by the First Committee. In an attempt to promote the unanimous adoption of that draft, the Soviet delegation would withdraw its draft resolution of 14 January 1957 (A/C.1/L.161). The Soviet delegation would also not press for a vote on its other two draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.160 and A/C.1/L.164), inasmuch as those drafts would be referred to the Disarmament Commission.

79. The Soviet delegation would wish to express the hope that the method of negotiation which had been used in agreeing upon the twelve-Power draft resolution would be utilized further in the work on the problem of disarmament. It was convinced that the proposals submitted by it, both with respect to the general programme of disarmament and to the partial measures envisaged in that field, might constitute a good basis for reaching agreement. The Soviet delegation expected that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee would pay due attention to the Soviet proposals. For its part, the Soviet Union would make very effort to find a practical solution to the problem of disarmament which would lead to considerable reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments and to the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

80. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) stated that he supported the procedure which had been outlined by the representative of the Soviet Union and the views that he had expressed in putting forward his suggestions regarding procedure.

81. With regard to the references which had been made by the representative of India concerning Canada's position on the Sub-Committee, he agreed that the Sub-Committee was exclusive and select — exclusive in the sense that it was small, and select in the sense that it had been selected by a larger body to which it was responsible and to which it reported. It was an exclusive organization in order that its members might meet in the informal, frank and very confidential manner that was best for that kind of preliminary negotiation between those Powers which had the greatest responsibility for disarmament irrespective of the type of their civilization. He did not include Canada among them. Therefore, the membership of the Sub-Committee could perhaps be even smaller rather than larger. Canada's

membership was in a sense accidental. He thought that Canada had got into the Sub-Committee by the back door, to which the representative of India had referred. That back door was the atomic entrance. Canada would be very glad to withdraw through the front door, if by so doing it advanced the cause of disarmament.

82. He still felt after the discussion in the First Committee that the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162) which Canada had sponsored with Japan and Norway, contained a proposal which was a practical, reasonable and useful first step, one which the General Assembly might well have endorsed if it had come to a vote. However, since, under the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163), of which Canada was also a sponsor, all proposals would be referred to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, he wished to state on behalf of the three sponsoring delegations that they did not intend to press the draft resolution to the vote.

83. The sponsors accepted the verbal amendment proposed by the representative of the Philippines (para. 66 above) and would be happy to submit the draft resolution to the Sub-Committee with that alteration.

84. Since the countries at present conducting tests were all members of the Sub-Committee, the objective sought in the three-Power draft resolution would be equally well achieved by the procedure laid down in the twelve-Power draft resolution.

85. He welcomed the fact that all members of the Sub-Committee, together with the other sponsoring delegations, had been able to reach agreement on the twelve-Power draft resolution. Although the agreement was on procedure only and not on substance, it was a hopeful augury for the discussions. He was confident that that draft would receive the unanimous support of the First Committee.

86. Mr. WALKER (Australia) commended the twelve-Power draft resolution to the Committee both as a member of the Disarmament Commission and as one of the sponsors. In view of the wide range of proposals made in the course of the debate, he believed that the procedure envisaged in the joint draft resolution was a sensible one and hoped that it would receive the unanimous endorsement of the Committee.

87. Mr. Krishna MENON (India), commenting on references made to his previous statement, repeated the view that the United Kingdom had in fact submitted proposals which amounted to substituting limitation of tests for the suspension of tests. With regard to the participation of India in the work of the Sub-Committee, even if the Government of India had not moved one finger, the Disarmament Commission had an obligation to make inquiries about the Indian proposals (A/C.1/L.100/Rev.1), especially since those proposals had been referred to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration by resolution 808 B (IX), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. After the tenth session of the General Assembly the Government of India had made two or three formal approaches to the Disarmament Commission. It was only after the second communication (DC/86) and a fair amount of subsequent lobbying about it that the Government of India had been invited to send a representative. Despite the inconvenient time set by the Disarmament Commission, the representative of India had appeared.

88. With regard to the statement made by the representative of France concerning Indian participation in the Disarmament Commission, he recalled that his own statement to the Disarmament Commission had been



followed immediately by the statement of the representative of France, the text of which had been distributed beforehand.

89. As to the effects of radiation, he suggested that the available scientific evidence was adequate on the ominous consequences which increased explosions of nuclear weapons could have for mankind.

90. In respect to the detection of intercontinental missiles, he believed that even rockets of great velocity and high limits could be detected at some stage of their flight.

91. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the second Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.161) had been withdrawn by its sponsor; that the first Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.160), the draft submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway (A/C.1/L.162) and the third Soviet Union draft (A/C.1/L.164) would be referred to the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee if the twelve-Power draft resolution were adopted (A/C.1/L.163); and that consequently a vote would not be required on those drafts. He called attention to the fact that the Philippine amendment to the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162), namely, to insert the word "advance" between the words "for" and "registration" in paragraph 1, had been accepted by the sponsors of that draft.

92. He therefore put to the vote the draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Canada, El Salvador,

France, India, Japan, Norway, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.163).

*The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.*

#### **Tribute to the memory of Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu**

93. Mr. LODGE (United States of America), referring to the contribution of Japan in connexion with the item under discussion, wished to express his sympathy and condolences on the death of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu.

94. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom), Mr. WALKER (Australia), Mr. Krishna MENON (India) and Mr. TIOULONG (Cambodia) associated their delegations with the expression of sympathy on the death of Mr. Shigemitsu.

95. The CHAIRMAN expressed the sympathy of the Committee to the representative of Japan and requested him to convey the Committee's condolences to the Government of Japan and to the family of the late Mr. Shigemitsu.

96. Mr. SAWADA (Japan) thanked the Chairman and members of the Committee for the tribute they had paid to Mr. Shigemitsu.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.