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Chairman: Mr. Víctor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 22

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/3366, A/3470, A/C.1/783, A/C.1/784, A/C.1/L.160, A/C.1/L.161)

1. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that he would concentrate primarily on proposals designed to facilitate a sound and effective agreement in the year ahead. President Eisenhower, who had recently been re-elected, would renew his efforts to find a way of devoting more of the resources of mankind to the cause of peace, of increasing confidence among nations through the establishment of a new plan for the control of armaments and of lessening the danger of an outbreak of war and of a large-scale surprise attack.

2. In his letter dated 31 December 1956, to Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower had reaffirmed his belief that deliberations in the framework of the United Nations were the most likely means of achieving some success in the matter of disarmament; he had also announced that the United States would submit new proposals in the United Nations.

3. He (Mr. Lodge) wished to emphasize that the United States was ready to take any steps towards arms reductions provided that they were subject to effective inspection. An agreement which did not provide for adequate inspection would not serve the cause of peace.

4. Renewed negotiations should strive towards the following objectives: first, to reverse the trend towards larger stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to reduce the future nuclear threat; secondly, to provide against large-scale surprise attack and thus reduce the danger of major war; thirdly, to lessen the burden of armaments and to make possible improved standards of living; fourthly, to ensure that research and development activities concerning the propulsion of objects

through outer space would be devoted exclusively to scientific and peaceful purposes; fifthly, to ease tensions among nations and to facilitate the settlement of difficult political issues.

5. The details of the proposals promised by President Eisenhower would be developed in the negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. In broad outline, however, they consisted of the following:

6. In the first place, the United States proposed that an agreement should be reached at an early date, under which, subject to effective international inspection, all future production of fissionable materials would be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. Diplomats and scientists knew that it was impossible to determine with certainty, or to discover through any scientific means of inspection, all the fissionable materials produced in the past or all the existing stocks of nuclear weapons. As it was not possible to turn back the clock of scientific development, the Members of the United Nations should establish effective international control of future production and undertake not to utilize it for the manufacture of weapons.

7. Once those undertakings had been given, it would be possible to move confidently towards the reduction of existing stockpiles. As soon as future production was controlled, it should be easier than with the information now available to establish, within a reasonable range of accuracy, the approximate amount of fissionable materials previously produced; equitable and proportionate amounts could then be transferred, in successive increments, from past production to internationally supervised national or international use for purposes other than armaments.

8. That proposal was a logical consequence of the statement made by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953 before the General Assembly (470th plenary meeting) and was inspired by the same motives as the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Under that programme, the United States, for its part, would make generous progressive transfers of fissionable material to peaceful uses and would continue to encourage other nations to make their contributions to the constructive utilization of atomic energy.

10. Secondly, if such an arrangement to control the future production of fissionable materials could be negotiated, it would become possible to limit, and ultimately to eliminate, all nuclear test explosions. Pending the negotiation of such an agreement, the United States was willing to work out methods for advance notice and registration of all nuclear tests, as had been suggested by the Norwegian delegation at the 598th plenary meeting, and to provide for limited international observation of such tests.

11. Thirdly, the United States proposed that steps should be taken to realize, under adequate inspection, a first-stage reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces; the figures suggested, which had apparently been agreed upon in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, were 2.5 million men for the USSR and the United States and 750,000 men for France and the United Kingdom. Those reductions could be made concurrently with the progressive establishment of an effective inspection system. The United States accepted the principle of establishing observers at key ground locations, as generally proposed by Mr. Bulganin, in addition to air inspection. If there was good faith on all sides in establishing that system of inspection, the proposed first stage of reductions could be fulfilled.

12. Furthermore, other nations should begin to consider the relation between their own armed forces and the projected first-stage force levels. Greater reductions than those proposed could not be made so long as the major existing political issues remained unsettled.

13. Fourthly, scientists were proceeding with efforts to propel objects through outer space. Those efforts should be brought within the purview of a reliable system of armaments control. As a first step, and with a view to ensuring that future developments would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes, the United States proposed that the testing of such objects should be placed under international inspection and that provision should be made for international participation.

14. His fifth point was that all nations should be safeguarded against large-scale surprise attack; such a guarantee would reduce the likelihood of a major war and would do much to prevent miscalculation by any nation regarding the intentions of another.

15. It was in the interest of each nation that other nations should be certain of its intentions. Many nations had the necessary strategic information to wage a devastating war; but unless a reliable inspection system was established, with open skies, ports and industrial centres, no nation would possess the regular, dependable information necessary for a durable peace. The United States therefore proposed the progressive installation of inspection systems and was willing to execute, either as an opening step or later, the complete proposal made in Geneva by President Eisenhower at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers. Whatever the first steps might be, a method of control, an organization of supervision and a mechanism for regulation would be needed. The United States therefore proposed that an international agency for the regulation of armaments should be installed concurrently with the beginning of the programme.

16. Moreover, the United States still believed in the worth of the proposals and suggestions which it had submitted at Geneva and later in the Sub-Committee.

17. The third report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (OC/83) contained the suggestions submitted by the United States in May 1956. The sole object of the United States in presenting new proposals was to attempt to meet the views of other nations and to facilitate effective agreement.

18. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the arms race not only threatened the welfare of peoples, but was also capable of turning any local conflict into a global war. Hence, an agree-

ment governing armaments, worked out under the auspices of the United Nations, would be the best contribution to the maintenance of peace and would make it possible to devote the resources of science and technology to constructive purposes. If the armaments race were ended, and if there were peaceful coexistence and economic co-operation, the under-developed countries would be able to make up the lag in their economic and cultural development.

19. The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union on 17 November 1956 (A/3366) should be supported by the General Assembly. The Soviet Union for its part had been a consistent advocate of the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and complete disarmament.

20. In its statement of 17 November 1956 (A/3366) the Government of the Soviet Union had described the international situation as serious. The armed attack against Egypt had jeopardized world peace; the object of the aggression of the United Kingdom, France and Israel had been to restore the dominant position of the colonial Powers throughout the Near and Middle East. Owing to Egypt's resistance, to the universal condemnation and to the warning served on the aggressors by the forces of peace, hostilities had ceased; but the danger of fresh conflict persisted, for the region in question was beset by the threat of another form of colonial oppression, emanating from the United States, whose programme for the Near and Middle East was at variance with the Charter of the United Nations and in the nature of an imperialist programme fraught with danger to the peace. At the very moment when a settlement had been made possible, the United States was considering intervention and even military intervention in the affairs of the Arab countries. No circumlocution could hide the aggressive and colonialist nature of its programme. Ruling circles in the United States sought to impose a colonialist trusteeship over the Middle East with a view to seizing its wealth.

21. The CHAIRMAN said that the only way to reach agreement on disarmament was to avoid in the debate any topic that might engender acrimony. While paying a tribute to the Soviet Union and its representative, he therefore invited the latter to speak strictly on the agenda item being considered by the Committee: the question of disarmament.

22. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said it was impossible to understand the substance of the disarmament issue without an understanding of the conditions which led to the armaments race. Ruling circles in the United States believed that the weakening of the French and British colonialists and the strengthening of Arab independence had created a vacuum which they should fill.

23. Mr. LODGE (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, said that the statements made by the representative of the Soviet Union were offensive to the United States and had nothing to do with disarmament.

24. The CHAIRMAN said that, with all the authority attaching to his office, he would like to request the representative of the Soviet Union, in the interests of disarmament, to keep to the subject.

25. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his remarks were directly connected with the question of disarmament.

26. In order to camouflage its policy, the United States invented slanders about an alleged Soviet threat

to the Arab States. It was, however, the chief partners of the United States which had cruelly attacked Egypt, whereas the Soviet Union had displayed its friendship and, in co-operation with all the forces of peace, had taken action to halt the aggression.

27. On the other hand, when Egypt's independence had been threatened, the United States had refused to take joint action with the Soviet Union under the auspices of the United Nations; the United States in fact thought only of how it could take over French and British positions in the Middle East, whereas the Soviet Union sought no bases, concessions or privileges incompatible with the principles it maintained.

28. The CHAIRMAN said that that point had been already discussed in the General Assembly and asked the Soviet Union representative, for the third time, to avoid provoking replies which would delay the Committee's work.

29. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) protested against the fact that the Chairman had interrupted him for the third time. Although his remarks were directly connected with the maintenance of peace, he would try to be brief.

30. The Soviet Union was in favour of strengthening the national independence and economic prosperity of neighbouring countries. The aggression against Egypt and the failure of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy in Hungary had led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to accelerate the armaments race. The leaders of that aggressive bloc had rejected peaceful coexistence and were intensifying their policy of subversion in the Socialist countries. Owing to the *détente* which had been developing the imperialist forces had feared a halt in the armaments race, which enriched the monopolies supplying war materials. Nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles would inflict far heavier losses than had been sustained in the past; and yet, in the two world wars, 30 million people had been killed and 55 million wounded, the equivalent of the total population of France and the United Kingdom or half the population of the United States. In his book *Peace, War and You*,¹ Mr. Jerome Davis, an American journalist, gave an idea of the resources that had been wasted during the Second World War; it was not hard to imagine what would be the consequences of a war waged with the new weapons.

31. On 22 May 1956, Lieutenant-General James M. Gavin had told a United States Senate sub-committee that the effects of nuclear weapons would in case of war affect the civilian populations of many countries, both belligerent and non-belligerent, and that there would be several hundred million deaths. Those were the victims that the imperialists were ready to sacrifice for the sake of their profits which, according to Mr. George H. Mahon, Chairman of a sub-committee of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, were rising to unprecedented levels.

32. The world had to choose: it must either renounce the "cold war" and embark on a programme of disarmament and peaceful coexistence, or else the various States must continue to proceed along a course of hostile isolation which could only lead to a devastating war.

33. It was not safe to keep on stockpiling the most terrible means of destruction: history had shown that sooner or later a spark would set them off. The genesis of peace therefore did not lie in the "balance

of terror" advocated by certain Western Powers under the name "balance of forces"; the theory of "armed peace" was absolutely untenable.

34. The immediate need was therefore for a study of specific plans and for an agreement on the implementation of provisions on which there had been at least some *rapprochement*. Given good will, an agreement could be reached and steps taken to carry it out and the resulting improvement in the international atmosphere would facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive disarmament programme, which would lead to a relaxation of international tension and to the settlement of the most urgent international problems. In the interests of peace, the United Nations should fulfil the hopes of the peoples of the world, oppose the armaments race and urge all countries to find a practical solution to the disarmament problem.

35. The USSR tirelessly pursued a policy of peace and international co-operation. The roots of that policy did not lie in weakness, as was proved by the USSR's resistance during the Second World War. Since then, the Soviet State had gone from strength to strength. The Soviet people and the Soviet Socialist State rejected the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. The USSR had always done its utmost to eliminate the threat of a new war, to conclude an agreement on disarmament and to halt the armaments race.

36. Peace required the adoption of practical measures of disarmament. In that respect, the Members of the General Assembly should act in keeping with their responsibilities, if they did not want to see a recurrence of the failure of the League of Nations in that sphere.

37. The proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee showed that there was a whole series of problems on which agreement could have been reached if all the nations concerned had really wished it. Unfortunately, that agreement had not been achieved because the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had consistently refused to agree to any disarmament plan. During the negotiations, the USSR had constantly made concessions and accepted the proposals of the Western Powers. But whenever it seemed that agreement was within reach, the Western Powers had raised fresh objections.

38. That had happened, for example, in the question of determining the levels to which armed forces and conventional armaments were to be reduced. For a number of years, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other nations had asserted that atomic weapons could not be prohibited until armed forces and conventional armaments had been reduced. They had therefore proposed that the armed forces of the USSR, the United States and the People's Republic of China should be reduced to a figure between 1 million and 1.5 million men each, and those of France and the United Kingdom to 650,000 men each. When the USSR had agreed to that proposal, the Western Powers had shifted their ground and proposed higher levels: 2.5 million for the United States, the USSR and China, and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom. The USSR had made a further concession and had accepted those higher levels as a first step, to be followed, at a later stage, by reduction to the levels originally proposed. However, the representatives of the United States and other Western Powers had again opposed the conclusion of an agreement on that basis.

¹ New York, Abelard, 1956.

39. With regard to atomic weapons, the USSR had always proposed their complete prohibition and continued to do so. The Western Powers had proposed that such prohibition should become effective when 75 per cent of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments had been carried out. The USSR had again accepted that proposal, which had immediately afterwards been dropped by the Western Powers.

40. The Western Powers had also rejected the USSR proposal that the Members of the United Nations should assume a solemn obligation to refrain from the use or the threat of force in their international relations and should undertake to refrain from the use of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons.² That obligation had assumed particular importance in present circumstances, since it now appeared that the United States had expressed its intention to use its armed forces against the peoples of the Near and Middle East.

41. The Western Powers had also opposed any partial disarmament measure which it might have been possible to apply. Such measures included the immediate cessation of tests of thermo-nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the provision of atomic weapons to troops stationed on German territory, and a reduction of the military budgets of States by 15 per cent (DC/83, annex 5).

42. With respect to control, the Soviet Union had been the first country to submit a proposal to the United Nations concerning the establishment of international control over disarmament. It had proposed a detailed plan which for the first time provided effective safeguards against a surprise attack by the establishment of control posts at strategic points in the territory of States parties to the disarmament agreement (DC/71, annex 15, p. 24).

43. In short, the Western Powers had not accepted the Soviet proposals of 10 May 1955 (DC/71, annex 15), 27 March 1956 (DC/83, annex 5) and 12 July 1956³ and others which would have made it possible to conclude an agreement on all disarmament problems. It should also be noted that the USSR had been ready to conclude partial agreements on the reduction of conventional armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons, the reduction of military budgets, etc., if the Western Powers had considered that method preferable.

44. Faced with the Western Powers' persistent refusal to conclude a general or partial agreement, the Soviet Union had made a new effort towards reaching an agreement. In its proposal of 14 May 1956 (DC/84), it had suggested that States possessing large armed forces should decide to reduce those forces unilaterally without waiting for an international agreement on disarmament. The USSR had taken the initiative in that question. During 1956, it had reduced its armed forces by 1,840,000 men, a reduction which had applied in part to the troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic; it had reduced military expenditure by about 10 per cent and had liquidated its military bases at Port Arthur and at Porkkala-Udd. At the same time, it had declared that if the United States, the United Kingdom and France would carry out a corresponding reduction of their armed forces, it would be prepared to consider a further reduction of its own forces. Unfortunately, the Western Powers had not followed the example of the Soviet Union and

had advanced new pretexts for delaying the solution of the disarmament problem.

45. Recently, the Western Powers had asserted that the end of the armaments race depended on the solution of a number of political problems, including the German question, the question of the Near and Middle East and the question of the Far East.

46. It was common knowledge that the USSR had done much towards the solution of international political problems. It was sufficient to recall the measures adopted to solve the Austrian problem, the restoration of normal relations with Yugoslavia, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and with Japan, the efforts to develop contacts between statesmen of different countries, the Soviet proposal for a European collective security system and the proposal made by the USSR to the United States for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and co-operation.

47. The USSR would, of course, continue its endeavours in the future to achieve the solution of important political problems. It was quite plain, however, that to make disarmament contingent on the solution of international political problems was tantamount to abandoning all hope of an agreement on disarmament. The question which of the two problems should be resolved first admitted of no solution. The champions of the armaments race wanted States to be drawn into endless dispute. Thus influential quarters in the Western States were seeking not only to oppose disarmament negotiations, but also to justify the remilitarization of West Germany, the presence of United States forces in Europe and Asia and the dispatch of United States forces to the Middle East. That attitude was dangerous and might reduce the United Nations to inactivity at a time when a deterioration of the international situation required greater efforts to be made to solve the disarmament problem.

48. The USSR had submitted on 17 November 1956 its statement on disarmament and the lessening of international tension in the firm belief not only that the solution of the disarmament problem would strengthen peace, but also that all the necessary conditions existed for starting work on an agreement in the matter. The Soviet proposals could constitute an excellent basis for negotiation.

49. In the first place, the Soviet Government proposed a considerable reduction in the armed forces of the USSR, the United States, China, the United Kingdom and France, to take place in two stages. During the first year, the forces of the first three States should be reduced to 2.5 million men and those of France and the United Kingdom to 750,000 men. During the second year, those figures should be reduced to 1.5 million and 650,000 respectively. The forces of the other States should not exceed 150,000 to 250,000 men. Armaments should be reduced correspondingly.

50. In addition, the USSR proposed that a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons should be put into effect within two years, including cessation of production, prohibition of their use, and complete destruction of stockpiles. As a provisional measure, it was proposed that nuclear weapons tests should be discontinued, since nuclear explosions constituted a threat to the life and health of the population of all States. India had already made a proposal to that effect,⁴ which had been supported by the Parliaments of

² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 52nd meeting.

³ *Ibid.*, 57th meeting.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 58th meeting.

Indonesia, Japan and other States. To meet the universal desire of the peoples and the humanitarian purposes of the United Nations, the USSR had submitted a draft resolution providing for the immediate cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons (A/C.1/L.160).

51. Control over the implementation of an agreement for the prohibition of nuclear bomb tests raised no problems, since no explosion of atomic or hydrogen bombs could, at the present level of scientific knowledge, be set off without being detected in other countries. Such bombs could therefore not be exploded in secret, and that very fact provided a guarantee against any violation of an agreement in the matter.

52. Thirdly, the Soviet Union proposed that the armed forces of the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of Germany should be reduced by one-third during 1957, with the establishment of the appropriate control over that reduction.

53. Fourthly, it proposed that a substantial reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territories of NATO countries and of the armed forces of the USSR stationed in the territories of the countries which were signatories of the Warsaw Treaty should be effected during 1957.

54. It also proposed that all foreign military bases in the territories of other States should be liquidated within two years.

55. Sixthly, the Soviet Government proposed that the military expenditure of States should be reduced in the course of two years in conformity with the reduction of armed forces and armaments, the prohibition of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and the liquidation of military bases in the territory of other States.

56. Lastly, it proposed that strict and effective international control should be established to supervise the fulfilment of the disarmament obligations assumed by States. The USSR had repeatedly expressed its opinion on the so-called aerial photography plan and had stated that that proposal solved neither the problem of control of disarmament nor that of preventing aggression. But since that proposal had been advanced by the United States as a *sine qua non* for the conclusion of a disarmament agreement, the USSR, in order to break the deadlock, had stated that it was prepared to consider the question of employing aerial photography in an area extending 800 kilometres east and west of the demarcation line between the armed forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Treaty countries, if the States concerned gave their consent.

57. The USSR was convinced that the implementation of the disarmament plan it proposed would pave the way for the complete liquidation of armed forces and armaments of all types, States retaining only such contingents of militia and police as were necessary to maintain internal security and protect their frontiers.

58. Lastly, the USSR once again proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty signatories.

59. In view of the difficulties of the problem and of the need to explore every avenue, the Soviet Union had supported the proposal of the President of the Swiss Confederation to convene a conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the United States,

the United Kingdom, France and India. Such a conference might have made possible the conclusion of a disarmament agreement. Unfortunately, the United States, the United Kingdom and France had opposed the idea.

60. The USSR proposals manifestly took into account the position of the Western Powers. They greatly increased the possibility of an agreement on the most important disarmament issues, namely the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The next step lay with the Western Powers. The USSR trusted that its offer would be understood as a constructive contribution to the cause of disarmament. The success of the efforts to reach a speedy solution of the problem required only the good will of all concerned.

61. The USSR regretted that the prolonged efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament had had no positive results. The ineffectiveness of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee was partly the result of their restricted membership and of the limited nature of their discussions. In order to make the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee more representative and having regard to the opinions expressed on the matter, the membership of both organs should be expanded.

62. The USSR delegation suggested that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee should be asked to examine all the disarmament proposals submitted to the United Nations by the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, France and other States. In doing so, it took into consideration the view of a number of delegations, as well as the wish expressed by President Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Mollet in messages to Mr. Bulganin that all the proposals on disarmament should be discussed at the next session of the Sub-Committee.

63. The USSR delegation considered that the time had come for the General Assembly to give special consideration to the important problem of disarmament. It was therefore submitting a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.161) proposing the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to disarmament.

64. The Soviet Union delegation would of course examine and support any proposals which might bring practical results in the field of disarmament. The statement made by the United States delegation at the present meeting was worthy of attention and would be duly studied.

65. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said he was surprised that the USSR representative, disregarding the Chairman's appeals, had seen fit to accuse the United States of colonialism and of violating the United Nations Charter. Those accusations were the more surprising as the Soviet Union had recently perpetrated a blood bath in Hungary, had admitted its guilt by refusing to allow a committee of inquiry to enter that country and had been condemned in the General Assembly by a vast majority.

66. The truth was that no one had ever been enslaved by the United States. President Eisenhower's proposal implied no action deserving of condemnation. It was in harmony with the Charter and was the opposite of colonialism.

67. The statement which he (Mr. Lodge) had made at the present meeting was a sincere reflection of his

Government's desire to reach a solution of the disarmament problem. It was discouraging to find that the USSR representative, in his speech, had been contemptuous of the work of the United Nations.

68. Mr. MOCH (France) said he wished to submit a brief clarification on that part of the USSR representative's speech which referred to the disarmament problem.

69. At one point in his statement, the USSR representative had said that the United States, the United Kingdom and France had persistently evaded any agreement on disarmament. In that connexion he (Mr. Moch) observed that France had consistently followed a conciliatory policy on disarmament and since 1952 had presented a large number of compromise proposals — in 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956. Furthermore, France would indefatigably continue its efforts to bring about a meeting of minds.

70. Mr. COMAY (Israel), speaking on a point of order, said that the USSR representative, in touching on the Middle East question, had attributed to the Israel Government an attitude which was not in accordance with the facts.

Programme of work of the Committee

71. Mr. CASSIMATIS (Greece), speaking on a point of order, said that the items on the First Committee's agenda were not only important for the maintenance of peace in certain parts of the world, but also generally affected the prestige of the United Nations. As the Committee had only a limited time at its disposal, he thought that it should draw up a programme of work.

72. He therefore suggested that the Chairman should prepare a programme of work indicating the number of meetings which the Committee could hold before 15 February and how many could be devoted to each of the remaining items on its agenda, including, if necessary, night meetings, and the possibility of proceeding to the following item whenever there were no speakers on the item under discussion.

73. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Greek representative for his valuable suggestions. With the help of the Secretariat, he should be able to make use of them and so ensure that each problem was given due consideration.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.