



# General Assembly

Sixty-ninth session

## First Committee

**21**<sup>st</sup> meeting

Thursday, 30 October 2014, 3 p.m.

New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Rattray ..... (Jamaica)

*The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.*

### Agenda items 87 to 104 (continued)

#### Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

**The Chair:** This afternoon the Committee will continue to take action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 87 to 104. We will be guided by the same procedure I explained yesterday, and I trust that Committee members all have a copy of the circulated ground rules for reference.

We will begin by listening to the remaining representatives who requested the floor for explanation of vote or position following the voting on cluster 1, entitled “Nuclear weapons”, and who did not get an opportunity to speak by the time we adjourned yesterday. Thereafter the Committee will take up the draft resolutions and decisions listed in informal paper 2, which has been circulated among delegations and which contains the remaining drafts on informal paper 1, as well as new draft proposals that are ready for action today.

I should like to inform the Committee that, at the request of the sponsoring delegations, action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1, which is listed under cluster 2, has been postponed to a later stage of the Committee’s work.

I shall now call on the remaining speakers on the list for explanations of vote following the voting under cluster 1.

**Mr. Masmеjean** (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): Allow me, at the outset, to explain Switzerland’s vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.2/Rev.1, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, which we have once again supported this year. The draft resolution promotes the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the Middle East — a goal that Switzerland fully supports.

We welcome the specific measures adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the subject on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We commend the holding this year of several multilateral consultations in order to move forward towards that goal. We will continue fully to support the efforts of the Finnish facilitator in order to organize a conference in Helsinki as soon as possible. Holding the conference as soon as possible is crucial for the Middle East and for the NPT regime.

With regard to the contents of the draft resolution, Switzerland notes that the operative paragraphs refer to only one of the issues linked to the risks of proliferation in the region. It singles out the situation in one State in the region. By voting in favour of the draft resolution, Switzerland shows its support for the obligations that stem from the Treaty for each and every State, whether signatory or not.

I shall now explain Switzerland’s vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.16, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”. Switzerland did not support this draft resolution,

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org>).

14-59645 (E)



Accessible document

Please recycle



thereby maintaining its position of previous years regarding the text. Switzerland is still of the view that a draft resolution that aims at prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should include an appropriate reference to the pertinence and importance of the international non-proliferation system.

The Oslo and Nayarit Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons have clearly shown that the probability of a deliberate, accidental or unintended nuclear explosion has been underestimated and that the consequences of any nuclear detonation would be catastrophic in humanitarian terms, as well as surpass any possible response. In that context, taking further steps to prevent any use of nuclear weapons, including strengthening the norm of the non-use of such weapons, remains a key challenge for the international community.

In the absence of a legally binding instrument addressing this issue, all States possessing nuclear weapons are encouraged to take practical measures so that the use of such weapons becomes increasingly inconceivable. Such measures notably include refraining from further building up nuclear arsenals, reducing the alert level of nuclear weapons and diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national doctrines.

Switzerland remains ready to continue the dialogue with the sponsors of the draft resolution with a view to the evolution of its text so that it might benefit from broader support.

Many of the comments I have made with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.16 also apply to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.18, entitled "Reducing nuclear danger". We also hope that this draft resolution will further evolve in order to meet our concerns.

*(spoke in English)*

I shall now explain our vote regarding draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament".

The General Assembly High-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament (see A/68/PV.11), held on 26 September 2013, proved to be an event of great significance. Attended at the senior political level, it saw a strong expression of support for renewed efforts towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Deeming it important to build upon the momentum created at the meeting, Switzerland voted in favour of

the resolution on the follow-up to the high-level meeting last year (resolution 68/32). While reiterating its vote in favour of the draft resolution this year, my delegation would like also to underline the following points.

We remain convinced that in taking the High-level Meeting process forward, we should aim at acting in a collective and inclusive manner and at uniting the United Nations membership in pursuit of the shared goal of nuclear disarmament. In that context, Switzerland would see value in a deeper exchange between the authors of the draft resolution and other States during the drafting process, with a view to overcoming outstanding differences.

The High-level Meeting follow-up draft resolution welcomes the convening of the High-level Meeting and underlines the strong support expressed on that occasion for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In doing so, we see the draft resolution as fully consistent with the broad support expressed at the High-level Meeting that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with all its three pillars, constitutes the cornerstone of efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that context, we see value in explicit references in the draft resolution to the NPT outcome documents, including the 2010 action plan.

Referring to article VI of the NPT, the draft resolution calls for urgent compliance with the legal obligations and the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken on nuclear disarmament. We firmly believe that nuclear disarmament will become a reality only if all States possessing nuclear weapons move with resolve in that direction and fully commit to the objective of nuclear disarmament.

As nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and inherently linked, any new case of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would place at risk further progress on nuclear disarmament. Hence, the draft resolution's call for urgent compliance with the legal obligation. The fulfilment of the commitments undertaken on nuclear disarmament extends also to the need for strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations.

I should also like to stress that this delegation does not see a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons as the only option for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. The exchanges at the High-level Meeting indicated that different approaches were

possible when seeking to reach this objective. That fact is also underscored by the report of the Open-ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament that met in 2013, as well as by the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 68/32 and the 2013 High-level Meeting follow-up resolution containing the views of Member States with regard to achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Finally, we see the United Nations high-level international conference to be convened in 2018 as a General Assembly meeting that will provide an opportunity to take stock of, and give new impetus to, the efforts towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons. We also welcome that the draft resolution's calls for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, reaffirming thereby the pivotal function of the Conference on Disarmament as the single permanent multilateral negotiating forum.

**The Chair:** Permit me to address some personal remarks to our dear colleague from Zambia who, understandably, was not present with us yesterday. I want to express, on my behalf as Chair and on behalf of my Bureau, and indeed on behalf of this entire Committee, our sincere condolences at the passing, on Tuesday night in London, of President Sata of Zambia. You, your Government and the people of your country have our deepest condolences.

**Mr. Rowland** (United Kingdom): I should like to make an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.2/Rev.1, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

It is with regret that we decided to abstain in the voting on this draft resolution as a whole. We have long supported effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at by Member States, and remain committed to the goal of establishing a Middle East free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

We strongly support the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, as well as the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which called for a conference on the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. To that end, we continue to call on all States in the region that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards agreements and an additional protocol.

We regret the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which was scheduled to take place in 2012. We support the convening of such a conference as soon as possible once arrangements are agreed, and we believe that draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.2/Rev.1 should explicitly reflect that. The draft resolution should also acknowledge the steps taken towards a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in the past year through the series of meetings held in Switzerland where Arab States and Israel discussed the arrangements necessary for convening a conference. We believe it is still possible that States can agree the necessary arrangements for a conference and should continue to engage in direct discussions to achieve that.

**Mr. An Myong Hun** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.2/Rev.1 and A/C.1/69/L.12/Rev.1.

I turn first to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.2/Rev.1, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution. My delegation remains firm and consistent in its position to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, my delegation would like to state that some elements in the text related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), such as the general call for adherence to the NPT and implementation of the final documents of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, are not in conformity with the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. My delegation therefore expressed a reservation on the relevant paragraph.

On draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.12/Rev.1, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", my delegation voted against that draft resolution. My delegation notes that the main gist of the draft resolution is oriented towards nuclear disarmament

and global denuclearization. However, paragraph 10 fails to meet fairness and balance by having singled out the Democratic People's Republic of Korea alone with regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks stipulates the equal share of obligations of each party to be fulfilled and all parties agreed to take coordinated steps to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in line with the principle of commitment for commitment, action for action.

The notion that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula hinges only on a unilateral undertaking by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons is very much mistaken. The draft resolution distorts the essence of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The 2005 joint statement calls for the United States to respect each other's sovereignty, to exist peacefully together and to take steps to normalize relations. The United States, however, has defined the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an enemy and has refused to recognize its sovereignty. It continues to step up its hostile moves against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the ultimate goal of overthrowing its political system.

It is misleading to argue as if the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula could be achieved only if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abandoned its nuclear weapons. My country possesses nuclear-weapon capabilities because the United States has threatened us with nuclear weapons. It is not at all the case that the nuclear issue was taken up because we built a nuclear-weapon capability. If the United States had had the approach of respecting our sovereignty and choosing peaceful coexistence, this nuclear issue would not have been raised at all. As long as the United States persists in its hostile policy, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will further bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defence.

The negative vote of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on this draft resolution must not be seen as casting a shadow on working together with others to achieve global nuclear disarmament and denuclearization. As we made our position clear all year, my country aligns itself with the Non-Aligned Movement's principled position on nuclear disarmament, which is the highest priority.

**Mr. Jackson** (Ireland): I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino and Sweden

with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament".

Having participated at the senior political level at last year's General Assembly High-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament (see A/68/PV.11), our delegation strongly supports the disarmament objectives behind this draft resolution. In deciding to support the draft resolution, we would like to stress the following points of particular relevance and importance to us.

We see draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44 as being entirely consistent with and supportive of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), article VI of which requires the pursuit by all States parties to that Treaty of

"effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The draft resolution is also consistent with the action plan agreed without a vote at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, action 1 of which obliges all States parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the NPT and with the objectives of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Any discussion or initiative aimed at furthering efforts towards achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons should take account of the fact that currently the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains the only treaty-based commitment to disarm. These commitments, freely entered into, were underscored clearly in the 13 practical steps agreed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which included an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

That unequivocal undertaking was reaffirmed by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Our delegations believe that any efforts towards a world free of nuclear weapons should reinforce those obligations and support their full implementation. We are therefore pleased that draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44 benefits from an explicit reference to the NPT, and specifically to the solemn obligations of States parties undertaken in article VI of that Treaty.

Our delegations furthermore believe that any initiative aimed at advancing nuclear disarmament must give due prominence to the important ongoing discussion regarding the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear-weapon detonation, reflecting the fact that at this First Committee meeting 155 States — an overwhelming majority of the membership of the United Nations — associated themselves by name with the statement delivered by New Zealand during the thematic debate on nuclear weapons. We believe that the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear-weapon detonation should remain among the foremost precepts that guide and inform the process of disarmament. We are therefore pleased that the draft resolution acknowledges the deep concern of States at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, whether such use should occur by accident, miscalculation or design.

Finally, in supporting draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44 our delegations do not see a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons as being the only available option for achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. We emphasize that we would be favourably disposed towards any set of effective measures to achieve the objective of complete nuclear disarmament, regardless of how such measures might be elaborated. We would particularly like to emphasize that, consistent with our obligations assumed under article VI of the NPT, we remain willing to engage with and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards the elaboration of any such measures.

**Mr. Ammar** (Pakistan): I take the floor to explain my delegation's position on five draft resolutions, which I will do one after the other, starting with draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.2/Rev.1, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Pakistan continues to believe and support the primary purpose and focus of this draft resolution. However, we believe that references to the recommendations and conclusions emanating from various Review Conferences of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) need to be qualified. In that context, we are disappointed at the continued, but unrealistic, call on Pakistan to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Pakistan is a nuclear-weapon State, and there is no question of us joining the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In view of those considerations, we voted

in favour of the draft text as a whole while abstaining on the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs.

Now I shall give our explanation on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.12/Rev.1, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". There are several aspects of the draft resolution that the Pakistan delegation is in agreement with. However, we are disappointed at the ritualistic and unrealistic assertion in paragraph 9 that calls upon Pakistan to unconditionally accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. We also cannot accept references to NPT Review Conferences and their recommendations in the text due to our known position on the Treaty. As a non-party to the NPT, we neither subscribe to, nor are bound by, the conclusions and decisions of that Treaty, including those relating to its universality. Our delegation therefore abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole. Specifically, we abstained on the twenty-fourth preambular paragraph and on paragraph 11, and voted against paragraph 9.

On draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.21, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", Pakistan has always supported nuclear disarmament and the goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. We continue to share reservations concerning the draft resolution, particularly the frustration over the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament negotiations. A step taken by the sponsors last year not to propose the re-establishment of the Open-ended Working Group, whose establishment obliged us to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution at the sixty-seventh session, was a step in the right direction. We strongly believe that any move to re-establish the Working Group would weaken the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Therefore, the decision that was taken not to reconstitute the Open-ended Working Group was a step in the right direction and enabled us to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

For several years, Pakistan has drawn the attention of the international community to the erosion of the global consensus underpinning the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We recognize that there are continuing differences in approach, perspectives and modalities to overcome the challenges in this important area. Pakistan has therefore been calling for renewing the global consensus by harmonizing and reconciling those differences. We continue to believe that the best way forward is to convene a fourth special session of

the General Assembly devoted to disarmament so that not only could the objectives and the agenda of nuclear disarmament be advanced, but the entire disarmament machinery could be revitalized.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.22, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”, Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolution. We share agreement on most of the elements referred to in the draft resolution. Moreover, we wish to reiterate that the notion of decreasing the operational status of nuclear weapons must be based on reciprocity. The reference to the conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, from our point of view, is unwarranted. As a non-party to the NPT, we cannot subscribe to the decisions of the Conference, and therefore we were obliged to abstain in the voting on the eighth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution.

On draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.36, entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, my delegation continues to disagree with several provisions of the draft resolution. In accordance with our clear and considered position, we reject the unrealistic call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State without conditions. At the same time, we do not consider ourselves bound by any of the Treaty’s provisions, including those that are adopted by NPT Review Conferences or by other forums in which Pakistan is not represented.

Pakistan supports the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a key goal of this draft resolution. There are also several elements in the draft text with which my delegation agrees. However, we cannot agree to the immediate commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiations, on grounds that have been explained in detail, including in this Committee. It is curious, however, that a draft resolution that seeks united action towards the elimination of nuclear weapons calls for addressing the non-proliferation aspect of fissile material only. As for the universalization of a comprehensive safeguards agreement, we wish to underscore that such a measure applies only to States that have, out of their free consent, assumed legal obligations.

In view of the reservations I have outlined, my delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole, as well as on paragraphs 3 and 20, and voted against paragraph 11.

**Mr. van der Kwast** (Netherlands): I speak on behalf of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and my own country, the Netherlands, to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.12/Rev.1, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”.

Our delegations voted in favour of this draft resolution, as we support its overall goal to encourage the rapid advancement of nuclear disarmament, and many of the paragraphs contained within the text. However, we wish to express our disappointment at the fact that the authors of the draft resolution chose to include, in particular in the seventh preambular paragraph, references not only to resolution 68/32 but also to the decisions contained therein.

Our delegations have previously expressed concern about decisions taken in resolution 68/32, notably that the aim of the proposed 2018 meeting remains unclear and could serve to lay a foundation for an alternative pathway. Such a pathway could potentially damage the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which we do not believe is constructive. We believe the inclusion of this language weakens the otherwise strong support for the NPT contained in the rest of document A/C.1/69/L.12/Rev.1.

Our delegations have taken note of the call in paragraph 3 for the 2015 NPT Review Conference to give due prominence to the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, among other issues, in its decisions and follow-up actions. For the recommendation in paragraph 3 to be successful, however, and to achieve the desired consensus, constructive and concrete proposals will need to be developed and outlined well ahead of the April 2015 meeting.

Finally, while our delegations welcome the important language contained in paragraph 10 calling on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear-weapon programmes, we would like to suggest to the main sponsors that, given the strong interrelationship between disarmament and non-proliferation, future draft resolutions on this theme would benefit from a reference to cases of major non-proliferation concern that have been highlighted by the Security Council and that could lead to the need for further disarmament efforts.

I should like to make the following statement on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”. I now speak on behalf of the following countries: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, Monaco, Slovakia and my own country, the Netherlands.

Our delegations share the long-term goal of this draft resolution, namely, a world free of nuclear weapons. Each of our countries supported the holding of, and participated in, the high-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament, held on 26 September 2013 (see A/68/PV.11). During the Meeting, we discussed various perspectives on how best to achieve our shared goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

We regret that the various proposals made during the High-level Meeting were not included in last year’s resolution 68/32 and that only one particular view appears to have been brought forward. In the draft resolution that was submitted this year, there was again no clear reference to the NPT. On draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44, we approached the main sponsors with our concerns. Unfortunately, they were unable to meet our concerns. We regret that, and therefore our delegations will again highlight our continuing concerns with draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44.

This draft resolution includes only limited references to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a seminal instrument for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. We welcome the decision of the drafters to include a reference to article VI of the NPT, but would have preferred to see a broader reference to the Treaty as a whole. As set out in the NPT Final Document, the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons is indeed the best guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

We are concerned that the aim of the proposed 2018 meeting is unclear. It can be interpreted as either simply another high-level meeting on disarmament to ensure continued high profile of the issue, but also as a potential vehicle to negotiate a nuclear-weapons convention. That, in our view, is regrettable, as it may undermine our collective efforts to seek a positive outcome for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and may lay a foundation for an alternative pathway that could damage the Treaty.

While the draft resolution rightfully calls for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it points to only one core issue. We share the frustration expressed in this draft resolution that, for more than 16 years, the CD has not been able to adopt or implement a programme of work. We continue to call for the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work within the CD that would allow us to advance the four core issues. We are also firmly convinced that starting negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention without the participation of the nuclear-weapon States will not advance our shared goal of disarmament.

**Mr. Tilegen** (Kazakhstan): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.21, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”. Kazakhstan supported the draft resolution on the understanding that the Open-ended Working Group would not serve as an independent platform parallel to the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It is our view that the Open-ended Working Group’s outcome recommendations should be presented for further consideration and possible approval by these two established disarmament bodies.

**Mr. Neto** (Brazil): I take the floor in explanation of vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.16, A/C.1/69/L.18, A/C.1/69/L.21 and A/C.1/69/L.36.

The Brazilian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.16, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, as we share the understanding that nuclear weapons constitute a threat to the survival of humankind and therefore should never again be used. However, we would like to stress the need to go beyond the mere prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and completely eliminate them, as their very existence constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Complete, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament must remain a global priority. To that end, there is an urgent need to launch negotiations on a comprehensive, legally binding instrument banning the development, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, retention, testing, use and transfer of such weapons, and providing for their complete elimination.

We recall the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish nuclear disarmament in accordance with commitments made under article

VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that context, we also draw attention to paragraphs 81 and 82 of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The Brazilian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.18, entitled “Reducing nuclear danger”, as it agrees that risk of the unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons must be reduced. However, measures such as reviewing nuclear doctrines, de-alerting and detargeting nuclear weapons, while relevant, cannot be a substitute for multilateral agreements conducive to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

It is our view that the most serious threat to humankind and to the survival of civilization derives not only from the use of nuclear weapons, be it intentional or accidental, but also from their very existence. In that context, I stress once again the position of my delegation regarding the need to launch negotiations on a legally binding instrument to completely ban and eliminate nuclear weapons.

The Brazilian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.21, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”. We welcome the discussions undertaken within the framework of the Open-ended Working Group established by resolution 67/56, which were held in an open, constructive, transparent and interactive manner and included contributions made by civil society.

We also take note of the report of the Secretary-General (A/69/154) that compiles inputs by Member States in accordance with resolution 68/46. We understand, however, that the Open-ended Working Group and its follow-up initiatives should constitute useful steps towards the negotiations on legally binding instruments on nuclear disarmament within the United Nations framework, preferably in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

In that regard, we appreciate the fact that the draft resolution reaffirms the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and the roles and functions of the CD as set out by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as the functions and powers of the General Assembly to consider principles and make recommendations with regard to nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.36, entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, while we share with the sponsors’ view on the need to pursue the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the text does not recognize the compliance deficit that continues to exist with regard to nuclear-weapon States implementing their obligations under article VI of the NPT. On the contrary, welcoming recent nuclear-weapon States’ actions would suggest that effective concrete steps are being taken in multilateral nuclear disarmament, which is not the case.

We also view with concern language that seems to invoke preconditions for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, such as the enhancement of international peace and security. For Brazil, it is precisely the irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons that would remove one of the greatest sources of mistrust and instability. On paragraph 10, we believe that explicit mention should have been made to those annex 2 States, whose ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is required in order for the Treaty to enter into force.

We welcome the recognition, in paragraph 11, that negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be carried out in the Conference on Disarmament and on the basis of the mandate set out in document CD/1299. We believe, however, that the draft resolution could have made explicit mention of the need for such a treaty to cover existing stocks of fissile material in order to serve both disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Paragraph 14 of the draft resolution should have expressed support for the immediate commencement of discussions within the Conference on Disarmament of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, not excluding an international, legally binding agreement.

Finally, with regard to paragraph 20, my delegation would like to recall that the additional protocol is an instrument of a voluntary nature. The language used in the paragraph would have benefited from the relevant provisions set out in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which noted: one, that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol; and that, two, additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.



**Mr. Simon-Michel** (France) (*spoke in French*): I take the floor in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.36, entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

My country voted in favour of this draft resolution as, generally speaking, it reflects the commitments on nuclear disarmament issues to which we have subscribed. Nevertheless, I should like to stress the concern of my country with regard to the evolution of this draft resolution for several years and our wish to continue to see the 2006 consensus plan of action on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) move forward in a balanced way. My country remains committed to ensuring that draft resolutions presented to the General Assembly should rightly and properly acknowledge the efforts that States have made in that connection.

Furthermore, my country is fully aware of the serious consequences of the possible future use of nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of every country to avoid that. Let me recall that, for France, nuclear weapons are not weapons of war, but rather a means of deterrence intended solely for protecting our vital interests. France’s deterrence doctrine of strictly defensive use rigorously limits the instances in which nuclear weapons can be used to extreme situations of legitimate defence, in full respect for the Charter of the United Nations.

France regrets the absence in this draft resolution of a reference to the considerable work that has been done this year in the context of the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. France believes that the priority in nuclear disarmament is to implement concrete measures that are in line with the progressive and realistic approach reflected in the NPT action plan adopted by consensus in 2010 and aimed solely at practically strengthening our collective security.

France will continue to do all it can to move forward towards a more secure world for everyone and to create the proper conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free world in accordance with the goals of the NPT.

Comments that we have on the other draft resolutions adopted yesterday were mentioned by the United States Ambassador in a joint statement (see A/C.1/69/PV.20).

**Mr. Quinn** (Australia): I take the floor to explain my delegation’s vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.2/Rev.1.

Australia is committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, pursued in an effective and pragmatic way. As a strong supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we will continue to promote these objectives in all the relevant international forums.

Our strong advocacy for the universalization of the NPT and for universal application of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, including the additional protocol, is a matter of record. Australia places the greatest importance on the implementation of the consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and supports the practical steps endorsed by the Review Conference towards the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

We would like to acknowledge the steps taken in the past year through the series of meetings held in Switzerland where Arab States and Israel discussed the arrangements necessary for convening such a conference. We believe it is still possible that States can agree the necessary arrangements for such a conference, and should continue to engage in direct discussions to achieve that.

Australia’s view has been consistent for a long time that all States in the region should adhere to the NPT and that their nuclear facilities should therefore be subject to IAEA inspection. However, this draft resolution, which refers only to one country and makes no reference to other current nuclear proliferation threats elsewhere in the region, is, in our view unbalanced. Again, therefore, regrettably, we had to abstain in the voting.

**Mr. Eloumni** (Morocco) (*spoke in Arabic*): Morocco voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.36, entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, because we support its provisions and objectives. Morocco expresses its appreciation to Japan for including, in paragraph 17, a reference to the need for establishing in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as well as a call for the holding of the Helsinki conference as soon as possible. Morocco reiterates that the conference should be convened according to the plan of action agreed upon at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

**Mr. Cordeiro** (Portugal): I take the floor on behalf of Cyprus and my own country, Portugal, to explain our abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.21, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”.

We support overall the contents of the draft resolution, notably with regard to the inclusiveness and constructive work of the Open-ended Working Group established within the framework of the General Assembly. In line with what is set out, respectively, in the third and eighth preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution, it is also our strong view that “all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations” and that multilateralism is “an essential way to develop arms regulation and disarmament negotiations” — to mention just a couple of relevant references in that regard.

Portugal and Cyprus are of the view that the longstanding inability of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) — the United Nations sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament — to give adequate answers to the State that presented its request for membership constitutes, in practical terms, a denial of the principles of fully inclusive, multilateral negotiation mechanisms. The inclusiveness and non-discriminatory nature of those mechanisms are in and of themselves a major prerequisite for effective and universal progress in achieving long-term, sustained peace and security. Accordingly, we deem as appropriate and relevant the inclusion in draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.21 of a reference to the urgent need for the enlargement of the CD in line with the general principle set out in the preambular part of the draft resolution. The inclusion of such a reference was the subject of a specific request addressed to the sponsors of the draft resolution, which, regrettably, was not agreed to. For that reason, Portugal and Cyprus decided to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.21.

**Mr. Herráiz-España** (Spain): I have the honour to deliver a joint explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, on behalf of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, the Republic of Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and my own country, Spain.

Last year, our delegations abstained in the voting on resolution 68/32. Unfortunately, this year we are not in a position to support draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.44

either. The concerns we expressed remain valid. We believe in a world free of nuclear weapons, and we believe that disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing goals that should be pursued through successive and gradual steps involving all the nuclear-weapon States in the process.

We would like to stress the fundamental role we ascribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as to its complete implementation. We should continue moving forward with the implementation of the action plan elaborated by States parties at the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in order to achieve a successful 2015 Review Conference.

In that context, we continue to see the convening of another review conference by 2018 as set out by the draft resolution as parallel and possibly distracting our focus from the NPT. We appreciate the reference to the NPT in the preambular part of the draft resolution, but the emphasis is on only one of the pillars. In our view, nuclear disarmament is directly linked to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, and therefore NPT obligations should not be approached selectively.

Making progress on these commonly shared goals requires the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We agree that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) should start substantive work as soon as possible. However, we would not see a nuclear-weapons convention as the first priority in the CD. We should, rather, aim at a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, including the CD’s four core issues.

As agreed at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the CD would be a single negotiating body on disarmament affairs. It is unclear to us whether the conference in 2018 would be in contradiction of that consensual decision. We believe in a cooperative and inclusive approach in order to make real progress on nuclear disarmament.

Finally, we share the concern about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, yet banning nuclear weapons will not guarantee their elimination. Only by recognizing both the security and humanitarian

dimensions of nuclear weapons will we be able to achieve our goal of a world free of such weapons.

**Ms. Anderson** (Canada): Canada takes the floor to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.2/Rev.1, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”.

Due to the fact that once again this year the draft resolution demonstrates overt bias and unfairly singles out Israel by calling for its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while wilfully overlooking and choosing not to address the serious non-compliance issues by multiple States in the region that are already parties to the Treaty.

Canada has taken this position both here and in similar draft resolutions in other forums, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Canada believes that this draft resolution is still deficient because it ignores the reality of Iran and Syria’s continuing non-cooperation with the IAEA and their flouting of their international legal obligations. We are deeply concerned that Iran has failed to comply with six Security Council resolutions. Iran is choosing to disregard those Council obligations and the efforts of the international community to arrive at an equitable and lasting solution that would help address some of the concerns of the international community with regard to Iran’s nuclear programme.

In June 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors determined that Syria’s undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor at Deir ez-Zor constituted non-compliance by Syria with its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. Syria continues to ignore the repeated requests of the IAEA to cooperate with its investigation by allowing the Agency to have access to all the information, sites, material and persons necessary to resolve outstanding questions regarding that site and the three other related locations.

For those reasons, Canada has again voted against this year’s draft resolution on the risk of proliferation in the Middle East.

**Mr. Robotjazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I should like to explain the position of my delegation regarding draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”.

Since 1974, when Iran first proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the General Assembly has consistently adopted resolutions endorsing this proposal in recognition of the fact that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance regional as well as international peace and security.

However, in spite of repeated calls by the international community, no progress has been made so far in the establishment of such a zone as a result of the refusal of the Israeli regime to abandon its unlawful nuclear-weapons programme and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It goes without saying that the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel, with its track record of committing aggression and occupation and other international crimes, continues to pose the most serious threat to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in the region.

To pave the way for the establishment of the zone, Israel must verifiably eliminate all its nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon party without preconditions, and place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.

The sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East have a special responsibility to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons. They also have undertaken a clear commitment to implement the 2010 NPT agreement on the holding of a conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Neglecting that commitment would embolden Israel to continue its traditional policy of flouting international agreements. In order to create a positive atmosphere in the run-up to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the co-conveners of the Conference must exert the utmost pressure on the Israeli regime to participate in the Conference without any preconditions.

Consistent with its longstanding policy, Iran clearly announced its readiness to participate in the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. We are steadfast in our commitment to take practical steps within the agreed mandate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document aimed at making progress towards the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East

zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian delegation was forced to abstain in the voting, or even voting against, certain draft resolutions on issues of nuclear disarmament. We would like in particular to underscore that that in no way means a change in our positions of principle. Russia always was, is and will be the most consistent proponent of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. That is why we welcome any constructive initiative that truly contributes to achieving that goal.

Committee members know very well that Russia for many decades now has been carrying out an in-depth and productive dialogue on reducing offensive strategic weapons with a State that once actually used this kind of armament and then launched an arms race. Members also know quite well that we have already achieved quite a lot. The nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States have been reduced to the level of the 1960s. Negotiations in one form or another in substance are constantly ongoing. The nuclear arms race stopped a long time ago. On this point we have fulfilled our obligation under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but we would be ready to go even further.

A week ago, on 24 October, at the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, stated:

“We insist on continuing talks to reduce nuclear arsenals. And we are ready to engage for the most serious, concrete discussions on nuclear disarmament — but only serious discussions without any double standards.”

Overall, at this juncture we consider it very important to focus our efforts at comprehensive compliance with, or the implementation of, decisions that have already been adopted by consensus, in particular the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the corresponding action plan.

It is essential to work together very thoroughly to strengthen the NPT. That is why it is important to first create the conditions to move forward towards our common goal, namely, creating a world free of nuclear weapons. We are very concerned that in a number of draft resolutions the authors take a very selective attitude in interpreting provisions of the NPT. One example is

that the focus is placed on only the first part of article VI, whereas the other part gets left out. In fact, it is the obligation of all States to conduct negotiations on full and comprehensive disarmament. It is impossible to so overtly disregard the agreements that have been reached between us. Attempts to enshrine in documents of the General Assembly biased interpretations of the Treaty, and at the same time to impose on nuclear States unilateral or one-sided obligations, are unacceptable.

In today’s conditions of strategic instability — I would say even growing strategic instability — attempts to undermine what is in essence the only internationally binding document in the area of disarmament, the NPT, which is a generally acknowledged legal document, on which all nuclear disarmament is based are extremely dangerous.

We strongly speak out against any ideas that seek to launch any parallel disarmament process because that runs counter to the review process of the Treaty. Do we not understand that the consequences of such actions are unpredictable? Let us be realistic. These kinds of actions undermine the process of moving towards our common goal, which is general and complete nuclear disarmament. Let us not forget that the obligations under the NPT are borne by all States signatories without exception, not only the nuclear-weapon States. That is why Russia calls on all States, responsibly and consistently, to move towards general and complete disarmament, and at the same time adopt constructive positions rather than creating new obstacles and difficulties on the path to disarmament.

**The Chair:** We have exhausted the list of speakers on cluster 1 in explanation of vote after the voting carried over from yesterday.

The Committee will now turn to informal paper 2, beginning with cluster 2, entitled “Other weapons of mass destruction”.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who wishes to make a statement in explanation of vote or position before we take action on the draft resolutions under cluster 2.

**Mr. Robotjazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I should like to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.17, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”.

Combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on a non-discriminatory basis has

been the longstanding policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, Iran has always supported this draft resolution since its introduction in the First Committee, and we will continue to do so. We fully agree that international cooperation aimed at strengthening the security and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contributes to preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. We believe this important issue can be best addressed within the relevant multilateral organizations and in an open, comprehensive and transparent manner, with the participation of all concerned States.

In that context, the International Atomic Energy Agency provides the most appropriate forum for addressing this issue. We have reservations about the reference to the so-called Nuclear Security Summits in the ninth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.17. Therefore, my delegation would like to put on record that it disassociates itself from the consensus under the ninth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of Belarus to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.7.

**Mr. Lazarev** (Belarus) (*spoke in Russian*): The delegation of Belarus would like to introduce for the consideration of the First Committee the traditional draft resolution entitled “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new types of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament” (A/C.1/69/L.7).

In the current draft resolution, certain amendments of a purely technical character have been introduced. The issue of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction is specifically aimed at preventing an arms race and at establishing a disarmament mechanism that is supposed to become operational in case a dangerous situation occurs.

In terms of its contents, this draft resolution complements Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which confirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, is a threat to international peace and security.

We are convinced that keeping the topic of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction on the agenda

of the General Assembly is essential for this item to continue to be the focus of international attention, and hence could be a way of making sure that certain States acting in bad faith or terrorist organizations do not produce new types of weapons of mass destruction.

The lack of factually based evidence on the development and production of new forms of weapons of mass destruction is not direct proof that this kind of work is not being done or might not be done in future. Support for the kind of draft resolutions we are considering now enables States to unequivocally confirm their commitment to matters of disarmament and arms control, and in this case not to get involved in the development of new forms of weapons of mass destruction. We call on all States to support draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.7.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, who wishes to speak in explanation of position or vote before we take action on the draft resolutions under cluster 2.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation has traditionally supported First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.7, entitled “Prohibition of the development, production and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament”. We are one of the sponsors of this draft resolution. We are convinced that the topic of the prohibition of the development, production and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction must occupy a special place on the agenda of the First Committee.

We need to be proactive here. We need to be forward-looking. The level of technological development is increasingly more advanced. All this is being used to develop various types of weapons. We cannot accept that humankind is moving towards total self-destruction. The goal of the draft resolution is to establish coordinated international procedures that make it possible to monitor the situation in connection with the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and that would create conditions for the development of concrete recommendations.

Today already 33 States have signed up as sponsors of this draft resolution. We call on all States to support the draft resolution and thereby confirm their national, sovereign, negative attitude towards the development of new forms of weapons of mass destruction.

**The Chair:** May I remind members that, under the rule 128 of the rules of procedure, sponsors of draft resolutions and decisions are not permitted to make any statements in explanation of their votes either before or after action is taken.

There being no further requests for the floor, the Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.6, A/C.1/69/L.7, A/C.1/69/L.17 and A/C.1/69/L.38 under cluster 2, “Other weapons of mass destruction”.

The Committee will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.6, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Hungary at the Committee’s 17th meeting, held on 27 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/69/L.6.

In addition, the following oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Under the terms of paragraph 10 of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.6, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention, to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences and to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the remaining meetings of experts and the meetings of States parties during the current intersessional process.

The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that the States parties to the Convention, at the Seventh Review Conference, in December 2011, approved the cost estimates prepared by the Secretariat for servicing the meetings of experts and the meetings of States parties of the 2012-2015 intersessional programme.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, are to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations, may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States parties

to the Convention. Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.6 would not give rise to any financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015.

**The Chair:** The sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.6 has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.6 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.7, entitled “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.7 was just introduced by the representative of Belarus. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.7 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.4.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,

Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

Israel, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Ukraine

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.7 was adopted by 177 votes to 2, with 1 abstention.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.17, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.17 was introduced by the representative of India at the Committee’s 11th meeting, on 20 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.17 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.4.

**The Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.17 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.38, entitled

“Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.38 was introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.38.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,

Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Israel, United States of America

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.38 was adopted by 178 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** I shall now give the floor to those representatives who wish speak in explanation of vote or position following the adoption of the draft resolutions.

**Mr. Wood** (United States of America): I take the floor to explain the vote of the United States on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.7, entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

The United States believes that the international community should focus on the very real problem of the proliferation of known weapons of mass destruction, both by States that wilfully violate their commitments to treaties and by non-State actors. In the 66 years since the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction was written, no new types of weapons of mass destruction have appeared. The notion of new types of weapons of mass destruction beyond chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear remains entirely hypothetical. No useful purpose is served by diverting the attention of the international community away from existing threats. The United States therefore voted against draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.7.

**Mr. Ammar** (Pakistan): I have requested the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.17, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction".

My delegation shares the concerns that terrorists and non-State actors may potentially acquire and use weapons and materials that could cause mass destruction. We therefore continue to support the objectives of the draft resolution, although we believe

that there is room to improve it by conveying a more objective reflection of reality.

The fear of the acquisition and use of weapons and materials of mass destruction by terrorists and non-State actors needs to be evaluated and viewed in perspective. Terrorist organizations and non-State actors are more likely to acquire and use chemical weapons and biological weapon materials and capabilities. The acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and non-State actors is much less likely. The international community, however, must not lower its guard to prevent the possibility of the development and use of dirty bombs.

Increased international cooperation, including the initiation of negotiations on a radiological weapons convention, should be given serious consideration. While the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Nuclear Security Summit process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism play a useful role in this regard, addressing these concerns should not become an excuse for pursuing a policy of discrimination against selected countries.

With regard to the denial of means to terrorists to acquire, possess and use weapons of mass destruction, States have enacted and enforced export control measures, national physical protection and other related actions to prevent weapons-of-mass-destruction technology from falling into the hands of terrorists. International assistance and capacity-building, however, continue to be important areas of attention.

To lend greater legitimacy to international efforts in this area, measures such as the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011), which were designed to fill the gap in international law, need to be taken up by a more inclusive and representative United Nations forum. We agree with the widely held view that the best guarantee against the threat of possible use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons lies in their elimination.

The faithful implementation of existing treaty regimes such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction can effectively address most of these threats. Early disarmament on chemical stocks would enhance the level of confidence against the likelihood of their acquisition and use by terrorists. However, as long as



the process of chemical weapons disarmament proceeds at a slow pace and huge quantities of chemical weapons exist, the possibility of their falling into the hands of terrorists will remain as well.

The control of biological weapons will be of more concern, particularly to industrially advanced States, due to the extensive use of biological agents by them. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction should therefore be strengthened, including through the conclusion of a verification protocol, which has been negotiated for more than eight years. Reviving that process would fully serve the goal of promoting international peace and security as well as address the concerns expressed for example in this draft resolution.

In our view, a comprehensive strategy must be developed to prevent the possibility of terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, which must include, inter alia, depriving terrorist organizations of their operational and organizational capabilities, the strengthening of the relevant existing multilateral regimes, negotiating a universal treaty to fill the gaps in current international instruments, augmenting the capacity of States to implement global treaty obligations, and addressing the root causes of terrorism.

A distinction must be maintained between counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. This draft resolution quite appropriately mentions the Final Document of the sixteenth Non-Aligned Movement Summit as having expressed itself on the issue of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. We would like to remind members that, in the context of the issue of terrorism, the same document also stresses the need to identify and address the causes that sometimes lead to terrorism — causes that lie in suppression, injustice and deprivation.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now turn its attention to cluster 3, entitled “Outer space (Disarmament Aspects)”. I shall first give the floor to delegations that wish to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions.

I call on the representative of Egypt to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.3/Rev.1.

**Mr. Elshandawily** (Egypt): I have the honour to invite all Member States to support draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.3/Rev.1, entitled “Prevention of an arms

race in outer space”. This draft resolution reaffirms the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space with appropriate and effective provisions for verification. The draft resolution also recognizes that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce the legal regime applicable to outer space. In addition, it invites the Conference on Disarmament to establish a working group under its agenda item entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, as early as possible during its 2015 session.

The draft resolution introduced at this session contains only technical updates to the resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority during the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly (resolution 68/29). Egypt has full confidence that it will enjoy the same level of support at this session.

In addition, Egypt also welcomes initiatives concerning the no first placement of weapons in outer space, with a view to ensuring the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

**Ms. Del Sol Dominguez** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Under this cluster, Cuba has sponsored draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.3, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”; the new draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”; and draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.15, entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”, which will be taken up soon.

All States have the legitimate right to the use and exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes for the benefit of scientific and economic development. An arms race in outer space would entail serious dangers for international peace and security. For that reason, it is not only appropriate but necessary to continue to work out and implement international measures that are transparent and promote confidence in outer space. As part of its commitment to the peaceful use of outer space, last July Cuba and Russia agreed on a joint declaration whereby they committed themselves not to be the first to place any kind of weapon in outer space and to spare no effort to impede having outer space turned into a scene of military confrontation. Our country supports the adoption of a treaty for the prevention and prohibition of the placing of weapons in outer space and the use or threat of use of force against satellites or other types of space objects.

The draft resolutions submitted on outer space are a contribution to the efforts to prevent an arms race in

that arena and achieve greater transparency in space activities. Cuba believes it is necessary, urgently, to begin the negotiations for a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The Conference on Disarmament would be the appropriate forum for such negotiations. We hope that, as with similar draft resolutions in previous years, the draft resolutions I have mentioned can be adopted with the support of all Member States.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.15.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Our many common endeavours to ensure that space remains free of armaments and be used only for peaceful purposes should reflect the interests of all Member States without any exception.

The Russian Federation, with a solid group of sponsors, has submitted to the First Committee for consideration at this session of the General Assembly two draft resolutions and a new draft resolution on no first placement of weapons in outer space, that is, draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14.

Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.15, entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”, was prepared in the context of the further development of the traditional draft resolution submitted by Egypt and Sri Lanka to prevent an arms race in outer space. It is one of the outcomes of the joint activities of all of us here along those lines. We are convinced that, in order to ensure that we can prevent an arms race in outer space, this can be done only by working out an international agreement that will be adopted to prohibit such placing of weapons in outer space. We appeal for negotiations on this basis to be set up as soon as possible along the lines of the Russian/Chinese joint effort that was submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. It is an important element of our new draft resolution on no first placement of weapons in outer space.

The development of a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in space is a long-term process and requires a very thorough approach. In substance, our new draft resolution calls for the start of a constructive dialogue and for substantive work in that direction. Through our new draft resolution, we call on all States to consider the possibility of undertaking a political commitment on not placing weapons in outer space. It is clear that the globalization of this initiative

of no first placement of weapons in outer space, if it were to be global, would mean a political commitment by all States not to place weapons in outer space. The placement of weapons in outer space would in essence be politically forbidden. Already 10 States have officially joined our initiative, the political initiative that was launched back in 2004. Now as we are introducing this new draft resolution, we are finalizing the work that has been going on for 10 years. When we began work on the draft resolution last year and conducted preliminary consultations here in the First Committee, we already saw that this initiative had the support of almost all of the States Members of the United Nations and we counted on a consensus adoption of this draft resolution.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to achieve that. The reason for that is the tension that was created around the world this year. But we are not giving up. We are convinced that most States in any case will support this draft resolution. As for those that have already decided to abstain in the voting, we respect that sovereign position of each individual State. But we should take into account that this draft resolution encourages dialogue. If States are abstaining from dialogue, basically they are abstaining from dialogue on one of the most important topics on the agenda of the First Committee.

Let us not repeat the mistakes of the past. We had an opportunity not to start a nuclear arms race, but we did not manage to do that. Now we have to deal with the situation because we could not take that step many years ago. We do have an opportunity to prevent an arms race in outer space. To start, each State has to make a political decision not to be the first to place weapons in outer space. It is simple to do that. That does not require any technological, military or political efforts. That is the easy part.

Thirty-three States have already joined as sponsors of this draft resolution. We call on all States to support this draft resolution and thereby express their position of principle in support of an honest and responsible dialogue on all matters related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

**Mr. Tilegen** (Kazakhstan): I should like to present the view of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. Kazakhstan is a sponsor of this draft resolution in the light of the growing robust expansion of the use of space for military, commercial and other

purposes, which compels the international community to view outer space from the security and disarmament perspectives.

What is most dangerous is that action by some countries with advanced space warfare technology can result in proliferation by other countries also wanting to acquire it, as has happened in the field of nuclear weapons development and modernization. Past experience has proved that such a theatre of action can be concealed, thus becoming a major breach of international security.

Kazakhstan has on its territory the Baikonur Cosmodrome and would like to develop its space programmes with the assurance that no weapons will be placed in outer space. My country is committed to the peaceful use of outer space, which we all consider as a common public good belonging to all humankind, unfettered by threats to global peace and security. Therefore, we call on all Member States to support draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14 in order to prevent the weaponization of outer space and make it a restricted area for any kind of weapons.

**Mr. Lazarev** (Belarus) (*spoke in Russian*): Belarus has consistently been in favour of preventing an arms race in outer space. We have always supported the draft resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space that is annually submitted by Egypt and Sri Lanka. In 2005, Belarus joined the initiative on the no first placement of weapons in outer space, thereby taking the first practical step of making sure that outer space remains free of nuclear weapons. Undertaking that political obligation in the framework of this initiative became an important contribution of our country for ensuring the use of outer space for purely peaceful purposes. We consider the possible globalization of this initiative as a very important element in our common efforts to strengthen international security and stability throughout the world.

That is our position of principle. Based on that, Belarus supported introducing, for the consideration of the First Committee, draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”, and we were among one of its initial sponsors. We believe that this document will contribute to the rapid start of fully fledged negotiations on the development of a legally binding treaty on preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space, which the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations favour. We call on all States to support the draft resolution. Already

32 States, representing all regions of the world, have joined as sponsors.

**Mr. Isnomo** (Indonesia): As a sponsor, my delegation wishes to make a general statement on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”.

Indonesia subscribes to the common interest of all humankind and the sovereign rights of all States in the exploration and use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes. We emphasize that the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including a ban to deploy or use weapons therein, would avert a grave danger to international peace and security.

Indonesia remains concerned over the threat of the weaponization and the militarization of outer space. We underscore that space science and technology and their applications, such as satellite communications, Earth observation systems and satellite navigation technologies, provide indispensable tools for viable long-term solutions for sustainable development and can contribute more effectively to efforts to promote the development of all countries to conserve natural resources and to enhance the preparedness for and mitigation of the consequences of natural disasters.

Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14 underscores the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, and encourages space-faring nations to consider the possibility of a political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space. In doing so, we reiterate the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum with the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

In that regard, while underlining the importance of the availability of space science and technology to all interested countries, Indonesia stresses that they should be utilized in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the promotion of international peace and security.

**Mr. Ammar** (Pakistan): I have requested the floor to deliver a general statement in support of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”.

Our endeavours for more than three decades — at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted

to disarmament (SSOD-I), the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the General Assembly — have focused on one key objective, that is, ensuring that outer space stays clear of arms and weaponization. It is time to reaffirm the commitment that has led us thus far towards the realization of that objective. The Final Document of SSOD-I (resolution S-10/2) contains more than 30 paragraphs that relate to the dangers and urgency of preventing an arms race in its various aspects. Paragraph 80 of that document specifically recommends undertaking appropriate international negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Pakistan, along with a number of other States, has sponsored the Russian draft resolution entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. This clearly reflects the importance we ascribe to the issue. The draft resolution urges an early start of substantive work at the CD under the agenda item “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”. The draft resolution notes the importance of political statements made by many States as commitments to keep outer space free of weapons. Those commitments do not in any way undermine the security of any other State, and therefore are positive contributions to ensuring international peace and security. Pakistan attaches great importance to the common goal of ensuring that outer space is used for peaceful purposes alone. To that end, we join other sponsors in requesting Member States to extend their support to this draft resolution.

**Mr. Shen Jian** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): As one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, the Chinese delegation would like to make the following general statement.

Outer space is the common heritage of all humankind. It is in the common interests of all countries to ensure the peaceful uses of outer space and to prevent the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space. China has always been against the weaponization of, or an arms race in, outer space and is actively dedicated to maintaining peace and security in outer space.

China supports all previous General Assembly resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including this year’s draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.3/Rev.1, introduced by Egypt. These resolutions reiterate the importance of negotiating one or more multilateral agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on

Disarmament (CD). China supports an early start of substantive work in the CD on this agenda item.

Last June, China and the Russian Federation submitted to the CD an updated draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects. We welcome comments from all Member States for its further improvement.

China welcomes draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”, introduced by the Russian Federation. We believe this is an important effort to prevent the weaponization of outer space, which serves the ultimate objective of negotiating a multilateral treaty on arms control in outer space. China, Russia and other sponsors of this draft resolution look forward to active support from all Member States.

**Mr. Jimenez** (Nicaragua) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation would like to make a general statement as a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14.

We, like other sponsors of the draft resolution, speak out in favour of preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space and we hope, on the other hand, that space will always be used by humankind to promote peace. We support the ultimate aim of this text, to negotiate a multilateral agreement to prevent the danger we are confronting in weaponizing outer space. We therefore call upon all States to support the draft resolution.

**The Chair**: I shall now call on those delegations that wish to explain their votes or positions before we take action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 3, “Outer space (disarmament aspects)”.

**Mr. Wood** (United States of America): My delegation will vote “no” on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. In considering the no first placement pledge, the United States took seriously into account the criteria for evaluating space-related transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that were established by consensus, including by Russia and China, in a study by a United Nations-sponsored Group of Governmental Experts. The Group’s July 2013 consensus study (A/68/189) of outer space TCBMs was later endorsed by the full General Assembly in resolution 68/50. Per the consensus report, non-legally-binding TCBMs for outer space activities should, first, be clear, practical and proven, meaning that

both the application and the efficacy of the proposed measure must be demonstrated by one or more actors; secondly, be effectively confirmed by other parties in their application, either independently or collectively; and, thirdly, reduce, or even eliminate, the causes of mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation with regard to the activities and intentions of States.

In applying the Group's consensus criteria, the United States finds that Russia's no first placement pledge contains a number of significant problems. First, the no first placement pledge does not adequately define what constitutes a weapon in outer space; secondly, it would not be possible to confirm effectively a State's political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space; thirdly, the no first placement pledge focuses exclusively on space-based weapons but is silent with regard to terrestrially based anti-satellite weapons, which, as we have previously noted, constitute a significant threat to spacecraft.

To date, proponents of the no first placement pledge, including Russia, have not explained, and did not explain during the First Committee's thematic debate, how the no first placement pledge is consistent with the Group's consensus criteria for TCBMs. Given the inability to confirm compliance, the lack of an adequate definition of a weapon in outer space and the no first placement pledge's failure to address the near-term threat of terrestrially based anti-satellite capabilities, the United States has determined that the no first placement pledge fails to satisfy the Group's consensus criteria for a valid TCBM. Therefore, the United States will vote "no" on this First Committee draft resolution and intends to vote "no" again in the full General Assembly.

If the international community is serious about maintaining the space environment for future generations, we must develop and implement pragmatic and effective measures on a timely basis that remedy concrete problems, and reject flawed initiatives, such as the no first placement pledge, that are problematic, ineffective or irrelevant to protecting the security and sustainability of the space environment.

**Mrs. Garcia Guiza** (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled "No first placement of weapons in outer space".

Mexico will support this draft resolution, as we agree with the importance and urgency of preventing

an arms race in outer space, in keeping with our commitment to preserve outer space for solely peaceful uses and in accordance with our quest for general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Mexico will continue to persevere to ensure that no one places weapons in outer space. Similarly, Mexico reiterates that all nuclear weapons must be prohibited and eliminated, regardless of their classification or where they are to be found. My country supports arriving at new international agreements on this issue, as well as the launch of negotiations on new treaties to supplement those that already exist, so as to promote confidence and a safer world.

Finally, Mexico would like to state for the record that a statement by a country or several countries that they will not be the first to place weapons in outer space should not be construed in any way as a tacit endorsement or acceptance of any right to place weapons in outer space or to launch them from Earth if another State is the first to do so, or in response to an attack. Such a state of affairs could lead to a de facto arms race in outer space, as it could be used as an excuse to justify the possible placement of weapons in outer space — something that Mexico unequivocally opposes.

**Mr. Romussi** (Italy): I take the floor to explain Italy's vote on the proposal contained in document A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled "No first placement of weapons in outer space", I have the honour to speak on behalf of the member States of the European Union (EU), as well as Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Iceland and Norway. We will abstain.

We have a longstanding position in favour of the preservation of a safe and secure space environment and of the peaceful uses of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis. Strengthening the safety, security and long-term sustainability of activities in outer space is of common interest and the key priority for us. It contributes to the development and security of States.

We believe it is important to develop initiatives to ensure confidence and mutual trust between current and future space actors. The EU is convinced that transparency and confidence-building measures can make a contribution to the security, safety and sustainability of activities in outer space, and encourages States to support initiatives to that end, such as the EU proposal for an international code of conduct for outer space activities. We remain committed to the

prevention of an arms race in outer space. Therefore, EU member States voted in favour of resolution 68/29, regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space. However, the EU is concerned that “no first placement of weapons in outer space” does not adequately respond to the objective of strengthening trust and confidence among States.

We are concerned with the ambiguity of the very idea of “not to be the first to place”, which may entice States to prepare to be second or third. The EU therefore assesses that it could be interpreted as implicitly encouraging States preventively to develop offensive space capabilities in order to be able to react to the placement by another State of a weapon in space, by placing in turn a weapon in space.

Moreover, this initiative does not address the difficult issue of defining what a weapon in outer space is, which could easily lead a State to mistakenly assess that another State has placed weapons in outer space. Without a common understanding of what constitutes a weapon in space, a State could inadvertently put an object in space that another State considered to be a weapon. For example, a number of existing satellites are capable of performing orbital manoeuvres. These satellites could be construed as being space weapons, as they could also have the capability to manoeuvre into other satellites.

We remain concerned at the continued development of all anti-satellite weapons and capabilities, including terrestrially based, and underline the importance of addressing such developments promptly and as part of the international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. We therefore assess that introducing a no first placement pledge in this environment could lead to misperception and misunderstandings. It could potentially have the opposite effect of the declared intention, namely, to contribute to strengthening international peace and security and preventing an arms race in outer space.

We believe it is more useful to address the behaviour in, and use of, outer space to further discussion and initiatives on how to prevent space from becoming an arena for conflict, and to ensure the long-term sustainability of the space environment. We would like to stress that for us, for the reasons we have outlined, the updated draft resolution on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objectives, as submitted by

China and the Russian Federation, does not represent a basis for substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Finally, we should like to recall that we set out our priorities for work at the Conference on Disarmament in EU statements during the First Committee meetings earlier this month.

**Ms. Chan** (Costa Rica) (*spoke in Spanish*): Costa Rica will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”, under sub-item (b) of agenda item 94, because we agree with the need to prevent an arms race in outer space. Our decision to do so is rooted in our commitment to preserve outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes and to achieve full disarmament. Nevertheless, Costa Rica would like to state that the fact that one State or a group of States declare that they will not be the first to place weapons in outer space does not lead to an absolute, clear and convincing prohibition on avoiding having weapons placed in outer space, as Costa Rica would have liked. For our country, the goal should be a full, universal and complete prohibition and the elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international controls — and, above all, that such weapons never reach outer space.

**Ms. Bila** (Ukraine): Ukraine is committed to all aspects of disarmament, including the issue of no placement of any kind of weapons in outer space. We strongly support all multilateral negotiations in order to secure the use of outer space. As members may know, we are active participants in the European initiative on the elaboration of a code of conduct for outer space activities.

At the same time, I should like to state that my delegation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. The draft resolution submitted by the aggressor does not look credible. Therefore, it is the highest level of cynicism that the Russian Federation proposes this draft resolution for the Committee’s consideration. Everybody knows that the Russian Federation has abruptly annexed Crimea, which is an integral part of a sovereign State, Ukraine. The Russian Federation has violated the Charter of the United Nations by sending regular troops to the eastern regions of Ukraine and by providing armaments and ammunition to the terrorists. Ukraine firmly stands

for the necessity to implement the decisions that are taken at the United Nations. Therefore, we do not believe in the future of the draft resolution submitted by the country that has recently violated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the Budapest Memorandum and key bilateral treaties with Ukraine. The submission of this draft resolution is no more than a weak attempt to draw the attention of the international community from the crime being committed by the State.

**The Chair:** I call on the representative of the Russian Federation on a point of order.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I raise a point of order. We are discussing a draft resolution and not an anti-constitutional military coup d'état in the Ukraine. I call on our colleagues to stick to the topic of today's meeting.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions under cluster 3, "Outer space (disarmament aspects)".

We will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.3/Rev.1, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.3/Rev.1 was just introduced by the representative of Egypt. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.3/Rev.1 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.4.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon,

Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Israel, United States of America

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.3/Rev.1 was adopted by 180 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled "No first placement of weapons in outer space".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14 was introduced by the representative of the Russian Federation at the Committee's 18th meeting, on 27 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.14 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.4. In addition,

Eritrea, Nigeria and Viet Nam have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

Georgia, Israel, Ukraine, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino,

Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14 was adopted by 126 votes to 4, with 46 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.15, entitled "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.15 was introduced by the representative of the Russian Federation. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.15 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.4. In addition, Colombia has become a sponsor.

**The Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.15 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote or position following the voting.

**Mr. Varma** (India): We would like to state our position on draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.14 and A/C.1/69/L.15.

On draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled "No first placement of weapons in outer space", India voted in favour of the draft resolution. As a major space-faring nation India has vital developmental and security interests in space. The draft resolution states that the legal regime applicable to outer space needs to be consolidated and reinforced. India supports that objective, as well as strengthening the international legal regime to protect and preserve access to space for all and to prevent, without exception, the weaponization of outer space.

We support the substantive consideration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament along with other proposals that have been introduced. While not a substitute for legally binding instruments, transparency and confidence-building measures can play a useful and complementary role. Our discussions on a draft



international code of conduct for outer space activities should be inclusive, both in process and substance to ensure a product of universal acceptance.

We see the proposal for “no first placement of weapons in outer space” as only an interim step, and not a substitute for concluding substantive legal measures to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which should continue to be a priority for the international community.

Let me now turn to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.15, entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”. India joined the consensus on the draft resolution, consistent with our position that, while not a substitute for legally binding instruments, transparency and confidence-building measures can play a useful and complementary role.

We regret that India was not included in the Group of Governmental Experts convened by the Secretary-General that submitted its report (A/68/189) in 2013. In our view, a Group with more inclusive participation including all the relevant space-faring nations would have ensured a more balanced and coherent report, thus making an effective and meaningful contribution to international efforts with respect to outer space activities.

**Mr. Masmajeán** (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): I take the floor to explain the decision by my delegation to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”.

Spatial systems have become critical infrastructure for most Members of the United Nations. In that context, Switzerland supports the development of one or several legally binding instruments making it possible to prevent an arms race in outer space. Political confidence-building measures have an important role to play while we await negotiations on one or more legally binding instruments. The draft resolution calling on “no first placement of weapons in outer space” might represent an important and constructive signal in this regard. With regard to such a draft resolution, we believe that two elements need to be taken into consideration.

First, the preservation of outer space in the long run requires not only making sure that no weapons are placed there but, more broadly speaking, it needs to make sure that outer space should not become a stage for conflict. As a corollary to this first point, the “no first placement of weapons in outer space” represents

only one element of a much broader set of measures that are necessary to preserve outer space.

The development of ground-based systems that make it possible to attack or undermine space activities, including the testing of systems, also represents a major source of concern that is even more immediate than the possible placement of weapons in outer space.

Switzerland will follow the way this draft resolution evolves with great interest. We are ready to work with the authors to examine some of the conceptual concerns we might have about this draft resolution and how to resolve some of them in order to make sure that the document even broader support.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now turn to cluster 4, entitled “Conventional weapons”. I shall first give the floor to delegations that wish to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions.

**Mr. Wood** (United States of America): The United States welcomes the international community’s continued focus on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, which is the context in which we review this item. We call upon all States to implement the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, as well as the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.

*Mr. Alsaad (Saudi Arabia), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

**Ms. Cherraf** (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): The uncontrolled circulation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, quite apart from the human suffering and that they engender, are a real danger to the stability, security and development of States, particularly in Africa. Morocco believes that regional and subregional cooperation represents a key factor to fight the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.

The current worrying situation in the Sahel owing to the illicit trafficking of all kinds of weapons, including light weapons, and the connections between the various trafficking networks and terrorist groups call more than ever for stepping up efforts to strengthen cooperation among the States of the region on the basis of an inclusive approach. It is in this spirit that our Kingdom firmly supports the Programme of Action

to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and any incentive for such traffic.

Morocco welcomes the success of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States Parties, held last June. In that regard, we commend the efforts of the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan as Chair of that meeting. We also reiterate our appreciation for the adoption of Security Council resolution 2117 (2013), on light weapons, whereby the Council reaffirms its position on all international instruments and processes that contribute to curbing the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.

Morocco welcomes the imminent entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty, the adoption of which in 2013 was a very important development. In order for that instrument to achieve its objectives, Morocco remains convinced that it is essential to ensure a transparent and fair implementation, with full respect for the legitimate right of States to provide themselves with the means to defend their independence, national unity and territorial integrity.

**The Acting Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote before the voting on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 4.

**Ms. Anderson** (Canada): Canada takes the floor to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”, and related language in other draft resolutions on which we will vote “yes”.

Canada believes that the goal of impeding the illicit and irresponsible arms trade that fuels terrorism, organized crime and armed conflict is an important one. Canada has very high standards for export controls and will always work to keep arms out of the hands of criminals, terrorists and those who abuse fundamental human rights.

*The Chair returned to the Chair.*

We acknowledge that there is language in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) reaffirming the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory. When it comes to the international transfer of arms, however, it is very important to Canada that the ATT not discourage or impede exports and imports of firearms for legitimate uses, such as sports shooting and hunting. Canada is taking the necessary time to conduct a thorough review

of the ATT text and to consult domestic stakeholders to seek their views on the Treaty.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions under cluster 4.

We will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.4, entitled “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.4 was introduced by the representative of Mali on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States at the Committee’s 13th meeting, on 21 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/69/L.4.

**The Chair:** The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.4 have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.4 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1 was introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom at the Committee’s 15th meeting, on 23 October. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.4. In addition, the Dominican Republic has also become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

The following oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

By paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, the General Assembly would welcome the offer by Mexico to host the first Conference of States Parties to the Treaty in 2015. Pursuant to that paragraph 2, the proposed first Conference of States Parties to the Treaty would be convened in 2015 in Mexico. Should a request be made to the Secretariat to provide any specific assistance in respect of the organization of the Conference, the related costs incurred would be covered through extra-budgetary resources. Accordingly, the

adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1 would not give rise to any financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015.

**The Chair:** A separate recorded vote has been requested on paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1. I shall therefore put this paragraph to the vote first.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

Iran (Islamic Republic of), Lao People's Democratic Republic

*Abstaining:*

Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe

*Operative paragraph 3 was retained by 145 votes to 2, with 23 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab

Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

Somalia

*Abstaining:*

Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, as a whole, was adopted by 149 votes to 1, with 26 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.33, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.33 was introduced by the representative of France at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/69/L.33.

In addition, the following oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraphs 12 and 13 of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.33, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to render the assistance necessary and to provide such services as may be required for annual conferences and expert meetings of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention and of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II and Protocol V, as well as for any continuation of the work after the meetings. The Assembly would also request the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, to continue to inform the General Assembly periodically, by electronic means, of ratifications and acceptances of and accessions to the Convention, its amended article 1 and the Protocols.

The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that the respective cost estimates for servicing the three conferences of the High Contracting Parties to be held from 10 to 14 November 2014 have been prepared by the Secretariat and approved by the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II held at Geneva on 13 November 2013, the Seventh Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V held at Geneva on 11 and 12 November 2013, and by the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention held at Geneva on 14 and 15 November 2013.

The Secretary-General also wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that the costs of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, the Eighth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V and the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention would be borne by the States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in the meetings, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted appropriately. The request that the Secretary-General render the necessary assistance and provide services to the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, the Eighth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V and the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention should thus have no financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations. Following the established practice, the Secretariat will prepare cost estimates for any continuation of the work after the conferences, for the approval of the High Contracting Parties.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, ought to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations, may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States Parties.

Accordingly, adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.33 would not give rise to any programme budget implications.

**The Chair:** The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.33 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** the Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.35, entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Nakano** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.35 was introduced by the representative of Japan at the Committee’s 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.35 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.4. In addition, Eritrea and Suriname have become sponsors.

**The Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.35 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote or position following the adoption of the draft resolutions.

**Mr. Varma** (India): We would like to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”, on which we abstained. India participated actively in the negotiations for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Underlying India’s participation in the extended negotiations was the principle that Member States have a legitimate right to self-defence, and our belief that there is no conflict between the pursuit of national security objectives and the aspiration that the Arms Trade Treaty be strong, balanced and effective. That is consistent with the strong and effective national export controls that India already has in place with respect to the export of defence items.

Various events this year have sharpened the focus on some of the deficiencies in the Arms Trade Treaty, which India highlighted during the negotiations, namely, the imbalance in obligations between exporting and importing States and whether the Treaty could make any meaningful impact on illicit trafficking in conventional arms and their illicit use by terrorists and unlawful non-State actors, which is now a major source of international instability.

India is undertaking a thorough review of the ATT from our defence, security and foreign policy interests. Until that assessment is completed, we are not in a

position to take a final view on the Arms Trade Treaty. We therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1.

**Mr. Luque** (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): Ecuador would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”.

In previous years, Ecuador voted in favour of all the draft resolutions that were part of the negotiating process of an Arms Trade Treaty. Regrettably, we see that the text that ultimately was adopted by a vote by the General Assembly in April 2013 contained various flaws, in particular the imbalance between the rights and obligations of States that export and those that import; the important fundamental principles of international law and their position in the Treaty; the absence of an explicit prohibition of transfers to non-State and unauthorized actors; the absence of any explicit reference to the crime of aggression; and the possibility that articles that are related to the criteria may be used as mechanisms of undue political pressure.

We also regretted the fact that there was a last-minute attempt at the final moments of the Conference on the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, in March 2013, to redefine the practice and very definition of consensus. For those reasons, Ecuador abstained in the voting to adopt the Treaty at General Assembly, and we also abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1.

As announced in the explanation of vote by our delegation in April 2013, my country’s authorities were going to consider, and are continuing to consider, the text of the Treaty and its implications, with a view to taking a final decision with regard to signature or adherence to this instrument. Given that the Treaty will come into force in December this year, the process of analysis will be enriched by the possibility of considering the specific way in which the Arms Trade Treaty will be implemented, especially by the principal producers and exporters that promoted its adoption, in particular in connection with the transfer of weapons to the main conflict areas of the world. They will have to demonstrate that the real purpose of the Treaty as drafted is to control the harmful impact of the trade in weapons, and not just have one more instrument of undue political control and interference in the internal affairs of other States.

**Mr. Elshandawily** (Egypt): I take the floor to explain Egypt’s abstention in the voting on draft

resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1. As the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) enters into force this coming December, Egypt wishes to highlight the following.

First, the Treaty continues to lack definitions of important terms and concepts essential for its implementation. Similarly, it lacks a collective mechanism to identify the applicability of agreed criteria by which exporters would determine the application of the Treaty. Furthermore, it continues to lack references to the crimes of aggression and foreign occupation as part of the assessment of the implementation process.

Secondly, the continued lack of adherence to the Treaty by the major producing and exporting States detracts from its usefulness, as does the lack of international scrutiny regarding production and stockpiles in those States.

Thirdly, Egypt will continue to closely follow developments regarding the Arms Trade Treaty in order to determine its position towards it.

**Ms. Del Sol Dominguez (Cuba)** (*spoke in Spanish*): With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”, my delegation abstained in the voting on the text as a whole, and in particular with regard to paragraph 3, for the following considerations.

The negotiations carried out in the General Assembly on the Treaty offered a historic opportunity to provide an effective response to the very serious consequence of the illicit and non-regulated trafficking in arms. However, that historic opportunity was not duly taken advantage of. Unfortunately, the resolutions of this Committee and of the General Assembly that established consensus as a basic principle of any negotiation were disregarded. In fact, a premature vote was forced on a text that was not in line with the just demands and needs of the international community.

Various ambiguities, inconsistencies, lack of definition and legal gaps mark the Arms Trade Treaty. It is an unbalanced document that favours States that export arms, for which it establishes privileges that go against the legitimate interests of other States, including in the areas of national defence and security. By the same token, the parameters established to evaluate transfers are subjective, and hence easy to manipulate. What is particularly negative is the exclusion from the Treaty of the provision on the transfer of weapons to actors that are not duly authorized by States. Therefore, ultimately

one of the main sources of illicit arms trafficking is being legitimized.

Cuba will continue strictly to apply all measures necessary to prevent and combat the illicit arms trade.

**Mr. Alokly (Libya)** (*spoke in Arabic*): I have taken the floor to explain the accession of my country to the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.33, entitled “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”.

Libya shares the concern of all delegations about excessively harmful weapons, but the Convention and its protocols did not take into account defensive purposes in a way that can be controlled. The protocols did not take into account the situation of countries affected by mines and unexploded devices and old mines from the Second World War and the possibility of compensating the victims. The new Libya is keen to review its position on some disarmament treaties to which it has not acceded and take the proper decision, taking into account its defensive needs and the humanitarian consequences of such weapons.

**Mr. Xie Xinxing (China)** (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation would like to take this opportunity briefly to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”.

China supports the purpose and objectives of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). China voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1. China attaches great importance to the issue of the illicit trafficking in, and misuse of, conventional arms, which has led to regional instability and humanitarian crises. China participated in the negotiation of the ATT in a constructive manner, and made its efforts and contributed to making progress in the negotiations. China is now seriously considering signing the ATT. At the same time, China remains convinced that multilateral arms control treaties affect international and national security, and therefore should be concluded by consensus instead of being adopted by the General Assembly through a vote. China remains committed to continuously strengthening cooperation with all parties for the establishment of a regulated and rational order in the arms trade.

**Mr. Samvelian (Armenia)**: Armenia joined the consensus on two draft resolutions before the Committee, namely, draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.4,

entitled “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them” and draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.35, entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”.

Armenia is in full support of the purposes, principles and overall content of these draft resolutions in the parts concerning the core subject of those draft resolutions. Armenia continues to cooperate actively with all partners both within the United Nations system and on other platforms to promote those purposes and principles. We thank the sponsors of the draft resolutions for their efforts.

Having said that, given the references to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in the preambular parts of these two draft resolution, Armenia’s vote with respect to the draft resolutions should in no way be interpreted as a change of its position regarding the Treaty as has been stated by Armenia during the adoption of the Treaty by a vote.

Let me remind delegations that on the adoption of the ATT Armenia clearly articulated its national position to disassociate from the decision to approve the text of the Treaty. We had and still have significant concerns regarding the preambular sections and principles. Throughout the negotiation process, the Republic of Armenia advocated the need to have balanced and exclusive references to the principles of international law, in particular the inclusion of the principle of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. The inclusion of that particular principle, together with other important principles, in the text would have assured the comprehensiveness, viability and all-inclusiveness of the ATT.

Secondly, Armenia had, and continues to have, reservations with regard to the expediency of evaluation of the diversion issue to a separate article level of the Treaty. The key objective of the Treaty is the encouragement and enforcement of the regulation of conventional arms through a strong national control system, which is the first and most effective line of authorization and prevention of an enemy’s conduct.

However, Armenia remains a staunch advocate for a viable, robust and legally binding conventional arms control regime, be it at the regional or international levels. We are fully committed to our relevant obligations in other frameworks and are duly engaged in the respective adoption and modernization processes. Moreover, in the course of the past three or four years, the Armenian authorities have put in place an effective and functional national control system, which has been continuously improved.

In conclusion, I kindly ask the Secretariat for the stated position of Armenia to be duly recorded.

**Mr. Robotjazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation extensively explained its position regarding the Arms Trade Treaty in the course of the thematic discussion under the “Conventional weapons” cluster. On the grounds elaborated in our statement of 23 October 2014 (see A/C.1/69/PV.15), my delegation voted “no” on paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1, and abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

**Ms. Anderson** (Canada) (*spoke in French*): Canada takes the floor in order to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.35, entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”.

We are convinced of the importance of preventing irresponsible trade in those weapons, which fuel armed conflicts and terrorism. We have adopted very strict norms for their export and will always ensure that they do not fall into the hands of criminals, terrorists or those who are undermining fundamental human rights.

With regard to references to the Arms Trade Treaty, we also recognize that the Treaty reaffirms the sovereign right of every State to regulate and control conventional weapons exclusively within its own territory. With regard to the international trade in weapons, however, it is very important for the Treaty not to discourage those that wish to import or export firearms for legitimate purposes, such as hunting or sports. We would like to take more time to examine more attentively the text involved.

*The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.*