

29 June 2017

Original: English*

**Twelfth Meeting of Heads of National
Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Europe**

Vienna, 27-30 June 2017

Draft report*Rapporteur:* Kris Lapiere (Belgium)**Consideration of topics by working groups****Issue (c): Money-laundering, illicit financial flows and effective countermeasures**

1. The working group held one meeting on 29 June. In its consideration of the topic under review, the working group made the following observations:

(a) There are business entities established to provide exclusive money-laundering services of a sophisticated and complex nature to criminal groups, who need to invest the proceeds of their illegal activities;

(b) Lack of coordination and information sharing between national law enforcement authorities investigating organized crime and related offences remains an obstacle to preventing money-laundering;

(c) Authorities must be able to act quickly when suspicious financial transactions related to money-laundering are detected;

(d) Financial intelligence units (FIU) perform an invaluable role in identifying suspicious financial transactions linked to money-laundering;

(e) Law enforcement agencies and other recipients of FIU information should provide adequate and timely feedback to FIUs on how that information was used;

(f) Trafficking offences are often the predicate offences for subsequent attempts at money-laundering.

2. The working group drew up the following conclusions:

(a) Trafficking groups' illicit proceeds are at their most vulnerable at the time attempts are made to introduce them into the legitimate financial system;

(b) Organized crime business models and the diversity of their illegal operations are often too complex for a single national law enforcement agency to successfully identify and dismantle;

* Available only in English, French, Russian and Spanish, which are the working languages of the subsidiary body.



(c) When an FIU identifies an attempt at laundering the proceeds of crime, regardless of the type of that illegal activity, it should be able to report this to the competent national authority empowered to investigate such offences;

(d) FIUs should be able to obtain information held by all relevant national law enforcement authorities, including police, customs, tax authorities, immigration, anti-drug agencies, anti-corruption agencies, and intelligence services in a timely manner;

(e) To prevent the risk of disrupting the successful prosecution of those engaged in money-laundering offences, law enforcement agencies and FIUs should be encouraged to share information when it is apparent they are investigating common targets.

3. The working group adopted the following recommendations:

(a) In support of the investigation of money-laundering offences and the recovery of the proceeds of crime, Governments are encouraged to enable access by their law enforcement authorities to the information held by their FIUs;

(b) Governments are encouraged to ensure that evidence gathered through FIU investigations of money-laundering offences is legally acceptable by their courts if used in prosecutions brought by other law enforcement agencies;

(c) Governments are encouraged to make use of the tools available for training and capacity-building of their law enforcement authorities, financial investigators and prosecutors available through UNODC's Global Programme against Money-Laundering and other training institutions;

(d) Governments are encouraged to share with UNODC the results of their national money-laundering risk assessments to facilitate a coordinated global response to strengthening the capacity of competent authorities and financial institutions against such attempts.
