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**Twelfth Meeting of Heads of
National Drug Law
Enforcement Agencies, Europe**

Vienna, 27-30 June 2017

Item 4 of the provisional agenda**

**Implementation of the recommendations adopted
by the Eleventh Meeting of Heads of National
Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Europe****Implementation of the recommendations adopted by the
Eleventh Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law
Enforcement Agencies, Europe****I. Introduction**

1. The Eleventh Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA), Europe, held at Brussels from 22 to 25 June 2015, adopted a set of recommendations following the consideration by working groups of the issues defined below.
2. In accordance with established practice, the report of the Eleventh Meeting was forwarded to the governments represented at the session. A questionnaire on the implementation of the recommendations adopted at that Meeting was dispatched to Governments on 17 February 2017.
3. The present report was prepared on the basis of information provided to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) by governments in reply to that questionnaire. As of 28 April 2017, replies had been received from the Governments of Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan and Turkey.

* Available only in English, French, Russian and Spanish, which are the working languages of the subsidiary body.

** UNODC/HONEURO/12/1.



II. Implementation of the recommendations adopted by the Eleventh Meeting

Issue 1: Airport Communication Project

Recommendation (a)

4. It was recommended that Governments continue their financial and technical support to the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) so as to support the establishment of new operational joint airport interdiction task force units and the ongoing professional development of established operations.
5. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that the Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA) was the lead agency for the implementation of the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme (CCP) and that capacity-building was delivered by the AIRCOP programme for ITA officers.
6. Estonia reported its authorities were not participating in AIRCOP meetings which focused on cocaine trafficking from South America and Africa, as there were no direct flights to Estonia from these areas.
7. Finland highlighted its participation in the EU Counsel Law Enforcement working party (LEWP) network "Airpol", a network for EU airport law enforcement teams. Finland further informed that their customs were part of the Counsel of Europe POMPIDOU group and participated in the working group dealing with airport cooperation.
8. Germany opined that as the AIRCOP Project was building drug interdiction capacities at international airports in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the project could improve the quick and secure information exchange between those regions and European airports.
9. Hungary, Finland, Norway, Romania and Greece reported that they had not yet established cooperation with the AIRCOP project.
10. Israel said it was not yet participating in the AIRCOP project but would be interested in more information on the project and cooperation in this framework.
11. Italy reported on training provided within the framework of the AIRCOP programme to the Gambia and Ethiopia in 2016 and continued support to Cabo Verde, Senegal, Mali, the Gambia, Nigeria and Kenya.
12. Slovakia reported that the European Union had adopted new legislation in 2016 on the use of passenger name records (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, as a reaction to the terrorist attacks committed in Europe. Slovakia further indicated it had adopted measures accordingly, for example in the areas of agreements between the state and airports, the creation of a new unit, technical equipment and financial aspects.
13. Spain reported its customs were participating in AIRCOP since 2013. Through the Project, officials were trained in the control of narcotic drugs at airports in Africa, South America and the Caribbean, with the participation of the European Commission, the World Customs Organization and the International Criminal Police Organization. A number of international operations had been carried out, including COCAIR I, II and III and CARIBAIR (control of airports with regard to drug trafficking involving flights from Africa, South America and the Caribbean).
14. Switzerland reported that technical assistance for drug related measures was currently not a government priority.
15. Tajikistan reported that officer at Dushanbe International Airport had established an information exchange with colleagues at the airports of other Central Asian States, the Russian Federation, Germany, India, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and China.

16. Turkey reported that it was conducting bilateral and multilateral projects on related issues in cooperation with UNODC.

Recommendation (b)

17. It was recommended that Governments, where they have not already done so, encourage the airport-based law enforcement agencies to open a dialogue with the joint airport interdiction task force units, formed under the Aircop initiative, to commence information-sharing and to build professional networks that will in turn support more effective operational responses against trafficking.

18. Armenia reported that a range of law enforcement authorities were based at airports, including police departments, the national security service and the aviation security service, which all cooperated closely. These entities could take joint action to prevent the illegal shipments of drugs.

19. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported on a report produced on capacity-building for their API system (Advance Passenger Information) developed by UNCCT (United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre).

20. Estonia reported it would support the expansion of Aircop project to the Estonian Tax and Customs Board.

21. Finland reported that in the Baltic Sea Region national customs authorities at the airports maintained a network to tackle drug trafficking.

22. Greece reported that while it was not participating in the Aircop programme as such, the competent authorities cooperated upon request.

23. Hungary reported that the airport police had not yet established an airport interdiction task force unit and that the national police was responsible for drug related crimes.

24. Italy indicated that it would continue to provide training and mentoring in cooperation with UNODC in 2017 for countries affected by drug transit, in particular for countries which had requested courses.

25. Norway reported that the police and customs authorities closely cooperated at the airports, shared information and were sometimes co-located in a joint office. The airport police authorities participated in different international fora, including in the airport network Airpol and in the Pompidou-Group-network on drug trafficking.

26. Romania reported it was not taking part in Project Aircop.

27. Tajikistan reported that Drug Control Agency officers shared information on persons suspected of drug trafficking and on drug seizures at airports with the law enforcement authorities of other Central Asian States and the Russian Federation. Airport officials were encouraged to establish a sustainable channel for sharing information on persons suspected of transporting drugs in body cavities or by hiding them in travel goods.

28. Turkey reported that it had been conducting activities at airports based on risk and intelligence analysis.

Recommendation (c)

29. Governments were encouraged to support initiatives that facilitate close operational cooperation in the sharing of information between authorities (such as advanced passenger information, passenger name records, and advanced cargo information), in accordance with applicable privacy requirements, to enable effective and timely risk assessment of passengers and airfreight.

30. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that within the framework of the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme, their Port Control Unit (PCU) used software provided by the programme for the exchange of information and other communication with users worldwide. The core interest of PCU was cargo

information on all containerized and other import/export shipments. Cooperation and exchange of information resulted in several successful operations of the unit in 2016.

31. Bulgaria reported to be participating in many INTERPOL operations. The joint actions were focused on tracing and identification of criminal acts including firearms, narcotic substances and organized crime groups by identifying particular hotspots as well as risk indicators in relation to weapons and drug trafficking.

32. Cyprus reported their police was evaluating its work at the international airports in combating drugs trafficking on the basis of the exchange of best practices with other EU states.

33. Estonia reported it was developing the PNR programme with an expected completion in 2018.

34. Finland reported that risk assessments were carried out jointly by police, customs and the Border Guard Intelligence Centre at the airport. A national Passenger Information Unit (PIU) was established. Passenger name record legislation was adopted and enforced.

35. Georgia reported that relevant governmental agencies had developed an appropriate legislative framework to effectively gain and share advanced passenger information, passenger name records and advanced cargo information in accordance with applicable privacy requirements.

36. Germany referred to a new EU directive of 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR). The directive provided that Member States must set-up specific entities responsible for the collection, storage and processing of PNR data from air carriers. Member States of the EU were to implement the provisions by 2018.

37. Greece reported that customs and police were closely cooperating on the implementation of the EU directive on PNR and participated at the national level in the working groups on the subject.

38. Hungary reported that the its Counter Terrorism Information and Criminal Analytical Center established a PNR unit and that the Center was responsible for cooperation and information sharing related to Advance Passenger information (API) and PNR data.

39. Israel indicated its law enforcement agencies would cooperate and exchange intelligence regarding profiling, in accordance with applicable privacy requirements.

40. Italy indicated that as part of the Aircop project, the DCSA (Central Directorate for Antidrug Services) organized and carried out courses through the financial police aimed at improving the methods of analyzing airport data, identifying suspicious cargo/passengers/luggage and detecting and identifying drug concealments.

41. Latvia reported that in accordance with the EU directive of 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data, a new law on data registration of civil aviation passengers had come into force in 2017. The law defined the responsible authorities; the type of data that had to be registered; time-frame of registration; and the procedure of data disclosure to local authorities and international counterparts.

42. Lithuania reported that its police had developed a national PNR system and cooperation with air carriers had begun in order to create legal, organizational and technical preconditions.

43. Norway reported that the police located at Oslo Airport was part of a project under the National Police Directorate related to Advance Passenger information (API) and Passenger Name Records (PNR). The police would receive API-data from some airlines flying from Non-Schengen areas to Norway. Upon request they would

as well gather PNR-data from a number of airlines. The information obtained would be shared between the police and the customs authorities.

44. Romania reported it was not taking part in Project AIRCOP.

45. Slovakia reported it had created a group of experts on the national level as well as a new unit, the Unit of Operational protection of Airports. Staff of the National Crime Agency was stationed at the International Airport Bratislava, dealing with PNR data, cooperating with airlines and shipping companies (cargo), as well as profiling the couriers of drugs, cash money and illicit goods.

46. Spain reported that a PIU was created in 2015, forming part of the Centre for Intelligence against Terrorism and Organized Crime. Spain participated as a partner and a beneficiary in a pilot project on the exchange of data between Member States of the European Union (2015 to 2017). The project involved on-site verification of the evolution and entry into operation of the various passenger information units. Spain submitted a programme in response to a call by the EU in 2016 on improving PNR to which Finland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Portugal had expressed an interest in participating.

47. Switzerland indicated that respective measures had already been taken before 2015.

48. Tajikistan reported that law enforcement agencies operating in airports and railway stations were required to share information on narcotic drugs, goods and passengers and also on NPS, which were swiftly added to national lists of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors. Training courses should be offered for law enforcement officers on recognizing and detecting improvised explosive devices.

Issue 2: Container Control Programme

Recommendation (a)

49. Governments should encourage their drug law enforcement authorities to work more closely with drug source countries and transit States through capacity-building programmes such as the UNODC/World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Programme (CCP).

50. Armenia reported it was a member of the World Trade Organization and exercised control over container transport in accordance with the rules.

51. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that a port control unit (PCU) had been established within the framework of UNODC/WCO CCP in 2015. The PCU analyzed risk container consignments entering the country and detected smuggled, non-declared and wrongly declared goods.

52. Cyprus reported it was not currently participating in the CCP due to a lack of personnel.

53. Estonia reported the Estonian Tax and Customs Board were not participating in the CCP; information related to findings in containers was delivered via the CENcomm programme to Estonia. Distribution of operative information was organized via liaison officers with other states.

54. Finland reported that customs coordinated with drug producing countries and transit States as well as with UNODC/WCO CCP. Finland had also provided trainers for the programme.

55. Georgia reported that in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding with UNODC of 2012, the Container Control Group, consisting of patrol police criminal police and customs officers was working on detecting illegal goods imported into Georgia or transiting Georgia. The group used UNODC-WCO unified communication programme ContainerComm to exchange information.

56. Germany reported on a regular and close cooperation with the CCP and indicated that the programme was one of the main sources for drug related information from countries of origin.
57. Greece reported that its customs authorities had access to the CCP and that the risk analysis department created risk profiles in case of alerts received.
58. Israel reported its customs were not yet part of the CCP, but was ready to cooperate on all drug related matters.
59. Italy reported that in 2016 law enforcement authorities made 17 seizures of cocaine in sea containers, with 1,659 kg of cocaine seized. 10 of these operations had been particularly successful due to the direct cooperation with the corresponding authorities of the countries where the shipments originated.
60. Lithuania reported its law enforcement agencies actively cooperated with international institutions in combating illicit trafficking in drugs (INTERPOL, Europol) by exchanging criminal intelligence information. Investigations of cases related to illicit trafficking in drugs were coordinated with Eurojust and bilaterally.
61. Romania indicated it was not part of the CCP.
62. Spain reported its customs participated in and supported the CCP. The programme had been delivering results in the areas of increased seizures of narcotic substances and the transfer of alerts and information-sharing between the various participating customs authorities. Spain also participated in the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats project of the European Union, establishing Single Points of Contact for the exchange of information on drug seizures carried out both in the countries of South America and in Europe.
63. Switzerland reported that it had contributed to the implementation of the CCP through technical assistance in selected countries through its regional technical assistance programme.
64. Tajikistan reported joining the CCP in 2014. A meeting of representatives of Customs and drug control services of Central Asian States and Azerbaijan was held annually to discuss monitoring and risk analysis of freight container control. Training courses were held annually both in Tajikistan and abroad for Customs officials and officers of the Drug Control Agency. In order to improve Tajikistan's legal and policy framework for combating drug trafficking and to address drug abuse, the Drug Control Agency had drafted a new law which was currently under consideration.

Recommendation (b)

65. Governments should be encouraged to assist other countries in investigating drug seizures made in containerized freight destined for Europe, so as to secure the conviction of those who organize those shipments and the dismantlement of the organized crime networks that profit from their operation.
66. Armenia reported it was actively cooperating with a number of countries in investigating drug trafficking within the framework of the respective United Nations Conventions.
67. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that its Port Control Unit (PCU) had not made significant drug seizures yet but was exchanging relevant information with neighboring countries. The cooperation with the customs authorities of Croatia, Malaysia and others had contributed to the PCU's operations and results achieved.
68. Cyprus reported that their law enforcement authorities would cooperate with other countries in combating international drugs trafficking.
69. Finland reported that its customs were coordinating with other countries when necessary.

70. Georgia reported that close cooperation with foreign counterparts was maintained through Police Attaches and the Drug Trafficking Unit of the Central Criminal Police Department.

71. Germany indicated that European Union (EU) Member States were supporting different priorities/projects regarding drugs within the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT). In 2017 within the EMPACT Project Cocaine, increasing and developing joint South America-EU operational cooperation on container control had been agreed. The aim of the EMPACT Cocaine working group was to reduce cocaine trafficking to the EU and to disrupt the organized crime groups facilitating the distribution in the EU.

72. Greece reported that their competent authorities would exchange information with all countries involved through the international communication channels when drug were found in containers. The law enforcement agencies also participated in controlled deliveries.

73. Israel indicated its readiness for international cooperation.

74. Italy reported that 12 out of the 17 seizures referred to in recommendation (a) on the CCP were achieved in the framework of ongoing investigations into complex and vast organized drug trafficking crime networks.

75. Lithuania reported that its Criminal Police Bureau efficiently cooperated with international institutions in combating illicit trafficking in drugs, such as INTERPOL and Europol. In criminal intelligence or pretrial investigations Lithuanian law enforcement agencies cooperated with foreign law enforcement agencies in accordance with inter-institutional and international agreements.

76. Romania reported it was using all cooperation channels such as liaison officers, INTERPOL, EUROPOL and SELEC to share data and to cooperate in order to disrupt organized crime organizations involved in drug trafficking.

77. The Russian Federation reported that its representatives visited the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to arrange practical activities to counter drug trafficking and identify air and sea routes used for trafficking from South America to the Russian Federation. Experiences in law enforcement and public security on rail, air, and water transport were shared with China and curbing drug trafficking had been discussed with France.

78. Slovakia reported that foreign investigations were supported in response to new trends. A higher number of cases had been detected where perpetrators used the Darknet to communicate, order shipments, trade illicit goods including drugs, forfeited medicines and weapons. It was found increasingly difficult to collect evidence against such offenders.

79. Spain reported that through information-sharing via the network of advisers and liaison officers in other countries a smooth exchange of intelligence and operational information was maintained. The legal tools available, such as controlled delivery, permitted the use of special investigative techniques to conduct joint investigations and enable that evidence obtained could be used at the international level.

80. Tajikistan reported that in 2016, its Drug Control Agency conducted 11 joint operations with foreign law enforcement and security agencies, resulting in large the seizures of drugs.

Recommendation (c)

81. Governments should be encouraged to support source countries by making law enforcement experts and relevant technical equipment available to them to improve the technical skills and professional knowledge of their border law enforcement agencies in assessing the threat from organized criminal groups involved in illicit drug trafficking through their territories and designing measures to counter them.

82. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that the Container Control Programme had delivered training with technical experts from WCO and UNODC. Police and customs officers as well as other officials had also taken part in expert workshops provided by the CCP and the Global Money-Laundering Programme.
83. Cyprus reported that the EU through several programs provided support to many countries and regions.
84. Finland emphasized the possibility to create Joint Investigation Teams, in particular within the EU.
85. Georgia reported that officers of law enforcement agencies attend various trainings and seminars on fighting organized crime, combating drug trafficking and investigational skills development. The ContainerComm program was used for data exchange with foreign partners. Police attaches had been appointed in 13 foreign countries and a cooperation agreement had been signed with EUROPOL.
86. Germany reported that it supported source countries in training customs administrations (e.g. risk selection methods as part of the EU project “Law Enforcement Support for the Fight against Drugs in Peru” — EULENP).
87. Greece indicated that its police forces had trained Albanian Police on issues related to combating drugs a good cooperation was established with Albanian Law Enforcement Agencies through regular operational meetings on applying countermeasures against drug trafficking.
88. Israel reported having shared professional knowledge and technical skills with other countries on drug trafficking across borders.
89. Italy indicated that since the 1990s, the Central Directorate for Antidrug Services (DCSA) had stationed Law Enforcement Attachés at diplomatic missions and embassies in 20 countries affected by illicit drug production, trade and transit. DCSA’s aim was to continuously monitor the different scenarios where drug trafficking originated through an effective cooperation with the competent foreign bodies, in order to facilitate the rapid solutions of judicial and police matters.
90. Lithuania reported its police actively participated in international projects (twinning and EMPACT projects, Eastern Partnership Cooperation programme) and shared good practice related to combating organized crime, especially illicit trafficking in drugs.
91. Romania reported it was sharing data regarding organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking, as well as their modus operandi, to be used for risk analysis and profiling.
92. Slovakia reported its newly created unit in this field would cooperate with the airports in Brussels and Vienna, as well as with experts from neighbouring countries, especially with the Czech Republic, Austria and Hungary. CEPOL, MEPA, INTERPOL, Europol, EMCDDA and others were used as educational platforms.
93. Spain reported on providing relevant training at the international level, particularly in Latin America. Good contacts were maintained through entities responsible for combating drug trafficking between Spain and the countries of the Latin American region.
94. Tajikistan indicated that support was provided to the border troops of the State Committee for National Security by donor countries and international organizations. The Drug Control Agency, assisted by UNODC, provided substantial support in training and improving the professional knowledge of customs officials of Afghanistan and Pakistan to improve threat assessment of organized criminal groups involved in illicit drug trafficking.
95. Turkey indicated it had been in cooperation with source countries in order to develop further coordination and assistance opportunities.

Issue 3: Handling synthetic drug production and responding to changing trends in drug use, new psychoactive substances and precursors

Recommendation (a)

96. Governments were encouraged to urgently address the necessary control measures regarding the status of new psychoactive substances, which are sometimes marketed as “legal highs”, so as to remove ambiguity in the minds of consumers.

97. Armenia reported that NPS were added to the list of controlled substances in Armenia on a regular basis through changes in legislation. In 2016, 650 new preparations and substances had been included.

98. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that the law on “Prevention and Suppression of the Abuse of Narcotic Drugs” was in force since 2006 with an annexed list of scheduled substances. Most new psychoactive substances (NPS) were not under control yet. The procedure to schedule NPS was reported to be long. An expert working group was to be established to work on amendments to the list of narcotic drugs.

99. Bulgaria reported on establishing a mechanism for monitoring the market of NPS to include the substances as quickly as possible into the prohibition list. The list contained also NPS recommended by partner agencies and European institutions (EMCDDA). Bulgaria was directly implementing the EU regulations in the field of precursors since 2007.

100. Cyprus reported that the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances law was amended and NPSs were controlled in a generic system.

101. Estonia reported that an amendment of the Act on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Precursors was enacted in 2016 to allow scheduling of substances based on generic groups.

102. Finland reported that NPS or their positional isomers could be controlled as narcotics or as psychoactive substances with different restrictions. This enabled swift responses to reflect the rapid changes in the NPS market. Approximately 50 NPS had been risk assessed and effectively scheduled as narcotics and 456 NPS had been individually listed and classified as psychoactive substances. NPS entered Finland mainly via the Internet and mail import. Legislative efforts had effectively addressed this issue.

103. Georgia reported that a new law on New Psychoactive Substances was enacted in 2014. More than 900 persons had been charged for consuming, possessing or selling NPS since. The Ministry of Internal affairs ran various social activities and media campaigns to raise public awareness on the harmful effects of NPS on human health.

104. Germany reported on 20 NPS that had been nationally scheduled since 2015.

A New Psychoactive Substances Act had entered into force in 2016, controlling specific new NPS listed in its annex. Under this new act, NPS were defined as any substance or preparation belonging to the specified generic (group) definitions for synthetic cannabinoids and compounds derived from 2-phenylethylamine. The NPS Act prohibited producing, trading, importing, offering and possessing NPS and empowered the police to confiscate and eventually destroy such substances. For supply-related offences the law set out penalties of up to three years in prison for standard cases and 1-10 years in prison for severe cases.

105. Greece indicated that it implemented the current “law concerning drugs and medicines threats”, in order to address the threat of the New Psychoactive Substances. Officers of the competent authorities participated in international and European training and customs officials participated in project ION on new psychoactive substances.

106. Hungary reported that it had elaborated a monitoring and risk-assessment system to control designer drugs. The Medicines Act of 2005 defined new psychoactive substances as substances or groups of compounds recently appearing on the market that had no medicinal use and that, due to their effect on the central nervous system, were suitable for altering a person's state of consciousness, behaviour or senses, and therefore represented a threat to public health similar to the substances listed in the illicit drug and psychotropic substance schedules.

107. Israel reported on enacting new legislation on NPS in 2013, enabling the police to seize and destroy substances considered to be "dangerous substances". The legislation included provisions for temporary and immediate bans of any substance deemed to be dangerous for a period of 12 months, while the regular scheduling process was performed. The legislation focused on distributors and did not criminalize users. Israel adopted the generic approach to control NPS.

108. Italy reported that it was actively involved in the platform of operational exchanges on NPS "International Operations on NPS — Incident Communication System (IONICS)" and participated in the "Action Group on NPS", an international initiative launched in the framework of the G7-Group Roma/Lyon. The group aimed at increasing international coordination of the cross-cutting activities to combat, analyze and evaluate the risks related to NPS.

109. Latvia reported on its legislative background in relation to NPS. In 2013, a generic system had been introduced as well as the temporary ban as a new control mechanism. Amendments to the lists of controlled substances were provided on a regular basis.

110. Lithuania reported that since 2010 both generic and individual control was applied to NPS. An early warning system was implemented and information on NPS transferred to Europol and EMCDDA, which would then distribute the information.

111. Norway reported that its "Kripas" authorities recorded and analyzed the drug seizures made by the police and the customs in Norway and also handled NPS. All authorities worked closely with the Norwegian Medicines Agency that was responsible of the drug list, which was updated when new substances were discovered. Customs authorities actively used media to release information about seizures and the health threats.

112. Poland reported that the Act on counteracting drug addiction had been amended with an article which introduced a ban on manufacturing and trade in substitute drugs. A definition of NPS had been introduced in 2015. Poland further indicated that the police was closely cooperating with the National Sanitary Inspection on NPS, organizing joint actions targeting shops selling NPS. National Police Headquarters was also conducting several prevention programmes.

113. Romania reported on its legislative system to counter NPS using anti-drug law and generic law.

114. Slovakia reported advancing work towards more effective EU legislation on NPS with respect to the common market during of the Council of the European Union.

115. Spain reported that regulations had been adopted by the competent body (Ministry of Health and its Agency for Medicines and Health Products) to bring under control certain NPS that had previously been subject to control within the framework of either the United Nations or the European Union.

116. Switzerland reported that under its Narcotics Act substances with no medical or industrial uses could be primarily scheduled within 6-12 months after their first detection in Switzerland. More than 160 substances and classes of substances had been scheduled since 2011.

117. Tajikistan reported that measures were taken by the relevant competent bodies to add NPS to the draft national list of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and

their precursors. Public outreach activities were conducted for a range of social groups to prevent the use of these chemical products disguised as “safe” products.

118. Turkey reported that 523 substances were listed under the relevant provisions of the National Drug Control Law, 138 of those under generic classification; the remaining 385 substances were listed individually.

Recommendation (b)

119. Governments were encouraged to urgently undertake research regarding the harmful effects of new psychoactive substances on human health, and to take steps to improve the knowledge of their law enforcement authorities about the manufacture and supply of such substances, including the involvement of organized criminal groups in their trafficking and distribution.

120. Armenia reported that its police had taken active measures against drug trafficking, in particular by improving the professional skills of its officers. Officers participated in training on the national and international levels.

121. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that in cooperation with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) a national early warning system on NPS was established.

122. Bulgaria reported that its experts were attending different courses, seminars and events related to NPS, organized by CEPOL and EMCDDA, to get acquainted with new trends, means of production and trafficking. Events were held in schools to increase the knowledge on NPS and the harmful effects of their use.

123. Cyprus reported that the police along with the Antidrug Council ran a project on NPS and the knowledge gained through this project was shared with the law enforcement personnel.

124. Estonia reported that it was using an early warning information system (database) regarding new psychoactive substances for the exchange of information between different agencies with the aim of assessing risks and applying control measures.

125. Finland reported that it had continued its cooperation with the early warning network of the European Union lead by EMCDDA. About 100 NPS had been identified on the Finnish market. Data was obtained by the national forensic network and the prevalence of the NPS use was studied by national population surveys. Relevant information, expertise and data on NPS were shared with WHO, UNODC and INCB. A national network of frontline workers was established where health and social care professionals, different authorities and various NGOs shared expertise.

126. Georgia reported that the State Commission Supporting Suppression of Distributing New Psychoactive Substances had been established in May 2014. The Commission assessed the threats, identified challenges and developed recommendations to prevent the distribution of NPS. In 2016, the European Commission funded a workshop on NPS which contributed to raising awareness and setting up a sustainable mechanism for monitoring of and responding to intoxications caused by NPS.

127. Germany reported on research on the harmful effects of NPS, providing information on the situation, trends and developments concerning the consumption of NPS. The Federal Criminal Police Office shared information on manufacture and supply of those substances with other law enforcement authorities involved. Information received during police investigations was particularly valuable as this could provide insights into trafficking and distribution structures of criminal groups.

128. Greece reported on projects and seminars held nationally for educational and training purposes, assisted by European Organisations (e.g. CEPOL-Europol).

129. Hungary reported that its police paid special attention to NPS, which constituted a serious problem in Hungary. The police regularly seized considerable amounts of NPS with a decreasing trend as efforts were effective. Members of several criminal groups had been arrested and their produce destroyed.

130. Israel reported that NPS and respective legislation were discussed among law enforcement officers and other professionals in organized fora.

131. Latvia indicated that the prevalence of NPS in society, especially young people, was high in 2013-2015. The institution responsible for the Early Warning System on NPS gathered available data on the extent and patterns of use; acute health effects; and new substances identified on the illegal market. The trends on the illegal production and trafficking were assessed continuously by the state police, ensuring timely trendspotting and operative information exchange with relevant law enforcement units.

132. Lithuania reported on implementing a project co-funded by the European Commission on “Improving police officers’ competences in fighting synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive substances” in 2015. Officers from the criminal and public police were acquainted with the threats posed by NPS and the response to them.

133. Norway indicated that the goal of its Institute of Public Health (FHI) was to increase knowledge to contribute to good public health and the rule of law. Its work included analysis of blood and saliva in criminal cases to detect intoxication. A number of publications had been issued on the subject between 2013 and 2016.

134. Poland reported that the Criminal Bureau of National Police Headquarters organized meetings with regional police regarding the latest trends and new cases of NPS. The Police Central Bureau of Investigation provided training focusing on manufacture and supply of synthetic drugs including NPS and involvement of organized criminal groups in their production and trafficking. In the 2015 and 2016 several research activities were undertaken.

135. Romania reported that several studies were ongoing under the umbrella of Antidrug National Agency.

136. Spain reported that special groups within police units were tasked with researching NPS, with continuous training and participation in forums dedicated to the study of those substances, in addition to related national and international courses.

137. Switzerland reported that it continued to analyze seizures of NPS both chemically and in terms of their shipping routes. Most NPS seized were purchased on the Internet and shipped by mail. Results were disseminated among concerned authorities within Switzerland and a digital compendium of seized products and substances was available for all border guards.

138. Tajikistan reported on regular training for representatives of law enforcement agencies on identifying NPS and preventing their distribution by organized criminal groups. Questions about NPS were also included in a study that was conducted concerning narcotic drug use among adolescents and young people to be published in 2017.

139. Turkey reported that training programmes had been organized at national and international levels for law enforcement authorities on synthetic drugs as well as on the manufacturing process in clandestine laboratories. The cooperation with academia and universities working on synthetic drugs was continuing to raise public awareness on this issue and preventing harmful effects.

Recommendation (c)

140. Given the important role the Internet plays in promoting the sale of new psychoactive substances, and given the use made of international postal and courier

services to deliver them, Governments were encouraged to support their law enforcement agencies in establishing close partnerships with the services concerned to develop new and effective strategies to intercept such substances, including by encouraging the development and use of relevant technical equipment.

141. Armenia reported on participating in project Pangea, which aimed to prevent the distribution of drugs over the Internet. Law enforcement agencies and postal services actively cooperated to prevent the drug trafficking through international postal deliveries. In 2013, a national electronic single window system had been introduced to control the import of medicines.

142. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported their Port Control Unit (PCU) profiled and checked the postal consignments jointly with the Customs Office Mostar in 2015 and identified several cases of illicit importation of marijuana seeds. In 2015 the UNODC/WCO Programme donated to the PCU five field kits for preliminary analyses of narcotic drugs and these kits were used in daily activities.

143. Bulgaria reported that contacts with security officials of postal and courier services were established to solve cases on the manufacture and distribution of NPS. The close partnership enabled the prompt exchange of information. The Ministry of Interior was also working with the customs and courier services to detect packages containing NPS. Special investigative techniques such as “controlled deliveries” were used when needed.

144. Cyprus reported on a project by the police with the Antidrug Council run on NPS which shared its results with the express post companies.

145. Estonia indicated that the majority of new psychoactive substances were ordered via the Darknet through TOR browsers. Solutions to prevent the above activities were currently being searched in Estonia.

146. Finland reported that several MoUs had been signed with postal and courier services.

147. Georgia reported that the Ministry of Internal Affairs held several meetings with international and domestic postal courier services to inform them about major types of NPS distributed in Georgia. All postal services were aware that they should refuse transport of such substances and inform Law Enforcement Agencies on such requests.

148. Germany reported that the law enforcement agencies paid great attention to the increasing role of the Darknet in promoting the sale of drugs and other goods such as weapons and established good relations with postal or deliver services.

149. Greece reported that their competent authorities pursued cooperation with private and public postal and courier services.

150. Hungary reported its police had started drafting a memorandum of agreement on the issue.

151. Israel reported on carrying out intelligence work to identify NPS sold over the Internet and to intercept them.

152. Italy reported that DCSA had established a new section with specialized staff monitoring the drug trafficking over the Internet in 2012. In 2015, this section had been tasked with coordinating and providing investigative support to this specific sector, also becoming the central national reference unit for international cooperation. A legislative proposal on adding specific investigative capacities was currently being considered by parliament.

153. Latvia reported that hidden websites had been detected mainly related to drug trafficking by international postal and courier services. The control of postal services had been enhanced in 2015, resulting in a sharp increase of seized drugs in postal shipments. The work on encrypted websites remained challenging without specific financial and human resources allocated to enhance the response to drug

trafficking via these hidden websites. Criminal proceedings in this area were challenging due to a lack of evidence.

154. Lithuania reported on carrying out an operation in 2015 in the framework of EMPACT, where consignments transported via sea and air routes were checked to identify possible cases of transportation of NPS and to ensure criminal prosecution of the perpetrators. The Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau participated in operation “Postman” organized by INCB with the objective of monitoring the transfer of consignments containing NPS which are not under national control.

155. Norway reported its customs authorities cooperated with freight companies in terms of cargo and mail, including airfreight. The police received on a regular basis cases where customs uncovered offenses related to drugs. Customs officers used trained dogs to detect drugs in cargo and mail. In 2016 customs authorities established a new national center for intelligence and analysis. In 2015 the police had conducted a pilot project to detect illicit drugs in domestic mail freight, and based on that recommended legal changes which became effective in 2016.

156. Poland reported that the Criminal Bureau of National Police Headquarters established a contact with the National Post focusing on cases of NPS. Regional Police Headquarters were cooperating with courier and postal companies on the basis of their regional contacts. The Polish Police was participating in project EMPACT and EU operations against trafficking of NPS in post-parcels.

157. Romania reported that the drug distribution over Internet, mainly via the darknet and cryptomarkets, was a priority. Awareness was raised in custom offices and at courier companies. Romania indicated it was participating in EMPACT, a programme against drug distribution on Internet.

158. Slovakia found the Internet and Darknet to be a significant problem for state authorities including law enforcement, assuming that 40-50 per cent of trade in drugs, forfeited and unregistered medicines was organized via the Internet or the Darknet. Traders handled the full range of illicit goods, such as illicit drugs, medicines and weapons. Slovakia was exploring new approaches at the national level for its police force regarding detection and investigation of crime in this area.

159. Spain reported regarding the investigations carried out on the sale of NPS through the Internet, regular contacts had been established with courier and postal services, which cooperated to the maximum extent possible in locating such consignments. Technical teams identifying online trafficking faced increasingly complex searches as traffickers used the TOR anonymity network. Increased resources and specialized staff were required to effectively combat that new form of drug trafficking.

160. Switzerland indicated that the Federal Office of Police was involved in an ongoing research project financed by the Federal Office of Public Health on the magnitude of the online drug market in Switzerland.

161. Tajikistan reported that Internet sites were monitored for instances of NPS for sale. Currently, no such instances have been recorded within Tajikistan. Up-to-date methods and modern equipment were used to curb the proliferation of NPS.

Issue 4: Measures to counter money-laundering and illicit financial flows

Recommendation (a)

162. Governments should encourage their drug law enforcement agencies to share information with their national financial intelligence units at the early stages of investigations.

163. Armenia indicated it was currently developing guidelines for financial money-laundering investigations. Investigations on drug trafficking would then by default include items on money-laundering and involve the Financial Intelligence Unit.

164. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that the authorities and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina were legally obliged to deliver requested data, information and documentation to the financial intelligence unit (FIU).

165. Cyprus reported on communication at all stages of investigations with the National FIU on financial issues.

166. Estonia reported that drug law offences were one of the main types of offences related to money-laundering. Units dealing with both types of offences were part of the same agency, the Police and Border Guard Board. Drug law enforcement units shared information with national financial intelligence units at different stages of investigations, including at early stages.

167. Finland reported that the national FIU was part of the police and that information was shared with other national law enforcement agencies on a continuing basis.

168. Germany reported that joint investigations between law enforcement agencies and the national financial intelligence unit could be initiated any time in order to share information at the earliest stage possible.

169. Greece reported that drug cases concerning the legalization of income deriving from criminal activities were submitted to the FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit).

170. Israel reported that the police and the Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority were sharing financial intelligence on a regular basis and had further enhanced their cooperation with good results in the investigation and prosecution of money-laundering and terrorist financing offences.

171. Italy reported that the “Guardia di Finanza” was the agency specialized in financial investigations. They also participated in the anti-drug activities coordinated by DCSA with the other Law Enforcement Agencies. DCSA is reported as ensuring coordination and information exchange on drug investigations, including money-laundering.

172. Latvia reported that while information specifically on drug-related money-laundering cases was not available, changes in the institutional organization had been made to strengthen the capacity of the units responsible for money-laundering cases.

173. Lithuania reported that Lithuanian law enforcement agencies could involve the Financial Crime Investigation Service at any stage of an investigation. The Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau had a subdivision responsible for investigation of financial offences. In cases related to illicit trafficking in drugs the institutions actively cooperated and exchanged criminal intelligence information.

174. Norway reported having taken a number of measures to enhance information sharing and the use of financial intelligence, including in the area of proceeds generated from drug offences. A new instruction on the usage of various financial intelligence had recently been issued and was expected to have a positive impact on prevention, detection and investigation.

175. Poland reported that investigations on asset recovery and financial intelligence were conducted during the operational part of cases.

176. Romania reported that its financial intelligence unit was cooperating intensely with other similar units from Europe and other states.

177. The Russian Federation reported that the Eurasian Group on Combating Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (EAG) had been established in 2004. Improvements continued to be made to the national anti-money-laundering system in order to implement the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and the recommendations made in the progress reports on the Russian Federation.

178. Spain reported a very good cooperation and exchange of information and intelligence between the agencies responsible for combating drug trafficking and the financial intelligence units.

179. Switzerland indicated that respective measures had already been taken before 2015.

180. Tajikistan reported that information was exchanged with the Financial Intelligence Department of the National Bank and joint investigations were carried out at an early state where necessary. Under the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, a seminar on countering crimes relating to money-laundering and corruption was conducted by UNODC.

181. Turkey reported that a cooperation protocol on institutional information sharing had been signed between “Coast Guard Command” and “Financial Crimes Investigation Board” to investigate and organize the financial aspect of crimes and to reveal the links of criminal organizations and prevent criminal income and money-laundering.

Recommendation (b)

182. Governments were encouraged to establish inter-agency joint investigation teams to investigate the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking.

183. Armenia reported that as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization it was actively participating in operations of joint investigative teams established to combat drug trafficking on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

184. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that the legal basis for the formation of inter-agency joint investigation teams (JIT) were regulated in Article 24 of the Law on international legal assistance in criminal matters. State Prosecution could authorize or require the formation of a JIT.

185. Cyprus indicated compliance.

186. Estonia reported that since both units of drug law enforcement and money-laundering were part of the same agency, the cooperation between the two entities was routine.

187. Finland reported that investigation of laundering of proceeds was an overarching theme in all investigations related to drugs trafficking and other forms of serious and organized crime.

188. Germany reported that it had established an inter-agency investigation team in 1993.

189. Hungary reported that the police was responsible for investigations into drug crimes and drug related money-laundering. There was no need for special rules allowing joint inter-agency investigations. All investigative elements of the police were entitled to obtain financial information and to seize and forfeit assets. All investigative authorities and also the prosecutor could request the support of the Asset Recovery Office.

190. Israel reported on a government decision of 2006 targeting the illicit proceeds as a primary objective in the war on serious and organized criminal activity and requiring all relevant agencies to cooperate.

191. Italy referred to the identification of a money-laundering system called “Shielding”. It utilized foreign banking companies which made fictitious use of innumerable financial brokerage firms to create flows hiding the origin of money. Besides the traditional investigative methods, Italy developed a software called “Molecola” (Molecule), which gathered and channeled all data on the subjects of interest to a single file. Recent operations led to the arrest of numerous subjects

involved in international money-laundering activities, in particular money derived from illicit drug trafficking.

192. Lithuania reported that inter-institutional (including officers from police, customs, Financial Crime Investigation Service) investigation groups could be formed at any stage of investigations on illicit drug trafficking.

193. Norway reported that JITs were established when necessary from different investigative bodies, for example comprising of personnel from both Kripos (the Norwegian NCIS) and the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime.

194. Poland indicated that joint investigations teams could be established in case investigations were conducted by different agencies.

195. Romania reported that seizing assets and money was a priority in all drug operations.

196. The Russian Federation reported that a total of 233 offences of drug revenue laundering had been detected in 2016. The total amount of laundered money recovered in cases that had been concluded was over 4.4 billion roubles. Criminal cases resulted in the seizure and forfeiture of approximately 625.8 million roubles. The main predicate offences of the crimes that were solved were: theft (43.6 per cent) and drug trafficking offences (42.2 per cent).

197. Slovakia reported that the reorganization at the National Crime Agency of the Presidium of the Police Force created a new organizational structure, including new staff capable of conducting financial investigations and providing support other major investigations from the beginning.

198. Spain reported that its legislation permitted the use of special investigative techniques, including the establishment of joint investigation teams, as well as the use of property investigations, which begin with specific investigations into the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking. Those investigations drew on all resources available to obtain the necessary information, as well as to complete investigations in the most efficient manner.

199. Switzerland indicated that respective measures had already been taken before 2015.

200. Tajikistan reported that the Government had the power to establish inter-agency joint investigation teams to investigate the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking. The Drug Control Agency expressed its readiness to participate actively in the work of inter-agency joint investigation teams.

Recommendation (c)

201. Governments are encouraged to support UNODC in the implementation of capacity-building to combat money-laundering and illicit financial flows stemming from drug trafficking.

202. Armenia reported on ratifying the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1993 and criminalizing all offences under article 3 of the Convention, including money-laundering. Provision regarding forfeiture, extradition and mutual legal assistance had also been included in national legislation.

203. Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that Ministry of Security in cooperation with UNODC participated in the implementation of several regional projects in which money-laundering was an important component.

204. Estonia indicated readiness to participate in capacity-building to combat money-laundering and illicit financial flows stemming from drug trafficking.

205. Israel reported on a joint seminar with the UNODC and indicated readiness to further engage with the UNODC in additional AML/CFT initiatives.

206. Italy reported that Italian law enforcement agencies had ensured ad hoc exchange of expertise and training efforts to combat money-laundering and illicit financial flows stemming from drug trafficking to various international partners.

207. Lithuania reported that the prevention of money-laundering and investigations related to property obtained by criminal means, engaging into illicit trafficking in drugs were a priority. The investigations were carried out by the Financial Crime Investigation Service as well as separate specialized subdivisions. Active cooperation took place with international organizations such as Europol.

208. Norway said it was a sponsor of the UNODC Global Programme against Money-Laundering.

209. Poland reported that its police had last year provided UNODC with information on the relationship of money-laundering and drug trafficking.

210. Romania reported that seizing assets and money was a priority in all drug operations.

211. Spain reported on facilitating relevant training at the international level, particularly in Latin America.

212. Tajikistan reported that it had always supported United Nations initiatives aimed at combating drug trafficking, including the UNODC initiative to implement capacity-building to combat money-laundering and illicit financial flows stemming from drug trafficking. Tajikistan acceded to the three United Nations International Drug Control Conventions in 1995 and 1996 and established the Drug Control Agency with the assistance of UNODC.

III. Conclusions

213. The overview contained in the present report reflects the situation in 24 of the 56 members of the Meeting. In order to provide the Meeting with more complete information, all Governments should be encouraged to complete and return the questionnaires.

214. The quality and detail of the responses to the questionnaires show that a number of Governments have taken effective measures to implement the recommendations adopted by the Eleventh Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Europe, and that there is a well-established culture of cooperation between law enforcement agencies in the region.
