

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 2 July 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council**

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the briefings provided by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo; the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Olof Skoog; and the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations, Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as well as the statements delivered by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Michael Pompeo, and by the representatives of Belgium, China, Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, the Niger, the Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, Tunisia and Viet Nam, in connection with the video-teleconference on the agenda item entitled “Non-proliferation” convened on Tuesday, 30 June 2020. A statement was also delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javad Zarif.

In accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council (S/2020/372), which was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic, these briefings and statements will be issued as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Christoph Heusgen**  
President of the Security Council

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**Annex I****Statement by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo**

At the outset, let me recognize the presence today of His Excellency Mr. Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and His Excellency Mr. Javad Zarif, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I would also like to recognize the presence of Secretary-General António Guterres.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), endorsed in resolution 2231 (2015), is a significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy and dialogue. It remains crucial to the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and to regional and international security. It is therefore regrettable that the future of this agreement is in doubt. The United States withdrew from the agreement in May 2018. Before that date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified in 11 reports that Iran was complying with its nuclear commitments contained in the Plan.

As we have said, we regret the United States withdrawal from the Plan. The re-imposition of United States national sanctions lifted under the Plan, as well as the decision not to extend waivers for the trade in oil with Iran and on all remaining JCPOA-originating projects, are contrary to the goals of the JCPOA. These actions have impeded the ability of Iran and other Member States to fully implement the Plan and the resolution.

On 12 March, in a letter to the Secretary-General, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif wrote that United States sanctions were constraining his country's response to the coronavirus disease pandemic. The Secretary-General has appealed for the waiving of sanctions that could undermine a country's capacity to respond to the pandemic. Furthermore, he has expressed concern that the posture of private sector actors seeking to avert risk may continue to impede legitimate humanitarian aid transactions, especially with regard to banking needs.

We also regret the steps Iran has taken since July 2019 in response to the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA. As a result of those steps, taken under the monitoring of the IAEA, Iran has surpassed JCPOA-stipulated limits on its uranium-enrichment level and on its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium. Iran has also lifted JCPOA limitations on its nuclear research and development activities.

Today we appeal again to Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan. We also urge Iran to address concerns raised by other States regarding its actions that are inconsistent with the restrictive measures in annex B of the resolution. We encourage JCPOA participants to resolve all differences within the dispute-resolution mechanism under the Plan. We also urge all Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a further negative impact on the JCPOA and regional stability.

The full implementation of the Plan is key to securing tangible economic benefit for the Iranian people. We are encouraged by the positive developments in the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, which started to process its first transactions.

I will now turn to the Secretary-General's ninth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2020/531). As guided by the Security Council, the report focuses on annex B to the resolution. It also provides Council members with findings and recommendations, as called for in paragraph 7 of presidential note S/2016/44.

First, regarding the nuclear-related provisions, we stress that the procurement channel is a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. We call on all

Member States and the private sector to support and use the procurement channel. Furthermore, we regret the decision of the United States of 27 May to terminate the sanctions waivers related to the modernization of the Arak reactor. Exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B are specifically designed to provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of Iran under the Plan.

Secondly, regarding the ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States provided information on Iran's launch of Simorgh and Qased space-launch vehicles in February and April of this year. The information provided reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether the launches are inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B. Paragraph 3 called upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.

Thirdly, on the arms-related restrictions, the Secretariat analysed two United States seizures of arms and related materiel and continued its assessment of the cruise missiles and delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used in the 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia. Regarding the November 2019 and February 2020 United States seizures of arms and related materiel, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Secretariat that the "allegedly seized anti-tank guided missiles and thermal optical weapon sights do not conform to the products manufactured by the Islamic Republic of Iran." Iran further informed us that similar optical sights claimed to be exported to Iran and later seized in Aden are still in use in different military units.

Our findings indicate that the container launch units of the anti-tank guided missiles were of Iranian origin and had post-2016 production dates. We ascertained that the optical weapon sights had been delivered to Iran between February 2016 and April 2018, and observed that thermal optical weapon sights have design characteristics similar to those also produced by a commercial entity in Iran. We also found that the components associated with the anti-ship missile, the unidentified missile, as well as the cruise missile, bore Farsi markings. The transfer of such materiel from Iran after 16 January 2016 may be inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

Let me now turn to the cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia last year. In December 2019, we stated that we had not yet been able to independently corroborate that those weapons and their components were of Iranian origin or had been transferred from Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/PV.8695). Since then, we have made further progress in our examination of the cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs used in the attacks. We were able to confirm that some of the components of the delta-wing UAVs (ignition coils) and the cruise missiles (pressure sensors of the fuel-feed system) had been exported to Iran in 2016 and 2018, respectively. In our analysis, we took note of the feedback from Iran that "the concerned pressure transmitter is not a dual-use item to be monitored by the Government".

We also ascertained that the jet engines and other components of the UAVs and cruise missiles show similarity to known Iranian models or have similar components (gyroscopes and engines) to an Iranian UAV reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016. Furthermore, the sections of the cruise missiles recovered from the attacks and the sections seized by the United States in November 2019 form part of the same missile system, and it is highly likely that they were produced by the same entity. Finally, some of the items in the two seizures by the United States (a digital air data computer and the "Model V10" gyroscope) were identical or similar to those found in the debris of the cruise missiles and the delta-wing UAVs used in the 2019 attacks

on Saudi Arabia. Based on these technical findings, while also having taken into account the information provided by Iran, the Secretariat assessed that the examined cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs and/or parts thereof used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia were of Iranian origin.

Finally, the Secretariat also received information from Australia, Israel and Saudi Arabia regarding alleged transfers of arms and related materiel from Iran. We are analysing these issues, and the Secretary-General will report back to the Council, if appropriate, in due course.

Notwithstanding the current challenges to the JCPOA, it remains the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Its full implementation, as well as faithful adherence to resolution 2231 (2015), is also fundamental to regional stability.

Let me conclude by acknowledging the leadership of Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve in his role as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and to assure him once again of the Secretariat's full support. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for the continued cooperation.

## Annex II

### Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Olof Skoog

I am honoured to address the Security Council today on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and will therefore focus my intervention today on the Joint Commission.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to Secretary-General António Guterres and Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytsverve of Belgium, serving as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for the excellent collaboration over the past months. In addition, I would like to convey my sincere gratitude for the work done by colleagues in the Secretariat, including in relation to the procurement channel and the preparation of the latest report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2020/531).

Nuclear proliferation remains a global threat with potentially worldwide consequences. That is why we have the responsibility, as members of the international community, to address those challenges jointly for the benefit of world peace and future generations. Only last week, the international community celebrated the anniversary of the signing of the Charter of the United Nations. At that time, 75 years ago, the disastrous damage caused by nuclear weapons was fresh in memory. It is in that light and with that memory in mind that we need to view the JCPOA as a key component of the global non-proliferation architecture that helps reduce regional and global security risks.

The JCPOA has removed the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran from the regional security equation. Most important, it has done so in a verifiable way, as the agreement provides for an unprecedented amount of access and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under Iran's comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. Thanks to the Additional Protocol, the IAEA has access to both declared and undeclared sites in Iran, and to key facilities where the IAEA has installed 24/7 online monitoring systems. According to the IAEA's annual safeguards implementation reports, Iran's regular inspections have doubled as compared to the period before the JCPOA. In addition, since 2016, Iran has consistently allowed the highest number of complementary access under the Additional Protocol.

It is important to remember that the Additional Protocol is implemented by Iran as part of its JCPOA commitments. Therefore, losing the JCPOA would also mean losing the Additional Protocol, the access rights granted to the IAEA and, accordingly, the additional transparency.

Unfortunately, despite all its achievements, the JCPOA has been increasingly challenged. As Coordinator of the Joint Commission, we have spared no efforts to engage with all remaining participants and other partners to find solutions within the framework of the JCPOA and to address current difficulties, including matters referred to the Joint Commission for resolution. Now more than ever, a united international effort is needed to preserve the agreement, which was endorsed by the international community through the adoption of the resolution 2231 (2015).

I would also like to reiterate our deep appreciation for the IAEA, which plays a crucial role in monitoring and verifying the entirety of Iran's nuclear programme, including Iran's commitments under the JCPOA. We fully support the impartial and technical work carried out by the IAEA, as well as efforts to facilitate the IAEA

carrying out its mandate. I recognize that Iran continued to fully comply with the nuclear-related provisions for three and a half years, including for 14 months after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, and re-imposed unilateral sanctions, actions which the European Union and its member States, as well as the other remaining participants of the JCPOA, continue to deeply regret.

However, it is deeply worrisome that Iran has decreased its nuclear-related JCPOA commitments. We remain particularly concerned about Iran's continued accumulation of low-enriched uranium in excess of the JCPOA stockpile and enrichment level thresholds, its continued expansion of research and development with advanced centrifuges and the enrichment activities in Fordow. Those activities are inconsistent with the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA. We urge Iran to reverse them and return to the full implementation of its commitments without delay.

At the last Joint Commission meeting, on 26 February, the remaining participants in the JCPOA confirmed their determination to pursue all efforts to preserve the agreement. Full and effective implementation by all sides is key. These efforts have continued over the past months, and we remain determined to continue working with the international community to preserve the JCPOA, an important multilateral achievement endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2231 (2015).

I would like to recall that the JCPOA is a nuclear non-proliferation agreement. The implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments is one essential part of the agreement, which sets strict limitations regarding Iran's access to both plutonium and high-enriched uranium and establishes a comprehensive monitoring and verification mechanism. The other essential element is the comprehensive lifting of sanctions, promoting and facilitating the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran.

The European Union, for its part, lifted sanctions in line with its JCPOA obligations on the day of implementation. Today it remains fully committed to working on the preservation of the agreement, including towards the objective of normalizing economic and trade relations with Iran. In that spirit, extensive technical support has been provided to set up and operationalize the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges.

I would like to address the issue of the possible snapback of sanctions in the Council, about which there has been recent speculation. As the High Representative already said, in May 2018 the United States announced that it was ending its participation in the JCPOA. This announcement was confirmed in a presidential memorandum. Since then, the United States has not participated in any meetings or activities within the framework of the agreement.

I will now turn to the procurement channel, which was established under annex IV of the JCPOA. The procurement channel remains a unique non-proliferation, transparency and confidence-building instrument. It is a key mechanism to prevent the misuse of nuclear or dual-use items and to ensure that exports of such items are consistent with the JCPOA.

We recognize the challenges brought about by the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions. The procurement channel, however, remains a Security Council mechanism, and the decision on a proposal for transfer is endorsed by all its 15 members. In the ninth report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues, submitted to the Facilitator on 5 June and subsequently circulated as document S/2020/508, the remaining participants stated their commitment to continuing to review proposals in an impartial and independent manner.

In that context, it is a positive signal that the channel continues to receive proposals. We expect all Security Council members to continue to support the preservation of the channel in line with resolution 2231 (2015).

We also deeply regret the United States decision to end the three waivers covering key JCPOA nuclear projects in Iran, including the Arak modernization project. These projects, endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015), serve the non-proliferation interests of all and provide the international community with assurances of the exclusively peaceful and safe nature of Iranian nuclear activities.

Today, as I said, I am focusing my intervention on the JCPOA. Nevertheless, I am very mindful of a series of events outside the nuclear domain that are increasingly worrisome.

Finally, I should like to recall that the JCPOA will have its fifth anniversary in two weeks. The agreement remains a great achievement of multilateral diplomacy. The full implementation of the JCPOA by all sides is crucial. It remains the only tool to provide the international community with the necessary assurances regarding Iran's nuclear programme. It is therefore essential that we do all we can to preserve it. We should not allow it to be derailed or degraded or to become irreparable. Nor should we assume that an opportunity will arise again in the future for the international community to address Iran's nuclear programme in such a comprehensive manner.



## Annex III

### **Statement by the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations, Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)**

I am speaking in my capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Since having been appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in January 2019 for a two-year period, it has been an honour for me to serve the Council in the exercise of this mandate. While carrying out this task, I have been able to count on the unwavering support of the Secretariat, and I thank them for their commitment.

According to paragraph 3 of presidential note S/2016/44,

“[t]he facilitator shall brief the other members of the Council on its work and the implementation of the resolution every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General”.

The report of the Facilitator is aimed at being a factual and objective account, through which the Security Council is informed of the activities that took place in the 2231 format of the Council, in conjunction with the reports of the Secretary-General and the Joint Commission. It is an agreed text that reflects the Council's comments and approval, under a no-objection procedure, and, when submitted to the President of the Security Council, it is a report that reflects consensus by the Council.

Unfortunately, I have to inform members that the ninth report of the Facilitator (see S/2020/508) has not been approved by all the members of the Council. Informal consultations with the members concerned were held exhaustively with a view to reaching a consensus, but to no avail. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members for their written comments, active contributions and flexibility.

In lieu of having no report at this point in time, I would like to brief members on some of the key highlights of the activities of the 2231 format that took place during the six-month reporting period from 17 December 2019 to 23 June 2020.

First, the Security Council, in the 2231 format, held two informal meetings via a closed video-teleconference: a meeting on 13 May 2020 to discuss the 22 April 2020 space satellite launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and a meeting on 22 June 2020 to discuss the findings and recommendations contained in the ninth report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/531) on resolution 2231 (2015), prior to its public release.

Secondly, the two regular quarterly reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during the past six months, in March (S/2020/307, enclosure) and June (S/2020/548, enclosure), were also circulated to the 2231 representatives for their information.

Thirdly, I would like to thank Member States that sent official communications addressed either to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and/or myself, which were circulated within the 2231 format during this six-month period. There were a total of 21 letters from nine Member States circulated. These letters reflect the state of deliberations among the parties on the main topics at stake in relation to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I deeply regret that I am not in a position to present a written overview of those contributions, which are central to our debate.



Lastly, I note that there were four proposals submitted to the Security Council for approval, through the procurement channel, during the past six months.

In conclusion, let me simply join with the other bodies responsible for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), the Secretary-General, the Joint Commission and the IAEA in strongly regretting the deterioration of the current context, which affects compliance with resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I would therefore like to end my briefing by reiterating paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), which calls upon all

“Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of JCPOA, including by ... refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA”.

**Annex IV****Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America,  
Michael R. Pompeo**

I thank you, Mr. President, for your couple of words in English. I appreciate that.

It is good to see the Secretary-General. I thank Rosemary DiCarlo for her comments this morning. I would like to say that she made some comments about humanitarian assistance inside Iran. The United States has tried to facilitate that, in the light of the coronavirus disease issues inside Iran. Indeed, we offered our own American assistance to the Iranians, which was rejected by them. So, to suggest that somehow our sanctions have prevented humanitarian assistance from getting into Iran, I think, is a misunderstanding of the situation on the ground.

Because of the flawed nuclear deal negotiated by the previous American Administration, the arms embargo on the world's most heinous terrorist regime is scheduled to expire on 18 October, a mere four months from now — four months. This Chamber has a choice: stand for international peace and security, as the United Nations founders intended, or let the arms embargo on the Islamic Republic of Iran expire, betraying the United Nations mission and its finest ideals, which we have all pledged to uphold.

If the Council fails to act, Iran will be free to purchase Russian-made fighter jets that can strike up to a 3,000-kilometre radius, putting cities like Riyadh, New Delhi, Rome and Warsaw in Iranian crosshairs. Iran will be free to upgrade and expand its fleet of submarines to further threaten international shipping and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Iran will be free to purchase new and advanced technologies for its proxies and partners throughout the Middle East, including Hamas, Hizbullah and the Houthis.

Iran will hold a sword of Damocles over the economic stability of the Middle East, endangering nations, like Russia and China, that rely on stable energy prices.

Iran will be free to become a rogue weapons dealer, supplying arms to fuel conflicts from Venezuela and Syria to the far reaches of Afghanistan. In November of last year, President Rouhani himself said, “When the embargo ... is lifted next year, we can easily buy and sell weapons.” We should take him at his word. Iran is not a responsible democracy like Australia or India. We already know what Tehran will do if given the ability to buy more weaponry.

Let us just consider the Secretary-General's report on resolution 2231 (2015) that we are discussing today (S/2020/531). The report confirms that weapons used to attack Saudi Arabia in September 2019 were of Iranian origin. The report also confirms that the weapons interdicted off the coast of Yemen in November of 2019 and February 2020 were of Iranian origin.

Iran is already violating the arms embargo, even before its expiration date. Let us imagine if Iranian activity were sanctioned, authorized by this group, if the restrictions were lifted. We do not need the Secretary-General's report to see what else the regime is doing. In January, Iran launched an attack on the coalition forces in Iraq with its own advanced missiles.

Iran, even as we sit here today, supplies Shia militia groups like Kata'ib Hizbullah — groups that have launched dozens of rocket attacks since the fall of last year against United States and coalition forces fighting the continued important campaign against Da'esh. Iran unleashes ship-mining attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Oman, as it did in May and June of last year.

Nearly all countries have arms. Mature nations use them for defensive purposes and to promote stability, but not the Islamic Republic of Iran. Do not just take it from me or from the United States; listen to countries in the region. From Israel to the Gulf, countries in the Middle East, which are most exposed to Iran's predations, are speaking with a single voice: extend the arms embargo. The Council has a responsibility to listen to them.

The overwhelming preference of the United States is to work with the Council to extend the arms embargo to protect human life, to protect our national security and to protect that of Council members. We have imposed arms restrictions on Tehran in various forms for 13 years, with good reason, to substantial effect. When we unanimously adopted resolution 1747 (2007) back in 2007, which, among other actions, prohibited arms transfers from Iran, the United Kingdom's representative to the Council said, "The path of proliferation by Iran is not one that the international community can accept." (*S/PV.5647, p. 7*)

I welcome the recent statement of the United Kingdom, France and Germany recognizing that lifting the embargo would have major implications for regional security and stability. I also welcome the support of almost 400 members of the United States Congress. For those not tracking, there are only 435. Those almost 400 members supported my diplomacy to extend this arms embargo. Our concern is a matter of national security, not partisan politics.

We saw from Iran's actions while implementing the JCPOA that the regime does not moderate when we lift sanctions or weaken accountability. In fact, it does just the opposite. While still claiming to remain in the deal, Iran, by its own admission and as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is showing no signs of slowing its destabilizing nuclear escalation.

Iran is also accumulating dangerous knowledge. For example, late last year Iran announced that its scientists were working on a new centrifuge — the IR-9 — that would allow Tehran to enrich uranium up to 50 times faster than the IR-1 centrifuges allowed under the JCPOA. Even as Iran pursues research that could threaten its breakout time to a nuclear weapon, it has also denied IAEA inspections the access to locations that Iran is obligated to provide. The Council cannot simply hope that Iran acts in good faith, given its indisputable fact pattern. The Council must hold Iran accountable, and we all have the chance to do so.

I will close with this appeal to our greater purpose. Article I of the Charter of the United Nations says the purpose of the United Nations is to "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to ... peace". Consider the overwhelming evidence that I have detailed today. It is a fraction of the evidence available. If Iran is not a threat to peace that demands a collective measure, I do not know what is.

The Council must reject extortion diplomacy. President Rouhani recently declared, "Iran will give a crushing response if the arms embargo on Tehran is extended." Given the Iranian regime's history of resorting to terrorism and violence, perhaps we should take this threat seriously. Iran's Foreign Minister will speak today. I hope he will tell us whom he intends to crush and how he will crush them.

Renewing the embargo will exert more pressure on Tehran to start behaving like a normal nation. The world needs this to happen. The long-suffering Iranian people need this to happen.

Seventy-five years ago, the founders of the United Nations came together after the devastation of the Second World War to ensure that the world would never

again have to face such horrors. Let us not shrink from the challenge before us simply because the path ahead seems hard. Let us uphold the mission of this body to address the threats to international peace and security that the Islamic Republic of Iran presents. And let us take real action in the name of the Security Council by extending the arms embargo.

**Annex V****Statement by the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations, Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve**

I am going to speak in my national capacity.

As Ms. DiCarlo has just pointed out, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an important achievement of effective multilateralism. It is the result of 12 years of intense activity, based on dialogue and diplomatic pressure.

Belgium is joining forces with its European partners to defend it with conviction. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is our best guarantee to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. However, in order to succeed, all parties need to implement its provisions in full and maintain the spirit of cooperation.

Belgium, like the Secretary-General and the majority of the members of the Security Council, regrets the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan. My country also regrets the reimposition by the United States of unilateral sanctions and their side effects, as well as the recent decision not to extend nuclear waivers. These sanctions prevent not only Iran but also the other Member States of the United Nations from implementing their commitments under resolution 2231 (2015), approved by all the members of the Council and supported by a large majority of the international community.

Together with other European countries, Belgium adhered to the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges in 2019 in order to uphold the economic benefits that form part of the Plan.

Belgium regrets the increasing non-compliance by Iran with its commitments under the Plan. Like our European partners, we reject any "less for less" approach. We call on Iran to return to full compliance with the JCPOA as soon as possible in order to prevent irreparable damage. We support the efforts of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to resolve the outstanding issues in the framework of the dispute resolution mechanism under the Plan.

Belgium continues to support the professional, objective, independent and impartial work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It commends the Agency's efforts to maintain monitoring and verification activities in Iran despite the challenges, including those posed by the coronavirus disease crisis.

Belgium is concerned at Iran's continued ballistic activities and calls on Iran to comply with all provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), including those listed in annex B.

Belgium is also worried by the assessments presented in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/531), as we have just heard, that point to the Iranian origin of, first, transfers of conventional arms seized in the territorial sea of Yemen, and secondly, of parts of the cruise missiles and the drones used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia last year. These activities reinforce mistrust and only contribute to the exacerbation of tensions in the region.

It is clear that the issues discussed today cannot be addressed in isolation from the regional dynamics at play. If we want long-lasting peace and security in the region, we must focus our attention on the broader regional context. The region urgently needs confidence-building measures between stakeholders, and must work in good faith to solve its protracted conflicts. These regional concerns must be resolved by proactive dialogue and by negotiation with all actors in the region. All the relevant resolutions of the Security Council must also be observed.

Belgium calls on all stakeholders to exercise restraint. Undermining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will not put us in a better position to discuss regional issues, nor will it provide us with a solution to the proliferation risks. Our priority as members of the Security Council should therefore be to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to make it work.

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**Annex VI****Statement by the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, Zhang Jun**

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Pecsteen de Buytsverve and Ambassador Skoog for their briefings. I welcome the attendance of Secretary-General Guterres and Foreign Minister Zarif.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an important multilateral agreement endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015). It is legally binding and should be effectively implemented. Earlier this month, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi clearly stated China's position on the Iranian nuclear issue in his letter to the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council (S/2020/517, annex). Preserving the JCPOA is conducive to safeguarding multilateralism, the international order based on international law, the international non-proliferation regime and peace and stability in the Middle East.

The root cause of the current crisis is the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and its unilateral sanctions against Iran. As stated in the Secretary-General's report (S/2020/531), these actions continue to be contrary to the goals set out in the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). The United States has decided to end the sanctions waiver to nuclear projects under the agreement and pushed for an extension of the arms embargo on Iran. This has again undermined the joint efforts to preserve the JCPOA. We urge the United States to stop its illegal unilateral sanctions and "long-arm jurisdiction", and return to the right track of observing the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

China opposes the United States push to extend the arms embargo on Iran. All provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) should be implemented, including arrangements on arms-related restrictive measures. Having quit the JCPOA, the United States is no longer a participant and has no right to trigger snapback in the Security Council.

The Iranian nuclear issue is at a critical stage. The full and effective implementation of the JCPOA is the only right way forward. Iran's reduction of its commitment under the JCPOA is a result of the United States maximum pressure. Relevant parties should exercise restraint, resolve differences through consultations in the Joint Commission and refrain from taking steps that might complicate the situation. China disapproves of the recent resolution of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's safeguards. We call on all parties to pay due attention to Iran's readiness for continued cooperation with the Agency and to find solutions at an early date.

The Iranian nuclear issue concerns peace and stability in the Middle East. Maintaining the JCPOA is in the interests of all parties. Regional countries should resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiation. Countries outside the region should inject positive energy into the region's peace and stability. All parties should work constructively to de-escalate the situation and promote the settlement of hot-spot issues in the region.

The Secretary-General's report underlines the importance of safeguarding the JCPOA and calls upon Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions. The report welcomes the positive developments in the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, encourages Member States to fully support and utilize the procurement channel and supports Member States' trade and economic relations with Iran, especially during the coronavirus disease pandemic. China appreciates that.



Meanwhile, China agrees with some countries that the report should remain fact-based and reflect the implementation of the resolution in an objective, balanced and comprehensive manner. The 2231 format is not a sanctions mechanism. The Secretariat should act in strict accordance with its mandate and functions. The report fails to fully accommodate and reflect the legitimate concerns of Iran. It also reaches conclusions on issues, such as the origin of weapons, that are based solely on one-sided information. This is deeply regrettable. China hopes to bring this to the close attention of the Secretariat.

China has noticed that some countries have expressed concerns over Iran's missile and satellite launches. Iran has clarified the conventional and self-defensive nature of its missile programme on many occasions. It is important that all parties accurately interpret the resolution so as to avoid having a negative impact on the implementation of the JCPOA.

Since the conclusion of the JCPOA, China has been committed to upholding the authority of the resolution and the efficacy of the JCPOA. China stands ready to work tirelessly with relevant parties to seek political and diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue. The Security Council should earnestly fulfil its responsibilities and stand with international law, multilateralism, and peace and dialogue. We cannot afford to allow the Iranian nuclear issue to go back to the old track of pressure and confrontation.

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**Annex VII****Statement by the Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations, Sven Jürgenson**

I thank all our briefers this morning for their statements and for their hard work in carrying out their respective functions. Allow me also to thank the Secretary-General and the Secretariat team for their continued professionalism in providing a well-researched and comprehensive report (S/2020/531).

I will start by expressing Estonia's support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Plan is a key element in the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and crucial for regional and wider international security. As the Plan is currently the only assurance for the international community regarding Iran's nuclear programme, we do not want to see it collapse.

Nevertheless, Iran's announcement, in May 2019, to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan and the subsequent steps taken are extremely concerning and worrisome, as they indicate a serious threat of nuclear proliferation. Although we commend that Iran continues to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the JCPOA, we note with concern Iran's recent lack of cooperation with the Agency's investigations under its Safeguards Agreement. Since cooperation with the IAEA is crucial in order to provide the necessary assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, Estonia supported the resolution adopted at the latest IAEA Board of Governors meeting.

Estonia welcomes our European partners' efforts to address and find a viable solution to the issues of non-compliance with the JCPOA within its framework, and notes the triggering of the dispute resolution mechanism by France, Germany and the United Kingdom in January this year. We hope that other participants in the JCPOA will engage constructively and substantively in this process.

The preservation and full implementation of the JCPOA also includes compliance with all the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), including the restrictive measures set out in annex B to the resolution. The Secretary-General's report outlines Iran's continued non-compliance with several of the provisions relating to its ballistic missile-related activities and transfer of various arms to other actors in the Middle East. The report therefore gives rise to serious concerns.

The Secretary-General's report offers a detailed examination of the weapons seized by the United States in November 2019 and February 2020, and concludes that they were of Iranian origin and may have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Moreover, some of the items were similar or identical to those used in the attacks against Saudi Arabia's oil facilities and its international airport.

We also note with concern the information provided in the report regarding the launches by Iran of space-launch vehicles, in two instances. In undertaking such activity, Iran is not providing confidence that it is not developing technology capable of serving as a means of delivery for nuclear weapons.

Such weapons-proliferation activities have a highly destabilizing effect on the region and only feed into the escalation of tensions. These very concerning activities do not lend any support to the planned expiry of the conventional arms restrictions this October, as established by resolution 2231 (2015).

To conclude, Estonia calls all parties to remain committed to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and of resolution 2231 (2015). It is our common responsibility as members of the international community to work together

to preserve the nuclear agreement and reach a diplomatic settlement through constructive dialogue and in good faith. We fully support efforts that are conducive to international peace and security.

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**Annex VIII****Statement by the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Nicolas de Rivière**

[Original: English and French]

I would like to thank the Secretary-General, the Secretary of State of the United States and the Iranian Foreign Minister for their participation. I also thank the briefers for their interventions.

Our priority remains ensuring that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. This is a proliferation issue, and therefore a peace and security issue, that affects and concerns us all. That is why France, Germany and the United Kingdom have been working since 2003 to resolve the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme. And we were able to find a way out of this crisis in 2015, thanks to the perseverance of the international community, and to the convergence from 2006 towards the line taken by France, Germany and the United Kingdom — the E-3 — and to robust dialogue with Iran.

The Security Council not only endorsed the Vienna agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) through resolution 2231 (2015); it also validated a method — that of pragmatic and demanding multilateralism, a method that was then carried out by its five permanent members in unity and in a steadfast and exemplary manner.

We are all keenly attuned to the challenges of the moment. The trajectories of the signatory States have diverged since the United States left the agreement, to our great regret and concern. Since then, worrisomely, Iran has taken measures that are contrary to its commitments under the agreement. Those measures have serious proliferation consequences, which is why the E-3 activated the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism in January this year: to address this serious problem, but to address it within the framework of the agreement.

France, Germany and the United Kingdom have fully implemented their commitments. We remain committed to preserving the agreement and to continuing discussions to bring Iran back to full compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA. This requires constructive engagement by Iran and by all.

We have just heard very worrisome confirmation of Iran's violations of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) on arms transfers. The Secretary-General's conclusions, which we support, are consistent with our assessment. Let me be clear: these destabilizing activities, which we have condemned, are unacceptable and must stop.

As the E-3 Berlin ministerial declaration of 19 June testifies, France, together with Germany and the United Kingdom, understands and shares the concerns regarding the implications of the upcoming expiration of the embargo on conventional arms provided for in resolution 2231 (2015). We have expressed our readiness to explore constructive options to address our common concerns, including outside the Security Council. We intend to address this issue in close consultation with all members of the Council, in particular the remaining participants in the JCPOA, and other key actors.

We will continue to be guided by the following objectives: respect for the authority and integrity of the Security Council and commitment to regional stability and security. We would not, however, support unilateral proposals leading to the return of sanctions. They would only deepen divisions in the Security Council and

beyond and would not be likely to improve the nuclear non-proliferation situation on the ground.

As the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom stated in Berlin on 19 June, “we firmly believe that any unilateral attempt to trigger United Nations sanctions snapback would have serious adverse consequences in the Security Council. We would not support such a decision, which would be incompatible with our current efforts to preserve the JCPOA”.

All members of the Council share fundamental security interests. They bring us together around shared objectives and responsibilities. That is the *raison d’être* of this Council and the spirit that drives us all. I would therefore like to believe that none of us would risk backsliding in such a way as to exacerbate tensions in the Middle East. The JCPOA, which is the result of compromise, can of course be seen as an instrument that could be improved. But there is, as yet, no serious alternative to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and its disappearance would improve neither the regional situation nor the security of our populations.

We certainly have differences of approach. But it is together that we must build a comprehensive strategy on all aspects of the Iranian issue, with our eyes open, without naivety, and with pragmatism and lucidity. It is this long-term objective that we wish to prioritize, while preserving the international order based on law, of which we are the guarantors.

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**Annex IX****Statement by the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, Christoph Heusgen**

Our friend from the Dominican Republic, José, reminded us in his intervention that, from tomorrow onwards, Germany will hold the presidency of the Security Council. At the same time, Germany will start its presidency of the European Union. Both are very important for us. They are the cornerstones of our post-Second World War policy. The foundation of both organizations is the rule of law and the rules-based international order. For us, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are key for our policy.

When I talk about the rule of law today, it has to do with this very foundation of German foreign policy. I will take the opportunity of the presence of the Iranian Foreign Minister to talk about the rule of law and Iran. Unfortunately, Iran is violating the very basis of what we are discussing here at the United Nations: the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The human rights situation in Iran is appalling. Human rights activists are persecuted. There are political prisoners. There is no press freedom, no right of assembly, and there is aggressive foreign policy meddling in the region. Iran not only does not recognize Israel, but also displays missiles with “death to Israel” written on them. This is all very appalling.

With regard to the rule of law, I come to resolution 2231 (2015): a part of the rule of law and one of the most important resolutions that we have. I would like to thank the Secretary-General and his team for the thorough investigation, which found developments that are contrary to, and inconsistent with, resolution 2231 (2015).

To respond to my colleague from China, we believe that the Secretariat is absolutely mandated to pursue this work. The Secretary-General is tasked with combating threats to peace and security, and therefore must do everything to preserve this. With regard to the position on resolution 2231 (2015), we would like to align ourselves with what the United Kingdom and France, as the other European three members, have to say. Since China is also a signatory, I would also align myself with what my Chinese colleague just said about the snapback mechanism. The overarching goal for us is the preservation, continuation and full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which has been described by some in the media as a masterpiece of diplomacy. Thanks to the JCPOA, it was possible to have Iran step back from its moves towards the acquisition of a nuclear bomb.

It is very unfortunate that the United States left the JCPOA. By doing so, it actually violated international law, because the JCPOA is enshrined in binding resolution 2231 (2015). We are very concerned to now be seeing Iran stepping away from the JCPOA, as was also mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/531). To illustrate this, imagine somebody running a red traffic light; that is no justification for another driver to run a red light as well.

Iran should engage constructively with the remaining JCPOA signatories. Because of these steps away from the agreement by Iran, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) have invoked the dispute-resolution mechanism, a measure within the framework of the JCPOA. Just as we continue to uphold our commitments as the E3 and even go beyond our commitments when it comes to the INSTEX mechanism, we are concerned about the United States not only leaving the JCPOA but also ending the waivers for key JCPOA projects. The E3 remain committed to those projects, including the Arak modernization project.

We are concerned about the reference to Iran's missile activities in the Secretary-General's report. They are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). As the E3, we have informed the Secretary-General and the Security Council about those concerns.

On the conventional arms embargo, we share concerns on the implications of the expiration of those limitations. On the other hand, we would recall that the sanctions on Missile Technology Control Regime-listed items will remain in place and that the transfer of arms by Iran to non-State actors will remain prohibited according to other Security Council resolutions.

We can build on those provisions when we consider how best to address the expiry of the arms embargo. We are ready to engage with the JCPOA members and the Council to determine how to best do that.

We just celebrated the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Charter. That is the basis for our rules-based international order. Multilateralism is about commitments and reliability. I would like to appeal to everybody to return to resolution 2231 (2015) and to the JCPOA and implement it.



**Annex X****Statement by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, Dian Triansyah Djani**

We thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Olof Skoog and Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve for their briefings. We also would like to thank Ambassador Pecsteen de Buytswerve and his team for their able leadership in facilitating the 2231 format.

We also would like to welcome the participation of the Secretary-General, His Excellency António Guterres; the United States Secretary of State, His Excellency Michael Pompeo; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, His Excellency Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Today we stand at a very critical moment. We cannot emphasize enough the importance of supporting the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015) by all parties. In that regard, Indonesia would underline the following points.

First, preserving the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) is crucially important. All parties must remain committed and perform fully and effectively their obligations under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) in good faith. In that regard, we are deeply concerned at the decision of the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA and to reimpose sanctions. Efforts must be made to create a conducive environment for JCPOA implementation. All factors should be taken into account in a just manner in assessing that implementation.

We also noted with concern the announcement by Iran that it would scale back its operational commitments under the JCPOA. We call on all parties to swiftly resolve those issues through constructive dialogue and appropriate dispute-resolution mechanisms under the agreement, so as to allow Iran to return to its commitments.

We recognize and support the efforts made by our European partners to facilitate all legitimate trade with Iran. We should always remind ourselves that the JCPOA should also bring concrete economic benefit for Iran and its peoples.

Secondly, stability must be maintained. All parties must exercise restraint. Extra caution needs to be taken before coming to a conclusion or taking any action, as rushed decisions can become counterproductive. Any new initiatives must add value and support resolution 2231 (2015).

We need to remain focused. The aim must be to enable success in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Issues that are not directly related to the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) should be treated separately. In that vein, Indonesia emphasizes the upholding of the rule of law as well as the United Nations Charter in the spirit of multilateralism. Nor should we forget the importance of confidence-building and of continuing dialogue to find amicable solutions. That is what diplomacy is all about.

Thirdly, cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is important. We welcome the continuation of cooperation between Iran and the IAEA in safeguarding its nuclear programme under the JCPOA. We would like to convey our appreciation for the professional work done by the Agency. We support the IAEA in discharging its mandate in an impartial and objective manner in verifying and monitoring Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

Fourthly, a world free of nuclear weapons must be achieved. We must remain focused and not be sidetracked by other rhetoric that hampers progress on the global nuclear-disarmament agenda.

Indonesia's position on this issue, nationally as well as in its capacity as the Coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement Working Group on Disarmament, is very clear. Furthermore, Indonesia is a party to the major treaties in that area, including the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. We are also a passionate advocate of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and urge its early entry into force and universalization.

Indonesia believes that the JCPOA remains an essential element of the global non-proliferation architecture. The obligation to support the JCPOA fully does not apply only to its signatories but also to all in the international community. Everyone should play their role in supporting its sustainability and original objectives.

Before I conclude, my delegation would like to express its concern with regard to the fact that the Facilitator's report cannot be agreed on by all Council members. In that regard, we urge all members of the Council to maintain communication and close cooperation to allow us to exercise our mandate properly. We thank the Facilitator of the format for his endeavours on this process and stand ready to work with all Council members in finding agreement on the way forward.

Let me conclude by once again reiterating Indonesia's support for the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

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**Annex XI****Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Niger to the United Nations, Abdou Abarry**

[Original: English and French]

Allow me at the outset to welcome the convening of this briefing on the consideration of the ninth report (S/2020/531) of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). His presence here today is a sign of the interest he attaches to this issue.

I would like to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Permanent Representative of Belgium, in his capacity as Facilitator; and Mr. Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union, in his capacity as coordinator of the Joint Commission to the Security Council, for their briefings.

We are honoured by the presence of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Michael Pompeo, and of Mr. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and I wish them a warm welcome.

I wish to reaffirm the Niger's commitment to the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which in 2015 approved the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme.

My delegation has taken note of the conclusions contained in the ninth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and calls on Member States and all stakeholders to comply with the obligations they have undertaken.

It is indisputable that the Plan of Action, as an expression of the will of the international community, supported by the Security Council, is an essential instrument in the fight against nuclear proliferation. In that regard, it must be preserved. That is why we deplore both the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement, with its resulting consequences, as well as the measures taken in response to that withdrawal since 8 May 2019 by the Islamic Republic of Iran to backtrack on certain commitments it has made with regard to nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Plan of Action.

In that regard, we urge all parties to the agreement to strictly implement its provisions in terms of both obligations and rights. As it is customary to say, legally formed agreements serve as law for those who made them. Should difficulties arise in the implementation of the provisions of the agreement, recourse should be made to the dispute-settlement mechanism provided for in the Plan of Action.

My country, the Niger, believes that while there is no doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran must respect its obligations under the agreement, in particular by submitting to the control measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency so as to eliminate any risk of proliferation, there should be no doubt either that the international community must lay the foundations for a new relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on mutual trust and respect.

Therefore, it is urgent, in accordance with the appeal made by the Secretary-General, to alleviate, on humanitarian grounds, all unilateral economic measures that could prevent Iran from mobilizing the means to combat the current coronavirus disease pandemic.

If the implementation of the JCPOA is to be pursued in good faith, it is no exaggeration to say that the situation currently prevailing in the Persian Gulf region

carries within it the seeds of suspicion and mistrust, which makes it difficult to establish a climate of trust among States. The worrying prospects of the forthcoming annexation of the occupied Palestinian territories are not, alas, cause for optimism. It could, if nothing is done — and this is, indeed, the right time to do something — add to the difficulties that concerns us today by plunging the entire region into cycles of violence whose unforeseeable consequences could have incalculable repercussions on international peace and security.

## Annex XII

### Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia

We welcome the participation of the Secretary-General in today's meeting. I particularly welcome Minister Zarif, who is with us now. I would welcome the participation of the Secretary of State, but he is no longer with us. I understand that he has a very busy schedule, but we regret that he did not choose to listen to Council members, at least some of them. But more than that, we regret that in his statement we — at least I myself — did not hear a single mention of the word “dialogue” or “cooperation”.

I would like to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/531) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We also welcome the contribution made by the Permanent Representative of Belgium, as Security Council Facilitator, to its implementation. We deeply appreciate his efforts to uphold the unity of the members of the Security Council and to that end negotiate a consensus Facilitator's report, even though it has not been approved.

To our deep regret, the world of multilateralism and order, where the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* used to be respected through the centuries, is at a risk. The United States policy of unilateral action disregards both common sense and the opinions of other States. We have been watching with grave concern the policy of maximum pressure on Iran, which is better characterized as a maximum suffocation policy. Iran is being deliberately squeezed from all directions. The task is to achieve regime change or create a situation where Iran literally would not be able to breathe. That is like putting a knee on someone's neck.

The responsibility for the current crisis belongs to the United States. Two years ago, it intentionally started to undermine the carefully balanced and calibrated agreement of 2015, of which both resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) constituted an inseparable package deal. Despite the fact that Security Council resolutions are part of international law and must be implemented by all Member States, the United States officially pulled out from its resolution 2231 (2015) and JCPOA obligations, closed the door behind it and engaged in unilateral pressure by reimposing and reinforcing national sanctions against Iran, which are contrary to the aims of both the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). Such actions eliminate any incentives for Tehran to comply with their provisions. Still, Iran continued to uphold its obligations under the JCPOA. On top of that, the United States, being a major violator, has been threatening other countries with unilateral sanctions for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which, as I said, is not an option but an obligation of Member States.

The road to the JCPOA was very bumpy. Everybody made concessions to achieve that carefully calibrated deal, including, first and foremost, Iran itself. The whole world was celebrating this unique achievement and a system of checks and balances of which a temporary arms embargo — arms restrictions — on Iran was only one element. It was introduced with the clear and unequivocal understanding that it would expire on 18 October 2020, provided Iran abided by its obligations under the JCPOA. Iran honoured its commitments despite two years of continued threats and sanctions by the United States.

But today we see that the United States is appealing to the authority of the Security Council to “demonstrate unity of vision” and adopt a new arms embargo resolution against Iran. We explained in detail our position in that regard in the letter dated 27 May 2020 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2020/451), which

was distributed in the Council. We cannot accept an attempt to get a blessing for the United States-designed maximum-pressure policy through the Security Council and to legitimize it. We have a special mandate and responsibility here to protect the legitimate interests of all States and maintain international peace and security.

The logic of the United States draft that was submitted is to impose a full-scale blockade of Iran by all means possible. It is obvious that the ultimate goal is to antagonize Iran and push it to radical retaliation, which would become an invitation to impose further sanctions. What we get in the end is an uncontrollable escalation, a destabilized region and lasting implications for international peace and security. Is this the remedy to resolve the current crisis that we are looking for?

Making Iran a scapegoat for everything that is happening in the region seems an easy approach. But simplifying things and coming to easy, but questionable and arguable conclusions, to which, I think, we all are unfortunately accustomed, is not a magic solution to the problems the region is facing. Moreover, that simplistic approach does not bring us closer to solutions. It only complicates problems.

We would like to reiterate that there are no legal or other grounds to raise the issue of arms embargo in the Security Council. The approval-based procedures for the transfer of armaments to and from Iran have been designed as temporary measures and their extension beyond 18 October 2020 has never been either envisaged or discussed. Given all that, it would be naive, at the very least, to suggest that there can be room for engaging the Council on this issue.

Brian Hook, United States Special Representative for Iran, chose to accuse Russia and China of going down the road to dystopia with regard to Iran. I do not know what prompted such a flight of fancy or what exactly he meant by that. Maybe he recently read George Orwell, Ray Bradbury, Aldous Huxley or some Russian dystopian writers — of which, incidentally, we have plenty. But if we take it at face value, then I am compelled to say that Russia, in particular, is adopting a dystopian stance because the United States is adopting a utopian one. We have said from day one that the United States draft resolution on extending the Iran embargo is a utopia. It will not fly. It is not a sound basis for any negotiations.

During the past two years, the United States has tried in vain to prove to us that Iran has been violating its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In fact, the only moves that Iran has made have been aimed at showing its frustration with the provocative actions of the United States, but even those moves, strictly speaking, did not violate the JCPOA.

In that regard, we would like to express our profound disappointment with the Secretary-General's ninth report (S/2020/531) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). It clearly fails to meet the high standards of impartiality that are expected in such documents. The Secretariat has never been mandated with investigative tasks, including at the invitation of individual States. The Council has been effectively kept in the dark about its activities, being instead presented with ready-made judgments. The group that conducted those investigations has neither retributive nor prosecutorial mandates. Nevertheless, today our fellow Council members use expressions such as "almost certainly" or "highly likely" — as if we were considering not allegations, but established facts. We regret to see that as a result of these amateur inspections, the report suffers from a persistent lack of evidence. Final assessments of Iran's involvement in activities in violation of the resolution 2231 (2015) are baseless and biased. In these turbulent times, it is unfortunate that this document fuels tensions rather than contribute to their solution.

While addressing the issue under consideration, we must not forget the broader picture. Today we are witnessing a spiralling escalation in the Persian Gulf, jeopardizing peace and security in the region and undermining international efforts to

settle conflicts there. We believe that there is a viable alternative — a comprehensive strategic solution that could help build trust and promote stability, transparency and predictability among regional players. The ultimate goal is to establish a genuinely inclusive security architecture that reflects the legitimate concerns of all countries of the region. Regional confidence-building measures could be instrumental in that regard. Our security architecture concept in the Persian Gulf, with international guarantees, remains relevant. Russia is also ready to work with our regional partners and all interested parties to support similar initiatives.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that Russia is fully committed to the unconditional implementation of its obligations under resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We call on all Member States to make every effort to preserve the JCPOA. We will continue to pursue and encourage dialogue aimed at finding compromises, with a balanced consideration of interests at its core. Such measures could be taken on all levels of political communication. Russia, together with other responsible members of international community, will spare no effort to bring the current situation back under control.



**Annex XIII****Statement by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations, Halimah DeShong**

I wish to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Skoog and Ambassador De Buytsverve, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines welcomes the Secretary-General's ninth report (S/2020/531) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We are dedicated to the full implementation of the resolution and we strongly support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — a key pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and multilateral diplomacy. Its preservation is crucial to safeguarding peace and stability in the region and the wider world.

We deeply regret the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and its subsequent decisions to reimpose sanctions and terminate waivers. Those actions run counter to the requirements and goals of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, and they do not promote an environment conducive to international cooperation. We encourage the United States to rejoin the agreement and to lift all sanctions. The appeal for lifting sanctions is now even more urgent with the arrival of the pandemic, as they considerably undermine and impede the coronavirus disease response and mitigation efforts.

We also regret the Islamic Republic of Iran's decision to break with several of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. We take note that Iran has indicated that those steps are reversible, having undertaken them subsequent to the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement. We urge Iran to return to full compliance and to meet the totality of its obligations. It is our hope, despite recent declarations, that Iran will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines supports the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as it works to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. The important role that the IAEA plays in the verification and monitoring of compliance with resolution 2231 (2015) cannot be overstated. We recognize Iran's cooperation with the IAEA thus far and we encourage further cooperation in implementing its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

We welcome the developments made in relation to the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges. Those advancements are essential to the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran. We also take note of the activities of the procurement channel, which must remain operational and effective to ensure that a new relationship is indeed cultivated with Iran.

The JCPOA remains the only viable path to ensure a peaceful, comprehensive and long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. In that regard, we implore all parties to fully implement their obligations under the agreement. Further, we urge all sides to exercise maximum restraint, to refrain from actions that can inflame tensions and to commit fully to dialogue and negotiation so as to resolve the current issues and preserve the JCPOA.

In conclusion, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines reaffirms its commitment to achieving a nuclear-weapon free world. As a member of the zone of peace of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and a party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, we appeal to the international

community to remain steadfast in its commitment to disarmament, as it is inextricably linked to non-proliferation.

**Annex XIV****Statement by the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, Jerry Matjila**

South Africa continues to welcome the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as one of most important diplomatic achievements in the area of nuclear non-proliferation since the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The JCPOA remains an example of global cooperation to address challenges that affect us all.

In that regard, we call on all parties to the JCPOA and Council members to uphold and implement resolution 2231 (2015), which is essential for the Council's fulfilment of its mandate to maintain international peace and security.

We believe that the Security Council should act responsibly and desist from any divisive actions that could provoke non-compliance with Council's resolutions, as that would undermine the credibility of the Council in fulfilling its central mandate. South Africa therefore urges Iran to fully implement its obligations under the JCPOA in order to preserve its prospect for success.

The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and its reimposition of unilateral sanctions measures are regrettable. The United States must reconsider its stance in that regard as its actions undermine previously reached understandings. We also regret its decision to not renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the JCPOA. It is our view that this decision will inadvertently affect Iran's ability to fully implement the provisions of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We note that the lifting of sanctions, especially with regard to certain nuclear-related materials, is an integral part of the JCPOA.

South Africa underscores that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee that they will never again be used by anyone, under any circumstances. We remind the Council that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. Lack of progress on nuclear disarmament will inadvertently affect the gains made in nuclear non-proliferation.

Regarding the broader security of the region, South Africa joins others in expressing its concerns about the growing tensions in the Persian Gulf and its impact on international peace and security. South Africa urges all parties involved to exercise the utmost restraint and not allow the situation to get out of hand.

In conclusion, the Council must pursue steps to de-escalate rather than escalate tensions in the Gulf and support any such efforts undertaken by regional players. In that regard, the Council must support initiatives aimed at restoring peace and stability — not only to the Gulf, but to the broader Middle East region.

That is why South Africa steadfastly supports continued efforts to resolve tensions among all actors in the region and promotes dialogue rather than antagonism to safeguard disarmament and non-proliferation gains essential for the maintenance of broader international peace and security.

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**Annex XV****Statement by the Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations**

I would like to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Ambassador Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, and Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytsverve, Permanent Representative of Belgium and Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their detailed briefings.

I would also like to welcome the presence of the Secretary-General and of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to this meeting, as well as the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Tunisia shares the view that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an important addition to the global non-proliferation architecture and reiterates its call for the full and effective implementation of this agreement and of resolution 2231 (2015) by all parties.

We believe that the ability to continue to guarantee Iran's status as a non-nuclear-weapon State is crucial for the security and stability of the Middle East. In that regard, we note that Iran has emphasized on various occasions that all non-compliance measures it has taken are reversible and that it will continue to be subject to the monitoring and verification of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We call on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA and to continue to implement the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement on a voluntary basis, pending its ratification.

Tunisia takes note of the continuing differences of interpretation regarding the implementation of the provisions of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular with regard to ballistic missile related activities. We understand that those provisions were designed to improve transparency and create an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA, and we urge all concerned parties to engage in constructive dialogue to resolve those differences.

In the meantime, we encourage Iran to refrain from any activities that can deepen mistrust and exacerbate tensions in the region, which have already reached an extremely dangerous level.

In that regard, we are particularly concerned by the conclusions in the Secretary-General's latest report (S/2020/531) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) — that the cruise missiles and/or their parts used in the attacks perpetrated against Saudi Arabia in 2019 are of Iranian origin. We reiterate our condemnation of those attacks and call on all parties to avoid any action that could further aggravate the situation.

Lastly, I would like to recall the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, which held its first session in November 2019 and in which all Arab countries and Iran participated constructively. Established by the General Assembly, the Conference should convene every year at United Nations Headquarters — at a cost of more than \$1 million per year for all Member States — until it concludes the elaboration of a legally binding treaty establishing the Middle East zone.

Notwithstanding the difference of views expressed during the process that led to the decision to convene the Conference, we believe that it can become a very useful platform for regular dialogue and confidence-building between the countries concerned on all issues of non-proliferation, disarmament and regional security, and help reduce significantly the tensions in the region. We therefore hope that all invited parties will be in a position to participate in upcoming sessions.

**Annex XVI****Statement by the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations, Dang Dinh Quy**

We would like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres for joining us today. We thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Skoog and Ambassador Pecsteen de Buytswerve for their briefings. We welcome Mr. Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States, and Mr. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, to today's meeting.

Over recent months, we have witnessed with deep concern that tension and mistrust continue to build in the region with respect to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). More than ever, it is important that the current situation be defused so as to maintain peace and stability in the region. In this regard, we would highlight the following points.

First, we take note of the ninth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2020/531). We stress that restriction and control measures under resolution 2231 (2015) are meant to promote full compliance and implementation of the JCPOA.

Secondly, we would like to reaffirm our consistent position of supporting disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. We also respect the right of countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with international law and their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Thirdly, we support measures that are designed to resolve all issues through dialogue and negotiations, in accordance with international law. We therefore support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as it aims to promote the compliance with and implementation of the JCPOA. We call on relevant parties to continue dialogue and negotiations to resolve differences and fully implement resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. It is important for all parties to exercise restraint and refrain from actions that could exacerbate the situation, erode trust and escalate tensions.

In conclusion, peace and security in the Middle East will reverberate far beyond the region. It is therefore necessary for the Security Council to carefully consider every issue related to resolution 2231 (2015). Members of the Council should be actively engaged in these discussions in order to create an environment conducive to cooperation and dialogue among the parties in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. It is also necessary for all of us to maintain peace and stability, uphold international law and fulfil obligations for a safe and prosperous world for all. For its part, Viet Nam is willing to make positive contributions to this process.

## Annex XVII

**Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, M. Javad Zarif**

I wish to begin my statement with the words Prime Minister Mosaddegh used in this Council 69 years ago.

“The Security Council was established so that small and great nations alike might sit round the same table and cooperate for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The Council cannot perform its great task ... unless the great powers respect the principles which it was created to embody.” (*S/PV.560, paras. 10 and 11*).

Two years later, he was overthrown in a Central Intelligence Agency coup.

If this Council falters again, it will be a generational setback for the cause of multilateralism and the rule of law. We have all in past years seen how the malign unilateralism of the United States has intently assaulted international cooperation and international institutions. Through its parallel endeavour to supplant international law with United States domestic laws, this has directly undermined global peace and security. Regrettably, complacency has enabled and encouraged this recklessness. Indeed, complacency is a root cause for why we are gathered here today.

Iran and other members of the international community have, since the 8th of May 2018, been witnessing the United States Government — a co-sponsor of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) — persistently flouting the resolution, while also trying to force other States to join it in violating the very text it put forward *itself*. More dangerously, and for the first time in United Nations history, a permanent member of the Security Council is punishing law-abiding States and private citizens for not violating a Council resolution, which emphasized, and I quote, “promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran.” (*resolution 2231 (2015), thirteenth preambular paragraph*).

And yet, not a single Council session has been convened to reprove the United States Government or to at least investigate its repeated violations. Instead, some European members of the Council are contemplating further undermining the resolution and the Council while further reneging on their own commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

To cover this up, the United States has — with some of its enablers — pressured the Secretariat to adopt a perverse reading of resolution 2231 (2015)—rejected by three JCPOA participants,<sup>1</sup> which is the polar opposite of the clear affirmation by the Security Council “that conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue...” (*Ibid., seventh preambular paragraph*).

The United States — along with its accomplices in war crimes in Yemen — have gone further in their now-infamous<sup>2</sup> campaign of intimidation against international institutions. Most recently, they coerced the Secretariat

1 This flawed interpretation of the JCPOA and the unacceptable approach of the Secretariat over the past four years has been repeatedly rejected by at least three members of the JCPOA Joint Commission, namely, China, Iran and Russian Federation.

2 The White House, “Executive Order on Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court”, 11 June 2020. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-blocking-property-certain-persons-associated-international-criminal-court/>

to rely on self-serving allegations and forged documents to produce an utterly unprofessional report outside the scope of its mandate under resolution 2231(2015).<sup>3</sup> Not surprisingly, the Secretariat simultaneously absolved the Saudi coalition of its well-documented child-killing in Yemen.

This status quo is neither acceptable nor sustainable. The international community in general — and the United Nations Security Council in particular — are facing an important decision: Do we maintain respect for the rule of law, or do we return to the law of the jungle by surrendering to the whims of an outlaw bully?

In spite of our strong and legitimate objections to the historic mistreatment of Iran by the Security Council — particularly throughout eight years of aggression by Saddam Hussein, as well as in the course of the unnecessary nuclear crisis — Iran showed its good faith by engaging in negotiations to reach a diplomatic solution as called for by all Security Council resolutions on the nuclear issue<sup>4</sup>. After 13 years of complex negotiations, in 2015 Iran and the five permanent members of this Council plus Germany signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is annexed to — and inseparable from — resolution 2231 (2015). Iran clearly stated its position immediately after the adoption of the resolution (*See S/2015/550*) and again more recently (*See A/74/850–S/2020/380*). Yet, it fulfilled all its commitments in good faith, verified by numerous reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In spite of this great achievement of multilateral diplomacy, the President of the United States in May 2018 announced his country's unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the unlawful re-imposition of all United States sanctions, in material breach of resolution 2231 (2015). Prior to that, the United States had persistently committed multiple cases of “significant non-performance” of its JCPOA obligations. It is important to note that even the previous United States Administration made every effort to minimize the positive impact of its sanction-lifting obligations under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). This has all been documented in my numerous letters to the JCPOA Joint Commission Coordinator and the United Nations Secretary-General (*See A/72/869-S/2018/453*), all of which, unfortunately, have been ignored by the European JCPOA participants.

Following the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA, the United Nations Secretary General<sup>5</sup>, the remaining JCPOA participants<sup>6</sup> and many other members of the international community called on Iran to address its concerns through the

3 The Islamic Republic of Iran has already categorically rejected allegations contained in that report (S/2020/531). From a legal point of view, such types of investigation can only meet the established norms of international law when they are characterized by lawfulness, fairness and diligence. The evidence — indeed allegations — the Secretariat relied upon do not meet the criteria set by established norms of international law. According to the International Court of Justice, a charge of such exceptional gravity against a State requires “a proper degree of certainty” and the standard, which should leave no room for reasonable doubt. (*Corfu Channel: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 17.*) and must be proven by fully conclusive evidence. (*Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 208.*) Such are totally absent in the uncorroborated self-serving allegations by the United States and Saudi Arabia.

4 Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), para. 3; 1737 (2006), para. 20; 1747 (2007), para. 9; 1803 (2008), preamble; and 1929(2010), preamble.

5 “Statement by the Secretary-General on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)”, 08 May 2018. Available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-05-08/statement-secretary-general-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-jcpoa>

6 “Remarks by High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini on the statement by United States President Trump regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA)”, Rome, 8 May 2018.



mechanisms established in the JCPOA and to allow the remaining JCPOA participants to redress the unlawful withdrawal.

The European JCPOA participants requested Iran to wait for only a few weeks to allow them to compensate for the losses Iran incurred as a result of re-imposed United States sanctions.

While expressly reserving Iran's immediate right<sup>7</sup> under paragraph 26,<sup>8</sup> I initiated the Dispute Resolution Mechanism under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA on 10 May 2018<sup>9</sup>. However, acting in good faith, we refrained from applying the 'remedy' in order to enable the remaining JCPOA participants to make good on their promises. For a full year, we continued full implementation of the JCPOA. I trust you are all aware of the 15 consecutive IAEA reports which verified Iran's full compliance with its JCPOA commitments.<sup>10</sup>

Unfortunately, the response of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) to our "strategic patience" was not a long overdue assertion of European "strategic autonomy". Rather it was over-compliance with the United States' "maximum pressure" targeting all Iranians.

On 6 November 2018, I made a final call on the Coordinator and the remaining JCPOA participants under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA. "The United States has now re-imposed with full effect all sanctions specified in the JCPOA and its Annex II, and as elaborated above, no remedial measure has been implemented by the remaining JCPOA participants. Most have effectively joined the restrictive measures against Iran...Either the European Union/E3 and China and Russian Federation — who have repeatedly underlined the security and strategic ramifications of the JCPOA — should ensure Iran's legitimate benefits by fulfilling their commitments made in their statements of 6 July and 24 September 2018<sup>11</sup> in real and practical terms without further delay, or Iran will have no option but to restore a semblance of balance — as 'the remedy that the participants contemplated if the dispute mechanism did not resolve the issue'... In view of the above, I formally call for the convening of another ministerial meeting of the Joint Commission."<sup>12</sup>

7 In my letter of 10 May 2018 to the Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission, I stated "It is Iran's unquestionable right — recognized also under the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 — to take appropriate action in response to persistent numerous unlawful acts by the United States, particularly its withdrawal and reimposition of all sanctions. However, as President Rouhani announced in his televised response on 8 May and further elaborated in the Statement of the Government on 10 May 2018, the Islamic Republic of Iran will decide its next step in the course of few weeks following consultations with the remaining JCPOA participants to see if and how the commitments collectively undertaken by the EU/E3+3 vis-a-vis Iran could be fulfilled in the absence of a reneging party by the EU/E3+2. Nothing in this period would affect Iran's right to react and protect its national interest as appropriate, a right which is manifestly recognized in the JCPOA and the Security Council resolution 2231(2015)."

8 Paragraph 26 of the JCPOA: "*Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.*"

9 My letter of 10 May 2018 to the Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission.

10 See IAEA reports to the Security Council: S/2016/57 (19 January 2016), S/2016/250 (15 March 2016), S/2016/535 (13 June 2016), S/2016/808 (22 September 2016), S/2016/983 (21 November 2016), S/2017/234 (20 March 2017), S/2017/502 (14 June 2017), S/2017/777 (13 September 2017), S/2017/994 (28 November 2017), S/2018/205 (8 March 2018), S/2018/540 (6 June 2018), S/2018/835 (12 September 2018), S/2018/1048 (26 November 2018), S/2019/212 (6 March 2019), S/2019/496 (14 June 2019).

11 See statement of the EU/E3 and Iran on 15 May 2018 as well as statements of the JCPOA Ministerial Joint Commissions of 6 July 2018 and 24 September 2018.

12 My letter dated 6 November 2018 to the Coordinator of the Joint Commission and distributed to the Foreign Ministers of all remaining JCPOA participants.

No meeting was convened and none of the European JCPOA participants even bothered to write a rebuttal for another six months. Having repeatedly exhausted the Dispute Resolution Mechanism to absolutely no avail, my Government was left with no recourse but to exercise its rights under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA to apply remedial action and cease performing its commitments in part on 8 May 2019.

In spite of all this, our remedial measures have until now had no impact on the IAEA's monitoring and verification of our peaceful nuclear programme, thereby making any proliferation risks irrelevant. Indeed, Iran's peaceful nuclear programme remains subject to the "most robust" inspection regime in history. From 2016 through 2019, over 92 percent of the Agency's total comparable global inspections were carried out in Iran.<sup>13</sup>

Even the recent controversial report by the Director General of the IAEA on 5 June 2020 states that "The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement"<sup>14</sup>.

Having said that, the Agency must resist external pressures to manipulate its agenda. The litany of forged documents at its doorstep have a stated objective of forever killing the JCPOA, thereby ending the Agency's robust monitoring of current activities in Iran. Resuscitating 17-year-old allegations with no proliferation risk — which were investigated and permanently closed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2015<sup>15</sup> — will certainly not serve the Agency.

Matters which are extraneous to the JCPOA by mutual agreement — such as Iran's defensive capabilities and regional policies — are being maliciously raised by the United States Administration and parroted by a handful of its allies and clients.<sup>16</sup>

Here, it must be underlined that the bargain made in the JCPOA was in total cognizance of our *disagreement* with the Western members of the P5+1 over certain issues. Do not be deceived: we mutually agreed not to address these issues; most importantly because the United States was not prepared to — or probably even capable of — addressing our grave concerns over its unfathomable level of arms sales and build-up in our neighborhood<sup>17</sup>, as well as its malign behaviour and constant interventions, which have left our region in ruins.

The United States has carried out numerous acts of armed aggression against Iran<sup>18</sup> and its neighbours; invaded our neighbours three times in the last three

13 IAEA, "The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2019", GOV/2020/9.

14 IAEA, report by the Director General, "Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)", GOV/2020/26, 5 June 2020.

15 GOV/2015/72 "9. Also notes that all the activities in the Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule and further notes that this closes the Board's consideration of this item;"

16 Russia and China as two important JCPOA participants — along with several other members of the Council and the United Nations have officially rejected this approach. See for instance S/2020/451 and S/2020/517.

17 <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/global-arms-trade-usa-increases-dominance-arms-flows-middle-east-surge-says-sipri>

18 The overthrow of the democratically elected Government in 1953. Armed intervention in Iran on 24 April 1980. Attacks on Iranian oil platforms in October 1987 and April 1988 leading to the International Court of Justice ruling that "the actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms on October 19, 1987 (Operation Nimble Archer) and April 18, 1988 (Operation Praying Mantis) cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America." (International Court of Justice. Oil Platforms: Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). This was the largest United States naval operation since the Second World War. (Love, Robert

decades<sup>19</sup>; milked the region of its resources through destabilizing arms sales<sup>20</sup>; systematically supported terrorists<sup>21</sup>; and provided material support for crimes against humanity in Yemen<sup>22</sup>. The peoples of our region have had enough of the malign United States presence, and demand its termination.<sup>23</sup> The bitter irony here is that most Americans also want their troops returned home, where they belong.

This very regime absurdly accuses Iran of “meddling” in its own region. Yes. Of course. We want to partner with all our neighbours to create a *strong region* that precludes the emergence of hegemonic aspirations, by *any* Power — regional or global. A *strong region* that requires homegrown political and territorial stability. And a *strong region* for which all neighbours need to exercise strategic self-restraint. It was to this end that, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran put forward the Hormuz Peace Endeavour — HOPE. And we can do it. Without United States meddling some 6000 miles away from its shores.

The International Court of Justice clearly underlined in its 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia, and I quote, “One of the fundamental principles governing international relationship thus established is that a party which disowns or does not fulfil its own obligations cannot be recognized as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship.”<sup>24</sup>

After officially and explicitly ceasing its participation in the JCPOA at the highest level<sup>25</sup>, and having violated each and every one of its obligations under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), the United States cannot arrogate to itself any right under that resolution. Nor can its enablers try to save its face via so-called middle-ground formulas.

The timetable for the removal of arms restrictions embodied in resolution 2231(2015) is an inseparable part of the hard-won compromise enabling the JCPOA participants to finally agree on the overall package of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). The resolution explicitly urges its “full implementation on the timetable”. Any attempt to change or amend the agreed timetable is thus tantamount to undermining

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William. History of the U.S. Navy: Stackpole Books, Harrisburg 1992.) The downing of Iran Air passenger flight on 3 July 1988, killing 290 civilians. Numerous incursions into Iranian airspace. The terrorist murder of General Qassem Soleimani and high-ranking Iraqi officials in Iraq on 3 January 2020...

19 Iraq 1991; Afghanistan 2001; Iraq 2003.

20 <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/global-arms-trade-usa-increases-dominance-arms-flows-middle-east-surge-says-sipri>

21 “ISIS weapons arsenal included some purchased by U.S. government” <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/isis-weapons-arsenal-included-some-purchased-u-s-government-n829201>. “ISIL weapons traced to US and Saudi Arabia” <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/isis-weapons-traced-saudi-arabia-171214164431586.html>

22 “U.N. report says U.S., Britain, France may be complicit in potential war crimes in Yemen” [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-report-says-us-britain-france-complicit-in-potential-war-crimes-in-yemen/2019/09/03/ad278cf6-ce48-11e9-9031-519885a08a86\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-report-says-us-britain-france-complicit-in-potential-war-crimes-in-yemen/2019/09/03/ad278cf6-ce48-11e9-9031-519885a08a86_story.html). “America is likely complicit in war crimes in Yemen. It’s time to hold the US to account” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/03/yemen-airstrikes-saudi-arabia-mbs-us>

23 “Trump administration refuses to heed Iraq’s call for troop withdrawal” [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle\\_east/iraq-asks-united-states-to-set-up-mechanism-for-troop-withdrawal/2020/01/10/794058ea-32f8-11ea-971b-43bec3ff9860\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraq-asks-united-states-to-set-up-mechanism-for-troop-withdrawal/2020/01/10/794058ea-32f8-11ea-971b-43bec3ff9860_story.html)

24 Legal Consequences for States of the *continued presence* of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council *resolution* 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, para. 91.

25 “Presidential Memoranda: Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional Action to Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Path to Nuclear Weapons”, White House, 8 May 2018.

resolution 2231(2015) in its entirety.<sup>26</sup> The Council must not allow a single State to abuse the process.

As specified in the letter of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the leaders of remaining JCPOA participants on 8 May 2019, any new restriction by the Security Council is against the fundamental commitments made to the Iranian people. In such a scenario, Iran's options, as already notified to the remaining JCPOA participants, will be firm. And the United States and any entity which may assist it — or acquiesce in its illegal behaviour — will bear full responsibility.

The unlawful unilateral withdrawal by the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of its sanctions<sup>27</sup> entail the United States responsibility under the resolution 2231(2015), the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law. The United States has also disregarded the decision of the International Court of Justice<sup>28</sup>.

It's long overdue for the international community, and in particular this Council, to hold the United States Government accountable for the consequences of its wrongful acts — including its malicious endeavours to wage economic terrorism on the entire Iranian nation, willfully deprive them of food and medicine<sup>29</sup>, and irreparably harm their economy and their standard of living<sup>30</sup>. The United States must fully compensate the Iranian people for all damages it has inflicted upon them — appallingly, for no reason other than to satisfy domestic constituencies and personal aggrandizement.

While the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown — in words and deeds — our desire and preference for constructive engagement, we do not depend on others for our security, stability or prosperity. We have learned to solely depend on ourselves. That is why more than 40 years of pressure from the United States — whether through demonization or war, sanctions or terror — including the cowardly assassination of our region's counter-terrorism hero, General Qassem Soleimani — has failed to “bring Iranians to their knees” or affect our people's decision-making calculus.

26 In paragraph 1 of resolution 2231(2015), the Security Council: “Endorses the JCPOA, and urges its full implementation *on the timetable established* in the JCPOA;”

27 A list of sanctions imposed by the United States submitted to the Council as an attachment of my recent letter (A/74/850-S/2020/380, annex)

28 <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf>

29 Michael R. Pompeo interview with Hadi Nili of BBC Persian, 7 November 2018: “[T]he leadership has to make a decision that they want their people to eat”. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/interview-with-hadi-nili-of-bbc-persian/>. Also “Mike Pompeo Says Iran Must Listen to U.S. ‘If They Want Their People to Eat’”, Newsweek, 9 November 2018.

30 The White House, Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press Conference: “[W]e’re putting sanctions on Iran, the likes of which nobody has ever seen before, including, frankly, North Korea.” Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-conference-2/>. Also “Brian Hook: Because of our pressure, Iran’s leaders are facing a decision: either negotiate with us or manage economic collapse.” 27 May 2020. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-special-representative-for-iran-and-senior-advisor-to-the-secretary-brian-hook-and-assistant-secretary-for-international-security-and-nonproliferation-dr-christopher-a-ford-o/>. Also, Brian Hook’s Economic Speech at Council on Foreign Relations, 12 December 2019: “Iran’s oil exports have decreased by more than two million barrels per day, driving down Iran’s revenue from oil by more than 80 percent. This amounts to a loss of more than \$30 billion per year ... Our sanctions are also restricting investment in Iran’s oil and gas sector, which will have a lasting impact beyond the immediate loss of revenue from reduced exports ... This year, Iran’s economy will likely shrink by at least 9.5 percent, according to the IMF. This would be the steepest single-year decline in more than 30 years. Some analysts have projected an even steeper contraction, possibly as high as 12 to 14 percent. This would put the economy on the verge of a depression”. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/special-representative-brian-hooks-economic-speech-at-council-on-foreign-relations/>

For my final words, let me again borrow from Prime Minister Mossadegh's speech before the Security Council in 1951:

“The Council will not have failed to note the cogency of our arguments on the law. This is not a legal body, but primarily a political body charged with the highest political responsibilities. It will readily understand me. therefore, when I say that ... we will not be coerced whether by foreign Governments or by international authorities.” (*S/PV.560 paras. 117 and 119*).

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