

**Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention  
on the Prohibition of the Development,  
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological  
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their  
Destruction**

8 August 2018

English only

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**2018 Meeting**

Geneva, 4-7 December 2018

**Meeting of Experts on Strengthening National Implementation  
Geneva, 13 August 2018**

Items 4, 7 and 8 of the provisional agenda

**Measures related to Article IV of the Convention**

**Role of international cooperation and assistance under Article X, in support of strengthening the implementation of the Convention**

**Issues related to Article III, including effective measures of export control, in full conformity with all Articles of the Convention, including Article X**

## **National Implementation under Article IV**

### **Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran**

1. National implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as required under its Article IV necessitates commitment towards the implementation of all provisions of the Convention.
2. The Convention embodies a delicate equilibrium of rights and obligations, and premises on a holistic approach, according to which no provision is intended to hinder the legitimate transfer and exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes among State Parties.
3. The States Parties to the Convention should not use the provisions of Article III and IV of the Convention to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer or exchange of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.
4. Denial strategies, coercive measures and reductionist approaches in the implementation of the Convention that are unilateral, exclusive, discriminatory and politically motivated, would be divisive, and in the long run, would be to the disadvantages of the Convention and weaken it, in its totality.
5. Selective approaches to the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, driven by exclusive and non-internationally-agreed export control regimes, not only lack any sense of political will to cooperate with the developing States Parties in their capacity building policies, are paradoxical and detrimental to the integrity of the Convention. This

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serious challenge should be addressed in any proposed formula for the strengthening of the Convention.

6. Activities prohibited by the Convention and the risk of the access of terrorists to biological (bacteriological) toxin and agents for hostile purposes are of great concern for all States Parties; however, these should not be used in a way to justify adopting measures undermining the objectives and purposes of the Convention. Proliferation concerns are best addressed through a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and multilaterally negotiated and agreed mechanism and/or procedure, consistent with the provisions of the Convention.

7. The States Parties should avoid prejudice and resolve any concerns arising from any given transfers through a process of transparent consultation and clarification procedure.

8. A reassurance mechanism - instead of a denial approach such as Australia Group's restrictions - is required in order to institutionalize a procedure to monitor transfers with a view to increasing transparency on trade activities, including through a reporting procedure, intended end-use and end-use assurance, consistency of each State Party's national regulations, national licensing, penal codes and the like. Accordingly, such a mechanism should be agreed upon and created through a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and multilaterally negotiated procedure, by establishing an open-ended working group, for the facilitation of the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the obligation undertaken under Article X.

9. The adoption of various national implementation practices, in the absence of a verification mechanism for BWC, have created different national levels of restrictions, barriers and/or limitations for legitimate trade and transfer of biological agents and toxins, equipment, materials and related technologies for peaceful purposes. Inequitable national implementation models intrinsically create obstacles for developing countries to manage their public health needs. Consequently, any national implementation measure should contribute to public health issues and facilitate the fullest possible exchange for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article X.

10. The States Parties have the obligation towards implementation of all provisions of the Convention. To this end, an appropriate mechanism is needed to ensure that laws and regulations of the States parties do not hinder international exchange and cooperation under Article X and allow for the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes among States Parties.

11. In this connection, the States Parties should reach common understanding and effective action on addressing the following measures:

- to review national laws and regulations to ensure that they are in full conformity with the obligations undertaken under Article X,
- to identify specific measures to ensure national implementation of the Convention are taken in full conformity Article X of the Convention,
- to identify obstacles and challenges related to the national implementation that hamper the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes,
- to identify specific measures to address the cases of denials arising from restrictions and/or limitations posed which hinders the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Convention.