



*President:* Mr. Peter FLORIN  
(German Democratic Republic).

**AGENDA ITEM 8**

**General debate (continued)**

1. Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I convey to you my delegation's sincerest felicitations on your election to the presidency of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We feel confident that in your experienced hands this session will be able to fulfil the expectations of its participants and the purposes for which it has been convened. Allow me to add my voice to that of the speakers before me who have paid rich tributes to your leadership and to wish you success in guiding the deliberations of this special session. I also salute your great country, with which Pakistan enjoys close and cordial relations.

2. I take this opportunity of conveying to the Secretary-General our profound appreciation of his role as a source of ideas and inspirational thought to facilitate initiatives to be taken in our quest for strengthening the foundations of peace and security in our world.

3. The opening statement made by the Secretary-General and your own address have brought into sharp focus the importance of this special session, which is the third of its kind in a decade. We hope that at its conclusion we shall have made concrete progress and succeeded in building a credible edifice of disarmament on the foundations laid at the first special session.

4. The suggested elements for consideration under the substantive items of the provisional agenda of the special session were spelt out in the report of the Preparatory Committee [A/S-15/1, annex, sect. I], which has greatly facilitated the work of this special session. I take special pleasure in acknowledging the contribution of Mr. Mansur Ahmed, whose able leadership of the Committee as its Chairman has earned generous praise from so many speakers. Mr. Ahmed's unanimous election as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole was a great honour for Pakistan and a source of particular satisfaction to me personally in view of our long association in the Foreign Service of Pakistan and our friendship over the years.

5. As we assemble here to discuss disarmament issues, several concerns dominate our thoughts.

There is the fear, no longer unrealistic, of the entire human race perishing in a nuclear holocaust. There is the concern among smaller nations in far-flung corners of the globe that the diversion of precious resources to armaments may produce economic and social chaos on the one hand, and military preponderance and expansionist ambitions on the other, which together will destroy the fragile fabric of security and breed aggressive wars in which the very foundations of the sovereignty, independence and freedom of States may crumble.

6. The urge for security is universal and transcends the factors of size or capability. The great Powers are as much preoccupied with it as are the smaller States. The only difference is that the great Powers are everywhere, whereas the smaller States have to worry mainly about their own neighbourhoods. The search for a disarmament régime, therefore, must be the equal concern of all States, big or small. Without universal participation in efforts to achieve disarmament, a viable disarmament régime answering global as well as regional concerns is hardly conceivable.

7. The United Nations is the only political and security forum in which all the nations of the world are represented. As such, its indispensable rôle in the disarmament process cannot be overstated.

8. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, of which Pakistan is a member, can take legitimate pride in having promoted the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, which focused world attention on such a role by the United Nations. Indeed, that special session produced a Final Document [*resolution S-10/2*] which provided a comprehensive basis for the development of any further ideas and concepts in the field of disarmament. That Final Document, which represents a distillation of our collective wisdom and thinking, is truly universal in its scope and character.

9. It is a matter of concern that we have not been able so far to live up to the hopes generated by that Final Document. But we need not feel despondent. Progress in this field is slow, since mankind learns its lessons often through costly mistakes. The time has come for a less leisurely pace, for constructive thought to produce concrete results.

10. The need for speed is obvious. Our thinking has to keep pace with weapons which can reach their targets at incredible speeds and carry warheads capable of obliterating life on Earth. The unbridled advance in science, technology and the sophistication of weapons of mass destruction at the disposal of mankind leaves us in no doubt that the preservation of peace and the survival of mankind depend as

never before on collective initiatives and efforts to halt and reverse the runaway arms race.

11. It is imperative that the fear of global annihilation should not be allowed to breed a state of mind so steeped in resignation, anguish and despair as to stifle thought and paralyse action, thereby hastening the doom we all fear and must avoid. In order to keep alive our urge for survival we have to be optimists and believe that mankind has a great future before it. We have only now acquired the experience, the knowledge and the capability to transform this world into a cradle of peace and security and a haven of prosperity and happiness.

12. Developments have taken place around us which renew hope and encourage optimism. Both in the global arena and in the regional context things have begun to happen which should be matters of good cheer to all of us.

13. The two super-Powers, which between them have the capability to make life extinct on this planet, are engaged in a meaningful dialogue to arrest the breathless rush towards the brink of doom and to begin a new experiment in co-operation for restraint.

14. There have been four meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev since 1985. We were heartened by the declaration issued after the first summit in Geneva in November of that year that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. This is a precept which should serve as the foundation of all our endeavours to banish the threat of a nuclear conflict, because the concept of fighting a nuclear war is neither rational nor practical.

15. The second summit, at Reykjavik in October 1986, saw the birth of the proposal for drastically reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers.

16. The signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—in Washington in December 1987 was a historic achievement by which the third summit will be remembered. The seemingly intractable issue of verification of measures of nuclear disarmament, which had defied solution since such negotiations began more than 40 years ago, has yielded to the political courage and skill of the two super-Powers. Even more important than its military significance is the hope it has aroused of real progress in East-West détente. It is a matter of gratification to us that the INF Treaty also eliminated the SS-20 missiles deployed in Asia.

17. We hope that the recently concluded fourth summit has prepared the ground for the eventual signing of a strategic arms reduction agreement. The nuclear arms race between the super-Powers has proceeded beyond the point where it makes any possible political or military sense. One cannot but ask why their nuclear stockpiles have vastly exceeded the level needed to maintain a state of mutual deterrence. Let us hope that the first destruction of missiles by mutual agreement by the two super-Powers, to which the Soviet Foreign Minister made an eloquent reference in his statement of 8 June [12th

meeting], will have dug the grave for weapons of mass destruction for all time.

18. Let us also hope that General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal for a joint venture to the red planet, symbolizing a new era of super-Power co-operation on Earth and in space, will inspire more urgent ventures between the two countries to achieve their declared objective of preventing an arms race in space, terminating it on Earth and, ultimately, eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of this planet.

19. Although the two super-Powers are the principal space Powers and bear a special responsibility to avoid competition in the military uses of outer space, the danger of the militarization of outer space is equally the concern of all the other members of the international community. This is because emplacement of weapons in outer space will introduce a qualitative new dimension to the arms race, undermining existing disarmament agreements and jeopardizing the disarmament process as a whole. The spiral of an offensive-defensive nuclear arms race can best be prevented by political, not technological means.

20. The existing legal régime, imposing some restraints on the military uses of outer space, is not enough to prevent an arms race there. It needs to be strengthened with new rules of international law to ensure that outer space, which is a common heritage of mankind, is reserved only for peaceful exploration and use by all nations. Pakistan therefore supports the early establishment of an international space-monitoring agency which can make a positive contribution to verification, confidence-building and transparency.

21. We cannot subscribe to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which is often advocated on the ground that it has prevented war in Europe since 1945, when millions of lives have been lost in more than 150 conflicts around the world. This is a self-defeating argument which, in fact, would invite other regions of the world to follow the European example. The overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have seen the extreme danger in such a line of reasoning and have contributed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons by voluntarily renouncing the nuclear option. We hope that States possessing nuclear weapons and the threshold nuclear States will follow this example.

22. There is another category of weapons which shares with nuclear weapons the capacity for mass murder and is similar in its indiscriminate and dehumanizing effects. I refer to chemical weapons, which are already an ugly reality, both in their development and in their deployment. These weapons have been responsible for taking thousands of innocent lives recently in the Iran-Iraq conflict. The use of chemical weapons is a clear violation of the Geneva Protocol<sup>1</sup> and cannot be condoned in any circumstances.

23. The threat of the proliferation of chemical-weapons capability is both real and present. In order to put a stop to the danger of the further development and use of such weapons the Conference on Disarmament must bring to an early conclusion the

on-going negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We call upon all States concerned to approach the remaining issues—in particular, that of verification—in a spirit of compromise and with a sense of urgency. In the long term it would not be strategically advantageous to throw away the chance of agreement because of the risk of a little cheating, if 100 per cent foolproof measures cannot be devised.

24. The dark side of human genius is capable of disturbing not only the serenity of the blue skies in space, but also the calm of the blue seas. Nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, have also been deployed at sea. The naval forces of a few States have acquired an unprecedented capability with the introduction of nuclear-powered attack submarines. The naval forces of many countries have been expanded and modernized beyond the legitimate requirements of coastal defence, causing smaller States within their reach to feel threatened. The question of naval disarmament and of the placing of limits on the military uses of the high seas therefore deserves to be addressed without delay.

25. The security concerns of the smaller coastal States need particular attention. In order to ensure coastal security for the threatened States, it is necessary for the major naval Powers and those States to enter into negotiations to prevent naval dominance of the oceans and high seas as a result of the introduction of sophisticated weapons systems, such as aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered attack submarines.

26. A moment ago I spoke of the danger of nuclear proliferation. A treaty prohibiting all nuclear test explosions by all countries, in all environments for all times, is long overdue. A nuclear-test-ban treaty's central importance for non-proliferation has been fully recognized. Its conclusion must not be delayed any further because of the strategically insignificant advances that could be made in warhead technology by continued testing. Such a ban would make an effective contribution to stopping the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and preventing their proliferation. At the very least, the nuclear-weapon Powers must set a time limit—not exceeding five years—on further nuclear tests for any nuclear-weapon programme in which they are engaged.

27. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] has, so far, served a useful purpose, despite the fact that it is unequal and discriminatory. However, in order to ensure that the credibility of a non-proliferation régime is not eroded, it is imperative for the nuclear-weapon States to live up to their commitments regarding a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States in the peaceful application of nuclear technology.

28. Indeed, a viable and durable non-proliferation régime requires further measures at the global and regional levels to allay the security concerns of non-nuclear States, such as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and effective assurances that States possessing nuclear weapons will not use or threaten to use them against those who have renounced these weapons.

29. Pakistan's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation is firm and unwavering. We want the present non-proliferation régime strengthened so that our world is not made more insecure by the addition of even a single nuclear-weapon State. Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons, nor does it intend to possess them. We have not carried out a nuclear explosion nor do we intend to conduct one. Our nuclear programme is emphatically peaceful in nature; indeed, we are firm in our resolve to keep our area free from all nuclear weapons.

30. In our region, South Asia, nuclear proliferation concerns are the product of a history of regional tensions and conflicts which feed upon mutual suspicions about each other's nuclear programmes. It is obvious, therefore, that only a regional approach can provide an effective answer to the problem.

31. Pakistan is fully committed to this approach, which in our belief is the only viable one to the problem of non-proliferation in South Asia. All the States of South Asia have declared at the highest level that they will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. We have made a number of proposals to convert these unilateral declarations into binding legal obligations, which I should like to repeat here: we are ready to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty simultaneously with India; we are ready to accept full-scope safeguards for our nuclear programme simultaneously with India; we are ready to conclude a bilateral agreement with India for the mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities; we are ready to make a joint declaration with India renouncing nuclear weapons; and we are ready to enter into a bilateral nuclear test-ban treaty with India. We will accept any equitable and non-discriminatory agreement with effective verification arrangements that would commit the countries of the region, in a legally binding manner, not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons.

32. Stockpiles of separated plutonium—for which there is no conceivable use in nuclear power plants for at least the next two or more decades—are increasing in our region with every passing day.

33. Pakistan has proposed the convening of a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, under United Nations auspices, with the participation of the regional and other interested States, to explore the possibilities of an agreement. We hope our proposal for the conference will receive the support of this Assembly which will enable such a conference to be held at an early date.

34. Earlier in my statement I underlined the indispensable role of the United Nations in the disarmament process. The overwhelming majority of its Members are non-nuclear States and as such have had no role in the super-Power negotiations on the INF Treaty and the ongoing negotiations on a 50 per cent reduction of long-range strategic arms. But it is self-evident that there must be multilateral participation in the negotiations over a whole range of disarmament measures, such as chemical weapons, regional conventional disarmament, a comprehensive test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

35. The concept of "constructive parallelism" between the super-Power negotiations and those which must necessarily involve the United Nations membership as a whole would point the way to the harmonization of the respective roles and co-operation between the nuclear-weapon Powers and the non-nuclear States in their common quest for putting at rest the haunting fear of the arms race.

36. We are not a super-Power, and we take a modest view of our role in fields where our reach is limited. While giving the foremost priority—and rightly so—to measures for nuclear disarmament, we do not allow such preoccupations to divert our attention from the need to limit and reduce conventional weapons, armed forces and military budgets. Once again, the regional approach offers the most realistic prospect for success in the area of conventional disarmament.

37. In many regions the arms race is fuelled by the efforts of the militarily most powerful States to attain positions of dominance in order to be able to pursue policies of regional hegemony. In such situations the States of the region become victims of a vicious circle of ever-increasing levels of forces and armaments and diminished security. It is therefore the special responsibility of States which are in a preponderant military position in a particular region to be responsive to proposals for arms limitations and, indeed, to initiate such proposals themselves.

38. We are deeply conscious of the need for conventional disarmament measures in South Asia, which has a long history of conflict and tension. An unduly large part of our resources is currently devoted to military expenditure instead of being spent for the economic and social development of our respective countries. We have made concrete proposals to India for a mutual agreement to limit arms or reduce military budgets, and we hope India will respond positively.

39. Confidence-building measures are a widely recognized means of reducing tensions and creating conditions which facilitate disarmament negotiations. These are particularly suited to regions such as South Asia where mistrust and mutual lack of information or the military intentions and activities of neighbouring States have sometimes led to an escalation wanted by neither side. We believe that the countries of South Asia could follow with advantage the European example on the prior notification of large-scale military manoeuvres. Another measure would be for the States of South Asia to agree to exchange information on their military capabilities and expenditures.

40. Other confidence-building measures could include treaties on non-aggression and non-use of force, as well as agreements on force deployments and the creation of fully or partially demilitarized zones, establishment of mutually acceptable military equilibrium and force ratios, clarification of security objectives and doctrines, commitment to resolve outstanding disputes through recognized international procedures, and promotion of economic co-operation on the basis of mutual benefit, which would generate a common stake in the preservation of regional peace.

41. The peace of a region can also be disturbed by external forces over which we have no control. The conflict in Afghanistan was such a factor which has had serious consequences for the peace and security of the South Asian region. For more than eight years the brave Afghan nation has carried on a heroic struggle to free itself from foreign domination. It has still to reassemble the pieces of its fragmented society. The tragedy of the people of Afghanistan was also our tragedy: over 1 million Afghans died in resisting the aggression; one third of the Afghan nation had to abandon its hearths and homes to seek refuge abroad; and 3 million Afghans sought shelter in Pakistan—and they are still there. The dimensions of this tragedy have few parallels in recent times. Mercifully, the long night of that tragedy is coming to an end.

42. Next to the gigantic effort and sacrifices of the Afghan people themselves, it is the overwhelming support of the great majority of the membership of the United Nations which has been responsible for the dawn of the day of freedom for that valiant nation. The role of the United Nations in setting in motion the peace process in Afghanistan augurs well for the resolution of conflict situations in other parts of the world. We wish to express our profound appreciation of the contribution made by the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative in initiating the Geneva process and bringing it to a successful conclusion. Pakistan is grateful to the Members of the United Nations for their consistent support of the cause of Afghan freedom. We are also grateful to the international community for the generous assistance that enabled Pakistan to fulfil its humanitarian obligation of providing shelter and sustenance to the Afghan refugees on its soil.

43. In the unfolding saga of the freedom struggle in Afghanistan, the positive role of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev must be recognized. It was Mr. Gorbachev's historic statement of 8 February, in which he announced the time-frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, together with his commitment to the restructuring of a new edifice of global peace, that made it possible for the Geneva agreements to be concluded successfully.

44. These agreements remain an important first step. It is our earnest hope that the Soviet Union will continue to play a positive role in the restoration of peace and tranquillity in Afghanistan, which is yet to be achieved. Indeed, the Soviet Union has a crucial role to play in the continuing United Nations process to enable the Afghan people to reach agreement on the form of a transitional government of their choice. Pakistan is committed to helping such a process. The establishment of such a transitional government in Afghanistan will facilitate the smooth implementation of the Geneva accords and create the necessary conditions for the safe return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland. The difficulties, if any, which may be experienced in implementation of the Geneva accords will be directly attributable to the absence of a transitional government acceptable to the people of Afghanistan.

45. Members who were present heard a statement from this podium in the afternoon of Tuesday, 7 June [11th meeting], which contained vile allegations

against Pakistan by the Kabul régime. These baseless allegations were accompanied by threats, which were reported by *The New York Times* of 8 June as sabre-rattling against Pakistan.

46. The Kabul régime cannot establish its credibility or legitimacy on false premises. As the day for the total withdrawal of Soviet troops draws near, the régime is gripped with the fear of being overtaken by nemesis. It must be this concern that impairs its vision and warps its judgement. The world will not be surprised if a crumbling régime makes a desperate bid to retain the protective umbrella of foreign troops, the withdrawal of which is the central element of the Geneva accords. Not only the people of Afghanistan and the international community, but, we believe, even the Soviet leadership will oppose such a reversal of the Geneva process. The Kabul régime should not be trying to rattle a sabre that lies in another's scabbard.

47. The Geneva agreements provide a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the Geneva accords, and the United Nations Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan [UNGOMAP] has its offices in Kabul and Pakistan. The proper procedure is for the parties to refer complaints, if any, to the UNGOMAP offices available to them and to await the results of their investigations. Pakistan has been following this procedure and has refrained from using, for political and propaganda purposes, the numerous instances of violation of its territory and air space from the Kabul side.

48. It is quite clear that the deliberate and vociferous propaganda campaign against Pakistan had been carefully orchestrated over the past few weeks to reach a crescendo at the time of the delivery of the aforementioned statement before this session last Tuesday.

49. I now come to the concluding theme of my statement. Disarmament by itself is an incomplete process. It has been rightly recognized that disarmament and development are two most urgent challenges facing the world today and are two pillars on which international peace and security can be built. The continuing arms race absorbs far too great a proportion of the world's human, financial, natural and technological resources and hinders the process of confidence-building among States. The global military expenditure, estimated at a thousand billion dollars annually, is in dramatic contrast to the economic and social underdevelopment and to the misery and poverty afflicting two thirds of mankind.

50. There is also growing recognition that both overarmament and underdevelopment threaten international peace and security. The lopsided commitment of the world's resources to the development and production of armaments of ever increasing sophistication and destructive power, as against the extremely limited investment in the social and economic well-being of our society, represents an increasing perversion of the values on which our civilization rests.

51. Such a situation creates a moral imperative for the international community to heave together in a

determined effort to stop the militarization of our Earth and space and, in a reversal of priorities, to concentrate on the development of mankind's material and spiritual resources. We must reconstruct while we can our present-day society, so convoluted in the distorting mirror of the arms race. Time has not run out on us yet. We retain the capacity to reassert our humanity and to save ourselves and future generations from having to face a final countdown.

52. Ms. HERNES (Norway): Mr. President, permit me first to congratulate you on your election to this very important post. I can assure you that my delegation will do its utmost to support you in the performance of your functions.

53. Ten years ago the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament successfully drew up a document of historic significance. The Final Document, with its Declaration and Programme of Action, provided a framework for the international community's disarmament efforts in the years to come. Although much remains to be done before the priorities and measures contained in the Programme of Action are achieved, we have experienced important progress in many arms control areas.

54. The potential of the United Nations to contribute to the international disarmament process is to a large extent dependent on the development in other disarmament bodies and in East-West relations in general. The third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is taking place at a time when significant progress has been made in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

55. The promising developments in international relations represent an important opportunity for the United Nations to play a more decisive role in the area of disarmament. The challenge before us is to promote the positive trends in arms control and disarmament bodies outside the world Organization. A successful outcome of this special session would both strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and give directions for future arms control and disarmament efforts. In other words, multilateralism and bilateralism should complement each other in a constructive manner.

56. The conclusion of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles represents an important step forward in the negotiations on reductions in nuclear arsenals. For the first time, efforts succeeded in eliminating a whole category of nuclear systems. This agreement strengthens security in Europe and Asia as well as in a global context. Furthermore, the INF Treaty has set important standards for future arms control agreements in other fields. I would in particular like to draw the attention of delegations to the extensive verification arrangements agreed upon as well as the principle of asymmetrical reductions to arrive at equal limitations.

57. The recent Moscow summit did not produce an agreement limiting and reducing the super-Powers' strategic nuclear arsenals. However, this should not be allowed to overshadow the progress that has been made in this field. The major elements of an agreement drastically reducing the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be emerging. In this situation we urge the super-Powers to sustain the momentum that has been created and to pursue with undiminished effort the task of reaching an early agreement on the strategic weapons. The conclusion of such an agreement would be in the best interests of us all and may pave the way for limitations in other threatening nuclear systems. The task of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our security arrangements should be pursued with no interlocking linkages and should aim at strengthening security at the lowest possible levels of forces.

58. Norway is greatly concerned that limitations agreed upon in negotiations on arms control and disarmament should not shift the military confrontation to new categories of weapons or to areas which have so far enjoyed relatively low tension. We therefore welcome the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to search for limitations on long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. It is our hope that the negotiating parties will succeed in finding effective and mutually acceptable methods of verification.

59. Attention has recently been focused on naval armaments and disarmament—in other words, on naval confidence-building measures. The discussion of such measures is of particular concern to Norway. Such a discussion must take into account geographic asymmetries as well as the principles of the freedom of navigation. The possibility of starting negotiations on a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea should be considered.

60. The prospect of significant reductions in nuclear arsenals has led to increased interest in other destabilizing military imbalances. This is a field in which the super-Powers alone do not carry the burden. Small and medium-sized countries have a responsibility and can make a contribution as well. That is the reason why Norway has wholeheartedly supported the efforts to initiate new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. Such negotiations should aim at eliminating capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

61. Talks in Vienna between representatives of those States whose military forces bear most directly upon the existing security arrangements in Europe have progressed satisfactorily. We are convinced that the remaining issues will not prove insurmountable and that negotiations on conventional stability will soon open.

62. Vast resources are spent world-wide on conventional armaments. Reversing that development is an important challenge for the international community. We are all aware of the enormous destructive consequences of the use of ever-more-sophisticated conventional weapons in regional conflicts in many parts of the world. Although our attention should be focused mainly on nuclear weapons, it is necessary

that conventional disarmament be reflected to a greater extent on the multilateral agenda.

63. Arms control and disarmament cannot be considered in isolation. The degree to which such endeavours will succeed also depends on the extent of trust that exists between the parties. A lessening of military confrontation and political détente are mutually complementary.

64. In this perspective we welcome the super-Power dialogue being conducted at the highest political level, as well as the regular net of contacts now established at other levels covering a wide range of issues. Arms control alone cannot bear the brunt of the responsibility for sustaining this dialogue.

65. Norway attaches particular importance to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In this forum smaller European States are able to participate in a process of extending and improving East-West relations across divergent social and economic systems and to make their contribution to building confidence in the military field. Progress at the Conference's third Follow-Up Meeting, at Vienna, has been slow. The recent presentation by the nuclear and non-aligned States of a draft concluding document is a constructive step which gives rise to hopes that it may be possible to reach agreement on an acceptable and balanced concluding document at a relatively early date. Norway for its part will work towards that end. In this context we would welcome a positive Eastern response to the compromise now emerging, in particular in the field of human rights and contacts.

66. Norway has no chemical weapons, and the Norwegian Government has decided not to allow the stationing or storage of chemical weapons on our territory.

67. We strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq. The renewed use and the danger of further proliferation of chemical weapons underline the importance of the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on such weapons. No efforts should be spared to accelerate the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible time. This should be duly reflected in the concluding document of this session.

68. The Conference on Disarmament is in the process of breaking new ground in the elaboration of an effective and global verifications system. I am pleased to note that the process of arriving at a satisfactory solution is well underway. Nevertheless, much detailed work still remains to be done in areas such as on-site inspection on challenge and non-production. As the two countries possessing the largest stocks of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility for implementing a ban on chemical weapons. However, all participating States in the Conference on Disarmament have a responsibility for sustaining the momentum in the negotiations and for making efforts in solving the outstanding questions.

69. Norway is the endorsed candidate of the Western group for membership in the Conference on

Disarmament. We have participated in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention since 1982. At this session we have submitted a memorandum which summarizes the main elements of the Norwegian research programme on the development of a complete procedure for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons [A/S-15/13, annex].

70. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban is a fundamental Norwegian policy objective. It is a matter of the highest importance for this session to underline its commitment to the achievement of an end to all nuclear test explosions. Such a ban should prohibit both nuclear weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions.

71. We welcome the signing of the Joint Verification Experiment Agreement at the Moscow summit meeting. We are encouraged that the United States and the Soviet Union will agree on effective verification measures enabling them to ratify the two threshold treaties. This will be the first concrete result of the bilateral full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations.

72. Nuclear testing, however, is not only the concern of the nuclear-weapons States. The Conference on Disarmament should undertake substantive work on relevant questions relating to a test ban. Such questions need in any case to be addressed prior to the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on this subject.

73. A test-ban treaty must contain comprehensive and effective verification measures. An effective international verification system is necessary to deter States from conducting clandestine nuclear tests and to provide assurance that events such as earthquakes are not misinterpreted as nuclear explosions. A global seismological network should be the central tool in monitoring compliance with a test ban. Such a network must be based on utilization of modern technology, including satellite communication of seismic data. This underlines the significance of the work being done in the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, in the Conference on Disarmament.

74. The Norwegian Government will make available all three of the seismic arrays in Norway—NORSAR, NORESS and ARCESS—as stations in the global seismological network. Those stations provide seismic coverage for a large part of the northern hemisphere and parts of the southern hemisphere. In this connection I would also like to draw attention to the strong co-operative links which have been developed between Australia and Norway in the field of seismological research to improve methods for nuclear-test-ban verification.

75. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would contribute to the promotion of both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation efforts. The strong commitment of the five Nordic countries to strengthen the non-proliferation régime is reflected in the joint Nordic memorandum submitted to this session [A/S-15/14, annex].

76. The role of the United Nations in the field of verification has been discussed extensively, both in

the Disarmament Commission and at this session. We support the idea of establishing an expert group to study possible United Nations activities in this field. We must bear in mind that the objective of United Nations involvement in verification should be to support and strengthen the ongoing efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament.

77. Arms control issues relating to outer space are of great relevance to international peace and security. A primary objective of the community of nations during the years ahead is to ensure that outer space will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Its exploration and use should be for the benefit of all countries, irrespective of their levels of economic and scientific development.

78. The efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space must be pursued in both bilateral and multilateral forums. The multilateral efforts should be supplementary to the bilateral negotiations on space arms between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament have a responsibility to contribute to the prevention of such an arms race. However, a common understanding on the scope and specific objectives of possible multilateral efforts is called for. No doubt, confidence-building measures could create an atmosphere which is conducive to the future work in this field.

79. The relationship between disarmament and security is a complex one. Agreements that constrain or reduce armaments help to eliminate distrust between nations and to create conditions for increased security. But security depends not only on military factors; a broader concept of security encompasses political, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental and developmental aspects as well. That was the main message of the Final Document which was adopted by consensus at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development<sup>2</sup> convened at United Nations Headquarters from 24 August to 11 September 1987. This broader concept of security has also been duly underlined by the World Commission on Environment and Development, which was chaired by my Prime Minister, Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland.

80. As was pointed out by the President of Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Mugabe [2nd meeting], and by the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher [8th meeting], the World Commission's report<sup>3</sup> highlights the vicious circle of poverty and environmental degradation. I should like to associate myself with what Mr. Genscher said about the increasing interdependence of these challenges which demands effective strategies by the international community:

“We must use all available instruments of international co-operation to prevent crises turning into wars, to prevent a lack of vital supplies leading to famine, and neglect of the environment leading to disaster. All of that is impossible if we seal ourselves off from each other. Openness and trust are required.” [Ibid., para. 80.]

81. Unless we understand the roots of the insecurity of nations, the search for solutions to international problems will not be successful. Insecurity is intimately linked to social and economic underdevelopment, and it is a fundamental challenge to the multilateral diplomacy to change the present disproportion between arms expenditure and development efforts. The aim should be to turn the negative relationship between arms buildup and development needs into positive interaction between disarmament, development and security.

82. It is of the utmost importance to have realistic objectives for the third special session. The concluding document should be concrete and forward-looking. It should express the resolve of the international community to support and revitalize the disarmament process. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to concentrate the discussion on a limited number of main topics and to pursue actively those issues on which consensus can be reached. In that way, this session would be instrumental in creating a framework which is more conducive to a speedy conclusion of ongoing arms control and disarmament negotiations.

83. Mr. HAMEED (Sri Lanka): Sir, let me at the outset offer you Sri Lanka's sincere congratulations and good wishes on your election as President of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Your wide experience and proven ability will greatly help us in our task.

84. I had the privilege of participating in both the first and second special sessions on disarmament. It is therefore of considerable satisfaction to me to be present on this occasion and to renew Sri Lanka's continuing commitment to the cause of disarmament. Indeed, it fell to Sri Lanka, in our capacity then as Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, to present to the Assembly the enabling resolution calling for the first special session.

85. The decade that has passed since then has been dramatic and eventful, yet the essential validity of the Final Document adopted in 1978 remains undiminished as an agenda for human survival and development. The global climate in which we meet this year is conducive to the disarmament process. The recent meeting of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union carries forward positive promise and political potential for the international community. These developments have seen practical expression in the signing last December, by the two countries, of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty. Sri Lanka has already welcomed these developments.

86. For the first time in the history of the disarmament process, agreement has been reached by the two nations for the elimination of an entire class of weapons. The treaty has not brought military advantage to either Power; it has, however, brought hope to humanity. The positive achievements of the INF Treaty need further enhancement and development in the interests of all mankind.

87. The arms race continues unabated with all political patronage. Military research and develop-

ment are being vigorously pursued to enhance the destructive capacity of weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence still hold sway. There are those who still consider a world free of nuclear weapons as highly utopian and even dangerous.

88. The first special session asserted that nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. This does not imply that the vast majority of States should be excluded from negotiations on issues of vital and direct concern to their own safety, security and survival. All States have the right—indeed, a duty to their peoples—to participate in disarmament negotiations. The threat of nuclear annihilation hangs equally over all nations, including militarily insignificant States like Sri Lanka.

89. Non-aligned and neutral States have rejected membership in military alliances. We believe that security is best promoted by shedding rather than adding weaponry. Non-membership in military alliances is not an act of self-imposed isolation but a desire to discourage power blocs and spheres of influence.

90. The United Nations and its disarmament bodies represent the international community in all its diversity. No one would question the right of any State to enter into alliance or negotiation with one or more other States on arms limitation or disarmament matters. However, what causes dismay is that the United Nations multilateral negotiating mechanisms, with all their potential, have not been given their due place. That has left several areas of immense concern unarticulated.

91. The first special session acknowledged the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and reconstituted it in its present form. Sri Lanka is a member of that forum. A decade later, this third special session is in a position to assess its success and failure. The progress of that body is linked to the international response to multilateralism. Invested with a negotiating mandate to conclude a draft convention to prohibit chemical weapons, it has, despite the political, technical and other complexities involved, come close to finalizing its work. That has demonstrated its capacity to undertake such a highly specialized task seriously and to do so within a multilateral framework.

92. In contrast, the competence and the capacity of the Conference on Disarmament to undertake negotiations on a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty in the proper multilateral context remain stifled. Nuclear weapons remain the greatest single threat to human survival. It is true that the two major nuclear Powers have reached agreement on a step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban. However, this approach tends to relegate the goal of a treaty into the distant, uncertain future. There are several negative consequences attendant upon that which clearly illustrate the limitations of an essentially bilateral approach. Continued testing enhances the lethality of nuclear weapons, and unbridled testing erodes the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty even in

the eyes of its signatories. One cannot argue for wider acceptance of that treaty while at the same time denying a universal framework for negotiating a nuclear test ban. A comprehensive treaty on the complete prohibition of testing of all types of nuclear weapons in all environments by all States would overcome those and other limitations inherent in an approach conceived in a purely bilateral context.

93. Outer space is another area where the lack of a multilateral framework and a proper negotiating mandate does not augur well. Agreements reached between the two major space Powers in December 1987 promise more intensive negotiations at the bilateral level, but such talks will in no way be jeopardized if, in parallel, the Conference on Disarmament is permitted to exercise its mandate to undertake negotiations. Such negotiations could lead to the eventual conclusion of a universally acceptable agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space and to ensure the exclusively peaceful development of its vast potential.

94. The existing legal régime governing the activities of States in that immense expanse has kept the peace thus far. However, such a peace has become fragile and tenuous given the rapid technological development and heightened strategic and military considerations being applied to outer space. Twenty-two years ago, when the Outer Space Treaty<sup>4</sup> was being adopted, as a representative of Sri Lanka at the General Assembly I had the occasion to caution against unrestrained military activities in outer space. I did so because of our concern that military space research would lead to the development of weapons, their testing and eventually their deployment.

95. A number of proposals have been made in respect of outer space, including proposals on verification measures and mechanisms. All the complex issues involved clearly require careful consideration in a multilateral rather than a bilateral framework, because both potential threat and potential benefit apply to all States. Agreements would require eventual incorporation within a comprehensive legal régime binding on and applicable to all. That can be effectively done only in a multilateral framework such as the Conference on Disarmament. The introduction of weapons into space would convert its still largely peaceful reaches into an arena of conflict, rendering the task more complex, even intractable. Already sophisticated technology has been deployed for military purposes, using space as an extension of weapons systems on Earth.

96. While high technology can perform useful functions in verification and confidence-building, weapons have become more lethal and more accurate. Each deadly advance is rendered obsolete the moment rival technologies improve on it, and the spiral continues upwards, the tempo picks up and the dangers multiply.

97. Tragically, too little of the research and sophisticated technology finds its way to enrich the quality of human life, although the relationship between disarmament and development has now been accepted. Last year the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Develop-

ment asserted that disarmament and development are "two pillars on which enduring international peace and security can be built"<sup>5</sup> and noted the glaring contrast between global military expenditure and the economic and social underdevelopment, misery and poverty afflicting more than two thirds of mankind. Security cannot be conceived of in purely military terms. Planned global development is a prerequisite for enduring peace. The social and economic dimensions of security can be enhanced with the resources released by disarmament.

98. Regional approaches to disarmament play a major role in enhancing security and economic development. We already have the example of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We already have the examples of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)<sup>6</sup> and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). There are also proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, in the Middle East, in South Asia and other regions.

99. Sri Lanka's initiative on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace [*resolution 2832 (XXVI)*] has been pursued here at the United Nations. Its fruition would contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security as well as the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States of the region. A consensus exists among permanent members of the Security Council, the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean and, of course, the regional States, for the holding of a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo at a date not later than 1990. That conference has had to be postponed several times for various reasons, and it is hoped that recent developments in the region will now make it possible for all States to participate fully in the convening of the Conference.

100. Considerable work has already been accomplished towards identifying substantive issues relating to the establishment of the zone with a view to their eventual incorporation in agreements for the preservation of the zone. In 1979 the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean adopted a document containing principles of agreement for implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. They include the non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, regional and other co-operation, denuclearization of the zone and the elimination of great-Power rivalry. Those principles are central to peace in the Indian Ocean, as indeed they are to peace in any other region or in the world as a whole.

101. Greater confidence and trust between nations at bilateral levels can be built only by adherence to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by the open examination and exploration of factors that lie at the heart of conflicts. On the universal issues of peace, security and development which are of common concern to all, the multilateral process must involve full participation—not only to air the issues and to permit articulation of the concerns of all, but also to provide collective means to negotiate solutions that heed the cardinal principle of the sovereign equality of all States. An American President has said that one must not fear to negoti-

ate, nor must one negotiate out of fear. The impulses for peace and for negotiation that have been set in motion are, I believe, being kindled less out of fear, more out of hope. The great task before us in the closing decades of this century is to seize that hope. The task is too great, too complex, to be seriously undertaken except as a collective endeavour. The success of this special session will be judged by the extent to which it will create a consensus and a commitment for the pursuit of that task, in a spirit that genuinely acknowledges and upholds our common human destiny.

102. Mr. THINLEY (Bhutan): This is the third time that the growing fear over the global arms race has brought this world body together to deliberate solely upon the subject of disarmament. While the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament concluded with a disappointing failure to resolve key issues in the light of the tense international situation, aggravated at the time by the relentless arms race, I express my confidence that you, Mr. President, will guide this session to a fruitful conclusion, aided by the prevailing climate of optimism and hope.

103. Bhutan shares with the rest of the world the sense of hope that the leaders of the two super-Powers have generated through the close rapport that they have achieved between themselves. While there were indeed missed opportunities in Moscow, a more detailed revision of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was signed and the possibility of the signing of another instrument on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms still remains very great. We applaud the two leaders for the dedication and courage with which they have dared to traverse a forgotten path. If greater expectations were not fulfilled, it was certainly not for want of efforts on their part. We also welcome the statement of Mr. Shervardnadze on 8 June [12th meeting], which was clearly positive, and have no doubt that Mr. Shultz's address this afternoon will be equally heart-warming.

104. While the prevailing international sentiments must not be allowed to foster illusions, it is worthwhile for us to ponder the significance of recent developments. It is apparent that a new beginning has been made in super-Power relations, opening up greater possibilities in the area of disarmament. A towering psychological barrier has been shattered, allowing mutual and larger human interests to transcend traditional fears and prejudices. It is to be hoped that the genuine dialogue between the two leaders will have a beneficial influence on the ramifications of super-Power relations. Indeed, a process of confidence-building between the two super-Powers has begun, and limited co-operative intentions are already in the air.

105. In reality, the INF treaty is of only symbolic importance. It does not make the world any safer from a nuclear war, nor does it lessen in any meaningful way the awesome destructive arsenals of the two Powers. Between them they still possess over 50,000 nuclear warheads, with land, sea and air delivery systems that could destroy the world more than ten times over.

106. There is also the possibility that the rapport between the two leaders and their key aides may remain at the personal level and that it may not have a more pervasive effect at the national levels to ensure continuity. We can only hope, for that reason, that changing leaderships on either side will find enough support and motivation to build further on the existing momentum. At the same time it may perhaps be naïve on our part to assume that other nuclear-weapon States will abandon their tenacious faith in the gospel of nuclear deterrence and follow the lead of the two super-Powers.

107. Finally, there are to be remembered those who dwell in the twilight zone of nuclear weaponry. It would not be incorrect to think that some of them may be less than eager to turn their backs on what they perceive as definite means to greater power and influence in their struggles and conflicts and in pursuit of their interests.

108. Amid such hope and despair, which confuse the mind and blur our vision, I believe there is need for us to engage in some honest retrospection as well as introspection, so that we may together arrive at a more realistic perception of how and what can be achieved both through individual endeavours and through the United Nations. To begin with, the Member States could consider the adoption of a framework with a broad common goal and attitude which could facilitate a greater level of accommodation and harmonization of views and opinions among Member States with divergent interests.

109. The first could be the need to adopt as the ultimate though not immediate goal general and complete disarmament by each Member State. To this end, each nation should actively engage in or promote actions to strengthen national awareness and commitment through the systems of education and various forms of media. It must be made unquestionably clear that only an act of insanity would cause a nuclear war, since neither victor nor vanquished could emerge from such a war. Technical and human error are not unlikely causes that could well trigger a holocaust. Nuclear arms, chemical weapons and other means of mass destruction are not tools designed for accurate manipulation in battles but mindless monsters that can unleash indiscriminate horror. These are in themselves forces of destruction that exist not to destroy real or imagined enemies alone but life itself.

110. It must be common knowledge that, while the concept of nuclear deterrence has thus far prevented a direct confrontation between the super-Powers, it has converted many nations and continues to beguile them into believing that the acquisition of such awesome weapons means an enhancement of national security. They believe that the security of a nation does not exist through simple peace but by its capacity to over-kill the enemy, unmindful of the fact that it does not deter the enemy from acquiring even greater deterrent capability.

111. The saddest aspect of that concept is that the very nature of its strategy deters any attempt towards building understanding and friendship. Furthermore, the vast financial, scientific and human resources upon which it feeds on a progressive scale do not

leave its detractors any resource for the consideration of a more humane and reasonable alternative security arrangement. We must nevertheless be firm in our belief that the human genius which has conceived and created such forces of destruction is equally capable of conceiving an arrangement for harmony and peaceful co-existence.

112. The need for an attitude arises from our belief that in a democratic system such as the one by which this world body functions, the collective strength to face a challenge demonstrates the sum total commitment of individual members to a common cause. It follows that this great world body could play a far more powerful and effective part in this highly contentious issue if each Member State exercised more restraint in pushing for international proclamation and action which it would not be willing to undertake within its own dominion. Instead of incapacitating this highly potent world body in this concern, we should then be in a position to empower it to act with greater certainty and effectiveness by giving it a meaningful and practical mandate.

113. Based on the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament and with a uniform attitude, let us then agree on a set of specific and attainable objectives on disarmament, which at present risk being overshadowed by varying emphases on a wide range of issues and the pronouncement of grandiose ideals. Taking the achievements of banning biological weapons and the INF Treaty as successful steps, it would be expedient to agree on a more modest agenda of three main objectives. Each of these should be further expressed within a time-frame to be decided upon during the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. Under a mandate given by the Assembly, the Secretary-General could then pursue actively the implementation of the objectives, both directly and through the Conference on Disarmament.

114. I believe that the three objectives should comprise the most common and pressing concerns expressed by the majority of delegations. I state them in the following order: first, conclusion of the proposed convention banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons so that, short of a nuclear war, the human race does not end by an act of self-poisoning; secondly, conclusion by the two super-Powers of a treaty to reduce by 50 per cent their strategic nuclear arsenals, as yet again a largely symbolic gesture of their earnestness to remove the threat of a nuclear war; and thirdly, reaching an agreement on a moratorium on nuclear testing so that new and qualitative development of such weapons does not take place while their gradual reduction towards eventual elimination is under way.

115. My delegation believes that if it were possible to report to the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly the accomplishment of those three objectives, the world should have reason to feel satisfied. At the same session another set of higher objectives, as well as important issues emergent at the time, could be identified to form the next phase in our disarmament efforts.

116. Devoting our efforts to the achievement of the first phase of the programme should not imply in any

way the undermining of the many other disarmament issues whose speedy and satisfactory resolution we must continue to pursue with equal zeal and ardour, if not within specific time-frames. Among the issues of major concern to Bhutan are those of which I shall now speak.

117. First is the non-militarization of outer space. There are those among us who appear to be of the mistaken impression that this is a concern prompted by recent developments. It may therefore be in order to recall that it was in 1958, the year following the launching of the first man-made satellite, that the General Assembly placed on its agenda an item dealing with peaceful uses of outer space. The concern even then was of such magnitude that it led to the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee which later became a permanent body. Two conferences on the exploration and peaceful use of outer space were held, thus far with obviously little result. Exploitation of outer space for destructive purposes by any man or Power must never be permitted. We consider it to be of paramount urgency that negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an agreement to prevent the materialization of this new threat, this new dimension to the arms race, be initiated very soon.

118. The second issue is the spiralling race in conventional arms. While most Member States point an accusing finger at the few but increasing number of nuclear-weapon States for their indulgence in the nuclear-arms race, most of us stand guilty of fuelling and pursuing our own arms race at regional and sub-regional levels in conventional weapons. In the process of such a pursuit, we have misplaced our national priorities against scarce resources and have unwittingly served to sustain the weapons industries of the nuclear nations. It is quite within reason to assume that the debt situation with which we are faced today may never have existed for some, while it would have been far less critical for most, if scarce national resources had not become sunk in military costs. Let us benefit from the wisdom that emerged at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and restrain ourselves from yielding to our baser instinctive impulses.

119. At this point it is pertinent to state that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, a neighbour in our region, was one of the most heartening events and a noteworthy achievement for the United Nations. However, we are deeply concerned by the continuous supply of excessive arms to the opposing sides. We believe that this can only prolong the pain and misery that the Afghans have already had to endure. This is the time to think of true national reconciliation, national reconstruction and the healing of wounds. These are the areas where assistance has been sought and should be given. We urge that while the foreign troops withdraw from their land the Afghans be left to determine their own destiny.

120. The third issue is the importance of confidence-building, a key element in and a prerequisite of the process of disarmament. From the lack of understanding between nations arises fear, and fear is the root cause of the arms race. If disarmament is a goal to which we subscribe, the process of confi-

dence-building at the international, regional and bilateral levels must be seen as an absolute necessity. Let us not be afraid to meet and to listen to each other, and look upon it as the obvious means to remove mutual doubts, suspicions and misunderstanding.

121. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of the third United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament, this one for Asia, to be located in Kathmandu. The birthplace of the Buddha is indeed a fitting locus for such a centre, which we hope to see playing the role of a pacifist and a facilitator of confidence-building in the region.

122. While we must recognize the efficacy of bilateral negotiation and continue to support and encourage it, we must not undermine the vital role of multilateral negotiation. For the reason that no international assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons can be realistic, and for the reason that the issue of disarmament pertains to the question of life itself, we see it as the responsibility and the duty of every nation ceaselessly to persist, through the best possible world forum, in the process of disarmament until the survival of mankind ceases to be in question. We are all aware that no other forum providing such scope is more representative, better equipped and more effective than the United Nations. Its central role as the sole multilateral negotiating body must be fully recognized by all nations. We believe that any attempt to confine the issue of disarmament to the singular level of bilateral negotiations cannot be viewed as being in the larger interest of mankind. I wish this special session every success.

123. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now hear a statement by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Finance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. I have great pleasure in welcoming Mr. James Fitz-Allen Mitchell and inviting him to address the Assembly.

124. Mr. MITCHELL (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines): Mr. President, on behalf of the Government and people of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, permit me to add my voice to those of all the delegations which have preceded me in congratulating you on your election to the presidency of this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are confident that with your vast experience and diplomatic skills you will guide this special session to a successful conclusion. May I also convey to the Secretary-General our appreciation of the role that he continues to play in the development of the Organization and, in particular, of his commitment to international peace, co-operation and development.

125. The Final Document unanimously adopted at the first special session on disarmament is still the most authoritative statement that has been made on disarmament. It proposed a wide range of measures to enhance the security of nations at progressively lower levels of armaments and stressed the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

126. The third special session provides a collective opportunity to review the progress made over the past 10 years. It is an opportunity also to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the disarmament machinery and to draw up a programme of action for the remaining years of the present century.

127. This special session, unlike the second special session in 1982, takes place against a background of improved relations between the super-Powers and some decrease in the level of international tension. The recently concluded Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles; the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country; the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe; and renewed activity on the part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization aimed at reducing the levels of their conventional forces are all positive international developments.

128. The task which the international community set itself in the Programme of Action in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament [*resolution S-10/2, sect. III*] is far from being achieved. The INF Treaty is an important psychological breakthrough. It is the first time in their present cycle of negotiations that the super-Powers have been able to agree to eliminate a whole category of weapons, thus initiating action in the area of true disarmament, as distinct from arms limitation.

129. This special session now derives added significance from the recent historic meeting in Moscow between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. I am authorized by the countries of the East Caribbean to congratulate President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on their historic achievement. We see significance not only in the treaty banning the deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles but in the signals of the mood of change in super-Power confrontation, which every country in the United Nations system should do all in its power to encourage.

130. We the small countries of the world recognize that the mood of conflict generated during the cold war contributed in large measure to the pace of decolonization over the past 40 years and created opportunities for our independence. We are prepared, however, to look positively on the easing of tensions between the super-Powers, which we recognize to constitute the new basis of hope for the improvement of the quality of life for those who love this beautiful world that God has given to us and to those whom we want to inherit it. It is our wish that the process of arms reduction by the super-Powers will gain momentum and stabilize at a level that will ensure their security and ours. We want to see a comparable easing of tension in regional conflicts, in particular in the Middle East and in Central America.

131. While it is fashionable to blame the arms race on the super-Powers and the other industrial Powers, attention must also be focused on those other countries which devote inordinate amounts of their

budgets to arms purchases. There are very few countries in the world that could not benefit from directing expenditure from arms towards expanding their health and anti-poverty programmes.

132. Never since the invention of the nuclear weapon and the arms race it sponsored has there been a more opportune time for the reversal of the arms race than now, and we must seek ways to build on the success of the Moscow summit. We must all encourage that process if we are interested in peace and improvement in the quality of life in the world.

133. The thinking of General Secretary Gorbachev has produced a unique opportunity for political restructuring in the rest of the world. We will not be naïve in our assessment of progress, and we will rely on those with the capacity to carry out the responsibility for verification of arms reduction. As this proceeds, we would urge that everything be done to ensure that the momentum of reduction be sustained. Similarly, this ought to be supported by universal progress in the reduction of conventional weapons and the easing of regional conflicts. Our "moral persuasion" must extend to the regional conflicts also.

134. In the long march of history, from the invention of gunpowder to the ultimate, in the creation of nuclear weapons, millions have died in the struggle for dominance by various peoples and various dogmas. The Moscow meeting may yet be the greatest turning point in this history. The question we must now ask is: How many more millions must die in the pursuit of mistaken policies that eventually have to be reversed?

135. *Perestroika* has created a unique opportunity in the persistent pattern of conflicts, and this, coupled with the response it has engendered in the United States, gives us cause to celebrate, and it is an opportunity to celebrate that we must not miss. Indeed, it has been too dangerous a road between TNT and the INF Treaty not to deserve a celebration of its conclusion.

136. Nuclear arms threaten life on this planet. We support the view that savings from disarmament should be channelled into development. There are many development demands, and, in my view, funds saved would be most efficiently used if redirected into a single project. I propose the urgent task of reforestation in Africa, halting the march of the desert, as the highest priority. This is the way we propose to celebrate. No human thought has produced results that threaten our environment so terribly, and if this threat recedes, we can do nothing greater than to apply these scarce resources for the enhancement of our environment.

137. This is not a project in which we, the people of the Caribbean, will benefit directly, but we are made sensitive to this great need by the increasing frequency of Sahara haze clouding our visibility in the Caribbean. But, above all, we will be only too happy to help focus attention on the continent in desperate need of environmental therapy, and one that claims

our ancestral roots. With this problem addressed on a global scale, with resources created by disarmament, there will be other sources freed up to meet our own needs for development finance.

138. But to access those funds for this project, or any other that may be agreed upon apart from my priority, there should be conditionality. The guideline should impose a simple rule of accessing funds: that recipient countries of disarmament funds should themselves be reducing their military expenditure. It certainly will not be logical to be calling on the super-Powers and the other industrial nations to reduce conventional arms while we in the third world reconstitute ourselves into new markets for conventional arms.

139. Creating a special fund for the use of disarmament savings will in itself keep the need to accelerate the creation and release of those funds in constant focus.

140. In St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the Caribbean, for which I speak, our declared policy is to concentrate on economic development as the surest way to ease social tensions. We do not perceive our insecurity as curable by military options.

141. The world has been watching with fascination in the last few days the monumental progress made at the Moscow summit. Coming on the heels of Moscow, this disarmament session must create a role for itself beyond being described as a sideshow. We will do that only by creating a new role for the United Nations in disarmament, whether in the fashion I suggest or any other that may arise, and in so doing fortify the essential and fundamental purpose of this body. Therefore, even as we move forward in new directions, we consolidate the foundations long established in the architecture of the Charter of the United Nations.

142. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Finance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines for the important statement he has just made.

*The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.*

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

<sup>2</sup>United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8.

<sup>3</sup>"Our Common Future" (A/42/427, annex).

<sup>4</sup>Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

<sup>5</sup>See *Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8), para. 2.

<sup>6</sup>United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068.