



President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

[The speaker continued in French.]

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker in the general debate is the Prime Minister of Canada. I have great pleasure in welcoming His Excellency the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and in inviting him to address the General Assembly.

2. Mr. TRUDEAU (Canada): Mr. President, I congratulate you on your election to the presidency of this special session devoted to disarmament. It is indeed fitting that the office be filled by such a distinguished representative of a country in whose capital the idea of holding this special session was first advanced in 1961.

3. Canada takes its place in a world discussion on disarmament as an industrial country, geographically placed between two heavily armed super-Powers, with an obvious stake in the prevention of war in a nuclear age. We are a member of a regional defensive alliance that includes three of the five nuclear-weapon States. We are none the less a country that has renounced the production or the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We have withdrawn from any nuclear role by Canada's armed forces in Europe and are now in the process of replacing with conventional-armed aircraft the nuclear-equipped planes still assigned to our forces in North America. We are thus not only the first country in the world with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so; we are also the first nuclear-armed country to have chosen to divest itself of nuclear arms. We have not, for more than a decade, permitted Canadian uranium to be used for military purposes by any country. We are a country that maintains strict controls over exports of military equipment and does not export any to areas of tension or actual conflict. We are, on the other hand, a major source of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

4. My excuse for reciting these facts is that it has been an assumption of our policy that countries like Canada can do something to slow down the arms race. But, obviously, we can do a great deal more if we act together. That is why such a great responsibility rests on this special session. It is not the business of this session to negotiate agreements. That will be the task of others. What we are here to do is to take stock and to prescribe. We must impart a fresh momentum to the lagging process of disarmament.

5. We could not have chosen a better moment to pause and survey the disarmament scene. What strikes us first is a general tendency to add to arsenals, on the pretext that there is no other way to correct what are believed to be imbalances in security. It is on this premise that the logic of the arms spiral is based and we must take it into account in our discussions. We must recognize it for what it is: a search for security, however elusive. To attempt to divorce disarmament from security is to be left only with the bare bones of rhetoric.

6. How to achieve security through disarmament is the theme of the great debate that has been waged through much of the present century. We are taking up that debate again at this special session, but the terms of the debate have been drastically altered in the last 25 years by two developments. One is the advent of nuclear weapons which has forced us to assimilate the concept of unusable power. The other is the transformation of the international political map which has brought a whole host of new international actors into the disarmament debate. It is useful, none the less, to review the principal strands of the historic debate to see what relevance they may have to our efforts at this special session.

7. The broad spectrum of proposals to achieve greater world stability and the reduction of tensions ranges all the way from what is sometimes called the declaratory approach to the notion of general and complete disarmament.

8. The declaratory approach encompasses the whole complex of non-aggression pacts, treaties of guarantee, security assurances and bans on the use of certain weapons. The classic example of this type of approach was the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. The parties to it, which included all the major Powers of the time, renounced war as an instrument of national policy and pledged themselves to settle disputes by peaceful means only. The Pact was regarded as the portent of a new era. The more devastating judgement of historians is that it clouded the vision of the statesmen of the 1930s.

9. The declaratory approach is, however, not dead. It is implicit in the idea of a commitment to non-first-use of nuclear weapons. That idea is being seriously advanced by some and seriously entertained by others. It is difficult to dismiss summarily because it would give expression and authority to a widely shared concept of international morality.

10. It may have a part to play as an assurance to coun-

tries that have renounced nuclear weapons. But it is important not to mistake the shadow for the substance. Declarations of good intent are no substitute for real disarmament. They need be violated only once to become mere scraps of paper. They have no impact on capabilities nor on the resources devoted to those capabilities. Indeed, their effect may be negative by diverting attention from the requirement of all real disarmament, namely, the reduction of armed forces and armaments.

11. If the declaratory approach places unreasonable reliance on the value of good intentions, the notion of general and complete disarmament has proved to be equally unrealistic.

12. It is important to remember how wide a range of vision was embraced by the concept of general and complete disarmament in the early 1960s. What was envisaged was not only the disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, the cessation of weapons production and the elimination of weapons stockpiles. The counterpart to global demilitarization was a global security system involving reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

13. That ideal need not be abandoned. General and complete disarmament remains the ultimate goal of our efforts. In practice, it raises serious questions in the minds of the negotiators. What should be the military balance at each stage of the process? What kind of an inspection system would give us assurance that engagements were being carried out? What would be the composition of an international disarmament organization and with what powers would it be invested? What would be the nature of the arrangements for keeping the peace in a disarmed world? Finally, what would be the impact of this ambitious concept on the security, not to speak of the sovereignty, of the parties?

14. One day these questions will have to be answered. But it must be admitted that today they remain unanswered. In the circumstances, it is only natural for us to aim at a less lofty goal and seek to bring about a disarmed world by building it brick by brick.

[The speaker continued in English.]

15. This is the course we have pursued over the past decade or so. Over that period, we have managed to negotiate a number of instruments of arms control on which we can look back as useful milestones in the construction of an international security system. As a result, the deployment of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and in outer space has been precluded; biological weapons have been prohibited; environmental warfare has been outlawed to a great extent; agreements have been reached to ban nuclear tests in all environments except under ground, and to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries not yet possessing them. These are not negligible measures even though all militarily significant States have not yet adhered to them.

16. Such measures are sometimes described as periph-

eral. I believe that to call them peripheral is seriously to underrate them. They are a great advance over declarations of intentions because they deal with capabilities and are, therefore, verifiable—which intentions are not. They have an effect on the arms race by closing off certain options. It is true that the measures taken so far have foreclosed options that were in large part hypothetical. But they set the stage for an attack on the heart of the arms race by foreclosing options that are real and, in the absence of restraint, inescapable.

17. Against this background, then, I should like to turn to the nuclear arms race. The preservation of peace and security between the nuclear Powers and their allies rests today primarily on the mutual balance of deterrence. Simply put, that balance means that any act of nuclear war by either Power would be incalculable folly. Nevertheless, the apparent success so far of this system in preventing a global war should not close our minds to the problems that it presents.

18. What particularly concerns me is the technological impulse that continues to lie behind the development of strategic nuclear weaponry. It is, after all, in the laboratories that the nuclear arms race begins. The new technology can require a decade or more to take a weapons system from research and development to production and eventual deployment. What this means is that national policies are pre-empted for long periods in advance. It also complicates the task of the foreign-policy maker because of the difficulty of inferring current intentions from military postures that may be the result of decisions taken a decade earlier. Thus, however much Governments declare that they intend to pursue a policy of peace, their declarations cannot help but be called into question, for they have allowed the blind and unchecked momentum of the arms race to create and put at their disposal military capabilities of an order of magnitude that other Governments cannot prudently ignore. In such a situation, there is a risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy, which is not the natural order of policy-making.

19. There is also a high risk that new weapons systems will revive concerns about a first-strike capability of disarming; or that they will tend to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare; or that they will increase problems of verification. All this suggests that stable deterrence remains an inadequate concept. And such a concept is a poor substitute for genuine world security.

20. These dangers have been perceived by both major nuclear Powers. I believe that both are serious in wanting to arrest the momentum of the nuclear arms race. They have been engaged in a dialogue on strategic arms limitations for some years. The dialogue has produced some useful quantitative limits and others are under negotiations. But the process is painstaking and, as I have watched it with a full appreciation of its importance to the security interests of my country, I have wondered whether there may not be additional concepts that could usefully be applied to it.

21. The negotiations under way between the major nu-

clear Powers have shown that it is possible to confirm or codify an existing balance of forces. But they have also shown how difficult it is to go beyond that and to cut back on weapons systems once they have been developed and deployed. That is not only because they are there and vested interests have been created in their deployment; it is also because it has proven immensely complex to achieve the magic formula of equal security by placing limits on what are quite often disparate weapons systems.

22. The conclusion I have reached is that the best way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear arms race may be by a strategy of suffocation, by depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds. This could be done by a combination of four measures. Individually, each of these measures has been part of the arms control dialogue for many years. It is in their combination that I see them as representing a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising approach to curbing the nuclear arms race. These are the measures I have in mind.

23. First, a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear explosive devices. Such a ban is currently under negotiation. It has long been Canada's highest priority. I am pleased that the efforts of Canada's representatives and those of other countries stand a good chance of success during 1978. The computer can simulate testing conditions up to a point, but there is no doubt in my mind that a total test ban will represent a real qualitative constraint on weapons development.

24. Secondly, an agreement to stop the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles. This would complement the ban on the testing of warheads. I am satisfied that, in the present state of the art, such an agreement can be monitored—as it must be—by national technical means.

25. Thirdly, an agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The effect of this would be to set a finite limit on the availability of nuclear weapons material. Such an agreement would have to be backed up by an effective system of full-scope safeguards. It would have the great advantage of placing nuclear-weapon States on a much more comparable basis with non-nuclear-weapon States than they have been thus far under the dispensations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.*]

26. Fourthly, an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems. This will require the development of the necessary openness in reporting, comparing and verifying such expenditures.

[The speaker continued in French.]

27. A strategy of suffocation seems to me to have a number of advantages. It is not merely declaratory because it will have a real, though progressive, impact on the development of new strategic weapons systems. It will have that

impact in three ways: by freezing the available amount of fissionable material, by preventing any technology that may be developed in the laboratory from being tested, and by reducing the funds devoted to military expenditure. It is also a realistic strategy because it assumes that, for some time to come at least, total nuclear disarmament is probably unattainable in practice. It avoids some of the problems encountered in the negotiations currently under way in that it does not involve complex calculations of balance but leaves the nuclear-weapon States some flexibility in adjusting their force levels by using existing weapons technology. It has at least the potential of reducing the risks of conflict that are inherent in the technological momentum of strategic competition.

28. The ultimate intent of a strategy of suffocation is to halt the arms race in the laboratory. But an offer to halt the arms race at any stage is a step in the direction of genuine disarmament. The President of the United States has shown the way in recent weeks with his far-sighted postponement of a decision to produce a new battlefield nuclear weapon. We must all hope that the response of the Soviet Union will make it possible to extend that postponement indefinitely.

29. So much for the vertical dimension of the nuclear problem. I should now like to say a word about the horizontal spread of nuclear capabilities.

30. There are those who have a fatalistic view of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They argue that nuclear proliferation is ultimately unavoidable and that there is little sense in putting undue constraints on the international flow of nuclear energy resources in the hope of being able to stem the process.

31. I do not share that view. I note with satisfaction that the list of countries said to be on the verge of a nuclear weapons capability is not very different today from what it was a decade or so ago. I believe that the greater dissemination of nuclear weaponry would reduce security and that Governments must define their policies and say that proliferation can be stopped.

32. We in Canada have perhaps gone further in our support for an effective non-proliferation system than have most other countries. In part, this is the result of national experience in nuclear co-operation. But in much larger part it is a reflection of public opinion in Canada which does not believe that we would be serving the cause of a rational world order by being negligent in the requirements we place on Canadian nuclear exports.

33. I make no apology for Canada's precedent-setting safeguards policy, though it has been criticized by some as being too stringent. Canada is asking of others no more than what we have ourselves accepted voluntarily as a party to the non-proliferation Treaty.

34. Canada judged it necessary to adopt a national policy, even though nuclear transfers were already within the compass of international regulation, because we were truly concerned about our role as a nuclear supplier. The inter-

national safeguards system, as it stood, did not seem to us adequate to deal with the problems posed by the advance of nuclear technology. Our object was to bring about a new, more effective international consensus on this matter. My country recognizes that the international system will need time to adapt to the new energy situation. It is now accepted by all that nuclear energy will have to play an increasingly important part in meeting ever-growing world energy needs. It is equally accepted that the benefits of nuclear energy must be accessible to all countries without alternative energy sources. Directly after an energy crisis, it is only natural that many countries would like to aim at a high degree of energy independence. In particular, they will expect to be protected against the interruption, without due cause, of essential supplies of nuclear fuel. Any new system will need to accommodate these aspirations.

35. But we also have to consider that we are hovering on the threshold of a plutonium economy. We shall have to make sure that the vulnerable points in the fuel cycle are capable of being adequately safeguarded by technical means and that, where that cannot be effectively done, we can devise institutional arrangements for international management. I, for one, believe that in the end the best prospect for countries to ensure their national energy security lies in an international system that carries the confidence of nuclear suppliers. There are limits to the contribution that can be made by nations acting unilaterally. I believe that Canada's efforts to date have been constructive and effective, but further achievement can be made only through multilateral agreement. We intend to play our full part in the working out of the assurances and the constraints that will inevitably have to form part of an enhanced international system of non-proliferation.

36. While nuclear proliferation remains a source of concern, it has shown itself amenable to control. That is more than can yet be said about the transfer of conventional weapons.

37. The problem of conventional weapons is serious. This special session cannot afford to leave it unattended to. Conventional weapons give rise to feverish spending. Eighty per cent of the world's military expenditures are for conventional purposes. Some 15 per cent of those expenditures are accounted for by developing countries. Well over half of these developing countries devote at least 10 per cent of their public spending to military purposes; nearly a quarter of them spend in excess of 25 per cent. It is with conventional weapons that 133 wars have been fought since 1945, involving 80 countries and killing 25 million people. Meanwhile, the transfer of conventional weapons has assumed massive proportions; in the aggregate, some \$20 thousand million are being expended on it each year. It is therefore not possible to oppose the nuclear arms race rather than the conventional arms race. Both threaten world security; both are absorbing resources better devoted to other purposes; both are the legitimate business of an Organization whose purpose it is to harmonize the actions of nations.

[The speaker continued in English.]

38. The traffic in conventional arms involves producers, consumers and the transactions between them. What can we do about it?

39. The more closely we look at the problem, the more clearly we can see that the question of sales is not easily divorced from the question of production. The production of military equipment is attractive for countries with an appropriate industrial base which require such equipment for their own armed forces. It contributes to national security; it reduces external payments; it creates jobs. Moreover, the attraction of production for defence is enhanced by the fact that some 70 per cent of new technology today derives from the military and space sectors.

40. The problem is that the more States go into the production of weapons to meet their own security needs, the more tempting it is for them to try to achieve lower unit costs and other economic benefits by extending their production runs and selling such weapons abroad. Almost every country that produces some military equipment finds itself, to a greater or lesser degree, caught on the horns of this dilemma. My country is no exception.

41. Of course, any particular country intent on making a contribution to world security could decide to abstain from producing arms, but what significance would such a gesture actually have? So long as arms are being bought, arms will be produced. There is no particular moral merit in a country that is buying arms but not producing them. And if the main reason for not producing them is not to be involved in selling them, it will have no practical impact on the arms race, because other suppliers that we are encouraging by our purchases will readily fill the gap.

42. One way out of the dilemma would be for suppliers, acting in concert, to practise restraint. That is easier where the incentive for arms sales is mainly commercial. It is more difficult where considerations of foreign policy are involved. Canada is not an important exporter of military equipment; we account for about 1 per cent of world sales. We could accept any consensus that might be arrived at among suppliers to cut back on military exports. We recognize that our position differs from that of others. The major Powers, in particular, sometimes see arms sales as a measure of maintaining a balance of confidence in situations where political solutions continue to elude the parties. But the major Powers must also recognize that a balance of confidence can be achieved in such situations at lower levels of cost and risk. I welcome the recent decision of the United States and of the Soviet Union to look for a basis of mutual restraint in their sales of conventional weapons.

43. Restraint by suppliers will help, but it is an incomplete answer to the arms traffic problem. It may also cause resentment among potential arms purchasers. For better or for worse, much of the arms traffic takes place between industrialized and developing countries. The purchasing countries seek, as is their right, to ensure their own security. In many cases, they seek no more than to maintain law and order on their national soil. To curb their right to acquire arms by purchase, even to place qualitative re-

straints on such purchases, would revive much of the acrimony of the North-South dialectic. It would be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as another instance where the rich are trying to substitute their judgement for that of the poor. Moreover, attempts to curb the transfer of conventional weapons would do nothing to change the incentive for acquiring them.

44. It is at the level of incentives that we are likely to manage best to come to grips with the problem of conventional weapons exports. The incentive to acquire arms is rooted in apprehensions of insecurity. The best way to allay such apprehensions is through collective regional arrangements. The countries of Latin America have set the world a useful example in turning their continent into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and in persuading outside Powers to respect that status. Similar arrangements are conceivable, in Latin America as elsewhere, to deal with the acquisition of conventional arms. It would be for regional decision-makers to devise incentives for restraint and sanctions for excess in the accumulation of conventional arsenals and in the build-up of conventional forces. In the long run, that seems to me the best prospect of curbing the conventional arms race without damage to the relations between nations.

45. While we are exploring these and other ways of making progress on disarmament, we must also strengthen our joint capacity to maintain international peace and security. Substantive progress on disarmament is at best a matter of years, if not of decades. Meanwhile, the security of nations is bound to remain precarious. In a world of 150 or more States, many of which have claims upon their neighbours and where resource shortages and population movements raise questions of life and death for millions of people, violence within and between States is a regrettable fact of life.

46. The United Nations was created to restrain and, if possible, to prevent war. Its record is a mixed one. But whatever we may think of its capacities, we must work as best we can to improve and to strengthen them. Recent events have demonstrated once again both the uncertainties of peace-keeping operations and the continuing need to make those operations a success. It must be our objective to create the conditions that will permit all Members to respond quickly, impartially and effectively to threats to peace whenever they are called upon by the United Nations to do so. I make this plea on behalf of a country that has made peace-keeping a special plank in its defence policy and has participated in every major peace-keeping operation of the United Nations.

47. Let me add a word about a third subject on our agenda, about institutions. It is easy enough to change institutions, but new institutions do not necessarily make intractable issues less intractable.

48. I believe that it is right for the United Nations to deal with disarmament at two levels. Disarmament is a common concern of the world community and there must be a deliberative body in which all Member States can periodically bring their views to bear on the disarmament process,

as we are doing here today. Actual negotiations, however, must continue to be pursued in a body of more manageable size operating on a basis of consensus. The decision of France to rejoin the disarmament dialogue is of major importance. It is a promising omen for the success of our deliberations. We also hope that the People's Republic of China will see its best interests served by joining its efforts to those of others in advancing the cause of disarmament.

49. Proposals have been made also to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for research on disarmament matters and to make the results of such research more widely available. We welcome proposals of this kind. In this, as in other matters of public policy, Governments can only benefit from more informed discussion. Disarmament is the business of everyone, but only a few are able to follow the issues. The consequence is that special interests dominate the debate and distort the conclusions. We must make sure that they do not carry the day. Dispassionate research and analysis, presented in terms that people can understand, would do much to right the balance.

50. As long ago as 1929, that most eloquent advocate of disarmament, Salvadore de Madariaga, spoke of disarmament as being "really the problem of the organization of the world community". In the larger sense of the word, history has proved him right. The arms race we are here to stop is a symptom of the insecurity of nations. But it is more than that. It is a latent source of world catastrophe. That is why this special session has been called together. It is the first major assize on disarmament to have been held since the end of the Second World War. We must not allow the opportunity to pass without putting our imprint on the course of events. We cannot expect to settle all the issues in our deliberations and we certainly shall not settle them by producing paper. What we must try to achieve is a reasonable consensus on broad objectives and on a plan of action for the next few years. If we can do that, if we can hold out hope that the arms race can be reversed, we shall have taken a significant step towards the better ordering of the affairs of our planet.

51. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the Prime Minister of Canada for the important statement he has just made.

52. Mr. CORRÊA DA COSTA (Brazil): Mr. President, it is with renewed pleasure that I extend to you the sincere congratulations of the Brazilian delegation on your unanimous election to the presidency of this special session of the General Assembly. Over the past year we have grown accustomed to the very high standard of leadership with which you have presided over our deliberations.

53. I should also like to express to Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina our deep appreciation for the significant contribution that he has already made to our work in his capacity as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee. We are confident that under his able and experienced guidance the *Ad Hoc* Committee will successfully fulfil its mandate.

54. For many years disarmament has been a priority goal

in international negotiations. This Assembly, interpreting the unanimous voice of the community of nations, has time and again restated this objective in the course of its regular annual sessions.

55. In the organs specifically mandated to carry on disarmament negotiations, it was immediately established that the crux of the problem was the indiscriminate accumulation of nuclear weapons. Ten years ago, in 1968, a consensus was reached, and this is reflected in the agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that disarmament negotiations should produce, as a first step, meaningful results in areas such as the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the freezing of the production of fissionable material for military purposes and, lastly, the reduction and destruction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles. At the same time, the limitation of the uncontrolled acceleration of the arms race was sought. Negotiations were proposed with a view to the prohibition of the development and production of certain weapons, such as chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as to the establishment of machinery for collective security that would provide the climate necessary for the attainment of our chief goal.

56. Since then the arms race has gained new impetus, and the quantitative growth in stockpiles has gone hand in hand with their rapid qualitative refinement. Over \$400 thousand million are being spent this year on research and development and on the production and refinement of existing systems and of new types of weapons. This process mobilizes the talents of over half of the most renowned scientists in such fields as engineering and chemistry.

57. Vertical proliferation has even given rise to theories that lend credibility to the tactical use of weapons of mass destruction, no matter how harmful the effects. Never before have the overtones of the "balance of terror" been so present in the world scenario.

58. In view of this prospect, the concrete measures of disarmament which have been negotiated so far are minimal, one could say negligible. As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, the only continent today that is totally free from these weapons happens to be uninhabited. The ban on nuclear-weapon tests in three environments, in addition to being only partial in scope, is of limited or no use for the purposes of disarmament, or even of arms control. There is little confidence that the international commitments in force are capable of ensuring the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. And there are even those who argue that the military use of outer space serves the purposes of strengthening strategic equilibrium and, consequently, international stability. As for the oceans, the only progress that has been made deals with the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in a manner that does not seem to figure in the strategic plans of any Power whatsoever. The strategic arms limitation talks, for their part, have been limited to quantitative measures, that is to say, to the freezing of stockpiles at certain levels, acknowledgedly high, without affecting the destructive capacity in the hands of the two super-Powers.

59. In the field of conventional weapons, it was only possible to achieve agreement on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*]. A preliminary agreement on chemical weapons is expected shortly between the super-Powers. Still in the conventional weapon field, we have reason to be alarmed by the fact that technological development is oriented towards the creation of weapons of mass destruction, the employment of which is particularly degrading because of their cruel and indiscriminate effects. Paradoxical as it may seem, the efforts of the international community still concentrate on collateral measures of disarmament. We do not ignore the importance of such measures, but the priority is certainly questionable.

60. Last September, when opening the general debate at the 6th meeting of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, the Minister for External Relations of Brazil, Mr. Azerado de Silveira, expressed confidence that the present special session would be a positive step in multilateral negotiations for disarmament. We view it as a favourable opportunity for a critical evaluation of the results that have been obtained so far and for the adoption of decisions that will open up new perspectives for tangible results.

61. In the General Assembly, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in other forums, Brazil has never failed to make positive contributions, within the limits of its possibilities, towards promoting the true objectives of disarmament. It has been the opinion of Brazil that, in multilateral negotiations on disarmament, maximum priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. Nowadays, it is common for us to run up against tolerant or even fatalistic attitudes towards the accumulation of nuclear weapons. It seems that living with the possibility of a nuclear holocaust over a prolonged period generates a kind of acceptance of the risk. And we can only put a stop to this peril if the international community faces up squarely to the question—in other words, if it can effectively halt the arms race, reverse it and finally destroy the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

62. In this process, it is undeniable that the primary responsibility falls on the nuclear-weapon States. Concrete initiative by these States, through the exercise of the political will to give practical form to the responsibility which is theirs, is thus an essential element for the success of the multilateral negotiations.

63. The negotiating process for disarmament cannot be dissociated from the general conditions of peace and security. There will be no disarmament while there is no peace and security. By the same token, there will be no peace and security while the arms race continues unabated—a dilemma which cannot be solved by half-way measures. The solution will only become possible when the question is confronted as a whole, in an objective manner, with due respect for the symmetry between the continued existence of situations of tension in some areas, on the one hand, and the security needs of States, on the other. It is there-

fore essential to ensure that the implementation of disarmament measures does not entail imbalances of a military or other nature that would tend to frustrate the ultimate goal.

64. As for the conditions of security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, it is Brazil's understanding that these conditions should be based upon concrete and unequivocal commitments on the part of the nuclear-weapon States until the complete elimination of all stocks of nuclear weapons. Such commitments should explicitly include respect for the nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace set up as the result of an agreement concluded in an independent and sovereign way by the countries of those regions. They should also explicitly include positive guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against such zones.

65. It was in the light of this understanding that Brazil signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco.¹ That Treaty, with its Additional Protocols I and II, is a real breakthrough which does honour to the peaceful traditions of our hemisphere. The banning of nuclear weapons implies not only that the region should remain free of these weapons, but also that it should be safeguarded against possible nuclear threats.

66. These two elements are essential for the perfect definition of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In the Treaty of Tlatelolco the signatories undertook concrete commitments on the banning of nuclear weapons, a stand that gives moral and political support to the positions we have been taking for many years in favour of disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This, however, requires, as a counterpart, the assumption of a series of obligations by the countries that possess nuclear armaments, including the obligation not to use such weapons in the region.

67. For this reason, Brazil fulfils all the requirements of article 28 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In practice, Brazil's position has had, and continues to have, the merit of encouraging the States that have not done so to sign Additional Protocols I and II, an indispensable requirement if the Treaty is to come into force.

68. In this connexion I must stress that, as stated in a public declaration by the Brazilian Government, in accordance with the principles of international law, Brazil committed itself *ipso facto*, by signing and ratifying the Treaty, to doing nothing contrary to the Treaty's objectives. To that extent the Treaty is already in force for Brazil, which will do nothing inconsistent with the goals of that instrument. In making a precise definition, in the case of Latin America, of the rights and duties inherent in the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, we are also rendering a service to other regions that wish to establish similar arrangements.

69. While favouring the cessation of the utilization of nuclear energy for military purposes, Brazil does not admit any hindrance to the peaceful utilization of such energy, so

long as non-discriminatory and universal safeguards are respected. Safeguards of this nature are indispensable in the promotion of confidence among States, in an atmosphere of international co-operation. To that end they must be applied to all States, without discrimination. None of these measures, however, must be of such a nature as to permit interference in the sovereignty of States, or as to affect the scientific technological or economic development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

70. On the other hand, it is imperative that a mutually acceptable balance of rights and obligations be maintained in disarmament negotiations. In this connexion, we do not accept international instruments that preserve situations of privilege and discriminate between States. Such treaties, in our view, are unjust and unfair. Brazil strongly supports the equal participation of all States in disarmament negotiations, as a corollary of the principle of sovereign equality, which is inscribed in the Charter of the United Nations. Such participation is an essential premise if the results of the negotiations are to meet the rights and interests of all States, and not merely those of a limited group of countries that today hold greater power.

71. The existing processes of negotiation for disarmament have been extensively explored. Neither creating new forums nor amending the rules of procedure of the existing negotiating bodies will suffice to bring about radical changes in the present state of affairs. Less cumbersome machinery and processes will not be effective unless they are accompanied by the unequivocal political will to put them into operation. It is clear, however, that the formal aspects of the question should not be put aside. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the Preparatory Committee for the special session, Brazil has supported proposals for the reformulation of the negotiating machinery for disarmament. We have done so because we are convinced that faulty machinery may hinder the political will and slow down progress in the field of disarmament.

72. Disarmament measures can, and should, have repercussions upon the establishment of the new international economic order. Brazil maintains that there must be a commitment to apply significant portions of the resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures to the promotion of the economic and social development of the less developed countries.

73. This is, in essence, Brazil's stand on disarmament. We are fully aware of the complexity of the question and recognize its political and security implications. Nevertheless, this understanding does not mean that we accept the idea that disarmament is a Utopian goal. In the light of these observations, the delegation of Brazil will take part in the debates of the special session in a constructive spirit, willing to contribute to the success of the task entrusted to this Assembly.

74. The present state of affairs is an additional challenge to our imagination and political ability. It is never too late to act. In the field of disarmament, inaction amounts to accepting an intolerable accumulation of risks. The primary

¹ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326).

responsibility for disarming rests with those who have the nuclear weapons; it is, however, incumbent upon the non-nuclear-weapon States to contribute positively to speeding up the adoption of effective disarmament measures.

75. Therefore, all countries have responsibilities in the process of disarmament. For this very reason we are meeting in special session. This General Assembly is undoubtedly the most representative forum of organized international society, and from it must emanate the ultimate guidelines, the imaginative and daring solutions required to ensure a peaceful future for mankind.

76. Mr. GARBA (Nigeria): It is a very happy coincidence, Sir, that this first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is taking place under the presidency of a representative of a very prominent non-aligned State. The initiative to convene this special session emanated from the non-aligned movement which, as long ago as its first summit conference, held in 1961 in the capital of your country, adopted a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament or of a world disarmament conference. Fourteen years later, in 1975, the non-aligned Ministers for Foreign Affairs, at their meeting at Lima, Peru, observed with considerable apprehension the acceleration of the arms race and the spiralling accumulation of more and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction by the two military alliances. They therefore recommended to their heads of State that they renew their call for the convening of a special session of this Assembly devoted to disarmament. Thus it was that at their fifth summit conference, at Colombo two years ago, the heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries firmly decided to work for the convening of the special session which we commenced three days ago. In view of the great and constructive role which your country has always played in the meetings of the non-aligned, it is fitting and proper that you are presiding over this session which is the fruition of one of the most significant initiatives of our movement.

77. It is no longer necessary to try to justify the need for this special session. The monumental disaster which is implicit in the state in which we find ourselves at present is obvious to all but the captains of the military-industrial complexes and their patrons on both sides of the armed camps. Thirty-three years after the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, in which we all vowed to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, we are witnessing a situation of unprecedented and escalating preparedness for war. The military alliances have developed and perfected sophisticated weapons of mass destruction capable of exterminating mankind several times over.

78. A world conflagration can no longer be confined to specific theatres. The nuclear-weapon genie, in its present state of perfection and effectiveness, will be far beyond the control and expectations of its master once it is let out of its bottle. Thirty-three years after the first nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we cannot claim to have seen the total effect of this most cruel weapon on its unfortunate victims. Yet the destruction and human suffering, tragic as they were, resulted from what can now be considered no

more than a toy bomb in comparison with the size and total destructive capacity of the warheads now available in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers.

79. Equally staggering is the increase in the military expenditures of the two alliances since the end of the Second World War. Figures compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicate that the total military expenditure in 1948 was about \$65 thousand million. In 1977 the figure jumped to \$400 thousand million. The investment of such a staggering amount in armaments at a time when there is utter neglect of the requirements of development in most parts of the world is a great reflection on the sense of priority of world statesmen.

80. Four years ago the General Assembly, at its sixth special session, adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order [*resolution 3201 (s-vi)*], whose main theme was the assurance of a decent standard of living for peoples everywhere. A comprehensive programme of action was duly adopted for the new international economic order. Today very little has been done to implement this programme because of the unwillingness to transfer resources from the developed world to the developing world, where there is such crying need. Since the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was launched four years ago, the amount of resources transferred from developed to developing countries has actually declined in real terms.

81. The target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national product set for official development assistance in the Second United Nations Development Decade has since been found to be much lower than the actual requirement if we are even to start out on the road to the new international economic order. Yet not only has that inadequate target not been met—except by a few developed countries—but there has actually been a tendency towards decline in many cases. The difficulties confronting the economies of the developed countries cannot be used as an acceptable explanation because these difficulties have not been reflected in expenditures on armaments, which have increased rather than decreased yearly. Obviously the members of the major alliances have no scruples about making development assistance the first victim of any real or imaginary difficulty. The vested interests in military expenditures on the other hand are such that no one dares reduce them even in the interest of the long-term peace and security of humanity.

82. I am firmly convinced that as long as 25 per cent of the world's scientific manpower and 40 per cent of the world's expenditure on research and development is tied to the unproductive military sector, as long as the world expends 7 per cent of its gross national product on armaments, economic and social progress cannot run its full course. The link, therefore, between disarmament and development is not only obvious but deserves to be explored in depth so that much of the vast resources, human and material, channelled into the production of armaments can be released for the promotion of economic and social development.

83. The Nigerian Government is therefore in full support of the study of disarmament and development as part of the programme of action that will emerge from this special session. Such a study should not be undertaken as an academic exercise; rather, it should be carried out in a manner that will facilitate the redeployment of manpower and resources into the more beneficial areas of economic and social development, particularly in the developing parts of the world.

84. The General Assembly, in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, proclaimed the decade of the 1970s a Disarmament Decade. We are already over eight and a half years into the Disarmament Decade and, sad to say, none of the elements of the programme for the Decade has been accomplished. In the area of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, no measure has been agreed upon since 1969. Indeed, the situation with respect to nuclear-weapon competition is worse today than when the Decade was proclaimed.

85. In spite of the agreement reached during the first round of the strategic arms limitation talks, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of nuclear warheads possessed by the rival super-Powers, not to mention the greatly improved sophistication of their means of delivery. Production and refinement have outstripped and nullified any effect which that agreement could have had. In a situation where even a fraction of the present arsenals of the super-Powers can destroy the world several times over, we cannot take consolation in these negotiations until they are geared to the reduction of up to 50 per cent of the nuclear-weapon arsenals and to a halt to the qualitative improvement of their means of delivery. It is not enough just to talk about limitation of strategic arms; it is time actually to reduce these most dangerous weapons.

86. The era of concentration on collateral measures should be considered at an end. The 1960s saw a proliferation of such measures—the partial test-ban treaty, the ban on the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We congratulated ourselves on the successful conclusion of these measures by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Today we are all dismayed that the necessary follow-up steps to these confidence-building measures have not been taken. We are all now aware, if ever there was any doubt, that disarmament will not be achieved by talking about and taking “convenient” measures while the real issues are left virtually untouched. After years of devoting attention to collateral measures, world opinion now demands concrete and direct measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. This is the only road towards stemming the danger of a nuclear holocaust which now threatens humanity.

87. A positive first step in this direction will be the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty—a treaty that has been the subject of inconclusive negotiation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and lately in a trilateral forum. At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly reflected the hope of humanity in this respect when, in its resolution 32/78, it declared that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and its open-

ing for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the special session devoted to disarmament. It is now clear that a comprehensive test ban treaty cannot be adopted at this special session; nevertheless, its importance indeed transcends the mere marking of a session, even an important one like this first special session devoted to disarmament.

88. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would, for the first time, mark the effective beginning of the end of nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, by providing concrete proof that the nuclear-weapon States do intend to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by which they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. A comprehensive test ban treaty would be a more persuasive reason for wider adherence to the Treaty than verbal appeals or threats of unilateral conditions imposed by the cartel of suppliers of nuclear materials.

89. For countries such as Nigeria and other early adherents to the Treaty, which foreclosed their nuclear option in the expectation that the nuclear-weapon States would also fulfil their obligation and enable us to look forward to a world free from the nuclear arms race, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would reverse the prevailing feeling of frustration and bitter disappointment.

90. Moreover, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would further enable the international community to isolate and effectively check that international leper in the comity of nations, the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, whose nuclear ambition—to blackmail the opponents of its criminal policy and in defiance of the firm determination of the Organization of African Unity with regard to the denuclearization of Africa—is well known. Recent reports of the plans of the *apartheid* régime to acquire nuclear capability, and the assistance provided by some Powers to that régime in the nuclear field, are therefore quite alarming. Africa, which has declared its firm intention to make the continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone, cannot stand idly by in the face of this threat to its security. Appropriate action will have to be included in the programme of action of this special session to deal with this urgent and grave matter.

Mr. Asencio-Wunderlich (Guatemala), Vice-President, took the Chair.

91. Racism breeds war; it has been a prime source of conflict in the modern world. The people of Africa, Asia and Latin America have suffered tragically from racists who have used military power to subjugate, oppress and exploit them. Today, Africa is not only still suffering from the iron hand of racist oppressors, but the worst manifestation of this criminal action, *apartheid*, is being sustained by the sheer brute force of armaments. In addition, the peace and security which we eagerly anticipated in the wake of African liberation from the colonial yoke have not been realized because of the constant stream of weapons pouring into the hands of the oppressors of the African people and a simultaneous denial of the means of defence

to the oppressed. Intra-State and intra-African disputes are being fanned by neo-colonialist motivations and the refusal to believe that the African peoples can make the right choice from their political options.

92. Let me take this opportunity to say that Nigeria, and indeed Africa, will not tolerate a late twentieth century equivalent of the partition of our continent. Regional arrangements in defence of peace and security must be made on the initiative of the African countries and the Organization of African Unity. Africa will not, and must not, be made the new theatre of the cold war.

93. It is clear to all that very little has been achieved over the last decade in the area of disarmament. The task of this special session is to correct this situation by establishing a programme of action for the effective pursuit of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Such a programme will necessarily be in two parts, namely, the conclusion of agreements on measures that are now ripe and urgent, and on measures of a long-term nature.

94. Among the former should be the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the conclusion by the nuclear-weapon States of an agreement substantially reducing their stockpiles of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery, an agreement on the prohibition of the development of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction, concrete measures regarding the conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament to economic and social development purposes, particularly in developing countries, effective steps to back up regional decisions on denuclearization, as in the case of Africa, and the promotion of disarmament awareness by the United Nations through a co-ordinated system of public information and education.

95. Since the other measures are fairly clear, I shall only elaborate briefly on my last point in this category, that is, the promotion by the United Nations of disarmament awareness. Too often we tend to overlook the important role which peoples generally and moulders of public opinion and public officials in an advisory capacity to Governments can play in the adoption of disarmament measures. Two years ago, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament recommended that the United Nations publish annually a Disarmament Yearbook and consider publishing a disarmament periodical. We have all seen how useful the Yearbook has been; but by its nature its circulation has been limited. The periodical must be conceived in short, easily readable form and be suitable for mass circulation.

96. I believe the time is now ripe to take an additional step. The United Nations must now launch a programme designed to give in-depth knowledge on disarmament issues to public officials so as to create a cadre of such officials in countries, mostly developing countries, which are currently short of such expertise. Under such a programme, the General Assembly would authorize the annual award of about 20 scholarships of up to six months'

duration for officials mainly from developing countries, but also including a few from the developed countries. The recipients would undergo a course in New York or at Geneva consisting of lectures, seminars and on-the-job observation organized by the Centre for Disarmament. They would conclude the course by being attached to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

97. The cost of such a programme would be included in the regular budget of the United Nations. It would represent no more annually than the cost of one military vehicle or the equivalent of five seconds' expenditure on armaments at the current annual rate. Surely this is not too much of an expenditure for the cause of disarmament and international peace and security. I therefore hope that this proposal will receive the support of all as part of the programme of action emanating from this special session.

98. I said earlier that this programme of action should consist of measures ripe for immediate implementation and those of a long-term nature. Having identified the former, I shall now turn to the long term. Obviously, the most efficient manner to deal with these latter measures would be to conceive them in the context of a comprehensive programme on disarmament that would lead to general and complete disarmament.

99. It will be recalled that in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV), adopted in December 1969, proclaiming the Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate on such a programme.

100. The Conference neglected to carry out that important assignment. In 1976 the Nigerian delegation submitted to the Conference a working paper on the conclusions of the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade and the tasks to be performed by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament². In that working paper the Nigerian representative at the Conference called attention to the Committee's neglect of the task of working out a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Later, at succeeding sessions, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions on that question. In the last of these resolutions, resolution 32/80, adopted on 12 December 1977, the Assembly took note of the decision of the Conference to set up an *ad hoc* working group to elaborate a comprehensive programme for disarmament and requested the Committee to continue its work on the subject and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament.

101. As representatives will see from the special report of the Conference in document A/S-10/2, the *ad hoc* working group on the comprehensive programme did no more than hold preliminary meetings. It did, however, direct the preparation of a document containing a comparative analysis of the various proposals submitted under this subject.

102. If Nigeria has over the past four years actively pro-

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27, vol. II, document CCD/510.

moted the elaboration by the Conference of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, it is because we firmly believe that there is need for a co-ordinated approach to disarmament negotiations. The time lapse since the General Assembly called upon the Conference to elaborate such a programme in 1969 has served to strengthen further the need for such a programme as an essential element in the disarmament process. Thus the scope of a comprehensive programme of disarmament will have to be broadened beyond the original perspective of the General Assembly reflected in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV). Such a programme should be a reference point not only for the Conference but for disarmament negotiations conducted in all other forums, so that, taken together, these negotiations will form a co-ordinated effort that will permit discernible progress in the over-all objective of general and complete disarmament. This special session must therefore make sure that work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme on disarmament will continue without any further delay.

103. I shall now speak briefly on the type of machinery which the special session should establish for disarmament. In the view of the Nigerian Government this issue should be approached in three parts.

104. The first part should be the forum for deliberation and for giving political directives in the field of disarmament. Such a forum should necessarily allow the participation of all Member States, in conditions of sovereign equality and taking account of the abiding interest of all in disarmament, which is intimately linked to their security and well-being. It should also be possible to convene such a forum as and when necessary and should, when in session, concentrate on issues of disarmament without distraction. In its desire to avoid the proliferation of organs while ensuring that the task envisaged will be discharged effectively, my delegation supports the reconvening of the Disarmament Commission established by the General Assembly in its resolution 502 (VI), adopted on 11 January 1952. The composition of the Commission should be the entire membership of the United Nations as decided by the General Assembly in its resolution 1252 D (XIII) of 4 November 1958, supplemented by resolution 1403 (XIV) of 21 November 1959. Considering that there will also exist a negotiating forum, the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission will have to be re-examined and will have to include new terms necessitated by the developments expected from this special session.

105. The second part of the machinery should be the negotiating organ. The Nigerian delegation believes that four factors should be borne in mind in this connexion: first, that for a negotiating organ on disarmament to be of maximum effectiveness, it must ensure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; secondly, that while such an organ should not be unwieldy, it should also not be unduly restrictive and representation in it should take account of the interest of all regions of the world in disarmament negotiations; thirdly, that a close link should exist between the organ and the United Nations; and, fourthly, that the experience and expertise on disarmament negotiations over the years should be harnessed in such an organ. Bearing in

mind the fourth factor, the conclusion of my delegation is that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to be the negotiating organ on disarmament. However, it should undergo such reform as will link it more closely to the United Nations, encourage the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, and take account of the growing interest in disarmament negotiations. To mention two possible reforms, my Government firmly believes that the institution of co-chairmanship should forthwith be abolished and that the Committee should be expanded by the addition of a few new members.

106. The third aspect of the machinery should be Secretariat support services. Two years ago the Centre for Disarmament was created for this purpose. It may well be necessary to look at the Centre in the light of the additional tasks which will devolve on the Secretariat as a result of the special session. My delegation keeps an open mind.

107. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament affords the United Nations and its Member States the opportunity of proving once again that the Organization can live by the ideals of its Charter. The peoples of the world look up to us to save them from the real threat of extermination which the present state of nuclear preparedness portends. We cannot afford to fail them.

108. MR. CHŇOUPEK (Czechoslovakia) (*interpretation from Russian*): First of all, may I extend to Mr. Mojsov my sincere congratulations on his election as President of this special session. In his person we are congratulating an outstanding representative of a country with which my country enjoys traditional ties of mutual esteem and co-operation. I am convinced that under his experienced leadership this session will achieve concrete and positive results.

109. We have met here in order to discuss, for the first time in the 33 years of the existence of the United Nations and with the participation of representatives from 149 countries of the whole world, such significant and vitally important questions of the present day as those pertaining to disarmament.

110. This fact alone represents an event of profound political significance in the life of our Organization; it is a concrete expression of the will of States to achieve progress in this key issue; it is an important milestone on the road to the achievement of lasting peace—an objective earnestly desired by the whole of mankind.

111. And if mankind, as is often correctly pointed out, is today standing at a fateful crossroad, then, as at any intersection, one road must be chosen. Since so much is at stake, it is hardly conceivable that we should do nothing. Unlike the past, however, when every road ended inevitably in the hardships of war, today humanity has a different, more reliable choice: to aim at the relaxation of tension, at the strengthening of peace, and at creating a balance of confidence instead of a balance of fear among countries.

112. Lately the world has not only embarked upon this road, but can already look back on the part which has been covered, marked by the milestones of international agreements—United Nations resolutions and, above all, that of the historic Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held at Helsinki. And what is even more important is that, proceeding along this road, mankind has succeeded in eliminating the oppressive tension of the cold war and has become accustomed quickly and with relative ease to peaceful coexistence. After all, even this session could not have been convened if détente had not become the main tendency in world developments.

113. Surely, much of what until recently was an unattainable wish, is now being gradually implemented. In Europe, which has gone down in history as a place of interminable conflicts, tension and the epicentre of the two most terrible wars, people today enjoy the foundations of security and co-operation that have been laid.

114. They do not want to live on a powder keg. Just as the needle of a magnetic compass persistently seeks the North Pole, so humanity aspires instinctively to peace.

115. In recent years a great deal has been accomplished for the sake of these truly humane aspirations. Numerous negotiations are conducted on a wide range of issues. Some of the channels of the arms race have already been closed off; not all of them, however, and by no means the most dangerous ones.

116. In this situation, naturally, political détente alone is no longer sufficient. It is absolutely necessary to take concrete steps in the field of disarmament and not to acquiesce in the fact that developments in the military sphere are still heading in a different direction. It stands to reason that there is no sense in talking about détente, on the one hand, while proceeding, on the other hand, with the development and manufacture of new types of weapons, raising military expenditures and kindling ever new hotbeds of war.

117. Moreover, as is generally known, armaments entail exceptionally harmful social and economic consequences, undermining the natural endeavour of nations to achieve a higher level of development. It is one of the biggest obstacles to the creation of a new equitable economic order and draws off immense material and human resources exactly from where they are most needed. To what extent would the standards of living of peoples be raised and how many burning problems facing mankind could be resolved by the funds thus saved! For instance, if at least for the duration of this session the arms race were halted, we would save \$30-35 thousand million, an amount which almost exceeds by a factor of eight the financial assistance which is to be paid from United Nations Development Programme funds for the implementation of projects in the fields of industry, agriculture and in the infrastructure of the developing countries during the whole Second United Nations Development Decade.

118. For all these reasons mankind is placing great hopes in this session of the General Assembly. It is not attracted by the concept of guaranteed destruction so eagerly put

forward by militarists, whereby the present arsenal of nuclear weapons might be equal to destroying all of mankind 15 times over, which in itself is apparently the best guarantee that there will be no war.

119. We put the question unequivocally: as opposed to the possibility of war, we put forward the alternative of peace; as opposed to the arms race, we put forward co-operation and peaceful emulation. That is why we intend to take an active part in the constructive work of the current session.

120. But to take a step forward means to weigh, with a sense of the highest responsibility and in a rational and pragmatic way, while taking into consideration the sound judgement and realism of all, the question of how to unite our thinking and what should be our common priorities. And not only that: we must reach agreement on concrete steps, too, and on that basis devise a realistic course of action that would make for tangible progress in the question of disarmament.

121. For our part, I can with full responsibility declare on behalf of my Government that Czechoslovakia, together with its allies—as we have already stated in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held at Bucharest in November 1976—is prepared, in keeping with the most intrinsic aspirations and interests of our people, to participate actively in the struggle to safeguard peace and for the continued relaxation of tension. President Gustav Husák stated recently: "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is resolutely opposed to the continued arms race and to the manufacture and deployment of new types of weapons of mass destruction."

122. History is full of examples of peace being advocated or proclaimed, but also replete with evidence that more often than not these were just empty words thrown to the four winds. We do not find many genuine attempts in history to create peace, to prepare the prerequisite conditions for it—in other words, to organize peace, if I may so express myself. And even despite the fact that all the best representatives of humanity, being guided by humane and noble ideals, have always been against wars, attempts at preserving peace were doomed to failure because in the course of all earlier periods of history objective conditions did not exist for halting wars and establishing lasting peace.

123. This was achieved only as a result of the Great October Revolution—that revolutionary event in the history of mankind which inexorably influenced its development, cutting substantially into the socio-economic roots of wars and causing such a change in the relationship of forces between peace and war that the strategic initiative was fully taken over by the forces of peace and progress. Lenin, in his penetrating diagnosis, proved quite clearly and irrefutably that imperialism and wars are communicating vessels, two inseparable terms representing the sum of the causes and effects of wars. However, in the present-day world, in the new correlation of forces which exists, there are factors which limit the possibilities of militarist expansion and clearly delineate the principles of peaceful coexistence—in

other words, a modern Rubicon—which cannot and must not be crossed without involving the mortal danger of self-destruction.

124. All the more absurd and, let us be frank, all the more futile, are efforts to perpetuate armaments by advancing ever new reckless projects such as nuclear bombs with reduced radiation and increased destructive effect or, vice versa, the production of the neutron weapon, which is so far the most dangerous project of its kind. It is no wonder that the absurdly inhuman nature of that weapon has united all of peace-loving humanity into a common wave of indignation.

125. Moreover, the neutron bomb attests to the existence of a deliberate, malicious design on the part of certain military-political circles to create types and systems of weapons which blur the differences between nuclear and conventional war and dangerously lower the threshold blocking the way to a global thermo-nuclear catastrophe. To yield in this matter to the pressure of the militarists would be tantamount to diverting for a long time and seriously jeopardizing genuine prospects for lasting peace and development. This must be taken into account by the respective Governments.

126. The post-war decades have shown with sufficient clarity that the socialist and other peace-loving countries could not and never can be talked to from a position of strength. The instigators of such attempts have never been able to net any gains; all they could enter into their books were losses. And what did mankind stand to gain from this? Only stepped-up tensions, cold war and teetering on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe.

127. We are therefore of the view that the question of the complete prohibition of the production, deployment and use of neutron weapons must be specifically stressed in the programme of action on disarmament which is to be adopted by this session. In our view, the best way to solve this burning issue is to conclude the agreements on which concrete proposals were this year submitted by the socialist countries in the Geneva Disarmament Committee.³

128. All these true facts that I have stated should strengthen our determination to achieve real and tangible results in this special session under the scrutiny of the peoples of our countries and of the whole world in order to overcome the feelings of futility and fatalism, which is our highest political and moral duty—in a word, to make this special session a success.

129. Our position on the halting of the arms race and on disarmament is embodied in the drafts of the main provisions of the declaration on disarmament and the programme of action [A/S-10/1, vol. V, documents A/AC.187/181 and 82]. Together with other socialist countries we have submitted them as working documents for the deliberations of this session, prompted as we were by a desire to adopt a document all parts of which would

reflect sober judgement, a correct evaluation of today's world and which would be well balanced, objective and guarantee equitable relations and the responsibility of all countries and, what is equally important, would also be generally acceptable. We also fully support the proposals which were made in this connexion at the last meeting by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko. They have faithfully reflected our point of view on this matter.

130. Thus, if this session is to make real progress towards the implementation of the supreme goal of our Organization—“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”—then its final documents must indeed be a programme of “action”, in order to be conducive to success in new disarmament negotiations. We have no need of rhetoric, of mere proclamations of even the noblest intentions, nor of voting or efforts to speed up the process at any price beyond what is realistically possible; what we need are concrete deeds and practical measures.

131. The pivotal issues in this set of problems are of course the questions related to nuclear weapons, that is, the halting of nuclear armaments, complete nuclear disarmament and averting the threat of nuclear war. It is after all nuclear weapons that are the most destructive force in today's military arsenals which could easily turn our world into a smouldering wasteland. This task is all the more pressing since, in the last 10 years alone, the world stockpiles of these weapons have grown more than three times. We are therefore convinced of the urgency with which we should demand that all nuclear Powers should undertake to halt further production of all types of nuclear weapons and to proceed gradually to reduce their accumulated stockpiles until they are completely liquidated.

132. At the present time, conditions are undoubtedly ripe for reaching an agreement on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Thanks to the intensive work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, the technical aspect of supervision which for a long time represented a serious obstacle to progress has practically been resolved. We think it is absolutely essential, should this agreement indeed be reached and for it to be really effective, that all nuclear Powers, without exception, accede to it.

133. Incidentally, on the subject of supervision, past experience has shown that fully effective supervision measures, once agreed upon, have never caused any difficulties in practice and have met every expectation placed in them. What is, after all, always decisive in such a case is political will and a sense of responsibility, not new organizations or agencies.

134. Another requirement is that of preventing the continued spread of nuclear arms, of strengthening and achieving full universality in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, along these lines, of enhancing the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Peaceful co-operation among States in the field of nuclear energy must not be allowed to become a channel for nuclear armaments. This danger is further

³ *Ibid.*, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27, vol. II, document CCD/559.

complicated by the fact that a dozen countries by now possess the capability of developing, without any major difficulty, nuclear weapons of their own. It is also for this reason that the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic supports the idea of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in different parts of the world.

135. Of exceptional urgency, in our view, are also such important questions as a total ban on the development and manufacture of all new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems thereof. There is evidence that the development of such qualitatively innovative weapons is now leaving the realm of Utopia and becoming the reality of the present day, and that everything that mankind has so far experienced in wars is but a remote, dying echo of what the disastrously destructive effects of such new weapons could be.

136. Our session is offered an exceptional opportunity to create a favourable and constructive atmosphere for the successful culmination of such important current negotiations as the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, the three-Power talks on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the negotiations on the ban of chemical and radiological weapons.

137. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is deeply convinced that the most realistic and most dependable way in which this session could effectively contribute to the final elimination of the threat of war consists in the adoption of the most recent disarmament initiatives of the Soviet Union, submitted by Mr. Brezhnev, aimed at both qualitative and quantitative arms reductions by the major Powers in both the nuclear and conventional fields and which are undoubtedly in consonance with the aspirations of the majority of the countries represented in this hall.

138. The session would make a significant contribution to the cause of peace were it to appeal simultaneously to all States to adopt decisive international measures in order to avert the still existing danger of nuclear war and, in particular, to conclude a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. It is only natural, after all, that nuclear disarmament measures must go hand in hand with strengthening political and international legal safeguards for security.

139. The political and economic situation in the world demands urgently that, in the question of limiting arms expenditures and substantially reducing military budgets, attention should be paid to concrete and practical negotiations.

140. In the over-all context of the disarmament effort, an essential place is occupied by regional arms limitation measures to reduce armed forces and armaments, including conventional weapons.

141. We cannot be satisfied that the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, in which my country is also a participant, have now been going on for five years, so far without any tangible results. We are of the view that the Vienna talks, which represent

the first experiment of this kind in history, must extricate themselves from an interminable debate on mere technical details, must free themselves from all the variants of "asymmetrical" models that are contradictory to the main agreed principles, and must proceed with the main issue, namely, the preparation of a concrete agreement. For our part, we are prepared to do everything to achieve such a mutually acceptable agreement.

142. Of considerable importance in this respect was the recently concluded Belgrade meeting of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe where many inspiring proposals were submitted for détente in the military sphere, among them the programme of action aimed at military détente in Europe and containing such significant measures as, for example, the proposal that the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe conclude a treaty not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, as well as a number of other proposals. Let me beg, also, from this rostrum that practical consideration be given these proposals in a manner that should be agreed upon on the basis of general consent among the States participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

143. May I also touch upon the matter of machinery for disarmament negotiations. In the Czechoslovak Government's view, the United Nations, the General Assembly and other bodies, together with the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, constitute a sufficiently widespread and representative apparatus for multilateral disarmament negotiations, although we frequently wish for—and, in many instances, we are striving to achieve—a higher yield from their efforts. However, we have earlier voiced our apprehension that the laboratory-type analyses which are conducted as to who should negotiate, and where and how, might soon push into the background the main issue, in other words, negotiations on a specific concrete agreement. What we lack is not the machinery, nor is it the structure or organizational form that underlies these difficulties, but rather the political will of some States to accept the idea of disarmament and to proceed with its implementation in practice.

144. Czechoslovakia believes, therefore, that the session will best fulfil its purpose if it becomes a prologue to the convening of a world disarmament conference. It is that conference precisely that might become the appropriate, duly representative and authoritative forum, having machinery at its disposal which will make it possible to adopt concrete, effective and far-reaching measures.

145. However, the convening of that conference is being continually delayed by some States, including two permanent members of the Security Council. This is not particularly far-sighted, because world public opinion desires the convening of that conference and is fully aware that participation in it by all States is necessary, especially those possessing nuclear weapons. The Czechoslovak Government supports the idea that the Assembly at the current session should determine the specific date for the convening of that conference and should establish a body that would be engaged in its practical preparation.

146. I have already stressed that at this session the Assembly is facing an exceptionally difficult and responsible task, namely, to strengthen and further deepen the current positive trends in international development and to prepare joint measures for carrying them over into the military sphere.

147. I am glad that I can reaffirm the determination of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to do its utmost to ensure that our deliberations are conducted in a spirit of fruitful, constructive and creative discussion, and that the decisions taken by us form a realistic foundation for reaching a decisive turning-point in the disarmament effort.

148. In this we are motivated by the essential optimism of our world outlook. We are deeply convinced that the policy of détente, disarmament and development will overcome all obstacles placed in its way by its adversaries, provided, of course, that we all turn the energy devoted to the speeches we make on disarmament into energetic action. In this process there can be no passive onlookers.

149. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): Disarmament today is not an option, it is not one of the alternatives in front of us. Disarmament is a fundamental condition for the very survival of mankind. In a world where the number of missile-deliverable warheads of the two major nuclear Powers alone is somewhere around 12,000, with a combined explosive power of the equivalent of 1.3 million bombs of the size of that dropped on Hiroshima, one can no longer conceive of security outside the process of real disarmament.

150. I have to state with regret that there is not a sufficiently widespread and clear awareness in this world of the serious risk posed by the arms race to the present and the future of mankind. The secrecy around its main processes, the illusion created about disarmament negotiations, the wide publicity given to some of man's space adventures, have almost turned the arms race into a "science fiction" show, a sort of gigantic sports competition capable of providing audiences with a variety of sensations, except that such audiences are not composed of mere spectators but of real actors, that the settings are not made of cardboard, that there is no awakening after the nightmare and that this is a matter of their own survival. We have to emphasize here how dangerous are the illusions about the arms race and disarmament negotiations and how urgent it is to look at things as they really are and to take action, before it is too late, to put an end to the most dangerous course upon which mankind has embarked.

151. That is the meaning of the initiative taken by the smaller nations of the world, the developing and non-aligned countries to convene this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

152. We have arrived now at an historic moment, We must understand that moment in order to seize the opportunities it offers and to exploit those opportunities. That is the task before us now. What is new and historic about the present situation consists essentially of two points: first,

the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is the symptom—perhaps I could say the proof—that the question of disarmament has become a universal concern. Disarmament is no longer a matter of the two alliances or for a small number of States; all countries are now being actively engaged in the formulation of policies and priorities—their own policies and priorities. The second factor that makes this a major historic turning-point is that the international community is now beginning to tackle disarmament in the way in which such complex problem areas must always be tackled, namely, in terms of an over-all plan of clear priorities and a set of "here-and-now" steps, adding up to a co-ordinated whole.

153. The very fact of my presence here is an illustration of the new conditions in the world. A small country such as mine has a vital interest in disarmament. It is concerned about what is going on in the field of armaments, has subsequently decided to act and, over the years, has submitted various proposals aimed at enhancing the cause of disarmament.

154. The current decade should have been what it had been proclaimed to be, the Disarmament Decade. The fact is that, as a result of world evolution over the seven years which have elapsed so far, it seems to deserve the name of armaments decade. Not only has no disarmament measure been put into effect as an action meaningful to the basic trend, not only have no reductions of the present stockpiles been made and not only has no bomb or nuclear missile been destroyed, but the arms race continues to spiral unabated and to acquire new dimensions, thus creating new premises for its further intensification and for increasing the danger of war. The technological character of the arms race has been enhanced, the stock of weapons of mass destruction has grown at a fast pace, the military importance of the oceans and of space has become greater and more and more States have been involved in the competition in armaments.

155. In spite of the obligations undertaken by Governments in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of the strategic arms limitation agreements, the arms race has been stepped up. The arms race has become a planetary phenomenon mirrored by the increased weight of developing countries in world military expenditures, by the expansion of the geographical area and the increase in the number of countries kept supplied in various degrees with sophisticated major weaponry of the latest model.

156. While this is true there is also a tendency to assess the prevailing trend by ignoring its context and to infer or to give the impression that the main danger comes from the developing countries. Let me stress here the fact that the largest accumulation of armaments in the developing countries can be signalled in just a few conflict areas or tension zones where the independence of nations is threatened. Even in these cases, however, developing countries play an entirely minor role in the over-all picture considering that it is only now that their armed forces are taking shape.

157. True enough, this horizontal proliferation has al-

ready resulted in an even greater scope and destructiveness of local wars and a higher risk of confrontation between the leading military Powers and consequently it is a factor which increases the danger of a new world war. We should, nevertheless, emphasize that behind this situation lies the primary responsibility of the most heavily armed countries which maintain the arms race and determine its dynamism.

158. The report of the Secretary-General on the economic consequences of the arms race, which is before the General Assembly,⁴ makes it clear that the driving force behind this world-wide arms race is constituted by the qualitative arms race among the largest military Powers, owing chiefly to their virtual monopoly in the development of advanced military technology, to their overwhelmingly large share of world production and world exports of advanced weaponry and to the global character of their political and military interests. It may be asserted that the horizontal proliferation of armaments is, to a large extent, the direct expression of the competition between the largest military Powers and, in many cases, a means of promoting certain political and economic interests.

159. The arms race constitutes the main obstacle to development efforts. The establishment of a new international order calls for the elimination of obstacles to development and for the utilization of all ways and means to bring about a rational management of resources and interdependencies and thus to allow all nations of the world equal access to the fruits of progress as well as free and independent development. This explains the intense interest in the problems of disarmament viewed in close connexion with other global problems and with concerted efforts to restructure the world. It is true that until recently the developing countries showed little interest in the various aspects of disarmament which were viewed as problems specifically affecting the developed countries. The feeling that we shall die of starvation before dying of the effects caused by an atomic war is being replaced by the conviction that we shall die of starvation if we do not uproot the causes of a new world war. The arms race is in total incompatibility with the efforts aimed at the establishment of a new international economic and political order. This is true not only because the possible and probable outcome is a devastating war; it is due also to the fact that the armaments escalation constitutes the most powerful factor of preserving the present system of international relations and exacerbating all its negative aspects.

160. As the Secretary-General's report, which I have just mentioned, makes clear, the burden of armaments rests especially on the shoulders of developing countries which, criticized as they are by the international community, too often make exorbitant expenditures by comparison with their modest resources, the result being balance-of-payments deficits, rising foreign debts, decreased favourable effects of imports on growth and a notable decline of accumulation possibilities at a time when the bridging of debts requires even higher growth rates.

161. It is to be stressed that we do not regard disarmament as a universal remedy to contemporary problems. It does not and cannot solve the opposition between rival ideologies, nor does it solve territorial disputes or conflicts of economic and political interests between nations. But disarmament will help to divert the efforts exerted to solve outstanding issues towards the field of political negotiations, thus keeping open the options of further co-operation between States having different social conceptions or interests. Disarmament would therefore entail the "demilitarization" of national policies and of international relations, the elimination of strategic considerations from the process of decision-making, a method which is currently affecting the international development of States and international co-operation. Disarmament and the establishment of a new economic order are, however, complementary in the sense that real progress towards the bridging of economic gaps between States, the reduction and abolition of inequities in world economic structures and a mechanism devised to solve global problems would eliminate many of the present sources of tension and threats to peace and implicitly remove the roots of the present competition in armaments. Progress in the field of disarmament thus constitutes one of the principal factors of a new type of security for all nations.

162. As to the final documents to be adopted at the end of this special session on disarmament, it is the view of my delegation that disarmament should be approached in a comprehensive manner, and that our efforts should be aimed at real disarmament. Work should be resumed on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

163. The following elements, we feel, should be reflected in the final document. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that disarmament is general and complete and that war will no longer be an instrument for settling international problems; and that such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The highest priority should be given to disarmament matters related to nuclear weapons. All States should have the opportunity to express their views on the substance and basic principles of such a programme and on its scope, on practical ways and means of implementing it, and on other aspects of the programme, they should participate actively, on terms of full equality, in all phases of the negotiations on the drafting of the programme, so that it may embody the will of all peoples and give expression to their fundamental interests.

164. The participation of all nuclear-weapon States and of all other major military powers in the efforts to contain the nuclear arms race and to reduce and eliminate all armaments is indispensable if the disarmament efforts are to have a full measure of success.

165. As disarmament is a matter of great concern to all States and all peoples, there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about, and to under-

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1.

stand, the prevailing situation in the field of the arms race and of disarmament. In this connexion, the United Nations has a central role in keeping with its obligations under its Charter. The problems of disarmament affect the security and the very lives of peoples, and they should know what action to take in this direction so that they may have their say and defend their vital interests. That is why the peoples of all countries must be fully informed, and periodic reports must be issued on the current state of armaments and its consequences, and on the steps to be taken to stop the arms race.

166. The United Nations which, under its Charter, bears responsibility for disarmament, should be kept informed of all unilateral, bilateral or multilateral efforts in this connexion.

167. No disarmament, or disarmament-related, measure should adversely affect the scientific, technological or economic future of nations. All nations have full rights of access to all achievements of science and technology, without any restrictions whatsoever.

168. The international agreements in the field of disarmament that have already been concluded should become universal, and all parties should fulfil all the obligations arising from these treaties.

169. The programme for general and complete disarmament should ensure that States have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens. It should also ensure that States provide and support agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

170. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence of stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within a specified time-limit. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place after a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and, where appropriate, that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are ready to become operative.

171. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage. Security could thus be ensured equally for all.

172. All disarmament measures should be implemented, from beginning to end, under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties were honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out at each stage. To implement control over, and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be cre-

ated within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured of unrestricted access, without veto, to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

173. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and for settling international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the necessary measures should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations the manpower agreed to be necessary for an international peace force equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat to use, or any use of, arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.

174. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on, and implementation of, measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress towards agreement on the total programme, and in such a way as to facilitate and form part of that programme.

175. I wish to express the full support of my delegation for the proposals made by the Secretary-General at the opening of this session. I see particular merit in the proposal to establish an advisory board, on which matter I wish to comment briefly.

Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) resumed the Chair.

176. The problem is in the way the General Assembly works. It is a forum for making statements and finding compromises by cutting a heel here and a toe there. In that way it plays a very important role, of course, but it cannot stand alone. What is lacking is an institution for digesting or processing, for transforming the raw material of the positions adopted at one session into inputs for the next session. Without such processing, the elaboration of a strategy and a consensus on problems and directions for solutions becomes exceedingly difficult. The tendency for the General Assembly to reconsider exactly the same item in exactly the same way year after year is well known. The idea of putting items on the agenda only every second year is to hide the real problem, not to solve it. What is being done is the collation of existing proposals with no fundamental questions answered.

177. What is needed is to create an institution with which the General Assembly can enter into a dialogue in such a way that a consensus of views on the problems faced and the strategy to deal with them, rectified and adjusted as one goes along, emerge from the dialogue. The chief institutional requirements for the advisory board fol-

low from this role as dialogue partner of the General Assembly. It must be similar enough to the General Assembly to permit a genuine dialogue, and different enough to make that dialogue dialectical in the classic sense.

178. What is proposed, therefore, is a body that is much smaller than the General Assembly, with greater weight being placed on expertise; a body that is nevertheless politically representative, sufficiently permanent and organized in terms of expert status; a body with a great inclination to raise basic questions and cut through sheer rhetoric; and finally, of course, a body with purely advisory status.

179. This points to an organization similar to the Commission on Development Planning: some 28 experts, appointed for perhaps five years at a time. Its tasks would be to draw up an annual report on the situation in the field of disarmament and on priorities and problems as it sees them, before the session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly could request it to consider specific questions, and the advisory board could itself raise any issues it felt pertinent.

180. It is to be noted that this is in no way a substitute for the research and documentation functions of the Secretariat. It would be a powerful supplement to it and they could work effectively hand in hand. The basic point is, of course, that the annual reports would not commit Governments but would nevertheless indirectly have a considerable influence on the work of the First Committee—the Committee dealing with political and security questions—steering it in a specific direction and all the time being a little bit ahead of it. If the General Assembly is to fulfil the dynamic and co-ordinating role in disarmament clearly envisaged in the conception of a special session on disarmament, an institution pretty much along these lines seems to me to be essential.

181. That will be the organ to ensure that disarmament negotiations take into account the security interests of States and the progress made in other United Nations bodies dealing with security and also to ensure that disarmament negotiations are relevant to the developments in military technology.

182. Mr. ROMULO (Philippines): Sir, it is a special pleasure for the Philippine delegation to see you presiding over this special session of the General Assembly, the third in a row within a year. Your enviable record is totally unprecedented in the history of the United Nations. That the membership of our Organization should have chosen you as President of the General Assembly not only for its thirty-second regular session but also for its eighth, ninth, and tenth special sessions is a fitting and well-deserved tribute to the qualities of leadership and the wisdom you have consistently shown as a diplomat and as a man in public life. Our warmest congratulations, Sir. We wish you the best as you guide the deliberations in this crucial special session on disarmament.

183. We are brought together here in extraordinary session to consider once again the most immediate and intractable threat to human survival on earth—the arms race. Spaceship earth is being packed with nuclear dynamite, in

the name of security. Yet, sooner or later on earth's orbiting course, those explosives are bound to go off through accident or miscalculation or by design, with incalculable results for all human life.

184. The holding of this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is a measure of the level of concern which is felt throughout the world. It is a measure of the dismay that solutions have yet to be found to the madness in which States, large and small, have been caught up. This session may possibly set loose new and creative forces in the world community. It may possibly lead to the discovery of new and promising approaches to arms limitation and disarmament which have thus far escaped us. It can assist, and already has assisted, in mobilizing and informing world public opinion, a force which may demand increasingly faster progress on the part of the nations assembled here.

185. All nations, large and small, are fellow riders on spaceship earth. Yet the fate of our community depends entirely too much on the actions and inaction of too few—the most militarily significant States, which balance all our futures on a razor's edge of precarious nuclear parity. We had reason to hope that in the months between the time our decision was taken to hold this session and now, steps would have been taken which, although not of the greatest military significance in themselves, would have given cause for hope to all peoples that the tide could finally be reversed. Such steps might have included actions jointly agreed on and taken or, on the other hand, they could have included examples of individual national restraint and goodwill. An agreement on a comprehensive test ban remains to be concluded. An agreement to destroy and prohibit the most lethal chemical weapons—in particular, nerve gas—remains uncompleted.

186. No State has found it possible in the interim to stimulate progress by identifying and taking steps leading to reciprocation by others and thus to new agreements. We recall the example of the prohibition of bacteriological and biological weapons, an agreement which followed quickly upon the initiative taken by a major Power to declare the destruction of stockpiles and a halt in production of these fearsome agents.

187. We welcome and applaud the decision not to deploy sophisticated radiation weapons. At the same time, we deplore the lack of undertakings to refrain from the development and deployment of new types of heavier, more accurate multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles and of cruise missiles. It would seem clear and logical that the least we could do in the absence of arms reductions and disarmament would be to refrain from those things which we have not yet done.

188. If vertical proliferation continues, so does horizontal proliferation. No undertakings have been forthcoming to suspend sales and delivery of nuclear reprocessing plants with capability for concentration of weapons-grade material nor to forgo such arrangements in the future. Nor has the build-up throughout the world of conventional arms been any less resistant to restraint. The sums being

spent on arms by countries with pressing domestic needs are well known to all, and such sums continue to increase as the demand for the latest technology in armaments spreads. Thus there is little to suggest that in preparation for this special session it has not been "business as usual" in the arms race. The deadly momentum of the arms competition has thwarted efforts to slow it or to turn it aside.

189. Regrettably, the extent to which our current exercise in the removal of brackets from the draft documents of the special session will contribute to tangible measurable progress towards a disarmed and secure world, remains an open question. It will, of course, be useful to agree both upon the general character of the armaments competition and upon an agenda of steps to be taken. Not since the United States⁵ and USSR⁶ draft treaties on general and complete disarmament has there been as comprehensive a treatment of the arms problem as is proposed in the draft documents before us.

190. Might I suggest, however, that there is nothing to prevent one or the other major Power from announcing during this session the definite steps it is taking to initiate a process of change from the present situation. Such steps might well include an announcement of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, a reduction in the stockpiles of such materials, a moratorium on the production or deployment of any new weapons, systems or their testing, the destruction of stockpiles of nerve-gas weapons and a moratorium on all nuclear tests pending a comprehensive ban.

191. These are only suggestions. There are many such steps which could be taken without greatly affecting the condition of essential parity in hyper-destructive weaponry. What are required are steps which will break the vicious circle of action and reaction towards ever-increasing armaments. What is required is initiation of a new kind of process. Our problem is as much one of the restoration of sanity as one of dealing with hardware. Increases in hardware are seen and interpreted as threats and lead to matching hardware. This has been the main characteristic of the arms race. Similarly, measures of restraint will be seen as a reduction of threat and will in time lead to an atmosphere in which substantial arms reduction measures can be negotiated.

192. As I have suggested on earlier occasions, what are required are acts of high statesmanship to establish a new trend, a trend which will serve initially to reduce the oscillatory arms increases on each side and will lead, when persevered in, to an oscillation of a different kind, a competition to match measures leading to reduction of tension and arrest of the arms build-up. It is from such changed conditions that fruitful negotiations can lead to useful results. The international community has up to now not given suf-

ficient attention to the creation of the necessary conditions and atmosphere for success. The conditions are psychological in nature as well as physical and have as much to do with perceived threat as with actual threat.

193. One of the dangers we face in approval of the bracketed or unbracketed documents is the fact that everything has been put into the pot, so to speak, and thus we have before us a recipe for a stew which, while it may be savoury in itself, consists of a *mélange* of unrecognizable ingredients. The risks are obvious. Nothing may receive sufficient emphasis to appear compelling, to amount to a mandate, to galvanize opinion and support for change and progress. In particular, the text before us makes only passing reference to the relationship between disarmament and international peace and security. We venture to suggest, as we have done before, that this relationship may be more fundamental to the question of progress towards disarmament or the lack of progress than any other single factor. We must make a distinction here between arms limitation or reduction and general and complete disarmament. Arms reduction can, of course, be very substantial indeed without infringing State security, given the tremendous overkill capacity now available. However, arms reductions as such suffer from one severe limitation: depending on the fever chart of international affairs, which is to say the imagined level of threat, suspicion or fear, reductions may quickly turn to additions.

194. Only in comprehensive disarmament is there any hope of lasting world peace. Yet in the absence of effective, tried and true mechanisms for the maintenance of international peace and security, general and complete disarmament cannot and will not occur. The nature of security is changing. Heretofore, military strength and force of arms have provided what little security has existed in our anarchic world. But what lessons have we drawn from the fact that force of arms provides a rapidly diminishing increment of security as arms continue to pile up? As there is no defence against new weapons of mass destruction, in particular against nuclear weapons, so there is no real security. Nations are thus unable to perform one of their prime functions, namely, to assure the security of their peoples.

195. In the United Nations we have a world Organization charged by its Charter with the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but as yet unable to discharge this function effectively or, in any case, not effectively enough for nations to feel secure in disarming. How, then, can we talk about disarmament without prescribing the degree to which the United Nations must assume the functions which the Members are no longer able to perform? The prime requisite for disarmament has thus largely escaped our attention and our creative efforts.

196. In this regard we particularly welcome the decision of the General Assembly at its thirty-second session requesting the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security. We see this as a necessary first step, but only a first step, in what must inevitably become one of the most important searches in human history, namely, the search for

⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. F and document DC/205, annex 1, sects. E, F, and *ibid.*, *Supplement for January to December 1963*, document DC/208, annex 1, sect. H.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867 and *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1964*, document DC/209, annex 1, sect. A.

the means to provide security for the human community as a whole in the absence of national means of doing so. We should not delude ourselves or mislead the public into believing that disarmament will be achieved in the absence of a solution to this historic question.

19. A major factor, of course, concerns the extent to which Governments are prepared to enter into this search. The question of international peacekeeping and peacemaking in the context of the process of disarmament has as yet received little attention from States Members of the United Nations. In many instances, we do not believe the connexion between the two problems has yet become clear. If the special session should succeed only in one particular—in establishing clearly this interdependence between disarmament and emergence of an alternative world security system, the session would have succeeded in a most important respect. We would most urgently suggest the formation of a working group to consider the progress report on the study of the Secretary-General [*A/S-10/7 and Corr. 1*], and to initiate an ongoing approach to the relationship between disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security. Nations will have to choose: they cannot have disarmament without security, or security without disarmament.

198. Perhaps the foregoing considerations contain a clue to the reason for the lack of attention to comprehensive disarmament both in the documents before us and in the work done relative to the arms race in recent years. Whatever the reasons, it seems important to re-establish firmly that nothing less than general and complete disarmament is our goal, and that in fact nothing less will provide for global security at a time when retention of only a very few nuclear weapons can work havoc among us. One of our main aims in this session should surely be to re-establish the pre-eminence of the goal of comprehensive disarmament, even while we delineate the steps necessary to both short- and long-range progress.

199. In respect of the long-range effort for comprehensive disarmament, it is not too soon to begin to consider the nature of an international disarmament organization. It will be recalled that the draft treaties for comprehensive disarmament did, indeed, make provision for the establishment of an international disarmament organization and that there have been periodic attempts to focus the attention of the international community on the necessity for a new United Nations agency with responsibilities in this area. Thus, we are particularly interested in the proposal of the Netherlands for seeking the views of Members concerning an international disarmament organization, and its establishment, for example, at a second special session on disarmament [*A/S-10/1, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/108*].

200. The number of disarmament agreements is rapidly proliferating, and with them the necessity for their oversight, as well as for the organization of review conferences and for the development of effective verification measures and processes to assure the compliance of States. The Government of the Philippines feels that these rapidly growing responsibilities should be vested in an international disarmament organization providing a clearing house

for verification information from satellites. The responsibilities of the new agency can grow in keeping with the developments in the disarmament field and, conversely, new tasks can be assigned to the international disarmament organization as it gains experience and expertise. The Government of the Philippines, therefore, will strongly endorse the proposal of the Netherlands on the establishment of an international disarmament organization.

201. The portions of the world which live in dire want may be more sensitively aware than others of the tremendous waste of resources in the conventional and nuclear arms race. Many figures and comparisons have been provided in recent years. Thus, for instance, the cost of a new nuclear missile submarine is the equivalent of nearly half a million homes. The world is denying itself tremendous gains in social goods and services by its prodigious investment of treasure in the arms race. The mountainous production of military hardware is creating a "throw-away" world society through manufacture of non-consumable goods, now reaching a substantial percentage of the gross national product of many countries. From the long-range historical view, the diversion of such huge quantities of materials to arms production can only be seen as an unconscionable indulgence in the face of world needs. Thus, the suggestion that a conscience tax of a small percentage of arms expenditures of the militarily significant Powers be exacted and devoted to development needs seems appropriate and would serve two needs: first, it would provide funds for life-serving ends; secondly, it would remind the States involved of the extent to which their expenditures are defrauding themselves and the world of funds needed to meet social goals.

202. Closely related to the question of disarmament and development is the problem of reduction of military budgets. One of the most promising ways to reduce arms lies in the gradual shrinkage of military budgets. In this approach, the difficult problems of balancing asymmetrical weapons systems against each other do not arise. Military establishments choose their weapons, but paradoxically must do so with less. We earnestly hope that the very important initiative with respect to development of a satisfactory instrument for standardized reporting on military expenditures of Member States will contribute to the possibility of reduction of arms by the budget-cut approach, and that the envisaged pilot test of the reporting instrument will soon be carried out.

203. The major requirements for halting and reversing the arms race might be summarized as integrity, ingenuity and initiative. Without specifying, it must be clear that there have been deficiencies in each area. History will condemn us severely if we do not succeed in staunching this flow of the life-blood of our societies into suicidal channels.

204. Our special session cannot resolve the question of disarmament. Nor should we expect it to. It can, however, become a turning-point for the reversal and end of the arms race. It could be a turning-point for change in the ways in which we address this question. The late Lord Bertrand Russell of the United Kingdom stated that man-

kind has never refrained from any folly of which it was capable. It is our profound, noble and most urgent task to prove Lord Bertrand Russell wrong.

205. Mr. BOUCETTA (Morocco) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, may I, on behalf of the delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco and on my own behalf, most warmly congratulate you on your election to the presidency of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

206. This renewed expression of confidence in yourself is a manifestation of the esteem you enjoy among us and the embodiment of your fully proved competence. We are sure that the Assembly will find in your experience the best possible guarantees that this session will be guided to the success for which the entire international community hopes.

207. Morocco, as a non-aligned country, can only welcome your election to the presidency of our Assembly since this election is an act of recognition and a tribute to your country, Yugoslavia, which hosted the first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade and which has constantly sought to promote the principles of disarmament in order to strengthen the cause of peace and international security.

208. I wish also to express my gratitude to Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina, who guided the work of the Preparatory Committee with far-sightedness and efficiency, with the result that the Assembly has available important documents which, we are sure, will make our task easier.

209. I should like also to pay a tribute to the Secretariat in the person of Mr. Kurt Waldheim for the important contribution he made to the preparation for this session and for all the services provided for the success of our work.

210. Responsibility in the field of disarmament falls in the first instance to our Organization, which is entrusted by the Charter with the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly has undertaken praiseworthy efforts to check the arms race and to promote détente. To this end, it has encouraged the establishment of negotiating bodies which have made a signal contribution to the adoption of various disarmament measures. Unfortunately, the attainment of the main objective of general and complete disarmament has been impeded by the lack of political will among States and by mutual mistrust among Governments.

211. The lack of progress in this field, which is characterized by an unbridled race for the acquisition of the most sophisticated and destructive weapons, has led the countries Members of the Organization to decide, on the initiative of the non-aligned countries, to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This initiative is all the more praiseworthy since it provides the Assembly with the opportunity to assert its direct responsibility with a view to strengthening the role entrusted to it by the Charter to draw up principles of disarmament and to provide appropriate negotiating bodies.

212. This special session is, in fact, of major interest. It will allow the overwhelming majority of countries—large and small—to participate in a discussion from which they have thus far been excluded and thus to measure the true impact of disarmament on their security and development. Similarly, we hope that this special session will make the great Powers more aware of their special responsibility in the field of disarmament, in particular of nuclear disarmament, and will thus lead to positive progress in the negotiations now under way.

213. The unprecedented growth in and intensification of the arms race, the serious dangers posed by immense stockpiles of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, the persisting hotbeds of tension in the Middle East and Africa mean that a heavy threat of insecurity is weighing over mankind as a whole.

214. Thus, in the Middle East the arms race and the spectre of the use of nuclear weapons by Israel, which has not adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, endanger international peace and security in this region. In this respect we reaffirm that just and lasting peace can be established in this region only with the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, whose legitimate representative is the Palestine Liberation Organization, to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian State in its homeland.

215. A heavy threat also hangs over our continent of Africa because of South Africa's intention to acquire nuclear weapons. The Organization is in duty bound to ensure the effective implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa [*resolution 1652 (XVI)*] and to bring the necessary pressure to bear on the racist régime of Pretoria, in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and those of the Organization of African Unity.

216. Furthermore, our African continent is threatened with general destabilization because of the competition there among the great Powers and their recourse to ideological warfare. Foreign intervention in conflicts between African countries as well as aggression by some African countries against their neighbours are inevitably leading to an arms race engaged in by States seeking to protect their security. This arms race is undoubtedly impeding economic development and threatening world peace.

217. With regard to Africa, it is necessary that the principles of the Charter be observed and that the Organization of African Unity be left to settle inter-African conflicts with the means at its disposal, in order to permit member States to live in security enjoying full respect for their territorial integrity. It is in this spirit that His Majesty King Hassan II responded to the appeal of President Omar Bongo, current President of the Organization of African Unity, regarding the events which recently caused bloodshed in Zaire. His Majesty's response thus reflects a concern to limit the problems of our continent to a purely African framework and is designed to strengthen the unity and solidarity of member States and to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

218. Another hotbed of tension has been created because of the persistence of racist and colonial régimes in southern Africa. The Kingdom of Morocco, which has constantly provided all kinds of assistance and material and moral support to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Azania, is deeply convinced that those movements have the absolute right to have recourse to all appropriate means—including armed combat—in order to achieve their national aspirations to independence and freedom. The complete decolonization of southern Africa is the first condition for the cessation of the stockpiling of weapons in that region.

219. The Kingdom of Morocco, which has taken part in the work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, has a twofold concern in the security of the western Mediterranean: first of all as a Mediterranean country anxious to see the Mediterranean become a zone of peace, and secondly since it assumes special responsibility as guardian of the Straits of Gibraltar, which is a strategic and economic route of first importance. We hope that this route will remain a zone of innocent passage, preserving the peace and security of coastal countries.

220. All our regional policy has always been derived from the idea of the unity of the Maghreb. We have always endeavoured to achieve this unity for the greater good of our peoples, convinced as we are of our common destiny. Consequently, we have always called for regional disarmament, and my country was the first to advocate a reduction of tension in our region.

221. This was particularly stressed in February 1967 in a message which His Majesty King Hassan II addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, with a view to checking the arms race in the Maghreb. His Majesty stated, among other things:

“Out of loyalty to these principles and in view of the national obligations we assume, we have undertaken the total mobilization of our resources in order to ensure development and progress for our country and prosperity for our people.

“You know that the achievement of such objectives is hardly easy. We are devoting thereto all our own human and material resources and all the assistance we receive from international organizations and friendly countries. We have even reconverted our institutional and administrative structures on the basis of this priority option at the social and economic level and towards the achievement of which we are at this time focusing all our efforts.

“Because of all these considerations and in order to translate this conviction into fundamental reality, we would like this principle of disarmament to be extended also to the region to which our country belongs. For this purpose, we propose to Your Excellency that, under the aegis of the United Nations, a committee be set up that would have a twofold mission:

“First, to recommend to Algeria and Morocco that they renounce any increase in their respective military

potential in order to safeguard North Africa from the dangers inherent in the arms race;

“Secondly, to proceed *in situ*, using appropriate ways and means, to verify the arsenal of each of the two parties concerned, both in quality and in quantity, and to evaluate the respective level of requirements for maintaining order in each of the two countries concerned, Algeria and Morocco.”

222. The convening of this special session devoted to disarmament is all the more significant since it coincides with the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade. The General Assembly has repeatedly stressed the close links between disarmament and development. In this respect it is enough to recall General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) declaring the 1970s a Disarmament Decade. Paragraph 6 of this resolution recommends that a substantial part of the resources freed by disarmament should be channelled to the economic development of the third world, most particularly in the field of technological progress.

223. The growing awareness of the General Assembly in this respect is merely the reflection of the concern of world public opinion at the escalation of military expenditures, particularly in the field of nuclear weaponry, an escalation that is proportionate to a growing lack of funds devoted to international co-operation between developed and developing countries. It is sufficient to remember that expenditures on weaponry at the moment amount every year to \$400 thousand million, while official development assistance to developing countries scarcely exceeds \$20 thousand million.

224. Besides this squandering on military expenditures, we should also deplore the fact that other human, natural, scientific and technological resources are being used for armaments when they could have been better utilized to combat poverty, hunger and want, to solve urgent problems in the economic and social fields which hinder development in several regions of the world and to guarantee world stability and peace.

225. On this point, it is my duty as a member of a country of the third world to draw the Assembly's attention to a new fact which may assume considerable proportions.

226. We note that some developing countries are unfortunately tempted to divert some of the possibilities open to them to the establishment of a military or war industry and, following the example of the great Powers, are even beginning to trade in arms. This can, of course, only have serious repercussions on their economic and social development.

227. Morocco, for its part, will support any initiative designed to reduce international tension, one of the main consequences of which is precisely the stockpiling of arms. If tension is eased, it will be possible to establish the necessary conditions for a positive dialogue with a view to establishing a new international economic order that will meet the aspirations for justice and well-being of our peoples.

228. We hope that this special session will reaffirm the importance of the links existing between development and disarmament, and that our discussions will lead to concrete results making it possible to put an end to the current impasse.

229. While welcoming the efforts made and measures already taken for general and complete disarmament, we can only express, without pessimism, our conviction that what has been achieved thus far seems inadequate by comparison with the dangers attendant on humanity as a result of the quantitative and qualitative increase in the arms race, particularly in the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

230. Piecemeal measures have, of course, been taken in the nuclear field, such as the Moscow Treaty of 1963, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, together with the outcome of the first round of strategic arms limitation talks.

231. The Kingdom of Morocco firmly believes in the need to put an end to nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, in any region of the world.

232. The non-nuclear States which have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a right to claim the benefits of the peaceful use of atomic energy together with effective guarantees for security, particularly through a commitment on the part of the great Powers not to use nuclear weapons against those countries—indeed, not even to threaten to have recourse to nuclear weapons against them.

233. On this occasion I should like to recall that when the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco decided to undertake the necessary studies with a view to building a nuclear power station to meet the ever-increasing needs of the country in terms of electric power, and the immense phosphate reserves yielded by the Moroccan subsoil made it possible for Morocco to produce uranium, His Majesty King Hassan II proposed that the United Nations appoint a committee of wise men to ensure that the uranium should not be enriched for military purposes. To this end, His Majesty King Hassan II proclaimed the willingness of Morocco to agree to an annual or biannual visit. This solemnly declared commitment from the highest authority in the Kingdom is in addition to the obligations already entered into by Morocco under the Agreement concluded on 30 January 1973 with the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of guarantees within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Morocco is a party.

234. In informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 25 November 1976 of the foregoing, the Government of His Majesty King Hassan II was careful to assure him that, while wishing to have a nuclear power station, Morocco wished only to have all the means likely to accelerate its economic development for the benefit of all its inhabitants.

235. Morocco is convinced of the need to create an atmosphere of understanding and confidence between peoples and is desirous of devoting its energies and potential to the development effort. It has therefore adhered to all international conventions on disarmament and is taking an active part in all the negotiating bodies working in that field.

236. I should also like to pay tribute to the initiative which the Latin American States have taken in concluding the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We also welcome the praiseworthy efforts of the African States to declare the continent of Africa a nuclear-free zone, together with the initiative taken by Iran and Egypt with a view to considering the Middle East as a denuclearized zone.

237. The extreme seriousness of the situation of the over-arming of the world in which we live makes it obligatory for us to undertake a primordial task for present and future generations: that of organizing, at world level, a campaign of information, the aim of which would be to make available to the vast masses of the public information and facts concerning this matter and thus to make public opinion throughout the world more alive to the need for greater efforts to achieve disarmament.

238. Despite the complexity of the problems of disarmament and the dilemmas States are confronting at the moment, we must overcome our hesitation and our susceptibilities in order that the necessary decisions may be taken. Humanity as a whole has its eyes riveted on the Assembly and expects it to be equal to the historic task entrusted to it.

239. Mr. ADAMOÛ (Niger) (*interpretation from French*): It is now more than 30 years since the philosophers of disarmament, in the name of safeguarding peace and security, undertook the difficult mission of curbing the tendency of States to race to produce and buy engines of death. Thirty years of excellent professions of faith, masterly speeches in the major diplomatic forums.

240. But the picture remains desperately grim. Threats have become more acute because over the years we have seen the growing sophistication of the moral and physical ideas of inflicting death. The panoply of conventional weapons has grown beyond every stretch of the imagination; that of atomic and thermo-nuclear armament has reached the point of saturation where the devices already in existence alone could destroy our poor planet several times over. It has reached the stage where, without playing with words, the cynicism of destruction is pushed to the point of drawing a distinction in the production of arms between those that are "clean" and those that are "dirty", as if ending of life could take any account of aesthetics other than that banal death, intended to be as widespread as possible.

241. Since that time we have witnessed the most refined forms of international hypocrisy. Those who produce, refine, proliferate and sell arms do not hesitate to play at being heroes of peace. They meet, sometimes alone, sometimes among experts, to propose a brief respite in the new international balance of terror to which, willy nilly, all the

populations of our planet are in subjection. They have succeeded in creating successive conflicts in Latin America, in Asia, in Africa, in order to find gullible partners capable of abandoning their economic development for a few ruinous wars to prove the "credibility" and "feasibility" of the arms put into their hands.

242. More than 30 years of sterile attempts! How can we blame the countries of the third world for their concern about it and for wishing to see this conference on disarmament convened under the flag of the United Nations? Just another conference? Perhaps. But we still have faith in our institution and the proposals of the non-aligned countries, which we shall support, cannot but tend to promote favourable conditions for a solution of the problem. More than 30 years! But let us look at the facts.

243. As early as 24 January 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations invited the International Atomic Energy Commission, which had just been established, to submit proposals to the Security Council for ensuring the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, eliminating atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction from national armaments and taking effective safeguard measures.

244. The commitment of all peoples to this noble enterprise was especially sanctioned 15 years ago by the conclusion of a number of treaties. Thus we saw the birth of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, to cite but a few. Those treaties, to which must be added the agreement concluded in 1972 during the first round of strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, were signed or entered into force during the present decade, which the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session solemnly proclaimed the Disarmament Decade.

245. While there is undoubtedly an encouraging sign in all this, it also must be recognized that the results obtained have fallen short of our hopes. Indeed, we cannot abandon ourselves to exaggerated optimism at a time when the most authoritative voices are deploring the absence of tangible progress to halt the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race.

246. Niger, a developing country, cannot help but be swayed by this wind of pessimism when everyday facts show to what extent the industrialized countries, in their rush towards the heights of terror, pay scant attention to development problems. Is it not scandalous to see those countries relegate to second place their responsibility in the struggle against under-development and its evils while they indulge in a mad waste of human and material resources to satisfy their insatiable appetite for domination, which has nevertheless cost them two military adventures of world dimension within the space of 20 years during this century!

247. For additional proof we need only ask the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute or to look at the report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race which the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. These documents show, *inter alia*, that the arms race has cost humanity \$6,000 billion since the Second World War, that is to say, as much as the gross national product of the whole world in 1975.

248. It also appeared that it would be sufficient to contribute 1 per cent of the military budgets of the industrialized countries to assistance for the development of agriculture to bring its value, by the end of the decade, to the level of \$5 thousand million a year, decided on in 1974 by the World Food Conference.

249. These revelations make even more desperate the economic impotence of the third world, which, faced with the diabolical feats of the rich countries, are waging an unequal struggle against the evils which today stimulate economic uncertainty, foment unrest and increase violence.

250. These evils are complete destitution for 700 million human beings and malnutrition for more than 400 million and the permanent threat of endemic disease for more than 1 thousand million inhabitants of developing countries. To them are added famine, illiteracy and natural catastrophes which are so many obstacles and threats to the full development of people.

251. This grim picture, far from showing a clumsy pessimism, underlines the unfortunate priority status of arms investments in the industrialized countries and the pernicious effect that those expenditures have on the capacity of the rich countries to give the economic assistance the third world nevertheless looks for in the form of aid and comprehension in its liberation struggle and economic development.

252. For we in Africa still believe in cooperation based on mutual respect as the source of peace and harmony among nations.

Mr. Asencio-Wunderlich (Guatemala), Vice-President, took the Chair.

253. This desire for co-operation in peace and security is best illustrated in the attempts at political and economic integration which have marked the 30 years during which our States have exercised international sovereignty. Some have been crowned with success because they established joint bodies of a continental or subregional nature. We see in this desire for *rapprochement* in the economic field an essential factor for peace and collective security; a concrete approach at the regional level to problems of détente and disarmament.

254. To that end, 15 countries of the community of States of Western Africa have just signed at Lagos an historic pact of non-aggression.

255. Hence it is not with a light heart that the African peoples today see that their rich partners, obsessed by the

progress of science, have not always tailored their policy to the needs of true solidarity.

256. It is this hesitation and absence of determination in trying to find solutions to the problems of Africa which are the basis of the obstacles which stand in the way of the progress of the international community towards the new economic order and the inevitable elimination of the last bastions of colonialism.

257. Strengthened by this unanimous opinion, the delegation of Niger is convinced that the reduction of military investments and the reconversion of the armaments industries will hasten the establishment of a just and durable economic order.

258. We are also aware of the fact that the overnight elimination of the arms industries throughout the world would inevitably lead in many countries to social and economic difficulties which would be difficult to overcome. That is not the wish of my delegation. We must not allow this to become an excuse to prevent political will from working towards the reduction of arms and the progressive reconversion of armaments industries. International peace and collective security would unquestionably gain in that event.

259. Disarmament, in the opinion of my delegation, also involves a struggle for the triumph of a just cause, a struggle for the elimination of all sources of conflict in the world.

260. This truism, however, does not yet seem to be impressed upon the whole world. In southern Africa and in the Middle East, terrorism has been elevated to State law and the hopes of innocent populations are daily drowned in blood.

261. It is highly regrettable that in this last quarter of the twentieth century the international community allows itself to be distracted by the minority and retrograde régimes of southern Africa dominated by a handful of blood-thirsty people who hark back fondly to the Nazi era, to which Africa paid a heavy ransom, although that is not fully recognized today. After having been bled white throughout contemporary history, African peoples are once more subjected to the trial of strength and obliged to sacrifice the best of their men to regain in their own ancestral land the freedom and independence which is their unquestionable right. The valiant sons of Africa have for a long time now taken up arms to fight against the tainted régimes of Vorster and Smith, despite the powerful arsenal which has been given to them by their allies.

262. It is high time that those who arm the enemies of Africa put an end to the discrimination and sectarianism which characterize their attitude in defence of democratic freedoms.

263. Let them agree, in the name of the ideal of peace which has brought us together in this forum, to give up that attitude of complicity against the African people.

264. During these difficult times, when age-old African wisdom is being sorely tried by battles for influence and pockets of tension set afire here and there by those who hark back to times which will never return, we are firmly convinced that the African States will gain by cultivating the virtues of dialogue and tolerance in their relations.

265. On 7 December 1977, in a statement before the First Committee, Niger made an appeal along these lines and proclaimed its refusal to believe in armed victory in conflicts which pit two States against each other.⁷ Such a victory, we say, would at most create—and history has proved this—a climate of frustration calculated to breed hatred among peoples, thus paving the way for the self-destruction of the victors and the vanquished. In saying this we are firmly convinced that no developing country has the power today to dominate another, because the will for independence is so firmly anchored in the spirit of our peoples that they prefer unnatural alliances to the loss, even to a brother people temporarily become their enemy, of one iota of their sovereignty and their territory.

266. In these conditions, realism forces our States to safeguard and respect the principles which heretofore have assured victory over the forces of evil and alienation.

267. It is indeed regrettable—even mad—for African countries to be involved in a real race against time in the arms field, resulting in the diversion of a large part of their meagre resources—perhaps I should say simply their resources—to the accumulation of a war arsenal which is generally out of all proportion to their legitimate defence and security needs. Considerable financial resources, which could play a leading role in the economic development of these countries, are siphoned off to the unproductive armaments sector.

268. The feeling of insecurity springing from their inability to respond to the noble aspirations of their people pushes them into the arms of a foreign Power from which they request arms to face a danger which, in truth, exists only in their imagination. In doing so they are unconsciously playing the game of the big Powers and fuelling the struggles for influence of the antagonistic blocs. This clearly demonstrates an erroneous idea of what security is, and it paves the way for the forces of evil and division. It is only natural that the over-arming of some countries in a zone should be a cause for concern among their neighbours, especially those whose only aspiration is to improve the standard of living of their people in peace and harmony. This concern naturally breeds distrust, which one day will result in open hostility between countries condemned by history and geography to live together.

269. Niger is against such an eventuality because it is incompatible with the needs and the solidarity of Africa and with the march of our peoples towards progress and unity.

270. My country has unshakeable confidence in the capacity of the African States to silence their quarrels and to

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 55th meeting.*

honour the commitments which they have assumed before God, before their peoples and before history. I refer to the consolidation of their independence and the quest for their unity. This will be their way of preparing the coming of this era of confidence, the prelude to the general and complete disarmament for which this august Assembly earnestly appeals.

271. This is an abiding concern of the Government of Niger, under the leadership of His Excellency Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountche, President of the Supreme Military Council, our Head of State who, speaking of African problems, said: "The first thing to do is to ask everyone to admit that it is up to each State member of the Organization of African Unity to respect its neighbouring State, whatever régime or form of society that society has chosen."

272. Without clashes or hue and cry Niger has since given proof of its devotion to the cause of peace, in making its modest contribution to the attempts to settle the burning problems of the region. In doing so it has simply obeyed a natural impulse which drives us towards dialogue rather than confrontation.

273. We cannot close this chapter on security without mentioning the Zionist entity which, since its creation, has posed an almost insoluble problem to the world at large and to the United Nations in particular. No one is condemning a country to defencelessness, nor asking it to expose the lives of its people to the anger and vengeance of others. In the Middle East, the problem of security is crucial, but in no case can it justify aggression for the purpose of preventing aggression, territorial conquest in the name of the Bible, or the refusal to negotiate in the name of security. The numbers of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council are ample proof that whole generations of diplomats have tried to find a just and equitable solution. But the tension continues despite all that has been done because distrust has been elevated into a doctrine which is incompatible with the objectives and idea of peace which it is the purpose of this special session to seek. We voice the hope that the recommendations and research programmes on disarmament which are adopted will mitigate the spirit of escalation and cut down the problems of the Middle East to their proper size.

274. The special session devoted to disarmament is a laudable initiative. The thanks for it are due to the non-aligned countries, which had the idea in 1961. That is not surprising in a movement which has made a most positive contribution to East-West détente. Was not non-alignment born out of the refusal of the third world to be associated with the division of the world into two antagonistic blocs? The movement bore the sign of conciliation and hope when it was created. However, it must remain faithful to its image, and now, more than ever, be an influence for peace and concord between nations.

275. Niger is proud to belong to that school of thought whose virtues and principles are a constant source of inspiration to its leaders.

276. This session, for which it worked so hard, once

more gives that movement an opportunity to reaffirm its faith in the future. We venture to hope that this Assembly will help it by examining in depth the noble ideas that it submitted to that end regarding the declaration of principles, the programme of action and the machinery for negotiation. These ideas demonstrate the conviction of the non-aligned countries that general and complete disarmament remains the key to lasting peace and security, their legitimate preoccupations in the field of development, and their confidence that the United Nations will do its best to solve the problems of international peace and security.

277. However, our movement's initiative would have been fruitless without the open-mindedness and readiness which have been shown by all Members. The various proposals submitted to the Preparatory Committee are ample proof of this. We believe they are a positive contribution to the permanent dialogue between nations in such a vital sphere as disarmament.

278. We offer our heartfelt congratulations and thanks to all those who, in one way or another, have contributed effectively to the holding of this session, which marks an epoch in the history of the Organization.

279. Their joint efforts resulted in a draft final document [A/S-10/1] which should sanction our debates. It reflects the complexity of the disarmament question. Despite the fact that there are still numerous points of disagreement, optimism always prevails. The fact that certain matters are no longer controversial gives us reason to think that the divergencies are not insurmountable.

280. Indeed, we note with satisfaction the reaffirmation of the incompatibility of the arms race with the principles of the United Nations Charter, which, in our view, is the first and fundamental step on the road to disarmament. Furthermore, it has been generally agreed that lasting peace and security can neither repose on the stockpiling of weapons nor be maintained by doctrines of strategic superiority or the precarious balance of deterrence. Moreover, we are justified in welcoming the affirmation that in our world, with its limited resources, there is a close link between arms expenditures and economic and social development.

281. In this connexion, the idea of creating an international disarmament fund for development deserves our consideration. It is nevertheless to be hoped that this initiative will not be diverted from its true purpose by a restrictive interpretation which would have development financed from the expenditures of the industrialized countries in the field of armaments, since the developing countries, in connecting disarmament with development, did not intend it that way; their main preoccupation is the reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and the reconversion of the arms industries to development purposes. Any other solution would be a mere palliative in a field where there is an imperative need for energetic decisions.

282. Such considerations prompt us to hope that the fund to be created will be fed by the voluntary, but regular and progressive, renunciation by nuclear States and the large

arms producers of a certain percentage of their military budgets, including commitments from the private sector. This formula would allow development to be financed at the expense, rather than in favour, of armaments progress.

283. Furthermore, most of the proposals have highlighted a concern for the democratization of the disarmament negotiations. This session will provide a response by strengthening the role of the General Assembly in guiding the general disarmament policy; for while effective disarmament is the exclusive prerogative of a minority of countries, on the other hand, the effects of nuclear and bacteriological weapons will recognize no boundaries. This sad possibility is enough in itself to open the negotiating forums on disarmament to the small countries.

284. With regard to regional disarmament conferences mentioned in certain proposals, we see in them one more means of promoting mutual trust between neighbouring States. However, here we must not fail to see the wood for the trees and allow them to conceal the absence of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

285. As to the problem of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology, while it is closely linked to the deployment of weapons of the same kind, we could sanction no action which would forbid the access of our States to such use.

286. Nevertheless, we continue to see a danger to our people in the free use of nuclear energy and technology by the irresponsible white minorities in southern Africa.

287. Before concluding, we wish to welcome the delegations of non-governmental organizations, whose presence among us attests to the international public's need for information and participation in this field. Their contribution to our deliberations will be a first step in the satisfaction of that legitimate need.

288. We should like here to pay a tribute to the delegations from the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which, by their desire to attend this session, have shown courage, as well as faith in the future.

289. This special session devoted to disarmament has already had, and certainly will have, a great impact on the world. The participation of eminent heads of State and Government of numerous Member States, by conferring particular solemnity and importance upon its work, should usher in a new era of the fulfilment of our hopes. We hail these leaders as messengers of peace.

290. We are convinced that this session will justify the hopes placed in it and that the General Assembly will go beyond mere rhetoric to adopt specific decisions on all the items before us, the main one being the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament by the necessary democratization of the negotiation and supervision machinery and the creation of a special disarmament fund for development

291. That is the modest contribution of my delegation.

Even if it is a dream, we still wish to believe in it, because the arms race and its political, economic and social effects prove beyond doubt that disarmament is essential for the survival of mankind.

292. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 53 of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (A/S-10/1), which the Assembly adopted at the first plenary meeting, I call on the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Mr. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow.

293. Mr. M'BOW (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) (*interpretation from French*): It is an honour for the Director-General of UNESCO to speak at this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and, in greeting the heads of State and Government, Ministers and all eminent representatives of Member States gathered here to take part in its work, I wish to say how happy I am to have the opportunity of placing before you the views of the organization I head on one of the crucial problems of our time.

294. The decision of the General Assembly, in accordance with the proposal of its Preparatory Committee, to invite me to address it in plenary meeting seems to me to confirm the importance of the role that UNESCO has constantly played within the United Nations system in the building of peace. This role is one that UNESCO has always shared with all the bodies within the system; therefore I will venture during this brief statement to echo some of the concerns which my colleague Dr. Mahler, Director-General of the World Health Organization, has particularly asked me to put before you.

295. While UNESCO's action in regard to the subject of this special session of the General Assembly is of a specific nature, its Constitution assigns it the purpose of "advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims". But, as the Constitution further specifies, "peace based exclusively on the political and economic arrangements of Governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, on the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind".

296. Therefore, in the 32 years of its existence UNESCO has endeavoured to work in the field of its competence and according to the means proper to it, through research and action, to consolidate peace. It is convinced that without peace and reduced tension the solution of the problems confronting humanity will be seriously and no doubt irrevocably jeopardized. But it has always felt that any international settlement attained to the detriment of freedom, the dignity of peoples and respect for individuals could never claim to be a true peaceful settlement in terms of spirit or lasting quality. That is why the UNESCO General Confer-

ence has linked the struggle for peace to the condemnation of all forms of oppression, discrimination or exploitation among peoples—not only because they inevitably engender violence but also because they are themselves forms of violence and a manifestation of the spirit of war.

297. With those principles as a basis, UNESCO has always faithfully followed the guidelines of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

298. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, the Executive Board of UNESCO defined the bases of "UNESCO's contribution to United Nations action in favour of general and complete disarmament". At its eleventh session, in 1960, the General Conference considered that "one of the main tasks of UNESCO was to create public opinion favourable to the implementation of United Nations resolutions condemning warmongering propaganda and favouring general and complete disarmament". In 1962, at its twelfth session, the General Conference expressed its support for the conclusions of the group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General to study the economic and social consequences of disarmament. Sixteen years ago, the General Conference was already asking for the establishment of long-term plans in the fields of education, scientific research, communications media and the elimination of illiteracy, taking into account the major responsibility UNESCO would have to assume when large quantities of resources were liberated by disarmament for international programmes of social and economic development. At the same time the Director-General was authorized to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that UNESCO was ready to provide him with all studies under its terms of reference which he might need in order to analyse the economic and social consequences of disarmament.

299. It goes without saying that this offer still holds good today, and I wish to renew it here. More recently, at its eighteenth session in 1974, the General Conference took care to state in one particular resolution that "peace cannot consist solely in the absence of armed conflict but implies principally a process of progress, justice and mutual respect among the peoples designed to secure the building of an international society in which everyone can find his true place and enjoy his share of the world's intellectual and material resources, and that a peace founded in injustice and violation of human rights cannot last and leads inevitably to violence".

300. The medium-term plan of the Organization, adopted at the nineteenth session of the General Conference at Nairobi in 1976, is permeated with the same ideas. It is geared to enabling UNESCO to make a most active contribution towards the establishment of a new international economic order likely to remedy the inequalities between nations and peoples in order to give a solid foundation for peace. Participants at the round-table discussions on the future of the third world held under the auspices of UNESCO in Mexico in December 1977 came to the conclusion that "all the real problems in the new international economic order are inextricably related and linked to the matter of general and complete disarmament".

301. Now, since 1945, at what cost has a third world war been avoided? For how many days have the guns really been silent throughout the world? The axis of conflicts—which none the less continue to implicate the industrial Powers, large or small—has shifted towards the poor countries, but this in fact changes nothing in a situation in which men, women and children whose lives are as valuable as any other lives continue to die because of war.

302. But nations which have in this twentieth century sacrificed more than 100 million victims to war continue as though caught up in a giddy spiral, spending an enormous amount of their ingenuity, their energy and their resources, according priority to the manufacture of machines of death that are ever more sophisticated and terrible. And these nations can meet here and together seek to find the means of moving towards "general and complete disarmament". This seems to me to sum up most strikingly both the wisdom and the folly of our time, justifying our greatest hopes and, unfortunately, our greatest concern. The peoples of the world, getting the better of the fear that arises from their differences, are beginning intuitively to glimpse the fundamental solidarity of the human race. This is a decisive turning-point in the history of mankind and of the community of nations. For the member States of UNESCO, for those now present, the representatives of the States of which I am speaking, and for all of us, the question of disarmament is a collective challenge, one that is unavoidable and total. Taking up this primary challenge would mean not only delivering humanity from the threat of unprecedented bloodshed but also having the means to struggle victoriously against poverty, disease, ignorance and other scourges besetting so many peoples, scourges which the United Nations system cannot at present combat effectively because of lack of adequate resources.

303. In this respect, the sum of military expenditures for the world as a whole has often been quoted from this very podium. What is less well known is that it is one fourth higher than the amount spent on education throughout the world. As for military research and development, today it absorbs the talents of about 500,000 research workers and engineers. This fact is, of course, of concern in itself. But what is of even greater concern is that the tendency is constantly increasing. While before the Second World War military research and development represented only 1 per cent of military expenditures, today it represents no less than 10 to 15 per cent. In other words, while millions of men, women and children continue to live in destitution or to die of diseases that could easily be remedied at so little cost, \$40 to \$60 thousand million are spent on refining the technologies of death and destruction, representing three or four times more than the amount spent on development assistance and more than twice the total expenditures on education in the developing countries.

304. These figures become all the more significant if we realize that the eradication of smallpox cost only \$300 million and that malaria, which today affects half the world and in Africa alone kills 1 million children under five years of age, could have been reduced to the level of ordinary illness for an annual expenditure estimated by the World Health Organization at \$2 thousand million.

305. In truth, all that is needed is to earmark for development only part of the material and human resources devoted to the preparation of war in order substantially to change the face of the planet, to narrow the widening gulf between the rich and the poor countries and to reduce the areas of poverty which still exist in many industrialized countries. A number of essential activities in terms of nutrition, health, literacy, development of education, training of scientific and technological staff, setting up of research centres, cultural development, environmental protection, to name a few of the fields in which the specialized agencies are active, are hampered or even stymied for lack of material resources. This shortage, in turn, intensifies inequalities and gives rise to new tensions.

306. Thus to the development of nuclear weapons must be added the so-called conventional weapons race, which extends to the smallest and poorest States. Feeding on every injustice, projecting every selfishness in the present world, such an arms race arouses fearsome world interests linked to the arms industries, multiplies the dangers of a world conflagration and engenders conflicts.

307. Such a state of affairs not only brings terrible threats to our very lives; it also determines a system of a choice of investments, favours economic structures which, once they have become essential to the life of nations, will subsequently make it all the more difficult to carry out the essential reconversion of the weapons industry to peaceful activities.

308. Thus, before dreaming of the immense benefit which mankind could derive from a reversal of this situation, it is primarily the conditions and processes of such a reconversion of the scientific and technological potential of the world to purposes beneficial to all the peoples of the world that the United Nations system is inviting the leaders of the developed nations to ponder upon when it proclaims the need to establish a new international economic order. The economic, social and political problems arising from this reorientation would make it seem one of the most complex tasks and it would be scarcely realistic to underestimate the difficulty of achieving this objective. But it ought to be one of the major lines of action for the international community in the last 25 years of the twentieth century. For the reconversion of the arms industry must obviously be thought of only in the context of a true establishment of peace at the world level and a world-wide vision of the development of mankind. It presupposes in fact that the industrial potential, today geared to military activity, can be reconverted to activities beneficial to all the peoples of the world.

309. This is an ethical requirement and also an economic imperative if we want to avoid reconversion of the arms industries entailing, in countries which would agree to attempt it, crises the fear of which helps precisely to perpetuate this type of activity.

310. The effort is essential. How can we conceive of a world where relations of reciprocity would replace those of unequal exchange, where differences of culture, of colour, of opinion would no longer perpetuate injustices, but begin

to learn from each other how to lay the bases of a humanism at the level of all peoples, when there is no genuine peace?

311. In fact the United Nations—and UNESCO—have often been invited to take action. It is quite clearly the determination to give practical effect to the commitments undertaken, to carry out one's promises to the full, which is most often lacking. Countries whose high level of development makes them able to change the restrictive social and economic process of weapons stockpiling have, in this respect, a special responsibility towards the international community, towards the small and medium-sized States now at the mercy of decisions taken elsewhere but which none the less affect their future. This spirit of common responsibility of nations which inspired the project for a new world order requires that all peoples, finally recognized as being equal in dignity and in rights, take part in the making of decisions which concern humanity as a whole.

312. Confidence will certainly emerge from the political, diplomatic and technical measures which the Assembly will take, in accordance with the Charter. To increase that confidence, however, more will be needed. That is why I am firmly convinced that in this essential and long-term task it will fall to education to create a movement of public opinion throughout the world favourable to disarmament and peaceful co-operation. One of our main objectives has to be to strive to include education on disarmament in the syllabus of schools, universities, wherever learning or skills are acquired.

313. Examining at a recent debate what might be the specific contribution of UNESCO to the work of the General Assembly, the members of the Executive Board of UNESCO stressed that we had to get to the deep-seated roots of the problem through action on minds by developing international understanding through education and by making the best possible use of the means of communication. They recalled that this programme, which several described as moral disarmament, could be successful only if relations between States were radically changed, because it is from these relations that inequalities become more acute and that tensions leading to catastrophes are produced.

314. The action on the "minds of men" must clearly not be one of propaganda, but of information. Communication between peoples and nations in this respect is of decisive importance, particularly the regular dissemination of free and responsible information, applying the results of in-depth research work in the fields of psychology, sociology, economics and history in order to throw light on human behaviour and to do away with cultural prejudices and to bring people closer together.

315. It is above all by contrasting, on the one hand, the burden that any war, even a potential war, imposes, and, on the other hand, the immense benefits of peace, that public opinion can apply its full weight and help Governments to achieve disarmament.

316. Pursuant to the decisions of the eighteenth and nineteenth sessions of the General Conference, UNESCO established a vast education and information programme to

promote peace and international understanding, in which research work and scientific publications, symposia and seminars help to compile the knowledge that the means of communication then disseminate.

317. I should like to mention, among other works, the bibliographic studies on the economic and social aspects of the arms race and disarmament and on the dangers for mankind and man's environment posed by modern weapons and techniques of war; a study on the role of international organizations—in particular the United Nations—and on the role of the regional organizations in the slowing down of the arms race and the promotion of disarmament; an anthology of scientific texts representing the various disciplines concerned with the effort at disarmament; finally, a world survey on education for disarmament.

318. I should also like to mention the symposium organized in April last at headquarters on "the obstacles to disarmament and the ways of overcoming them". Participants in this symposium from every intellectual and geographical horizon studied not only the international, economic, diplomatic and military structures but also—and, I would even say, above all—the psychological factors which contribute to weaken any political will to proceed to effective disarmament.

319. The Executive Board stressed the interesting conclusions of that meeting, some of whose suggestions might, it seems to me, be worthy of the Assembly's attention. They included suggestions to organize in 1980 an international congress on education and disarmament; to study the concept of disarmament from the viewpoint of international law and *jus gentium*; and to develop new uses of audiovisual means in order most effectively to disseminate information on disarmament. *Inter alia*, a film festival on the arms race and disarmament was proposed.

320. At the conclusion of the discussion which I have just mentioned, the Executive Board, while welcoming the fact that the Director-General of the Organization had been invited to take part in the work of this special session, recalled that "UNESCO has a vital role to play in the creation of a general climate conducive to the cessation of the ever-increasing arms race and favourable to disarmament and must, in the fields within its competence, make an effective contribution to the creation of such a climate, which would facilitate increased aid to developing countries, the establishment of a new international economic order and the promotion of international cultural understanding".

321. I believe that UNESCO is playing this role effectively, devotedly and competently with all the efficiency that its means permit. It is not a case of imposition. No international organization really has the means for that. It is a matter of persuading and convincing people, appealing to reason and good sense, but also to high-mindedness and fully understood solidarity, beneficial to all. It is a long and difficult struggle and sometimes not a very rewarding one, for these are ideas which have to silence guns, but it is one which has with it all the hope of the world.

322. As I was saying, world solidarity is not to be taken for granted. It is our most recent and most precarious conquest. There is nothing irreversible about it; it is what we shall make of it. By our actions we can develop it or stifle it. Since we have begun to grasp the vital need that every man has of every other man, we see a glimmer of the end of an age in which the strength of some has inevitably meant the weakness of others; where success for some, far from leading to the happiness of others, of necessity has meant their failure; where war alone has sanctioned peaks and slumps and beat the rhythm of history.

323. We are now on the threshold of a new era, when we know that war can be set aside, because the possibilities of the mind and the will of man are infinite.

324. However, we are still hesitating at this decisive crossroads of our future. We remain torn between the demons of mistrust, which we have dragged along with us from the very earliest horizons of time, and the call of a universal consciousness which today has gained a foothold in part of us only.

325. History has already known lost opportunities. There is no fatal choice for good. Peace is offered as one option among others, to be taken and defended, not as a need independent of our choice. We have to deserve it, and deserve it quickly. The balance of nuclear terror expresses all the dangers of our present uncertainty as we waver between war and peace. It is, if you like, the negative sign of our wisdom. It is the fear of war. It is not yet confidence in peace. We have to want this peace with enough strength, with enough imagination, with enough courage to attain it.

326. For my part I can assure the Assembly that UNESCO, which will follow the work here and study the conclusions reached with particular interest, will do everything in its power in the fields within its competence and in close co-operation with the other institutions and agencies within the system and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, to accomplish the tasks which without a doubt the Assembly will assign to it, since both the reduction and the progressive disappearance of arms will be the most signal proof that man, finally reconciled to himself, can hope to enjoy some day the peace in justice and brotherhood that has been his aspiration since time immemorial.

327. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of Chile has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I now call on him.

328. Mr. DIEZ (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Chile regrets to have to speak in exercise of the right of reply because of statements made this morning by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia. Such statements are counterproductive for his country's objective of securing an outlet to the Pacific. The only way to this end is through resumption of the dialogue between Bolivia and Chile. The frank and flexible attitude of Chile and its readiness to co-operate in the solution of Bolivia's land-locked situation, with due regard for existing treaties and within the norms of justice and equity that must rule international

relations, are the expression of the will of its people which, together with its sympathy for Bolivia, has an awareness of what are the appropriate means of giving it practical effect.

329. We hope that calm and the spirit of conciliation will mark the future decisions of the Government of Bolivia on this matter.

The meeting rose at 8.10 p.m.