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**President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).**

***Continuation of the fifteenth session***

1. The PRESIDENT: The fifteenth session of the General Assembly is resumed, and the 961st plenary meeting of the Assembly is called to order.

***Tribute to the memory of His Majesty  
King Mohammed V of Morocco***

2. The PRESIDENT: Before we proceed, I would ask members of the Assembly to stand and to observe one minute of silence as a tribute of respect to the memory of His late Majesty King Mohammed V of Morocco.

*The representatives stood in silence.*

***Statement by the President***

3. The PRESIDENT: I wish to welcome all representatives to this resumed fifteenth session of the General Assembly and to express my sincere hope that the deliberations of the resumed session will achieve fruitful and constructive results.

***Address by Mr. Kwame Nkrumah, President  
of the Republic of Ghana***

4. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will today have the honour and privilege of hearing an address by His Excellency Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the President of the Republic of Ghana. On behalf of the United Nations I greet His Excellency and I now invite him to address the General Assembly.

5. Mr. Kwame NKRUMAH, President of the Republic of Ghana: I appear before you today on a sad and solemn occasion, the first meeting of the General Assembly since the murder of the Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba. History recalls many occasions when rulers of States have been done to death. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba, however, is unique in that this is the first time in history that the ruler of a country has been killed in the very presence of United Nations forces which he himself had

invited to his country to restore law and order. That such a thing could have happened must make all those of us who believe in the United Nations anxious about its future. I must, therefore, state quite clearly that any comment or criticism that I have occasion to make on the United Nations action in the Congo is not intended to disparage its efforts or to undermine its authority. As I said in my last address to the Assembly [869th meeting], the United Nations is indeed the greatest hope for the peace and security of the world. I believe we must stand four-square on what is one of the most important principles of international law and basic to the whole conception of the United Nations.

6. A Government which comes into power as a result of a genuine revolution is entitled to international recognition. Otherwise a way is left open for interference in the internal affairs of Member States. But an intervention from outside aimed at fomenting a revolution in a Member State is as illegal as is an intervention aimed at suppressing a genuine revolution. If, as I believe, Mobutu's rebellion in Leopoldville, Tshombé's rebellion in Katanga and Kalonji's rebellion in South Kasai were engineered from outside, then any assistance to these rebels or any recognition of them in any form is intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo.

7. It is for this reason that Ghana so strongly deplored the decision of the United Nations to seat the so-called Kasa-Vubu delegation. This action was not supported by any single country which had a contingent in the Congo, and it is, in my view, a glaring example of how universally accepted principles of international law are sacrificed to the exigencies of the cold war.

8. What has been done is, not only to recognize in the United Nations a faction whose recognition is contrary to every principle of international law, but also to recognize as the Government of the Congo a group which does not even claim to speak for the whole of the country. The tragic fruit of this recognition is seen today in the fact that the so-called Government which was recognized by the United Nations has made an armed attack at Matadi on the forces of the United Nations. Even as I speak, the lives of soldiers of the United Nations contingents are threatened by the undisciplined mutineers enlisted by Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu.

9. The significance of the Congo situation is that it gives the United Nations an opportunity to reassert its authority. If speedy and effective action is taken now in the Congo, the United Nations will have that prestige and moral backing which it must have if it is to tackle other even graver world problems that it may have to face in the future. I have in mind the problems bound to arise over Angola, Mozambique, the Union of South Africa, Ruanda-Urundi, South West Africa, Algeria, the Rhodesias and other African colonial territories. These are all potential problems for the United Nations, and the United Nations must work out now the machinery

which can be used to solve such problems should the necessity arise.

10. In one of his first addresses in regard to the Congo situation, the Secretary-General himself underlined and emphasized this need for speedy and effective action by the nations of the world. Addressing the Security Council on 20/21 July 1960, he said:

"... There should not be any hesitation, because we are at a turn of the road where our attitude will be of decisive significance, I believe, not only for the future of this Organization, but also for the future of Africa. And Africa may well, in present circumstances, mean the world..."<sup>1</sup>

I entirely endorse what the Secretary-General then said. It is impossible, however, for us to shut our eyes to the fact that there has been hesitation, vacillation, inconsistency and weakness in the United Nations handling of the Congo crisis. In consequence, the world authority, the moral authority of the United Nations has become dangerously weakened, the dangers of a war have seriously increased and even the very office of the Secretary-General has been called into question.

11. I believe the non-committed countries of the world have now the opportunity of working out, within a United Nations framework, practical plans which can solve the Congo crisis, restore the prestige of the United Nations and remove the threat of hot war occasioned by continued disorder in the Congo. No such plan, however, is possible unless it is set in an African framework with the independent States of Africa and the Asian countries playing the leading role in its accomplishment.

12. Some little time ago I asked the Secretary-General to circulate to the members of the General Assembly a number of concrete proposals [See A/4661] on which I believe a settlement could be based.

13. I have come here today to put these proposals before the General Assembly. However, before I state the specific points which I consider should be adopted by the Assembly, I would like to say a few preliminary words about how Ghana regards the Congo situation in general.

14. The murder of Patrice Lumumba is not merely the murder of an individual. It is the murder of that principle of legality which the United Nations has been advocating in the Congo. It is the grossest affront to the whole conception of collective action through the United Nations, and it marks the most cynical disregard of the authority of the United Nations by a puppet régime maintained in power by outside assistance in flagrant disregard of the Security Council resolutions.

15. Indeed, the murder is the culminating event which proves what Ghana has long contended, namely, that the United Nations cannot restore law and order in the Congo if it takes a neutral position between order and disorder, if it permits Parliament to be suppressed by mutineers and the Constitution of the Republic disregarded and ignored.

16. The position at present is that though the Security Council resolutions have insisted that the integrity of the Congo must be preserved, Katanga is, under the very eyes of the United Nations, being detached from the Republic. The Security Council has repeatedly called for the removal of foreign troops, yet war is being waged by Belgian-led bands of mutineers supplied with

arms from Belgium and equipped with Belgian military aircraft. An end must be made of this situation.

17. As I said when I last addressed the Assembly, the Congo is the heart of Africa; any wound inflicted upon the Congo is a wound to the whole of Africa. Outside intervention in the Congo is a threat to the independence of every African State and a further extension of the cold war.

18. It is with these considerations in mind that I put my proposals before the Assembly. They are:

(1) A new and strengthened United Nations civil and military command should be established in the Congo.

(2) This command and the contingents under it must be primarily African and should take over complete responsibility for law and order in the Congo.

(3) All Congolese armed units should be disarmed. This disarming will involve their return to barracks and the surrender of their weapons to the new United Nations Command.

(4) The disarming and hand-over should be voluntary and should lead to the reorganization and retraining of the Congolese National Army, but if certain factions will not co-operate, force must be used.

(5) All non-African personnel serving in the Congolese Army must be expelled immediately.

(6) The United Nations Command should control the major air and sea ports in the Congo so that the flow of arms and equipment to warring factions may be stopped and adequate support for United Nations troops be guaranteed.

(7) All foreign diplomatic missions and representatives should immediately leave the Congo for the time being in order to give this new United Nations Command a fair chance to eliminate the cold war from the Congo.

(8) Once the military situation has been brought under control on these lines, all political prisoners must be released by the new United Nations Command, and the new command should then convene Parliament under its auspices. Those responsible for the murder of Patrice Lumumba and his close associates should then be brought to justice.

19. It is self-evident that the first task of the United Nations is to allow the Congolese people to be ruled by a government of their own choice. The Congolese Constitution provides a means by which such a government can be chosen, and we support the Gizenga Government because it was chosen by this means and was the Government that invited the United Nations to the Congo.

20. The duty of the United Nations is not to force on the Congolese people this or that government because the other States of the world think that any particular government would be a suitable one for the Congo. This is colonialism. I therefore do not understand the emphasis which a number of Powers lay on recognizing this or that government. Ultimately, it must be the Congolese people who choose their government and not the United Nations. What the United Nations must do is to see that the Congolese people have the opportunity to choose the government which they want.

21. One of the greatest sons of the United States of America, Thomas Jefferson, laid down this principle, namely that before recognizing a government, that government must be supported by "the will of the nation, substantially declared".

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, 1960, 877th meeting, para. 19.

22. The "will of the nation substantially declared" can only be obtained, under modern conditions, by the free exercise of representative institutions. Under the Constitution of the Congo the representative institution charged with choosing the government of the Congo is the Congolese Parliament. The President's duties consist of formally appointing to office Parliament's nominees. Unfortunately, with the murder of Patrice Lumumba and other prominent parliamentarians, the existing Parliament of the Congo is no longer likely to be fully representative. Further, so much has occurred since it was originally elected that the mandates upon which various members were chosen now bear little relation to the needs of the present situation. My proposal is, therefore, that there should be, as soon as the United Nations has established law and order, a new general election conducted under United Nations supervision and under conditions where every political party can freely canvass for its policy without fear, without force and without intimidation.

23. Before, therefore, accepting a decision of the present Congolese Parliament as an expression of the will of the nation, the United Nations must first satisfy itself that Parliament is not meeting under duress and that the balance of political forces has not been changed by organized murder.

24. The murders of Senators and Members of the Chamber, including that of Joseph Okito, the Vice-President of the Senate killed at the same time as Patrice Lumumba, suggest that Kasa-Vubu, Tshombé, Mobutu and Kalonji realized they would not be able indefinitely to resist pressure for a meeting of Parliament and determined to secure a majority by assassination.

25. What we need in the Congo is not a solution that is a compromise or that seeks to reconcile the divergent views between East and West. What we want is a solution acceptable to the Congolese people and one which ensures peace and stability in Africa and thus excludes the cold war from the continent. As I have said many times before, we in Africa have a vested interest in peace. What is taking place in the Congo today could lead to a serious conflagration which would set us all ablaze and spare no one. Unless this unhappy and ominous trend is arrested at once, a major war will descend upon us again.

26. If the proposals I am making succeed, we will be ensuring that the world is not only safe for ourselves in Africa, but also for the big Powers. I believe that the plans I have put forward are entirely realistic and practical. Most people who have served or are serving with the United Nations in the Congo would agree with me. I believe that the latest Security Council resolution<sup>2</sup> authorizes the carrying out of at least three of my proposals—the regrouping and retraining of the *Force publique*, the expulsion of the Belgian military personnel and that steps be taken to increase the African representation in both the civil and military spheres. Moreover, any African representation must be by people who truly reflect a policy which is of benefit to Africa and must be the nominees of the Governments concerned. I hope that this Assembly will endorse the remainder. In particular I hope that the Assembly will endorse the use of United Nations troops to restore law and order. This will prevent the recurrence of the deplorable

situation which arose the other day when the Moroccan contingent of the United Nations Command had no authority to use force against the *Force publique* at Matadi, and therefore had to retire.

27. In the event the United Nations Assembly endorses the remainder of my proposals, I am convinced that the uncommitted countries of Africa, Asia and other parts of the world can produce the commanders, staff and full military support which will be necessary.

28. The African point of view at the United Nations Headquarters in New York has now some influence, in that the Secretary-General is making use of the Advisory Committee on the Congo, but this is not enough. The African viewpoint must also be much more fully represented at United Nations headquarters in Leopoldville, in both the civil and the military spheres.

29. The United Nations headquarters in Leopoldville is divided into civil and military sections. On the civil staff I would like to see many more experienced Africans in positions of authority than is at present the case. On the military side, my feelings are the same.

30. Action in the Congo is urgent. Up till now, the United Nations has failed in the Congo. It entered the Republic to restore law and order. Yet, today, mutinous troops roam the country committing atrocities, rapine, murder and all forms of indiscriminate killing. There is virtual civil war. The United Nations entered the Congo with a specific mandate to preserve the unity of the Republic. Instead, under the very shadow of the United Nations, the Katanga province is being in practice detached from the rest of the State and converted into a new type of Belgian colony. The first task of the United Nations was to secure the withdrawal of Belgian forces. Instead, Belgium has been allowed to establish what amounts, in fact, to a military dictatorship in Katanga. Belgian military equipment is supplied to rebel and separatist forces before the eyes of the United Nations forces, who are powerless to intervene. How has this situation come about?

31. First, the Security Council, in particular, and to some extent also the General Assembly, has allowed itself to become mesmerized by the problem of the cold war. Every solution to the Congo problem was therefore worked out in terms of cold-war politics in which the interests of the Congolese people were too often forgotten. The Congo was seen as a possible political vacuum into which one or other of the great Powers might move, and all energies were therefore devoted to neutralizing the Congo without sufficient thought being given to what effect this policy would have on the internal situation within the Congo itself.

32. The Government of Ghana, from the earliest moment, took the view that the cold war must be kept out of the Congo, but we also took the view that if United Nations policy was limited to this negative objective it would fail. The cold war can, in fact, only be kept out of the Congo if the Congo becomes a strong and truly independent State not dependent upon any of the great Power blocs. In fact, however, the individual policy of the great Powers was directed not to securing a truly independent Congo but to preserving existing positions of influence and control or to establishing new zones of influence. Indeed, Congolese independence has, from the very beginning, been bedevilled by the cold war. In consequence, instead of the principles of collective security being applied, a situation very close to collective colonialism has been established.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

33. A writer familiar with the Congo has thus summed up the basic reasons for the failure of Belgium in dealing with the Congo prior to independence. After giving an account of the considerable material achievements of the Belgian administration, he said:

"The Belgian view had always been that economic development and education are the foundation for political independence. It is a popular view, shared by the present rulers of Central Africa and South Africa. But it is a false belief; no enterprise—economic, educational or religious—can stand unless it is embedded in solid political foundations, which imply government by consent."

Despite Belgium's example, United Nations policy in practice has followed exactly the line condemned by the writer whom I have just quoted.

34. In practice, the United Nations has ignored the fact that the United Nations presence in the Congo had to be based upon the solid political foundation of the consent of the Congolese people. This consent could only be expressed by the Congolese people through their elected representatives assembled in Parliament, and through the Government which had been appointed by Parliament in accordance with the Constitution of the Congo.

35. Instead, the United Nations stood by passively while Parliament was prevented from meeting by Mobutu in command of a band of mutineers. While in theory the United Nations acknowledged the Constitution of the Congo Republic, it in fact collaborated with the very forces which denied its legitimacy.

36. Representatives will recall that Mobutu claimed to have deposed both President Kasa-Vubu and the government of Patrice Lumumba, and to have deposed all governments but his own. He had no possible claim to exercise any legal authority. Nevertheless, the United Nations authorities in Leopoldville collaborated with his so-called "college of commissioners" which he had set up, and thus gave the mutineers not only authority but also a ready supply of cash from the resources of the Congo. This the rebels employed in furthering their mutiny and in attempting to consolidate their position in opposition both to the President and to the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba.

37. That such action should be taken by the United Nations can only be explained by a profound disregard by the United Nations technicians on the spot of the political realities of the situation. Interested only in the narrow question of setting some sort of administration in motion, the United Nations officials never considered what that administration was or whether its aims were in any way consistent with the purposes for which the United Nations was sent to the Congo. There has been no secret about what has been happening. As early as November 1960, a special correspondent of the United Kingdom *Financial Times* wrote an article explaining in detail exactly what was taking place. He said:

"... The United Nations is already having to co-operate with the existing authorities in the business of day-to-day administration. Perhaps the most important example of this co-operation is in the economic field where the young Commissioner dealing with finance, Mr. Ndele, sits with a number of United Nations experts and others on the recently established Monetary Council. This body is in effective charge of public finance and, with certain reservations, foreign exchange policies.

"When it took over, the Monetary Council was confronted with a situation where there was a virtually empty Treasury and virtually exhausted foreign exchange reserves . . .

"It has been financed very largely by an increase in the permitted ceiling of Central Bank advances to the Treasury, with the United Nations providing 250 million francs."

38. Look what happens. Mutinous soldiers in Leopoldville paralyse the legitimate Government. What does the United Nations Command do? Its officials sit down with Ndele, a nominee of the mutineers. The Monetary Council, the key to the control of the Congo administration, is put in the hands of the rebels. Thus, the United Nations Command in the Congo gave Mobutu complete control over the finances of the State and put him in a position to hire mercenaries to arrest and harass the political leaders of the Congolese people. The Command did not even stop short at putting the resources of the Central Bank at Mobutu's disposal. As the *Financial Times* has explained, the Command actually contributed 250 million Belgian francs from United Nations resources for the payment of rebel soldiers. In other words, instead of suppressing the mutiny of the *Force publique*, the United Nations actually paid for it. Indeed, as I shall attempt to explain later, the United Nations monetary policy in the Congo has, in practice, been one not only of supporting Mobutu's rebels, but also of assisting Belgium to re-establish influence in the Congo.

39. Let me give you one further example, drawn from a report written less than two weeks ago by the special correspondent of *The Times* of London in Leopoldville. His dispatch, appearing in the issue of *The Times* of 25 February 1961, describes how a new National Bank is being set up in the Congo. The head of this Bank is to be the same Ndele who was referred to by the *Financial Times* correspondent. He was a member of Mobutu's so-called "college of commissioners", which was responsible for sending Patrice Lumumba to Katanga and to his death at the hands of the Belgian-led forces in that province.

40. How do we find this collaborator-in-murder treated by the United Nations Command in the Congo? Is he shunned? Is he considered to be beyond the pale, as someone with whom the United Nations could not decently have any dealings? No. On the contrary, according to *The Times*, Ndele is to be the channel through which the United Nations funds are to be fed into the Congo. The same Ndele who is deeply involved in the murder of Patrice Lumumba—the very Prime Minister who invited the United Nations to come to the Congo—was actually introduced to the public as the Governor of the new Bank by Dr. Victor Umbricht, the expert whom the United Nations had sent to the Congo to assist in reorganizing the country's finances.

41. *The Times* correspondent gave a vivid account of this remarkable scene. He wrote:

"... Experts from the International Monetary Fund who were present at the formation of the new Bank today are known to favour immediate budgetary aid for the Congo from the United Nations Congo Fund."

"Any such aid would have to be extended to a recognized government," *The Times* correspondent explained, "and the Provisional Government of Mr. Joseph Iléo, who also spoke at today's ceremony,



still looks like the only possible candidate for that role."

And who is this Iléo whom the International Monetary Fund considers to be the only possible Prime Minister? He is the very man who delivered an ultimatum to the United Nations and whose troops have attacked the United Nations forces.

42. To sum up, while in theory the policy of the United Nations may have been to support the legitimate Government, in practice all that has been done on the spot is that the International Monetary Fund has given a golden handshake to Ndele and the finances of the Congo have been handed over to those who have no legal claim to power and who are engaged in fighting the United Nations.

43. The colonialist nature of the manoeuvre is made even clearer by *The Times* correspondent's statement that it is rumoured that the European Common Market countries are about to extend substantial credits to the Congo, perhaps as much as 3 million German marks. What has happened to the principle, so widely canvassed in theory, that all aid should be channelled through the United Nations? Some little time ago, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, the representative of the United States, wrote an article in the London *Sunday Times* in which he pointed out the absolute madness of partitioning Africa economically on the pattern established in Europe. Why, indeed, should the Congo be economically attached to the Common Market countries? Only one valid reason for this exists: the maintenance of Belgium's financial interests. Yet all this is going on under the shadow of the United Nations, and apparently with the active participation of the United Nations experts.

44. There is a Special Voluntary United Nations Fund for restoring the Congo's economic life and carrying on its public services. The use to which this Fund has been put has been a matter of grave concern to us of the independent African States. It is now over three months since I wrote to the Secretary-General and asked him some plain questions. I said in my letter, written on 7 December 1960 [A/4669]:

"Now, Your Excellency, I would like to ask a few simple questions. How are the ANC being paid? Who is paying them? Where is the money coming from? . . ."

To these questions I have received no reply, but I shall attempt later on in this address to show the Assembly where I think the money is coming from.

45. The policy in regard to the *Force publique* which the United Nations Command was authorized to apply was set out in the first Security Council resolution, adopted on 14 July 1960.<sup>3</sup> In this resolution the Security Council decided, among other things:

" . . . to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government, with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks".

46. Yet, in practice, this resolution was interpreted by the United Nations officials then in charge of United

Nations affairs in Leopoldville as justifying the contribution of United Nations funds to paying the wages of mutinous soldiers who had forcibly closed down Parliament and had repudiated alike the authority of the President, Mr. Kasa-Vubu, and the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. Can such action be considered by any stretch of the imagination to be in any way consistent with the instructions given by the Security Council?

47. The resolution of 14 July which was adopted by the Security Council was drafted by the African-Asian nations, and its precise wording was decided upon in the light of the experience which former colonial territories have of such military forces as the *Force publique* of the Congo. I do not say that that army does not contain many devoted, brave and honest soldiers, but, in essence, it was a force raised and organized for the purpose of colonial oppression.

48. The *Force publique* was founded some seventy years ago by King Leopold II of the Belgians in his capacity as personal ruler of the Congo, and its object was to enforce what was known as "King Leopold's System". That system was described by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary of the day, Lord Lansdowne, as "bondage under the most barbarous and inhuman conditions and maintained for mercenary motives of the most selfish character". This army of King Leopold was allowed to live on the land in return for assisting him to enforce such tyranny.

49. I have in my possession an old copy of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, dated 26 July 1908. It contains Mark Twain's famous cartoon about the Congo—a huge pyramid of skulls flanked by mutilated skeletons, on the top of which stands the Belgian King Leopold. There is also a long interview with a Mr. William Lange, who was a former river captain in the employ of the Congo Government. There are photographs taken by Mr. Lange showing children with their hands cut off by the *Force publique*. He describes in detail how Belgium deliberately trained these troops in brutality. To use his own words, the Belgians:

" . . . used to pat them on the back and praised them when they had committed some especially horrible piece of cruelty or had brought in as trophies of the day the largest number of hands, feet or other parts of the human body".

50. It is only necessary to turn to an official document published by the Belgian Government in July 1960 to realize that the *Force publique* has continued to behave in the same fashion. The Belgian official enquiry into the assaults, raping and murder of Belgians in the Congo shows that, almost exclusively, these acts were committed by members of the *Force publique*. It should be remembered that it was these same soldiers who had, only the year before, fiercely repressed the popular demonstrations for liberty in Leopoldville and who had a seventy-year history of brutality behind them.

51. Let me put the issue clearly. Up till now, in effect, the United Nations has supported the mutinous *Force publique* against the democratically elected Government of the Congo. The policy which I am putting to you now is that no government can exist on such support. The *Force publique* was a colonial army, trained in brutality and inhumanity and with a long and consistent history as the subservient tool of the Belgian colonial oppressor. Such a force, in the view of the Government of Ghana, can never be the basis upon which to build a government.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4387.

52. The Government of Ghana has from the very first considered that it was essential that the *Force publique* should be disarmed, and that only thus could the United Nations fulfil the resolution of the Security Council of 14 July 1960. This stand is also that of the Powers which participated in the Conference of Casablanca.<sup>4</sup> The resolution which I have already quoted to you provided that the Secretary-General should take all necessary steps to provide the Government of the Congo with such military assistance as might be necessary until the national security forces of the Congo were able to meet fully their tasks. The only way, in the view of the Government of Ghana, that this resolution could be implemented was by disbanding the *Force publique* as then organized, and by regrouping it and retraining it with United Nations assistance. Within a week of the adoption of the Security Council resolution to which I have referred, my Chief of Defence Staff came to New York, on my instruction, to make a personal report to the Secretary-General. In that report, which I caused to be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as early as 21 July 1960, he said:

"The immediate and also the long-term possibility of getting the country back to normal hinges on the retraining and re-disciplining of the *Force publique*. In fact, no amount of technical or any other form of assistance will be of any use so long as you have a force of 25,000 men without officers and without discipline. They strike fear not only into the hearts of the European population but into those of the Congolese man in the street and members of the Government. One of our first tasks must be to bring the *Force publique* under proper command and control. Unless this is done the situation will be quite hopeless because, apart from any other reason, no European civilian will remain in the country."

53. On 19 August 1960, following disturbances in Leopoldville and in Stanleyville when United Nations personnel were attacked by the *Force publique*, I again renewed this proposal and pointed out that on the basis of the technical military appreciation of the situation, Ghana could promise that if its troops were given United Nations authority, we could bring the *Force publique* in Leopoldville under effective control within one week. Instead, the Ghana troops were sent to Kasai.

54. It has thus been the consistent policy of Ghana throughout that the *Force publique* should be disarmed and reorganized. We took the same view on this issue when the *Force publique* still professed allegiance to the Government of Patrice Lumumba, as we take today when the *Force publique* is divided into a number of commands some of which support the legitimate government of Mr. Gizenga, and some of which comprise the private armies of Tshombé, Mobutu and Kalonji.

55. Indeed, I wrote to Patrice Lumumba on 27 July as follows:

"What you and I both want is the restoration of the Government free from the threat of armed violence. This can only be achieved by ensuring that the ANC—the *Force publique*—are excluded from the argument. In this respect we must allow—in fact, urge—the United Nations to bring this disorganized army under effective control."

That is what I wrote to Patrice Lumumba when he was alive.

<sup>4</sup> Held from 3-7 January 1961.

56. The Ghana proposal is that all these forces should be disarmed irrespective of whom they are serving. It is impossible for a country like the Congo to be ruled by a military organization steeped in a colonialist tradition of brutality and organized for the purpose of suppressing popular liberties in an inhuman fashion.

57. The representatives will recall that the first of the specific proposals that I made was that a new United Nations Command should be established in the Congo and that this Command should be primarily African and should take over complete responsibility for law and order under the direction of the Security Council.

58. One of the most important reasons for suggesting such a Command is that the most urgent task is the disarming of the *Force publique*, and this is much more likely to be achieved by agreement, and peaceably, if the national contingents enforcing the disarming are African. There are, however, deeper and more important reasons why this Command should be primarily African.

59. It has been said that history repeats itself first as tragedy and then as a farce. We must make certain that we do not repeat as a farce the tragedy which befell Africa as the result of the Berlin Conference of 1885. This Conference was called to solve the problems of the Congo.

60. It ended by drawing up a set of rules to regulate the division of Africa among the great Powers. This Berlin Conference was a gathering of the fourteen most important nations of the world at that time, and they included the United States, the United Kingdom, Czarist Russia and France, whose successors in title provide four out of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The only interested parties not represented were the inhabitants of Africa whose welfare and progress it was the ostensible object of the Conference to assist.

61. From the point of the view of the Powers attending, it would be impossible to quarrel with the proposals of the Conference which were to exclude colonial rivalry—the cold war of those days—from Africa by friendly agreement on how the continent should be divided up. Slavery was to be suppressed, yes; trade promoted, yes; missionary endeavour promoted, yes; and Africa opened up to commerce and industry. Nevertheless, there is an important lesson for us today in the criticism which was made in the United States Congress at that time. A United States Congressman, Perry Belmont, after reciting the many advantages which Africa would supposedly receive as a result of the agreement reached between the great Powers, thus concluded:

"Certainly all these are beneficial and desirable objects. But at least for us in the United States, these were and are, when worked out in Berlin for Africa, European objects."

62. Ghana's criticisms of the United Nations action are identical with those made long ago by this United States Congressman. The objects attempted are all beneficial and desirable but, at least for us in Africa, they are, when worked out in the Security Council and in the Secretariat of the United Nations, not essentially African objectives. They are primarily objectives aimed at halting the cold war by achieving the compromise between the great Powers and they reflect, in all their imperfections, the struggle of the great Powers over issues which do not affect the Congo or Africa.

63. The settlement arrived at by the Conference of Berlin was of course no settlement of the African problem. It split up the continent arbitrarily, dividing peoples of the same ethnic or historical background and drew frontiers through old established lines of trade and communications. It ushered in for Africa an era of unparalleled colonial oppression.

64. As I stated a few minutes ago, we must not seek compromises between East and West in this Congo crisis. What is at stake now is African unity, peace and security and not the ambitions or interests or rights or legalities of the great Powers. Do not let us repeat in the twentieth century the errors and follies of the nineteenth.

65. Yet, unless at this juncture the United Nations acts in full consultation with the African States and in accordance with the needs of Africa, the same results will flow from the United Nations intervention in the Congo as flowed from the intervention by the great Powers in African affairs at the Berlin Conference.

66. In the same way as Africa was broken up into colonies by the great Powers in their own interests, so today the Congo is in danger of being fragmented into small States—the clients of one or other of the great Powers. There is danger of this being done, either directly, as in the case of the separatist movement in Katanga, or indirectly by means of federation imposed through outside pressure which might dismember the Congo as effectively as if it had been formally partitioned into separate States.

67. The confidence of the uncommitted countries in the administration of the United Nations enterprise in the Congo is being destroyed by a series of contradictory and inconsistent acts by the United Nations administration on the spot for which I find it impossible to find any logical explanation.

68. Representatives will recall that, at one stage in the affairs of the Congo, the United Nations authorities on the spot considered that their mandate of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Congo nevertheless entitled them to prevent the Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, from broadcasting at Leopoldville radio station. He was, in fact, forcibly prevented from doing so by the Ghanaian troops under United Nations Command. The action of the troops on this occasion was entirely consistent with Ghana's policy of supporting the United Nations, although, on this occasion, the Government of Ghana considered that the action of the United Nations was a most improper interference in the internal affairs of the Congo and an abuse of the powers granted to the United Nations forces by the Security Council.

69. However that may be, one must ask this question. If it was proper for Ghanaian troops to stop Patrice Lumumba from broadcasting at Leopoldville radio station, why was it not equally proper for Swedish troops at Elisabethville airport to intervene to save Lumumba's life? Why were the Ghanaian troops at Fort Franqui forbidden to intervene to prevent the arrest of Lumumba by the *Force publique*? How is it possible to argue that the United Nations had authority to prevent Lumumba from broadcasting, yet lacked authority to prevent him from being murdered?

70. At one time the United Nations authorities interpreted their mandate as giving them power to close the airfields of the Congo so as to prevent the Lumumba Government from moving troops to put down the rebel-

lous forces in Katanga province despite the fact that the Secretary-General had given an explicit undertaking that the Central Government would not be hindered in any way in using its own resources to restore law and order. In contrast to this, the United Nations authorities on the spot had apparently no authority to seize the military aircraft delivered to Tshombé by a United States aircraft. These aircraft were admittedly shipped aboard a United States Globemaster. They were apparently part of a consignment of aircraft being provided to Belgium under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is now known that they were manufactured in France and that the aircraft carrying them to Katanga stopped in Malta for some days for repairs. All the countries concerned—that is to say, the United States, whose aircraft carried these planes; France, where they were manufactured; Belgium, which had ordered them on NATO account, and the United Kingdom, through whose colonial territories they passed, deny any knowledge or complicity in the matter. It is right to say that the United States Government, which was apparently unaware of what was being done by United States nationals prior to publication in the Press of their activities, has taken strong action against the airline concerned. It will be interesting to see whether the other countries more deeply involved follow the United States lead. I shall, however, make this comment.

71. I ask representatives to pause for a moment and to imagine what type of speeches would have been made in this Assembly if these aircraft had been manufactured in Czechoslovakia for Poland, under the terms of the Warsaw Pact, and then had been delivered to Stanleyville in Soviet aircraft which had stopped for repairs and refitting in Romania on its way out.

72. It is not in dispute that these aircraft were part of the Belgian order placed under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is not disputed that they are normally fitted with 7.5 millimetre machine guns and racks for four 55-pound air-to-ground rockets and two 110-pound bombs. Yet the delivery of these aircraft would apparently never have come to the attention of the United Nations if the affair had not been subject to press publicity. In such circumstances, whatever the responsibility of the particular Government concerned, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there are highly paid officials in Belgium and France who are in a position to organize the wholesale disregard of the Security Council resolutions, and who do not appear to be subject to any penalties either from the French or from the Belgian Government for what they have done.

73. We must face the fact that certain factions in the Congo are today equipped with the most modern weapons by methods which the United Nations as a body apparently knows nothing about.

74. It is very difficult for me to understand how it was that the mandate of the Security Council apparently was sufficient to authorize United Nations troops to close the airfields when the Government of Patrice Lumumba wished to use the airfields to move troops against Katanga, and yet the mandate was not sufficient to prevent the Katanga airfield being used for the open landing of Belgian military aircraft for the use of the Katanga forces.

75. This supply of arms to one side is bound up with the failure of the United Nations to exercise any control over the financial dealings of Katanga and Belgium.



Through the control of the Congo banking facilities, the Belgian Government or, if not the Belgian Government itself, financial interests in Belgium closely associated with the Government have had money at their disposal to hire mercenaries from abroad and to purchase the most modern and up-to-date arms and munitions. Indeed, the United Nations officials on the spot seem to have looked at this issue in the most narrow and bureaucratic sense. This has played completely into the hands of those Belgian interests which are financing Mobutu, Kalonji, Tshombé and Kasa-Vubu.

76. What is now needed is a positive United Nations policy by which the central finances of the Congo are controlled by the United Nations and are not used to finance private armies or to exert political pressure in favour of the colonial Powers or of particular political parties in the Congo.

77. In order to explain what I mean, I shall try to summarize simply what has been the history of the financial relations between Belgium and the Congo since independence.

78. When the Congo became independent in July 1960, it inherited a public debt of roughly £350 million sterling. The servicing and redemption of this debt required almost a quarter of the Congo's annual budget. The greater part of this debt had been incurred in the development of Katanga province, a development which, incidentally, permitted the Union Minière and other industrial enterprises to make large profits. In exchange for this debt, the Congo Government inherited a portfolio of some £240 million sterling of assets which were mainly situated in Katanga and which included a large holding in the Union Minière. If the Government of the Congo was to have access to these assets, or was to be able to discharge its obligations with regard to the public debt, it had to have control over Katanga, in which the assets were situated and which provided 60 per cent of the national revenue.

79. A speedy reassertion of the authority of the Central Government of the Congo was therefore necessary, not only upon political grounds, but for strictly financial reasons. If the Government had access neither to the assets in Katanga nor to the revenue derived from the province, then it could only meet its liabilities by borrowing from the Central Bank.

80. By the time of independence, however, all control over the Congo Central Bank had passed to the Belgian National Bank. In the months before independence the Belgian Government allowed an unprecedented flight of capital from the Congo to take place. In consequence, the Congo Central Bank found itself unable to meet its obligations. The Belgian National Bank thereupon agreed to guarantee the Central Congo Bank on two conditions. First, the Central Bank's total gold and currency reserves were to be removed from the Congo and lodged in Belgium. Secondly, the monetary policy of the Central Bank was to be agreed with the Belgian National Bank.

81. When the Government of Patrice Lumumba came into power at independence, it found as a result of this disorganization caused by the mutiny of the *Force publique*, by the withdrawal of Belgian administrative staff and by the separation of Katanga, that revenue was only one-tenth of what it had been before independence. On the other hand, despite the separation of Katanga and the departure of the Belgian civil servants, essential expenditure still remained at two-thirds of its original figure.

82. The only way in which this gap between revenue and expenditure could be bridged was by advances from the Central Bank. The Central Bank, however, could not do this without the concurrence of the Belgian National Bank which refused assistance. Mobutu's engineered rebellion was successful largely because the Lumumba régime was in danger of being unable to pay the soldiers or to meet other public expenditure.

83. This is a typical case of concealed colonialism in which independence is theoretically granted, but is in fact denied by the exercise of the most powerful financial pressures, capable of making or breaking any government.

84. To my mind, what fatally compromised the United Nations administration in Leopoldville is that as soon as Mobutu, with outside assistance, usurped the authority of the Central Government, it threw behind him the whole weight of the Monetary Council which incidentally was not even set up until after his rebellion. It is true that the advances given by the Central Bank in order to pay Mobutu's men could not have been obtained without the approval of the Belgian National Bank. It is unlikely that Belgium would have agreed to a raising of the permitted ceiling of advances by the Central Bank unless this policy had United Nations backing.

85. The fact that United Nations financial technicians stepped in so decisively in order to swing the balance of power in favour of Mobutu illustrates an essential weakness of the United Nations Organization which the proposed reconstituted Command would cure.

86. For a variety of reasons—which I do not consider to be in any large degree the fault of the Secretary-General or of the United Nations Secretariat—the technical staff of the United Nations tends to be drawn from countries of Western Europe and the United States of America to the almost complete exclusion of any technical staff whatsoever from the African continent. However impartial any person attempts to be, he is bound to be influenced subconsciously by his background. I personally believe that this is how the United Nations found itself in its extraordinary position. It entered the Congo at the invitation of the lawful government in order to restore law and order. Yet it soon became engaged in financing mutinous soldiers supported by Belgium whose aim was to overthrow the Government which had invited the United Nations to the Congo. The officials who organized the pay of these rebellious elements were by reason of their background so remote from African affairs, that it never occurred to them what they were doing.

87. As I have said, the first task of the reorganized Command would be to neutralize the *Force publique* everywhere. It is only when the military situation has been brought under control that the Congolese Parliament can meet in an atmosphere of security. Until Parliament met it would be the duty of the United Nations Command to keep order in the Congo and to prevent tribal or political clashes which might involve the loss of life. This Command will not interfere with existing organs of Government and, in particular, will respect the provincial administrations in so far as they are functioning within the Constitution. Where provincial councils, as in the case of Katanga, have usurped powers not accorded to them by the Constitution, the United Nations should give the necessary mandate to restore the constitutional position.



88. Considerable increase in the existing United Nations Force would be necessary. My Government's calculation is that now a force of some twenty-seven battalions would be needed together with supporting air strength and with other appropriate services to bring the Congo to order. This is a very large increase over and above the existing United Nations Force in the Congo. I am certain, however, that if the United Nations adopted a realistic policy based upon the points I am putting forward, then these troops would be readily forthcoming. I suggest that they should come in the main from Africa and Asia.

89. Let me now deal with the remaining points in my proposals. My third point was that all non-African personnel serving with the Congolese army should be expelled immediately from the Congo.

90. The presence of "volunteers" or officers and other ranks seconded by foreign Powers is bound to lead to suspicion of intervention by one or other of the protagonists in the cold war and, therefore, to counter-intervention from the other side. My proposal under this head applies particularly to the Belgian forces in Katanga. Every press account of incidents in that area shows that Tshombé's troops are invariably commanded by Belgian officers. Tshombé has admitted that the commander of Patrice Lumumba's guard was a Belgian and even the doctor who certified his death was of Belgian nationality and apparently a Belgian official. Visitors to Elisabethville report that all military executive functions are in the hands of Belgian nationals.

91. It is useless to rely on the Belgian Government's "invitation" to their "volunteers" to return, particularly as the so-called "volunteers" are under no penalty if they refuse their Government's invitation. The Belgian troops must all be expelled whether they are themselves volunteers or not. In regard to Belgian civil technicians, there can be no objection to teachers, doctors and the like carrying on with their work. However, Belgians controlling the banks and monetary policies of the Congo must be expelled if the Congolese people are to be in a position to assert an independent monetary policy of their own.

92. It is proper that I should emphasize to the General Assembly the extent of Belgium's admitted intervention in the Congo. The United Kingdom Press has reported, and the Belgian Government has never denied, that between 11 July 1960, the day upon which Tshombé set up his so-called "independent State", and 8 September, more than one hundred tons of arms and ammunition were flown from Brussels to Katanga including mortars, submachine guns and FN automatic rifles. Twenty-five Belgian air force aircraft were transferred to the Katanga government. Eighty-nine Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers who had previously served with the *Force publique*, were seconded by Belgium to Tshombé's army. Three hundred and ninety-six Belgian non-commissioned officers and technicians were sent to Elisabethville from Brussels. In addition, Belgium transferred from the Kamina base great quantities of arms and ammunition to the Katanga army.

93. Delegates will be familiar with Mr. Dayal's reports as to the use to which these Belgian arms, munitions and personnel have been put. According to the United Nations representatives on the spot, these troops, armed and officered by Belgium, have pillaged and murdered throughout North Katanga killing indiscriminately anyone who they thought might be opposed to Katanga's separatism.

94. Of course, the Belgian intervention, which must have had the support or at least the acquiescence of other foreign Powers, has not been the only support from outside which has been received in the Congo. The Soviet Union delivered to the legitimate Government one hundred military trucks and twenty-nine Ilyushin civil transport aircraft accompanied by two hundred technicians. This demonstrates that our fears about the danger of the cold war being fostered and established in Africa are real. The continuous struggle for power between East and West is only waged at the expense of others. Let us not put Africa in a position where African States have to accept embarrassing offers of assistance under pressure, because the wolf is on our doorstep. In Africa we are used to giving for the sheer joy of giving.

95. This brings me to my next point, namely, that all foreign diplomatic missions and representatives should immediately be recalled from the Congo by their respective Governments. One of the most dangerous features of the Congo situation is that one section of the people has been influenced to oppose the other on ideological grounds which are by no means understood by those who are persuaded to act in accordance with them. This is by no means the first time that there has been an ideological conflict in Africa. For example, in the 1890's there were the most serious religious wars in Uganda between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics. By a curious coincidence it happened that the Protestant party favoured the United Kingdom's taking over in Uganda while the Roman Catholic party favoured France. The Press at that time in the United Kingdom and in France became inflamed with accounts of the religious persecution and intolerance of the rival Christian factions. The French Government concentrated on the injury to the Catholics while the United Kingdom newspapers were almost unanimous in their belief that the Protestants were the real sufferers. Indeed, a situation nearly arose when a war in the interest of religion might have broken out between France and Britain. The example of Uganda should be a lesson to us all that ideological disputes have often concealed more practical colonial aspirations.

96. I suggest, therefore, that there should be an end to the intrigues in the Congo, and that all missions, including those of African States, should be withdrawn so that there is only one centre of outside influence—the United Nations.

97. Connected with this proposal is my next proposal that all sea and air ports in the Congo should be occupied immediately by the United Nations. Unless this is done, each of the great Powers will suspect that the other is in fact delivering arms, aircraft and munitions to one side or the other.

98. I now come to the last of my proposals, namely, the release of all political prisoners, the reconvening of the Congolese Parliament, the establishment of a legitimate government, the holding of a general election under United Nations supervision and the reassertion of the territorial integrity of the State as provided in the Security Council resolution.<sup>5</sup> This last point is most important.

99. For sixty years the sweat and blood of the Congolese people have been invested in the province of

<sup>5</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4405.

Katanga. The development of Katanga has been paid for, not primarily by the people living in the province but by the whole population of the Congo. Katanga represents the Congolese people's greatest investment. If Katanga is joined to the Congo, the prospects of industrial development are unlimited. Potentially the Congo could produce the cheapest electrical power in the world. It has been calculated that if a dam were built at Ingra, on the lower Congo, it could produce eight times the power at present generated by the Grand Coulee Dam in the United States. The mineral wealth of Katanga, instead of being exported as at present, could be processed in the Congo itself more cheaply than it is now being processed abroad. In fact it would be possible to establish in the heart of Africa a great industrial centre.

100. I would like the financial groups who are encouraging Tshombé and the Belgians in their separatist policy in Katanga to take heed that such a policy is dangerous. There is still time for them to save their investments, but time is running short and ultimately the world will not tolerate any financial group, however powerful, defying the United Nations.

101. The question of the exact position of Katanga within the Congo must be decided by the Congolese people as a whole. It is their wealth and their endeavours over the last sixty years which have built up Katanga into what it is today, and they should therefore be entitled to a decisive say in its future.

102. Let me now turn to one other matter which has been raised in the controversy over the Congo: the position of the Secretary-General.

103. There have been serious differences of opinion amongst Member States on the position of the Secretary-General and also on the reorganization of the structure of the United Nations itself. However, in my view the most important issue to which Members of the United Nations must address themselves now is the urgent problem of setting the Congo on its feet on the basis of the Security Council resolutions. The immediate necessity for settling the situation in the Congo should not be confused with the question of reorganizing the structure of the United Nations itself and the position of the Secretary-General, although these are very important issues which must be resolved at the appropriate time. I have strong views on these matters, because I believe that if the United Nations is to survive it must adjust itself to the changing political circumstances of the world today.

104. It must be stated clearly that most serious mistakes have been made by the United Nations Secretariat in handling the Congo situation.

105. I am sure the Secretary-General will realize that there must be a new departure and that African States cannot indefinitely tolerate a position in which United Nations decisions appear to be weighted in favour of the colonialists and against the aspirations of the African peoples, in consequence of which administrative acts are executed by the United Nations Secretariat in a manner which does not correspond with the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

106. Indeed, in the whole of Africa south of the Sahara, this problem is likely to arise in one form or another. The situation in the Union of South Africa has already become the direct concern of the Security Council. Similarly, the United Nations has a direct responsibility

for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi and for the Mandated Territory of South West Africa. Urgent action must be taken by the United Nations in the case of Ruanda-Urundi. The original mandate of the League of Nations, from which the Trusteeship Agreement derives, was only awarded to Belgium because the Territory could be conveniently administered as part of the Belgian colony. Under present circumstances, the maintenance of Belgian garrisons in this Trust Territory is bound to inflame the Congo situation, and the people of the Territory are entitled to the same free choice as to their form of government as are the people of the Congo.

107. In all honesty, the United Nations must this year tackle resolutely the problem of South West Africa which has been for so long before the General Assembly without any effective action being taken. If at this stage the United Nations gives way once again to South Africa on this issue, its prestige will be most seriously damaged.

108. Positive neutralism involves the taking of action by the uncommitted Powers to isolate areas of the world from cold war pressures. The greater the areas of the world which can be so isolated, the greater the possibilities for peace. We have no desire to go to war with anyone. In fact, we do not have the armaments. Nevertheless, the life of every single person in Africa is threatened by the possibility of irresponsible nuclear warfare let loose through fear, mistake or miscalculation. In a nuclear war there can be no neutrals any more than there can be victors.

109. The action, therefore, which I am proposing for the Congo is not only to save the Congo; it is directly linked with the saving of world peace and, indeed, the prevention of mankind's extinction through the unregulated discharge of nuclear poisons let loose by irresponsible nations.

110. I close by asking the Assembly's support in implementing the following proposals; in principle, what I have suggested to you this afternoon can be summarized under four heads:

(1) The United Nations Command in the Congo must immediately fulfil its duty to maintain law and order and to preserve the integrity of the Republic. The maintenance of law and order includes the enforcement of the Constitution and the laws of the Congo as at present existing. The United Nations Command can no longer be neutral between order and disorder.

(2) The United Nations civil and military command in the Congo must be reorganized so that the initiative in producing a solution comes primarily from the African States with military support from the uncommitted countries of Asia and elsewhere.

(3) All initiative and aid from Powers outside Africa, and particularly from those countries which are allied in pacts against one another, must cease. The flow of arms and equipment into the Congo provides conditions which could lead to a civil war of the Spanish type, or worse, with grave consequences for the whole world.

(4) As soon as the military situation has been stabilized, the Congolese Parliament should meet under United Nations protection so that a legitimate Congolese Government can function normally in accordance with the Constitution. In order that the will of the people may prevail, a new general election should be held as

soon as possible under United Nations supervision and under conditions free from intimidation and violence.

111. In order that these principles can be carried out, I propose that the following detailed steps should be taken:

(1) A new and strengthened United Nations Command should be established in Leopoldville at once.

(2) The Command should be primarily African and should take over complete responsibility for law and order and for reasserting the territorial integrity of the State.

(3) All airfields and seaports should be brought under United Nations control in order that the flow of arms and other equipment from outside can be stopped.

(4) All foreign diplomatic missions should be recalled from the Congo for the time being in order to give the new United Nations Command a fair chance to eliminate the cold war from the Congo.

(5) All Congolese armed units should be disarmed in order to neutralize them from politics. The disarming will involve the return to barracks of all Congolese soldiers and the surrender of their weapons to the United Nations Command.

(6) The disarming and handover should be voluntary, leading to the reorganization and retraining of the Congolese National Army under the direction of the United Nations Command. If certain factions will not

co-operate in handing in their arms, force will be necessary.

(7) All non-African personnel serving in the Congolese Army should be expelled from the Congo immediately.

(8) The civil side of the United Nations Command must assist the Government of the Congo to formulate a banking and foreign exchange policy which makes the Congolese Government free from outside pressure of all kinds.

112. We all wish for peace, not only in the Congo, but throughout Africa and throughout the world. Those countries which have contributed contingents to the United Nations Command did so to bring peace, not to foster a great-Power struggle. It is only by facing the realities of the situation in the Congo that the United Nations can end the Congo crisis. I hope that I speak for all Africa—and I certainly speak for the Casablanca Powers—when I say that we can save the Congo, given the support of the uncommitted countries. Give us the mandate and the resources to do so.

113. The PRESIDENT: I am sure I am correctly interpreting the wishes of all members of the General Assembly when I express to His Excellency the President of the Republic of Ghana, before he withdraws, our sincere thanks for the statement which we have just been privileged to hear and to which we have listened with keen interest.

*The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.*