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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. BA (Mali) (translated from French): Owing to the somewhat special circumstances in which the Republic of Mali was admitted to the United Nations, our delegation was unable at an earlier stage to congratulate Mr. Boland on his election to the presidency of this General Assembly which we regard as the most representative body in the world.

2. Before taking up the important questions which are of concern to us all, I should like to recall the French representative's sarcastic remark that we were not accustomed to the fair play of the Assembly, the reason for that remark being that we had denounced the Machiavellian schemes to impose on us a sponsorship which would assuredly have undermined our policy of genuine national independence.

3. I shall merely point out that the Government of the Republic of Mali, through the radio and the press, including the French press, has categorically denied ever having solicited the sponsorship of France. To the experienced diplomats among you, certain positions adopted by the newly independent African States may appear somewhat crude or even vulgar, but our conception of diplomacy is based on law, rectitude, justice and truth. It is thus fundamentally opposed to the cunning diplomacy of the old "civilized" States which, while handing out generous servings of flattery, most frequently employ the weapons of duplicity, trickery and intrigue.

4. As a result of fifteen years of revolutionary struggle, we have abandoned such methods and, in Mali, we follow the typically French procedure of calling a spade a spade. After all, if the French colonialists had freed their subject peoples in 1945, after the decisive contribution which those peoples had made to the liberation of France from the Nazi yoke, we might perhaps have acquired a longer experience of the traditions of this august body. Since we made our statement [876th meeting], there have been attempts to depict Mali as a naughty child, over-excited by its newly-won independence and too impudent to observe the proper conventions. But what these are, we are not told. We are not here to be conformists and to take up positions which run counter to the

aspirations of our people and their Government. We are not here to swell automatic majorities in support of any given Power or group of interests. We feel that the essence of neutralism—an active and positive neutralism—does not consist in abandoning the pillars of truth and morality nor, in Jaures' fine phrase, in bowing down before the law of the triumphant but hollow lie, nor even in adopting a rigid and static attitude towards the history which we, big and small, industrialized and under-developed nations, are writing.

5. We envisage neutralism as the policy adopted by the uncommitted nations in their search for the most effective ways and means of enabling the two great politico-economic systems which divide the world to coexist peacefully, and in their efforts to strengthen continually the cause of peace in the struggle against the warmongers.

6. In this sense alone can the adjective "uncommitted" be applied to us. We are indeed committed—and have been committed for more than twenty years—to the anti-imperialist cause of the peoples who are struggling for their freedom and prosperity; we are committed to fighting colonialism in every form, whether ancient or modern, and to opposing colonial domination with its train of political, economic, cultural and racial oppression.

7. Some officials of the United States and of certain Western countries have, red pencil in hand, discovered "errors" and "omissions" in our inaugural statement. Among other things, they have charged us with opposing our neutralism to communism and capitalism, whereas they regard themselves solely as the proponents of free enterprise. They have charged us with speaking only of imperialists in general, whereas, according to them, we should have spoken merely of French imperialism. For them, it seems, the term "imperialists" on African lips can only mean the United States.

8. These representatives have been particularly disturbed at our failure to criticize the Eastern countries. It must be admitted that such views do them little credit. For our part, we refuse to have anything to do with this shameless paternalism, this undisguised blackmail which seeks to place us younger nations under the Caudine Forks of such and such a bloc. We have said repeatedly that we refuse to barter our dignity as Africans for illusory promises of aid. These imperialist schemers forget that the leaders of our African freedom movements have been trained and have reached maturity, not in ministries, chancelleries or banks, but in the campaign against colonialism. They have studied colonialism and its originating force, imperialism, on the spot, under actual conditions of colonial oppression.

9. I shall not dwell on the different forms of colonial oppression, for distinguished speakers have dealt with

them before me. I should like here to pay a special tribute to President Sékou Touré, the Chief of State of Guinea, for his pithy, serious and constructive statement [896th meeting], which can serve as a frame of reference for the problems of African solidarity and can be regarded as an instrument that has expanded, crystallized and brought up to date the views set forth at Bandung and at the various conferences of the newly independent African States.

10. The political oppression inherent in colonial domination is a well-known fact. For us, it ceased only on 28 September 1960, although attempts had been made, in successive stages, to mitigate the virulence of such oppression by making certain concessions to the demand for national independence and by allowing the colonies to become semi-autonomous or to exercise jurisdiction over their domestic affairs amid a profusion of "loi-cadre"—all this as if to suggest that the colonial peoples, smitten with a congenital inferiority, would be overpowered by too sudden a dose of freedom and would be stifled by the full enjoyment of independence.

11. For decades, a certain school of literature has pandered to the colonialists and racialists, supplying arguments which put a brake on any desire for independence. The Anglo-Saxon and German schools of ethnology—not forgetting the French—joined together in a chorus and discovered scientific arguments to prove the racial inferiority of the colonial peoples. Gobineau, Vacher de Lapouge, Leo Frobenius and Rosenberg were particularly outstanding and, from the terrain of colonialism, arrived at the criminal theories of racialism and anti-Semitism of the Hitler-Fascist era. Lévy-Bruhl, not wanting to be outdone, established as a postulate that "the Negro mentality is primitive and pre-logical". Various Governments of France, the country of Descartes and the humanists, have neither shuddered nor recoiled before the exploitation of such theories which tended to retard to the utmost the emancipation movement of the French colonial empire.

12. Nevertheless, economic oppression remains the back-cloth of the colonial régime and has been described at length during this Assembly: slave-trade economy, mercantile economy, exploitation of raw materials, exploitation of cheap labour with starvation wages often ten times lower than the wages of European workers in the colonies, the almost universal system of the single crop or the cultivation of industrial crops at the expense of food crops or crops which might be really profitable to the peasant masses—and all this accompanied by methods of agriculture reminiscent of the Middle Ages. All the moves of the imperialists and all the obstacles they have placed in the way of de-colonization are attributable to this economic exploitation of the colonies. The secession of Katanga and the situation in Algeria—take, for example, Hassi-Messaoud or Edjelé—show that the colonialists have no other aim but to channel towards the metropolitan countries the raw materials and energy resources of the dependent territories. In this regard, the colonial administrations have made themselves the zealous lackeys of imperialism by protecting the privileges of the colonial trusts—those agents of the international monopolist trusts—at the cost of savage repression of trade unions and liberation movements.

13. As a result of the exacerbation of racial conflicts between the ethnic groups of the subject territories, tribalism is today one of the most serious threats to the stability of certain of our States. The superiority complex of the colonizer in all facets of colonial life, wage discrimination and separate collective bargaining for whites and blacks, the employment of African officials only in auxiliary posts—auxiliary clerks, auxiliary doctors, auxiliary nurses, etc.—are all phenomena which have produced, within the colonial countries, a regrettable inferiority complex the extirpation of which is one of the thorniest problems of de-colonization. This form of oppression reached its culmination in the Fascist hysteria of the Hitlerites and of the ultra-colonialist governments of South Africa. We shall return to this point later.

14. Among the misdeeds of the colonialists, the most flagrant is the cultural oppression that has led to the catastrophic dearth of an intellectual élite and of trained technicians. The fact that some colonial countries have been more liberal than others in this respect excuses nobody. Illiteracy is king in all our States. In the Republic of Mali (formerly French Sudan), which has a population of 4.5 million, only 7 per cent of the children of school age actually go to school. Ignorance became a powerful ally of colonialism, and obscurantism has caused as many ravages in our country as physical misery; the two, moreover, are always associated.

15. I felt saddened the other day when the Belgian representative tried to make us believe that the school enrolment in the Congo was of the order of 45 to 50 per cent and that Congolese university students would soon be available to assist those who have already graduated. What a fortunate country to have such prolific reserves of intellectual and technical manpower! We believe, however, that they exist only in the fertile imagination of the Belgian representative, who had the sheer audacity to insinuate before Mr. Nehru, the learned Prime Minister of India, that the former Belgian Congo had almost as many trained people as India.

16. Such assertions by the representative of a country which has practised the most execrable form of colonialism whose consequences now threaten the peace of the world are absolutely scandalous and must be denounced by all honest people.

17. The country of Gandhi, which has a culture dating back to several millennia and has produced men of outstanding intellect, including Nobel prize-winners, may still have some distance to go in overcoming its economic backwardness, but it certainly has nothing in common with the frightful tragedy in the Congo compounded of the anarchy and crimes perpetrated by the Belgian colonialists in an effort to retain their privileges.

18. If we have felt called upon to paint the portrait of colonialism with all its horrors, it is because we felt it proper to refresh the memory of those who are guilty of crimes against the colonial peoples and who, in the din of the applause occasioned by our entry into the great family of nations, are trying simply to wipe the slate clean and to overwhelm us with the positive aspects of colonialism. They have spoken to us of the bridges, schools, clinics, clubs, metalled roads and so on that were built, but they never tell us about the privileges that were acquired, of the monstrous

profits that were extracted from the agricultural and mineral wealth of the oppressed countries, of the enslaved manpower or of the cannon fodder which they have used in all the colonialist and imperialist wars.

19. We are not aware that slavery has any positive aspects, and we challenge free peoples and free men to show us that they are willing to undergo those so-called positive aspects of oppression.

20. We have not spoken with acrimony about colonialism for the simple pleasure of vituperation. We do not adopt a rigid attitude based on a past full of suffering and humiliation. As one representative so aptly put it, no people can build its future unless it remembers its past. On the other hand, a people cannot live only by dwelling on its past, but must direct all its energy and all its skills towards the future.

21. While our national aspirations and our development programmes will certainly not be achieved by indulging in jeremiads, it is right that the past should enlighten the present, and this is what we have tried to do.

22. As has already been said by many speakers here, we had placed high hopes in the United Nations, and we were admittedly impatient to come to take our seats here together with our fifteen brother States of Africa. We still await others who will occupy their legitimate place in this body when colonialism in Africa and elsewhere has been finally liquidated. We have come here with the enthusiasm which is characteristic of youth and which reflects the disciplined enthusiasm of our peoples. We have come with our burning faith in the destiny of man and peoples and with a sincere desire to co-operate unreservedly with all peoples in order to win the battle for peace and strengthen fraternal relations among peoples.

23. However, we must confess that certain surprising developments in this Assembly, in which we had such complete confidence, have pained and disturbed us.

24. In the first place, the other day, after an interminable procedural debate, a vote was taken on a draft resolution [A/L.317] recommending the renewal of contacts between East and West. This draft resolution, which was submitted by eminent members of the African-Asian group, reflected the official positions taken up at this rostrum by all nations, great and small, which declared themselves, if not champions, at least fervent advocates of peace and the relaxation of international tension and resolute adversaries of the cold war.

25. As a result of cunning procedural manoeuvres, this draft resolution was rejected, and this is what a great Parisian newspaper wrote about it:

"By 41 votes to 37, with 17 abstentions, it [the General Assembly] rejected the Argentine amendment. However, President Boland announced that the words 'President of' and 'Chairman of the Council of Ministers of', not having been adopted by the requisite two-thirds majority, should be deleted from the draft resolution submitted by the neutral Powers."

26. Far be it from me to criticize the President's interpretation of the vote, which was approved by the Assembly, but I think that it is part of the numerous manoeuvres which resulted, as the same newspaper stated, "in a useful victory over the uncommitted

States and the thwarting of a distressing tendency on the part of the young States to rule the United Nations". The same newspaper went on: "The West now runs the risk of appearing as the sole opponent of a conciliation at the summit."

27. After such a vote, who can seriously think that a relaxation of tension is genuinely desired? This is really the crux of our disappointment, because a relaxation of tension more than anything else is necessary for our development and our national construction, the success of our plans and, in a word, an improved level of living for our peoples. The cold war kills us twice over, one speaker has said. The cold war is the source of miseries which grind us down relentlessly before the advent of war itself.

28. Another subject of bitterness for us is the refusal to discuss the question of admitting the People's Republic of China. This refusal by the General Assembly to admit 650 million Chinese, who cannot be validly represented by the spokesmen for a few islands occupied by the followers of Chiang Kai-shek, constitutes a scandal and an aberration of historic scope which the Assembly, for the sake of its prestige, should never have sanctioned. Genuine and positive neutralism implies the defence of truth and justice and the steering of a middle course between the disputes of the two blocs. Countries of less than 400,000 inhabitants which have an economic and social structure infinitely less developed than that of the People's Republic of China are represented in this body. A representative from one of these small countries stressed that numbers are not a valid criterion for representation and spoke of human values. Would he have the audacity to insinuate that a national of his country was more worthy than a Chinese from the land of Confucius having behind him a civilization of several thousand years which he has been able to transcend by the contribution of a new humanism based on more than thirty years of revolutionary struggle?

29. The one true sense in which all nations can be said to be equal is in respect of the inalienable rights inherent in their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The absence of the People's Republic of China would seem to justify those who in growing numbers speak of the "disunited" nations. Furthermore, if the Assembly, for partisan ideological reasons, does not respect the rightful aspirations of a great country, it is useless to talk of disarmament and peace.

30. By a flagrant paradox, the same Assembly which rejected the inclusion of the Chinese question in its agenda decided the day before yesterday that it would take up the question of Tibet, which is part of the People's Republic of China, as though a decision of the Assembly on Tibet could not be binding on the People's Republic of China, which is not a Member of the United Nations, unless, of course, the idea is to ask the followers of Chiang Kai-shek, the people of Taiwan, Quemoy and Matsu to liberate the country of the Dalai Lama.

31. What is the height of irony, or perhaps I should say tragi-comedy, is the inclusion of the Hungarian question, when there are present in this Assembly the representatives of the Government in office, the legal Government of the Hungarian People's Republic. During the two years when I attended the meetings of the International Labour Organisation, I heard the

same variations of the same theme. Here again, the partisans of positive neutralism are sorely tried by the attempts to involve them against their will in the ideological struggle. And here again, we shall likely incur the wrath of the sanctimonious knaves by asserting boldly in the name of law and justice that the domestic affairs of States and the régimes of Member States are the business of the people of those countries and their business alone.

32. If the Members of the Assembly wish, however, to discuss the domestic régime of every country, would they like me to suggest, in the name of what is right and just, to expel from the Assembly the representatives here present of all the countries which have a Fascist régime, which strangle political and trade-union freedoms, which have set up racism as a way of life or a method of government, and all countries whose governments were established as the result of a bloody revolution or armed revolt? The United Nations would then be so reduced, if not completely disrupted, that I think there is no risk of such a suggestion being made.

33. While ill-disposed persons will no doubt accuse us, on the basis of our voting record, of being presumptuous in taking a clear stand on such vexed and burning questions a few days after our admission to the United Nations, it is precisely in connexion with such matters that national sovereignty and the equality between great and small nations should be stressed. The representatives of the Republic of Mali will always vote according to right and justice and in the considered interests of the people of Mali and of Africa.

34. The same earnest desire to defend justice and the rights of peoples will guide us in our approach to the problem of the Congo on which the attention of the African States is focused. This distressing problem is familiar to us for two reasons. In the first place, we responded to the appeal of the United Nations by sending our best troops to the Congo, because the newly-won national independence and territorial integrity of an African State had to be defended against the worst type of colonialism. From that point of view, Mali, which was threatened with a Katanga of its own, is well acquainted with the colonial stratagems of secession and reconquest which leave the colonial Power in possession of what it considers to be the choicest morsel so that it can perpetuate its domination and retain the privilege of shamelessly exploiting the resources derived from the territory before its accession to national sovereignty.

35. Judgement has already been passed on Belgian colonialism, and a proven and incontestable verdict of guilt has been pronounced by all peace-loving and freedom-loving Governments and peoples. Speakers here have proved beyond all doubt the nature of the campaign of colonial reconquest undertaken by the Belgians a week after the proclamation of the independence of the Congo. The pseudo-argument that Belgium could not grant independence to the Congo and then dispute it does not stand up to analysis and the evidence of facts. We are accustomed to seeing the colonialists give with one hand what they take away with the other. Everyone knows, moreover, how idle is Belgium's boast that it could have maintained its hold over the Congo rather than indulge in a pretence of granting independence. Independence is never granted by a country secure in its domination; it is the result of a struggle by the people, whether that be

a peaceful struggle using parliamentary methods, the organized action of political parties with mass support and of trade union organizations, or the armed insurrection of a people united behind an organized vanguard. It was under the pressure of growing revolutionary action by the people that King Baudouin made the gesture of granting independence, one which does him all honour, but in no circumstances could any imperialist force or coalition have resisted the popular will of the Congo.

36. You cannot give and at the same time withhold. By having recourse to secessionism in Katanga, to the Tshombés, Mobutus, Kasa-Vubus or any other puppets or paid agents of colonialism, the Belgians can only slow down the organization of the new State. No form of aggression can restore the former privileges of the colonial trusts of Belgium and her allies who pounced on Katanga, the richest province of the Congo. I shall not expatiate on the circumstances of the arrival of the "blue helmets", or even on the use or the attempted use of the United Nations troops. What is certain is that an attempt was made to liquidate the Central Government and its chief, Lumumba, the only person in whom the powers of the Republic were vested. Previous speakers have shown that the "loi fondamentale", which is based on Belgian practice, does not confer any power on the Chief of State.

37. We shall not therefore waste time expounding and discussing the matter with those who, in the teeth of right, law and justice, are prepared to use the United Nations Force for the settlement of their own scores with the Central Government, which they prefer to be in the hands of a puppet chief whom they will have no difficulty in bending to their imperialistic designs. Hence, without further ceremony, all of us here, representing as we do the free nations of the world, must at once take the only decision that can give a favourable turn to the Congolese conflict, namely, to re-establish the authority of the Central Government democratically elected by the Parliament, to assist it in strengthening its administrative structure, to place at its disposal—in adequate amounts and in a co-ordinated manner—the resources that it needs, and to help it build up the economy of the country by restoring the unity jeopardized by the old colonial method of "divide and rule".

38. We fully support the proposal by the President of Guinea [A/L.319] for the provisional seating in the Assembly, in accordance with the rules of procedure, of the legally accredited representatives of the Central Government of the Congo.

39. We pointed out in our inaugural speech that a similar attempt had been made against the former Federation of Mali by the French colonialists—a kind of "katanganization" which would have eliminated and isolated the former Republic of Sudan, which is today the Republic of Mali, whose revolutionary attitude towards de-colonization, the Algerian question and African regroupment was not viewed with favour by the French.

40. The plot, in the traditional colonialist pattern, used the pretext of an imaginary "coup d'état" by President Modibo Keita. However, it deceived no one except its authors in Paris, for it was the French newspaper *Aux Ecoutes* which stated in black and white that a non-Mali African chief had announced to one of its editors, fifteen days before the plot, the collapse

of the Federation of Mali—a prediction which actually came true within the stated time.

41. Thanks to the maturity of the Malian political leaders, the colonialists did not have their second "Operation Congo". The frontier incidents and reprisals against the nationals of the Republic of Mali who were deprived of their property and sent destitute to the Sudan frontier are known facts which were reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but no such provocations will induce the brave and peace-loving people of Mali to engage in a fratricidal struggle with the people of Senegal, who are as anxious as we are to defend African values of progress. The colonialists will soon find that they have taken all these pains for nothing. They will learn to their cost that the colonial system has collapsed forever and that they cannot swim against the tide of history in the Congo, in the former Federation of Mali or elsewhere.

42. I should now like to say something about the Algerian question. However urgent may be the problem of the Congo, the colonialist war in Algeria, which, for seven years, has been a cancer in the French body politic, is the predominating concern of anti-colonialists everywhere. It is the only war at present being waged in the world, and the hypocrisy of pacification deceives no one. The Algerian people's struggle for liberation from the colonial yoke must be brought to an end. The peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples and Governments in Africa, Asia, America and Europe must no longer be content with saying "this must stop", as they invoke negotiations, self-determination, "Algeria for the Algerians" and all the other Gaullist verbiage based on the vain hope that a series of postponements and delays may lead to the collapse of the aptly-styled "dirty war" and to a Pyrrhic victory after seven years of heroic struggle on the part of the Algerian combatants whose weapons and fighting experience are daily increasing.

43. Peace-loving and freedom-loving people can and must demand an immediate cease-fire and the holding of a referendum under United Nations supervision. The Organization can and must play its part and at once take the necessary decisions. It is the forum of the nations, including France, and it can no longer be defied by General de Gaulle, in the light of the fact that hundreds of young Algerian and French soldiers are dying each day. A wilful act of genocide is being committed if, with clearly defined ways and means of ending the conflict, the principle of self-determination is denied, that is to say, negotiation on the conditions for a cease-fire with the true and only possible spokesmen, with those who are fighting, after which the Algerian people will be allowed to express their wishes. The hypocritical and outdated theme of a "French Algeria" is now supported only by the Fascist elements. There can be no question of a French Algeria any more than of a French Sudan, of a French, Portuguese or Spanish Guinea, of a Belgian or French Congo. The terms used to label the colonies were invented to suit the power complex of the colonizers. The existence of the French minority in Algeria does not mean that the part can replace the whole. When, after their liberation, the Algerians have become masters of their country and their destiny, they will find a democratic solution to this problem, as has been done by various other free nations.

44. The delegation of the Republic of Mali will therefore vote in favour of any proposal for ending the colonialist war in Algeria, for holding a referendum under United Nations supervision and for establishing a time-table for those operations.

45. By the very fact that we support this as the only effective solution, we deprecate the isolated mediation efforts of some African leaders who have not been particularly outstanding for their action and assistance to the Algerian people in their struggle against colonial despotism. Why should the mediation of Africans from the south of the Sahara—a formula dear to colonialism when attempting to create division or diversion—be preferred to the much more logical mediation of King Mohammed V and President Bourguiba who, as leaders of the Maghreb, represent countries whose destinies are closely linked with that of Algeria?

46. In our opinion, the historic fate of African solidarity is and will be decided in the United Nations. The touchstone of our solidarity and of our African dignity is the Algerian problem. I am convinced that African dignity will be secure in the future, as it has been in the past and is today.

47. In an attempt to discredit Mali for its stand in support of the Algerian people, strategists in the French Ministry for Defence have invented, or simply imagined, a Conakry-Bamako-Sahara axis by means of which Guinea and Mali are supposed to be helping the National Liberation Front. The fantastic legend of the "Sahara fringe" is nothing more than a pretext for intervention along the Sahara frontier of my country—some 1,500 kilometres long—and exists only in the imagination of French activists who must know that Guinea and Mali, under-developed countries where colonialism has left nothing or almost nothing, cannot possibly solve the problems of organization, equipment and transport, particularly air transport, that would be involved in crossing the thousands of kilometres of the Sahara in its most arid region, the Tanezrouft. If such resources had ever existed in the Republic of Mali and in Guinea, the colonialist war of extermination in Algeria would have been ended years ago.

48. I have wanted to speak of South Africa and the question of "apartheid". Racial discrimination in South Africa is one of the plague-spots of our continent and resembles the Algerian war in that the many racist and Fascist Governments of the country, that of Smuts, that of Malan, and in fact all of them, have continued to defy and arrogantly ignore the feelings of the civilized peoples of the free nations of the world. The black world, and all coloured people, must be saved from the racial peril in South Africa. "Apartheid", as others have said before me, is the great outrage of the century. Here too, the Assembly should consider all practicable solutions and establish a time-table for the liberation of the coloured people of the Union of South Africa, so that barbarity may cease in that region of Africa. United Nations forces should be sent to South Africa if it persists in its present policy despite economic retaliation and international ostracism.

49. I shall now speak of the end of colonialism. The fifteenth session of the General Assembly, which has been called the "session of Africa", should indeed take practical measures for the complete abolition of the

colonial system. Mali will accordingly vote in favour of any draft resolution establishing a time-table for the end of colonialism in the regions of the world still under its yoke. The country of Jomo Kenyatta, the country of Tom Mboya and all the countries of western, central and eastern Africa must, as soon as possible, become independent of all foreign control. The people of the territories under Portuguese domination must see their chains broken; the hypocrisy of the sham assimilation of the "Portuguese" of the colonies must not be allowed to impede the work of liberation by the United Nations.

50. Another great problem which has been much discussed is that of assistance to the under-developed countries. This is the great hypocrisy, if not of the century, at least of the post-war period. This striking example of the brotherhood of man could strengthen the stability and the chances of peace by freeing the "third world" from hunger if the industrially developed countries did not make such assistance seem like charity and an outlet for surpluses of the over-production crisis, or rather the under-consumption crisis, which is the lot of the majority of highly developed countries. Surpluses may provisionally, and therefore deceptively, eliminate the hunger of the "third world", but do not place at its disposal an instrument of economic development which could help it to transform colonial structures and promote a real improvement in the level of living. In such a form, this assistance is nothing more than charity, which undermines the dignity of the receiver.

51. Assistance should likewise not be used as an instrument of blackmail to influence the attitude of the uncommitted countries and ensure that they will automatically vote in favour of any particular country or bloc. Unless assistance is a decisive factor in true economic development, it is harmful. Recent examples should convince developing nations of the need for caution if assistance is not to lead to economic slavery, which is nothing less than naked, unqualified slavery.

52. I should like, in conclusion to speak of disarmament, because it is the basic question of our time. The Republic of Mali, as a small under-developed country emerging from the darkness of colonialism, needs peace in order to build itself up as a nation, to forge the instruments of a planned economy, to consolidate its independence at home and abroad and to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Mali is therefore a staunch supporter of general and complete disarmament and of the inspection of all armaments, even including sling shots if that will satisfy the extreme pacifists. The dangers of the armaments race and the cold war and the undoubted harm they cause to the economies of the developing countries are well known. Mali, as an advocate of peace and of peaceful coexistence between all economic and political systems, will accordingly support every effort to induce the great Powers to carry out general and complete disarmament under control, for it regards this as a decisive factor in the relaxation of tension and the establishment of peace.

53. I stated on 21 June 1960 at the International Labour Conference held in Geneva:

"Independence is only a means—a major means, but still a means—to achieve a policy that is worthy of the name, which consists in raising the standard

of living and culture of the people. Our policy will be based on fraternity and solidarity of all peoples But this solidarity will apply equally to all States of the African Continent. The foreign policy of Mali will be based on respect of sovereignty of the national integrity of each and all, of international co-operation and of peace. In Mali we do not belong to those who, whilst turning their backs to international co-operation, proclaim such international co-operation from every roof-top."

I added:

"The Mali, it is said, has been born from its ashes. Our primary object is to build up a large Negro-African nation, . . . of which the Federation of Mali is the kernel."^{1/}

The words I spoke then are even more true today after the entry of so many of our States into the international arena and in the light of the encouraging prospects of de-colonization and of the end of colonialism throughout the world.

54. I shall conclude by saying that our most ardent hope is that the independence of Africa, and the unity and solidarity of Africa, may be achieved in dignity on a basis of mutual respect between peoples and nations and that it will redound to the service of man. That will be the price of Africa's contribution to world civilization.

Mr. Fekini (Libya), Vice-President, took the Chair.

55. Mr. UNDEN (Sweden): A great number of speakers have expressed, during this general debate, their appreciation of the action taken by the Security Council to assist the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) when this new State, shortly after the proclamation of its independence, was threatened by internal unrest and an extensive paralysis of its political and economic life. Many speakers have also warmly praised the energy, ability and impartiality shown by the Secretary-General in carrying out the tasks entrusted to him by the Security Council. On behalf of the Swedish Government, I concur in these opinions regarding the United Nations action in the Congo. At the same time, I wish to express my sincere hope that it will be possible to pursue this action successfully in spite of the tremendous difficulties that will have to be overcome. This hope is founded on the fact, among other things, that we have had such favourable experience of the competence and the ability to take initiative displayed so far by the Secretary-General and his collaborators not only in the Congo but on earlier occasions as well. His efforts have been facilitated as a consequence of the independent position which the Charter has conferred upon the Secretary-General when executing tasks assigned to him by the policy-making organs of the United Nations.

56. It did not appear in the beginning that the problem of the Congo need give rise to special complications. Nevertheless, it has become controversial to a high degree. It has moved into the centre of all activities of the United Nations and is now in the focus of the world's attention. The first intervention of the Security Council corresponded to a general wish to support the new State. It would appear that this was a case where co-operation might be possible, within

^{1/} See International Labour Conference, Records of Proceedings, Forty-fourth Session, 27th sitting.

the framework of the Charter, on the basis of mutual interest among the great Powers in avoiding the splitting of this important region by bloc conflicts. The Republic of the Congo was outside the regions of the world included in the great power-blocs. The action undertaken by the United Nations was intended to be of a local nature. At the same time, there existed a wide-spread feeling that the risk of complications would be much greater if the United Nations remained passive in relation to the events which were taking place in the Congo. There was a possibility that rival political leaders in the country might appeal to foreign Powers for assistance. Such a development could result in foreign troops facing each other on Congolese soil.

57. Unfortunately, in spite of the unanimous decisions of the Security Council about United Nations action in the Congo, differences of opinion gradually emerged not only in respect of certain measures that had been taken but also regarding the whole operation as such and the role which the United Nations was supposed to play in this connexion. It would seem that, after a while, the question of the Congo had become an international political problem of the first order and that a situation had arisen of exactly the kind that the United Nations had tried to prevent.

58. However, it became possible for the General Assembly, convened in an emergency special session, to agree on the continuation of the United Nations operation in accordance with the policies laid down by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. It has been of particular importance that there has been a large degree of agreement among the African States on the advantage to the Republic of the Congo of receiving international assistance through the United Nations.

59. There may be different opinions regarding the suitability of certain measures or regarding the advisability of omitting the taking of certain steps in the Congo. I have no possibility of commenting upon such problems, which require a thorough knowledge of conditions on the spot. Instead, I shall mention a few words on some controversial question of a more general character.

60. A source of unrest and discontent has been the separatist movement which has come into existence in the Province of Katanga. However, it is a fact that this separatist movement has been forcefully condemned and counteracted by the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, by a large majority of the Governments of other African States, by the Security Council and by the Secretary-General. It is true that there has been some influence to the contrary from Belgian circles with interests in Katanga, but this cannot in the long run outweigh the wide-spread and firm opinion which is against the secession of this Province. The criticism which has been levelled against the Secretary-General for not having been sufficiently energetic in endeavouring to bring about the withdrawal of the Belgian troops cannot be sustained in the face of the evidence of facts and documents. The international officials who, under difficult conditions, have to apply the directives given by the Security Council in general terms, are entitled to expect that we have confidence in their good intentions.

61. Another dispute is related to the attitude to be taken towards the rival political leaders who have

claimed to represent the legal Government of the Congo. In international practice, we are familiar with the dilemma facing foreign Governments when there has been a "coup d'état" or rebellion in a country, but when none of the rival leaders involved has succeeded in obtaining full control. Usually, in such cases, other States delay their recognition of a new Government until the situation becomes clarified. In order to safeguard important interests and to protect nationals, however, circumstances may make it necessary to establish relations, on a *de facto* basis, with this or that authority exercising control of a part of the country, perhaps also with authorities subordinated to different Governments. As far as I understand, the Secretary-General has followed this diplomatic practice when two or several authorities have claimed to be the Central Government. This attitude has been in the interest of the population concerned and it has not implied any taking of sides in favour of one or the other of the authorities involved. I hardly need to point out that situations of this kind can be most embarrassing to foreign States and can confront them with problems which it may be very difficult to solve. It would, indeed, not be surprising if, in exceptional cases, actions may turn out to be the cause of misunderstanding.

62. Can it be said, however, that any of these disputes are of such a character as to constitute a valid reason for preventing co-operation among the States Members of the United Nations in an action to assist the Congo? Are we witnessing a clash of interests between some big Powers, and is it necessary that an action to assist the Congo, undertaken by the United Nations, must lead to a taking of sides in favour of any one party in the cold war?

63. Sometimes statements are made that seem to mean that it is in the nature of things that the Republic of the Congo is to be the object of a struggle for power between various groups of States. It is assumed that the interests of the Western Powers and those of the Eastern bloc necessarily must go apart. Indeed, in this connexion, mention has been made of a bloc of neutral States as if the freedom from alliances of these States was to be sufficient reason for letting them appear as a homogenous bloc with special interests of their own in the Congo. At any rate, Sweden does not regard itself as belonging to a neutral bloc. Sweden, for its own part, does not expect to derive either direct profit or disadvantage from its participation in the operation to assist the Congo.

64. However, we warmly wish that the peoples of the Congo who have just obtained their political independence will be able to master the new problems confronting them and to increase their standard of living and to build up an orderly judicial system and a spiritual culture. We also sincerely hope that the Congo in the future shall escape the fate of becoming the scene of a competition between other Powers to secure influence over that country.

65. It has been said that the Secretary-General, who has to carry out the decisions of the United Nations, necessarily will do this in a manner favourable to the interests of one group of States and to the detriment of other States. Possibly this view is an expression of a dogmatic, now somewhat antiquated, concept of the communist doctrine on the struggle between the classes. However, I regard assistance rendered to the Republic of the Congo collectively, and within the

framework of the United Nations, as being in the fullest conformity with the principle of peaceful co-existence so often and so eloquently defended by the chief of the Soviet Government.

66. When the Swedish Government decided to accede to the demand of the Secretary-General to have a military troop from Sweden, it based its decision, among other things, on the information received on the rights, duties and tasks of such a troop. The United Nations Force should be stationed in the Congo at the request of the Government of that country. The Force should be under the exclusive command of the United Nations and it would not be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict. The United Nations operation would be separate and distinct from activities by any national authorities. The Secretary-General had also referred to previously established principles for international forces in the service of the United Nations. The international units ought not to be used to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution. These units would be entitled to act only in self-defence. Men engaged in the operation should never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but would be entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms, including attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions which they occupied under order from their commander. Altogether it was not a question of a military force designed for combat purposes, but of a police force with duties similar to those carried out by the United Nations forces set up in connexion with the Suez crisis of 1956 and the action in Lebanon in 1958.

67. Considering these rules regarding the tasks and duties of the military forces, it was natural and in full consistency with Sweden's policy of neutrality that our country should participate in the United Nations operation in the Congo.

68. It has been said in some quarters that the United Nations forces should have been put at the disposal of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, or that that Government should have been permitted to use them for the solution of domestic political conflicts. The Swedish Government cannot agree with this view. An intervention into the internal affairs of the Congo could, from a political point of view, easily lead to a spread of the unrest and to conflicts between States Members of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has indicated, in the Security Council, the principles guiding the military assistance that can be given by the United Nations in this case, and these principles have met with no objection on the part of the Security Council. It goes without saying that sometimes there may be some uncertainty as to the extent of the authority and freedom of action of the military forces. Mistakes can be made, and accidents may occur. However, it is not reasonable to doubt, because of this, the objectivity and the good intentions of those who bear the responsibility. It is of the utmost importance that there is no doubt whatsoever as to the functions which the United Nations forces are intended to fulfil. The experience already gained on the two previous occasions mentioned before, when police forces have been organized to serve the United Nations, is likely to make their functions clear.

69. If I may now turn to the problem of disarmament, I want first to note the existing agreement of opinion between the leading Powers regarding the possibility

of disarmament and the necessity of continued negotiations. In his recent speech before this Assembly, President Eisenhower said:

"Some who have followed closely the many fruitless disarmament talks since the war tend to become cynical—to assume that the task is hopeless. This is not the position of the United States." [868th meeting, para. 73.]

70. On his part, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union has characterized disarmament as this Assembly's most urgent problem [869th meeting].

71. I also wish to express the satisfaction of my delegation at the fact that the Three-Nation Conference^{2/} in Geneva is carrying on its deliberations regarding a ban on nuclear weapons tests, and that considerable progress has been made lately. This is the only bright spot of the disarmament picture. There seems to be a real prospect that the three Powers at Geneva will before long be able to agree on the ending of tests. Such an agreement would not only in itself be of great importance, but would also prove a powerful incentive to the great Powers to reach agreement on nuclear production and conventional arms. Obviously, an agreement between the three States must be acceded to by the other States in order to give it the desired effectiveness.

72. I should also like to draw attention to the interesting proposal recently advanced by the United States regarding the suspension of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. President Eisenhower stated in his speech before this Assembly:

"If the Soviet Union will agree to a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, some production facilities could be closed without delay. The United States would be willing to match the Soviet Union in shutting down major plants producing fissionable materials, one by one, under international inspection and verification." [868th meeting, para. 71.]

73. The setting up last year of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament as an organ for continued efforts to solve the numerous knotty problems of disarmament has not been without benefit. Last June, the great Powers in the Committee presented new versions of their respective programmes and contributed thereby to a clarification of the differences existing between the programmes—differences which, incidentally, are quite considerable. The Government of the Soviet Union has, on 23 September 1960, submitted a revised programme [A/4505]. A study of the programmes allows us to acknowledge that there also exist certain points of agreement between them, which are not insignificant.

74. Among the points in the programmes, which appear to correspond, I mention the following three and I here quote the representative of Canada in the Ten-Nation Committee:

"(i) That disarmament should proceed by stages;
 "(ii) That at no stage of disarmament should any State or group of States achieve a military advantage over other States;

^{2/} Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests, opened on 31 October 1958.

"(iii) That disarmament measures should be balanced as, for example, between measures of nuclear disarmament and measures of conventional disarmament."^{3/}

According to the Canadian representative's statement in the Ten-Nation Committee, these three principles had all been accepted by the representatives in the Committee.

75. Particularly, I want to stress the importance of the second principle. The reduction of armaments shall be effected in such a way as not to cause disturbances in the balance of military power between the latent opponents. Here lies one of the main difficulties; but it would surely not be technically impossible to ensure, when the plan is being drawn up, that neither side is favoured by the order in which disarmament is successively brought about.

76. The Swedish Government is of the opinion that an advance towards the common goal—a general and complete disarmament under effective international control—may possibly be facilitated by depoliticizing the preparatory studies which, in any event, are essential. We all know that every important step towards the goal requires a political act of will, a political decision. But after many years of debating disarmament in different organs, it appears not to be necessary to devote much further time to general debates, comprising the whole conglomerate of questions, until a number of problems of an essentially technical nature has been mapped and clarified by experts. This viewpoint has been emphasized by several speakers preceding me in this debate.

77. The three programmes which this year have been put forward by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, all envisage the convening of a general disarmament conference at a specific stage of the deliberations within the disarmament organ. But if there is to be any prospect of arriving, within a reasonable time, at positive results at such a conference, thorough examinations by experts must have been made before the conference is convened. To the Swedish Government it appears desirable that this Assembly give such directives to the Ten-Nation Committee that a rational organization of the work is brought about. There should be no insurmountable obstacles to reaching an agreement regarding the setting up of groups of experts, each with the task of reviewing a specific, important problem in the field of disarmament.

78. The argumentation I am now making was set forth last year by the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch. On 22 October 1959, he stated in the First Committee:

"Let us refer it all to the Geneva Committee. Let us also remind that Committee, without dwelling on a disappointing past, of the value of the work of experts. As long ago as 1957, I suggested in London that we entrust to such groups the technical study of clearly defined problems. In this very place last year, I suggested applying this procedure to the prevention of surprise attack, to the halting of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to the study of defence budgets, to the reduction of troops and armaments, to the utilization of outer

space, and to the methods of control for each of these measures."^{4/}

79. The mentioned example of questions which Mr. Jules Moch wished to have referred to groups of experts for consideration, is also found in the United Kingdom programme of March 1960 as questions which should be reviewed during the first disarmament stage. In the United Kingdom programme is added as a subject for consideration "the structure of an international authority for keeping peace in a disarmed world", a problem which, it seems to me, should rather be put off to a later stage. The Soviet programme envisages during the first stage a common study of certain questions, namely of measures which should be carried out during the second stage and which relate to the suspension of production of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons. In the United States programme it is stated that, in the course of negotiating a disarmament treaty, the Ten-Nation Committee should arrange for and conduct the necessary technical studies to work out effective control arrangements for measures to be carried out in the programme. These studies shall provide an agreed basis for proceeding with the implementation of the measures studied at the appropriate stage. It is added that among the early studies shall be a technical examination of the measures necessary to verify control over, reduction and elimination of agreed categories of nuclear delivery systems, including missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery. The United States programme recommends also a study of the control system, necessary for the suspension of the production of fissionable materials.

80. Thus, already in the existing programmes submitted by the West and by the East the necessity of expert studies concerning a number of problems is envisaged. It is easy to mention other such problems.

81. Both sides suggest the setting up of a control organization for supervising various measures designed to a reduction of the military defence. In the programmes, this whole problem of control is dealt with only in general terms and could very well be referred to a special group of experts.

82. The concept of nuclear weapons carriers plays an important role in the programmes of both sides. The idea of indirectly bringing about an effective ban on nuclear weapons by a ban on nuclear carriers is originally French. An examination should be made with a view to establishing which categories of vehicles, artillery, etc. should be classified as nuclear weapons carriers. In this connexion, the question arises as to what extent a ban or a limitation on the use of nuclear weapons carriers signifies an entirely new method of tackling the disarmament question. It seems that there is here a great need for a closer examination by a group of experts.

83. As I have previously pointed out, both programmes envisage that disarmament shall be brought about gradually, namely, in three stages. According to the proposal put forth by the East, the first stage is fixed at a period of twelve to eighteen months, whereas no period has been fixed for the first stage of the West's proposal or for the second and third stages

^{3/} See Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, verbatim record, 46th meeting.

^{4/} This statement was made at the 1030th meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which was published only in summary form.

of both proposals. However, it is emphasized in both proposals that all measures relating to disarmament shall be taken within specifically defined periods of time.

84. The fixing of the time for executing various disarmament measures is of the greatest importance when it comes to an appraisal of the significance of a programme. The proposed programmes can, as a matter of fact, hardly be compared if they are not drawn up in such a way that they cover the same periods of time. The Ten-Nation Committee should give directives to the various groups of experts on this point, naturally without anticipating its final position on the question. To give such directives implies a political decision, but a decision only designed to serve as a working hypothesis for the technical studies. If the first stage is set, for instance at five years, the task of the expert group will be to establish what decisions can be made and which actual measures can be taken in the course of five years.

85. Thus, I suggest that the Ten-Nation Committee, perhaps somewhat modified as regards its composition and brought within the framework of the United Nations, should begin its deliberations by trying to organize the work in such a way that prospects are opened for results as rapidly as possible. With the assistance of the United Nations Secretariat, the Ten-Nation Committee should consequently make a selection within the whole complex of disarmament problems of those questions of a preparatory nature which, with advantage, could and should be examined by experts without losing view of the final goal. It must be emphasized that the suggested method of work is designed to expedite and not to delay a result. Thus, a relatively great number of groups of experts should work at the same time and submit reports to the main group. Among the experts there may very well be persons belonging to none of the countries represented in the Ten-Nation Committee.

86. The proposed procedure may give rise to objections to the effect that the difficulties for the experts to agree on conclusions would delay the completion of the various studies. Naturally, the experts may sometimes be expected to adopt political attitudes, and political antagonism may thus enter the groups of experts. This is, no doubt, possible. But the procedure I have recommended would still lead to better results than those which may be obtained if the central organ considered directly the whole host of technical problems.

87. The United Kingdom Prime Minister concluded his speech in this Assembly a few days ago [877th meeting] by observing that, according to his experience, in all human affairs there are dangers in excessive pessimism as well as in too much optimism. As matters stand today, I hardly believe that there is any risk of the representatives in this Assembly giving themselves up to too much optimism. Evidently, Mr. Macmillan wanted above all to call upon us to avoid an exaggerated degree of pessimism. Indeed, it seems natural to me that the Members of the United Nations, as a working hypothesis, start from the assumption that the problem of disarmament, in spite of its tremendous difficulties, does not belong to the problems which are unsolvable. No doubt, it is this opinion that underlies the resolution [1378 (XIV)] adopted by this Assembly last year.

Mr. Boland (Ireland) resumed the Chair.

88. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon): At this stage of the general debate, after the full discussion we have had, it is not without some reluctance that I venture to make a few comments on behalf of the delegation of Ceylon on only a few world problems that concern all of us vitally. Our agenda is a heavy one. It contains items on important and basic issues which deal with world peace and security and the political, economic and social welfare of all peoples represented here at this General Assembly. I should like to deal with most of these, but shall refrain from doing so, as I realize the great volume of work this Assembly has yet to do and the urgent need to get down to business in plenary as well as in the Committees at the earliest possible time.

89. Permit me, however, to digress for a moment to mention to this Assembly a domestic event which also has an international interest and significance. Last year, in September, Ceylon lost a great leader in tragic circumstances and the country went through difficult and uncertain times for a short period, but, in July of this year, a general election was held on the same basis as we have held Parliamentary elections since 1931, that is, on the basis of universal suffrage. The election had a happy result in that a political party emerged as the leading party with a strong majority. The head of this party was a lady, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who was called upon to form a Government. This she did, and she became the first lady in the world to become a Prime Minister. We are naturally proud of this unique distinction, and I am sure the world would like to know, particularly at this time, and would be interested in the fact that we can look forward to an era of political stability and to the wise guidance of a Prime Minister who is capable of and devoted to bringing about the unity of our peoples and their political, economic and social welfare and who will also maintain close and friendly relations with all countries. I know that Mrs. Bandaranaike, had hoped to attend this session, but unfortunately she could not free herself from urgent and pressing problems which need her presence at home as she had just assumed the responsibility of her office. She would like me to express to this Assembly her deep regret that she was prevented from being here with us and her hope to join in our work in the future, and also to convey her greetings and good wishes for the success of the work of this Assembly.

90. May I now proceed to deal with a few specific problems that have claimed the special attention of this Assembly. I should like, in the first place, to make only a few comments on the Congo question, to try to clarify the United Nations position in the light of the relevant facts. It is not necessary to go fully into this question now, as it is included as an item on our agenda. Until the question came before the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly on 17 September 1960, it was dealt with by the Security Council, whose decisions are to be found in three resolutions adopted by it unanimously on 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960.^{5/} These decisions have not been criticized or challenged as lacking in any way in regard to the situation as it first emerged and as it developed during that period. I think it necessary to point out that the Soviet Union itself, which sup-

^{5/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, documents S/4387, S/4405 and S/4426.

ported the position taken up in these resolutions, has not at any time impugned the action taken by the Security Council and has conceded that the action taken by the Security Council was right and proper. That the Security Council's decisions were right has been borne out also by the convincing vote taken during the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly which upheld these decisions by adopting resolution 1474 (ES-IV), the original draft of which was co-sponsored by all the African States and several Asian States. I shall now quote operative paragraph 1 of that resolution:

"Fully supports the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council."

At that session, the General Assembly also endorsed the implementation by the Secretary-General of the Security Council resolutions. I quote operative paragraph 2 of the same resolution:

"Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions"

That sets out the position with regard to the facts of the situation in connexion with the action of the Security Council.

91. The situation in the Congo still continues to be far from satisfactory, and it is incumbent on us to take such further action as may be needed to bring about speedily the restoration and functioning of a stable government which will be able to ensure security and law and order and to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. At its fourth emergency special session the General Assembly called for the appointment of a good offices committee. I hope that this committee will be appointed soon.

92. The Secretary-General personally has come in for some criticism on the ground that he was biased or prejudiced in the implementation of the Security Council's decisions. We do not think that, except for some errors of judgement, he has failed honestly to carry out those decisions. We are satisfied with his bona fides. We have known his views on and his work for the freedom and independence of dependent peoples, and we know that he has worked hard and with an admirable single-minded devotion to duty to carry out the Security Council's decisions on the Congo. It must be noted that, whenever he was in doubt, Mr. Hammarskjöld did not hesitate to come to the Security Council, as for example when, in attempting to send the United Nations Force to Katanga Province, he encountered resistance and felt that he should not push his way through by the use of force. This, he felt, he was precluded from doing according to the principles on which the United Nations Force had been assembled, principles which had been followed in previous operations and principles which had been approved by the Security Council in respect of the Congo. He therefore did the only thing he could do in case of doubt. He returned to New York and submitted the position to the Security Council.

93. The Council's resolution of 9 August 1960 is well known. The United Nations Force was authorized to enter Katanga Province but not to interfere in the internal conflicts, constitutional or otherwise, in the Congo. On that same occasion, after considering his

report,^{6/} the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's position and actions.

94. We cannot ignore the fact that, in the implementation by him of the Council's resolutions, he had to take actions on which there could be honest differences of opinion. Some might consider that a certain situation that existed, or suddenly arose, in the course of these operations should have been dealt with in one way, while others might have thought that the action should have been different. Some may even go to the length of considering that the course adopted by him disclosed a partisan or prejudiced attitude. I myself stated in the Security Council that some actions of the Secretary-General, in my view, would appear to be due to errors of judgement, but we do not think that these were due to any partisan attitude. We also have to recognize that mistakes of this kind are inevitable in a situation of such magnitude and complexity as the Congo situation has turned out to be. I might even state that the Security Council resolutions themselves might well have been much clearer and more precise.

95. We do hope that the Soviet Union will be prepared to appreciate this point and continue to retain the confidence which it had in the Secretary-General. It was no doubt the Soviet Union's loss of confidence which prompted its Chairman of the Council of Ministers to suggest the abolition of the office of the Secretary-General and to replace it by a triumvirate or collegium of three persons representing the Western Powers, the Eastern Powers and the neutralist Powers. We regret that we cannot accept this suggestion. First, its acceptance would require an amendment of the United Nations Charter and we ourselves know how strongly opposed the Soviet Union is to a revision of the Charter. Last year, when my delegation proposed the revision of the Charter to deal with what might be considered a merely technical matter—to permit an increase in the number of the members of the Economic and Social Council—in the course of a debate in the Special Political Committee, the representative of the Soviet Union objected to it for the reason stated by him. I quote from the official record of the proceedings of that Committee on 14 October 1959:

"Mr. Sobolev noted with regret that the area of agreement essential to a revision of the Charter was still lacking in the General Assembly. The chief reason for that state of affairs was the absence from the United Nations of the lawful representatives of the Chinese people," ^{7/}

96. The same reason still holds good. How then can the Soviet Union expect its proposal to be implemented without a revision of the Charter, especially when the proposal deals with an important aspect affecting the structure of the Organization as laid down in the Charter? Quite apart from this, it is our view that the establishment of a triumvirate to take the place of the Secretary-General will not contribute in any positive way to the better working of the United Nations. The collegium or triumvirate—call it what you will—composed as suggested, would not, if it is at the same time hamstrung by giving the right of veto to each member, be capable of effective or prompt action or of discharging the responsibilities which, as successor

^{6/} Ibid., document S/4475.

^{7/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Special Political Committee, 129th meeting, para. 5.

to the Secretary-General, it would be called upon to assume under the Charter. The Secretariat, if it is to be able to maintain the impartiality of the United Nations in the cold war and to further the interests of peace, should remain and act independently of cold war pressures and also serve as a kind of buffer, as well as a bridge, between the cold war groups. The body envisaged in the Soviet proposal would be much too much of a product of the cold war to function with any independence, even if it could function at all.

97. Abolition of the post of Secretary-General would, in our view, weaken considerably the position of the United Nations and impair its future. We are, of course, not unaware of the damage that could ensue from the loss of confidence in the Secretary-General by any major Power group or by any other substantial section of opinion. We trust, therefore, that, in the interests of the United Nations itself, further consideration will be given to this matter.

98. I wish now to devote a few minutes to a subject which, in the view of my delegation, is of considerable importance in the international field. I refer to the item on the agenda of the present session of the Assembly dealing with the question of Algeria. The position of my Government in regard to the situation in Algeria does not permit of any ambiguity or equivocation. Its policy has been clearly stated on several occasions. We have always maintained the right of peoples to self-determination. If such self-determination can be realized by peaceful methods based on negotiation and the principles of pacific settlement of disputes, none will be happier than ourselves. Unfortunately, the struggle of the Algerian people has dragged on over the last six years in a manner which can only be described as tragic in the suffering which it has caused to a people fighting against heavy odds for their freedom and independence. The General Assembly has had the Algerian question on its agenda at each of its regular sessions since 1955.

99. At its eleventh and twelfth sessions, the Assembly unanimously adopted resolutions [1012 (XI) and 1184 (XII)] expressing the concern of the United Nations at the continuance of the Algerian conflict and urging that the problem be solved in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. At the thirteenth session, a draft resolution [A/4075, para. 4] recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence and expressing concern at the continuance of the war in Algeria as a situation endangering international peace and security, and urging negotiations between the two parties concerned with a view to reaching a solution in conformity with our Charter, failed to be adopted by the Assembly only by a single vote. The memories of what happened at the fourteenth session on this matter are too fresh to require repetition here. The tragic events in Algeria continue to cause deep concern to my Government. The armed conflict in that country, which has necessitated almost the entirety of the French army being maintained in combat strength in Algeria, and has displaced over a million Algerian civilians, continues to embitter international relations and to increase international tensions.

100. In our view, in the context of the vast fermentation going on at present in the African continent, any further delay in a settlement of this problem is fraught with grave danger to the peace of the world. When General de Gaulle came to power in 1958, it

was under circumstances which led us to believe that a speedy and satisfactory solution of the Algerian question was at hand. We welcomed the statements he made and we looked towards an implementation of his promises. Two years have passed, and the fighting in Algeria goes on with unmitigated vigour. We were heartened a short time ago, however, by what appeared to be a constructive prospect of "pour-parlers" between the French Government and the representatives of the Algerian national liberation movement. General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, in his address to the nation on 14 June 1960, stated:

"Above all, it is no longer contested anywhere that self-determination for the Algerians regarding their destiny is the only possible outcome of this complex and painful tragedy.

"In this respect, it is granted that the choice will be completely free...."

101. These were heartening words, words of statesmanship, coming from so weighty and authoritative a source. We were therefore all the more dismayed when the chapter which was so hopefully begun, ended in a most regrettable and unproductive manner, especially in view of the fact that the issues at stake were so vital for the peace and security not only of Africa but of the whole world. We regret that the Melun meeting held in June 1960 to which the Algerians had sent delegates proved abortive. The Government of France must recognize the imperative need of negotiating with the only body of Algerians capable of speaking for the Algerian people—the National Liberation Front.

102. It was in that same speech that the French President said: "There is no policy which is worth while apart from realities." What are these realities? It is a war which will not, and cannot, end except with the triumph of the aspirations of the Algerian people for political freedom. That is one reality. The inexorable will of a people for freedom cannot be destroyed by arms. This is a reality. France has to take account of the realities of the mid-twentieth century, particularly the realities of the happenings in the continent of Africa, and to fashion its policy on Algeria in a manner worthy not only of the ideals which the French Revolution gave to the world, but also worthy of the realities of political liberation of today. Most French people, especially the intellectuals, have recognized these realities. These are not people who love France less, but whose passion for freedom and right conduct has been more. They have been strong enough to try to save France—the country they love, the country which had such a glorious past and which can look forward to a great future—from pursuing a path which involves the denial of freedom and the infliction of injustice to a people whose only crime is their love of their native land, a people who were and still are prepared to discuss and negotiate an honourable settlement. If France is unable or unwilling to do so, we sincerely hope that the Assembly, at this session, will finally face its responsibilities and act in such a way as to put an end to the futile, tragic and meaningless loss of life which the Algerian war has caused over the last five years. The time has now come for a final settlement of this problem. We cannot, and we should not, procrastinate any longer. My delegation will support any measure the United Nations may deem fit to take to put an end to the blood-

shed in Algeria and to ensure to the people of that land a free and untrammelled opportunity to decide for themselves the kind of government they wish to set up and live under. This is the right of self-determination as we understand it, and this must indeed be the meaning of the self-determination that was promised to them by General de Gaulle himself. If these people decide for independence, let them have it. It is their right which no one can deny.

103. Now I should like to say a few words on an item of considerable importance on the agenda which my delegation would like to examine more fully when it comes up for consideration in plenary meeting or in Committee. I refer to the question of the independence of all colonial and dependent countries. At this stage, I need only say that my Government is wholly opposed to the continuation of colonialism, which is an anachronism in the mid-twentieth century and has to be ended. It is a system which is repugnant to our conceptions of freedom and the fundamental rights of human beings. No doubt, there are some colonial Powers which do a great deal for the improvement of the conditions of dependent peoples. Such humane considerations we applaud and we do hope that they are only steps in preparation for the total emancipation of these peoples. We urge, therefore, that urgent steps be taken to make the whole world free, so that, when we refer to the free world, we shall be referring to a reality.

104. However good a colonial government may be and however much it may do to improve the lot of the dependent peoples, there is no justification for the continuance of a system of colonial domination. Good government can never be a substitute for self-government. We are glad to note in this connexion that very recently no less than fifteen countries have advanced from colonialism to freedom and independence and have been admitted into the United Nations as sovereign and independent States. We have all felicitated them and wished them success. The present Assembly which the President rightly termed as the "Assembly of Humanity" will always be remembered for this unique event. When the history of the United Nations comes to be written, there will be a chapter regarding this unique event which recognized the freedom of so many countries, most of whom come from the one continent of Africa.

105. We therefore fully support the declaration [A/4502] calling for the abolition of colonialism and ask that all dependent peoples should be freed from any form of colonial domination.

106. Last year, when we met at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, it seemed to be a propitious beginning. International tension was perceptibly lessening; the international climate was brightening and the skies were beginning to be clear of the dark clouds that earlier that year had been ominously gathering. The great Powers had agreed on a new disarmament committee of ten thus establishing for the first time parity between East and West, and thereby overcoming a formidable obstacle which had, up to that time, ever since the failure of the talks in 1957, prevented the United Nations Disarmament Commission from functioning, and which had also prevented any joint disarmament discussions. Even earlier, the nuclear Powers had agreed to meet to discuss a ban on atomic tests and their meeting was beginning to show positive results. It was for these

reasons that I said that the international scene showed signs of improvement.

107. Then again, at the fourteenth session, the United Kingdom, through its Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, submitted a concrete disarmament plan [A/C.1/820], and this was followed a few days later by another disarmament plan submitted to the General Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union [A/4219]. The two plans differed in several respects, but both were based on the concept of general and complete disarmament. Before the session ended that year, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted a resolution [1378 (XIV)] accepting the principle of general and complete disarmament which Mr. Khrushchev had urged so convincingly when he submitted his plan.

108. This was not all. Mr. Khrushchev was here on an extended visit to the United States as an honoured guest of the President. He was well received throughout the country; then, he met Mr. Eisenhower in Washington and left with him to talk in peace and quiet at Camp David and explore the fundamental problems of the world and to find the way to world security and peace with harmony, good-will and justice to all. Apparently, their talks had been successful. Apparently, they had understood each other better and, in their joint communiqué, they proclaimed to an anxiously waiting world that they had agreed that international differences should be settled by means of peaceful negotiations and not by war. Before Mr. Khrushchev left, he had invited Mr. Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union, and Mr. Eisenhower had accepted. Plans were also made to have a summit meeting in the early part of 1960. That was the international climate in the latter part of 1959, and I have referred in detail to the meeting of these two great men only to express the ardent and anxious hope that, although the five-Power draft resolution [A/L.317] was not accepted recently in this General Assembly, these two great men will make up their minds to meet, because it is only by meetings of that kind that the same atmosphere which was generated in 1959 could be brought about at a time like this when good-will and harmony are so much in need.

109. All this we considered at that time as amounting to a great achievement, and the world heaved a sigh of relief. It is known that Mr. Khrushchev himself made every effort in his country to prepare a welcome for Mr. Eisenhower and to propagate the idea of peaceful relations between the two countries. Of course, this is history which we know. Out of the blue, like a thunderbolt, came the incident of the shooting down over Soviet territory of the United States reconnaissance aircraft. Mr. Khrushchev considered this flight perfidious conduct. He considered that all his efforts to improve relations between his country and the United States had been seriously prejudiced; and from that time, all the good-will that had been so laboriously built up evaporated into thin air and the relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. The consequence was the failure of the summit meeting in Paris even before it had begun, and, from that time to this, international tension has mounted and today the prospect for peace has become dismal and gloomy indeed.

110. It is in this atmosphere that the present session of the General Assembly has begun. This session is different from any held before, in that many Heads of

State have attended it, in addition to other distinguished leaders from many countries. Their efforts, whatever they were, do not seem to have immediately resulted in improving the situation. But we do know of one real effort, to which I have referred, which some of them made, but which failed to bring about the meeting which all felt would have been desirable at the present time—that is, that the two great leaders of the two most powerful countries of the world should meet and try to revive what has been referred to often as the Camp David spirit. However, that opportunity has passed. The leaders, or most of them, have gone, and we are left in the encircling gloom of the international climate of today, to plough wearily through our task, heavy in spirit and tired in mind. But we cannot give up; we dare not give up. We, therefore, hope that we shall undertake the work that faces us in the belief that failures are the pillars of success and that soon a way may be found for the creation of a better atmosphere.

111. It seems to my delegation that there are two ways in which we can fruitfully continue our efforts. I have in mind the two most important issues which vitally affect the question of world security and peace. I refer to the need to stop the arms race and to stop the discontent and dissatisfaction which exist and spread rapidly through the world, particularly in the under-developed areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, caused by the presence of hunger and want, ignorance and disease, and by so many of the other social ills of our modern society. These two problems, which are usually referred to as the problems of disarmament and of economic development, are the main problems we have to deal with. If I were cynical, which, of course, would be inexcusable in view of the gravity of the present situation, I might be inclined to ask myself whether there is any use in thinking of economic development, however important that may be, when the prospect of the complete destruction of all humanity is not too remote a possibility. Of course, we cannot allow this defeatist attitude to take possession of us. We have to go on hoping and praying and actively working for a speedy settlement of the disarmament problem.

112. The question of economic development is closely connected with disarmament, because the financial resources of countries involved in the arms race are committed, almost to the maximum of their capacity, to the building up and maintaining of the best and most modern weapons of destruction. Economic development, to be effective, must be tackled in a large and comprehensive manner, not in little efforts. It must be an attack on all fronts, conceived and prepared with greater imagination and larger resources than were devoted to the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe. Are not Asia, Africa and Latin America of at least equal importance? In fact, more people live in these regions. They are poorer and more handicapped by the lack of technology and capital than were the people of Europe. We are glad of the assistance that was provided for the peoples of Europe, but we hope that the needs of these other countries will be kept in mind. This can be done only if we put an end to the arms race and transfer a major part of what is so lavishly spent on weapons of destruction—built solely with the object of destroying humanity on a mass scale—to the constructive humanitarian purpose of improving the standards of living of all

people so that they may live in dignity and contentment.

113. I must not fail to recognize that some effort is being made by the United Nations and by individual countries to aid economic development. This is good and is welcome, but how meagre is this effort and how totally out of proportion to the great need. In the United Nations, we have the scheme of technical aid. We have the scheme of expanded technical aid. We have the Special Fund. We know how limited are the financial resources available to these schemes. Take the proposal to set up a capital development fund to expand the work of economic development. It has been received with so little warmth or enthusiasm that one wonders whether the whole objective of the world is to destroy and, incidentally, to be destroyed in the process, and not to build. Last year, I discussed this question fully, but, for want of time, I do not propose to do so on this occasion. I only wish to draw the attention of this Assembly once again to the need for comprehensive and large-scale action for the sake of humanity.

114. Finally, I come to the question of disarmament. This is today the most vital and most important matter this Assembly has before it. On its solution hangs the fate of the world. The tragedy of the arms race that is going on is that either it will disrupt severely the economy of countries which have entered the race or lead to a clash which could result in the destruction of the world. The arms race is man's most colossal folly. It is an absurd monstrosity. We hope, therefore, that sanity will return and enable us to see the danger in time so that we may take such measures as we can to avert a catastrophe.

115. History has a habit of repeating itself. We should therefore learn the lessons which history has to teach. If we ignore them, we do so at our peril.

116. One is alarmed at the leisurely and almost indifferent way in which we stand at the threshold of the most horrible danger that faces mankind. It would seem that, when disarmament is the subject, there is no hurry. Since the failure of the London talks on disarmament in 1957, nothing had been done, except to accelerate the pace of arming, until August 1959, when it was decided to establish a new disarmament committee; but the first meeting of this committee did not take place until March 1960, only to break up, without any solution, in a few months.

117. Obviously, the most important task confronting us is to find the means to halt the arms race and to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. This cannot, of course, be done by unilateral action. The nations of the whole world, and especially the nuclear Powers, must make a superhuman effort to reach agreement as soon as possible. Let us not wait until the house has burnt down to become interested in adequate fire protection. In our country, we have an old saying which we might well take to heart. It runs like this: "Don't repair the leaks in your roof when it begins to rain." I think that there is a good lesson in that saying.

118. History teaches us that wars happen with uncomfortable regularity. Knowing how the arms race led to the First World War in 1914, we should see that, if we continue to drift along as we are now doing, another major war—and this time a nuclear war—will

be a certainty, with consequences so terrible that one shudders even to think of them.

119. Similar procrastination was also one of the important causes of the Second World War. Let me quote a passage from Sir Philip Noel-Baker's book The Arms Race. He says:

"But the Governments, and in particular the Governments of Britain and France, delayed too long in putting forward proposals on which a general disarmament could certainly have been made. The Geneva Disarmament Conference ultimately met in February 1932; it was not till March 1933 that the British Government laid before it a comprehensive Draft Convention which Sir Anthony Eden had prepared. There was a general consensus of opinion at the time that, if this had come at the beginning instead of at the end, the Conference could hardly have failed... But Britain and France took too long to make up their minds that disarming itself was better than allowing Germany to rearm; by the time they had done so, Hitler was in power and the Conference was dead."^{8/}

Let us not allow a repetition of a situation of that kind to happen again. There is a lesson here for us.

120. It is true, of course, that, in our case, we do not lack plans of disarmament. What we have to overcome is the paralysis that seems to set in, caused undoubtedly by fear, suspicion or even hatred, which postpones or prevents action. The United Nations must realize its responsibility and do something to get the disarmament talks out of the rut into which it has fallen and commence meaningful discussions in a better atmosphere than seems to prevail at present, as we have seen ourselves at this Assembly.

121. Disarmament is particularly needed at this time because of the danger of a nuclear war. We know that neither side wants a war. The people of the world want peace. The smaller countries do not want war. But we cannot rest assured from this knowledge that a nuclear war will not break out. It can happen by accident or by design.

122. Neither can we depend too much on the thermo-nuclear weapon as a deterrent. There was a time, between 1945 and 1949, when the United States was the only country which had an atomic weapon. It was then truly a deterrent. Now, both the United States and the Soviet Union are known to possess large quantities of the most destructive atomic weapons, with a perfected system of delivery. But, as the arms race continues, it is not impossible for one of these countries to gain a definite superiority over the other, which might induce it to launch an attack. I do not suggest that it would happen, but it could possibly happen when a point had been reached of superior power. Retaliatory power no doubt is still a deterrent, but it may be thought that a first surprise blow may destroy the retaliatory power.

123. Furthermore, we cannot exclude the possibility of accident, which is possible in so many ways. Mr. Sobolev, the Soviet representative in the Security Council, made a simple statement of such a possibility. He said:

"American generals point to the fact that up to now the United States aircraft have returned to

^{8/} P. Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (London, Stevens and Sons Limited, 1958), p. 43.

their bases from half-way as soon as it became clear that the alarm was false. But what will happen if United States military personnel, watching their radar screens, fail to perceive in time that the falling meteor is not a guided missile and the flock of geese not a squadron of bombers? Then the United States aircraft will continue their flight and approach the frontiers of the Soviet Union. In this event, the Soviet Union will find itself compelled, in order to protect the security of the Soviet people, to take immediate counter-measures to eliminate the approaching threat."^{9/}

This was said in a light vein, but there is a serious point to be noted there with regard to the possibility of mistakes and accidents.

124. We can, of course, multiply instances of the possibility of mistakes being made or even accidents occurring which will set off a nuclear blast. We should also not exclude the possibility that another Hitler might arise who, drunk with a lust for power and believing in the invincibility of his own arms, may decide to take a gamble. Therefore, disarmament becomes a matter of paramount importance.

125. In recent times, we have, of course, made a distinct advance towards disarmament. As I said before, at the fourteenth session, the General Assembly adopted the resolution [1378 (XIV)] on general and complete disarmament. The two main parties have put forward plans to achieve this purpose. There are many points of agreement between them, particularly on the important question of control; but there are, at the same time, points on which they are still diametrically opposed.

126. We should, of course, try not to underestimate the complexities of the problem. One of the most serious difficulties appears to be tied to the question of the effectiveness of control. Disarmament cannot be based entirely on trust. There must be an acceptable control scheme. It is the general belief of experts who have examined this aspect of the question that a satisfactory scheme of inspection and control could be formulated which would be effective. It might, however, be impossible to formulate a scheme which would guarantee 100 per cent effectiveness. Some risk has to be taken; otherwise, it would not be possible to formulate any control scheme which would be acceptable to all sides.

127. In a report to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Foreign Policy Research Centre of Johns Hopkins University, made on 6 December 1959, it was stated:

"In a totally disarmed world, even a small number of secreted or clandestinely manufactured nuclear weapons could disrupt the international order and allow one Power to dominate its more trusting adversaries."^{10/}

The passage which I have quoted indicates the kind of thinking even among people who must know that a certain element of trust is required, provided, of course, that every effort is made to draw up a scheme

^{9/} Official Records of the Security Council, Thirteenth Year, 813th meeting, para. 6.

^{10/} The Johns Hopkins University, The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, A Study prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1959), p. 7.

of control which is as perfect as it can humanly be made.

128. But this is an important point to remember: that at a time when the questions of control and inspection are both accepted points, the discovery of a plan which is acceptable to both sides should not be difficult if we were prepared to drop the demand for absolute certainty that the plan of control and inspection be 100 per cent effective.

129. If we do not agree to that, we shall never get disarmament with adequate control. We are then faced with a situation where the parties most directly concerned—that is, the nuclear Powers—are willing to accept disarmament, but are unable to agree on some vital aspects of it. We in the United Nations cannot let the matter rest there. We have to consider what we can do in this situation. That is why the subject of disarmament is before the General Assembly, and my delegation hopes that we shall succeed in finding a way to achieve an effective disarmament agreement. I do not propose to discuss any of the plans that have been submitted, because that is a matter which we can leave to the Committee stage of the discussion of the disarmament question. But there is one point that I should like to make in this Assembly.

130. Reaching a disarmament agreement is not something that we can leave to the great Powers and be content to stay outside. Undoubtedly, effective disarmament will not be possible without great-Power agreement, and especially without the agreement of the two greatest Powers; but we, the medium or small Powers, have a vital stake in it ourselves. A nuclear war will affect the whole world, and we must have a voice in the efforts to prevent such a cataclysm. It is here in the United Nations that we can make our most useful contribution. The United Nations has appointed a Disarmament Commission, in which all Member States are represented. Here is the opportunity which we should seize. In this forum, we should ourselves, as Members of the United Nations and as representatives of the smaller countries, discuss the problem in detail, in a detached, sober and objective manner. I am sure that the concentrated wisdom of all the countries represented there, guided by the Commission's most experienced Chairman, will be able to produce proposals which might help the great Powers to reach agreement on disputed matters. It is in this field that the smaller Powers which have no direct interests in armaments or the maintenance of power politics can be of help to the great Powers.

131. My delegation therefore suggests that the Disarmament Commission should meet soon after the end of this session of the General Assembly and continue to study the problem until a solution is found. We hope that the Commission will not go to sleep for another year and awake just before the next session of the Assembly only to register feebly that it is still alive. The smaller Powers must see to it that the Disarmament Commission is used to the best advantage. The United Nations should also, at the same time, make every effort to get the great Powers—including, of course, the nuclear Powers—to resume their disarmament talks in the Ten-Nation Committee or in any other forum they may wish to set up. There is a heavy responsibility to all humanity, and theirs is the primary responsibility. It is our hope that they will overcome their mutual suspicions, create an area of understanding and good-will, and genuinely

seek an agreement which will bring an end to armaments and lead to peace on earth.

132. My delegation, as I said a moment ago, does not propose in this general debate to discuss the disarmament plans put forward by the big Powers. We are glad that both sides have shown a willingness to modify their plans to meet points advanced by the other side. That is one of the most hopeful features for the success of the impending talks. I shall illustrate this point by one important reference, namely, the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the French proposal to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. We are well aware of the inclusion of that proposal in the Soviet plan submitted at the Geneva Conference. This was a far-reaching proposal, but there was one difficulty. In accepting the proposal and including it in the first phase of the Soviet disarmament plan, the Soviet Union omitted to include in that phase the question of conventional armaments. This naturally led to objections from the Western Powers, which could not agree to a plan whose first phase contained provision for destroying the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the elimination of bases and yet retained the superiority in conventional armaments.

133. We were glad therefore to note that, in the statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union before this Assembly, in the course of the general debate [869th meeting], he agreed to take that point into account and to include conventional arms reduction also in the first phase in order to make the scheme a balanced and therefore more acceptable one.

134. I refer to this only by way of illustration, to indicate that both sides can show a willingness to meet each other as far as possible to find that accommodation that is necessary to reach agreement. I could point to several other instances if I had the time. I would only refer briefly to the statement of President Eisenhower from this same rostrum [868th meeting], when he, too, made certain changes in the plan submitted by the United States—even the last one, which was submitted just at the time the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament broke up. Even to that plan there were certain changes suggested by the President in the course of his statement here, as an accommodation necessary in order to reach agreement.

135. What the people of the world want is an agreement without any delay, as they realize that they are on the brink of a precipice. The voice of the people should be raised in angry protest against any further procrastination. This Assembly must see to it that the voice of the people of the world prevails in this matter. That is the clear duty we have before us at this session.

136. I referred at the outset to the apt description by the President of the General Assembly of this Assembly as the "Assembly of Humanity". Let our deliberations and our decisions make it such a session. If the Charter obliges us to do all we can "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", let us take whatever action we can in this direction in the field of complete and total disarmament. If the Charter obliges us "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights" and "in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small", let us fulfil that obligation by deciding to put an end to the last

vestiges of colonialism, wherever and in whatever form they still survive. If the Charter obliges us "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom", let us prove to the world that we are neither insensitive nor indifferent to the vastness of the social and economic problems that face mankind. If we make some impact, however small, in each of these three major areas of international obligation, then this Assembly, which opened under the most unprecedented and historic circumstances,

will surely deserve to be named by history also, as the President has named it, the "Assembly of Humanity".

137. It is the earnest hope and prayer of my delegation that, in the coming weeks and months, we shall dedicate ourselves to these tasks and to these ideas, fully aware that the life, happiness and welfare of our fellow human beings are really in our hands.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.