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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 8

Adoption of the agenda (continued)

FIRST REPORT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE (A/4520) (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will take up this afternoon the question of the allocation of the items which it has decided to include in the agenda, that is, the question to which Committee or to which forum the various items should be referred for consideration and report. I might perhaps remind the Assembly again that for the moment we are not dealing with the merits or substance of the various items concerned, and discussion of these items is therefore relevant only to the extent to which it bears on the question of the allocation of the items.

2. In its first report [A/4520], the General Committee recommended twenty-four items for consideration directly in plenary meetings. In addition to these, I would draw the attention of the Assembly to the three draft resolutions submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union [A/L.311, A/L.312 and A/L.313]. These three draft resolutions propose that three items which the General Committee recommended should be dealt with in the First Committee should be considered and dealt with in plenary. First I shall ask the Assembly to consider twenty-four items recommended for consideration in plenary. I will then ask the Assembly to consider separately the three draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union.

3. If there are no objections regarding the recommendation of the General Committee for the allocation of the twenty-four items, I shall take it that the Assembly approves their allocation to plenary meeting.

It was so decided.

4. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the General Assembly to turn its attention to the Soviet draft resolution [A/L.311], which proposes the allocation to the plenary Assembly of the item entitled "Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament". In connexion with this draft resolution I call first on the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

5. Mr. KHRUSHCHEV, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (translated from Russian): We are now determining the items which require consideration in plenary meetings of the General Assembly. There is no more significant question than that of disarmament. This is the view of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the socialist camp, the belief of all peoples who sincerely seek to ensure a stable peace on earth. We therefore consider it essential that the disarmament question should be discussed precisely in plenary meeting in order that this issue, which is a source of concern to all peoples, may occupy the most prominent place in the work of this Assembly.

6. The General Assembly, as the highest organ of the United Nations, was set up not only to deal with the various disputes which may arise at any time between States, but primarily to resolve the important problems involved in ensuring peace.

7. In the world of today, disarmament is the cardinal problem, and its solution is the key to the attainment of a stable peace. No issue, whatever its importance, is comparable with it, for what is at stake is whether or not there is to be another world war. War can be ruled out only if agreement on disarmament is reached among States and if disarmament is carried out under the strictest international control so that no State could secretly rearm itself and again threaten other States.

8. The Soviet delegation has already put forward this item as one which should be given urgent and priority consideration in plenary meeting. Today we appeal to all representatives to recognize the full gravity and urgency of this matter.

9. Of course, if we were to view the disarmament problem in the manner suggested by Mr. Lodge, who said that since the General Assembly had seventy-nine items on its agenda, it was impossible to deal with the disarmament problem, if we were to take this approach to the work of the United Nations and to adopt this interpretation of its main purpose, we would virtually be condemning the United Nations to failure. In such an event this Organization would be incapable of discharging the main task entrusted to it.

10. This chief responsibility of the United Nations is to ensure peace, and one of the main problems in the task of ensuring peace is the achievement of an agreement on disarmament and on the destruction of armaments under strict international control. This is something we must all clearly understand, for what is at issue is the fate of the world and the destinies of peoples.

11. The course of action which the General Committee now proposes has been tried for many years. For how many years have different commissions and committees been discussing the disarmament question, but

how much have they done to bring about a practical solution of the problem? Little, very little—one might say that they have done nothing. The Soviet Government therefore hopes that all States will at last recognize the responsibility which rests with them, will recognize the full importance of the disarmament problem and will debate it in plenary meetings.

12. If the disarmament question is to be pushed aside once more, as it has been until now, there is a danger that events will take the same course they did in the days of the League of Nations before the Second World War. Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, made this point very convincingly in his statement at the present session [882nd meeting]. There is a danger that the United Nations will get into the same rut in which the League of Nations cart dragged along where the disarmament issue was concerned. We must therefore make special efforts to extricate the Organization's wheels from this deep rut and set them on a path which will ensure agreement on disarmament.

13. I should like to impress upon my fellow representatives that a very complex situation is now developing. Some minor and time-consuming questions are being discussed, but each day more and more weapons are being piled up, each day there are new acts of provocation, which do not simplify but complicate the solution of the disarmament problem, which heighten tension, aggravate the "cold war" and intensify the arms race.

14. It is hard to convince people who thirst for peace and, consequently, for a solution to all issues which will ensure peace that the General Assembly has no time to discuss so vital a question as general and complete disarmament. Remember how much time was spent on discussing whether the Chiang Kai-shek puppet should be kept in the United Nations, although it is abundantly clear to all sensible people that the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China, whose Government represents the entire Chinese people, should long since have been restored. For how many years in succession has this question been discussed, how many days have been spent on it at each session of the General Assembly? Those chiefly responsible for the failure thus far to restore the legitimate rights of China in the United Nations are the United States of America and its allies in military blocs.

15. The representatives of the Western Powers do not have time to discuss the disarmament problem, but they do not grudge time on efforts to maintain international tension and prevent the normalization of relations between States. They are creating, through their actions, a situation which will make it impossible to reach agreement on disarmament in the future either. The United States Government continues to follow the Dulles policy of "brinkmanship", but we all know how easy it is to fall from a brink, in which case we may be faced with the outbreak of a world war that would bring untold suffering to mankind.

16. Take other items of the same kind which have also been discussed in the United Nations for a number of years without producing anything but a bad odour and a poisoning of the international atmosphere. I am thinking of the "question of Hungary" and the "question of Tibet", and other such questions hunted up by the past masters of provocation in the United States. They make every effort to focus the attention of the

United Nations on these items and thus to distract it from the really important and urgent world problems. It is clear to all, however, that items of this kind are not intended to reduce world tension but, on the contrary, contain the seeds of discord and hostility, and force international tension to a higher pitch. In this way, certain circles seek to prolong the "cold war". It is time everyone realized the gravity of the present situation.

17. The fact that most of the Heads of State and Government who came to the General Assembly have already returned home and others are preparing to do so shows that they obviously have no confidence in the current session of the General Assembly and do not expect it to come to close grips with such vital issues as that of general and complete disarmament.

18. But this state of affairs can be rectified, since modern means of transportation make it possible to return just as quickly as one flies away. I am convinced that if the disarmament question were to be put forward for serious discussion in plenary meetings of the Assembly and if special and exceptional importance were to be attached to it, those Heads of State and Government who have already left might well return to the Assembly, and, what is more, the Heads of State and Government who did not participate in the first part of this session's work might also take their places here.

19. The problem might also be resolved in another way. I have already discussed this in conversations with Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, with other statesmen, and also at a press conference with the United Nations Correspondents' Association. It may be advisable to consider the question of general and complete disarmament at a special session of the General Assembly.

20. At present, owing to the preparations for the presidential election in the United States, we are faced with a situation in which the United States Government does not apparently intend to assume any important new obligations. Without the constructive participation of the United States, however, it will be impossible to reach an agreement on disarmament in the General Assembly.

21. A special session of the General Assembly might be convened, for example, in March-April of next year, and the proposal might be made to all countries that their delegations to this session should be led by Heads of State or Heads of Government. Everything must be done to ensure that an agreement on disarmament is reached at the special session of the General Assembly and that each country makes its vital contribution to the common cause of achieving an agreement on disarmament and on the safeguarding of peace throughout the world. I believe that all people who aspire to peace and friendship among peoples would welcome a decision to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly.

22. I should also like to repeat that it would be desirable to convene this session in Europe, for example, at Geneva, since most of the countries represented in the United Nations gravitate geographically towards Europe. The session could be held in Moscow or Leningrad, and in that case we would do our utmost to create suitable conditions for the normal work of the General Assembly session and for all representatives who attend it.

23. Hence, the Soviet delegation would emphasize the need to discuss the question of general and complete disarmament in plenary meetings of the General Assembly with the participation of Heads of Government. If, for some reason, it proves impossible at this session to discuss the problem fully and reach an agreement, at least on the main principles, the Soviet Government considers that it will be necessary to convene a special session of the General Assembly with one item on its agenda: general and complete disarmament.

24. I appeal to representatives to take full cognizance of the great responsibility which rests with the United Nations for the solution of so important a problem as disarmament. The peoples of the entire world expect the United Nations at long last to pave the way for a solution of this urgent and crucial issue of general and complete disarmament.

25. Mr. GREEN (Canada): I do not need to remind this Assembly that disarmament is the most important question facing us. In that regard I agree with the statement to that effect made by Premier Khrushchev. Nor do I need to emphasize my country's serious concern for the earliest possible solution to this pressing problem.

26. Canada's nearest neighbours are the United States on the south and the Soviet Union to the north. In other words, we happen to live between the two nations which would be the main protagonists in a nuclear war. We are directly and vitally affected by any increase in world tension.

27. In these conditions, it will be easily understood by all delegations that Canada is anxious to see a thorough discussion of all the disarmament items on the agenda. Chairman Khrushchev said in his remarks that the representatives of the western Powers did not find time for the discussion of the disarmament problem. That, I suggest, is not an accurate statement of the situation today. I believe that every nation in the world is anxious to see the problem of disarmament discussed.

28. The immediate purpose of the General Assembly today, however, is not to enter upon a substantive discussion of disarmament, but to consider the procedural question raised in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation. We are dealing with the question of how discussions on disarmament are to be undertaken during the present session, not at an emergency session that may or may not be called next year. The question is that of how we are to deal with disarmament at this present session.

29. The Soviet Union is proposing that the General Assembly should decide to allocate to plenary meetings only the Soviet item on disarmament, the item which reads, "Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament". The effect of the proposal now made by the Soviet Union would be to change the allocation of this particular item which was recommended by the General Committee, after a thorough discussion and by a very decisive majority, for consideration in the First Committee. We believe that recommendation to be a correct one.

30. In the discussion in the General Committee, and earlier in the meetings of the Disarmament Commission which took place in mid-August, the Canadian

delegation drew attention to the basic truth—and I point out today that this is the basic truth—that if the deadlock in disarmament is to be ended, negotiations must be resumed or new negotiations must be undertaken. The key to the situation is negotiating, and I suggest that it is the main task of the General Assembly at its fifteenth session to bring about negotiations, not just speeches, but negotiations on the question of disarmament.

31. The practical way to bring about a resumption of negotiations is by considering all the various disarmament items in the First Committee. We all know that discussions in a Committee are more informal than debates in plenary session. We know that ideas can be more easily exchanged, that questions can be asked and that answers can be given spontaneously. The whole atmosphere in the Committee is more conducive to real agreement.

32. Moreover, a debate on disarmament in plenary session would merely be a repetition of the general debate, which has been underway for nearly three weeks. Practically every speaker in that general debate has dealt with the question of disarmament. What useful purpose would it serve to begin another general debate after we complete the one which has been going on for the last three weeks?

33. It is interesting to recall that one of the main arguments used in the General Committee in support of allocating this item to the plenary meetings was that Heads of State would be taking part and that it would be inappropriate for them to do so in the First Committee. Why they should not appear in the First Committee, I cannot say, but this was one of the arguments used. It was never a valid contention, and it certainly is meaningless now, with the last Heads of State departing. I venture to predict that by the end of this week there will be so few Heads of State in New York that one will be able to count them on the fingers of one hand. When the First Committee has dealt with disarmament and when the report of that First Committee goes back to the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, then the Heads of State can return here, if they so wish, and debate the submissions of the First Committee on that item on the question of disarmament.

34. It should also be remembered that the Soviet item is not the only item dealing with disarmament. Chairman Khrushchev today mentioned no other item at all on disarmament as being on the agenda, but his item is not the only one. Yet here an attempt is being made to single it out, and it alone, for discussion in plenary meeting, leaving the others to the First Committee. Each one of those other items on disarmament is of equal importance.

35. For example, the report from the United Nations Disarmament Commission [A/4463] is on the agenda, and it contains a resolution unanimously adopted by the Commission less than two months ago. It is not a case of a resolution adopted a year ago. This unanimous resolution of the Disarmament Commission was adopted less than two months ago and after a first-class discussion that lasted for three days. One paragraph in that resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission in August goes to the very heart of the problem now facing us in disarmament. The paragraph to which I refer reads as follows:

"The Disarmament Commission,

"...

"2. Considers it necessary and recommends that, in view of the urgency of the problem, continued efforts be made for the earliest possible continuation of international negotiations to achieve a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;"

That is the key to the problem we are facing today.

36. A third item connected with disarmament has been submitted by India, and this deals with the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. Certainly to all non-nuclear nations, including Canada, this item is of great importance. Our stand has been that there should be no more such tests.

37. A fourth disarmament item, coming from Ireland, calls for the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The aspect of the disarmament problem raised by that item has great urgency, for if an agreement on disarmament is not reached at an early date, it just may be too late to stop the spread of such weapons.

38. It is our view that all four disarmament items, including the Soviet item, should be dealt with in the First Committee and should be the first business of that Committee. There is no reason why these discussions on disarmament should not start later in this present week.

39. Whether the four items are brought together under a single heading and discussed as a unit, or whether they remain separate items, I presume that some latitude would be allowed in the discussion. I am sure that that will be the case because of the fact that the chairman of the First Committee is Sir Claude Corea, representative of Ceylon. For example, we presume that a representative discussing the report of the Disarmament Commission would not be ruled out of order if he were to express his Government's concern regarding nuclear tests. In any event, those four items are closely related and their separation, at least for purposes of discussion, would be highly artificial even though each item would probably give rise to a separate resolution, as has happened in other years. What would be the sense of discussing the Soviet item on disarmament in plenary session and discussing the other three items on disarmament in the First Committee?

40. Canada today is particularly interested in following up the resolution of the Disarmament Commission which urged the earliest possible continuation of international negotiations on disarmament. As a member of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, we know that considerable progress was made during the meetings of that Committee. This is a fact which has not been generally recognized. However, it is clearly evident from a comparison of the original disarmament plans submitted in March by the two sides with those brought forward in June. The revised plan of each side clearly reflected an effort to meet the views of the other and brought the two sides appreciably closer to agreement on many points. The progress made in that Ten-Nation Committee should not be thrown away.

41. This debate is no time for recriminations and I do not intend to stir up any trouble, but I do point out that I have never been able to understand why the Eastern side in that Ten-Nation Committee saw fit

to walk out of the negotiations just as the revised Western plan was about to be tabled. This, I submit, was a great mistake and a very unwise action.

42. In the course of the general debate here a number of suggestions have been made for improving the work of the Disarmament Committee; and, of course, the work of the Ten-Nation Committee was not perfect. Canada, for example, put forward the idea of providing a neutral Chairman from the United Nations and we believe that other nations could very well be invited to assist with disarmament studies. Surely the First Committee is the proper place to discuss all such suggestions; and I know that other nations have equally worthwhile suggestions to make. Every nation represented in the Assembly stands to gain by disarmament, and that is particularly true of the non-nuclear Powers. The very fact that the non-nuclear Powers cannot defend themselves against the nuclear Powers makes disarmament a matter of life and death for them. Their situation in the world today is intolerable. They have a special contribution to make in the discussion of this problem of disarmament. I suggest that contributions can now best be made in the deliberations of the First Committee as that Committee addresses itself to the immediate task of finding a way for the resumption of disarmament negotiations.

43. There are so many constructive, worthwhile things to do in the world today, so much development required in every nation of the world, so many peacetime problems to solve. There is plenty of work of that kind to keep all nations busy, both large and small, without spending so much energy and wasting such vast resources on preparations for a nuclear war. The key to unlock the door to this happier age is disarmament, and for disarmament, negotiating is essential. I suggest that today there is no other road to the relaxation of world tension.

44. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): The United States supports the allocation of the Soviet item on disarmament to the First Committee and opposes its allocation to plenary session. We do so because we think that disarmament is a complex subject requiring serious consideration, and not a subject to be exploited for propaganda purposes.

45. Last year the General Assembly adopted unanimously a resolution on disarmament [1378 (XIV)], expressing its hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. This resolution was originally negotiated between the delegations of the United States and the USSR, and the United States promptly declared proposals to seek to implement it.

46. The discussions on ways to bring about balanced and controlled disarmament measures were started in February in the meeting of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. These continued until 27 June, when the USSR and its side walked out of the negotiations. And they walked out immediately after being informed by the United States representative that new Western proposals were about to be presented—in other words, when they had to face concrete proposals. There is no other way to describe it.

47. This was not a particularly new tactic. This was not the first, but the second time in the course of two negotiations that the USSR walked out of disarmament

talks in order to avoid discussing Western disarmament proposals. In 1957, in London, Mr. Zorin, the same representative who walked out in 1960, in Geneva, also walked out of the United Nations Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission within hours after new Western proposals were submitted. This year he did not even wait to see them.

48. A few moments ago Chairman Khrushchev said:

"At present, owing to the preparations for the presidential election in the United States, we are faced with a situation in which the United States Government does not apparently intend to assume any important new obligations. Without the constructive participation of the United States, however, it will be impossible to reach an agreement on disarmament in the General Assembly."

49. The United States has been ready ever since 27 June when the meetings of the Ten-Nation Committee at Geneva were broken off, to resume those negotiations. It was not the United States that walked out. We are prepared to go back to the negotiating table today, elections or no elections.

50. Now, this same United States proposal to participate honestly in disarmament discussions was carried into the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, a Commission in which all United Nations Members have a chance to state their views. That happened this summer—when the USSR threatened in a written communication to refuse to attend a session called to consider the serious situation created by the breakdown of the ten-nation Geneva talks. But now Chairman Khrushchev tells us that he wants substantive discussion of disarmament postponed perhaps to a special session of the General Assembly which would be called to deal with the subject in the spring. Apparently the plenary discussion which he is urging today would lead only to that.

51. There is only one conclusion to be drawn from these developments. When there is an opportunity to make big speeches and propose grandiose schemes for disarmament, the USSR is for it; when there is a necessity to face the realistic negotiation of disarmament agreements, in detail and with the systems of impartial inspection which such agreements would entail, the USSR walks away from it. We hope we are wrong, but our experience has not been encouraging.

52. The problem before us is in no way a problem of an appropriate forum. There is no magic in a plenary discussion. There is no magic in a special session of the General Assembly. There is only the question of the will and the desire of the parties to negotiate honestly and equitably in the interests of the lives of us all. That will and that desire will be truly tested, not in speeches from this rostrum, but in real negotiations. For our part, we are, as I have said, ready to negotiate now. We support the full-membership Disarmament Commission—a Commission established, incidentally, at Soviet initiative—as the forum for the expression of the views of all United Nations Members and for the full consideration of this subject. We asked that it should meet this summer. We are prepared for it to meet again. We are also ready to return to the Ten-Nation Committee in spite of the walk-out and to resume serious negotiations there. We are ready: let the USSR respond.

53. But here and now we are about to decide on how the General Assembly, at its fifteenth session, will

undertake its work on disarmament; we are not at this point in our debate deciding what should be done next. The United States has always recognized and shared the deep and proper concern of all United Nations Members in this important subject. Each year we have supported a comprehensive discussion of this issue in the General Assembly. It was in fact here that, fifteen years ago, the United States—then the sole possessor of atomic power—offered to turn that power over to international control, only to have that offer rejected by the USSR, with such tragic consequences. Accordingly, and in the same spirit, we look forward again this year to a full discussion of disarmament, not just to a succession of speeches.

54. We urge that the Soviet item be allocated to the First Committee, the major political Committee of the General Assembly, where it may be given, along with other disarmament items, serious and detailed consideration. Only a workmanlike approach will offer hope for real progress.

55. We are ready to discuss disarmament now, and there is no reason to avoid this subject, as the USSR seems to wish to do. We do not believe that the Soviet request to have this item assigned to discussion in plenary meetings is made in the interests of disarmament. We believe it is made in the interests of turning what should be a serious discussion into a table-thumping propaganda spectacle.

56. We shall vote against the Soviet proposal, and we hope that the Assembly will do likewise and that we can subsequently proceed promptly and soberly to discuss this serious problem in the First Committee, where it belongs.

57. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) (translated from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation fully supports the proposal that the disarmament question should be considered directly in plenary meetings of the General Assembly and notably with the participation of the leading statesmen of a number of States Members of the United Nations. This measure is necessary owing to the serious situation that has arisen this year in connexion with the disarmament discussions and to the urgent demand that this situation should be remedied by decisive measures taken with the full weight of authority.

58. The important question of disarmament must not be approached in a routine manner, nor should it be referred to a Committee for consideration, as has been suggested by the representatives of the United States and Canada who spoke before me. This question is the most important item on the agenda of the fifteenth session.

59. At its last session, the General Assembly took an important step in unanimously adopting a resolution [1378 (XIV)] which termed the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control the most important problem facing the contemporary world and which called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve its constructive solution.

60. World public opinion trusts that the unanimity displayed in the adoption of the resolution on general and complete disarmament will mark a turning-point in the hitherto unsuccessful discussions on disarmament. Unfortunately, that has not yet happened.

61. We take the position that the highest forum, the General Assembly in plenary session, should examine

the situation that developed in the course of the work of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The representatives of the United States and Canada made reference in their statements to the situation in the Ten-Nation Committee at Geneva. As we know, two completely opposed approaches to the solution of the disarmament problem emerged during the Committee's discussion of this question. The delegations of the socialist States, on the one hand, being guided throughout by the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its fourteenth session, did everything in their power to achieve, without undue delay, real progress towards a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Western Powers, on the other hand, frustrated any fruitful consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament and, in defiance of the spirit and the letter of the resolution, endeavoured to limit the discussion to control without disarmament. The proposals they put forward dealt essentially with matters of control, and their adoption would have resulted in the institution of control over armaments and the legalization of espionage on a world-wide scale. The delegations of the socialist countries would not take part in deluding the world community and after all possibilities had been exhausted they discontinued their participation in the Committee's fruitless discussions.

62. In the light of these developments, it rests with the General Assembly, the supreme organ of the United Nations, to undertake a responsible examination of the situation. The General Assembly's responsibility in the matter is particularly great, for the Western Powers are clearly retreating from the very idea of general and complete disarmament. How else can one account for the fact that neither the President of the United States nor the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom found it necessary to refer in their statements in this forum to the important resolution on general and complete disarmament?

63. The Czechoslovak delegation is convinced that a suitable basis on which the General Assembly should rely in its consideration of the disarmament question is offered in the proposal, "Basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament" [A/4505], which was submitted here on 23 September 1960 by Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and in which the USSR Government makes a further effort to meet certain points raised by the Western Powers.

64. Hence the allocation of the disarmament question directly to the plenary meetings of the General Assembly could lead to a solution of the main aspects of the disarmament problem and to the formulation of the necessary bold and far-reaching specific directives for future discussions, including an agreement on the composition of a new body to examine the disarmament question. From a practical point of view, this would gain time, for it would prevent a double consideration of the matter, once in the First Committee and again in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly.

65. The view of those delegations which spoke in the General Committee against the question being discussed in plenary can be accounted for solely by the fact that their countries little understand the need to create the most suitable conditions for the consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament, and are not interested in seeing any progress made in the matter.

ment, and are not interested in seeing any progress made in the matter.

66. On the one hand, they reject the sound proposal that disarmament, as a problem of extraordinary importance, should be discussed in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly; on the other, however, these same delegations have seen to it that the plenary should waste time on the consideration of such non-existent problems as the "question of Hungary" or the "question of Tibet".

67. Provocative proposals of this kind have been foisted on the General Assembly by the United States and its supporters in order to divert the Assembly from its real business and, instead, stir up the cold war and heighten tensions in the relations between States. Use of the General Assembly plenary meetings as a platform for spreading slander and launching attacks upon the socialist States does great harm to the authority and prestige of the General Assembly, and of the United Nations as a whole.

68. We hope that the delegations present here will display as of now—from the very outset of our work—sufficient good will and understanding to enable the General Assembly at this session to make an important contribution towards a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament which so profoundly affects the vital interests of all mankind. The USSR proposal is a first step in this direction. Consequently, the Czechoslovak delegation fully supports this proposal.

69. The Czechoslovak delegation also supports the proposal just made by Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, regarding the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly in March or April of next year. If for any reason it should prove impossible to discuss the disarmament problem fully and achieve an agreement at this session, the convening of a special session would, in our view, be essential.

70. Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria whole-heartedly supports the proposal of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that, in view of the non-fulfilment of last year's resolution, the question of general and complete disarmament should be examined in plenary meeting at this session of the General Assembly.

71. The agenda of the fifteenth session contains no more important item than that of general and complete disarmament, which represents the best and fullest safeguard against a third world war. All speakers in the Assembly have recognized that, in the present state of armaments, war would be a disaster for all mankind and would result in the annihilation of entire nations and peoples. The prevention of a third world war is, indeed, the cardinal task of the United Nations. It was for that purpose that the Organization was founded and it is for that purpose that it exists today. That is why there is, in fact, no more urgent item on the agenda than that of disarmament. It is natural that the most important items on the agenda should be examined in plenary meeting. By this means the Assembly not only underscores the significance of an issue, and its own attitude towards it, but enables the most authoritative representatives of Member States to take part in the debates and in the adoption of decisions; it also ensures that the deliberations on the issue will enjoy the widest possible publicity.

72. The arguments we have heard against allocating the disarmament question to plenary meetings do not stand up to criticism. Some have claimed that the General Assembly does not have sufficient time to give serious consideration to an item of this nature. It should be pointed out that this argument, if it can be called an argument at all, is usually put forward by those who, with a zeal worthy of a better cause, defend the wasting of time on plenary discussion of such fictitious issues as the so-called questions of Tibet and Hungary. It has also been said that consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in plenary meeting would be contrary to the established practice. We know, however, that eleven years ago the General Assembly itself decided [resolution 362 (IV)] that the most important items on the agenda should, as a rule, be discussed in plenary meeting, precisely in view of their importance and the need to give them wide publicity. Another fallacious argument put forward is that discussion in plenary meeting would open the way to propaganda and that, since propaganda has no place in matters of general and complete disarmament, we should pass as quickly as possible from words to deeds. No one could possibly dispute that it is indeed high time to turn from words to deeds. But the form we want the deeds to take is general and complete disarmament, and everything points to the fact that, although a resolution was adopted on the question last year, it is still necessary to make it clear that this resolution is quite unambiguous and requires no interpretation whatsoever. It is strange and, to my mind, discreditable to hear statements against propaganda for general and complete disarmament from statesmen who venture from this rostrum to put forward the notion that the West German militarists and revanchists have now become gentle lambs. Recently, some representatives of Western States have tried, in discussing disarmament, to depict propaganda as something harmful and bad. There is harmful propaganda; it includes the propaganda in favour of Hitler's successors we have just mentioned, and the propaganda against the People's Republic of China carried on here by those who occupy Chinese territory. As to propaganda for disarmament, for a world without armaments, for lasting world peace and co-operation among all peoples, irrespective of the colour of their skin, irrespective of their beliefs or their social system—this is useful propaganda, and it can, like all sound ideas, become a material force capable of presenting a serious obstacle to those with a predilection for military adventures. Genuine advocates of peace need have no fear of such propaganda. In the present instance, indeed, the General Assembly has not only a duty but an effective opportunity to bring about practical progress in disarmament and to end the current deadlock in the matter.

73. Of course, the General Assembly will not go into the details of the implementation of general and complete disarmament. But it can and must pronounce on the main lines of a future treaty on general and complete disarmament. It must give directives to any future working organ which might be called upon to draft such a treaty. We cannot but agree with what the Prime Minister of Cuba said [872nd meeting] quite rightly when he pointed out in the Assembly that the Government of the Soviet Union has proposed a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and that no other Government and no other delegation in the

United Nations has so far proposed a better one. The basic provisions of the Soviet draft treaty should be debated in plenary meetings of the General Assembly so that a start could then be made on working out the details of the treaty itself. But this is the very thing the Western States, headed by the United States of America, do not want. Those who do not want disarmament do not want to discuss it seriously either.

74. Consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament in plenary meeting is particularly essential in view of the need to analyse here the reasons why last year's resolution on general and complete disarmament has hung fire. We cannot agree that the only action we can take on questions of disarmament and peace at sessions of the General Assembly is to express pious hopes. At this session it has become clearer than ever that not all Governments will accept general and complete disarmament of their own free will. Evidently, some of them will be forced to agree to it by reason of the moral and material superiority of the peace-loving forces in the world. How can we pretend, for example, not to be aware of the vast difference between the stand on general and complete disarmament taken by the USSR and the other socialist countries, on the one hand, and that taken by the United States of America and its principal allies, on the other? How can we shut our eyes to the fact that one side proposes disarmament under effective control, while the other, maintaining complete silence on last year's resolution, insists on the so-called inspection of armaments? Even a primary schoolchild could tell you that such inspection could continue for one year, two years, ten years, twenty years, or more, and that during this period the armaments being inspected could quietly be piling up and increasing. Is it not easy to see through the Western leaders' "agreement" to disarm in the field of space vehicles, that is, to give up something in which they lag hopelessly behind? Is this what last year's General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament had in mind?

75. Those really responsible for the present failure of the disarmament negotiations—the United States of America and its allies—are now trying to sell throughout the world, and at the current session of the General Assembly, some disarmament "plan" of theirs, which the socialist countries have allegedly declined to examine. We need only look, however, at what is envisaged, for instance, for the first stage of the "plan" these gentlemen have devised, to see that it not only does not aim at general and complete disarmament but actually makes no provision for disarmament at all. Most important of all, it does not fix a time for the beginning of disarmament; nothing can have an end that does not have a beginning. Neither does the "plan" of the Western States fix a time-limit for the completion of the first stage, after which the next stage can be started and the end—general and complete disarmament—can finally be reached. The most prominent leaders of the West have confirmed this fact in their statements during this session of the Assembly. Mankind needs disarmament, however, not in 500 years' time, not in fifty years' time, but now, within a clear-cut and short period of time, so that the outbreak of a third world conflict can be averted.

76. We hold that diplomatic manoeuvring cannot be tolerated in the matter of achieving general and complete disarmament. We must point out that those who

confine themselves here to talk of arms inspection without genuine disarmament are precisely those who oppose the restoration of the rights of People's China in the United Nations, though it is well known that in the last analysis the disarmament problem cannot be solved without that country; that it is these same gentlemen who oppose the final abolition of colonialism on the false ground that colonialism has already died a natural death, and that it is these same statesmen who think that the United States Government is entitled to carry on a policy of provocation and open aggression against the socialist countries and, after thousands of years of international relations, to establish its own new brand of "international law". We cannot but draw attention to the fact that it is these same representatives who also oppose discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament in plenary meeting.

77. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria could not agree to the meetings of the Ten-Nation Committee at Geneva being devoted to interminable and aimless discussion over and around disarmament, thereby deceiving the peoples of the world and giving them the false impression that something is being done to promote disarmament, whereas in fact arms are now continuing to pile up and accumulate, while the possibility of an armed conflagration, and even of one set off "by accident", is increasing. For these same reasons, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria cannot agree that, at the fifteenth session of the United Nations, the question of general and complete disarmament should be downgraded and be submerged in talk, thus involving further deception of the peoples.

78. The Bulgarian delegation consequently presses for the adoption of the USSR draft resolution calling for the allocation of the disarmament question to plenary meetings of the General Assembly, and will vote for it.

79. In conclusion, we wish once again to state from this high rostrum that the peoples of the whole world rejoice to find in the mighty Soviet Union and in the tireless fighter for peace, Mr. Khrushchev, a solid bulwark in their struggle for peace. The latest evidence of this fact is provided by the Soviet Union's statement calling for the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly to discuss disarmament questions, should no headway be made in the matter at the current session. Everything must be done—and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, together with other socialist States and all who oppose war, is prepared to do everything—to achieve lasting peace on earth.

80. Mr. SHTYLLA (Albania) (translated from French): The delegation of the People's Republic of Albania supports the proposal made by the USSR delegation that the question of disarmament and the fulfilment of the General Assembly's resolution of 20 November 1959 [1378 (XIV)] should be examined directly in plenary session by the General Assembly.

81. We consider that proposal to be entirely justified. A number of representatives who spoke early in the general debate rightly pointed out that disarmament is the most important and urgent problem before the present session of the General Assembly. The future of peace and that of our Organization itself depend largely on its solution. Many Member States have sent the Heads of their Governments to this session

and they have done so chiefly because of the great importance they attach to the problem of disarmament.

82. The peoples of the world are looking to the United Nations. They are awaiting its decisions, especially on the subject of disarmament. The peoples are tired of interminable and sterile discussions in various committees and commissions, since they have not only led to no result but have been used by the United States of America and its partners in NATO to accelerate the arms race under cover of hypocritical declarations in favour of peace and disarmament.

83. We believe that the problem of disarmament is fundamentally a political problem to which a political solution must be found, and as soon as possible if we want to halt the arms race, maintain and strengthen international co-operation and save and consolidate peace. The General Assembly is the most appropriate and the best qualified organ of the United Nations to adopt real and effective disarmament measures.

84. To allocate the problem of disarmament to the First Committee, as recommended by the General Committee, would be tantamount to placing it on the same level as the ordinary problems included in our agenda, to hide it in a maze, to prevent the public from following the deliberations and to delay the adoption of positive steps. The problem has been under examination by the First Committee for many years during which the General Assembly has been called upon only to confirm the Committee's conclusions. Why should the question not be examined by the Assembly itself? Why, in the eyes of the delegations of the United States of America and its allies, are non-existent questions, mere provocative manoeuvres, like the "question" of Tibet or Hungary, important and worthy of being discussed by the General Assembly while the same delegations oppose the examination by the General Assembly of the most important problem of our day: the problem of disarmament? The attitude taken by the Western Powers reveals not only their purpose, which is to foster the spirit of the "cold war" in the Assembly, but also their lack of enthusiasm for a serious examination of the problem of disarmament and the conclusion of an agreement on the subject. An additional proof is furnished by their negative and unreasonable attitude towards the problem of the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

85. In that connexion I would emphasize once again that the problem of disarmament cannot be solved without the participation of the People's Republic of China. Those Governments which oppose the presence of the People's Government of China in the United Nations are in fact opposing agreement on disarmament and are thus assuming a heavy responsibility towards the peoples. If the General Assembly wishes to make it possible to achieve a real decision concerning disarmament and to enable the United Nations effectively to carry out its task of guaranteeing international peace and security, it must take steps to give the People's Republic of China its rightful place in the United Nations and expel the puppet Government of Chiang Kai-shek from the Organization.

86. In our view it is for the General Assembly itself and not the Committee to consider the implementation of the resolution of 20 November 1959 and the fact that, in the course of the year, because of the negative attitude and aggressive actions of the United States,

the disarmament negotiations have failed to make any progress and that indeed the international situation has deteriorated and the arms race has been intensified.

87. The proposals for general and complete disarmament made last year by the Soviet Union have been warmly supported by all the peoples, but they have not been put into effect. The Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, set up in accordance with the resolution of 20 November 1959, has not done what it was intended to do. The representatives of the Western Powers have neglected no means of preventing the Committee from achieving any results. They have refused to give serious consideration to the Soviet proposals. They have used the Committee to hoodwink public opinion and have transformed it into a weapon of the "cold war" and the armaments race. The representatives of the Socialist countries refused to take any part in these deceptive manoeuvres, which were sabotaging the problem of disarmament and peace, and withdrew from the Committee.

88. The Soviet Government has rightly requested that the General Assembly at its fifteenth session should consider the question of disarmament in connexion with the fulfilment of the resolution of 20 November 1959, so that the Assembly itself may recommend effective measures for the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

89. During the present session the Soviet delegation has submitted fresh proposals which are not only important but clear and precise. These proposals are submitted in the form of basic provisions for a treaty on general and complete disarmament [A/4505]. They are a further development of the proposals of 18 September 1959 [A/4219] and 2 June 1960 [A/4374/Rev.1]. Their essence and their purpose are the same: to abolish every kind of armaments, armed forces and the various military establishments within a short time, by stages agreed upon by the countries concerned and under rigorous international supervision. The new Soviet proposals take into account a large number of proposals put forward by the Western Powers themselves. They provide for a precise and detailed system of international supervision under the aegis of the United Nations and with the participation of all Member States. Each stage would consist of definite steps to be taken simultaneously by all States, under appropriate international control. When general and complete disarmament has been effected, international control will also be general and complete in all countries.

90. The delegation of the People's Republic of Albania, like a large number of other delegations, has stated its full support for these proposals, which in its view are very important and provide a solid basis for agreement.

91. In our opinion no further shilly-shallying or evasion can be tolerated in connexion with the problem of disarmament. Member States must make their positions clear and show by their deeds that they desire to make progress towards a disarmament agreement. The peoples cannot agree to the aggressive policy of the cold war, the policy of "brinkmanship" and the arms race.

92. During the Second World War fifty-seven million died, twenty-nine million were wounded and twelve million children were orphaned. The peoples are well

aware that with the use of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction a further war would be even more terrible. It is for that reason that they protest against the policy of war and demand that the United Nations should take effective steps to stay the hand of the aggressors and to guarantee peace. They regard disarmament as a powerful instrument of peace.

93. We consider that the serious situation which has now been created and the bitter experience we have had of previous discussions in committees and commissions oblige us to abandon the usual practice and to adopt new and effective methods. We believe that the time has come for the General Assembly to take the problem in hand, to consider it carefully and to lay down clear instructions and a programme of work for the committee to be set up to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

94. For those reasons we oppose the recommendation of the General Committee and will vote in favour of the Soviet draft resolution under which the question of disarmament would be examined by the General Assembly direct without reference to the First Committee.

Mr. Tchobanov (Bulgaria), Vice-President, took the Chair.

95. Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): At the beginning of his statement this afternoon, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union said that disarmament is the question of questions. I am sure that nobody here denies the importance of the disarmament question—certainly not the United Kingdom. But it does not necessarily follow that the best procedure for making progress in the field of disarmament is to have a discussion in plenary meeting at Heads-of-Government level. It is the United Kingdom's belief that the Assembly can make a useful contribution to progress in the disarmament field. What we are considering here this afternoon is not the question of substance—the advantages or disadvantages of certain disarmament plans—but whether disarmament should be discussed in plenary or whether it should be discussed in Committee in accordance with the well established procedures of the Assembly.

96. Let me deal with some of the arguments which have been put forward in support of a change in our procedure.

97. First of all, it was argued that plenary meetings are required to enable Heads of Government and Heads of State to take part in the debates. This, of course, is totally inconsistent with the statements made by the representatives of Bulgaria and Romania in the General Committee [130th meeting], where they said that there was no difficulty about distinguished representatives of any country taking part in the discussions in the First Committee. It is also a fact, referred to by previous speakers this afternoon, that, whatever the situation was earlier in this session, most of the distinguished visitors have now left New York, and even Chairman Khrushchev, in his television appearance on Sunday night, indicated that his stay here was not what one might term an open-ended one. In fact, he made it very clear that he was leaving us on Thursday. I therefore submit that the first argument is not a valid one.

98. The second argument that has been put forward is that to allocate the subject at this time to the First Committee is to downgrade its importance, and the

term, the "relegating" of the subject of disarmament to the Committee, has been frequently used. This, to me, is quite a new conception: that important subjects are not taken up in the First Committee. I believe that this is a conception alien to the Assembly. It is not supported by any precedent, and the United Kingdom, for one, entirely rejects it. We do not accept that disarmament was an unimportant subject last year, when it was discussed in the First Committee. We believe it was an important subject last year; we believe it is a very important subject this year also. Indeed, last year's discussion in the First Committee gave rise to a useful debate and a unanimous resolution. The only unfortunate feature was that, building on the basis of last year's resolution, we were not able to make greater progress in the Ten-Nation Committee, owing to the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies walked out of the negotiations as soon as they heard that the Western side was going to introduce counter-proposals. And I am bound to say that I thought that the passage in Chairman Khrushchev's speech earlier on in our session [869th meeting], when he tried to make out that the Soviet Union's devotion to disarmament was clearly displayed by its refusal to continue negotiations, was an extremely unconvincing argument. I therefore maintain that the allocation of this very important subject to the First Committee in no way indicates that it is being downgraded.

99. Finally, there appears to be a suggestion that the allocation to the First Committee is tantamount to saying that the subject will not be discussed in plenary. Of course, anybody who knows about the procedure of the Organization knows that that is totally inaccurate. It will come to plenary, but after discussion in Committee, in accordance with the orderly and long established procedures of this Assembly.

100. For all these reasons, we are convinced that this important and complicated subject should be fully discussed in the First Committee, and the results of the deliberations there will come before a plenary meeting of this Assembly. It is certainly our hope that the worldwide publicity which is given to these discussions will provide the impetus to new disarmament negotiations, and it is certainly the United Kingdom's hope that we can start our discussions in the First Committee at the earliest possible moment.

101. Mr. QUAISON-SACKY (Ghana): I have been constrained to come to this rostrum to speak on behalf of millions of people everywhere who are hoping against hope that the General Assembly will pave the way to the immediate resumption of talks on general and complete disarmament. But what are we witnessing today? The very forum where the question of disarmament should be discussed has already assumed a cold-war atmosphere. Already we are losing sight of our main objective—immediate disarmament. Why this farcical demonstration on the part of those who should be well aware that the fate of mankind hangs precariously on this great question?

102. To my delegation, it does not really matter where this important question is discussed. What is important is that there should be a willingness on the part of all of us, and especially on the part of those who will be charged with the actual detailed negotiation that should take place. If the matter should be discussed in plenary, then my delegation would support a resolution, for example, by which this Assembly would request an immediate resumption of talks by

the Ten-Power Committee, which may be enlarged to include five more States, representing the uncommitted nations of the Organization. We would also support a similar resolution if it were adopted by the First Committee. In other words, the result of our discussion on disarmament is the most important factor, and not the forum in which it is discussed.

103. But then the debate on the allocation of the item of disarmament has become bedeviled by external considerations. In the circumstances, my delegation will abstain when the draft resolution is put to the vote, but by making our position clear, I still cherish the hope that it will be possible for representatives from either side to go out of this forum and agree on the forum where the question of disarmament should be discussed.

104. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union proposes that disarmament should be discussed by the General Assembly in plenary meeting.

105. Why, in fact, is that necessary? In our view, the reasons for the proposal are completely and absolutely clear. In the first place, consideration must be given to the importance of the disarmament problem, whose significance transcends that of any others. In view of the importance and complexity of the problem, it is essential that it should be discussed by the most authoritative body of representatives of States Members of the United Nations. That is precisely what a plenary meeting of the General Assembly is.

106. It may now be regarded as an incontrovertible fact that the initiative taken by the Soviet Government in suggesting that the delegations to the General Assembly at its fifteenth session should be headed by the most responsible statesmen has had a favourable effect on the whole course of the work of this session. Very promising conditions have also been created for seeking sound and constructive solutions to a problem of such major importance as general and complete disarmament. We should remember that it was precisely the importance of the disarmament problem which prompted the proposal that the present session of the General Assembly should be held at so high a level. Consequently, we should take advantage of the exceptional opportunity offered by the fact that the responsible statesmen of the strongest nuclear Powers could participate in the general discussion of disarmament.

107. These important and fundamental considerations escape those who oppose the discussion of disarmament in plenary meeting. Even though the arguments they give in support of their objections are ostensibly procedural, it is quite obvious that these arguments are a matter not of form but of substance, in other words, that they stem from the stubborn unwillingness of the Western Powers to end the arms race once and for all under conditions of complete and general disarmament.

108. In the General Committee [130th meeting] the Canadian representative took the line that what matters most at the present stage is to determine whether negotiations on disarmament will take place and, if so, when. The Canadian representative has upheld that point of view in his statement today.

109. It is, however, clear to everyone that the deadlock on the question of translating the idea of disarmament into reality is due to the existence of diametrically opposite standpoints and attitudes on the whole approach to a solution of this problem. The difficulty is that one side is advocating general disarmament to be carried out under the most effective international control, while the other is calling for control without disarmament or even "control over armaments". I would remind the Assembly that Mr. Eaton, the United States representative at the Geneva talks, said outright that the words "general and complete disarmament" are totally empty and devoid of all meaning.

110. Thus, the representative of one of the great Powers, the United States, some six months after the last session of the General Assembly at which that country voted in favour of a resolution calling for general and complete disarmament, actually asserts that general and complete disarmament is nothing but an empty and meaningless catch phrase. Incredible though it is, such an assertion has in fact been made. If this is what the United States and its partners think, it may well be asked what they really mean when they say that the main thing now is to resume discussions in the Ten-Nation Committee. What would the subject of such talks be and on what basis would it be discussed? What are the Western Powers aiming at: genuine negotiations on a concrete basis or empty talk devoid of concrete substance?

111. Before sitting down at the conference table, it is necessary to make it quite clear whether the negotiations will be concerned with the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, or with control which is not intended to lead to genuine disarmament. We, for our part, are convinced that endless argument about such matters as control and technical research represents an unsound course, the effect of which is to postpone the solution of the disarmament problem indefinitely or, to be more precise, until every country faces the imminent danger of war with all its horrors and suffering, and war can no longer be prevented by negotiation.

112. Mr. Khrushchev, the Head of Government of the USSR, has emphasized that before we sit down at a table and start negotiating, we must reach firm agreement on the need to solve the disarmament problem, and on the need to induce the world's statesmen to accept general and complete disarmament without reservation.

113. The Ukrainian delegation believes that a decision on how the solution of the disarmament problem should be approached and on the direction future talks should take can be reached most satisfactorily and successfully in plenary meetings and that this will in no way impair the First Committee's prerogatives. That procedure would, first, re-emphasize the prime importance which the United Nations attaches to disarmament and, secondly, make the best use of the opportunity to reach agreement in the highest and most authoritative forum in the United Nations, namely, the General Assembly in plenary meeting, on our general course of action. It would, furthermore, be in line with the view expressed by the Disarmament Commission, which, in the resolution it adopted in August 1960, reaffirmed "the continuing and ultimate responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament" [see A/4463].

114. The need to discuss disarmament in the highest organ of the United Nations arises from the fact that the year which has elapsed since the General Assembly adopted its resolution of 20 November 1959 has been wasted so far as disarmament is concerned. In the meantime, recent events and, particularly, the acts of aggression by the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union, have confirmed that peaceful coexistence cannot be sufficiently stable, or peace be deemed fully secure, so long as the arms race continues and until we have made a start on translating the idea of general and complete disarmament into reality.

115. In supporting the proposal that disarmament should be dealt with in plenary meeting, we base ourselves on the fact that a very complex international situation is now developing, a situation which makes it incumbent upon the United Nations to give priority to the consideration of questions of paramount importance that are decisive for the fate of the world.

116. The arguments of those opposed to discussing disarmament in plenary meeting are often of a very questionable character. Indeed, the United States representative, who has put forward various arguments against a highest-level discussion of a vital problem disturbing all mankind, has shown excessive disrespect for the General Assembly's authority in stating that a disarmament debate in plenary meeting might be regarded as a propaganda spectacle. We take a different view of the role and the prestige of the General Assembly, which is intended to be the highest international forum.

117. And yet it is precisely in plenary meeting that we are being asked to consider items such as the so-called question of Tibet and the so-called question of Hungary, although every sane individual must realize that those issues are dead and are being raised for the provocative purpose of interference in the domestic affairs of other States.

118. How can this attitude be explained to the peoples? Are we not inevitably led to the conclusion that certain parties intend to utilize the United Nations for all kinds of purposes except the constructive settlement of the most pressing and urgent world problems?

119. In view of these considerations, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR states that it fully supports and will vote in favour of the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/L.311] which recommends that disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 should be allocated to plenary meeting. If, notwithstanding all the arguments put forward and the very heavy responsibility borne by the States represented in the United Nations, the General Assembly decides not to allocate disarmament to plenary meeting, it will probably prove necessary to convene a special session of the General Assembly.

120. Mr. SIK (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation is of the opinion that the question of general and complete disarmament should be discussed in plenary session. There is not the slightest doubt that this is the most important problem of mankind in our day. Hundreds of millions cast their eyes with great expectation in the direction of New York and this building in it wondering whether or not the representatives of nearly one hundred nations gathered here will at

last take a decisive step towards the solution of this urgent problem of humanity. The man in the street will neither understand nor forgive us if we cannot achieve at least some positive results in this matter.

121. The leaders of dozens of States came here, first and foremost, for that purpose. They did not come to discuss technical details in a committee. They came with the fervent wish to achieve agreement on principles. The decision which the world expects from us is one on which the future of mankind, the fate of our civilization, depends.

122. This is really a historic session of our Organization. Its historic significance lies in the fact that it has the task and the opportunity to solve the greatest question in world history—whether humanity, after thousands of years of work on creating a wonderful civilization, will survive in peace and happiness and march forward to ever greater perfection, or will end its earthly existence as a madman committing suicide.

123. The discussion of this question demands the biggest possible publicity, because the thousands of millions of the human race want to know, and are entitled to know, the position of each of our delegations on this important issue in every detail. This can be achieved only by discussing it in plenary session. It is well known that the deliberations in a committee used to be published only to a very slight extent. It is difficult to understand how and why anybody can be against the proposal to discuss the question of complete disarmament in plenary session. There can be only one explanation. Those who oppose it are doing so because they have something to hide, because they do not sincerely want to disarm and do not want the masses to know this. They do not want the masses to find out the truth that the large majority of nations and Governments not only desire but most fervently demand general and complete disarmament, and that there are only a few Governments—as a matter of fact, only the leading Powers of the NATO bloc—which are against it.

124. That is why they first stood for discussion of this question by only the narrow circle of the big Powers, and later, under the pressure of public opinion and only with great reluctance, agreed to set up a committee of ten. Now, after the Disarmament Commission, in August of this year, unanimously requested that the Assembly discuss this question, those Powers are trying to evade a really public Assembly discussion by allocating the item to a committee.

125. We have heard many eloquent speeches in the general debate during the last three weeks. All the speakers without exception declared in their speeches that they considered the question of general and complete disarmament to be the most important and urgent question of our day. Does it not follow logically from that that this question should receive priority over all other questions and be discussed first and in full by this same plenary session? What shall we discuss here if not disarmament? The General Committee recommends for deliberation in plenary session, besides the different routine matters, three questions. One of them, the question of the Congo, is really an important question which must be discussed here, although even it cannot be compared with the question of disarmament from the point of view of its general significance. And what else? Oh, yes, the question of Tibet and the question of Hungary. Irrespective of what one's opinion may be with regard to the essence

of those two so-called questions, is it not absurd and is it not a mockery to maintain that they are of such overriding importance for the world that they require discussion in plenary session, while the question of general and complete disarmament does not?

126. The Hungarian delegation believes that by rejecting the proposal to discuss the question of general and complete disarmament in plenary session the United Nations would deal a severe blow at its own prestige before world public opinion. Those hundreds of millions watching our deliberations could not but regard such a decision as shameful and ridiculous. The Hungarian delegation will vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution [A/L.311] which calls for the discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament in plenary session.

127. Mr. RAPACKI (Poland) (translated from French): I think it would be useful to realize what can and should be done for the cause of disarmament at this session of the General Assembly. That, indeed, is the basis on which the procedure to be adopted for the consideration of this question by the General Assembly must be decided.

128. The root cause of the stalemate in disarmament negotiations lies in the substantive difference between the points of departure of the two parties. That difference may be summed up as follows: controlled armaments or controlled disarmament.

129. The first and fundamental task of the Assembly is therefore to establish a common point of departure for continuation of the work on disarmament. The positions of the two sides are clear and there is no need to clarify them further in the Committees. The plans of the Western Powers continue to be based on the concept of arms control. That is, in fact, also the meaning of the active control referred to in the Western plan of 27 June 1960, and in the new plan, which in fact contains nothing new. It provides for maximum control from the outset, regardless of the scope of the disarmament measures carried out.

130. As to the socialist States, we also desire—and this is also in our own interests—the most effective control, but control over disarmament. We desire the control appropriate to each stage of disarmament and, ultimately, general and complete control over general and complete disarmament.

131. We have heard the clear and precise statement made here by Mr. Khrushchev [882nd meeting] that, if the disarmament plan presented by the socialist States were accepted, the Soviet Union would be prepared, for its part, to accept all the methods of control suggested by the West.

132. Nevertheless, in his statement today, the United States representative seemed to continue to lay emphasis on the view that the First Committee should devote itself to a detailed discussion of inspection and control. It follows from this fact alone that the work of that Committee might encounter, and be halted by, the same difficulties, the sole difficulties, which have thus far made any agreement impossible. Without a clear and precise decision by the General Assembly as to the relationship between control and disarmament, there can be no assurance that the Committee's work will have any positive outcome. The arguments of the two sides are also known. So far as the socialist States are concerned, I may take the liberty of recalling that they consider that control without dis-

armament, control of armaments, can lead only to an aggravation of the danger of a nuclear and rocket war.

133. Such control would make clear the preponderance of one side or another in one or another field, and the triple effect of this would be, first, the weaker party would be encouraged to redouble its efforts in order to reach parity with the stronger party, and to encourage the stronger party to redouble its efforts in order to maintain its lead, in short, to create additional incentives to the acceleration of the arms race, secondly, the stronger party would be encouraged to wish to exploit its superiority, and therefore to start a preventive war; thirdly, in the light of modern military techniques based on nuclear weapons and rockets, knowledge of the adversary's defensive system, acquired through arms control, might encourage the desire to ensure preponderance by a surprise attack.

134. The question of arms control or control over disarmament therefore reduces itself, in its simplest form, to the following alternatives: either an accelerated arms race and the growing danger of war, or controlled disarmament. That is why the position of the Western Powers with regard to control is unacceptable if the purpose of the negotiations is really to be disarmament. If, on the other hand, we are to talk interminably of disarmament in order to make possible the simultaneous continuation and intensification of the arms race, the development of the network of bases in foreign territory, the arming of an increasing number of States with ballistic and nuclear weapons and the rearming of the West German Bundeswehr to come closer and closer to the critical point, then such alleged disarmament negotiations can only serve as a smokescreen for armaments and increase the danger of war.

135. The failure of the Geneva talks is the natural and inevitable consequence of the stalemate into which the attitude of the Western Powers with regard to control has led us. And now we hear the failure of the Geneva talks referred to from this rostrum but only in order to prolong the existing stalemate. The fundamental difference of view on the question of control must be decided by the highest organ of the United Nations, the organ which has the greatest authority, that is to say, by the General Assembly in plenary meeting.

136. Another problem on which a decision must be taken in order to make possible effective progress in the disarmament negotiations is that of the composition of the body which is to work out a plan of general and complete disarmament.

137. This fifteenth session has further confirmed the very important part played in the contemporary world by the Asian and African States and the other States which have arisen out of the ruins of colonialism. No one can deny that those countries are acting as a constructive force for peace. Moreover, they are particularly interested in the possibility of using for their economic development at least a part of the enormous sums now wasted in the arms race in the more developed countries. They should therefore be represented in the new disarmament body. Does the question of representation and of recognition of the rights of the neutral States really require detailed deliberation in the General Assembly's Committees?

138. The third question is that of undertaking the application of the measures urgently needed to slow

the trend towards a deterioration of the international situation. This is a very real and very serious threat. It must be discussed, and discussed openly before the world. That is why my delegation has suggested the establishment, under United Nations auspices, of a committee whose task would be to examine the dangers of a war in the contemporary world and to take a stand on that problem. And, above all, everything possible must be done to slow the arms race. And here the Polish delegation has submitted specific suggestions. We have also suggested that a referendum should be held to obtain the opinions of all countries on the question of foreign military bases, which are so dangerous to the security and sovereignty of nations.

139. The General Assembly in plenary meeting is the body which can, with the greatest authority, warn the nations of the danger of the arms race and call on Governments to halt that race.

140. The fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly took a great step forward by adopting unanimously the principle of general and complete disarmament. It indicated the only objective which rightly meets the needs of our time. The fifteenth session can and should take the next step: to establish the common point of departure, to determine the most appropriate way to conduct the coming disarmament negotiations, to overcome the stalemate in the disarmament negotiations, a stalemate which in itself constitutes an additional factor accelerating the arms race, and to ensure the best possible atmosphere for specific decisions leading to general and complete disarmament. These are substantive, indeed I would say elementary and urgent decisions. We must not waste time and prolong the discussion at every procedural level—but it will be impossible to avoid doing so if these problems are referred to the Committee.

141. It is for all these reasons that the Polish delegation considers that the disarmament question should be discussed in plenary meetings. It may be that, for one reason or another, the General Assembly cannot, at the fifteenth session, resolve all the basic problems of disarmament. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union today suggested that a special session of the General Assembly should be held a few months hence, devoted solely to the question of disarmament, and with the participation of Heads of State. The Polish delegation considers that this idea merits consideration and adoption.

142. The United States representative saw fit to speak of propaganda. Obviously he considers that a discussion at plenary meetings of the General Assembly is useful only for propaganda purposes. We are already accustomed to the fact that whenever anyone lays one of the key problems of our time before the General Assembly in plenary session he is accused of wishing to make propaganda. It may be that dealing with the key questions of our time is not an easy matter for those who do not wish or do not know how to solve them, but we are all here to contribute to such solutions and it is in that spirit, I think, that the General Assembly approved [resolution 362 (IV)] the recommendations and suggestions made by the Special Committee on Methods and Procedures of the General Assembly. Paragraph 23 of those recommendations [rules of procedure, annex I], which is entitled "Consideration of agenda items in plenary meetings, without prior reference to a Main Committee", states, *inter alia*, that this procedure would have the great

advantage of reducing to a notable extent repetition of debate, and, a little further: "consideration of questions in plenary meetings would have the benefit of the attendance of leaders of delegations and of greater solemnity and publicity".

143. I find it difficult not to make one further remark. For one or another reason, a majority of delegations have thought it advisable to include the so-called question of Hungary and the so-called question of Tibet in the agenda, and, more precisely, in the agenda of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly. Yet these are unreal problems, artificial problems which are in practice non-existent and outside the competence of the United Nations. On the other hand, when it is a matter of the disarmament problem, of the final abolition of colonialism or of the direct threat to peace created by the aggressive raids of United States aircraft over the territory of other States, that is, when the most vital problems are in question, they are referred to the Committees. With regard to the question of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the work of the United Nations, a question of prime importance for our work, and above all for effective action by the United Nations on disarmament, it was decided that the question should not be considered at all during the present session, a minority of the States represented here having opposed that decision. World opinion will neither understand nor accept such a policy on the part of the United Nations, and with good reason.

144. Those who, whenever just criticism is directed against our Organization, or suggestions are put forward with a view to strengthening it, take it upon themselves to champion the authority of the United Nations, should ponder well before deciding to deal a new blow to the authority of our Organization, and, in any case, the General Assembly should not allow it. What is involved here is not only the authority of the United Nations; what is at stake here is the most important question of our time, the question of disarmament and the maintenance of peace.

Mr. Boland (Ireland) resumed the Chair.

145. Mr. MAZUROV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic supports the Soviet Union's proposal that the question of general and complete disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament should be discussed at the plenary meetings of the current session.

146. I should like first of all to draw attention to the fact that questions of disarmament are within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly meeting in plenary session. I should like to quote from Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, which says: "The General Assembly may consider ... the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members...". The right of the General Assembly to consider this question in plenary meeting is also envisaged in rule 67 of the rules of procedure and in the recommendations and suggestions of the Special Committee on Methods and Procedures, which were confirmed by the General Assembly.

147. The attitude of the United States and other countries that have opposed discussing the question of

disarmament in plenary meetings is astonishing and cannot but put us on our guard. The United Nations is the organization which bears the chief responsibility for the maintenance of peace, and the plenary meeting is the most authoritative forum of that Organization. Settling the question of disarmament means maintaining peace and fulfilling the basic task of the United Nations. The absolute majority of the representatives who have already spoken in the general debate acknowledge that the question of disarmament is the central problem of this session of the General Assembly. Concern has been expressed here about the turn of events in the world and the danger of a continuing armaments race. In these circumstances, energetic and rapid action by the most highly authoritative organ of the United Nations is essential.

148. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that, as the question of disarmament is the most vital question of international life today, it should be dealt with at the highest level of the United Nations, namely, in plenary session. The General Assembly in plenary session is in a position to give the most authoritative directives to whatever United Nations bodies may be set up for the specific consideration of disarmament problems.

149. Surely the plan for general and complete disarmament under effective international control which has already been suggested at this session by the Soviet Union does not prevent the Western Powers from approaching the disarmament problem in a similarly specific and businesslike manner. We have before us clear and precise Soviet proposals; let us discuss them seriously.

150. Everyone agrees that the question under consideration is of vital importance. The rules of procedure envisage the possibility of such questions being considered at plenary meetings. Then why not do so? Why are the Western Powers opposed to this? Are they afraid that a thorough discussion in plenary session might unmask those who have so far been attempting to prevent any agreement being reached on the disarmament problem?

151. Mr. Wadsworth, the United States representative, has stated from this rostrum that in seeking to have a problem on which the maintenance of peace depends discussed in plenary session, the Soviet Union was pursuing purely propagandistic objectives. That is strange logic. If that represents the United States attitude towards the plenary meetings, then the obvious conclusion is that the United States has a very low opinion of the main organ of the United Nations and that it regards any discussion in plenary session as a mere waste of time.

152. The United States representative insinuated that there was no time in the plenary meetings to deal with the question of disarmament. The Western Powers, on the other hand, have found the time to discuss such provocative issues as the "question of Hungary" and the "question of Tibet" in plenary session even though the discussion of such questions is patently designed to intensify the "cold war". We say of those who accuse others of all kinds of things that it is "the pot calling the kettle black". This is what the delegations of the Western Powers are doing when they oppose placing the question of disarmament on the agenda of the plenary meeting. We are proud that the Socialist States not only are constantly advocating the need for

disarmament as the main requisite of the struggle for peace but have also put forward a clear and specific proposal on that important question. We are willing to hear the propaganda of the Western Powers on the disarmament question in the plenary meetings of the Assembly. The debates in plenary session will enable the peoples of the world to realize who is really for disarmament and who is merely being hypocritical about it.

153. The disarmament question has been discussed for many years in commissions, committees and sub-committees, but there have not yet been any results. The First Committee discussed the question last year, and adopted a satisfactory resolution on it. When, however, there was a question of practical steps at Geneva, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the other Western States adopted an attitude which was at variance with what they had said at the previous session. We believe, lastly, that the question of disarmament must be discussed in plenary meeting because there is already a resolution which was adopted at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. To refer the implementation of that resolution of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly for discussion in a committee would detract from the importance of the whole problem.

154. Although the question which we are now discussing is of a procedural nature, we must not lose sight of the fact that a very great deal depends on the settlement of this question, that is to say, on the speedy achievement of an agreement on disarmament as on the principal question of the day. We cannot tolerate a decision which would be in the interests, not of the majority of mankind, but of a small aggressive group. People are weary of the armaments race, and this desire on their part must govern all our actions.

155. The disarmament problem requires a highly serious approach. In present circumstances, a discussion of this problem in plenary meeting would constitute such a serious and responsible approach. Those who are striving for disarmament, not in words but in deeds, cannot but agree with this.

156. We support the proposal made by the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, that, if for some reason the disarmament problem cannot be thoroughly discussed at this session (although we feel that it can and should be done at this session), a special session of the United Nations General Assembly should be held at the level of Heads of Government and Heads of State to discuss the one question of disarmament. That would be an emergency special session on this very important question.

157. In conclusion, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR calls upon the delegations of other States to support the proposal that the question of disarmament should be discussed in plenary meeting.

158. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translated from French): At the request of the Government of the Soviet Union, and on the recommendation of the General Committee, the General Assembly of the United Nations placed on the agenda of its fifteenth regular session an item entitled "Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament".

159. This is unquestionably the most important item which the General Assembly is to discuss at this ses-

sion, because our ability to solve the disarmament problem and, in particular, to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament—that is, an agreement on the elimination of the physical means by which States make war on one another—will in the end decide whether mankind is to live in peace or to be plunged into a catastrophic nuclear war.

160. In this situation, as many speakers have pointed out this afternoon and on certain occasions, it seems wholly reasonable that the Assembly should pay the greatest attention to the problem of disarmament, and that it should consider how far the resolution on general and complete disarmament adopted by the fourteenth session has been carried out.

161. Since the problem of general and complete disarmament is the most important on our agenda, it should be discussed by the organ of the United Nations which has the highest authority, in an effort to find ways and means of reaching an agreement. Yet we have seen an attempt in the General Committee, and again today in the plenary meeting, to relegate the discussion of the disarmament problem to the First Committee, as if nothing had happened, and as if this were only a recurrent routine question on the agenda. We know that certain groups and Governments see things in that light.

162. The question of general and complete disarmament affects all international relations. As many speakers have said, both today and in the general debate, although it is indisputable that specific disarmament measures directly and mainly concern the Powers which possess the greatest military strength, the fact remains that a nuclear war would bring down incalculable disasters on all mankind, and that general and complete disarmament, the elimination of all material means of making war, is a problem which closely concerns all peoples of the world, without exception.

163. At this stage in my speech, I should like to comment on the views expressed by a number of earlier speakers. The Chairman of the Canadian delegation tried to persuade the Assembly today that the key to the situation is negotiating. I entirely agree. But, if negotiations are the key to the situation, is the level at which the negotiations take place a matter of no importance? Does it make no difference whether the negotiations are held at the level of permanent representatives, of ambassadors or ministers plenipotentiary, or at the level of Heads of Governments? It seems to me that the Canadian representative's argument points to the opposite conclusion.

164. It is not too late to hold discussions on the disarmament problem at a level which will ensure their progress and, in this connexion, I would refer to the statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union at the beginning of this meeting. As he said, even if many of the Heads of State, Heads of Government and most responsible political leaders have already left, modern means of transport could bring them back if the General Assembly gives the question the importance it deserves.

165. I should like to take this opportunity to comment on what the United Kingdom representative said. In the speech he made today, he said that the representative of Bulgaria and I had argued in the General Committee that the problem of general and complete disarmament should be discussed in plenary meeting

because many delegations to the fifteenth session were led by Heads of State, Heads of Government and political leaders. He added that since those leaders had already left, there was no longer any reason to discuss the question in plenary meeting. I wish to correct the United Kingdom representative's summary of what I said in the General Committee. I said that certain groups and Governments represented in the General Committee and in the Assembly seemed to be doing their best—if one can use the word—to prevent the United Nations from taking full advantage of the presence of eminent political leaders at the fifteenth session, because certain groups and Governments represented here do not want any progress to be made towards the solution of the fundamental problems of international life and relations between States, of which the most important is disarmament. I still maintain what I said in the General Committee. I also think that developments since that meeting of the General Committee and the present positions of the United States and United Kingdom representatives confirm the view which I put to the Committee.

166. I should also like to comment on what the United States representative has just said. Mr. Wadsworth told us that disarmament is a complex subject requiring serious consideration, and not a subject to be exploited for propaganda purposes in plenary meeting. It would be hard to disagree with this statement of the problem. But, although the Government which Mr. Wadsworth represents puts the problem in this way in order to give the impression that it is concerned about the seriousness of the problem and wants to ensure proper conditions for its discussion and solution, that Government's acts belie the fine speeches which its representatives make from time to time in the Assembly. If the problem is so serious, let us devote the plenary meetings to discussing it. I entirely agree that plenary meetings should not be pretexts for propaganda demonstrations; but how then can the same Government insist on having its way and force the General Assembly to discuss the so-called problems of Tibet and Hungary?

167. What did the United States representative mean by his statement? Does he think the rostrum of a plenary meeting is a forum for "cold war" propaganda, and is that why his Government forced the General Assembly to discuss the so-called problems of Tibet and Hungary? These are only pretexts for cold war campaigns and for repeated attempts to turn the rostrum of the General Assembly into a platform for "cold war" propaganda.

168. The United States and United Kingdom representatives referred today to the breaking off of the Ten-Power Committee's work at Geneva. Mr. Wadsworth said that the socialist countries walked out "when they had to face concrete proposals"—meaning disarmament proposals. It seems to me that certain groups and Governments tried to use the Geneva negotiations to hoodwink world public opinion in order to camouflage the continuation of the arms race, and that they are still trying to do so here.

169. That is why, as one of those who took part in the Geneva negotiations, I should like first to make the point clear. When the United States delegation at Geneva submitted its so-called disarmament proposals, the Committee had already been talking for about a month without making any progress, because the representatives of the NATO Powers on the Com-

mittee refused to take a position with regard to the proposals submitted by the USSR and supported by all socialist countries on the Committee. The socialist States then decided not to lend themselves to a propaganda trick designed to mislead public opinion, which the Western Governments were using at the Geneva negotiations, and this led the United States to put to the Committee its proposal which, at the time—27 June 1960—had not yet been discussed and adopted by the United States' allies in NATO. Even now, I do not think that the proposal to which the United States representative has just referred has been accepted by all the United States' allies in NATO.

170. The third remark I should like to make is that, in any case, the United States has submitted no disarmament proposal, either at the fifteenth session or at the meeting of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations which was called, at their insistence, a few days before the regular session. In the Disarmament Commission, it was suggested that about thirty tons of fissionable materials should be taken from stocks and converted to peaceful uses, and that the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes should be stopped, but neither suggestion can be seriously considered as a disarmament proposal. I am not an expert, but I assume that existing stocks of fissionable materials are so large that the great military Powers could easily divert thirty tons of fissionable materials for non-military purposes without reducing their military power; and the suggestion that the production of fissionable materials should be stopped is not a disarmament proposal, because it would not affect the arms race or nuclear striking power of nations which already have the means to destroy the world.

171. The key to the situation is, I think, that the United States and the Governments which are its allies in NATO have no disarmament proposals to submit to the fifteenth session, because they want to maintain their old view that there should be no disarmament, but arms control, no reduction of the arms race, but an increase in tension through the setting up of an indefensible system of spying. Since the Government of the United States and its allies hold this view, which is against the interests of peace, their representatives here advocate referring the discussion of disarmament to the First Committee, and oppose its discussion in plenary meeting.

172. My delegation supports the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [A/L.311]. In conclusion, I should like to draw the General Assembly's attention to the way in which the reputation of this fifteenth session will suffer if it relegates the consideration of a question as important as disarmament to a Committee, while it forces the plenary meeting to discuss so-called questions which are merely cold war issues. Several distinguished speakers—Heads of State, Heads of Government and eminent political leaders of many countries—have said that the fifteenth session, by the importance of its agenda and the eminence of those taking part in it, may go down in history as a session which led to progress in the solution of important international problems, especially the problem of general and complete disarmament. Members of this Assembly should therefore think of their responsibilities and should be aware of the danger that, because of the way in which certain groups and Governments have tried and are trying to divert our discussions,

the fifteenth session may go down in history as the Assembly of missed opportunities.

173. The PRESIDENT: I call on the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in exercise of the right of reply.

174. Mr. KHRUSHCHEV, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (translated from Russian): I have listened carefully to those who have spoken here. The representatives of the Western countries have objected primarily to our proposal that the question of disarmament should be discussed by the General Assembly in plenary session. These gentlemen are well versed in debate. They say that the Soviet Union wants the question of disarmament to be discussed by the Assembly in plenary session for propaganda purposes. But they themselves are the propagandists, and they have become past masters in propagandizing their views.

175. They are now "throwing out" for discussion by delegations the question of which United Nations organ—the Assembly, meeting in plenary session, or the First Committee—is the better suited for discussing disarmament. That is an idle argument. As far as we are concerned, there is no argument about this question; we wish to discuss it in the place where a real solution of this burning question can most quickly be found in the interests of the people.

176. That being the case, you might ask me why we insist on having this problem discussed by the General Assembly in plenary session rather than agreeing to deal with it at the committee level. The explanation is very simple. We have already been in the Committee. We are already familiar with that stable, if you will pardon the crude comparison; we know how it smells, and we have been unable to obtain any result there.

177. You know that we were in the Committee of Five, comprising the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France and the Soviet Union. We were in that Committee for many years, and at first we even agreed that its discussions should not be made known to the Press, should not be publicized outside the Committee itself. We thought and honestly believed that the persons taking part in the work of that Committee, the representatives of the countries which I mentioned, were genuinely concerned that the disarmament discussions should not aggravate matters; we believed that they wanted to create better conditions in which agreement could be reached as quickly as possible.

178. Yet what was the result? The United States had its best representative on the Committee of Five, namely, Mr. Stassen. But in the end he left that Committee, or rather he was induced to leave it, because he would not accept the position imposed upon him of upholding the views of the late Mr. Dulles, the erstwhile United States Secretary of State.

179. We saw that the only thing that was taken seriously in that Committee was the tea-break, or the coffee-break for those who preferred it. They sat there and sat there, and one would speak and another would listen, and a third would call for an adjournment until another day. And that went on endlessly. I do not know exactly how many years they went on holding those meetings, but we could not stand it any longer. To speak without mincing words, we said "Let the

Committee go to the devil, and let us get out of it". That was what we did, for the Committee was not a body in which the disarmament question could be settled, but rather a smoke-screen with which to deceive public opinion, to deceive the people, the working class, the toiling peasants, the intelligentsia and those who really want disarmament. We did not wish to be a party to that deception. I see Mr. Moch sitting here. He is regarded as a Socialist; he has had plenty of experience in the Committee of Ten, and what good has it done? None at all.

180. After my meeting with President de Gaulle of the French Republic, it was apparent that we had a similar understanding of certain problems. If there was to be agreement on disarmament, the first step in giving effect to that agreement must be to destroy the means of delivering nuclear weapons. I still support these views expressed by President de Gaulle.

181. Subsequently Mr. Moch spoke at a press conference or on some other occasion—I do not remember exactly, he himself knows better—and repeated what President de Gaulle had said. We were delighted that France, through its President and later through its representative on the Ten-Nation Committee, should have made such statements for all to hear. We thought it meant that there was one among the members of the Atlantic military bloc whose views coincided with ours, but we were mistaken in that hope. When Moch appeared in the Committee he began taking an entirely different line. He was a different Jules Moch, not the one who had spoken out for the public to hear, but the one who had sat for years in the Committee and done everything he could to frustrate the disarmament negotiations.

182. We still have a bit of patience left, and our last hope is that the General Assembly in its plenary meetings will perhaps be able to reach an agreement on disarmament and save mankind from war after all. I repeat, if war breaks out, it will break out all over the globe. There are many who do not realize what war in the future will be like. I myself have a very clear idea of what it will be like. The Soviet Union is not afraid of war. If war is imposed on us, we shall fight for our country and we shall be victorious, no matter what sacrifices it may cost us.

183. It must not, however, be forgotten that in such a war the casualties will be innumerable, and you who are sitting here will also have to answer for them. True, not much can be expected of some of those sitting here, but history will not forgive them. Let me emphasize that we consider it imperative for the question of disarmament to be discussed by the General Assembly in plenary session.

184. Statements have been made here by Mr. Green, the representative of Canada, and by the representative of the United States—his name is very difficult to pronounce, so I shall not twist my tongue trying to say it. I do not think anyone will be mistaken; I think it is clear whom I have in mind. In any case, they said that Khrushchev is also getting ready to leave. Yes, I am getting ready to leave for Moscow on Thursday, 13 October, at midnight, but if you really want disarmament I shall not only postpone my departure for Moscow but shall sit here until an agreement on disarmament is reached. The situation in our country is fine. I, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, have already been gone for a month. Yet things are

going along splendidly at home, and I can therefore stay on here as long as may be necessary to reach an agreement on disarmament. Things in our country are improving year by year, day by day.

185. You consider that the struggle for disarmament is propaganda. But are you, as Comrade Rapacki, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, so aptly asked, sowing the seeds of peace and mutual understanding by raising the questions of Hungary and Tibet? No, you are seizing upon questions with which you hope to set one country against another. Well, go ahead—we are not afraid of such questions. We are not bulls that can be teased with red rags and made to charge the person who teases them. We are Communists; we have strong nerves; we are schooled in fighting. We fought against the White Guards for four years; we overthrew and crushed the enemies of the working class. Yet you want to frighten us with arguments. The fact is—if I may be pardoned the expression—that you do not have the stomach for it.

186. Why do you bring up the question of Tibet? Yet I repeat, bring it up if you must. I go about in New York, and I see Americans rhythmically chewing gum, as is their custom. Now you want to give the representatives in the Assembly a piece of cotton wool instead of gum so that they can sit and chew on it. If anyone is interested and wants to take his exercise in that way, let him, but we have no intention of doing so.

187. Those who are sitting here dozing must be awakened; those who are absent must be awakened. The people have sent them to the meetings of the General Assembly and think that they are discussing the question of disarmament, but they are wandering around New York or wherever it may be—God knows where, but they are spending the people's money.

188. I say that the time will come when you will understand the need for disarmament. The people will throw out those who are putting obstacles in the way of peace and mutual understanding instead of creating conditions in which agreement on disarmament can be reached.

189. We, the peoples of the Socialist world, will not be frightened by you. Our economy is flourishing, our technology is developing, our people are united. Do you want to force us to compete with you in an armaments race? We do not want to, but we are not afraid to. We shall defeat you. In our country rockets are now being mass-produced. Recently I was in a factory, and I saw rockets coming out like sausages from a sausage-machine. Rocket after rocket is coming off our assembly lines.

190. Is there anybody that wants to put us to the test, to see how we stand? You tested us once and we beat you. I am thinking of the time we beat those who waged war on us in the first years after the October Revolution: the imperialists of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan. We defeated their forces and swept them like trash from our sacred soil. And if the imperialists now repeat that aggression, we shall repeat our victory over the aggressors but on a much broader scale.

191. There are people who will now begin to say that Khrushchev is threatening someone. No, Khrushchev is not threatening anyone; he is offering a realistic prediction of the future. If you do not realize what the true situation is, if you do not create conditions

for an agreement on disarmament, things will get even worse, for if there is no disarmament, there will be an armaments race, and any armaments race will eventually end in war. If war breaks out, many of us who are sitting here will no longer be around to tell the tale. Wake up; pinch yourselves where it hurts if you are having a hard time staying awake. Many people here are accustomed to hearing unctuous words. I do not want to indulge and soothe them when the world is on the brink of a catastrophe. If anyone finds my words unpleasant, it will mean that I have attained my object—that is what I wanted.

192. What is there to add? As yet not all the peoples of Asia and Africa, who have only recently freed themselves from the colonialist yoke, have realized their strength; they are still following the lead of the hangmen who were yesterday their colonial masters. While that may be true today, it will not be true tomorrow. It will not be true because the people will rise; they will straighten their backs and want to be the real masters of the situation. You will see; that will happen in the not distant future.

193. You have the right to vote in favour of discussing this question in the First Committee. We have nothing against the First Committee, nothing at all. In fact, I do not know which is better and which is worse, the First Committee or the Assembly. We are simply saying that the First Committee has already been tried. Nothing came out of it. That is why, for the sake of the happiness of the people, we should like to have the question discussed again, this time in plenary meeting. If you drive us once again into the First Committee, we shall insist on the right to decide whether we shall participate in the work of that Committee or not. If we see that the Committee is being used as a smoke-screen for the purpose of deceiving people, that the talk about disarmament is nothing but talk and that in reality nothing is being accomplished, just as nothing has been accomplished so far, then we shall leave the Committee. We shall not serve as a smoke-screen; we shall not deceive the working people of the whole world.

194. The Canadian, United States and United Kingdom representatives have spoken here. They made a great show of righteousness. These are the colonizers who are rich because the colonies are poor, because the colonizers plundered those colonies. And here they represent themselves as so many zealots. But honest people can see the true faces of those representatives.

195. Yes, we left the Committee of Five. Why did we leave? Because you, gentlemen, turned that Committee into a stable. You created such a stench there that an honest man could not even breathe, and so we got out. We had to get out into the open air, like honest men and true sons of our toiling people. We left, and we are not going back.

196. If the discussion of the question of disarmament takes place in the First Committee, we shall participate in it at the beginning. We shall see how the discussion there is conducted. Perhaps it will be necessary to decide to expand the Ten-Nation Committee. We have proposed, incidentally, that the membership of that Committee should be expanded to include the representatives of fifteen States. We are willing to participate in the work of that Committee on the condition that the representatives of neutral countries are included, as we have proposed. That Committee will be able to work successfully if the

General Assembly resolves that all countries should assume the obligation to disarm, to destroy their weapons, the process to be carried out under international control.

197. What kind of international control is required? I repeat, if a resolution on general and complete disarmament, on the destruction of weapons, is adopted, we will then agree to any kind of control. Take the most rabid haters of communism and socialism, we shall even believe them—let them work out proposals for control. The wider and more thorough international control over disarmament is, the better it will protect the hopes of the peoples that no country can secretly manufacture weapons and threaten to launch a new war against any of its neighbours. We are not afraid of controls, but they must be controls over disarmament, controls put into effect when a resolution on disarmament has been adopted. Accordingly, disarmament must be carried out under controls.

198. Yet what was it that Mr. Macmillan proposed from this rostrum? Also, in a conversation with me, he said: "Mr. Khrushchev, you are in too much of a hurry; such matters cannot be decided quickly. This is the way we should do it: Let us get together, let us set up a political committee, let us set up a scientific committee." And that scientific committee will determine how best to kill a flea—whether to tear off its legs or cut off its head. That, of course, is a "scientific problem" but one which is of interest only to those who do not want disarmament. Therefore I said to Mr. Macmillan, "You want to drag us into a labyrinth without light or air, inhabited only by bats who are afraid of the light. There you would have us participate in working out scientific problems, such as the problem of achieving disarmament." And that, they say, will take five or ten years.

199. If we wait five or ten years, then we shall assuredly be able to say that we are not going to reach agreement on disarmament. While at present, when only three States actually have atomic weapons, although a fourth has already begun atomic tests, I am certain that in five or ten years there will be several dozen such States. And then reaching agreement will be even more difficult.

200. Rockets and missiles can already be delivered to any point on earth, and, what is more, we can land our space ships wherever we please. What then, will it be like in five or ten years? You should really try to picture it to yourselves. Therefore, if you truly want peace—not everybody here wants it, but the majority presumably does, and I am addressing myself to that majority—then raise your voices on behalf of disarmament, and mankind will thank you for it. If you follow the lead of imperialistic, monopolistic capital, whose representatives have spoken here, if you follow the lead of the North Atlantic war bloc, then people will curse you. They will curse you because they will have entrusted to you that which is most sacred to them, peace, and you will have betrayed the hopes of the people. You will have failed to reach agreement on disarmament, and you will have plunged mankind into war.

201. This is the dilemma which confronts us. You must solve it.

202. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of France on the Disarmament Commission in exercise of the right of reply.

203. Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): I shall be very brief, but as my country has been accused of changing its position, and as I myself have been attacked by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, no one can object to my taking his place on this rostrum in order to deny his statement completely.

204. France has not changed its position. I know Mr. Khrushchev likes proverbs, and a French proverb says that there are some balloons which must be pricked. France has not changed its position on vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. On 22 October last year I stated France's views in the First Committee [1030th meeting]; then in the Ten-Nation Committee at Geneva, I mentioned the successive statements of the President of the French Republic. It will be found France has consistently called for the progressive elimination of such vehicles, beginning with their neutralization, in the first stage, with a view to precluding the risk of war by accident. The next step would be the destruction of such vehicles, with the exception of vehicles needed for scientific research and aircraft or vessels for the use of those forces which would provisionally be maintained; finally, in the third stage, production would be prohibited and places of manufacture would be controlled.

205. This has always been France's position. Simply to repeat that the French position has changed, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has done in three letters to the President of the French Republic, does not make the statement true. The texts are there; they are stronger than any statements.

206. Lastly, I would add that we in this hall are not at a street meeting, although it seemed to me a moment ago that we were; I was rather ashamed of a spectacle which was completely inconsistent with the sober, methodical and workmanlike study of such a problem as disarmament. In my view this is an additional reason why the Assembly should reject the Soviet proposal that the question of disarmament should be directly considered in the Assembly. I repeat, with the President of the French Republic, that France is ready at all times to resume serious discussions but not to abandon itself to improvised procedures and propaganda, offering a kind of spectacle I would rather not describe.

207. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United States in exercise of his right of reply.

208. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): I know that the hour grows late and I do not wish to keep the Members over long, but I would say this: that if the intervention which we have just heard from the representative of the Soviet Union is typical of what he would say in the disarmament debate, that is all the more reason why it should not be held in this chamber. Disarmament is a complex subject, it needs a quiet, sober and workmanlike approach. This has not been displayed so far by the representative of the Soviet Union.

209. Let me repeat what I said earlier today, that we are ready to negotiate soberly and sincerely in any forum which seems appropriate. Let me also repeat that it was not the United States that walked out of the various forums that have been held on the subject of disarmament. Let me repeat again particularly that it was not Mr. Stassen who walked out in 1957, it was Mr. Zorin.

210. I think that what we have to think about here is the much larger picture. We are ready and have been ready—apparently the Soviet Union has not. Mr. Khrushchev, whose name I hope I can pronounce, stood here before you just a few moments ago and said: "Agree with us on disarmament and we will take any kind of control you want." Now I happen to claim some experience in this sort of business because on 31 October 1958, I sat in a conference room in Geneva and there I heard the Soviet representative say: "Agree to banning tests and we will have no trouble whatever with control." Six or seven weeks later we decided we could not get an agenda, so we decided to talk business and we talked business, and the first four articles of a treaty which we hoped would have been completed long since went right down the line with what both of the sides wanted: a complete ban on nuclear tests everywhere and the obligation that all the parties would not only refrain from holding nuclear tests but would refrain from participating in, engaging in, or in stimulating or encouraging tests anywhere in the world. Then we were supposed to find out that control was going to be easy. All I have to do is to remind my friends here in this room that for over twenty-two months the three delegations have sat there worrying about control. I say: Be warned by experience when the representative of the Soviet Union tells you that if you will accept his principles of disarmament, he in turn will give you any kind of control that you want. I can tell you that it is not true.

211. But, as I am sure everybody here has realized for some time, this particular discussion seems to have got away from the point, which is, are we going to discuss disarmament in this hall, in plenary session, or are we going to discuss it in the First Committee? And I hope that before too long we can have a vote on that.

212. I feel quite sure that all of you who have been here before will realize that if any want publicity they can get it in the First Committee too. They can have their speeches repeated and reported; they can have their pictures taken for the television and the newsreels; they will not have any trouble about that. So if that is what Mr. Khrushchev wants he can be perfectly happy to go to the First Committee also.

213. One final word, and my apologies to you all for taking up your time. This is not the kind of subject that really lends itself to levity. It is not the kind of subject that really lends itself to the waving of the arms. It is not the kind of subject that lends itself to shouting.

214. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Afghanistan for an explanation of vote.

215. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan): The General Assembly has before it the recommendation of the General Committee and also a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation concerning the question of the allocation of the item on disarmament. We expect that in a few minutes the President will call upon us to vote on the two proposals. Before voting, my delegation finds it necessary to explain the vote that it will cast on this procedural issue.

216. I must say that from the discussion of the procedure at this stage it is quite obvious to all of us how much can be practicably expected to be done about the question of disarmament. To small countries such as mine a situation such as this is a very painful one,

and I am quite sure that all the small countries sitting here with the hope which they have always had for an agreement and a better atmosphere on this very important question—as a matter of fact, one of the most important problems of this world—share the feelings held by my country and my delegation.

217. However, none of those questions is under discussion here, and as a small country we cannot do anything to bring about a change. But before casting a vote on this issue we have to state that, whatever the causes of confusion may be or whatever the causes of argument, we are not a party to them because we are not a party to those considerations which do not help to bring about complete and comprehensive disarmament, and have absolutely no interest in such considerations. The vote which we will cast in this matter will be based only on certain principles, and these are the principles which we would consider relevant at this stage.

218. The first principle is that disarmament is one of the most, if not the most important of the problems facing the world today. In the light of its importance the discussion of this question on the highest level is more desirable, because of its importance only. If the level means the level of representatives, we would prefer the highest level. If it means the level of one meeting as compared with another, that is to say the General Assembly or the First Committee, we would prefer the higher level because of the importance.

219. The second principle is the concern of the Members of the United Nations—all of them, not only the big Powers but the big Powers and the small Powers—represented in this Organization. If the Assembly is going to express concern about this question the way to ensure a deeper expression will be to take up the discussion of the question at the highest level possible.

220. The third principle is that it has been done in the past. Also, even the General Committee itself has this year decided upon the discussion of certain items in plenary meeting. Therefore, we do not see any reason at all why disarmament, which is the most important item and the concern of all countries alike—whereas the other items might be less important in themselves and be the concern of fewer Members of this Organization—should not be discussed on the plenary level.

221. Those are the three main principles, and we have based our decision with regard to voting on the draft resolution and on the recommendation of the General Committee on those principles—and purely on principles. As I have said we are not party at all to any of the disagreements which exist between the two blocs or the two Powers. We have here only our own duty, and that is our duty as one of the Members of this Assembly independently to judge a case on its merits and, limiting itself to what is before the Assembly at this stage, to cast a vote on the matter.

222. All that we shall be asked is whether we prefer the discussion on disarmament to take place in plenary session or in the First Committee. We shall say that we prefer the discussion of this question to take place in the plenary Assembly. Thus, if the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union is put to the vote first my delegation will vote in favour of it. If that draft resolution is defeated, my delegation will then support the recommendation of the General Committee to take up the matter in the First Committee because,

after all, what is important to us is the discussion of this question.

223. Therefore, the last word I would say in explanation of my vote is that it is in fact a matter of preference, and as a matter of preference we would like this question to be discussed in plenary. But if it is not discussed in plenary, we shall not object to its being discussed in the First Committee.

224. The PRESIDENT: There being no more speakers, perhaps the Assembly will now proceed to take a decision. The Assembly has before it on the one hand the recommendation of the General Committee contained in its first report [A/4520], that item 67 of the agenda should be dealt with in the First Committee. The Assembly also has before it the Soviet draft resolution [A/L.311] proposing that this item should be taken up in plenary.

225. The Assembly will now vote on the recommendation of the General Committee. A roll-call vote has been requested. Those who favour the recommendation of the General Committee that the matter should be dealt with in the First Committee will vote in favour; those who oppose that proposal and support the draft resolution of the Soviet Union will vote against; and those who wish to abstain will say so.

226. I call on the representative of Afghanistan on a point of order.

227. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan): I apologize to the President for having had to ask for this point of order.

228. In the explanation of my vote I said that there were two proposals before the Assembly: the recommendation of the General Committee and a different proposal submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union.

229. The recommendation of the General Committee has not only been objected to here, but a different proposal has been submitted to the Assembly by the Soviet Union. I said that my delegation, and I am quite sure many other delegations, will find it very difficult if you tell us that those who vote for the recommendation of the General Committee should vote against the proposal of the Soviet Union. We do not think that this will be an easy or a right thing to do.

230. Therefore, I would like to request the President to deal with these two proposals separately so that we have a chance to express ourselves on both of them.

231. I hope that I have explained my point, and I hope that you will agree with me and put to the vote first the proposal of the Soviet Union and then the recommendation of the General Committee. My delegation thinks that is the right thing to do, and that is what I would like to propose.

232. The PRESIDENT: The Chair was merely trying to enable the Assembly to vote on what seemed a perfectly clear issue. The Chair had understood this as not a matter of shades of difference or preference. There are only two alternatives: either the question goes to the plenary or it goes to the First Committee. The Chair had proposed voting in a form that would enable the Assembly to say quite definitely which of those two it preferred. I am sure that on reflection the representative of Afghanistan will agree that that is the case. If one is voted upon and is carried, the other automatically fails.

233. If the Assembly is agreeable then, perhaps it would vote in the way I suggested which gives everybody an opportunity of saying definitely which of the two mutually exclusive alternatives it prefers: discussion in plenary or the First Committee.

234. I call on the representative of Pakistan on a point of order.

235. Mr. BHUTTO (Pakistan): According to rule 93 of the rules of procedure, which I would like to read out, it is stated:

"If two or more proposals relate to the same question, the General Assembly shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted. The General Assembly may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal."

236. Now, both questions relate to the same issue, and unless the Assembly decides otherwise, it will have to be according to the priority in which the proposals have been submitted.

237. The PRESIDENT: Of course, if there is objection to the proposal of the Chair, then we must go back to the rule.

238. I call on the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

239. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It seems to me that we must direct our attention to a procedure in conformity with the rules of procedure that will facilitate the position of the delegations and will enable them to make known their attitude in the course of and by means of the voting.

240. We have all heard the statement which was made by the representative of Afghanistan and from which it follows that if the procedure recommended by the President is adopted, the delegation of Afghanistan will be unable to express the stand referred to by the chairman of the Afghan delegation, and we may never reach a vote on the second proposal.

241. I believe that in the present case, and I hope that also in all other cases, the President will rise above narrow considerations and will not insist on his original proposal. If we adopt the proposal of the representative of Afghanistan, that will not be detrimental to any delegation which does not share our attitude, the attitude of the Soviet Union; nor, on the other hand, will it complicate the position of those delegations which support the Soviet proposal. I therefore believe that in the interests of basic objectivity the Soviet proposal should be put to the vote first. I say this because, besides the considerations I have put forward, that proposal, as I think you will all agree, is in its essence an amendment to the General Committee's report. I think that, in the light of all these considerations, the President will agree with this conclusion and will adopt the order of voting to which I have referred in accordance with the Afghanistan proposal.

242. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Afghanistan on a point of order.

243. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan): I should like first of all to recall that in his last statement the President said that unless any member objected to his proposal, he would proceed to a vote. I should like to make it

quite clear that I shall not object to whatever ruling he may make. That is not my delegation's intention. I had only one intention in the intervention I just made, and that was to explain my vote and to explain the principles which I hold as representative of my country, and to bring those principles to the attention of the Members of the General Assembly so that they might understand the manner in which I shall vote. That purpose has already been fulfilled.

244. What I had in mind to say, without objecting to the ruling, whatever it might be, is that there is a recommendation of the General Committee before the Assembly, and there is also a draft resolution submitted by a Member State on the issue. If we vote only on the recommendation of the General Committee, and if the Soviet draft is not put to the vote, it is not the draft resolution that does not have the chance to be voted upon, it could be the representative who has no chance to express himself. He would be deprived of the right to express himself on a document presented officially to the Assembly.

245. It is my right as a representative to express my point of view on a document which has been presented to us. I shall agree with any manner in which the President may satisfy that right, but I should be given an opportunity to be able to see in the records the record of my vote on this proposal and on the other proposal. That is why this draft resolution, which came after the recommendation of the General Committee, should be put to the vote first. In case you did not want to put to the vote the recommendation of the General Committee, somebody might object to it and somebody might not, but I would like that proposal to be voted upon even if the recommendation is carried. I will not insist upon that, but I would like a chance, as one representative, to express myself on both proposals.

246. The other point I would like to make is this: If the President considers the whole issue the subject matter of only one proposal, then this proposal should be considered as an amendment. Otherwise there would be no need for any representative to make another proposal after a recommendation had been submitted by the General Committee, and it is obviously the right of any delegation to make any proposal in the General Assembly, whatever the recommendation of the General Committee might be. Therefore, I must make it very clear to the President, because of the respect I have for his person and for the Chair he is occupying, that I am not objecting to or challenging his ruling at any time, but I shall submit the matter wholly to him to satisfy the right of a representative who wants to express himself on the proposals in any manner the President considers proper and the right way to do it.

247. The PRESIDENT: I am sure that the General Assembly does not wish to embark upon a procedural debate at this late hour, and I will do everything to help it to avoid doing so. I made a suggestion which was based on the idea that the issue involved was really a single issue. Objection has been taken to that on the ground that there are in fact two proposals before the Assembly and that the Assembly should vote on them separately. The two proposals are the recommendation of the General Committee that this item should go to the First Committee and the Soviet draft resolution proposing that the item should go to the plenary.

248. Rule 93 has been invoked in regard to these two proposals, but, as regards the order in which the proposals were submitted, the first proposal was, of course, the recommendation of the General Committee that this item should go to the First Committee. Therefore, if rule 93 is invoked—and it was invoked from the floor—then the Assembly should first vote on the recommendation of the General Committee. After that would come the Soviet draft resolution. I am prepared to submit the two proposals to the Assembly separately if that is the general view. If that is so, we will proceed first to vote on the recommendation of the General Committee that this item should be assigned to the First Committee.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Turkey, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand.

Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Mali, Poland, Romania.

Abstaining: United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia.

The recommendation of the General Committee was adopted by 62 votes to 12, with 24 abstentions.

249. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now vote on the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/L.311]. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Argentina, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Mali, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Afghanistan, Albania.

Against: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay.

Abstaining: Austria, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroun, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

The draft resolution was rejected by 54 votes to 13, with 31 abstentions.

250. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Yugoslavia in explanation of his vote.

251. Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia): My delegation considers that the item entitled "Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament" might usefully be discussed in plenary meetings of the Assembly. At the same time, I wish to point out that we have never felt that

the question of procedure—that is, the question whether such an item should be discussed in plenary or in the First Committee—is of decisive importance. We of course strongly maintain the view that it is essential that the disarmament question should be constantly in the forefront of the attention and activities of the United Nations so that an early solution of this all-important problem may be arrived at.

252. The course of our deliberations here—and particularly some new elements that have been introduced and certain suggestions and views which have been put forward and which we have not been able to study—has strengthened our belief that the procedure to be followed here is not of overriding importance. We therefore abstained from the vote on the question of the allocation of this item. For the same reason we abstained from the vote on the General Committee's recommendation on the question.

The meeting rose at 7.35 p.m.