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AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Prince Norodom SIHANOUK (Cambodia) (translated from French): Like many of the nations who are our friends, Cambodia attaches very great importance to this fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Its importance has indeed already been underlined in the words spoken by the eminent statesmen who have preceded me, and by the high level which the discussions seem called upon to attain.

2. I shall, therefore, as representative of the Cambodian nation, take the liberty of giving voice to certain thoughts which, though they may not have the merit of originality, express the views of the Khmer people on a number of questions.

3. First of all, it is my duty to say how sad and distressed we are at the revival of the cold war between the two blocs, after a period of "détente" which small peoples like ours hoped to see develop into lasting reconciliation and cordial co-operation. However, we find reason for optimism—moderate optimism, of course—in the presence here in our General Assembly, for the first time in United Nations history, of so many national leaders. Our optimism makes us feel that their presence is due both to awareness of the importance of our Organization and to solidarity between Governments, each of which, whether it be weak or strong, bears some share of responsibility for the future of mankind as a whole.

4. Despite its fourteen centuries of history, Cambodia is fully aware of its weakness and hence of its insignificance in a world which belongs either to the powerful (particularly if they are "atomic" Powers) or to those who are fortunate (or unfortunate) enough to represent a more or less vital stake, or sometimes even a bargaining counter, for one bloc or the other. In fact, we ourselves only just escaped this position of being an international "star".

5. Our little country comes before the Assembly today with none of the attributes which attract international attention. It is poor; it is sparsely populated; it enjoys peace and internal stability; yet it is bold enough to follow its own course and to refuse obstinately to take sides with one camp or another, even the "neutralist" one. In these circumstances, how could we not be aware of the slowness of our influence, how could we not be a little ashamed of coming before the world simply as a "neutral"?

6. However, if the peaceable Cambodian people has sent me to this Assembly for the second time, it is in order that I should express its anxiety and deep dismay at the growing deterioration of the international situation and at the tragic consequences of the ideological war which is being waged by the two blocs in the countries which border on our own.

7. Since the United Nations has done us the honour to accept us as a Member, I would ask the Assembly for permission to present our humble contribution to the search for a solution to the very serious problems of peace, justice and freedom for all men, these being the problems which alone justify the presence of all of us here.

8. The problem which chiefly exercises the minds of all peoples is undoubtedly that of disarmament. The great leaders have justified their participation in this session by the vital importance of this problem and by the need to find a satisfactory and lasting solution to it. In this respect we have been struck by the statements made by the distinguished representatives of the world's two greatest military Powers, since both express the same conviction that disarmament is essential. This unanimity on the main issue cannot but be encouraging, even though differences on points of detail may remain.

9. Disarmament is certainly an extremely complex problem, as the great producers of armaments do not fail to remind us in justifying the interminable discussions which continue for months, then are broken off and then are taken up again—"hot-and-cold shower" treatment for an anxious world. But today, having heard the unambiguous statements of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States [868th meeting] and of Mr. Khrushchev, Prime Minister of the USSR [869th meeting], we are certainly not alone in thinking that disarmament is possible and that it will become more and more difficult to justify further conferences which lead to no conclusion. The giants have spoken to us of their will to disarm and each has convinced us of his good faith.

10. As the President of the United Arab Republic has very rightly stressed in his speech [873rd meeting] what is now required is for this common will to be translated into action, as in the meantime progress in the manufacture of ever more deadly weapons is continuing at a prodigious rate. Con-

ventional weapons which have become obsolete are being distributed ever more widely, with touching generosity, to countries that are courted by the imperialists and are easily persuaded to accept these attributes of power and progress! This secondary aspect of the arms race—the doling-out of obsolete but nevertheless highly dangerous weapons to small "lined-up" nations—is one that is causing increasing concern among our own people.

11. Today, when the great Powers speak of disarmament, it would seem that they think primarily in terms of nuclear weapons and do not attach sufficient importance to these obsolete "toys" which merely destroyed a few tens of millions of men during the Second World War. I would therefore like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that, for small nations like ours, over-armament in conventional weapons represents an immediate danger, infinitely greater than that of the costly nuclear weapons whose use the manufacturing Powers have hitherto reserved to themselves, while proclaiming aloud the full horror of atomic war! Some even think that the existence of these terrible weapons so frightens the Governments as to prevent them from boldly launching a "hot war", and cause them to fall back on a "tepid" war. This "tepid" war can in fact be waged without risk to the principals instigating it, as it is carried on through small "interposed" nations in various parts of the world, and particularly in the countries of South East Asia having a common frontier with Cambodia. And if our Far East has not yet become an erupting volcano, it is not for lack of explosive conditions which our friends, like sorcerers' apprentices, have assembled there, but is thanks to what remains—though it is daily being whittled away—of tolerance and will to peace on the part of the peoples of South Asia.

12. Having said this, I would state my personal view that our country would not, whatever happens, approve the possible use of atomic bombs. It is equally our desire that the great Powers should soon be in a position to dismantle these devices, which do great honour to their inventive genius. But what we ask of them, what we beg of them, is to give up the extravagant arming of medium-sized and small countries, the moral arming of peoples—whose sole desire is to live in peace—with a view to persuading them to kill each other under the false pretext of the anti-communist or anti-imperialist struggle.

13. However, to return to atomic disarmament, which remains a matter of prime interest to us, we think that the General Assembly will be able to contribute greatly, if not decisively, to it by reaffirming to the atomic Powers the feeling of all the peoples. This feeling, which cannot be doubted, quite clearly amounts to total and unanimous rejection of the use of atomic power for military purposes, including tests. We hope that these nations will thus be sensible of their immense responsibilities with regard to our civilization and the destiny of everything living on our planet, and will seek, with greater sincerity, a ground for agreement and a sound policy for general disarmament. We think, in fact, that the General Assembly could exercise a great moral influence in this search for the settlement of a problem which as so far been rendered virtually insoluble because of the mistrust between the leading nations of the two blocs.

14. However, given the complexity of this problem and the way in which an agreement would be applied,

we think it would be desirable to leave to the great Powers responsible for war and peace, for over-armament and disarmament, the task of discussing it and getting to the root of it. Once the long-desired agreement had been arrived at, it would then, and only then, be logical for the procedure adopted to be submitted to all the medium-sized and small nations. We can hardly see how such complicated discussions could lead to anything of substance within the framework of an over-large assembly, as opposed to a small committee.

15. We should like also to draw the General Assembly's attention to the uselessness and absurdity of ignoring the People's Republic of China and of thinking that the major problems, and first and foremost peace and war, can be settled without the participation, as of right, in all international conferences of the legitimate representatives of a people numbering 700 million, of a nation whose strength is growing continually. In this connexion—since we are nobody's satellites, maintain with the People's Republic of China nothing but relations of friendship on a footing of equality, and therefore cannot be reproached with a biased or servile attitude—we feel it our duty to insist once again, in all objectivity and without heat, that the General Assembly revise its position on the admission to the United Nations of the People's Republic of China.

16. Every year the United Nations throws its doors wide open to many nations which have gained or recovered their independence. This is greatly to the credit of the Organization, which has set out with the noble aim of attaining universality; and we are most happy that our African brothers, so long subjected to the laws of foreign colonialism, should at last be able to make their voice heard as free men. But while small nations numbering one, two or—as in our own case—five million people can sit in the United Nations, we feel it to be senseless and tragic that the nation with the largest population in the world, and one of the most deserving of countries from the standpoint of nation-building, should still be treated as a pariah.

17. Certain critics of the People's Republic of China regularly oppose its admission to the United Nations, justifying their obstructive attitude by references to the Tibet affair and the frontier dispute between India and the People's Republic of China. Yet India, the country mainly concerned in the frontier dispute and the most qualified observer of events in Tibet, remains convinced of the need for admitting the People's Republic of China to this great assembly.

18. And has it never occurred to these unbending critics that certain Members of the United Nations are very far from behaving better than the People's Republic of China with regard to weaker neighbours, without anyone suggesting that they might be considered unworthy of sitting among us? It is, indeed, somewhat surprising that in many cases greater attention and greater consideration seem to be shown to those who are constantly infringing the rights of peoples and creating disturbances and discord. Thus my country has seen part of its territory occupied by one of its neighbours while another carried out armed incursions on our soil and threatened to wrest from us all our off-shore islands, without the great Powers who make so many moral pronouncements being in the least disturbed.

19. But apart from these considerations, we must recognize that sooner or later the United Nations will

be compelled to admit the People's Republic of China. We can also foresee with misgiving that, if the time is put off still further, a moment may come when the Organization will be forced not only to permit, but to beg the People's Republic of China to join our number. Then the prestige and authority of the United Nations may well be impaired, perhaps irremediably.

20. Having said this, may I now turn on behalf of Cambodia towards the delegations of those countries which are sitting among us for the first time, to offer them our warmest greetings and confirm once more the joy felt by the Cambodian people at seeing them attain full national sovereignty and assume their rightful place in the concert of nations.

21. This joy would be unalloyed had we no knowledge of the difficulties with which our Congolese brothers are at present contending, and of the Algerian nation's ordeal, whose outcome we have been awaiting for so many years.

22. With regard to the Congo, it is not for us to comment upon the regrettable events taking place there, or to express our views as to the steps which should be taken to solve the problem of restoring peace in the Congo and maintaining that country's unity. We will simply state that we Cambodians recognize only one Congo, whose capital is Leopoldville; for we consider that the local rivalries which undeniably exist in no way justify external incitement to disunity.

23. Naturally, we regret the difficulties that the United Nations has encountered, but these difficulties serve to strengthen the conviction which we voiced in 1958—that if each of its Members agreed to lend it greater confidence and authority, the United Nations would be in a better position to render outstanding services to peace, to the protection of independence wherever it is threatened, and to the cause of reconciliation and understanding between the peoples.

24. I must now mention the Algerian affair—for although its end is desired by all nations, and particularly by the African and Asian nations who are not directly involved, Cambodia as a tried and tested friend of France, wishes to record its hope that, after too many years of killing and destruction, Algeria will soon know peace once more.

25. In this connexion, we were glad to hear General de Gaulle speak clearly of an Algerian Algeria, not rejecting the idea of an independent Algeria. But the President of the French Republic insisted, as a prerequisite to negotiations regarding the future status of Algeria, on the cessation of the hostilities between the forces of the provisional government of the Algerian Republic and those of France.

26. We in Cambodia, who experienced the war in Indo-China and know the courage and determination of those who are fighting in Algeria, are convinced that it is an illusion to imagine that they will be persuaded to "lay down their swords". For eight years, the former French Indo-China lived through the situation that now exists in Algeria, in which two adversaries, with ever-increasing violence, seek to attain victory through attrition and exhaustion. No one has forgotten that that earlier war in Indo-China was brought to an end only by international arbitration and left behind it terrible after-effects which are still present both in Viet-Nam—still divided—and in Laos.

27. My country, of course, had the great good fortune to preserve its national unity, which enabled it to escape having its fate affected by external events and influences. In fact, eight months before the 1954 Geneva Conference, we succeeded in getting France to restore to us the remaining prerogatives of an independence which had to all intents and purposes been recognized since 1949.

28. As true friends both of the French and of the Arab and Algerian peoples, we fervently hope for their speedy success in arriving at an agreement, for with each passing month the conflict between Frenchmen and Muslims grows more acute and inflicts fresh wounds that will not heal. Nevertheless, General de Gaulle has formally recognized the Algerian people's right to self-determination. He has also expressed his conviction that, whatever path Algeria may choose, it cannot mean a complete and definitive breaking of its ties with France. We share this conviction and we are sure that, if France grants independence to Algeria while there is yet time, the new State cannot fail to maintain ties of friendship and close co-operation with the former ruling Power, as we ourselves have done. But it is no less certain that the whole world awaits from France an act of greatness in regard to Algeria, an act similar to that just performed by France in respect of its African possessions, an act which will regain for France the friendship of the African-Asian world and of the Arab peoples in particular.

29. Nevertheless, there are grounds for wondering whether it is reasonable to hope for peace in Algeria to be restored without external assistance, although there can be no doubt that the peoples of France and of Algeria both long for an end to this fratricidal war and for a referendum which will determine the status and future of the whole Algerian nation. What organization other than the United Nations could act as an intermediary of guaranteed good faith and objectivity, as a "bridge" between adversaries who will not and cannot "lose face"?

30. Unfortunately, France has already made known its position—which is one of refusal, in advance, to participate in the debates on Algeria or to admit the validity of any United Nations decision on the Algerian question. For our part, it is our duty to try to find some effective means of helping to bring about a just and equitable solution of the Algerian problem. A condemnation of France would not serve this purpose, for it was in order to assist France and the Algerian people to attain the dual aim of a cease-fire and a referendum that United Nations aid was to be invoked. I believe that we should devote ourselves, above all, to finding a formula acceptable both to France and to the provisional government of the Algerian Republic, a formula which neither of the two opponents would be justified in refusing.

31. We are convinced that a properly controlled cease-fire, and a referendum whose results could not be challenged by either party, would be entirely susceptible of achievement with the good offices and guarantees provided by the United Nations. We express this conviction because otherwise we can see no end to the present war and to the deadlock in which France and the provisional government of the Algerian Republic now find themselves. Moreover we have not forgotten the Geneva Conference of 1954 and the agreements which—although they were, necessarily, not entirely satisfactory to all—did have the merit of bringing

to an end a frightful war and of representing, to some extent, a victory for compromise and mutual concessions. It is obvious that, without the assistance of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, it would have been infinitely more difficult for France and the Viet-Minh to find a practical means of bringing the fighting to a close.

32. Passing now to a more general plane, I will venture to explain to representatives Cambodia's conception of the role of the United Nations.

33. Ever since 1958 we have pressed for the use of the Organization, not as a mere platform for propaganda, but as an undisputed arbiter and an impartial force for the settlement of international disputes with a view to restoring peace, freedom and justice, wherever they are threatened or compromised without hope of restoration by normal means.

34. This path, which all peoples of the world would like the Organization to follow, is undoubtedly a difficult one. Nobody has forgotten that, with the agreement of most of its Members, the United Nations intervened in the Korean question, shouldering responsibilities out of all proportion to its regular ones—in the case in point, opposition to, and not participation in, a localized conflict. More recently, the United Nations intervened in Laos, though here, unfortunately, it lacked the means to bring about the peaceful and final solution desired by our friend and neighbour. Lastly, the United Nations, summoned to the Congo in order to ensure the maintenance of order, now sees its action disputed, not only by the parties themselves but by several Member States.

35. For our own part, we have had occasion to call upon the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve our relations with Thailand, and in this connexion we were able to satisfy ourselves of his impartiality in a problem of this kind and to convince ourselves of his ability to help in finding a formula for settlement and reconciliation. However, while some nations are quite ready to rely on the Organization for the settlement of their disputes, many others remain unwilling to accept a verdict not in their favour.

36. Our feeling is that the United Nations will not be wholly fulfilling the purposes it has set for itself, or the expectations of all peoples of the world, until each nation, great or small, is able to call upon it for assistance when it is in difficulties; until each nation, large or small, accepts and scrupulously respects its decisions or else must agree to be exposed to sanctions, and lastly, until its doors are open to all free and independent nations. In short, it is essential for all countries no longer to content themselves with fine speeches about the grandeur and nobility of the United Nations' ideals, but to endow the Organization with the means to play a part acknowledged, with complete sincerity, by each.

37. Not very long ago, certain statesmen referred to the "so-called" United Nations and some serious newspapers wrote of the "disunited" Nations. This is indeed sad; but we must recognize that our Organization is divided, in a way which reflects the division of the world today. It thus departs from its purpose and its ideal, as these were envisaged by men of goodwill at the end of a war which, had it ended in

defeat for the democracies, would have set its seal on the enslavement of an immense proportion of mankind.

38. A way out of this situation exists; but it demands that each of us, on entering this imposing house of glass, should leave behind him, at the door, all tactical considerations and feelings of resentment, cease to think as a "Westerner", a "socialist" or a "neutralist", and bear in mind only the word "brotherhood"; for are not all of us—white, yellow or black—born of the same clay and marked out for the same destiny?

39. In this connexion, I should like to explain Cambodia's position in regard to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal [869th meeting] that the Secretary-General be replaced by a directorate of three members, one belonging to the Western, another to the socialist, and a third to the neutralist group. This proposal is interesting from several points of view, but we cannot entirely agree with the distinguished Head of the Soviet Government, for the following reasons. We believe that we must avoid the splitting-up of our Organization into rival clans—a process which increasingly prevents the United Nations from playing its proper role, particularly as sole guarantor of the survival and independence of the small nations. This division, if extended to the office of the Secretary-General, might well paralyse it.

40. It seems to us on the contrary that the Secretariat with its present structure, headed by a strictly neutral person standing above all disputes of interest or compromise, offers the best possible guarantee of impartiality for the uncommitted nations. We would certainly not say of any man, no matter how neutral he may be, that he will never err; but what we are convinced of is that a directorate would be able to act only with the unanimous consent of its three members, which in the present state of the world is out of the question, and that its action could only be the result of wrangling or of shabby compromise.

41. May we apologize now to our Lao brothers for referring here to their country, in whose domestic affairs we have no right to intervene. But we are so close to Laos by reason of religion, customs and way of life, and the feelings which unite us are so sincere and disinterested, that we venture to express the hope that an end will be put to the external pressure which is now being exerted in order to drag the peaceful kingdom of our neighbour into one bloc or the other—pressure which threatens not only peace in this part of the world but the very unity and independence of a nation reborn to freedom in 1954.

42. In this connexion, we must express our distress and apprehension at the increasingly overt manoeuvres, ranging from outside encouragement to direct support, of the rebellion against the legitimate Government of Vientiane. Laos does not deserve to be brutally and cynically sacrificed, on the altar of neurotic anti-communism, by certain foreign rulers or agents who favour secession and can contemplate unmoved the abandonment of the North of the country to communism and the creation of an illusory anti-communist stronghold in the South.

43. I can assure these strategists that their plan of division is doomed to failure, for Southern Laos is in fact just as vulnerable to infiltration by the Pathet Lao as Southern Viet-Nam is to that by the Viet-Minh.

44. The world has its eyes upon the Congo crisis. Nevertheless, I should like to draw the attention of

the Organization to the danger which the present situation in Laos represents for the maintenance of peace in Asia. Although the situation undeniably arose out of external interference by both blocs, it has become obvious that, in order to avoid the danger of a trial of strength, the only sound and reasonable way of disposing of this new and dangerous source of disturbance is through the neutralization of Laos, accompanied by international guarantees of its unity and territorial integrity.

45. Since the formal proclamation of its neutrality in 1955, Cambodia too has been the object of the most open pressure and of innumerable demands from certain committed countries. We have had to face unjust and unjustifiable territorial claims, armed incursions, economic blockades, criminal outrages, incitements to revolt and secession, and incessant provocation by Press and radio. However, the Cambodian people has rallied to a throne almost two thousand years old and has expressed its determination to fight to the last breath in defence of its independence and territorial integrity.

46. Our neutrality, our freedom and our independence are today intact; but this does not lull us into believing that we have reached the end of the ordeals in store for us as a result of the desperate struggle of the two ideological blocs in this part of the world. At present we are experiencing a period of relative calm, which removes us from the international limelight. Our one hope is for a continuation of this period, so that we may be able to work peacefully on the building of our nation.

47. Some people will perhaps accuse small countries like ours of showing selfishness, of thinking of nothing but their own situation and of refusing to participate in the ideological trends which divide the world. But are not the great Powers themselves concerned above all, and in all their actions, with their own interests? That is perfectly natural. We for our part believe that, in view of the crucial problems which face us, we are entitled to remain outside blocs and so-called defensive military organizations that in practice often tend to draw peoples into ventures which do not concern them and in which they stand to lose everything and gain little.

48. The small, poor, under-developed countries like ours consider it, generally speaking, more urgent to cover the distance which separates them from the modern and prosperous countries, than to participate in quarrels which do not concern them, to take part in conflicts which in any case are beyond their scope, or to nurse the vain and reckless delusion that they can play a historic role in world development. For our part, we leave it to the great Powers to write the history of the world; our modest ambition is simply to contribute, in all sincerity and as far as our small means allow, to a better understanding between the peoples and to the maintenance of peace.

49. Desiring thus to minimize the danger of friction between the contending blocs in this critical area of the world—South East Asia—with a view to establishing calm conditions for peaceable but weak peoples, Cambodia believes that it would be in the general interest for Cambodia and Laos to constitute a neutral zone, whose very strict neutrality would be seriously and formally guaranteed by the great Western Powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and their Asian allies Thailand and South Viet-Nam—on

the one hand, and by the socialist Powers—the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and their ally North Viet-Nam—on the other. As a consequence, the two blocs would by joint agreement expunge Cambodia and Laos from the list of areas in which they are competing for influence, and regard these two States as buffer States whose function would be to prevent direct contact, a permanent cause of conflict. We should remember that France and Great Britain, the two great colonial Powers of the last century, sometimes resorted to the establishment or maintenance of such buffer States between their external possessions. That example, which has proved its usefulness in the past, deserves to be borne in mind today as a means of averting calamity.

50. Since the Geneva agreements of 1954, the possibility of neutralizing Cambodia and Laos has repeatedly been mentioned. In fact, however, there is great reluctance to admit that this neutrality can be effectively established. Not only has there been external pressure, but within the two countries—contrary to the deepest wishes of their peoples—factions have been brought into being which agitate or conspire to promote association with the East or with the West, and this is seriously described as pro-Western and pro-communist neutrality!

51. Cambodia knows and practises only one kind of neutrality; and the entire Cambodian people hopes that the great Powers will, not only in word but in deed, recognize this neutrality, which is our only guarantee of survival as a free and independent nation.

52. The very concept of neutrality is questioned in the Western world. Certain newspapers claim that neutrality is an absurdity, and non-commitment a form of cowardice. It is nevertheless true that the concepts of neutrality and non-attachment have great attraction for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America who have experienced colonialist and imperialist domination and are rightly suspicious of so-called defensive military organizations and of political organizations serving as a mask for resurgent imperialism.

53. The committed nations, which dislike seeing their propaganda beat in vain against the firm determination of the third bloc to remain neutral, should show somewhat more understanding for the peoples that refuse to align themselves. Then, perhaps, they might realize that their chief subjects of concern are very different from those of the peoples whose primary problem consists in escaping from their state of under-development. Furthermore, how can there possibly be a genuine political alliance between nations whose peoples are separated by levels of living ranging from opulence to dire poverty and even a state of perpetual hunger?

54. Recent events in Cuba, Japan, South Korea and Laos have confirmed this trend towards a position of neutrality, towards a refusal to participate in the dangerous game proposed by the great Powers. Is this attitude, adopted by more than one third of the human race, absurd and cowardly, or is it simply a manifestation of the instinct of self-preservation and of a very human love of liberty?

55. In 1953, when France transferred to Cambodia the remaining powers it had retained, certain newspapers reflecting semi-official opinion predicted that our country would not survive longer than four years "by the grace of Buddha and Mr. Ho Chi-minh". In

1955, after we had proclaimed our neutrality, the same newspapers, together with a number of Western politicians, prophesied for us a disastrous collapse within an even shorter time. Yet seven years have passed, and each year has seen some consolidation of our independence and neutrality; while within the same period many countries, neighbours or non-neighbours of ours, have, unhappily suffered serious misfortunes. Our enemies, in order to explain the success of our neutrality, allege that the countries surrounding us have had the courage to commit themselves in our place and thus to draw upon themselves the hostility of the communist world!

56. I appeal for greater fairness to us, since, although there are small grounds for that allegation, we on our side are justified in expressing our apprehension about the threat to our peace constituted by the serious deterioration of the situation in the neighbouring countries. Furthermore I venture to appeal to the Assembly for effective assistance to the peace-loving peoples of the States of what was once Indo-China, so that they may recover and maintain the peace and stability which with all their heart they desire.

57. In my humble opinion, there is only one solution which would enable that end to be attained: genuine, effective and strict neutralization of those countries, unhappily placed, by an accident of geography, between the two rival blocs, together with the abandonment of all pressure, interference or subversion on the part of foreign Powers.

58. I beg representatives to forgive me if I prolong my speech by describing how Cambodia envisages peaceful coexistence. I do not think these explanations will be useless, for although peaceful coexistence is a topic of the day it is very possible that not all those who proclaim their devotion to it interpret these two words in the way that we do. Peaceful coexistence should not consist merely of mutual toleration, or of shaking hands with him who remains the enemy while hunting for his weak points.

59. In that connexion we have been very glad to hear leading statesmen express their desire to put an end to the arms race and turn to peaceful competition. The adjective "peaceful" is undoubtedly attractive at first sight, and unquestionably represents an advance over the principally military nature of the existing competition. Nevertheless, this new competition contains the seeds of ideological struggles pregnant with trouble. Moreover we do not consider that the achievement of ideological uniformity is a desirable aim for humanity.

60. Our people has adopted a form of Buddhist social democracy which is peculiar to it, entirely corresponds to its aspirations and enables it to make definite material progress, without at the same time forsaking its traditions or a conception of life which nothing in the world would persuade it to abandon.

61. For us, the people of Cambodia, coexistence should in the first place be genuinely peaceful; in other words, it should entail not only the renunciation of generalized, total war, but also the renunciation of localized trials of strength, of small wars waged through intermediaries, such as our country has known and such as Laos, the Congo and many others are experiencing.

62. Peaceful coexistence also means the absolute renunciation of any attempt by one country to impose

its policy or its ideology on others. It implies the renunciation of efforts, by corruption or indoctrination, to de-nationalize members of any country's population and to induce them to betray their country's interests, disregard the deepest feelings of their people, and seize power by violent means such as "coups d'état" or revolutions.

63. Lastly, coexistence means that the rich and powerful nations should increasingly come to the aid of poor and weak ones, and that they should do so in a truly disinterested spirit of solidarity and not with the aim of propaganda or subversion. If the super-great Powers are to carry on peaceful competition, the finest and noblest sphere of activity in that line is, I think, assistance to peoples victimized by hunger, epidemics and the convulsions of nature.

64. Up to now, the volume of the assistance given to the under-developed countries has been in proportion neither to their population, nor to their poverty and their need, nor yet to their determination, their efforts to build for the future, or their deserts. In most cases such assistance is measured by the value of these countries as pawns in the blocs' struggle for influence, the extent of their docility or willingness to join one of the blocs, or their potentialities as threats or sources of trouble to them.

65. May we now congratulate our powerful friends, and particularly our Soviet friends, on their amazing scientific progress, which will shortly enable man to undertake the conquest of space. This progress, however, brings home to us the tragic irony of the fact that men, whose power is continually increasing, show so little wisdom in their behaviour and persist in laughing each other merely because they have different conceptions of how to achieve happiness, or for other and even less valid reasons!

66. As I draw to my conclusion I am aware how much I have abused the time and patience of the President and the members of the Assembly, particularly in view of the fact that, as the representative of so small a country, I should probably have shortened my speech by two-thirds. I beg forgiveness, and ask indulgence for my possibly over-bold remarks on the subject of blocs and the great Powers.

67. In this connexion I should like to try to dispel a misunderstanding. Certain newspapers of the "free world" have alleged that the neutral or neutralist countries are taking advantage of the rivalry between the two camps and playing them off against each other with diabolical skill, thereby reaping immense moral and material benefits. That view attributes to the small nations truly remarkable qualities of Machiavellianism, duplicity and irresponsibility! Cambodia, which is neutral, is too well acquainted, by experience, with the disastrous consequences of rivalry between the great ones of the earth to dare to try to use it for its own ends.

68. The celebrated magazine *Time*, which takes a great interest in our country, wrote with somewhat dubious humour: "Sihanouk unveiled a second rule of aidmanship: always bite the hand that feeds you." We are used to such amiabilities and have passed beyond the stage of indignation. Need I say that this acrimonious statement bears no relation to truth, so far as either we or the other under-developed and uncommitted countries are concerned?

69. We are sincerely grateful for the aid given us by the great and wealthy Powers, but the only assistance we can accept is that which will help to improve the lot of our people and enable us to emerge from our under-developed state. Many representatives are perhaps unaware of the fact—known, however, to a number of small nations which have received aid—that the friendly assistance provided for in official agreements is too often accompanied by clandestine assistance of a much less friendly nature.

70. This latter form of assistance, which is never referred to and the mere mention of which arouses indignation, can take a number of forms: direct subversion, or the support or artificial creation of rival groups, or the bribing of men who are supposedly influential enough to achieve the secession of certain provinces, to destroy neutrality and the national régime, or, again, the conditioning of public opinion through the purchase of part of the national Press.

71. Despite all my goodwill and my feelings of friendship towards those countries which have granted us official aid, I cannot ignore this assistance for which we did not ask and which is a direct threat to our independence, territorial integrity and national unity. If the granting of official aid is to entail obligations which run counter to our convictions, our real interests and our honour, and leave us open to contempt, we would prefer to be the wolf in Aesop's fable rather than the dog!

72. In short, I wish to make it clear that I am biting, not the hand which feeds our people, but the other hand, which seeks to contrive their death.

73. I hope that members of the Assembly will be kind enough to allow me to express some ideas with regard to the organization of this and future sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. The traditional aspect of the Assembly has been radically changed by the decision of Heads of State and world leaders to take part personally in the debates. In our view, the participation of Heads of State in the annual sessions of the General Assembly constitutes a two-edged weapon with regard to world problems calling for a solution. The presence of Heads of State may expedite the solving of those problems; but it could also be very dangerous, if the words uttered and the acts performed led to no practical results.

74. The presence of Heads of State at the United Nations has given rise to great hopes in all nations and among all peoples. It would be disastrous if those hopes were to be disappointed.

75. In the past, international diplomacy was carried on mainly by ambassadors, whose actions could be disavowed. In recent years its conduct has become the prerogative of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, then of Heads of Government and finally of Heads of State. My compatriots were undoubtedly very keen on this new kind of international diplomacy, with its Summit Conferences and meetings at the highest level. They were, however, greatly disappointed by the collapse of the recent Summit Conference in Paris which destroyed their hopes for peaceful and friendly coexistence and reopened the cold war, to the growing alarm of the isolated, small, "unclassified" nations like our own.

76. Hence we consider that the Heads of State and Heads of Government who are with us here this year have a formidable responsibility for the success or

failure of the work of the United Nations at this fifteenth session. If we are unable to give the peoples whom we represent definite assurances concerning an early and happy conclusion to the discussions on vital problems, the result may well be catastrophic.

77. What will be the reaction of the hundreds of millions of people who long for peace, freedom and justice, if the representatives of the great Powers meet only in order to agree to continue to disagree?

78. On behalf of my country of Cambodia, I should now like to address to the new President of the General Assembly our very sincere congratulations on his election. We are particularly glad to see this manifestation of the world's esteem for Ireland, a nation which is proud and courageous and treasures its independence.

79. Lastly, I should like to convey to all the delegations here present our warmest wishes for the success of their work.

80. Mr. MACMILLAN, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: I should like first to congratulate the President on his election to his high office. It gives me particular pleasure, as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, that I should be addressing this Assembly under the presidency of a representative of a country with which my own has so many close ties.

81. This fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations must be of great significance in world affairs. Indeed, never since the foundation of the Organization has one of the sessions been attended by so many international figures or commanded such wide public attention.

82. In this great Assembly, with nearly one hundred nations represented, there are bound to be different views. Some of the speeches that have been delivered have been partisan and even violent. I will try not to follow this example, for I feel that it would be out of harmony with the real mood either of the representatives as a whole or of the people outside.

83. Indeed, the sponge of public opinion is almost saturated with the persistent flood of propaganda. It can pick up no more. Ordinary people, all over the world, in their present mood, are beginning to tire of the same conventional slogans and catchwords.

84. The Prime Minister of Canada, in an arresting speech on Monday [871st meeting], pointed out the choice before us. Are we to indulge in a sterile debate of charge and countercharge, accusation and rebuttal; or are we to seek, by reasoned argument, practical solutions to the many problems with which we are confronted today?

85. These problems will not be solved in the context of ideological warfare. What we have to judge, in looking at the merits of any particular proposal, is its practicability and the contribution that it will make to a settlement of the pressing difficulties of these critical times.

86. That was the great value of the remarkable speech which President Eisenhower delivered here last Thursday [868th meeting].

87. A period of crisis is always a period of opportunity. If this session of the Assembly is dramatic, it may well be historic. It may mark the beginning of a period of steady deterioration, ending, as far as

human intelligence can foresee, in tragedy. Or it may be the beginning of better things.

88. We all feel in our hearts that as the world grows smaller it must, if it is to survive, become more united. But as each crisis underlines the difficulty of maintaining side by side the two principles of peace and justice, there are periods when all of us must have doubts. Nevertheless, whatever its difficulties and perhaps shortcomings, the United Nations is the best—indeed the only—organization which we have available. Its influence is continually growing. Like all organizations, it can no doubt be improved. The President of the United States made certain suggestions for this purpose, which I greatly welcome. Their object was to increase, not reduce, the power of the Organization to deal with crises as they may arise.

89. The proposal made [869th meeting] by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, if I may say so, seems calculated to have the opposite effect, for it would extend the veto, with all its embarrassments, into the realm of the Secretariat. It would freeze into the permanent structure of the Secretariat what we must all hope may be only the temporary divisions among us. I therefore believe that it will be unacceptable to the majority of Members.

90. The present division in the world exists and in this situation the interposition of the United Nations is often the only way to prevent the spread of these rivalries into areas where they may be a source not merely of local disturbance but of world danger. For that reason the United Kingdom Government feels that what the United Nations has done in the Congo was timely and should continue. We do not think that the constitutional disagreements between the Congolese leaders are a matter for this Assembly. It is for them and the Congolese people to decide how their constitution should be interpreted and their disagreements resolved. But certainly it would be a tragedy if the Congo were to become the arena for the contest between the two great groups of Powers. I believe that the great majority here are convinced that the United Nations is the best instrument to prevent that happening. It is of the first importance to the people of the Congo themselves. It is of the first importance to Africa as a whole, where so many new nations are emerging. I will return, if I may, a little later to this wider issue.

91. As for the Secretary-General, I would like to associate myself with the wide expression of confidence in his energy, resourcefulness and, above all, integrity.

92. I said just now that this session could be a turning point to better things, and since I am by nature an optimist, I do not despair that that may be the result. At any rate it is for that purpose that I have come here. In recent years I have tried to make some contribution towards the reduction of tension and publicly to declare my belief in negotiation. My visit to Moscow, when I had long and important discussions with Mr. Khrushchev, led to a series of interchanges of visits between the statesmen of the protagonist countries. These visits seemed about to fructify in the Summit Conference in Paris. The very fact of the choice of that city rather than an international place of meeting like Geneva indicated the possibility of a series of meetings to be held successively in, let us say, Moscow, Washington and London. There would then

have followed a period, if not of agreement, at least of sustained effort to agree.

93. We all know what happened at Paris, and there is no purpose now in recrimination. But the peoples of the world, who were deeply disappointed at that failure, expect us to overcome that setback and in due course start again. It was my hope, it was the hope of President Eisenhower and President de Gaulle, it was a hope which I believe was also shared by Mr. Khrushchev, that the setback would be temporary. The three Western statesmen issued on the night of the Paris meeting, on 17 May 1960, a statement from which I would venture to quote. This is what we said:

"They remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiation."

We went on to say:

"They themselves remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future."

94. Similarly, Mr. Khrushchev, although he permitted himself some forcible language, has seemed anxious to regard the path as temporarily obstructed and not permanently barred. At all events, it is in that spirit that I have worked during the period that I have been Prime Minister of my country, and it is in this spirit that I speak today.

95. At any given moment in the world's history we tend, all of us, to be obsessed by our own ideologies. We may thus become prisoners of our own arguments.

96. The great division in the world must be seen in a wide, historical perspective, and what a strange contrast it is between the dramatic achievements of modern science and the melancholy failures of modern statesmanship! We throw instruments into distant space, which circle the earth. We put hardly any limit to the ambitions of discovery. I am told we expect soon to visit the moon. Yet if there are inhabitants in any other planets looking down on us, how strange they must think the antics of humanity. With all this immense knowledge, the results of thousands of years of effort, emerging from savagery and superstition to the most sophisticated techniques, how strange it must seem to see human beings fighting and quarrelling, attacking not the real problems which confront us—economic, social, medical, agricultural—but each other, and even perhaps risking their mutual destruction through the accident of nuclear war.

97. And yet while their leaders have been quarrelling there has never been a time when ordinary folk, if they were only let alone, were more agreed as to their requirements and aspirations. Materially they want peace, prosperity and advancement; and they want perhaps something more, the chance to think for themselves about the deepest problems on which man has to meditate during his short individual sojourn on earth—the relations between man and man, and the relation between man and God.

98. It is therefore as trustees for ordinary men and women whom we serve that we, the so-called statesmen of the world, should approach our tasks today. But if we are to free mankind from ignorance, poverty, and fear, we must at least free ourselves from old and worn-out slogans and obsolete battle cries. Let me take a single example. Words like "colonialism" and "imperialism" have been slung about here without much

regard to the facts, at any rate of modern colonial and imperial history. Mr. Khrushchev made great play with this theme, but his exposition was demonstrably a complete distortion.

99. No one who heard the Prime Minister of Canada's brilliant reply in his speech on Monday [871st meeting] can doubt where the truth lies.

100. Without repeating the comparisons which Mr. Diefenbaker drew with the communist record, I think it right to recall for a moment the story of my own country.

101. I could not tell this story better than in words I addressed to Mr. Khrushchev himself in reply to a communication in the summer of this year. I referred to "policies which British Governments of all parties have followed not only since the war but for many generations". I went on to say this:

"For more than a century it has been our purpose to guide our dependent territories towards freedom and independence. Since the Second World War India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya, comprising over 510 millions of people, have reached the goal of independent life and strength. We have aided this process both by technical assistance and financial contribution. All these States are completely independent members of our free Commonwealth association. Nor is this movement at an end."

102. Where are the representatives of these former British territories? Here they are, sitting in this hall. Apart from the older independent countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa—here are the representatives of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya. Here—in this hall. In a few days' time, Nigeria will join us. Sierra Leone, and then the West Indies Federation will follow. And in due course others. Cyprus is already represented here. The problem of Cyprus, always an international rather than a colonial problem, has now been resolved. The Island has become an independent Republic as a result of friendly agreement between all the countries concerned. Who dares to say that this is anything but a story of steady and liberal progress?

103. Of course, even within our Commonwealth of independent nations there are bound to be differences. But, however acute these may be, the member countries try honestly and peacefully to resolve them. We have seen a recent notable example of this system. India and Pakistan have reached, after many years, with the help of one of the most potent organs within the framework of the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, assisted by the generous support of the United States, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries, and also the Federal Republic of Germany and others, an agreement upon the difficult question of the Indus waters.

104. Similarly, the French Colonial Empire has changed into the French Community of Nations, and here are their representatives with us in this hall today.

105. In Africa, above all, we are in the presence of a dramatic political transformation: the greater part of this continent has already gained its independence. For this great credit must go to the great people of Africa themselves. Those of us who have helped them forward to nationhood feel that we, too, have a right to be proud, for we have been working with the people

of these countries to help them realize their aspirations for peace, independence, prosperity and individual freedom. We know that they want these things in a form which suits them, and not according to some ideological pattern imposed from outside. We know that they want to avoid violence and chaos, for these things bring with them outside pressure and interference. New nations, to preserve their real independence, must be effective in protecting their own interests. In helping the people of these countries to advance to independence, we have devoted our efforts not to checking the forces of nationalism, but to harnessing them in the creation of new, strong and vigorous nations, undivided by tribal, ideological or racial strife, and imbued with the strength which only freedom and prosperity can give.

106. Of course, I accept that in this story of Commonwealth progress, there are still difficult areas. There are the parts of Africa where Europeans and Asians and Africans all live side by side. Our aim is certainly clear and constant: to build the people of these countries, or help them build up, societies in which all these, the people, of whatever race, tribe or religious persuasion, may live and work harmoniously together. To that purpose we are pledged, and for that purpose we shall continue to work.

107. In this year of 1960, so great for the peoples of Africa, the consummation of this policy can already be seen in some countries; in others it is approaching. With our willing help the peoples of these countries are steadily proceeding to the goal of political independence; Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika are all examples of the harmony and agreement between us and the people's leaders by which this process has gone forward. But what the peoples of Africa and also those of Asia equally need, as well as freedom, are those things to which President Eisenhower referred in his speech—food, development, education, freedom from the arms race. On these people can build nations. Ideological war would destroy them. I venture to say, therefore—I must say—that to my mind, these slogans are out of date.

108. And the same is true of many of the secular conflicts of Europe. There has been a great deal of communist denunciation, both at this Assembly and elsewhere, against the Government and people of the Federal Republic of Germany. Here again I am amazed at how backward-looking and reactionary much of this communist argument is. Both the Polish and the Czech representatives talked of the spirit of "revanche", which they alleged was reviving in West Germany. I am bound respectfully to say that I do not think their own speeches were flowing over with the spirit of reconciliation.

109. The representative of Czechoslovakia suggested that NATO "has become"—I use his words—"...an instrument of West German militarism for the preparation of new conquests" [871st meeting, para. 96]. Well, what are the facts? The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, by its declaration of 3 October 1954, has formally assumed the obligations contained in the United Nations Charter to settle its international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force. In the same declaration it has pledged itself never to attempt to carry through the reunification of Germany or to effect any change in its present frontiers by the use of force.

110. I will be frank. I represent a country that has no particular reason to regard German militarism with any special favour. Twice in my lifetime the British people have suffered most grievously both in blood and treasure as the result of German militarism. But we must look forward, not backward. Nor can you, to quote a famous phrase, "draw up an indictment against a whole people". Germany is divided into East and West, and so the German people, in spite of their great population and importance, cannot be represented in this Assembly today. East Germany is armed. Great Soviet forces are stationed there. That is part of the unhappy state of the world today. Yet at the same time, West Germany is condemned for rearming. We have an old proverb in our country about the pot calling the kettle black.

111. I know that some people tell us that East Germany is a communist heaven and West Germany a capitalist hell. I have, however, observed that during the last twelve years, 2.5 million people have voluntarily moved and are still moving from East to West Germany. No doubt there is some lesson to be learned from these dry statistics. At any rate, instead of talking so much about the right of self-determination of peoples in general, I think the Soviet authorities might explain why they have so consistently refused this right to the people of East Germany. And then Western Germany is accused of seeking allies. It has at least sought them freely, of its own will, and it has sought them among its natural friends, the countries of the world that are, broadly speaking, governed by free and democratic institutions, similar to its own. Moreover, as regards its rearmament, it has been willing and anxious to organize its defence forces entirely in the framework of an integrated Western alliance and to accept strict limitations as to the character of its weapons and the deployment of its forces. There is, therefore, no question of independent military action by the Federal Republic which might threaten peace.

112. Nevertheless I have thought it right to say these things; whatever our point of view, this is a case where we must surely try to free ourselves from the past and look to the future. There are great problems in the future of Germany. There is the difficult and delicate question of Berlin. But these problems, I would plead, should be resolved not by overriding and setting at nought international agreements, but by patience and honest attempts to reach agreement by negotiation. It was in this mood that considerable progress was made last year by the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, ^{1/} and if the same mood could prevail today there would be no crisis over Berlin.

113. If only we could recover the spirit that seemed to be at work even a few months ago, we could make a new start. The East-West conflict here or elsewhere cannot be resolved by weakness, by moral or physical exhaustion of one side or the other. It cannot in this nuclear age be resolved by the triumph of one side or the other without the extinction of both. I say, therefore, we can only reach our goal by the gradual acceptance of the view that we can all gain more by agreement than by aggression.

114. The urgent problem before the world today is not, or should not be, the supremacy of one set of nations over another or of one ideology over another.

The practical task should be to increase the world's resources and to meet by public and private investment the needs of expanding and politically maturing populations. How can this be done and how is it to be done?

115. First of all, in many fields a great deal is being done by the United Nations itself. We owe a great debt to the Secretariat for their patient and devoted work in organizing the technical aid programmes. The Special Fund is now becoming effective. Moreover, the whole effort of the United Nations has been to spread a better understanding among the Governments and peoples of all the world, that is, understanding of the essential unity of the world and the need to deal with economic problems, like political problems, on a comprehensive basis. And in addition, we must develop general recognition that the interest of all is the interest of each, that the whole world must grow and expand together, that nations cannot live or succeed in isolation. All these concepts are being popularized by the work of the United Nations.

116. We in the United Kingdom particularly welcomed the Secretary-General's proposals earlier this year for assistance to newly independent countries, both in Africa and elsewhere. We must all, within the limit of our resources, make the greatest possible contribution in men, money and materials to the less developed countries of the world. We, therefore, in the United Kingdom Government also welcome the proposals made by President Eisenhower last week [868th meeting] regarding the African programme, the Special Fund, and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. We share, with the United States Government, the view that the Programme for the provision of operational, executive and administrative personnel must be expanded and made permanent. We equally welcome President Eisenhower's emphasis on educational needs, for training and education are the essential tools of freedom and progress.

117. Inside our Commonwealth—I venture to speak once more of that—we have made considerable progress in these fields. The Commonwealth Education Scheme has been successfully launched, and a substantial share of it is for the African countries. Similarly, the meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers which has just ended in London resolved to initiate a special Commonwealth Assistance Plan for Africa, to help to meet the need to raise the standards of life in the less well-developed countries of the Commonwealth.

118. I say, therefore, it is also right to take some courage from these things, for they are moving; and it is right, also, to recognize the immense efforts made since the war on such a huge scale by agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and their associated bodies. This is now to be supplemented by the new International Development Association. Although all these are within the framework of the United Nations, it is a fact that their vast operations have depended upon the efforts of only a few countries—and those not the communist countries. The United States, of course, has been by far the largest contributor. The United Kingdom comes next. Many other countries have helped. So far I regret that the communist countries have not contributed.

119. According to the most recent figures which I have seen the total flow of finance during this period from the Governments of North America—that is, the United States and Canada—and the Governments of

^{1/} Lower Foreign Ministers' Conference, held at Geneva from 11 May to 20 June and from 13 July to 5 August 1959.

Western European countries, including the United Kingdom, has totalled \$14 billion net—\$14,000 million. That is an average of \$3.5 billion a year. That is the amount actually spent by these countries, either individually or through the international organizations. It excludes entirely, of course, the large flow of private finance to the developing countries.

120. Just to make the comparison, not necessarily to underline it, Russia and the other Eastern European countries entered the field of providing assistance in 1954. Over the whole period since then the sum total of the assistance promised or committed is not more than \$3 billion in all—less than the amount actually spent, not promised or committed, by the Western Governments in a single year.

121. I do not make this comparison to attack the Soviets. I had always hoped that this great problem of world economic development might have been discussed at a summit meeting. Indeed, General de Gaulle had publicly proposed that some complementary and co-operative efforts might be undertaken on an East-West basis, to start with no doubt in a limited field, but perhaps growing with experience. At any rate I believe that if we could revive the spirit of last spring this would be a fruitful source of discussion. Certainly it must be true that the emergent and under-developed countries would be the beneficiaries of a political "détente" between the great rival forces of East and West. Any new summit conference, therefore, would be bound to be economic as well as political.

122. We ought, of course, to turn away from our internecine struggle and concentrate our efforts on the universal problem of development. What prevents us? Not the lack of technical resources; they are very great and growing year by year. What prevents us is fear and suspicion. And the problem, therefore, is how to remove these fears and these suspicions. I know the Soviet powers are always attacking the defensive alliances of the West. On what are they based? On one thing: fear.

123. What formed the NATO alliance? The fear that, after the events of 1948, communism would spread over the whole of Europe, not by persuasion but by force. The countries of Western Europe drew together by a natural and instinctive gesture. They turned to the United States and Canada for help. The same expansionist policies led to CENTO and SEATO. Let us face it. It is from fear that the great deterrent forces of the West have sprung.

124. And on the other side, the Russian people no doubt believe—incredible as it seems to me and to my friends—they no doubt believe that they may be attacked by the West. And this is human—perhaps understandable. They too have their memories of invasions throughout the centuries, from Poltava to Stalingrad. So long as fear exists, so long as each side believes that it must rely on its own right arm to defend its own rights, so long will the tension continue, so long the "détente" becomes more difficult, so long will the great armaments of the world represent an ever-increasing burden on our resources of money, science and technique. That, therefore, brings us to the key of the problem—disarmament.

125. Some of the older ones here will remember that disarmament projects go back a very long way. The debates of the old League of Nations are filled with them. Plan after plan has been put forward in the last

fifteen years in the United Nations. Only last year a comprehensive proposal was launched [798th meeting] by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, then Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom. The next day [799th meeting] Mr. Khrushchev set out another full plan. We have had committees and sub-committees, meetings, debates, year after year, in every variety of forum and by every variation of discussion. Mr. Khrushchev has spoken once more at this session [869th meeting], and made it the main reason for his coming, of the vital need for world disarmament. Well, why have we not already reached some agreement? Why have none of the plans reached fruition? The reasons which I have given we all know—fear and suspicion. These are the causes, not the effects, of world armaments. So the problem remains. How can this fear and suspicion be removed? How can we make some real progress this time?

126. One thing is clear: words are not enough. The nations require some assurance of safety before they will act. If this is given, the rest will follow. It is very easy to say: "We will get rid of all our armaments whether nuclear or non-nuclear, whether conventional or non-conventional, if others do the same." But the key of it all is faith, and in the present state of the world faith cannot grow on its own. It must be strengthened, fortified, buttressed by practice. I ask any member of this Assembly honestly to face the problem with himself and in relation to his neighbours. In the vital matter of national survival it is not enough just to sign agreements. It is absolutely essential to have the assurance that these agreements will be rigorously adhered to. That leads us straight into the problem, the question of international inspection and control.

127. The Assembly has heard the dramatic declarations, first by the President of the United States, then by the Prime Minister of Canada. President Eisenhower said: "...we are prepared to submit to any international inspection, provided only that it is effective and truly reciprocal" [868th meeting, para. 66]. Mr. Diefenbaker said: "Canada is prepared to make available for international inspection and control any part of Canadian Arctic territory in exchange for a comparable concession on the part of the Soviet Union" [371st meeting, para. 204]. Yesterday the representative of Denmark said [875th meeting] that his country would be ready to consider making the same offer in respect of the vast area of Greenland. I will add this: the United Kingdom will gladly allow any form of inspection and control that is accepted by the Soviet Union.

128. So, if these offers could be taken up—and no doubt they will be taken up—this session of the Assembly could not fail. But can they be taken up? Is there some obstacle, and if there is, can we help to remove it?

129. We have, I think, to recognize that some governments believe—and this is the objection that the Soviet representatives have often expressed in the past—that inspection and control might be just a kind of cover for espionage. Of course, let us be frank—none of us would particularly welcome into our countries the large number of officials from abroad who...

Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, spoke in Russian from the floor.

130. Mr. MACMILLAN, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: I should like that to be translated if he wants to say anything.

131. I say, that none of us would particularly welcome into our countries the large number of officials from abroad who might be necessary to inspect and control all the variations of armament production in its wide form, the atomic plants as well as the factories for making aeroplanes, guns, warships and the rest. And I realize also—and I want to be fair in this—that some countries, partly because of their historical traditions, partly because of the very state of world divisions, regard with suspicion, natural suspicion, and would wish to reduce to a minimum, any international inspectorate. Yet, if we are to succeed, we may as well be realistic. We have somehow got to overcome these doubts, however reasonable they may be. Fear of espionage, fear of strangers, resentment of the fact that words are not enough, that each nation needs to be reassured and reinsured by effective inspection and control—all these misgivings are very human. But they must not stand in the way. And if we succeed, if disarmament can progress step by step, keeping time with the setting up of the controls, then these fears and suspicions will begin to fade. They will wither away.

132. How then can we get over this difficulty? I would venture to make what I hope is a practical proposal. Let us recall what has been our experience regarding the matter of nuclear test explosions. Happily, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, in spite of the somewhat worsening atmosphere of recent months, is still going on and still making progress. Of course it has taken a long time. But when it started the views of the different parties were very wide apart. Now they are very much closer, and it is essential that we should bring this matter to a successful conclusion. It is essential, not only to prevent a resumption of nuclear tests with all that that involves, but to show that settlements can be reached, in spite of their technical complexity.

133. But let me recall how the Geneva Conference started. It started by reaching agreement between the three Powers concerned that, in the initial stage, our representatives who were meeting together were not to play a political role. They were to study the problem from the scientific and objective point of view. They were scientists, not diplomats or politicians, and they were to report whether, in their view, effective measures could technically be devised by which, if an agreement were made to stop nuclear tests, the agreement could be enforced. It was the agreement of the scientists that was the first step. I would venture to submit that there is a lesson to be learned here.

134. We should apply this principle to the wider field of disarmament. It is the best, and perhaps the only, way to make practical progress.

135. Of course, it may be easier to do this in some sectors than in others. Nevertheless, there is, first, the problem of preventing what I might call the expansion of armaments—trying to prevent the present situation from getting worse. We need to prevent the use of outer space for military purposes, and President Eisenhower has made some wise proposals in this respect. We need to call a halt to the manufacture of fissile material for military purposes. Proposals have also been made in this respect, and I am very

happy to see that the Soviet Union has now accepted the need for joint studies in this connexion. We want technical experts to tell us what measures could in fact prevent the extension of armaments and the clandestine storage of fissile material, without giving rise to the problem or the fear of espionage. This examination should, therefore, be largely scientific and technical.

136. That is the first set of problems. Then there is the problem of ensuring against surprise attack by one side or the other. That is what all are afraid of, or feel they ought to protect themselves against. It would be an immense relief to people all over the world, including the admirals and the generals, if this could be done. We could all sleep more soundly in our beds. And here, perhaps the experts, both technical and administrative, could work out a scheme against surprise attack, either upon a limited or upon a wider scale, and tell us how it would work.

137. And then, thirdly, there is the task of reducing to a minimum all forms of armaments—obviously a very complicated problem. But here again, if we could give administrative experts some guiding principles, they should be able to tell us what measures of inspection and control would be effective and fair to all countries. We should tell them that their measures must not give at any stage a significant advantage to either side, and must at all stages provide effective verification.

138. I therefore want to develop and to give my support to the suggestion made by the Foreign Minister of Denmark yesterday, [875th meeting] and to make the specific proposal that there should be appointed a group of technical experts, scientific, military and administrative, to prepare a report, an agreed report, as to how we are to do this. That is the first step. That period need not be very long, for a great deal of work has been done on this subject by the various committees that have sat over all these years. Some of it has been largely lost and buried in those discussions, but valuable material exists on which a new inquiry could draw.

139. This practical procedure is not in any sense a proposal to institute control without disarmament. No country could be committed at this stage to implementing any of the measures which the technical experts might suggest until there was a subsequent agreement about the disarmament measures related to the system of control. Of course, if confidence is to be maintained it is obvious that control must be concurrent with disarmament and that it must be effective.

140. The great advantage of this report, I would suggest, is that it would not, at any rate in the first stage, be political or controversial. It should say, from a purely technical and objective basis, what measures would be appropriate, in the fair interests of all nations, and in the various aspects of disarmament which I have mentioned. The experts would make a report which would provide a basis for political action, just as it was the scientists' report which provided a basis for the Geneva Conference—certainly I hope to be effectively concluded, but at any rate far the most hopeful conference which we have had in all this field. This report would therefore be of the greatest value in the work of the negotiating body, whatever that body might be. It would enable the statesmen or

their representatives to translate into action what the technicians tell us is technically possible.

141. I venture, therefore, to make this proposal. I trust that it may receive favourable consideration and approval, and if we can agree to it in principle I cannot believe that the appointment of the experts and the terms of reference under which they are to work can present any grave difficulty.

142. Of course, this proposal, if accepted, would be only a modest step, but it would be a step in the right direction, and it is the first practical step which counts.

143. I have to thank the President and the members of the Assembly for their attention to what I have said. I will venture to end with one general observation. It has been my experience that in all human affairs there are dangers in excessive pessimism as well as in too much optimism. It is foolish to deny the existence of the great divisions of the world today. There are those who accept them as inevitable and irreconcilable. I believe that they are wrong.

144. Equally, there are those who think they can be removed by mere words. This, alas, is a delusion. I am sure that a less dramatic but more practical way is this. The only way forward is by gradual approach, working step by step in practical ways to improve the position. We need to work patiently and sincerely, and all the time we need to remember that the hopes of millions of people are fixed upon us in this Assembly, and for their sake we must not fail.

145. Mr. KREISKY (Austria): May I congratulate the President, on his election to the Presidency of the fifteenth General Assembly? As far as his outstanding qualifications are concerned, there is little I can add to the laudatory remarks of the speakers who preceded me; however, I may be permitted to affirm them, and to say that it is a source of special gratification to my country, which is bound to him by close and lasting ties, that Mr. Boland has been chosen to guide us through this historic session.

146. Never before in the history of the United Nations have so many heads of State and of Government addressed a General Assembly; as has been pointed out before, this fact has undoubtedly lent special significance to this year's Assembly.

147. It would be a most damaging self-delusion, however, if we were to attempt either to ignore or to minimize the basic contradictions which have so far been revealed in the debate. In the recent past, it was the process of polarization which overshadowed all other developments. However, there has been evidence for some time of another, simultaneous process, which, in a period of relative stability and peaceful progress, might soon occupy the centre of the political stage; it is the crystallization of several political and ideological centres which may well be destined to supplant the former clear-cut pattern of East versus West. Matters would then have progressed beyond the stage where we could simply regard those who do not always agree with us as belonging to the other camp.

148. Although the experience of a colonial past may have induced resentment against the Western world among the emerging nations, it does not necessarily follow that they therefore must subscribe to the political aims of the East. And it is equally true that one's dedication to the principles of Western thought need not be impaired if one does not always accept Western

political practice. Clearly, one must no longer overlook the fact that the political problems besetting the world today cannot be exclusively seen in terms of oversimplified alternatives. There is no doubt that several fundamentally contradictory views have been advanced at this year's General Assembly and not, as has often been held, only two.

149. The United Nations and, more specifically, the General Assembly, cannot consider it its task merely to register conflicting opinions. It must also provide an opportunity to establish the extent to which the various views might lend themselves to conciliation.

150. For example, at this session of the General Assembly the leaders of the two great Powers, Mr. Eisenhower [868th meeting] and Mr. Khrushchev [869th meeting], have both subscribed to the view that the era of colonialism is at an end, and that the new nations which are now emerging into a new phase of their history must be given aid and support by tangible evidence of international solidarity.

151. The United States has on previous occasions succoured many European nations which might have perished without such aid. And President Eisenhower has now again given expression to the magnanimous spirit of his nation. He proposed that we join forces in order to carry out a great programme which, it should be stressed, envisages measures designed not only to fight hunger and epidemics but, in equal measure, to render a contribution towards the utilization of the great intellectual resources of the new nations. There are no differences of opinion on this, the most fateful question of our era. On the contrary, the two great Powers are determined to contribute to its solution.

152. This has been, up to now, the outstanding result of the fifteenth Session of the General Assembly.

153. The recent turn of historic events has brought about a substantial increase in United Nations membership. Consequently, the world Organization has come even closer to the realization of the principle of universality on which it is founded.

154. This development, which attests to the change of the political structure of Asia and Africa, has been a source of great satisfaction to all of us. It is the consummation of a development which began some time ago and which has already brought us new Members from among the Asian and African States without whose collaboration our Organization would be immeasurably poorer.

155. In this context, however, we must also take note of the regrettable fact that Germany is not yet a member of the United Nations and that the question of the representation of China has not been solved in a manner satisfactory to all Member States.

156. The precipitate increase in the number of independent nations should be accompanied by a process of assimilation based on the principles of equality and mutual co-operation. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom has described this essential development in the following terms: "from dependence to independence to interdependence."

157. However, it is not only the political structure of Asia and Africa—and, incidentally, of Latin America—which have undergone a fundamental change. There has been a peaceful evolution in Europe the importance of which should not, I submit, be underestimated. And

there is a growing conviction among the democratic European nations—nearly 300 million people—that a programme of mutual co-operation, transcending frontiers, should be initiated with the aim of combining the spiritual and material resources of that part of the continent. I would ask you to consider that the concepts of social welfare and social justice originated in Europe and that it is in Europe that they have reached maturity.

158. At present the European nations have embarked upon a venture of economic integration. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to state before this international forum that in so doing we do not propose to serve only our own ends; it is no less our purpose to contribute an increasing share of our national income to the economic development of other nations. European economic integration, whatever its final shape, has been conceived to serve peace and nothing else.

159. In the wider international arena it is the United Nations, its specialized agencies, committees and funds which provide the framework for the co-operation of all nations in all fields of human endeavour. Therefore, in spite of the great financial obligations assumed by Austria in the past years, we are determined substantially to increase our contribution to the Special Fund and to the Technical Assistance Programme.

160. To us, the small countries, the United Nations is not merely a clearing-house of political opinions. The difficulties which beset the world Organization are of the utmost concern to us. It is our view, therefore, that the organizational structure of the United Nations should not be subjected to an additional strain which could not but increase these difficulties.

161. It is hardly conceivable that many of the small nations could subscribe to a concept exposing the office of the Secretary-General to the risk of immobilization which, unfortunately, other organs of the United Nations have incurred in the past. The opposite should be our aim: we should assist the United Nations in solving the problems which confront it and we should support the Secretary-General, whose activity we have had occasion to observe with increasing admiration during the past weeks.

162. It is often held to be the cause of the present political impasse that the protracted disarmament negotiations have yielded few results. It would be futile to ponder the question whether the disarmament talks have been stalemated as a result of present political tensions or whether the break-down of disarmament negotiations has itself caused the situation to deteriorate. What we should consider, however, is the fact that a fair measure of agreement has been reached on matters of principle as well as of detail.

163. It is widely held that in order to overcome the present impasse, some measure of confidence should be established between the great Powers. Yet time and again such confidence has been destroyed by mere incidents which have wiped out the patient efforts of many years. We will escape this vicious circle only if we can gain some significant, tangible success by solving one of the outstanding problems. This would mean much more than any exposition of one's own views—however thorough—which, after all, would convince only those who have been convinced in advance.

164. It appears, therefore, that a new attempt should be made to achieve at least preliminary results; to be

quite specific, nuclear test control is one of the most vital aspects of this vast and intricate problem, and here again it should be noted that agreement has been reached on several points. I would therefore suggest that the United Nations and affiliated bodies pursue this subject with the utmost vigour.

165. I should now like to comment on the problem of the Austrian minority in Italy. Permit me first to express my gratitude to the members of the General Committee who, in compliance with the Austrian request, have voted for the inclusion of this item on the agenda.

166. Originally it had not been my intention to deal with the merits of this problem in the general debate. Yesterday, however, the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Segni, gave his views [876th meeting] on the problem of the South Tyrol—one which, I hardly need to say, is of crucial importance to Austria. I feel, therefore, that I should make a few remarks on the substance of this problem.

167. Article 14 of the Charter of the United Nations specifically states that the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation which it deems likely to impair friendly relations among nations. And, indeed, relations between Austria and Italy have been seriously impaired by the unsettled problem of the South Tyrol. It follows then that the General Assembly is the proper authority to deal with this question.

168. As the Charter indicates, the founders of the United Nations were guided by three basic purposes: to bring about world-wide co-operation, to prevent conflicts from breaking out, and to promote the principle of self-determination and self-government.

169. With these aims in view, the problem of South Tyrol could be speedily brought to a satisfactory solution if only the demand of the Austrian minority for autonomy, raised on 4 February 1958 by the freely-elected South Tyrolean representatives in the Italian Parliament, were complied with.

170. The Austrian delegation will therefore submit proposals designed to secure such autonomy to the Committee dealing with this question.

171. We live in an era in which the right to self-determination and to self-government has been accorded universal recognition. It has been solemnly reaffirmed by the admission of many new States into the United Nations. Should we expect the South Tyroleans to understand why they—and apparently only they—must forego the right to self-government?

172. For some years now we have patiently endeavoured to solve this problem in the course of bilateral negotiations which have finally ended in a deadlock. The Foreign Minister of Italy drew attention yesterday to correspondence he and his successor as Prime Minister, Mr. Tambroni, have conducted with Chancellor Raab. Mr. Segni stated that the Austrian Government rejected an invitation to talks at the head-of-government level. Allow me to say that the Austrian Chancellor, in his letter of 26 January 1960, agreed to such talks provided that they dealt with the question of autonomy for the province of Bozen. Clearly this was a most reasonable stipulation; yet Italy rejected it.

173. I believe that this might well demonstrate that it was not Austria which dramatized this issue. The

facts—and not any action that Austria might have taken —have contributed to this dramatization.

174. These facts are simply that the South Tyroleans, a population of a quarter of a million people, have so far been denied the very rights which have been granted to much smaller populations elsewhere in the world.

175. Let me express the hope that the United Nations will bring this question closer to a solution which would affirm the right of the South Tyroleans to self-administration and self-government; it might thus contribute towards a renewed concord between the two neighbouring States.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.