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President: Mr. Víctor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

In the absence of the President, Mr. Kuznetsov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Vice-President, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. CASEY (Australia): Had our friend and colleague, Mr. Belaúnde, been in the Chair this morning instead of being unfortunately temporarily indisposed, I would have expressed to him the very sincere congratulations of the Australian delegation on his election to the high office of President of the General Assembly. It is a most well-deserved honour by reason of long and devoted work, for which the United Nations is so much indebted to him, and is, I believe in addition, an earnest of the esteem and affection in which he is personally and universally held.

2. This year the possibilities of a new approach to some chronic problems in international relations have been opened up, first of all by the courageous and imaginative initiative of Mr. Harold Macmillan. The Heads of Government of the United States and of the Soviet Union—the two greatest Powers of the modern world—are visiting one another's countries. Mr. Khrushchev, has addressed this Assembly from this rostrum [799th meeting].

3. I believe it is true to say that a good deal of the world's problems in this post-war period have been due to deep-rooted suspicion between the two countries—between the countries of the democratic and of the communist blocs. Whatever the causes, the inescapable fact is that such suspicion exists. I believe that the matters that are bedevilling international relations at this time—a divided Berlin, a divided Germany, lack of progress on disarmament, and the cold war generally—I believe that the basic reason why these problems are proving so intractable is fundamentally the existence of a deep-rooted overall suspicion between the two blocs.

4. The individual political problems between East and West are symptoms of something much wider and deeper. Some of the individual problems might still exist, even if there were no suspicion, but they would not be insuperable problems or carry the seeds of war. Consequently the elimination—or even the diminu-

tion—of mutual suspicion must be the objective of constructive statesmanship. This demands the creation of a better international atmosphere, in which existing individual problems will not have such urgency or potential importance.

5. If we attach such importance to removing or at least diminishing the present degree of distrust and suspicion, one must regard as a vital contribution the present series of high-level exchanges of visits. These began with the visits to Moscow of Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, followed by the visit of Mr. Nixon, and then by the visit of Mr. Eisenhower, to three European capitals, and then by the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to the United States. There will be Mr. Eisenhower's most important visit to Moscow, I expect next year, and, in addition, the probability of a summit meeting. Out of all this highly important chain of exchanges may come some more realistic mutual appreciation of the respective attitudes—and, one hopes and prays, some diminution of mutual suspicion and some more noticeable mutual confidence.

6. To those who ask if any of the existing individual matters in dispute are likely to be solved by these meetings, I reply that I would personally believe not necessarily. These meetings are designed to attack a cause of the world's malaise: suspicion—not the individual symptoms. If these high level meetings result in an improved atmosphere, the individual problems will be easier to deal with later and, in any event, they will represent a less dangerous aspect than at present.

7. The whole chain of high-level visits might be described as an exercise in public relations on the grand scale. I define "public relations" as a confidence-generating exercise, not as a cure-all for specific problems. And I would add this—that it is unlikely that confidence will be substituted for suspicion in one round of such high-level visits. Maybe the world will need a succession of such visits over a considerable period of time before the temperature of the world's political atmosphere is sufficiently reduced.

8. Moreover, suspicion is not just a state of mind which can be approached without regard for causes. On the democratic side, we find most difficult to understand the steady pressure maintained against non-Communist countries—subversion through foreign-inspired Communist parties; threats and incursions of a more overt form, as has recently occurred in Laos; even active border clashes in some parts of the world. Any new-born hopes for peaceful coexistence cannot persist if it is interpreted by Communists to mean: "Hands off so far as Communist countries are concerned, but a free hand for Communists in all other countries."

9. Relations between the great Powers are crucial to the preservation of peace. Indeed, the whole structure of the United Nations is based on the principle of unanimity of the great Powers so far as maintenance

of peace and security is concerned. Yet it is obvious that this unanimity does not exist. Our greatest efforts inside and outside the United Nations must be devoted towards widening the area of agreement between the great Powers.

10. It is now almost fifteen years since the Charter of the United Nations was signed at San Francisco. The Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter, which has reported [A/4199] to the present session of this Assembly, was of the opinion that it is not timely to convene such a conference just now. The Australian Government agrees with that view. Clearly a sufficient area of agreement does not exist on possible amendments to the Charter to warrant such a conference. Nevertheless, it is appropriate in the general debate to ask ourselves some questions about where the United Nations is going.

11. Some thoughts about this will come to mind by reason of developments on disarmament last month. A Ten-Power Committee has been established outside the United Nations with parity of representation between the countries of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty—or, in the current but quite inaccurate term, between East and West. This poses two important questions: To what extent should international activities be conducted through the United Nations? And what place should a doctrine of "parity" occupy in our work?

12. It is quite clear that the drafters of the Charter did not intend everything to be done in the United Nations. The Charter is full of references to activities which not only can, but even should, be conducted outside of the United Nations itself. For example, under Article 33 of the Charter, parties to any dispute are told first of all to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, or other peaceful means. There are a number of references to activity outside the United Nations—for example, reference to regional arrangements and to the right of individual and collective defence. Such references illustrate that it was never intended at San Francisco that every act of international negotiation and of international conduct should be made through the United Nations.

13. But the Charter lays down in Article 1 that the United Nations should be "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends", that is to say, the ends set out in the Charter as the purposes of the United Nations. The Charter also states in Article 103 that, "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." It is clear, therefore, that even where the machinery of the United Nations is not directly involved in the discussion of a problem the over-all purposes and principles of the United Nations are still intended to prevail.

14. If every question was brought before the United Nations, its machinery would be brought to a standstill, just as a river can be clogged with weed so that the passage of ships is impeded. We have to approach this in a practical way, treating each subject on its merits. It has, for example, been a generally accepted practice, specifically kept in mind at the San Francisco Conference when the provisions of the Charter in relation to regional organizations were drafted, that disputes inside Latin America should be settled through

the Organization of American States and not brought directly to the United Nations. The idea of trying to settle some things regionally is a sound principle which has worked very well in Latin America, and is one which, I believe, could often be followed with advantage in other parts of the world.

15. What about disarmament? The Australian Government does not feel aggrieved that the great Powers have had direct talks on this subject, and would not object to further talks proceeding outside the United Nations. The great Powers have the large armaments and the nuclear weapons which threaten the survival of the modern world. No agreement, no resolution of the United Nations, that did not obtain the consent of the Soviet Union, of the United States and of the United Kingdom could be of any real force. It is therefore a good thing that these three great Powers should negotiate with one another.

16. If they choose to exclude the smaller countries or the uncommitted countries, and take the view that agreement is more likely to be reached in direct and private discussions amongst themselves, then we have to accept it. Australia would certainly not wish to attempt to upset any prospect of the great Powers coming to an agreement on any aspects of disarmament.

17. At some stage, however, the United Nations must be brought into consideration and international co-operation on this question of disarmament. In fact, since the fourteenth session of the General Assembly began, an additional item: "General and complete disarmament" has been placed on the agenda [agenda item 70] and will go to the First Committee. I do not propose in this general debate to attempt to discuss details of possible means of United Nations participation in the disarmament field. I shall content myself with making the point that the rest of us—that is to say, those of us who are not amongst the ten—have a great interest in the progress and outcome of the Ten-Power Committee talks. The consequences, and even the direct impact, of a world war would not be confined to the geographical part of the world from which these ten countries come.

18. Nor are Europe and the North Atlantic the only parts of the world in which the threat of war exists. Therefore, the other seventy-two of us have a very real interest in seeing that the search for a settlement continues, and in maintaining pressure so that the convening of an inner group does not degenerate into a device for covering in eloquent silence the fact that possibly no real progress of a practical nature is being made towards reaching agreement.

19. Having said this, let me add that we must also recognize, as realists, that the most substantial and promising approaches towards a solution on aspects of disarmament have been, not in United Nations bodies, whether small in number or consisting of all of our eighty-two Members, but in the talks this year in Geneva directly between the great Powers, particularly those talks on the control of nuclear tests, on which there is reason to believe that agreement may be close.

20. Now a word about "parity". By parity I mean the proposition that in a committee there should be an equal number of representatives of the so-called East and West. Sometimes parity is interpreted as providing for a leavening of the uncommitted countries.

Whatever meaning is attached to parity, I would regard its general application as unhealthy doctrine which should not find a place in the United Nations. The Ten-Power Committee in Geneva, set up to work on the specific problem of disarmament, must not be allowed, we believe, to become a precedent for representation in other bodies, particularly for those inside the United Nations. Disarmament can be regarded as a special case.

21. The first objection to the doctrine of parity, as a matter of general application, is that it would tend to force countries into two blocs. Instead of widening possible areas of agreement, it would work to crystallize and freeze the world into two camps and make attitudes more rigid. Australia, for example, generally supports the policies of the West because we believe in the ideological outlook of the West based, as it is, on the conception of freedom for the individual. But that does not mean that on every issue we line up automatically with all countries of the West, regardless of the merits of the question as we see it. Can we, or any other independent nation represented in this Assembly, accept a doctrine of parity which would automatically assign to us in advance an attitude on questions coming before the United Nations?

22. In the second place, the doctrine of parity, as applied up to now, at any rate, could mean exclusive or at least preponderant representation for Europe and the North Atlantic countries. In the Ten-Power Committee, the whole of Asia, Africa, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand are unrepresented. I repeat that my Government accepts this for the discussion of disarmament, at this stage, because it is the arms of Europe that are under discussion in the first instance. We certainly cannot accept such a doctrine as a general approach to the majority of questions coming before the United Nations.

23. In discussing the general question of the role of the United Nations, I referred to procedures for international negotiation on disarmament. On the substance of the question of disarmament, I imagine that most of us when we came to New York this month thought that there would be little discussion at the present session of the Assembly, in view of the establishment of the Ten-Power Committee and because of the general feeling in the Disarmament Commission that there was not very much that could usefully be said about it here just now. But the subject of disarmament has burst the bounds and has figured prominently in this general debate. An item on general disarmament has been placed on the agenda of the First Committee; Mr. Selwyn Lloyd outlined a detailed and practical programme [798th meeting] of disarmament, and Mr. Khrushchev in his address to this Assembly devoted [799th meeting] a substantial amount of time to disarmament.

24. Mr. Khrushchev's proposals are for the most part not new, but we hope that the spirit behind them is new. Progress in disarmament is very much dependent on the spirit in which countries on both sides put proposals forward and examine them. This spirit has to be demonstrated, not only in the broad enunciation of high principles, but in willingness to work out details to put them into effect. A number of matters which some might regard as technicalities, such as provisions for inspection and control, in fact lie at the very heart of disarmament, because they are essential to the creation of mutual confidence and

safeguards against breach of agreements. Without such guarantees countries will not disarm.

25. I welcome Mr. Khrushchev's emphasis on having a comprehensive approach to disarmament. In earlier debates in the United Nations, Australian representatives have stated the Australian Government's belief that disarmament in the nuclear and conventional fields must go on side by side and not as separate and successive stages. It may well be that some points that have not proved susceptible to agreement as long as they are contemplated as elements in successive stages may, nevertheless, prove capable of acceptance if intended to be put into effect simultaneously as part of a more comprehensive approach.

26. All proposals will have to be given careful and honest examination, whether at this Assembly or in some other more restricted forum. Discussion at this session can hardly go beyond some general statements. The smaller nations will now look to the great Powers, and would like to spur them on to practical detailed discussion. The Australian Government considers that disarmament might well be the most useful topic upon which the first summit meeting could concentrate.

27. The world will take some encouragement from the press "communiqué" issued on 27 September 1959 in Washington after the meeting of Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David. We welcome their reference to disarmament when they said:

"The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States agreed that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. Both Governments will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem."

28. Now I shall touch on another subject. The affairs of the Middle East have held the attention of the General Assembly and of other bodies of the United Nations since the very inception of this Organization, and I do not feel that we should fail to record our continuing interest in its economic and political development. Many of the tensions and problems can only be tackled by those directly concerned, the countries of the Middle East, when the proper conditions and atmosphere exist, but the United Nations and others can help to bring about these more favourable conditions. In any event, the peaceful economic development and stability of the Middle East will need considerable outside assistance.

29. One item on our agenda item 27, deals with the question of Palestine refugees. This is of great importance to the countries of the Middle East and is a vast humanitarian problem. It demands the sympathetic attention of us all. It is not a question that is going to be solved quickly, and I do not believe that it can be solved in isolation from efforts to solve other problems in the Middle East, for example, the raising of standards of living and promotion of economic development throughout the Middle East. This is one of the points made in the document submitted by the Secretary-General, Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees [A/4121]. It is the political disputes that tend to attract the attention of the outside world, but not the least fundamental problem in the Middle East is to increase production at a faster rate than the rise in population in certain Arab countries.

30. Another question that has remained before our attention during the past year, though it is not an item on the agenda of this session, is freedom of transit through the Suez Canal. This is of great concern to a large number of countries at both ends of the Canal—European and Asian countries as well as others such as Australia and the Americas—which need to use this important waterway for their international trade. I do not intend to go over any of the incidents that have occurred during the past year, mostly related to Israel, but, in view of these incidents, I wish to record again that we believe in free passage through the Canal for all countries without exception.

31. South-East Asia is the region adjacent to Australia. We have close relations with all the countries of South-East Asia and we have a direct concern with their welfare, progress, and security. Australia is a member of many regional arrangements linking us in common endeavour with these countries. For example, early this year the fifteenth session of ECAFE was held in Australia. Then, in November, I shall be going to Djokjakarta in Indonesia for the annual meeting of countries members of the Colombo Plan. I mention these as examples of the degree of fruitful and continuous partnership existing between Australia and its neighbours.

32. In the political sphere we record our satisfaction at the success achieved by the Secretary-General in his efforts to ease difficulties that had arisen between Thailand and Cambodia. This was a good example of the quiet constructive work that can be done through the United Nations, and it should not pass unnoticed merely because it was done in private and not in public.

33. In South-East Asia the situation giving most concern at present is in respect of Laos. The facts of the situation are far from clear, and it was therefore appropriate that the Security Council should decide to take steps to ascertain the facts before embarking upon any consideration of substantive action.

34. Since the Laos situation is still before the Security Council, I do not propose to go into detail on the subject. But it would be useful to state very briefly the Australian Government's approach to the whole question of the status and international relations of Laos.

35. We support the right of the Government of Laos to exercise its sovereign rights. The Government of Laos is opposed to reconvening the International Commission for Supervision and Control, considering itself to have fulfilled its obligations under the Geneva agreements of 1954, the execution of which the International Commission was established to supervise. As the French representative explained at the Security Council [847th meeting] earlier this month, the Geneva agreements were never intended to place Laos under perpetual trusteeship. It would be an unhappy day for the United Nations if any of the smaller and newer countries among its Members were told that they could not look to this Organization in the same way as other Members could look to it.

36. Let me quote to this Assembly some remarks in the Australian House of Representatives, made on 17 September 1959 on behalf of the Australian Government by the Acting Minister for External Affairs:

"I should like there to be no misunderstanding in the minds of Honourable Members about the Govern-

ment's view of the desirability of Laos continuing to avoid military alignment with either the Communist bloc or the Western Powers. That it should refrain from adopting such military alignments is in our view consistent with the intention of the Geneva settlement, with the need to avoid giving the powerful Communist States on its borders any opportunities for provocative activities, and thus with the best interests of Laos itself. Certainly I believe that neither the Laotian Government nor any of its friends wish to see the neutrality of Laos abandoned or modified. Likewise they want to see that neutrality respected.

"But whatever limitations on its foreign relations may reasonably be held to derive from Laos' adoption of a neutral status, there can be no doubt that Laos enjoys the same sovereign rights as other neutral Powers, in particular the right to secure itself against any threat to its integrity, whether that threat derives from subversion, insurgency, or from incursions into its territory by foreign Powers. In addition it has the right to accept military aid reasonably consistent with the defence needs of a country with powerful and aggressive neighbours to the east and north and with a long and difficult frontier to police."

37. All Members of this Assembly will be watching what proceeds from the Security Council's transactions. We must all be conscious that continued moves against the integrity of Laos could mean involving other countries. United Nations consideration is designed to prevent this contingency from arising.

38. One feature of the general debate so far has been a number of references by representatives to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization. This reflects the [A/4132] amount of thought-provoking material which Mr. Hammarskjöld has included in his report, and is one more example of the way in which he has been developing his high office so that it will help Member nations co-ordinate their own policies as part of the world community.

39. In his report the Secretary-General has some pertinent things to say about economic growth. Even before reading his report I had intended to say something about this on the basis of his notable statement on the world economic situation made on 6 July 1959 at the twenty-eighth session of the Economic and Social Council [1068th meeting] in Geneva. He has directed our attention to what he regarded as an indication that recently much of Government thinking in many countries seemed to have shifted from an emphasis on economic growth towards giving a higher degree of priority to other goals such as price stability.

40. The Secretary-General, I know, would not assert that economic growth should be pushed at the expense of all the other elements in a nation's economic and political policy, such as the avoidance of a substantial rate of inflation or of severe balance of payments difficulties. There must be a balancing of objectives and also of alternative courses. I take it that what he was trying to encourage was a state of mind—a climate which he calls "growth-minded"—and for this I believe there will be wide support.

41. Indeed, his remarks are very relevant to our own policies in Australia. The Australian Government in recent years has pursued the major objective of developing Australia economically. Since the end of the

Second World War, Australia has maintained a high rate of immigration, at over one per cent of its total population each year. The Government of which I am a member has insisted on keeping this high rate of immigration, necessitating a high level of public and private investment, a proportion of which has been derived from current income rather than borrowing—investment made necessary, for example, by the demands for additional housing, roads, schools, hospitals, and other capital requirements, all being undertaken before the new immigrants are able themselves to contribute on net balance to our total production. Over the past ten years, expenditure by public authorities in Australia has increased very much more than expenditure on personal consumption. This indicates the importance the Government attaches to economic development. The same story is shown by figures for private fixed capital investment, which has risen from 15 per cent of the national income ten years ago to 21 per cent today.

42. There has sometimes been criticism in Australia that we have been pushing this goal of development too far and too fast when we could avoid some of the strains by keeping on comfortably at a steady jog-trot. But we have rejected such a timid approach. On the whole, a society either progresses or goes backwards. As the Secretary-General said in his statement to the Economic and Social Council: "No one would feel that price stability had been well won if its cost proved to be economic stagnation..." [ibid, para. 12].

43. But, of course, as I have said, the choice is not the simple one of growth or something else. Nobody wants big and embarrassing inflation. Even on the most severely practical grounds, too rapid a rise in prices and costs can discourage needed forms of economic activity. Economic development is set back if inflation proceeds at such a rate that the economic mechanism of the country is disorganized and the incentive to save is destroyed. Nor can any country push ahead with a development policy without regard for its balance of payments position, in regard to which it may very often be dependent upon the economic policies of other Governments. There have been some useful discussions in the past in the United Nations, some of them promoted by Australia, to the effect that all countries of the world, and particularly those which play the greatest part in international trade, have a duty to the international community and under the Charter to do their best to maintain a high level of domestic economic activity.

44. In this connexion I have in mind the Secretary-General's remarks about the repercussions on under-developed countries of a slowing-down in the rate of expansion of the advanced countries. What he says is relevant to my own country. Australia, though it is industrializing rapidly, is still dependent for its economic welfare upon the export of certain key commodities, such as wool, wheat, dairy products, and metals. We are therefore acutely conscious of the fact that a sustained rate of consumption and growth in the great trading and creditor nations is essential for the economic development of others.

45. One of the satisfactory features of the post-war years has been the great resilience of the United States economy. There has been, on occasion, a slowing down of the rate of growth of the United States economy, and on each of these occasions fears have been aroused that a depression might develop, with

consequent difficulties for other countries. But the recessions have been short-lived and the slackening of economic activity in the United States has never been as severe as some feared it would be. This, of course, has been of immense importance to the economies of the rest of us. Another encouraging feature has been the recognition by successive United States Administrations that none of us can be healthy economically if the world economic situation as a whole is not healthy. With enlightened generosity—and I use those words—the United States has provided economic assistance to other nations to repair the ravages of war and to assist their economic development and to ease economic burdens. I have called this "enlightened generosity", because it takes a great people and a high level of understanding to see where their ultimate interest lies and to give effect to the necessary policies.

46. Before I leave the question of growth, I would draw attention to my remarks [759th meeting] in the Assembly last year about scientific research and about the need for positive action to spread and apply a knowledge of its results. Australia is a country whose continued economic progress is made possible only by continuous research to overcome natural obstacles, such as desert and heat and climatic conditions, and to enable the successful transfer to Australian conditions of plants and animals from other environments. We in Australia are not only "growth-minded"—we are "science-minded". In the modern world the two things go together, or so we believe. New opportunities are being opened to mankind by current scientific research in both the physical and biological sciences, of which we believe we must make the most.

47. At its thirteenth session the General Assembly adopted a resolution [1316 (XIII)] sponsored by Australia on scientific research. The Australian Government looks forward to seeing during the coming year the first results of this international scientific study being conducted through the United Nations and specialized agencies as a result of that resolution. I regard it as a contribution to the state of mind—thinking in terms of growth rather than of safety-first—that the Secretary-General referred to.

48. In the general debate in this Assembly during the thirteenth session I ventured to lay special stress upon the importance to under-developed countries, including Australia's own neighbours in South-East Asia, of maintaining stable commodity prices and in particular of avoiding violent fluctuations in such prices. Unfortunately I must substantially agree with the Secretary-General when he states that not much progress has been made in dealing with the problem of commodity price instability. Some progress has certainly been made, but not as much as many of us would like. In so far as it results in an over-all reduction in agricultural protectionism, my Government agrees with the Secretary-General, the World Economic Survey 1958^{1/} and the GATT panel of experts that industrial countries could significantly improve export markets for the under-developed countries by selective reductions in agricultural protectionism. My Government, and, I am sure, all countries which depend on primary products for an important part of their foreign exchange earnings, would like to establish a clear and continuing

^{1/} United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.II.C.1.

trend towards the reduction of agricultural protectionism over a wide range of primary production. The trend in recent years towards increasing agricultural protectionism in industrial countries is a cause for concern to those countries themselves because they must pay more for agricultural products. But it can also mean severe economic difficulty for the primary exporting countries whose markets and foreign income are constantly being eroded.

49. In his introduction to his annual report the Secretary-General raises the question of improving the procedures of the Economic and Social Council so as to "render possible a searching examination and discussion of key issues of decisive general importance at a policy-making level" [A/4132/Add.1, p. 3]. There have been occasions in the past where it has done this, for example in some of the early discussion of economic development, and in the setting up of the United Nations Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance. There will from time to time in the future be other important questions on which international attention should be focussed. We need not always expect the Economic and Social Council, or the United Nations, to make decisions or to take action as a body. The focusing of attention, the bringing together of people from different countries in related fields, the forcing of Governments to apply their minds to international discussions of particular problems—all these can be very important. The Economic and Social Council must guard against becoming too stereotyped in its approach to its work and drifting into a pattern whereby papers are called for as a routine procedure and get discussed and passed on in an equally routine way. We think that the Council must not neglect its opportunities to give a lead and to provoke thought on the bigger economic issues of the day.

50. The Economic and Social Council is the principal organ of the United Nations in the economic field, not simply because it is described as such in the Charter, but because it is the only body of the United Nations which is small enough to permit fairly detailed discussion and yet large enough to represent the principal regions of the world and the varied types of economy. The Second Committee of the General Assembly is too large for this work. Yet I believe that the Second Committee might sometimes be able to do more if the Economic and Social Council could give more guidance to its discussions—if, for example, the Council were to propose each year an important topic of discussion, not so wide that discussion can be only general, but a topic of defined scope and practical importance, with some supporting paper that would serve as a basis for discussion. An item with too broad a heading does not allow Governments to brief their representatives closely, nor does it allow discussion to be narrowed sufficiently to produce an impact on international thought. This year several important subjects are referred to in the report of the Economic and Social Council itself—which is item 12 on our agenda—but it is difficult to anticipate much prepared discussion on any one of these when delegates' attention has not been specifically called in advance to the likelihood of discussion on that subject. This is something to which the Council itself might perhaps give some thought, as a way of increasing its own effectiveness and usefulness.

51. On another subject, one of the great problems—probably the greatest—facing the world is the rapid growth of world population. The subject of population

growth has been under close study over a number of years by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and by ECAFE. This study has resulted in the production of a series of reports, one of which was produced by the ECAFE secretariat for the consideration of the ECAFE Conference held in Australia earlier this year^{2/}. In the preface to this report, it was said:

"The growth of world population during the next 25 years has an importance which transcends economic and social considerations. It is at the very heart of the problem of our existence." The rate of population growth varies from region to region and from country to country. The most important incidence of population growth is in Asia, which already comprises almost half the world's population. On the basis of present trends the population of Asia may have doubled in the next thirty years.

52. The present global rate of population growth is about 1.5 per cent a year which is expected to increase to about 2 per cent in the course of the next thirty or forty years. The present rate of growth of population in Asia is 1.7 per cent a year, with the prospect of rising to 2.3 per cent a year in twenty years' time.

53. By no means all the Asian countries are overpopulated. But in some of them the population problem and its growth is of immediate and growing intensity and is a factor that currently influences the success of development plans. As is said in the introduction to the latest Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East:

"There is even a danger that the developmental effort will not be large enough to offset the effect of a rapid population growth and that per capita income will decrease."^{3/}

54. The main reasons behind these menacing problems are: improved health services, higher levels of nutrition and better standards of infant care. In many countries where the birth rate has remained fairly static, the death rate has decreased due to modern public health measures. This reflects the effectiveness of national and United Nations actions in these fields. These endeavours must and will continue. However, we must realize that, as is so often the case, an improvement in one direction brings with it accompanying problems in another direction. The basic problem will be to feed, clothe, educate, and employ the increasing population. On the short term, a rapid and extensive growth of population causes a large increase in the number of minors and dependants, and consequently a tendency for the living standards of the working population to be reduced. At a later stage, comes the problem of finding productive employment.

55. I will not attempt to detail methods of dealing with the economic and social problems of a rapidly increasing population. There is clearly no single or easily applied solution. My intention at this stage is to seek to bring the problem once again to notice and to stress the urgency of positive and adequate planning. This will necessarily vary from country, according to the social, religious and economic structure. For example, a national policy of family planning, which has been successfully initiated in India, and in

^{2/} "Population Trends and Related Problems of Economic Development in the ECAFE Region" Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. X, No. 1.

^{3/} Ibid, p. 2.

Japan, would obviously be unacceptable in a variety of other countries of the world. In the countries that are now overcrowded it is difficult to see how the speeding up of industrialization or increased food production can keep pace effectively with the rising tide of population, although such efforts would no doubt reduce the scale of the problem. Likewise, large-scale emigration would be unpractical by reason of the vast numbers involved and the difficulties of their absorption into other economies. Even if it were practicable, saturation point would soon be reached and the problem would persist.

56. I make this plain statement on a matter of incontrovertible importance, which is already well known to us all, but which seems to receive much less high level attention than it deserves.

57. I am glad to place on record Australia's continued support of United Nations programmes for international aid. Including the Colombo Plan, our contributions to international aid in its many forms will come to over \$14 million, an increase of nearly \$3 million over last year's figures.

58. Australia takes satisfaction from the fact that, on a per capita basis, it is one of the five largest contributors in the world towards international aid. This has to be read against the background of the fact that there are great demands on our resources for our own development and for the development of the Non-Self-Governing Territories for which we are responsible.

59. Australia is a net importer of capital, and so may be regarded as coming into the categories of both a developed and an under-developed country.

60. Subject to parliamentary approval, Australia's contributions towards the various forms of international aid through the United Nations for the financial year 1959-1960 will be over \$1,700,000. In addition, Australia will contribute \$12,320,000 towards Colombo Plan aid to the countries of South and South-east Asia—making a total of over \$14 million. The previous year's total was something over \$11 million.

61. In conclusion, let me say a few words on a matter that I know is in the minds of a great many of us. In the world as a whole there is a movement towards some accommodation between the great Powers. But in particular areas of the world there are—and, unfortunately, it may be expected that there will continue to be—tensions and potential sources of conflict, many of which are not susceptible to early or quick solution. In some of these places the United Nations has by its very presence had a beneficial influence; for instance, in ending open conflict or in calming the atmosphere. I have in mind such examples as the United Nations Observers in Kashmir and elsewhere; the UNEF in the Middle East; the Secretary-General's representative in Jordan, and the Secretary-General's own quiet diplomacy in the course of his many overseas visits. The United Nations "presence" in a trouble spot can be a great influence for peace. It is something to which men's minds are increasingly turning, and is a development which the Australian Government welcomes as part of the positive role which the United Nations can play in the world. Let us exercise our minds towards directions in which the conception of the United Nations presence might be developed even more than has been the case in the past.

62. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) (translated from French): I should like first of all to express the great and sincere satisfaction of the French delegation at the remarkable demonstration of unanimity which has made Mr. Belaúnde the outstanding figure in the United Nations Organization this year. It is a fitting tribute to a man who has devoted his entire career to the service of right, peace and understanding between peoples. Such a mark of recognition was due to him; and France, whose friend he is, welcomes and hails this recognition.

63. Two weeks ago, our President closed his inaugural address [795th meeting] with the words: "May God will that this Assembly should go down in history as the Assembly of peace." These noble words, which bear the stamp of his personality, might well be repeated year after year within these walls, for they represent the real and the only mission of our Organization and the fundamental aspiration of all. Year after year, however, we meet to take note of the constantly increasing difficulties and the constant succession of crises, without any sign as yet, so long after the Second World War and the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, of that far-reaching settlement which would finally make it possible to lay the foundations everywhere of political stability and enduring peace. May the coming months, during which many new events will no doubt occur, open the way to a new state of affairs to which that hackneyed yet hope-inspiring expression, the easing of international tension, may at last be appropriate.

64. At the opening of the thirteenth session of the Assembly, the world was living under the threat of two major international crises—one in the Middle East, the other in the Far East—which occupied our attention to the exclusion of all else. The world moves quickly. Who remembers them nowadays except as events of the distant past? It is a fact that the situation in the Middle East has become remarkably stable since 1958. No one is happier about this than France, particularly with regard to Lebanon, whose rapid and peaceful recovery after the trials of 1958 is a source of great satisfaction to us.

65. Not all the problems are settled, of course, far from it, as witness the renewed difficulties concerning free transit for Israel ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal. The 1888 Constantinople Convention, reaffirmed by the United Nations, remains for us the basic instrument in this matter. However, real progress has been made, with the help of the discreet and effective presence of UNEF. It is to be hoped that, as requested by the Secretary-General, the Force will be allowed to continue its activities.

66. Mention should also be made of the settlement, in a neighbouring region, of the Cyprus problem, a settlement made possible by the clear-sightedness, wisdom and courage of the three Governments which were parties to the dispute. The close collaboration subsequently established between Turkey and Greece is a subject of particular satisfaction to France.

67. In Asia, on the other hand, there are abundant reasons for concern. The crisis in the Formosa Straits has quietened down for the moment. Elsewhere, however, on the periphery of the vast land mass of China, incidents and even serious disturbances are developing. The whole world is aroused by the exces-

ses committed in Tibet and by the contempt they imply for the elementary rights of the human person. Let us hope that the Tibetan people will soon recover their ancient liberties and respect for their beliefs.

68. The difficulties which have developed in Laos have been before the Security Council for the last few weeks. France, which has a very sincere friendship for that country and has special responsibilities there under the Geneva agreements of 1954, has followed these events closely. It gives its full support to the action taken by the Security Council. It particularly hopes that the Sub-Committee which was sent to that area will be able to carry out its mission of inquiry under the most favourable conditions. It is important to put an end to the instances of outside interference which have occurred. Such interference is calculated to create disturbances which would make Laos, an essentially peaceful country, a victim of the cold war. The Security Council will have to give the matter renewed consideration. Discussion in any other form would therefore be inappropriate, and we hope that the necessary pacification will follow.

69. During the general debate in 1958, I had occasion [758th meeting] to say to the Assembly that the crises then in existence, both in the Middle East and in the Far East, should not make us lose sight of the overall problems, particularly those resulting from the last war. In the forefront of these problems, we French place the tragic division of Europe. Events have already demonstrated that these problems have lost none of their seriousness; indeed, they have since become the burning questions of the day. There is little doubt that in the coming year they will continue to be the principal subject of discussions between the East and the West.

70. Everyone knows that it was the Soviet note of 27 November 1958 that started the so-called Berlin crisis, which is really the crisis of the whole of Europe; indeed, the question of a general European settlement was immediately raised. Everyone is aware, too, of the slow development and the generally negative results of the Geneva Conference.^{4/} But it had at least the virtue of opening the discussion and also reducing the temperature of the crisis and the seriousness of the threats which had been made or were implied in certain attitudes adopted. The discussions at Geneva were suspended for reasons which are common knowledge. No doubt they will be resumed later on, but everything is still in the melting-pot.

71. The Assembly naturally has all available information about the substance of the problems involved, and several of our colleagues have spoken here about them. I shall therefore merely recall in a few words the point of view taken by the French Government.

72. With regard to Germany it is time, high time, nearly fifteen years after the end of the war, to reach a settlement. This settlement, namely the signing of a peace treaty which would crystallize the new look of that country, can be concluded, in our opinion, only on the basis of the reunification of the two parts of Germany which are today set up as completely separate entities. This was the proposal of the Western Powers at Geneva in a document which they called a "peace plan" because it dealt simultaneously with the German settlement, the organization of European

security and the beginning of general disarmament. The reunification of Germany would, of course, ipso facto dispose of the Berlin problem.

73. This reunification could be conceived only in accordance with a democratic process and consequently should be concluded by free elections. This automatically raised the question of the survival of the present régime in East Germany. Here is the reason, in a nutshell, why our plan did not succeed and why—let us frankly admit—it could not succeed in present circumstances.

74. Under such conditions, the only way open to the responsible Governments was to continue the status quo, adapting it to conditions and circumstances to avoid difficulties and incidents; the only possible attitude was to wait until the world situation and the evolution of East-West relations would make it possible to conclude a substantive agreement. That was our opinion, and it was in that spirit that we considered the possibility of concluding a provisional agreement on Berlin. In the light of the substantial concessions which we had stated we were prepared to make—the fixing of a ceiling for Western garrisons, an agreement not to install nuclear weapons in the city, the control of propaganda and subversive activities—this was calculated to allay the concern which the Government of the Soviet Union had expressed to us.

75. Such an agreement—modest in itself, but with far-reaching consequences, if only it meant tackling a German problem—proved impossible because our Soviet colleagues had taken a stand basically opposed to ours. Since reunification by agreement between the two camps is not possible at the present time, they draw the conclusion, not that this provisional state of affairs must be accepted, but that it must become permanent, in other words not only de facto but also de jure recognition must be given to the existence of two Germanies and must be ratified by the conclusion of a peace treaty with each of them. At the same time, they maintain that the anomalous situation which prevails in West Berlin because of the continued lack of a single German Government should be coped with by establishing a permanent régime in the form of a neutralized free city.

76. Such a development would in fact mean essentially the evacuation of the Western garrisons in Berlin. In law it would amount to giving legal sanction to the division of Germany. If this were put into effect it would unquestionably have serious repercussions among the German people, with long-range consequences which could not be measured. We have always considered that it would be contrary to justice and reason.

77. The two sides are thus still very far apart. Long negotiations will be necessary to bring them closer together. We ourselves will never refuse to undertake such negotiations, because it is indispensable, both for the countries directly concerned and for world peace, ultimately to find ways of establishing in Europe a stable and enduring equilibrium. The Germany of today is not the Germany of the past; it will undoubtedly make a large contribution to the establishment of such an equilibrium.

78. The Geneva Conference, which adjourned on 5 August 1959, thus ended on a provisional note of failure as far as the main point of its programme was concerned. On one point, however, we were more

^{4/} Four-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference, held at Geneva from 11 May to 20 June and from 13 July to 5 August 1959.

successful, for some concrete results were achieved. These were limited inasmuch as only a procedural question was involved, but they were important in that they dealt with the basic question of disarmament. I say basic question, because I sincerely believe that this matter is of vital urgency for all the peoples represented in the United Nations and for all the peoples of the world. I also believe that if this Organization has a mission it is first and foremost to promote disarmament, and I am happy to note that nearly all the speakers on this rostrum have also realized this.

79. It may perhaps not be an exaggeration to state that, under present conditions, the future of man depends upon the decisions which in the years to come may be made in two very different yet very closely linked fields. I mean disarmament and assistance to under-developed countries; in other words, I refer to the battle which we must jointly wage against war and poverty.

80. These two fields are interdependent, not only because they are fundamental necessities of our time, but also because the solution of the one problem, that of assistance to under-developed countries, depends to a large extent on the solution of the other. Effective and large-scale disarmament is the only means by which the wealthiest and economically most highly developed countries can afford to devote sufficient funds to the advancement of the less-developed countries. The French Prime Minister, at the summit Conference held at Geneva in 1955,^{5/} was the first to propose the idea of allocating to the assistance of the less-favoured countries all or part of the savings to be made from a disarmament programme. The idea has gained ground since then. It was repeated on this very rostrum just a few days ago by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union [799th meeting]. We still feel that it is sound and fruitful.

81. But it is easy to speak of disarmament. It is easy to show what absurd and ruinous burdens the arms race imposes on the nations which engage in it. One need not have a mastery of scientific or technical knowledge to describe the incredible dangers which the accumulation of nuclear weapons involves for the earth.

82. Obviously, the best course would be to go all the way: ever since wars began, man's dream has been of a world without armies. Man also dreams of universal peace and of a society where poverty and all forms of inequality would be banished forever. Let us respect this ideal, let us preserve it and let us try to use it to achieve some progress along a path where even the most modest results would mean almost revolutionary progress.

83. The Assembly is already aware of the arrangements made at Geneva for the Governments principally concerned to resume the discussions on disarmament in the near future. These arrangements were recently approved by the Disarmament Commission [see DC/146], which fully understood that in accordance with the Charter it retained the major responsibility in the matter, and that the action taken by the four Powers [see DC/144] was intended to accelerate the technical studies and discussions of a problem which was constantly being changed and made more complex

by scientific progress. The Ten-Power Committee is expected to meet at the beginning of next year. It will take up the question of disarmament where it was left off in 1957 at the end of the last session of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

84. Two suggested work programmes have already been put before you, one by Mr. Khrushchev, the other by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation [798th meeting]. The first will be the subject of a preliminary discussion by the present session of the Assembly. This discussion will undoubtedly provide more exact information about possible means of putting into effect and controlling the total disarmament which has been proposed. The second is based on the French-United Kingdom plan submitted in 1956. It has already been worked out in much greater detail and it is very broad in scope. Like the first plan, it should be very carefully studied by the Ten-Power Committee and I should like for the time being to confine myself to a few remarks on two points which are fundamental as far as disarmament is concerned.

85. The first of these remarks concerns the eternal problem of control, about which the Western Powers and the Soviet Union have always held widely divergent views. The other day we heard Mr. Khrushchev forcefully explain his point of view. The Soviet Union, if my understanding is correct, accepts the idea of control but assumes that it would not be set up or at any rate function effectively until the disarmament measures agreed on had been put into effect. We feel, on the contrary, that the disarmament process itself and the application of control cannot be separated. The latter guarantees and consequently conditions the former. Moreover, in the absence of real control, the indispensable element of confidence would be completely lacking. I use the word confidence by design, for it is the keyword. The disarmament problem has technical aspects and these are important; but basically it is a political problem.

86. Disarmament is not, cannot be and never will be an end in itself. In any decisions taken, considerations of defence, international responsibilities and political relations in general must have priority. Economic, financial, moral or psychological considerations are inevitably secondary. It is undoubtedly correct to say that disarmament can be a factor in the relaxation of tensions but it is not conceivable without this relaxation itself. Nor is there anything contradictory in this, since interdependence is one of the facts of life. Disarmament is both a result of the relaxation of tensions and a factor in bringing it about; this means that there is an urgent need of a first step which can be taken only in the field of politics. For example, the Berlin problem would be brought into perspective and efforts would be made to find there, as elsewhere, conditions for peaceful coexistence; there would be no attempt to impose on some the will of others. We would try to settle all together the conflicts arising in Europe, Asia or elsewhere. Indeed, it would be the beginning of that fundamental change in East-West relations for which the world hopes. Everything would then become possible, to begin with; effective disarmament.

87. The second point concerning disarmament to which I should like to draw the Assembly's attention is the nuclear problem. Obviously, that is the vital point; and I should not like there to be any misunderstanding whatsoever concerning the French Government's posi-

^{5/} Conference of Heads of Government of the four great Powers, held from 18 to 23 July 1955.

tion. I stated last year [758th meeting] and repeat at this time: a disarmament programme must first and foremost cover nuclear weapons, that is, it should provide not only for the halting of tests, but also for the cessation of manufacture, the progressive reconversion of stocks and lastly a ban on possession and use.

88. Until such time as these decisions are taken, atomic devices will continue to make up the essential part of the military arsenal of the principal Powers. This will be true even if these Powers give up future experiments and merely continue tests related to the launching of nuclear devices, i.e., the construction of inter-continental and other types of rockets. Under these conditions, which do not constitute disarmament, we ourselves cannot undertake commitments which in fact would amount to sanctioning and hence running the risk of perpetuating the present situation. This point of view has been criticized and will be criticized again. We are prepared as in the past to explain it before the Assembly; I hope that a debate on the subject will serve to convince everyone of the necessity for genuine nuclear disarmament.

89. With regard to the above question, a movement has developed which is reflected in the submission of a special item for inclusion in our agenda, protesting against the prospect of nuclear tests being carried out in the Sahara by the French Government. The African countries, or at any rate some of them, have expressed the fear that there might be radioactive fall-out on their territories. We are prepared to provide all necessary explanations on this point. The precautions which will be taken will absolutely eliminate any risk whatsoever. We are convinced that an objective examination of the facts will give every assurance, just as a similar examination has already convinced the Governments of the African States associated with the French Republic in the Community.

90. A few minutes ago, I stressed the undoubted connexion between a reduction in military expenditure and the expansion of international assistance to the less-developed nations. This is true from the financial point of view and it is also true from the political point of view, for such assistance will only take on its true meaning and become truly effective in a world from which the cold war has been banished. In this field, too, a relaxation of tension would be of significance.

91. Only concerted action by the more favoured nations could reduce the present inequalities in the distribution of resources and the difference in the rates of development. Such an undertaking would answer the demands not only of reason but also of justice.

92. France has consistently supported the steps taken in this direction within the United Nations. It was for these reasons that it supported the plan to set up a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. In the same spirit, we welcomed the establishment of the Special Fund, whose objectives are perhaps more modest but whose effectiveness already seems to be assumed.

93. This year we learned with interest of the plan of the United States Government to set up an International Development Association, which, with its more flexible regulations, would be a useful adjunct to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-

ment. We shall support this plan, on the grounds that such an agency would fill a gap in the complex machinery for the distribution of international economic assistance.

94. Lastly, we ourselves have on several occasions proposed general plans of varying content but all inspired by the same philosophy. Our own experience has led us to take a global view of this problem—and here may I be permitted to point out that, having regard to its national income and taking into account the assistance which it affords to the Territories for which it has special responsibilities, France is probably doing more than any other country on behalf of the under-developed countries.

95. Although we do not reject piecemeal plans, we are sure that the assistance needed for the launching of development plans cannot be a permanent solution. In the last resort, nations must find the mainsprings of their progress within themselves. For this there are a number of preconditions, one of the most important being the stabilization of prices for primary commodities. Price fluctuations cause serious disturbances in the developing countries, from which for the most part these commodities come. If there could be some organization of markets to guarantee, through appropriate machinery, stable revenues to the commodity-producing countries, a large proportion of mankind would escape the phantom of poverty and would be able to face the future without fear.

96. Our activities in the field of technical co-operation, too, are directed towards economic development. I shall not expatiate on them today, but I am glad that they are to be further extended and consolidated. France has always considered this to be the most effective and fruitful form of assistance and it is delighted to see that international solidarity in this field is becoming increasingly close and confident.

97. I shall devote the second part of my speech to problems which are, for the most part, outside the competence of the United Nations, but on which we feel it might be well for the General Assembly to have some information. I refer to those regions of Africa in which France has special responsibilities.

98. Some of these problems have been discussed year after year by the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter. These relate to the African Trust Territories under French administration. On 1 January and 27 April 1960 the Cameroons and Togoland under French administration will respectively attain independence. The Assembly has already given its sanction to this evolution, which France, with your assistance, has brought to a successful conclusion. Everything has taken place in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned, as expressed by Governments properly set up as a result of free and democratic elections.

99. There are other territories, in Africa south of the Sahara, over which France has exercised the rights of sovereignty for many years, sometimes for centuries, and which, with French assistance, have made tremendous strides. This transformation was ratified on the occasion of the drafting, followed by the approval by popular referendum, of our new Constitution. The peoples of these territories were invited, in the most solemn and explicit manner, to decide for themselves how they wished to build their future. They were offered a choice between two solutions. One was

the breaking of the ties which had hitherto bound them to France. The other was entry into a Community, which we were ready to build with them, within which they would have complete autonomy in the management of their own affairs while sharing with France certain responsibilities such as those of defence and external affairs, and retaining special and mutual ties with the Republic in the financial, economic and cultural fields.

100. The choice thus offered was exercised on 28 September 1958 by means of a referendum held simultaneously in France and in Africa. By approving the new Constitution by a large majority, the French people ratified in advance the choice which was made by the various African peoples. The latter, by deciding freely for or against the draft Constitution, made it clear whether they opted for the new Community or for secession.

101. One African territory, Guinea, decided in favour of the second. Its new status was immediately recognized by the French Government.

102. All the other territories, by ratifying the Constitution, decided in favour of entering the Community; that is, they decided to assume responsibility for their own future by becoming States while at the same time maintaining their co-operation with France. These are the circumstances in which in the autumn of last year, between 14 October and 18 December 1958, twelve republics were constituted, one after the other, to form with France, the new Community: the Malagasy Republic, the Sudanese Republic, the Republic of Senegal, the Republic of Chad, the Mauritanian Islamic Republic, the Gabon Republic, the Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Ivory Coast, the Republic of Dahomey, the Voltaic Republic and the Republic of the Niger. All of these have now ratified their own Constitutions, held regular democratic elections for their own legislatures and properly constituted their own Governments. All of them are now States, born in freedom, fraternity and non-violence.

103. This is why the delegation which has the honour of representing the French Republic at this General Assembly also represents all the other States of the Community, and therefore includes people who are specially representative of those States.

104. I should add that by entering this new system, the originality of which I need not emphasize, the various African States and the Malagasy Republic have not determined their future once and for all. According to our Constitution, agreements may be entered into to alter the sphere of affairs under joint management. There may be territorial regroupings. Already, the countries which once constituted French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa have agreed to set up a customs union among themselves. Lastly, there is an article in the Constitution which provides that any member State may cease to be part of the Community. Clearly, the principles which served as the basis for the formation of this Community remain valid for the future, so that at any time the States forming it remain members only because they freely desire to do so.

105. Thus the right of peoples to self-determination, laid down in Article 1 of the Charter, was the rule followed by the French Government in the policy which has led it over the last eighteen months to define its

relations with the African Territories for which it was responsible. Elections and referendums have been held in complete freedom everywhere, and everywhere the people concerned have voted and made their decisions in circumstances which no one, inside or outside, can claim to be irregular or invalid.

106. I have dealt with the Community. I think it is time now to raise a very different question, one which is unique, namely the political future of Algeria. In his statement of 16 September 1959, General de Gaulle, the President of the French Republic, solemnly laid down the conditions within which the political destiny of Algeria will be determined.

107. Once again, the case of Algeria cannot be compared with that of the Territories which have now become the African and Malagasy Republics of the Community. The territory of Algeria, which, as General de Gaulle said, has never, since the beginning of time, known unity, still less Algerian sovereignty, has for nearly a century and a half been bound by innumerable close ties to France, whether in the field of demographic structure, economic affairs, culture or administration.

108. One million citizens of European origin are established there, many of them having been there for five or six generations. More than 300,000 Algerians work in France and support by their remittances a million and a half people in Algeria, or more than one-fifth of the Moslem population. Algeria cannot by itself support a population already too large and expanding at an increasing rate. Its economy has for a very long time, and of necessity, been closely geared to the French economy. It can only make up for the resources it lacks by selling on the French market products which would find no outlet elsewhere, by sending a large part of its working population to earn a living in France, and by organizing jointly with France, and by means of the tremendous investments made by France over a period of many years, the gradual exploitation of its territory.

109. The development scheme known as the Constantine Plan has provided a decisive impetus for this exploitation: from 1960 onwards 100,000 million francs, equivalent to \$200 million, will be set aside by the French budget to finance this programme, without counting the large contribution of private capital and the money spent by France in Algeria on the civil administration. The petroleum and gas of the Sahara will also provide the cheap and abundant power which is essential for new industry.

110. For more than four years, Algeria has been torn and ravaged by an insurrection, which quickly took on the aspect of a real civil war. This is certainly not, despite the over-simplified and harsh claims of propaganda, a civil war in which the French forces are ranged on one side and the Algerian Moslems on the other. On both sides, most of the combatants and most of the victims are Algerian Moslems. One hundred and twenty thousand of these, that is, many more than there are in the rebel ranks, are in the French army, most of them volunteers. Among those killed in the fighting, the ambushes and attacks, the proportion of Moslems is much the highest.

111. The rebels seek to impose secession by force. We say: no one has the right to force a régime on Algeria; the régime it is to have can only be the result

of the freely expressed wishes of the Algerians themselves. Fighting, violence and terror are not the way to find a solution. Let them be brought to an end and let the men and women of Algeria, all of them, without distinction of race, religion or political conviction, be allowed to decide for themselves in peace and liberty. This is the programme which France has formally enunciated.

112. In the circumstances, there is no political or moral justification for the rebellion. "Why, then" said the President of the French Republic in the statement to which I have already referred, "why, then, should the hateful fighting and fratricidal violence which is still bathing Algeria in blood, go on?"

113. For more than a year and a half the way has been prepared for the decision which the Algerians are called upon to make. The system of a single college has been instituted, which gives the Moslem population by far the greatest majority of voters and representatives. Many elections have already taken place, in which various candidates of all shades of opinion have campaigned for the voters' favour. The most important occasion was the participation of the Algerians in the referendum on the draft Constitution, on 28 September 1958. In this vote, the significance of which can hardly be over-estimated, the vast majority of Algerians signified that they wished their future to be linked with that of France and—why not say so?—that to that end they placed their trust in General de Gaulle.

114. The instrument, therefore, exists. When peace is restored, it will be used to conduct the referendum in which the Algerians will choose their destiny. Such a referendum is not conceivable until all fighting has ceased. I have already said that the fighting has now become meaningless. The offer of a cease-fire, made a year ago, retains all its validity in this respect. Once peace has been restored, as an essential requirement, some time will be needed to organize the voting in circumstances which can give rise to no dispute. A maximum term of four years has been fixed. It is essential for the balloting to take place in a peaceful country, where normal living conditions have been restored. The exiles must have returned and the fighters gone back freely to their homes. The most complete safeguards are provided whereby all, regardless of position or party, will be able to participate in political life, make their voices heard and play their part. In all truth, I cannot see what more could be done to ensure the validity and honesty of such a consultation. Moreover, anyone will be able, without hindrance, to come from abroad to observe the carrying out of the operation. I ask you, how would it be possible, in the world of today and on such a subject, for the voters to be forced or led into total error?

115. The subject of the referendum will of course be a choice between the possible solutions, of which as everyone knows, there are three: secession; complete integration with France; and the government of Algeria by Algerians, in close union with France in the fields of economic affairs, education, defence and external relations.

116. This is what France proposes to do with the Algerians and what a voice far more authoritative than mine has told them all, Moslems and Europeans alike, whether on our side or fighting against us. The way is clear, sincere, unambiguous. It is the only solu-

tion which can bring to a speedy close a drama which has been going on all too long.

117. For several years now the United Nations has had the Algerian problem before it and has discussed it. The French delegation has always voted against such a discussion because it considered and continues to consider that under the terms of the Charter the question is not within the competence of the United Nations. This year again, a majority in this Assembly has overridden our objections. Many of those who voted against us were moved by intentions which may have been generous but were, I think, ill-informed. I for my part am convinced that United Nations intervention in the past has not helped to solve the Algerian problem but rather the contrary. To stir up feelings cannot serve the cause of peace. What I want to say for the future, and for the present session in particular, is that, even if the United Nations has decided to go beyond the bounds of competence laid down for it in the Charter, I do not really see how it could now justify an intervention. It does not rest with the United Nations to take, on behalf of one of its Members, decisions which are the latter's sole responsibility. The French Government not only recognizes but proclaims, by its formal decision to have recourse to self-determination, that it rests with the Algerians to choose their own destiny. They will do so in full freedom and in full knowledge of the facts.

118. I have set before the General Assembly, in broad outline, the French Government's views on the principal problems before it, some international, others national. I believe I have shown that on all these questions—the Middle East, Asia, Germany and Europe, disarmament, assistance to the under-developed countries, the French Community, Algeria—France is inspired by the same sentiments and guided by the same principles: an overriding wish for peace, respect for fundamental human rights, faith in liberty and fraternity, a dogged search for international agreement. Thus, France remains faithful to its traditions and to what is and always has been its true vocation.

119. Mr. UNDEN (Sweden): In his introduction to his annual report [A/4132/Add.1] the Secretary-General has drawn the attention of the General Assembly to the position of the International Court of Justice, which offers opportunities for constructive progress that have been seriously neglected. The Secretary-General recalls that, on previous occasions, he has noted with regret the failure of many Member States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In his report he further stresses that the development and acceptance of international law impartially administered by judicial tribunals is essential to progress towards a more just and peaceful international order.

120. In a recent statement, the Prime Minister of Canada has expressed similar opinions. He strongly emphasized the importance of the International Court getting the opportunity to play a larger and more dynamic role in the international field. It may be added that the United Nations Charter explicitly provides that the Security Council, in making recommendations concerning the settlement of a dispute, should take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice.

121. In view of this principle, which is embodied in the Charter, the attitude of the Member States to the

Court is undeniably not very encouraging. While eighty-five States are parties to the Statute of the Court, only thirty-eight States have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Of these thirty-eight States, sixteen have laid down restrictive conditions which, in some cases, are equal to reservations of such a far-reaching nature that very little remains of the "compulsory" jurisdiction. No fewer than forty-seven States have failed altogether to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

122. It has attracted attention that no States with Communist régimes have been prepared to accept the Court's jurisdiction. The question has often been asked whether there is any principle embodied in the Communist ideology that prevents these States from accepting international jurisdiction in disputes of a legal character. In the course of a previous session of the General Assembly, I had occasion to point out that the Swedish Government had in vain suggested arbitration in connexion with a serious controversy of a legal character with the Soviet Union.

123. If, on the one hand, it might be asked whether the negative attitude of the Communist States to arbitration be dictated by reasons of principle, we could, on the other hand, point to the fact that these States have not taken a wholly negative attitude to arbitration proceedings in connexion with disputes arising out of contracts of a commercial nature. Furthermore, lawyers from some of the Eastern European States have accepted mandates as judges of the International Court.

124. Perhaps I may be permitted to express the hope that further developments will open the eyes also of the Governments of the Communist States to the fact that peaceful coexistence will benefit from agreements on arbitration, in case of controversies between States for example regarding the interpretation of agreements, the establishment of facts, the denouncing of violations of accepted principles of international law.

125. It seems obvious, however, that arbitration cannot be a universal means of solving international disputes. Many such disputes are not of a legal character but call for the application of political methods. Some disputes, although by their nature of a legal character, can be so impregnated with political explosives that legal solutions will not prove durable. But there remain large categories of disputes which could be successfully solved by legal means, if the parties would show a certain measure of good intentions.

126. It is a regrettable fact that a considerable number of States have taken a completely negative attitude toward the value of following legal procedures in international relations. This fact need not, however, prevent other States, holding a different opinion, from accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and this without far-reaching reservations, as the acceptance is binding only in case of reciprocity.

127. As we know, the International Court also has the function of giving advisory opinions upon the request of the Security Council, the General Assembly and certain other United Nations organs. It should be recognized, the Secretary-General points out in this connexion in the introduction to his annual report, "that there are many international disputes which involve legal questions along with the political elements and that submission of such questions to the Court for judicial determination would clear the ground for pro-

cesses of peaceful negotiation in the political organs of the United Nations" [A/4132/Add.1, p.4].

128. This observation undoubtedly is correct. It leads to the question whether that controversy of many years standing between Israel and Egypt, now the United Arab Republic, concerning free passage through the Suez Canal, could not be brought to a solution by having recourse to the International Court. I am, however, not quite convinced that an elucidation of the legal aspects of this controversy would touch the principal point of the dispute. The Government of the United Arab Republic is basing its alleged right to establish a blockade against Israel ships and cargoes on the thesis that a state of war exists between the two countries, and that the 1888 Constantinople Convention, regarding the Suez Canal, as it has been applied in practice, does not prevent the United Arab Republic, in a state of war, from taking blockade measures for security reasons.

129. Let us assume that the arguments put forward by the United Arab Republic would be held invalid by the Court for the reason that the present situation could not be characterized as a state of war. If this were to be the case, could it not be feared that the United Arab Republic would take sharper measures with a view to justifying the alleged "state of war"? As far as I can see, this problem, in its essence, is hardly a question of juridical subtleties in connexion with the interpretation of the conception of "state of war"; instead, the question really is, whether it could be considered reasonable that two Members of the United Nations for years find themselves in a warlike relationship. If there is a war, it should be the duty of the States involved to make peace. This is simple common sense, so much more so because the blockade cannot be of any practical value for the United Arab Republic, while it does harm the shipping interests of many other countries. Sweden too is suffering from the blockade. As evidence of this, I should like to mention that the Swedish Seamens' Union has requested their Government to work for the cessation of the blockade.

130. I should also like to say a few words about another ever-recurrent controversial question that the United Nations has to deal with, that is the question of the representation of China. The General Assembly recently rejected a proposal to inscribe this item on our agenda [803rd meeting]. The Swedish delegation voted in favour of its inscription, as it has done already for a number of years.

131. The opposition of the majority against dealing with the question is founded mainly upon the opinion that Communist China has committed many sins or crimes and, therefore, does not deserve to be accepted as a Member of the United Nations community. This feeling is understandable, bearing in mind the Korean war. There is, on the other hand, a wide-spread practice in international politics, according to which when a new government has been formed following a revolution, other States by and by recognize it when such a government has proved itself to be firmly established in the country in question. Such an attitude is justified by the argument that the recognition ought not to be seen as an expression of approval of the new régime, but means only, in effect, that for practical reasons it is desirable to maintain normal relations with all countries.

132. This standpoint found an expression in a statement made by the late Mr. Foster Dulles in a book published before the outbreak of the Korean war. He said in this connexion:

"I have now come to believe that the United Nations will best serve the cause of peace if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts which we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing that all the nations should be Members without attempting to appraise closely those which are 'good' and those which are 'bad'. Already that distinction is obliterated by the present membership of the United Nations.

"Some of the present Member nations and others that might become Members, have governments that are not representative of the people. But if in fact they are 'governments'—that is, if they 'govern'—then they have a power which should be represented in any organization that purports to mirror world reality."^{6/}

133. It should be admitted that recognition is no obligation under international law, but is a political decision that every State can take or not. In some cases, many years have gone by before a new régime has won general recognition from other States. The United States Government has perhaps been more restrictive in this sense than many other Governments.

134. As far as the present régime in China is concerned, it has been recognized by quite a number of States. Among them are Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. From the Swedish point of view, it is a natural act of political logic that our country should adopt the same attitude as a Member of the United Nations which it adopts in its direct relations with China.

135. The Charter of the United Nations does not give an answer to the controversial question that I am now dealing with. The conditions for the election of new Members cannot be applied in the case of China, which, according to the Charter, is one of the founding Members of the United Nations and also a permanent Member of the Security Council. No election is necessary.

136. As far as the United Nations is concerned, there are no legal obstacles to a recognition of the Communist régime in China. The question of whether the Peking Government should be recognized or not as the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations is a political one. After numerous debates in this Assembly we are well aware of the arguments that are usually put forward against recognition, as well as of those that have been advanced in favour of such recognition. I shall limit myself to emphasizing the fact that important problems, such as disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear arms tests, are dependent for their solution upon co-operation with the Government that rules in Peking. Also, other negotiations that deal with peace and security in this world require that the seat of China in the Security Council as well as in the Assembly should not be left vacant. That seat cannot be filled by the Government of the small island of Formosa.

137. A regular item on the agenda of the Assembly is [agenda item 61] the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the

Government of the Union of South Africa. In the debate on this question we hear now and then new facts which indicate a rigorous continuity in the pursuit of these policies. There are no signs which indicate a softening of the attitude of the Union Government. On the contrary, it seems as if the methods had been further tightened up.

138. The Association of University Students in Sweden has drawn the attention of the Swedish Government in 1959 to the worsening situation of the coloured students in the Union of South Africa and has requested action through the United Nations. The Swedish Government is well aware that the Union does not attach any significance to the opinions expressed by this Assembly. Nor does it attach any authority to the advisory opinion^{7/} of the International Court of Justice regarding the question of South West Africa. The Assembly, on its part, has no power to influence the Union's race policies. What the Assembly can do is to follow developments attentively and to express its opinion.

139. It seems to me that the race policies of the Union of South Africa are a strange anachronism in an Africa where the coloured population gradually becomes rightly more and more conscious of its human dignity and its right to freedom and to equality with the white elements of the African peoples.

140. The truly fantastic progress that mankind has achieved in the course of the last year in its efforts to widen its knowledge about outer space has, I am sure we all agree, made international co-operation for the peaceful use of outer space, as envisaged by the Assembly at its thirteenth session, all the more imperative. The work accomplished in this field by the ad hoc Committee appointed [resolution 1348 (XIII)] by the Assembly a year ago constitutes, in the opinion of my delegation, a good beginning. But new efforts are now called for in order to arrive at a fully international participation in this work. My Government, noting with satisfaction that the ad hoc Committee has refrained from all action that might have made such participation more difficult, wishes to express the hope that it will be possible for us in the course of our deliberations here to reach such agreements that all parties, and particularly the two main Powers in this field, will make their contribution in common to these new and daring endeavours.

141. Unfortunately, the conference in Geneva on the Berlin question,^{8/} though of long duration, did not lead to a solution and had to be adjourned. The problem of Germany as a whole has been dealt with outside the framework of the United Nations and I do not intend to examine here the disputed questions connected with this problem which have been discussed on different occasions between the Powers most immediately concerned. As representative of Sweden I would only like to stress that we sympathize with the inhabitants of West Berlin, living as they do in an exposed position isolated from the territory of Western Germany. We have a deep understanding of the apprehensions which they must feel in respect of every solution that may allow a situation to develop in which West Berlin is swallowed up in Eastern Germany. It is our sincere hope that the new discussions which it is planned to hold may lead to an agreement that offers a fair

^{6/} John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 190.

^{7/} International status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 128.

^{8/} See note 4.

degree of satisfaction to the parties concerned even though it may still have to be of a provisional character.

142. After the adjournment of the Geneva Conference, Mr. Eisenhower took the initiative in having a personal meeting with the most prominent representative of the Eastern bloc, Mr. Khrushchev. This, as we all know, resulted in Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States, which has attracted so much attention.

143. I am sure that there is in this Assembly a widespread feeling of gratitude to Mr. Eisenhower for his initiative in trying to establish, in the deadlock that had arisen, personal contact with Mr. Khrushchev, thus making possible political discussions on the highest level. It is still too early to form an opinion of the results of these discussions but the mere invitation to the chief of the Soviet Government is considered to have brought about a certain improvement in the political atmosphere. Thus, in his speech before this Assembly, Mr. Khrushchev said: "The ice in Soviet-American relations has undoubtedly begun to break up and we are sincerely glad of this." [799th meeting, para. 25.]

144. Perhaps not many of us in this hall reckoned with such a sudden breaking-up of the ice as the one announced as possible by Mr. Khrushchev in his speech here. Of course, I shall not go into detail in regard to the sweeping and far-reaching plan for a general and complete disarmament outlined by Mr. Khrushchev, nor shall I dwell upon the more limited programme presented as an alternative. It will be incumbent upon the Ten-Power Committee, established through agreement between the big Powers members of the present Disarmament Commission, to examine the Soviet plan as well as other proposals that may be submitted. However, it seems a Utopian scheme that our heavily armed world could be transformed, in a period of four years, to a completely disarmed world where the people would live in security, trusting that no armed intruder would be in a position to threaten their independence and the territorial integrity of their countries. But perhaps the length of the period is not an essential feature of the scheme. Even if the plan had taken into account a period of transition to complete disarmament many times as long and envisaged a partial and proportional disarmament during, for instance, a first period of ten years, its realization would have been greeted as a great stride towards relaxation of tensions—yes, as a miracle against the background of the fruitless negotiations regarding disarmament which have taken place since the end of the Second World War.

145. Moreover, Mr. Khrushchev himself has taken into account the probability that a more limited programme for disarmament may have greater chances to be carried out. In his speech he said that the Soviet Government is ready to come to agreement with other States on the appropriate partial steps on disarmament and the strengthening of security, and he has listed the major steps in the order that they are recommended by the Soviet Government.

146. Both the Soviet plan and the programme outlined just recently [798th meeting] by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, will serve as a basis for the discussions which now will be resumed after an interval which began in 1957. Considering the slow pace with which earlier disarmament negotiations have been conducted, I venture

to express the hope that the participants will not dig themselves into fixed trenches from which to fight a long war of positions. It is necessary, I think, to agree on certain general principles for the consideration of different sections of the problem of disarmament and then to entrust to groups of experts the working out of the details.

147. I also wish to suggest that an expert study be initiated regarding the merits of agreements on regional zones where nuclear weapons would be banned and restrictions applied to conventional armaments. It is well known that the idea of establishing such zones with reduced military potential as a step towards disarmament has been put forward in different contexts and has been the object of much discussion and interest. A study of this matter under the auspices of the United Nations should include also the so-called Rapacki Plan for Central Europe.

148. In the course of the thirteenth session of the Assembly, the question of suspending nuclear tests was very much debated. In spite of differences of opinion between the atomic Powers as to the prerequisites for a mutual agreement regarding this question, unilateral decisions on the part of the three Powers concerned have brought about the result that tests have been suspended since November 1958.

149. The decisions of the United States and United Kingdom Governments were limited to a period of one year only. Recently, however, Mr. Eisenhower announced that the one-year unilateral ban on tests which the United States voluntarily undertook in October 1958 would be continued to the end of 1959; and United States Secretary of State Mr. Herter added in his recent speech to this Assembly [797th meeting] that his hope was that if a reasonable extension of time was allowed for the negotiations to proceed, significant progress could be made. A spokesman of the United Kingdom Government declared in the House of Commons on 30 July of this year:

"So long as useful discussions continue at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Her Majesty's Government would not propose to authorize the resumption of testing." ^{2/}

The Soviet Union has decided not to resume nuclear tests in the Soviet Union if the Western Powers do not resume theirs. Only if they resume tests of nuclear weapons will the Soviet Union consider itself freed from this commitment.

150. Thus we have three unilateral decisions to suspend nuclear tests. One may well regard these decisions as constituting, taken together, a provisional agreement. The United States and the United Kingdom have not yet made it clear for how long a time they would be prepared to pledge themselves. The Soviet Union has declared its willingness to observe the ban on nuclear testing as long as the Western Powers do not carry out any experiments. Thus it depends on the Western Powers whether the experiments really have come to an end. The wording of the Soviet declaration does not, however, give any clear indication whether in this connexion among the Western Powers are included other Western States than those two negotiating in Geneva and until now the only producers of nuclear weapons.

^{2/} See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959) Vol. 610, No. 158, p. 676.

151. It is with the greatest satisfaction that I note in this connexion that the atomic Powers seem to entertain good hopes that the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests shall result in an agreement between them. The remaining divergencies can hardly be of such importance as to stand in the way of a settlement. In particular, I would like to draw attention to a statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in an article written by him and published in the review Foreign Affairs. There he says that the progress achieved in this matter justifies the hope that an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests will shortly be reached.

152. In his speech before this Assembly on 18 September 1959, Mr. Khrushchev said the following:

"The Soviet Government believes that the elaboration of a programme of general and complete disarmament should not hold up the solution of such an acute and fully mature question as that of the

discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests for all time. All the prerequisites for such a solution are now at hand. We hope that the appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of tests will be concluded and put into effect without delay." [799th meeting, para. 81.]

153. The Swedish Government, for its part, would like warmly to concur in this hope. It is of the utmost importance that the three atomic Powers at least reach an agreement regarding a final ban on all kinds of nuclear weapon tests. The next step should be that those States which have so far not produced any nuclear weapons adhere to the agreement. My Government wishes also to express the hope that, pending a more final agreement, the actual existing ban against nuclear weapons tests will be prolonged for as long as necessary, and that it will be observed as also establishing a rule for those States which have not yet produced nuclear weapons.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.