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President: Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon).

## AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): During the present general debate, the Soviet delegation has stated the position of the Soviet Government [750th meeting] on a number of important questions to be dealt with by the General Assembly. It has also given a general appreciation of the existing international situation, which may be described as very strained and fraught with the danger of a serious military outbreak. If that were to happen, it might plunge mankind into the maelstrom of an atomic war of extermination.

2. This relieves us of the need to return to those questions and, still more so, to dwell on the international situation as a whole. If my delegation has thought fit to speak once more in the general debate, the only reason is that with regard to one important question which concerns, and indeed cannot fail to concern, the General Assembly and all the States represented in the United Nations, a new factor has appeared which cannot be passed over in silence. We have in mind the situation which has now arisen in connexion with the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan. The report just presented by the Secretary-General [A/3934/Rev.1] prepared at the request made by the General Assembly at its recent special session, deals with this very question.

3. Taking the main point first, can we say that effect has been given to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its special session, the purpose of which was to obtain the early withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from the Near East? We all know that it has not. There are still United States and United Kingdom troops in the territory of Lebanon and Jordan, although there has been no lack of noisy publicity about their imminent withdrawal. This shows that the danger to peace in the area of the Near and Middle East, which arose as a result of the aggression by the United States of America and the United Kingdom against Lebanon and Jordan, has not been lessened a whit.

4. Ask any delegation—except, perhaps, the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and a

few other countries which are the most fervent supporters of those Powers' activities—whether it is satisfied with the way in which the resolution adopted at the third emergency special session [resolution 1237 (ES-III)] is being carried out, and you will invariably receive the answer—no, it is not satisfied.

5. All these delegations will give the very same answer to the question of how they feel about the contents of the Secretary-General's report. Despite the fact that the report contains a good dose of forced optimism, it does, nevertheless, reveal that there are no possible grounds for complacency about the situation in the Near East, since the United States and the United Kingdom have not yet carried out the obligations imposed on them by the above-mentioned Assembly resolution.

6. Enough time has passed since the adoption of that resolution for the United States of America and the United Kingdom, if they really had any regard for the United Nations, not only to begin withdrawing their troops from Lebanon and Jordan, but to have completed the withdrawal. It is well known that when they committed their aggression against Lebanon and Jordan, and by that token against the entire Arab world, they were able to land their troops very quickly. Now that the question of withdrawing them has arisen, however, they procrastinate under various pretexts and continue to occupy Lebanon and Jordan and to bear the brand of aggressors.

7. Since the closing of the special session, the United States and the United Kingdom have engaged in intensive, not to say feverish, diplomatic activity. The trouble is that the purpose of this activity has not been to put the resolution of the General Assembly into immediate effect, but to delay doing so. There has been one diplomatic measure after another, different kinds of pressure have been brought to bear by the United States and United Kingdom Governments on Lebanon and Jordan, but the policy of the United States and the United Kingdom has remained the same: to postpone as long as possible compliance with the decision about the withdrawal of their troops and to continue in their role as occupying Powers, with all the consequences.

8. Why the delay? Because the United States and the United Kingdom sent their troops to the Near East for purposes which are alien to the interests of the peoples of that region, even as they are alien to the cause of peace in the Near and Middle East.

9. Those who appraised soberly the situation which arose in the Near and Middle East as a result of United States and United Kingdom intervention and who said openly and unequivocally that those actions, no matter in what guise they were carried out, were the actions of enemies of peace, realized even at the time for what purpose the United States and the United Kingdom

landed their troops in Lebanon and Jordan, along with tanks, aircraft, guns and warships.

10. Now, however, it must be clear even to those who were inclined to accept at their face value the assurances given by United States and United Kingdom statesmen concerning their motives in sending troops to Lebanon and Jordan, that the aims they were pursuing in landing troops in the two small Arab countries have nothing to do with what those statesmen said on the subject.

11. All this gives ground for believing that the existing situation regarding the carrying out of the resolution of the special session will be properly understood, and that those responsible for the continuing occupation of Lebanon and Jordan will draw the appropriate conclusion and fulfil the obligations for which they themselves voted on 21 August 1958 in this very hall.

12. Evidence that the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom continue to create obstructions to the withdrawal of their troops from Lebanon and Jordan is to be found, not only in the fact that the troops still remain in those countries, but also in the Governments' statements about their intentions for the immediate future. It is this subject which is dealt with in the principal section of the Secretary-General's report, concerning withdrawals of United States and United Kingdom forces, and also in the memoranda by those Governments appended to the report.

13. Regarding United States forces, one of the documents referred to say that they will be withdrawn from Lebanon "as expeditiously as possible". It is further stated that the forces may be withdrawn by the end of October, but "provided the international security situation with respect to Lebanon continues to improve". Thus, the passages quoted, expressing as they do the position of the United States Government, speak for themselves.

14. The same must be said about the memorandum on the withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from Jordan. There it is stated that withdrawal of the forces can be begun and completed "provided satisfactory progress is being made". The document goes on to say that the withdrawal is intended to begin during the month of October and to be completed "as quickly as the situation in the area allows". These expressions of the United Kingdom's attitude also speak for themselves.

15. It is true that the United States and United Kingdom Governments have promised to make further statements about their plans as regards the withdrawal of their forces. One might have thought that better formulations of policy would be forthcoming and that these Governments would make clear statements about withdrawing their forces promptly from the Near East. However, this has not so far happened. The United States Government, it is true, has not yet made its promised statement, and it is not yet known to the Members of the Assembly, or at least to the overwhelming majority of them, including the Soviet delegation, when it intends to do so.

16. But, as we all know, the United Kingdom Government has made its promised statement. Did this statement, by any chance, change the situation and remove

the grounds for alarm? Not in the least; for the statement, which was circulated to all delegations yesterday [A/3937], says no more than that the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from Jordan will begin on 20 October and that it will be completed within a period not exceeding such time as may be required for the necessary arrangements for the movement of personnel, stores and equipment.

17. Thus, this statement by the United Kingdom Government also reveals great reluctance to name a date for the completion of the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from Jordan. On the basis of this statement, it is not difficult to see that the date by which the withdrawal of troops is to be completed will be left hanging in mid-air.

18. Furthermore, in this statement by the United Kingdom Government nothing is said about whether its previous statement in which precise political conditions were laid down for the withdrawal of troops, remains in force, or whether it has been superseded.

19. One may wonder why the United Kingdom Government should have recourse to such evasive and indefinite phrases, if it intends in the near future to begin and complete the withdrawal of its forces from Jordan and to abandon the delaying tactics it has been using in this matter. There would seem to be no reason for this, if the United Kingdom Government is not playing a double game and has good intentions—to the extent that one can speak about the good intentions of a country which has just committed aggression against another country.

20. It is our view that phrases of this sort are not used by accident, that they point to a definite plan to delay the withdrawal of troops still further, or, at any rate, to continue attempts at procrastination.

21. That the United Kingdom Government has made such a statement is not a very good omen for the anticipated statement by the United States Government, which has promised, as we have already pointed out, to give details of its plans regarding the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon. But the Government of the United States will be wrong if it follows the example of the United Kingdom Government and goes on making evasive, indefinite statements indicative only of the desire to continue obstructing the execution of the General Assembly resolution on the early withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from the Near East.

22. We must dwell briefly on the specious arguments put forward by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in order to justify not only their original aggression against Lebanon and Jordan, but also their present efforts to obstruct the withdrawal of troops.

23. We shall leave aside what was said by the United States and United Kingdom Governments in defence of their intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, including statements by their representatives at the special session of the General Assembly on that subject. Their actions, like the arguments which they have put forward in defence of those actions, have, in fact, been universally condemned. It makes no difference that not all States felt able to condemn the United States and the United Kingdom aloud and openly, and that some countries expressed their opposition to

those actions in a more restrained way, or even simply by voting for the draft resolution proposed by the Arab States.

24. We shall deal only with those arguments which the United States and United Kingdom Governments have used recently, that is, since the United Nations took its decision on the early withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom forces from the Near East, as they have a direct bearing on any appreciation of the present position regarding the withdrawal of troops, a question which is at the moment of prime importance and which the Assembly cannot by-pass.

25. First argument. It is said that before the troops can be completely withdrawn, a radical improvement must be achieved in the relations between Arab States and that unless such an improvement takes place there is some danger that if the United States and United Kingdom tanks, aircraft, guns and military personnel were removed from Lebanese and Jordanian soil, and if the United States and United Kingdom warships, which for a considerable period now have kept their gun muzzles trained on Lebanon and Jordan, were to leave their shores, then the prospects of friendlier relations among the Arab countries might deteriorate. But, first, for the imperialist Powers to take upon themselves the role of judges in regulating relations between countries of the Arab East is an absurdity, since everybody knows that they are only waiting for an opportune moment to seize some of these countries by the throat. Secondly, this requirement is in blatant contradiction with the letter and spirit of the General Assembly resolution, which does not and could not (I would stress that—it could not) contain any condition of that sort for the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops. To make the withdrawal of troops dependent on a radical improvement of relations between the Arab countries when the Western Powers are in fact hindering such an improvement must mean that these Powers have plans for continued aggression against Lebanon and Jordan, with all its attendant consequences. Further evidence of the insincerity of that requirement is that the presence of United States and United Kingdom troops in Lebanon and Jordan is in itself a serious obstacle to the unity of the Arab States. Such unity is just what the United States and the United Kingdom do not want. The main reason why the Arab States have not yet achieved the unity they should have is the imperialist policy of those two Western Powers, a policy of setting the Arab States against one another, in the belief that the longer their various differences are perpetuated, the easier it will be for the two Powers to carry out their policy. The United States and the United Kingdom seek every pretext to postpone withdrawing their troops precisely because they are fully aware that to do so would help to unite the Arab peoples and to remove the various differences which exist between the Arab States. Any one who really wants good relations to obtain between the Arab States would blush to defend the occupation of Lebanon and Jordan by foreign forces, or the aggressive policy of the Western Powers towards the Arab States, or the delay in the withdrawal of their troops from Lebanon and Jordan.

26. Second argument. It is said that the situation in Lebanon is not stable, and that there is, therefore, a danger of its deteriorating if United States troops leave Lebanese territory. Earlier we were told that

United States troops could not leave Lebanon until the new President took office and a new Lebanese Government was formed. But the new President, General Chehab, has taken office and a new Lebanese Government has been formed. One would have thought that those who had delayed the withdrawal of their forces with the excuse that the new Government had not been formed would now withdraw them immediately. This, however, has not happened, and now a new argument has been put forward to the effect that the forces should not be withdrawn until the situation in Lebanon has become stabilized. We know, however, that, first, the very presence of United States troops in Lebanese territory is a way of exerting pressure on Lebanon enabling imperialist circles to cause provocations of various kinds and use them as justification for their actions. Secondly, the way the Lebanese settle their internal affairs is no concern of the Americans, the United States Government, or anyone else. Why should they have to do it under the threat of United States machine guns? If we accept that those who attempt to justify the delay in withdrawing the United States forces from Lebanon on the ground that the situation is unstable are acting for the good of Lebanon, it is difficult to say what would constitute gross interference in Lebanon's internal affairs and a flouting of those United Nations principles which protect States from such interference.

27. Third argument. It is claimed that the date for the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon must be fixed in agreement with the Lebanese Government and at its request. It is well known, however, that the new Lebanese Government asked for such withdrawal a long time ago and has said on a number of occasions that the sooner these forces leave the better. It is true that the Lebanese Government has not openly and officially asked for the withdrawal of United States forces by a certain date, as far as we are aware. But let us be frank, gentlemen. The Lebanese Government is in a difficult position—not only are there foreign troops in Lebanese territory, but they are also occupying the capital of the country, so that the Lebanese Government is carrying on its work within range of their rifles. You can judge for yourselves under what conditions the talks between the United States Government and its generals in Lebanon on the one hand, and the Lebanese Government on the other, are proceeding. I think we can all agree that these conditions are extremely difficult and that this enables the United States Government and the United States military command to put daily, or even hourly, pressure on the Lebanese Government, which, in fact, is what they are doing. Have we not all read in today's papers, published here in the United States, that pressure by the United States Government has reached the peak where it has demanded that the Lebanese Government should be changed to include persons more acceptable to the United States? In front of the whole world, virtually holding the Lebanese Government at pistol point, Washington is blatantly and shamelessly interfering in Lebanese affairs. For these recent actions alone the United States Government should be present here in the Assembly in the role of the accused party and should be made to answer before the whole world for its brutal coercion of a small Arab State. Indeed, all small countries, and not only the Arab States, whose representatives are here in the Assembly hall, cannot but realize that if Lebanon is not pro-

tected against such actions, the fate that is Lebanon's today may befall them tomorrow, and it is the aggressor who will decide which of them is to be the next victim. The question arises, should the General Assembly act on this, or is it to turn a deaf ear to the cries of a victim of aggression, cries which are not always heard through the thick walls of the Assembly hall for the simple reason that the victim is not allowed to voice his protest out loud. It is therefore time to discount any claims that the wishes of the United States Government are taken into account in fixing a date for the final withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon; such claims are worthless. The Lebanese people and the Lebanese Government will not be free until all United States soldiers, United States artillery, United States machine guns and United States rifles have been removed from Lebanon and until the United States fleet, which has lately become a symbol of blackmail, pressure and direct aggression against a number of countries, has left the Lebanese coast.

28. Now for the fourth argument. It is still being claimed that it would be awkward for the United States to withdraw its forces from Lebanon while the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from Jordan remains undecided. This argument is also painfully transparent and is only used to avoid responsibility. Everyone has known for a long time that the United States and the United Kingdom are hand in glove in this matter. The United Kingdom makes the United States its excuse, and vice versa, and each uses the other to justify in the eyes of the world its own actions—in this particular case, its delay in withdrawing its troops. If the United States Government were to state clearly, without conditions or reservations, that it would withdraw its troops in the very near future, if it were actually to do so, the fact would be bound to influence the United Kingdom. I do not think anyone would dispute the validity of this proposition. On the other hand, if the United States Government continues to delay the final withdrawal of its forces on various transparent excuses, pointing to the United Kingdom at the same time, the fact can be used by the United Kingdom Government to avoid withdrawing troops from Jordan in the immediate future. If the United States and United Kingdom Governments continue to employ these tactics, the only possible conclusion is that they are conspiring together, even as they did in the original aggression against Lebanon and Jordan.

29. I come to the fifth argument. We are told every now and then that in the event of a United Kingdom withdrawal from Jordan, the latter will be liable to attack by Israel. We consider that this story has already been sufficiently discredited, since everyone knows that an attack by Israel on Jordan would in actual fact be an attack by the United States and the United Kingdom. Israel would obviously not lift a finger without their sanction and encouragement. Since the argument is still being repeated, however, it would not be out of place to say a few words about it. If the United States and the United Kingdom continue to intimidate Jordan by speaking of a possible attack by Israel, they will clearly be doing so deliberately, in order to hinder the withdrawal of their forces, and, if so, they will bear full responsibility for the performance which they stage from time to time, in which they assign the leading part to Israel.

30. Several other arguments, just as invalid and

absurd, have been advanced by the United States and United Kingdom Governments in justification of their obstructionist policy. Ever since the question of the withdrawal of troops was first considered by the United Nations, the two Governments have claimed that one of the obstacles is the refusal by the Jordanian Government and King Hussein to agree to the arrangements envisaged in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its special session, when we all know that Jordan was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution.

31. Not long ago the world Press widely reported that first the Jordanian Government was refusing to admit United Nations observers, then refusing to admit representatives of the Secretary-General, then refusing something else, and putting forward its own conditions making special demands upon the other Arab States, primarily the United Arab Republic. Becoming embroiled in its policy, having placed itself in the hands of certain foreign groups, and afraid to face its own people, the Jordanian Government presumed to act as a judge of who should have the last word on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Near East.

32. The United States and the United Kingdom, of course, were quick to seize this chance and have now been using King Hussein as a pretext for some time, although everyone realizes that neither Hussein nor the Jordanian Government is concerned. We do not think that the United Nations can allow the unreasonable and irresponsible position of the Jordanian Government on this point to hinder the early withdrawal of United States forces from the Near East, as demanded by the General Assembly resolution—I repeat, "the early withdrawal", as more than a month has now passed since the resolution was adopted at the special session, a fact we cannot fail to take into account.

33. If we all agree with this, and I think that those who sincerely want the resolution to be implemented are bound to agree, let us tell the United Kingdom Government first, the United States Government next, and, naturally, the Jordanian Government, whose representatives are also present in this hall, that it is high time to stop their tricks. As for Jordan's domestic affairs, for which the British are still showing great concern, they are for the Jordanians, and the Jordanians alone, to settle as they choose.

34. It is also said that the Jordanian Government is displeased with the broadcasts transmitted by certain Arab States and is making various demands in this connexion as a precondition for the withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from Jordan. But this only shows the degree of absurdity which the claims of the Jordanian Government and those behind it have reached. On the strength of these demands it might be thought that the General Assembly had adopted a resolution on radio broadcasts rather than on the withdrawal of troops, which is patently not the case. We hardly consider it necessary to speak at length on this subject.

35. These claims are nothing but another attempt to justify the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom and to make the withdrawal of forces more difficult.

36. And now a few words on the report. We have al-

ready dealt with and assessed the main points contained in it. They reflect the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, which bear the entire responsibility for their actions.

37. We feel bound, however, to mention another aspect of the report—the one-side interpretation of certain provisions of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its special session. The report gives the impression that the resolution in question was mainly concerned not with the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Near East, but with relations between the Arab States. We all know, however, that such is not the case and that the resolution arose out of a debate on the question of withdrawing United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan, and that the session was convened for consideration of this particular question and no other. It is true that the report states that it is only interpreting the resolution, but it might well be asked why an interpretation of this kind was found necessary, especially since it is neither exact nor objective.

38. In saying this we do not wish in any way to belittle the importance of the Secretary-General's efforts; on the contrary, it is our hope that his efforts will bring positive results in the interests of peace. But we have felt it our duty to draw attention to serious defects of this kind which could and should have been avoided. Is it possible to agree, for example, with the assertion contained in the report that "the political essence"—I repeat these words—"the political essence" of the resolution adopted at the special session lies not in the demand for the early withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops, but in the provisions concerning the relations between Arab States. To draw such a conclusion is to miss the whole point.

39. These remarks on the report have been made *en passant*. We all realize that we are not now concerned with which way the resolution, adopted unanimously at the special session of the General Assembly, is interpreted, since no matter what interpretation is put on it, it deals with the early withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom forces—that, after all, is what the resolution states—and that any attempts to delay the solution of this problem are a flagrant violation of the resolution and should be strongly condemned.

40. The position of the United States and the United Kingdom on the withdrawal of troops, the contents of the Secretary-General's report and the statements of the Governments of these Powers setting forth their position, give us full grounds for asking that the question of carrying out the special session's resolution on the withdrawal of troops and, consequently, the elimination of the consequences of Anglo-American aggression in the Near East, should be included in the agenda of the present session as a separate and independent item.

41. That is the additional statement which the USSR delegation has felt it necessary to make on the subject of the Secretary-General's report on the carrying out of the resolution adopted by the emergency special session of the General Assembly concerning the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan.

42. The PRESIDENT: I wish to put a question to the

Soviet delegation. From the last part of the statement that we have just heard, I understand that there is now a formal request by the Soviet delegation that the report of the Secretary-General be included in the agenda as item 73. We already have seventy-two items on the agenda. If that is so and if I receive confirmation of that interpretation from the Soviet delegation, I will certainly present the matter to the General Committee at its next meeting.

43. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I have nothing to add to the clear statement made by the USSR delegation a few minutes ago. There is a specific procedure for the submission of items by representatives for inclusion in the agenda. I do not think that fact is anything which you and the other representatives did not know before.

44. I repeat that our position on this question has been stated.

45. The PRESIDENT: Then, until that procedure is complied with I have no request before me to include this separate item in the agenda.

46. Mr. LODGE (United States of America): Mr. Gromyko always has it in his power to start an altercation here in the General Assembly, whatever may be said about his ability to finish an altercation or to influence Members in favour of his contention. The latest strictures which have just been made, from the Moscow propaganda factory against the United States are both violent and untrue.

47. We have committed no aggression against Lebanon. We were invited in, as the whole world knows. Not only has there been no aggression, but not one shot has been fired by an American against the Lebanese in the whole time that we have been there by invitation of the Government of Lebanon.

48. We do not wish to delay the implementation of the resolution. Our forces are not there for reasons alien to the interests of the Near East; on the contrary.

49. We are not—and I quote again his phrase—"creating obstructions". In fact the United States has already pulled out three battalions of marines, and those are the larger-sized battalions.

50. We will scrupulously live up to the United Nations resolution and we are complying fully with it. This resolution which received the overwhelming support of the Members of the General Assembly represents in every respect what the United States favoured.

51. Our actions have not been universally condemned. In fact, the Soviet Union withdrew its draft resolution [A/3870] criticizing the United States for what it had done in Lebanon, which is some reflection on how much the Soviet Union really believes what it itself is saying.

52. We have not incited one Arab State against another. We have no aim to create provocation. Our aim is a peaceful world and if Soviet communism did not keep the world stirred up all the time we would have a peaceful world.

53. Mr. Gromyko has not offered one scintilla of proof of one single thing he has said. The speech was straight, unadulterated vilification. It is mere billingsgate. It is abuse with a sinister ulterior motive.

A speech of this kind makes a travesty of the United Nations. It reveals all too clearly Mr. Gromyko's contempt for the United Nations. It insults the intelligence of the Members. It casts grave doubts on Mr. Gromyko's intentions.

54. I have already given the whole speech far more attention than it deserves.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.