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GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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President: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. COOPER (Liberia): Permit me to express to Sir Leslie Munro my hearty congratulations on his election to the presidency of the twelfth session of the General Assembly. His qualifications and experience, as well as his courtesy and genial disposition, had much to do, I believe, with his selection for the task of presiding over our meetings. I am sure that these qualities will make less difficult and less onerous that task of presiding over an Assembly composed of peoples from many lands and of many races, with differing creeds and doctrines, customs and dispositions.

2. We have watched the steady growth and expansion of this Organization, whose General Assembly is now holding its twelfth session with a membership of eighty-two nations. During these years of its existence, the Organization has often been criticized, and has at times been branded as useless, helpless and ineffective in the settlement of international problems. Despite these constant attacks, the Organization has been able to carry on. It has been able to prevent major hostilities; and in cases where, despite its efforts, these hostilities have flared up, it has been able through moral pressure to localize the conflict, end the hostilities and restore order.

3. The question then arises: Why has this Organization succeeded where the old League of Nations failed so dismally? It is true that the ideas, the principles and the concept that brought the League of Nations into existence were very similar to those which formed the foundation of the United Nations. But there is a basic difference between them. The League lacked universal support. Its membership was confined to the principal nations of the First World War. It was therefore run by a few and in the interest of a few. It became a club, with an outer circle and an inner circle. Those who composed the inner circle, and were generally called the "midwives" of the organization, formulated the policies and executed them with little regard to the rights and feelings of the majority.

4. Each major Power was a law unto itself -- it interpreted the laws of the organization to suit its needs and national honour, and took action when necessary in strict conformity to its national interest. The rights of the weak and defenceless were generally ignored, if not trampled upon. The ruling circle was

not prepared to upset the balance of power in the interest of aiding and defending a small or weak State.

5. One of the other major weaknesses of the League was its "back door" policy, which ignored and by-passed the League itself. This policy was generally adopted by the major Powers in consideration of their interests or national honour or when it suited their convenience. Some chancellery then replaced the League, where the matter was discussed and settled by a few. This by-passing of the organization had a tendency to weaken the structure of the League itself. It thereby lost influence and respect among the smaller nations and, in the eyes of many, was considered an organization solely and exclusively run by a few powerful nations bent on maintaining the status quo of world domination.

6. Today we have the United Nations, conceived in similar circumstances but completely different in its application of the principles upon which the League of Nations was based. It is not dominated by any single Power or group of Powers. There is no inner circle restricted to a few at the expense of many. There are no hidden secrets lodged in the archives of any particular country or countries. It is true, indeed, that the Security Council may bear some resemblance to an exclusive club, but discord is more frequent than harmony. The ideological or "cold war" maintains this cleavage. It is true that this discord among the great Powers has hindered progress in some fields of the Organization and has caused stagnation, particularly in regard to disarmament and the control of nuclear weapons. It has also failed in many instances to bring a permanent peace to those areas where it has been able to stop hostilities.

7. Regrettable as this situation may be, such disharmony or disagreement has prevented any single Power or group of Powers from imposing its will on any majority or minority group in the exercise of the veto. People in the most remote regions of the world have also benefited indirectly from such discord. They have been able to air their grievances through the United Nations and, in many cases, not only have they been heard, but they have obtained a fair and just settlement of their problems. They have not been left isolated or alone in defending themselves, but have received invariably the staunch support of some of the leading Powers. Whether the aims of such Power or Powers were altruistic or selfish is difficult to say -- one does not look a gift horse in the mouth.

8. Though such disagreement has caused at times stagnation in the political field, on the other hand, it has made the Organization more universal in character. Never before in history have men been able to form an association that has touched the lives of so many people in so many lands and in so many ways. It has brought succour to the needy, aid to the sick, and hope and inspiration to the depressed, regardless

of race, creed or religion. There is no longer a back-room diplomacy in settling the affairs of men. What happens in Asia has its repercussions in America, Europe and Africa -- and vice versa. International problems are no longer the concern of the few with vested interests, but of all mankind.

9. If the nineteenth century is recorded in history as a time when the world was carved up among the great Powers, then the twentieth century must surely go down in history as the century of nationalism -- the awakening of national aspirations. No period in the history of the human race has witnessed the birth of so many new nations in such a short period of time. In this regard, our Charter is being rapidly implemented. As each new nation takes its seat in this Organization, the Organization becomes more universal, it becomes richer in the sense that however small or backward a people may be, they have something unique in their history to offer, in the social, in the cultural or in the political field.

10. We therefore welcome all new countries and extend to them the hand of friendship and co-operation, fully believing that they, like ourselves, are determined to contribute to world peace by adjusting our differences and settling our disputes in a spirit of conciliation under the aegis of this Organization.

11. We as a nation oppose all forms of domination -- whether imperialistic or communistic. Our interest and our support are linked with all free countries that have the dignity and worth of the human being at heart.

12. No country, small or big, can be indifferent to the problem of world disarmament. With the discovery of nuclear weapons, any major conflict becomes global. It is now over ten or eleven years ago that this Organization set up a commission on the problem of world disarmament. It appears that, despite these long ten or eleven years, we are no nearer a solution than when we started. The same background of distrust and fear which permeated the work of the Disarmament Commission in its early stage persists up to the present. Each year we witness the discovery of new weapons of mass destruction which tend, not to lessen the work of the Disarmament Commission or to allay the suspicion of the great Powers, but rather to sharpen the differences between them and therefore make the problem of disarmament more complex and difficult.

13. It is doubtful, under such conditions, when mistrust and fear occupy the minds and control the actions of the great Powers -- the possessors of such weapons of mass destruction -- that a solution to world disarmament will ever be found. There might be some justification for this fear, suspicion and mistrust, as history has shown that many nations have been the victims of deceit and treachery in regard to disarmament. It is indeed true that the smaller nations do not possess such weapons of mass destruction or the "know-how" of their manufacture: yet they have been allowed to discuss the problem in all its phases in the United Nations and have also been permitted to comment or to make recommendations on the various reports of the Disarmament Commission. Nevertheless, not possessing such weapons, the small nations, we believe, if given equal opportunity, might be able to devise a formula on disarmament that could be acceptable to the great Powers without the loss of national honour and prestige.

14. Often on the agenda of the United Nations have appeared questions of such an explosive nature that the least mishandling could have probably brought us to the brink of another world holocaust. Feelings at times among the contending parties have been tense and fierce. National honour seems to be at stake and therefore positions taken appear to be adamant and irrevocable. Patience and tolerance on both sides seem to have been exhausted as each side became convinced of the justice of its cause and therefore was prepared to resort to the last alternative in upholding its national prestige.

15. It is therefore a credit to the United Nations, when faced at times with such an impasse, to have adopted the attitude of patience and sober reflection. Each party to the dispute, without hindrance or restraint, has been allowed freely to put forward arguments in defence of its position. The Assembly has listened patiently to charges and counter-charges. It has heard language at times harsh, insulting and offensive, which in similar circumstances and in former organizations would have immediately led to hostile action. The only reaction to such language is the whimsical smile or the deep frown of the representatives, depending on their attitude to the question. This of itself speaks well and is a happy augury to further discussions in the Assembly.

16. After carefully listening to the lengthy and exhaustive speeches which have a tendency to allay feelings, the United Nations generally adopts a technique peculiar to itself -- a technique of conciliation and adjustment. Though such a solution offers little satisfaction to either party, nevertheless it offers no offence nor seeks to impose conditions that would embarrass or affect the national honour and prestige of either party.

17. This is a problem that gravely concerns my Government and people. It is in Africa among our kith and kin that most of the dependent peoples of the world are to be found today. Living on such a continent, surrounded by people of our own race, we could not ignore or be indifferent to their national aspirations. Like them, we too have known the bitterness of injustice, the common fate of all dependent peoples. My Government therefore will at all times and in all circumstances lend its aid and support to the cause of all dependent peoples.

18. We agree and fully support the principle that all men are born equally free and independent, with a right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This is a part of our national Constitution. We will, however, continue to seek a solution to this problem through peaceful and lawful means. Consequently, we will not be a party to any solution that calls for violence or the threat of violence in the accomplishment of these aims. Violence is not in the nature of our race.

19. Hardship, frustration and perhaps even enslavement have developed in our people a sense of humour that makes them impervious to all difficulties and hardships. Perhaps this has been an asset, otherwise they, like many other races, might have suffered extinction, not being able to match their weapons with the weapons of more advanced peoples. These sufferings and humiliations have developed in our race the virtues of patience and tolerance. We might retreat in the face of great odds, but we never lose hope

and we never abandon our goal. We believe in the motto "he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day" or, as in the last war, "we retreat according to plan".

20. The African, locked up in the vastness of his continent, was unaware of the strife and treachery prevailing in the world outside his orbit. By nature he is generous and kind to all strangers. This made him welcome the coming of the foreigner to his continent. He showered the stranger with gifts, allowed him to carry on his trade, gave him lands on which to develop and make use of the natural resources of his country in the search for gold, diamonds and other minerals which others labelled as precious but which to the African had no intrinsic value. It was therefore a rude awakening to the African to find that the more he gave, the less satisfied became the receiver. He soon came to realize that nothing would satisfy his guest except the complete surrender of everything he owned and cherished.

21. Naturally, in such circumstances he attempted to resist and was at times ruthlessly crushed by superior weapons. The spear and the arrow, despite his courage, were no match for the musket and the cannon. He was forced to submit, but he never gave up hope. He soon learned the ways of the foreigner and then began to improve his economic and social position. Adopting the methods of modern sanitation, he increased in number. He was prepared, in keeping with his nature, to wait to regain his political freedom, for he realized that only through patience, tolerance and pretence of submission could he survive.

22. These virtues have not gone unrewarded. The African, like so many other people in similar circumstances, with the passing of time, is beginning to attain his national aspiration -- complete freedom and independence -- as is evident by the many new African States in the Assembly. It is therefore indeed gratifying and a source of hope to know that, with the passing of each year, the United Nations becomes stronger with the addition of many new States, for it is indeed true, to quote Longfellow, that "Humanity with all its fears, with all its hopes of future years, is hanging breathless on thy fate."

23. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I have already, on 17 September [678th meeting], congratulated Sir Leslie Munro upon his election as our President. I repeat the good wishes which I then extended to him for a successful term of office. I should like also, if I may, to say a few words in tribute to his predecessor, Prince Wan Waithayakon. We are all most appreciative of the wisdom, statesmanship and charm with which he guided the deliberations of the General Assembly during a difficult session, and he joins the little band of those who have been presidents of the General Assembly -- distinguished international elder statesmen. We are delighted to have seen three others here during this general debate, Mr. Aranha, Mr. Romulo and Mr. Padilla Nervo, and I understand another, Mr. Entezam, is to join us shortly. I said "elder statesmen", although in fact they all seem to share in common the elixir of perpetual youth -- they all look younger each time one sees them.

24. The general debate is the opportunity for an annual stock-taking of the state of the world. The tone and the themes vary from year to year. This is the sixth time in seven consecutive years that I myself

have been present at the general debate. There have been ups and downs, moments of optimism and of pessimism, of hope and of fear.

25. I was thinking the other day of the situation in 1951, when I came for the first time to the General Assembly, which was held that year in Paris. At that time a bitter war was being waged in Korea. Sustained hostilities were taking place in South-East Asia. International exchanges between the great Powers had reached an advanced state of recrimination. On disarmament, the two sides were barely in contact with one another. There was a deep-seated misunderstanding of the British position and policy on colonial affairs. There were many countries which, though worthy candidates for membership of the United Nations, had not yet been elected. That was in 1951. Therefore, when considering the world situation of today, with all the anxieties attendant upon it, do not let us be completely oblivious of the progress made in the past and of the problems already solved.

26. The first topic with which I want to deal is that of the United Nations itself. This debate is an appropriate opportunity for frank discussion of the state of the Organization -- its achievements, its failures, its strength, its weaknesses, its standing in the world, the hopes for its development in the future.

27. We have all, I am sure, read the thoughtful comments of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report [A/3594/Add.1], in the passage dealing with the role of the United Nations. I think that I can accurately summarize his views as follows.

28. The United Nations is not a super-state. It is not a world authority enforcing its laws upon the nations. The General Assembly is not a parliament of individually elected members legislating for the world. The United Nations is an instrument of negotiation between Governments. It can blunt the edges of conflict between nations. It can serve a diplomacy of reconciliation. Its tendency is to wear away or break down differences and thus help towards solutions. In the Secretary-General's view, the real limitations upon the actions of the Organization do not derive from the provisions of the Charter or from the system of one vote for one nation irrespective of strength or size. They result from the facts of international life at the present time. The balance of forces in the world sets the limits within which the power of the world Organization can develop. The Secretary-General points out that enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter continues to be reserved to the Security Council and that it has not been transferred to the General Assembly.

29. In the light of these considerations there are, in his view, promising opportunities for improving the practices and strengthening the institutions of the United Nations. He points out that in the past two years a certain evolution has taken place, and he hopes that this process of evolution of emphasis and practice will be pursued and broadened in the future. That seems to him a more important task than to attempt formal constitutional changes.

30. That is an imperfect, but I hope not an unfair or inaccurate summary of this most important passage in the Secretary-General's introduction.

31. I think that the Government of the United Kingdom would broadly accept those views. We believe that a

world instrument endowed with the necessary authority, as Sir Winston Churchill once said, is necessary for permanent peace in the world. That remains my own deep conviction. So far as the United Nations in its present state of development is concerned, it is unfair to blame it as an institution for its shortcomings. Any blame there may be must be attributed to the Member States that collectively constitute the strength or weakness of the United Nations.

32. I share the belief that this Assembly has a most useful function to fulfil as a forum for international debate. I believe that this annual meeting affords an occasion for colleagues with similar responsibilities to meet together. I am told that some forty Foreign Ministers have been here during the past week.

33. The United Nations should also be a place for mediation and conciliation, for reducing sharpness in controversy and for promoting settlements. Certain most interesting new developments have taken place in the practices of the United Nations -- for example, the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. I listened with a great deal of sympathy to what Mr. Diefenbaker said yesterday [683rd meeting] about a permanent force.

34. Another most important role is to inspire and promote the work of the specialized agencies. They have been joined by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Their work is perhaps less spectacular and less publicized than that of the political organs of the United Nations, but it contributes in an outstanding manner to the fulfilment of some of the objects of the Charter.

35. On the other hand, it would be wrong to blind ourselves to the fact that there are some weaknesses or defects in the practical operation of the Organization. I know that in some quarters it is regarded as wrong to utter even the mildest criticism of the United Nations. I think that is a foolish attitude. Any comments of mine are designed to strengthen the institution, not to weaken it. We have to admit that in fact some controversies are sharpened by discussion here; that some countries, bitterly resentful of any criticism of their own internal affairs, are only too ready to use the United Nations procedures to interfere in those of other nations; that certain processes of evolution in human relations, political and otherwise, are complicated and not facilitated by bitter argument in this place.

36. Above all, if there grows up the belief that the Assembly has two standards, one for the law-abiding for those who are influenced by its views, and another, less stringent, for those who treat it with indifference, the Assembly will never build up its authority in the world.

37. However these things may be, I think that the Secretary-General's views should be studied with the greatest care by all those who believe, as I do, that the world has got to make a success of the United Nations. So very much depends upon that success, both for us and those who are to come after us.

38. And now for some of the matters which have been raised in the course of the general debate so far.

39. The Assembly listened with close attention to the speech of the Soviet representative on 20 September [681st meeting]. I think its tone was a little milder than that which he adopted in the Press conference

which he gave just before he left Moscow. And that we can no doubt attribute to the calming influence of the United Nations. But when his speech is refined and analysed, I think it really can be reduced to the following propositions: first, let the Western countries disrupt the alliances which they formed to meet the threat from the Soviet Union; secondly, let the Western countries lay aside the weapons on which they principally rely to deter further Soviet aggression; thirdly, the Soviet Union promises in return to infiltrate and subvert with increased intensity all areas which are not already under its control. And that, I think, really is what his speech came down to. His propositions were really as simple as that.

40. Now let me deal, first of all, with the attack upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The origin of NATO is well known. At the end of the war, the Western Powers voluntarily handed over to Soviet control large areas in Europe. They withdrew to the dividing line previously agreed upon. They demobilized their armies; they reduced their overseas garrisons. The Soviet Union on the other hand maintained its armed forces; it maintained its military grip on Eastern Europe and it sprawled westward. The final danger signals were the overthrow of the democratic government in Czechoslovakia in 1948, followed by the Berlin blockade.

41. It was to meet the threat of further expansion that NATO was formed. NATO is a purely defensive alliance. It would never have come into being but for the actions of the Soviet Union. It is true that these actions were under the direction of Stalin. It is true that Stalinism is no longer in favour in the Soviet Union, so we are told. But we are not yet convinced that the fundamental aims of the Soviet Union have changed. Until we are convinced of that, not by words but by actions, we intend to retain our defensive alliances.

42. Mr. Gromyko referred to the Baghdad Pact and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, saying that they bore the same stamp as NATO. So far as we are concerned, that is a cause for pride. They are defensive alliances of precisely the same type, brought into being to provide a feeling of collective security against what we consider, and our allies consider, to be a military threat. They are alliances for collective self-defence specifically authorized by the Charter.

43. Mr. Gromyko referred to them as "blocs". The countries of NATO do not vote as a bloc in this Assembly. We do not even hold meetings to discuss Assembly matters together, and we rarely, all of us, vote the same way. Exactly the same applies to the countries of the Baghdad Pact and the countries of SEATO. The only bloc here is the Soviet bloc, whose nine hands, or perhaps I should now say eight, are always raised as one.

44. Mr. Gromyko put forward the suggestion, and other representatives have to some extent endorsed it, that Soviet troops should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact countries and that United States and British troops in return should withdraw from the mainland of Europe. That, it was suggested, would be a contribution to security in Europe. That idea, of course, has a superficial attraction, but what does it mean when you think about it? What does it mean geographically? The troops of the Soviet Union would remain

in position one mile beyond the frontiers of Poland, Romania, etc. United States troops would go back 3,000 miles across the ocean. Soviet troops could return literally at an hour's notice. For United States troops to return would involve vast problems of transportation and logistics. Even the United Kingdom has found it a considerable task from time to time to cross the English Channel. That is not the way, in existing circumstances, to European security.

45. I thought that in the context of European security the strangest omission from the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union was any reference to German reunification.

46. We believe that the Soviet Union should recognize its responsibility for the reunification of Germany as stated in the directive issued by the four Heads of Government to their Foreign Ministers at Geneva in July 1955. We believe that the Soviet Union should agree that it is desirable to reunify Germany at the earliest possible moment. The Soviet Government should agree that the German people should be allowed freely to choose their own government, by means of free all-German elections. The Soviet Government should recognize the right of a freely elected all-German government, freely to choose its own domestic and foreign policies.

47. If the Soviet Union were to accept those four propositions, the main obstacle to establishing European security would be removed. If, as a result of this self-determination of their future by the people of Germany, the Soviet Union felt any anxiety, the countries of the West would be prepared to enter into a treaty giving binding assurances designed to secure the Soviet Union against any threat of German attack.

48. The representative of the Soviet Union, in his rather scanty remarks about the problem of Hungary, said that it was provocative to inscribe the item called the Hungarian question on our agenda. He said it was time to realize and reckon with the fact that Hungary had had its say. I think that is an ominous phrase.

49. Even if Mr. Gromyko considers that the Hungarian people have had their say, this Organization should not be silenced. Until the Hungarian people are independent and have the right to determine their own future, we cannot remain silent. I say no more about Hungary today because there has recently been a lengthy debate in which our views were fully stated.

50. I now turn to the Middle East. This is the area of greatest tension at the moment. In 1948 I suppose it was Europe. From 1950 to 1952 or 1953 I suppose it was Korea. In 1954 it was Indo-China. Last year and this year without doubt it has been the Middle East. I do not want to add by anything I say to this tension. I merely want to outline some of the facts as we see them and try to measure deeds against some of the speeches here.

51. The outstanding issue for nearly ten years has been the conflict between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States. We, the United Kingdom, have tried in all sincerity to promote a just and honourable settlement. The United Kingdom has been second only to the United States in contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and we still believe that a just settlement of the tragic refugee problem is a primary

element in a wider solution. On all these issues we have urged compromise if the problem is to be solved, because as long as it remains unsolved, all the countries of the area must suffer.

52. What has been the Soviet contribution? The policy of the Soviet Union appears to us to have been simply opportunist. At first the Soviet Union was among the foremost champions of Israel. It was the votes of the Soviet bloc that gave the necessary majority for the State of Israel to be created. It was the Soviet bloc which first sent arms to Israel. Now the Soviet Union represents itself as the friend of the Arab States. Who knows when its next change of policy may come about? I do not know of one single constructive contribution that it has made towards the settlement of this problem. Many people feel that its whole purpose is to perpetuate and not to reduce tension in the area.

53. Another test of deeds, as against speeches, is the way in which the Soviet Union is handling its propaganda to the area at the present time. I read over the weekend extracts from some recent Soviet broadcasts and statements in the official Soviet Press: bitter attacks upon the present Government of Jordan - every kind of allegation against it of terrorism, torture and repression; bitter attacks upon the Government of Lebanon - descriptions of Lebanese leaders as enemies of the Lebanese people; attacks upon the Government of Iraq, calling for a holy struggle to bring about its downfall; attacks upon the Government of Iran; appeals to the peoples of these countries to rise up and overthrow their Governments. All this from the official propaganda sources of the Soviet Government. Yet it is the representative of that same Government who has presented a draft declaration calling upon all States to base their relations on the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs for any motives of economic, political or ideological character! It would be laughable if it was not so serious. I say again, it is deeds, not speeches here, which count.

54. What has been the new factor over the last two years or so which has complicated the existing issues and done so much to promote anxiety and tension? To my mind it is clearly the deliveries of Soviet-bloc arms, tens upon tens of millions of pounds' worth, introduced into a situation one would have thought already sufficiently explosive. Certain of the Arab States have had to mortgage their economic resources to pay for them and probably have done permanent damage to their economies. The arms themselves are more likely to cause trouble than to prevent it. There are some who believe that the purpose behind all this is to pre-stock forward bases for the Soviet Union itself. The deliveries are on such a scale as to give some colour to this suggestion. Again I say, it is deeds, not speeches here, which count.

55. The situation in Syria is very much in our minds. We view it with grave concern. We have no desire to prescribe the form of government. Our desire simply is that Syria should be independent and should respect the independence of its neighbours. I do not think that the Syrian people have any idea of how far their true interests are being subordinated to those of the Soviet Union, because the long-term bill will be a heavy one.

56. I have read carefully what Mr. Dulles [680th meeting] and Mr. Gromyko [681st meeting] said about

this matter, and the comments of the representative of the Soviet Union on this situation are utterly divorced from reality. I cannot conceive that the Soviet delegation really can believe in what it says. It says that none of Syria's neighbours seem to be anxious. I advise the Soviet representative to study the note from the Jordan Government to the Government of Syria which has just been delivered.

57. What is to be done about the situation? I think that we have to review it calmly and, as I say, having particular regard to deeds and not speeches. I think that Mr. Dulles did a useful service in drawing our attention to the "Essentials of peace" resolution [290 (IV)] of 1949, with its reference to indirect aggression. I agree that this resolution should be the standard by which we judge the situation there. But in the meantime, I hope that the Soviet Union will, upon reflection, perceive the dangers in its policies of increasing tension, and that some idea of what is really happening will percolate through to the Syrian people.

58. I now turn to disarmament. One of the difficulties during the years which I have been trying to deal with this matter has been the tendency to turn it into a propaganda issue. I think that is wholly the wrong approach and out of tune with the demands of this time. I think that the last series of meetings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission has afforded opportunity for useful discussion. The issues involved and the paths along which progress can be made have been more clearly defined than ever before. I welcome the careful consideration which this Assembly clearly intends to give to the matter, because I think that psychologically it is the time for us to make progress. Every country is increasingly conscious of the dangers inherent in modern weapons and in the strains and stresses at the present time in international affairs. Progress in disarmament would not only relieve the burden of armaments, but it would also of itself contribute to the reduction of tension and would make further progress in disarmament not only desirable, but also feasible.

59. In seeking common ground for progress, I think there are certain essential considerations which should govern our thinking. Firstly, a comprehensive disarmament plan covering all stages is not practical politics at this moment. The objective of the United Kingdom is still a comprehensive plan along the broad lines specified in the Anglo-French proposals of 1954 [DC/53, annex 9], a plan which will involve the prohibition and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments, under strict control, to levels needed for internal security only. That is still our objective and our ideal.

60. We know, however, that the Soviet Union for one would not accept at this juncture the degree of control which alone could make such a plan practicable. We should therefore aim at a partial or first-stage plan, one upon which there was a chance of agreement being reached.

61. My second point is that it would not be wise to impose political preconditions for the partial or first-stage disarmament agreement. There will have to be a settlement of certain outstanding problems before sufficient confidence can be engendered to enable dis-

armament to progress to its more advanced stages. I think that view is a common-sense acceptance of reality. I think it would be a mistake to complicate the issues by specifying what political settlements might be necessary for further stages. That might hamper and not help further progress. But at the present, for a first-stage or partial plan, I think that we should concentrate on such measures as are likely to be acceptable without political pre-conditions.

62. Thirdly, disarmament in the nuclear and conventional fields must proceed together. They are inter-related; they are intertwined. We of the United Kingdom, together with the other countries of Western Europe, depend for our security very largely upon the deterrent afforded by the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the West. *Vis à vis* the Soviet Union, we have a chronic inferiority in the conventional field. The Soviet Union is in the geographical position to move conventional arms and armies without great problems of transportation. It is much easier for it to mass armies for a conventional attack. It has the advantage of interior lines.

63. The United Kingdom has defence responsibilities all over the world. We have long lines of communication, over the sea in large measure. For the Western allies, the deployment of conventional forces for defence involves great problems of manpower, of transportation and of logistics. Therefore we are not prepared to weaken the nuclear deterrent unless there are corresponding advances made towards disarmament in the conventional field.

64. There is another reason for this view that nuclear and conventional disarmament must go along *pari passu*. We do not accept the implication that war fought with conventional weapons is more tolerable than war fought with nuclear weapons. Both are terrible, and I have not the slightest doubt that a global war fought with what are called conventional weapons would destroy international society just as surely as one fought with nuclear weapons. It might take a little longer for society to destroy itself, but that would happen just the same. We, with some experience, have a horror of war, whatever the weapons that may be used. The Soviets object to what they describe as making legitimate the use of nuclear weapons. I object to the proposition that global war fought with conventional arms is somehow tolerable.

65. The fourth consideration for progress, I think, affecting a partial or first-stage agreement, is that it should extend as far as the area of control which is acceptable and practicable in the present state of the world.

66. We regard verbal agreement without control, however extensive, however solemnly concluded, as valueless. We have no confidence at all that the Soviet Union, if hard pressed, would abide by any scrap of paper -- and there would be the same lack of confidence on its part, I should have thought, about other countries. And, if you do not know whether or not the other side is going to keep a particular agreement, that agreement adds to insecurity and to tension instead of diminishing it.

67. In the light of those four considerations, where should we seek common ground? What are the possibilities for a partial agreement?

68. First of all, with regard to the question of nuclear weapons, we believe that there should be agreement to suspend nuclear tests, subject to an inspection system to ensure that the suspension of tests is really enforced. The Soviet Union agrees that there should be a suspension of tests. There is, however, a difference of opinion as to the period of the initial suspension. We have said that it should be twelve months, followed by a second period of twelve months. The Soviet Union says that it should be two or three years.

69. Both sides now agree that there should be an inspection system. The Soviet Union maintains that such an inspection system is not necessary on the ground that explosions can be detected without it. That does not accord with our scientific information. We believe that it is necessary to have inspection posts with appropriate instruments covering the whole area where tests could take place. Without such a system it would be possible, so we are told, for a country with a large geographical area to have tests either underground or in the stratosphere about which other countries would not know. It has been agreed, however, that there should be an inspection system, and that difficulty has been removed.

70. The Western countries on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission have said that suspension of tests should be linked with a cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Our reasoning is as follows. Suspension of tests by itself is not disarmament at all. It does nothing to reduce armaments. It does nothing to prevent countries which have already tested weapons from piling up more weapons and more fissile material for weapons purposes. It does not prevent countries which have not yet made tests from also manufacturing fissile materials for weapons purposes, or indeed the weapons themselves. The suspension of tests by itself does nothing to stop the arms race. It does not prevent further countries from emerging as possessors of nuclear weapons.

71. But what would be a realistic beginning on the path towards nuclear disarmament would be to stop further manufacture of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Our scientists assure us that this is a realistic step, that the cessation of manufacture could be controlled. Unlike the mere suspension of tests, this would be a real measure of disarmament. It would call a halt to the nuclear armaments race. If the Powers which now possess these weapons would agree that they would produce no more fissionable material for weapons purposes after a certain date in the future, other countries might be dissuaded from pursuing their own nuclear programmes for military purposes. In this way alone, I believe, can we prevent a competition in the manufacture of nuclear weapons in which many countries might join.

72. Such an agreement is a prize really worth winning. It would mean something. A paper undertaking to renounce the use of nuclear weapons would not mean anything. It could not be controlled or enforced, and no one would know whether it was going to be honoured. It would add to insecurity.

73. The total elimination of all nuclear weapons remains, as I have said, the ultimate goal. But it is not practical politics today, since there is at present no known means of control by which it could be enforced. It is impossible to know whether or not exist-

ing nuclear weapons have been eliminated or whether countries have admitted to all their stocks. The Western Powers have, however, suggested that a start might be made now towards the total elimination of such weapons. They propose, as part of a first-stage plan, that a proportion of existing stocks might be handed over for conversion to peaceful purposes.

74. The next element in a partial or first-stage agreement is that of force levels in the conventional field. As I have said, the conventional field is just as important as the nuclear. All five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission seemed ready to accept the same figures for upper limits of military manpower in a first-stage agreement -- 2,500,000 each for the Soviet Union and the United States, 750,000 each for the United Kingdom and France.

75. I think we have to recognize the fact, however, that limitation of numbers of men is of little consequence unless accompanied by the limitation of the weapons which those men may use. The numbers of men in the forces of a country can be cut down, but the military power of that country can be increased by augmenting the fire-power of the reduced number of men. Therefore disarmament in the conventional field, to be realistic, must include limitation of tanks, aircraft, warships, submarines and all the rest of it, and such limitations must obviously be subject to strict control.

76. We do not think that in a first-stage agreement much progress can be made in what is a very complicated matter. Therefore we would be content, for our part, with the proposals which have been discussed in the Sub-Committee for the exchange of lists of weapons which various countries are prepared to set aside under international control, possibly for future destruction.

77. The next element which is a feasible part of a partial agreement can be dealt with under the heading of "Measures against a surprise attack", measures which will add to the feeling of confidence in the world. President Eisenhower put forward his "open skies" plan. This provided for aerial inspection. Marshal Bulganin put forward a plan for ground control posts at ports, communication centres and airfields. We believe that it is possible to amalgamate those two plans and for there to be both aerial and ground inspection; they would not necessarily cover precisely the same areas, but they should both be brought into existence.

78. If there are these areas of inspection, then each side will know whether armed forces are being built up, whether preparations are being made for launching an attack. We would be willing to have the whole of our country covered by such a system. Others may not yet be ready to go so far. That being so, we believe that a beginning could be made with certain trial areas -- a beginning which would greatly add to international confidence.

79. There are other possible elements in a partial agreement -- for example, control of objects entering outer space -- into which I will not go today.

80. That being our view of possible progress, let me compare it with what Mr. Gromyko indicated as the scope of a partial agreement in the field of disarmament.

81. In the nuclear field, the Soviet Union would agree to suspension of tests and to an inspection system. But the Soviet Union is not willing to agree to the cessation of the manufacture of more fissile material for weapons purposes. It pins its faith to an undertaking to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. But I think that the latter would be valueless, and I still hope that, after second thoughts, the Soviet Union will perceive the great step forward that could be made if there was cessation, under strict control, of the manufacture of more fissile material for weapons purposes.

82. In the conventional field, the Soviet Union agrees to the upper limit of 2,500,000 for itself and the United States and 750,000 each for the United Kingdom and for France. It wishes to include, however, in a first-stage agreement, further reductions of these force levels by two additional stages. We do not object to the figures suggested for those two further stages; in fact, they were put forward by the Western delegations. But we believe that we will not get progress to those further stages until there has been a relaxation of tension, to which a contribution would be made by a partial agreement. We therefore think that these two stages should come later. But we agree to them in principle.

83. With regard to the reduction of conventional arms, the Soviet Union proposes a reduction either by 15 per cent or by means of the presentation of concrete lists of armaments to be reduced as proposed by the United States Government. We favour the second of those alternatives.

84. The Soviet Union appears willing to accept in principle the idea of aerial inspection, and it has itself advocated ground control posts. For some reason, however, it no longer seems willing to have ground control posts on airfields in a first-stage agreement. I cannot myself quite see why that reservation should be made.

85. I hope that the Assembly will see from what I have said that, according to the declarations made by both sides, which I think I have summarized accurately, there is scope for a most useful partial agreement. There is, in my view, a real prospect of common ground. It is nonsense to say that the disarmament talks are necessarily at a deadlock at the present time. There is, however, one note of realism which I must sound. Mr. Gromyko in his speech rather scorned agreements in principle. I do not know why he of all people should be scornful in this connexion, because his scorn should apply equally to his own proposal to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. That could only be an agreement in principle.

86. It is clear that if agreement in principle is to be of any value, it has to be followed up by agreement on the practical systems whereby the agreement in principle will be honoured and enforced. And if that was the thought behind what Mr. Gromyko said, I entirely agree with him.

87. Over the last three years, and particularly in the past few months, we in the United Kingdom delegation have constantly sought to get discussions going upon these practical details. In early July of this year the four Western Powers made their answer about suspension of tests, indicating their desire to link that with the cessation of the manufacture of fissile material

for weapons purposes. But they also said that while the discussion of that was proceeding they were quite willing that technical experts should meet to draw up the inspection system for the control of the suspension of tests. The Soviet Union refused to agree to the meeting of the technical experts. Why? Is it because it really does not intend to submit to an inspection after all?

88. There was some argument in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission about the definition of manpower. In Mr. Gromyko's speech on 20 September [681st meeting] he talked about civilians working for the armed forces. That is one point. There are also other questions, I gather, of reservists and the like, which at once present themselves to one's mind. In this connexion I offered in London in June to agree at once to a meeting of experts to try to get an agreed definition of what we mean by force levels, to determine exactly what types of military service should be included in that definition. The Soviet representative refused to agree to such a working party being set up. Again, I wonder why?

89. At a later stage, on 17 July, I suggested that experts should meet to discuss the practical problems involved in a number of matters. I do not want to repeat all that I said in that speech; it appears in the verbatim records of the proceedings of the Sub-Committee. But someone must at some time be able to answer the following kind of questions.

90. With regard to the inspection system for the suspension of nuclear tests, who will control the inspection system? Will it be an international body? What will be the relationship of that body to the United Nations? How will it be constituted? What will be its powers? How will it be financed? When will it start recruiting its personnel? How will it recruit that personnel and from what countries? What will be the status of the inspectors? Where will they be situated? Will they be situated in the territories of other States besides those mentioned? What means of communication will they have? What freedom of movement will they have? Will their numbers be limited? Will their instruments be limited? How will their reports be dealt with? What will be the procedure in the event of a suspected breach? What will be the relationship of other countries to an agreement for suspension of tests? Will they be expected to adhere? Will their adherence or the adherence of any of them be a condition precedent to the entry into force of such an agreement?

91. With regard to the limitation of conventional armaments, how will the lists be drawn up and exchanged? How will the lists be related to each other and to manpower reductions? What types of armaments will be included? How will the depots into which they are to be put be controlled?

92. With regard to aerial and ground inspection, what areas will be covered? Will there be over-flying rights over the territories of other countries? What will be the safeguards for the countries overflown? How will breaches of any regulations which may be made be dealt with? What will be the plan for the location of ground observation posts or ground control posts? How will they be composed? What will be their powers? What will be their methods of communication?

93. These are all or almost all matters of technical detail. I do not believe that they will present insoluble or even great difficulties. But this is work with which progress has to be made if there is to be any reality in our search for a disarmament agreement.

94. Every time, on every issue, the representatives of the Soviet Union have refused to play their part in beginning this kind of technical discussion. Their point of view -- I hope I put it fairly -- is that until there is agreement there is no point in working out the practical details. I believe that until you work out the practical details you will not get an agreement. In any case, even on the Soviet thesis, these details have at some time to be agreed, and therefore I cannot for the life of me see why a beginning could not be made at once. It should in fact have been made long ago.

95. This repeated refusal of the Soviet Union to get down to what we call "brass tacks" and to find out what is practically involved in a viable disarmament agreement makes me wonder whether or not all its talk about disarmament is anything more than a propaganda theme. I have a feeling that the Soviet Union does not want to be tied down in any of these matters. But we say that every country has to be tied down on these details if we are to have a disarmament agreement which will add to security and which will be a real step forward on the way towards wider disarmament agreement in the future.

96. I have dealt in some detail with what is involved in the Assembly's discussions on disarmament. I have done that because I really believe that this is a field in which progress is possible in the course of the next few weeks. I echo what Mr. Diefenbaker said [683rd meeting] about this being a "disarmament Assembly". We in the United Kingdom at the moment depend in large measure for our security upon the nuclear deterrent. We would much rather depend for that security upon a comprehensive disarmament agreement capable of being properly enforced. The first step to such a wider agreement is the kind of partial or first-stage plan which I have outlined.

97. We as a country have a greater vested interest in peace than almost any other country in the world. We are a small vulnerable island. Our life depends upon our trade throughout the whole world. Peace is essential to our survival and our prosperity. It is our determination to give an impulse to this work in any way we can. But sham agreements, paper declarations, vague promises, are no good to us. We want something practical and definite. We want the real thing.

98. For us, in the United Kingdom, this twelfth session began upon two most pleasant notes. First there was the election of the President, and secondly there was the unanimous admission of the Federation of Malaya to membership of the Organization.

99. The Prime Minister of Canada referred yesterday to the Commonwealth in eloquent terms. He pointed out that it was an association of free nations which represented many different areas, colours and cultures, which had no rules or regulations and no constitution. But, as he said, its unity is forged in the sharing of a heritage of common ideals and a love of freedom under the law. I think that we in the United Kingdom can justly claim to have pursued and to be

pursuing a forward-looking policy in the development of our relationships with the peoples of the Commonwealth. It is this kind of forward-looking attitude which I suggest is needed in dealing with the wider problems of the day.

100. We are at a critical phase in world affairs, and much hangs in the balance. I have tried to speak today with frankness, but without bitterness. I believe that plain speaking can contribute to better understanding. Our hope is that the work of this twelfth session of the General Assembly will look to the future. In that way, I think, we shall all of us best serve the causes in which we believe and the peoples whom we represent.

101. Mr. LAROCK (Belgium) (translated from French): I should like first to associate myself with the well-deserved congratulations which have been addressed to the President on the occasion of his election.

102. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom has just said that his Government believed in the world mission of the United Nations. The Belgian Government also believes in it, and we wish to pay a tribute to all those who co-operate in that mission on a permanent basis. It is in the particular interest of the small and medium-sized countries such as mine that this institution should prosper and that it should some day be able to determine the law.

103. I should like to make a few brief remarks to the Assembly concerning one of the topics just dealt with by Mr. Lloyd. That topic is disarmament. I shall follow up my remarks with a practical proposal.

104. The discussions of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London showed that, on certain points, agreement was possible. No agreement, however, was concluded. As the Prime Minister of Canada has said [683rd meeting], efforts will have to be redoubled. The length of the negotiations has aroused criticism, particularly the criticism which was expressed from this rostrum by the representative of the Soviet Union [681st meeting]. To my mind, these criticisms are not justified. The problems are so numerous, so important and so closely interrelated that it is impossible to think of solving them in a few months. It will inevitably require a long time to arrive at the first lasting agreements.

105. The unfortunate result is that faster progress is being made in inventing and manufacturing new weapons of mass destruction than is being made in disarmament negotiations, and it is only natural that world opinion should be disturbed by this situation.

106. There is no lack in the world of persons who think deeply on political and military questions and who express doubt as to the possibility of any form of disarmament whatsoever and speculate on the failure of the disarmament conferences. Perhaps the future will prove them right. But let there be no mistake about it; if the future proves them right, we shall have war within a foreseeable time, because the opportunities which are missed for disarmament will be seized upon for war.

107. It has been noted that the principal wars of modern times, from the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 to the two world wars, were preceded by very vigorous discussions on disarmament. Nevertheless,

it would be going too far to say that the wars broke out because those conferences had been held. The wars broke out because the disarmament conferences failed.

108. It is not my intention to revert to any of the problems which were raised in London. I should like simply to ask you a question: is it not possible to make the task of the negotiators easier by informing the peoples objectively and directly about the extreme gravity of the problems awaiting solution? In other words, would it not be possible to arrive at some preliminary, practical solutions more quickly - partial and imperfect as such solutions might be - by pointing out the danger which lies in the absence of any solution at all?

109. I think that the United Nations can give an affirmative answer to this question. If, by some misfortune, it were impossible for the United Nations even to provide the peoples, all peoples, with impartial information, what could we expect from a disarmament conference, which has much more difficult work to do?

110. I think that three facts emerge from the London talks. The first is that disarmament or the controlled limitation of nuclear armaments cannot be separated from the controlled limitation of conventional armaments. Atomic disarmament alone, which would permit the conventional armaments race to go on, would not reduce the risks of war. And rather than try to make war more humane - which has always been a great delusion - we should try to eliminate the danger of war itself and, consequently, reduce nuclear and conventional armaments at the same time.

111. The second fact is this: in the present circumstances, a general war would be an atomic war, with all its consequences. Let us make no mistake about it: if no agreement is reached on armaments in the next few years, any general war will be a war of annihilation. Some optimists imagine that this will not be so, but they are deceiving themselves. They deceive themselves in order to allay their own fears, but this will not avert the danger. The most lethal modern arms are much too expensive and at the same time much too decisive to remain unused in the event of a large-scale conflict.

112. While the Sub-Committee was in session, serious warnings were sounded from both East and West, particularly in Moscow and Washington. A Soviet note addressed to a European State on 27 April 1957 stated literally that, in case of war, the territory of that State would be transformed into "one big cemetery". A few weeks later, General Norstad declared in turn that, in the event of aggression against the West, all the vital centres of the Soviet Union would be destroyed. These reciprocal warnings were not mere bluster. It is extremely likely that they would be realized to the letter if war broke out.

113. In this connexion, and without desiring to engage in polemics, I should like to make very brief mention of what I regard as a deplorable phrase which the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs used several times while addressing us on 20 September [681st meeting]. Several times Mr. Gromyko spoke of certain Western countries which, he alleged, wanted atomic war and were preparing for it. What is the good of making such accusations in a discussion as serious as this one? The Western States are well aware that

an atomic war would be no less terrible for those who started it than for those who retaliated with the same weapons. The Western States are well aware that there would be neither victors nor vanquished in a future atomic war, but only a frightful mutual slaughter. They have said this on several occasions, and I recall that Mr. Khrushchev repeated this statement verbatim at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. In these circumstances, how can anyone maintain that the Western States would be so insane as to want an atomic war?

114. The third fact which became evident in London is, as it seems to me, no less obvious than the two preceding ones. It is that at the present time, unfortunately, there is not the slightest mutual trust between East and West, so much so that any agreement which assumed such trust would be only a sham. If we look at things realistically, we must clearly recognize that, in the present state of affairs, a disarmament agreement which was based primarily on the goodwill or good faith of its signatories would be regarded with suspicion by both sides. It would have the appearance of a trap or a deception.

115. If irrefutable testimony had to be produced on this point, the choice would be only too easy. On 22 July 1957, Mr. Bulganin wrote in a letter addressed to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: "No one in the USSR is so naïve as to put the security of the State at the mercy of a guarantee furnished by the aggressive bloc of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The Soviet leaders should understand that this kind of language provokes exactly similar retorts from the Western countries and, I am sure, from the rest of the world. There is nothing easier than to reply that no country in the West or in the rest of the world is so naïve as to let its security depend solely on a guarantee furnished by the Soviet Union. There is nothing easier than a reply of that kind, but what good does it do? Meanwhile, one thing is certain: confidence on both sides is non-existent.

116. Does that mean that no agreement at all is possible? Probably not, but at any rate it means that the most formal mutual assurances and the most solemn promises are not enough. Whether it is a question of reducing the number of troops and armaments of all kinds or of discontinuing atomic test explosions, the only positive and lasting guarantee is that of international control. In order to make possible some beginning in disarmament, in no matter what field, it will be necessary to organize international control and inspection agencies and make sure that they will function continuously, so that their effectiveness cannot be challenged by anybody.

117. Until the need for this control is admitted and actually put into practice, any disarmament agreement will remain illusory. Negotiations will drag on indefinitely between partners suspected each of trying to disarm the other or of engaging in mere propaganda, rather than seeking joint disarmament under joint supervision.

118. By rejecting effective international control, any Power ipso facto gives the whole world reason to distrust its intentions. To refuse control in matters of armament is tantamount to refusing arbitration in matters of litigation. The acceptance of international control is the true test of a genuine desire for peace.

This acceptance does not imply mutual confidence, but it implies recognition of the fact that the rights of mankind are superior to those of any nation or of any group of nations. It is therefore in conformity with the spirit of the Charter to advocate the establishment of an international control body as a primary condition for a progressive limitation of armaments.

119. However, we are forced to admit that up to now nations have never actually submitted to this primary condition for success. Disarmament conferences have never achieved decisive results because they have always been brought up short by the question of control.

120. Those heads of State who oppose control advance a variety of reasons. They claim that international control would simply be a form of espionage, would weaken the morale of armed forces, maintain a deceptive sense of security, and prevent nations from righting their own wrongs.

121. In the past, these reasons have always proved stronger than the will for peace. Will they continue to prevail over the terrifying prospects of any new major war? That is the question which overshadows all others, as was shown more than once during the discussions in London. Several effective systems of aerial and land control were proposed. They were not accepted. In reality, it was the refusal to accept control or resistance to control which prevented the Subcommittee from reaching the slightest agreement.

122. Why is this resistance so stubborn? Because it clings to a concept of national sovereignty which is as narrow as it is outmoded. It cannot be denied - and we must recognize it - that international control over armaments is incompatible with a certain absolute concept of national sovereignty, and we must, unfortunately, acknowledge that many countries remain blindly attached to this concept. The heads of State who are opposed to control can easily find support among the masses of their populations. They have but to appeal to the so-called imperatives of sovereignty, national interest and national prestige, and the old reflexes are set in motion. This is the greatest obstacle to the efforts for peace.

123. There is only one way of surmounting this obstacle, and that is to enlighten all the peoples, without exception, concerning the realities of modern warfare, which has nothing in common with the warfare of the past, so that they may realize without the shadow of a doubt that an uncontrolled and unrestricted armaments race is leading them to suicide.

124. Here I should like to quote the declarations of two statesmen, one a Soviet statesman and the other an American statesman, who are not very often in agreement. These declarations, however, seem to me to complement each other. The first is that of Mr. Khrushchev. "We know," he said on 18 June 1957, "that the peoples of all nations want peace. But I think that among the masses of the people there is not yet sufficient awareness of the danger of war and not enough is being done to avert war."

125. If Mr. Khrushchev is right, as I think he is, and if his comment on the insufficient awareness of danger applies to the masses of the people in the Soviet Union as well as to those in other countries, then we must also agree with the United States Secre-

tary of State, who declared on 22 July, and repeated from this rostrum on 19 September [680th meeting], that "humanity faces a tragic future if the war threat is not brought under control".

196. This international control is necessary, then. It is vital, and yet nothing could be more difficult than to secure its acceptance. It would be less difficult, no doubt, if the eyes of the people were opened to that formidable prospect evoked by Mr. Dulles. Therefore an appeal must be made directly to the peoples, to their instinct of self-preservation. That is the only means of overcoming the old reflexes which balk at international control. Side by side with the disarmament negotiations, we must undertake, under the auspices of the United Nations, a collective information campaign on the armaments race, on weapons of mass destruction, on their lethal effects and on the necessity of international control as a condition of any disarmament agreement.

127. That is the purpose of the proposal with which I wish to conclude. I wish first to explain it and then briefly to justify it. The aim of the proposal has just been stated. We must explain - in the most specific and compelling terms possible - to the peoples of those countries which in case of war would be exposed to the effects of modern weapons, that only the international control of armaments can avert a monstrous danger as yet incompletely understood.

128. This danger is obviously not appreciated in the countries where all means of information belong to the State and where, therefore, the dissemination of information is never completely truthful and impartial. But even in other countries, the danger is not understood as it should be, because it is more or less concealed among the so-called military secrets, because it is the normal practice for the authorities to attempt to reassure the people rather than to frighten them and, finally, because nothing is more persistent in the public mind than the illusion that armed might means safety. As long as this illusion conceals the danger, it will be idle to hope that the manufacture and stockpiling of armaments can be submitted to United Nations inspection. International control requires an information campaign organized and carried out on an international scale.

129. In the course of this year, thousands of scientists of all nationalities and all shades of opinion have denounced the appalling danger which hangs over the entire world. The most eminent nuclear scientists have described the immediate and long-range effects of atomic bombardments. They have spoken of millions of human beings killed in the countries at war and of hundreds of millions of others outside those countries who would probably be affected by the after-effects of radiation. In India, two years ago, an extremely well-documented study appeared on these problems. This year, in the United States, a paper published by the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission has just supplied precise information on the destructive power of a bomb a thousand times more powerful than the one used at Hiroshima.

130. These facts and many others are reported in the daily Press, at least in the countries where the Press is free, but they are given only a few lines, and experience shows that in general newspaper readers are not deeply impressed by them. Thus the mas-

ses adopt a fatalistic and apathetic attitude and end by regarding it as inevitable that the armaments race should progress on an increasing scale. Many of these readers think that the more frightening the prospects are, the less likelihood there is that they will become realities. Thus, because they are insufficiently conscious of the tragic future sketched by Mr. Dulles at this rostrum a few days ago, the masses are, so to speak, neutralized. And, in the face of the danger which threatens all of us, what is neutrality but a more or less voluntary form of complicity?

131. The fact is that certain countries at the present time seem to be more concerned with acquiring new weapons - and those as destructive as possible - than with allowing the weapons they have to be subjected to international control. These attitudes will change only when the peoples of these countries clearly understand the fate awaiting them in the event of large-scale conflict.

132. The General Assembly ought to decide at its present session that a plan for a collective information campaign should be prepared immediately and submitted to it for approval at its next regular session. I propose, to that end, that the Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission, on the one hand, and the Secretary-General, on the other, to undertake in co-operation the following two tasks: first, the compilation of essential information for dissemination in all countries; secondly, the establishment of a programme and of practical means for disseminating the information.

133. The first task, therefore, would consist of the compilation of full and authoritative documentation and information concerning, *inter alia*, the present state of the armaments race and the expense it involves; the destructive power of weapons of all kinds, their immediate and long-range lethal effects and the measures taken for their possible use; lastly, the inadequacy, to which the British White Paper bears witness, of all military or civil defence and the need to strengthen the security of all peoples through the controlled limitation of armaments.

134. The second task, which would be the special responsibility of the Secretary-General, would be to prepare a plan for the dissemination of the information thus compiled, with a view to enlightening the populations of all Member States on the inevitable consequences of any total war. It is understood that this information would include only scientifically established and irrefutable facts, that it would eschew all ideological or political bias, and that it would be brought to the attention of all the peoples in identical form, which would of necessity be the form that was clearest, simplest and most expressive. The campaign would be carried out in each country with the co-operation of the authorities, but on the initiative of the United Nations and under the effective and continuing supervision of representatives appointed by the United Nations. It would employ those means of publication and dissemination - Press, radio, cinema, and television - which were able to reach the entire mass of the population in each country.

135. Such are the two preliminary tasks - the compilation of information and a plan of action - which the Disarmament Commission and the Secretary-General would be jointly responsible for carrying out, and whose

conclusions would be referred to the General Assembly in the course of its next regular session.

136. The proposal thus summarized is a contribution to the advancement of the spirit of peace and offers, I think, a threefold interest. In the first place, it would enable the United Nations to act directly on the mass of the population in every country, but in such a way that both the operation of the project and its results would be supervised by the representatives of the Member States. What Government sincerely devoted to the cause of peace could object to the free prosecution in its territory of such action on behalf of truth and against war?

137. Secondly, this information campaign would help to strengthen the efforts of the Disarmament Commission. In particular, it would help to convince all the peoples of the world that, if the armaments race is to be halted without impairing security, some action - armaments control - is essential.

138. Lastly, who can possibly doubt that, when they are confronted by the terrible prospects facing them, all the peoples of the world will press their own Governments and the great Powers to expedite the negotiations and the first agreements on disarmament?

139. The primary mission of the United Nations is to strengthen peace throughout the world; one of the means at its disposal is to enlighten the peoples in all lands concerning the unprecedented horrors of a new world conflagration.

140. The proposal which I have the honour to submit to the General Assembly is obviously open to amendment. What I hope, on behalf of a country which hates war, is that the General Assembly will agree to try out a means of action in the service of peace.

141. Mr. CHARLONE (Uruguay) (*translated from Spanish*): On behalf of the Government of Uruguay I should like to offer Sir Leslie Munro my sincere congratulations on his election as President of the twelfth session of the General Assembly. My delegation was among those which voted in favour of his election to that high office, and it welcomed the wise intervention of the Secretary for External Relations of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, urging the Assembly to seek a compromise formula in order to fill this very important post. We should like at the same time to express our warm appreciation of the decision taken by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Charles Malik, whose noble and generous attitude has earned him the Assembly's appreciation and gratitude. Both Mr. Charles Malik and Sir Leslie Munro, our President, are loyal and steadfast servants of this international community of States to which Uruguay has the honour to belong.

142. The events which took place in 1956 were the gravest the international community had had to face since Korea. And in both of the cases which arose, the General Assembly proved itself a worthy defender of the principles of the Charter.

143. In the first case - the war between Israel and Egypt and the subsequent armed intervention in the Suez Canal area - the General Assembly assumed its supplementary powers in the delicate matter of preserving the peace, as it had done in 1950 when faced with the aggression against the Republic of Korea.

144. In the second case - the Hungarian revolution - the General Assembly made use of its powers of investigation and, in defence of its honour and prestige, reasserted its competence as the international body legally established by the Charter to deal with such incontestably vital matters as the right of self-determination of peoples and respect for the fundamental freedoms of the human person.

145. My Government wishes once again to express its sincere appreciation of the honour conferred upon it by its selection as a member of the Special Committee appointed to investigate events in Hungary, whose findings provided the basis for the Assembly's subsequent resolution [1133 (XI)].

146. When the Assembly takes such resolute and unequivocal stands in support of international law and morality, it strengthens the faith of the peoples in the destiny of the United Nations.

147. In the first of the cases I have mentioned, the Assembly's decisions were respected by the States whose Governments were urged by the United Nations to respect the rules of law. We must hope - and it is the sincere wish of my delegation - that the same will occur in the case of Hungary. In the face of violations of the Charter which jeopardize the future of the international community, there cannot be two standards or two separate and even contradictory policies.

148. The tragedy of the Hungarian people affects the very basis of peaceful relations between nations. This belief is reflected in the resolution [1133 (XI)] which the Assembly adopted by an unprecedented majority: 60 in favour, 10 against and 10 abstentions.

149. Two significant facts should be underlined in this connexion. First, among the countries abstaining were several Asian States which had signed a joint declaration at New Delhi on 14 November 1956 stating that it was "the inalienable right of every country to shape for itself its own destiny" and that "the Soviet Union forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily". Secondly, the great majority of the new Members recently admitted to the United Nations voted in favour of the measures proposed. This fact, in our view, confirms the belief of the supporters of universality - of which Uruguay has always been one - that broader membership would strengthen the Organization.

150. These considerations are directly related to the duties of peaceful coexistence which, at a time when harsh reality is putting the very existence of the United Nations to the test, are the key to its future.

151. Our conduct in dealing with this vital problem must always be inspired by the tolerance and mutual understanding which the Charter enjoins on all Member States.

152. We regard it as evident that the United Nations was not founded to impose régimes or ideas on peoples or on men. We are a reflection of the world, and its complexity and variety are inconsistent with monistic institutions or ideologies. We believe, nevertheless, that there are limits to the discretionary powers of States in matters affecting peace and security. While every State has the right to maintain its independence and its personality, it must be remembered that States Members have assumed specific obligations which set limits that may not be transgressed for they are the boundaries of a common international jurisdiction

established, at a time when hopes ran high, by the concurrence of sovereign wills.

153. It is, I think, appropriate to recall these limits. The first is axiomatic: the immense benefits of peace and security are incompatible with unrestricted sovereignty. This fact is most clearly exemplified in the crucial problem of the control of nuclear weapons. If the control is made subject to the Security Council, there will be no control, for the simple reason that the Council's action ultimately depends upon one major consideration: whether the great Powers choose to exercise their right of veto; but the veto, in our view, is the worst expression of unrestricted sovereignty.

154. The veto is not a legitimate power, for power that is outrageously arbitrary and absolute can never be regarded as legitimate, least of all in the present world situation when tension, fear and anxiety have reached an almost intolerable level.

155. There can be no better opportunity for the great Powers to demonstrate their love of peace than by submitting their differences on this grave matter to the most representative body within the United Nations, the General Assembly.

156. The decisions of States, which may safeguard peace or precipitate war, are taken by the men who constitute the governments; but confronting these men, and above them, are the peoples. In the present dramatic situation, let us remember that in the preamble of the Charter the peoples, who nowhere wish for war, declared their determination at the birth of the United Nations, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind".

157. The attainment of the ideal of a lasting peace is, of course, a dynamic process depending on the harmonious interplay of all the many factors involved, for, as has so often been said, the problems of peace and security are indivisible.

158. The United Nations was born out of a world in ruins still lit by the flames of the great conflagration. In the last stages of that orgy of violence, in which great and small nations had been invaded, occupied and put to the sword, in which human beings had been subjected to the grossest outrages against liberty and dignity, the Charter was drawn up with the aim of establishing the pillars of an international organization and jurisdiction for the purpose of preserving and strengthening the essential foundations of peace.

159. Among these pillars were the self-determination of peoples and respect for fundamental human rights, the enforcement and promotion of which throughout the world are inconsistent with the principle of unrestricted sovereignty. Animated by these principles and ideas, the authors of the Charter gave expression to the desire that democracy and peace should be ever more closely linked together. This had been President Wilson's dream at the end of the First World War; his noble and far-seeing ambition had been to replace the balance of power by a union of peoples able freely to guide their own destinies, thus ensuring that the future of the world was not left at the mercy of the personal power of dictators.

160. The Peace of Versailles was made and unmade under the banner of nationalism. When this, our second League of Nations, was set up at San Francisco, we

included the principle of self-determination of peoples in its Charter, so that each people could shape their own destiny, but self-determination was indissolubly linked with the fundamental human freedoms which are at the basis of government that is truly representative of the people.

161. Human freedoms and the self-determination of peoples are, we believe, inseparable rights, and we therefore consider that they were rightly embodied in a single instrument. These inseparable rights are an expression of the driving forces behind a movement towards freedom, whose importance should not be underestimated. As Ferrero said with great wisdom, "while power comes from above, freedom comes from below". This is why the right of self-determination is attained by evolution or by violence depending on whether the fundamental human freedoms are respected or not. The support given by the United Nations to the first of these methods, peaceful evolution, has already borne fruit abundantly. Seventeen new States have attained independence since the establishment of the United Nations and this achievement, whose consequences are incalculable, is in our view enough to justify the existence of this international community to which Uruguay is proud to belong.

162. Both the spirit of the Charter and the draft International Covenants on Human Rights under consideration by this General Assembly reflect the desire that peace and democracy should increasingly go hand in hand. Article 4 of the draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, does not admit of any limitation upon the enjoyment of these rights that is inconsistent with the general welfare in a democratic society. In addition, article 21 of the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proclaims freedom of association with no restrictions other than those necessary in a democratic society.

163. Unquestionably, we all start from a common belief in the excellence of democracy, conceived not merely as a form of government or as an electoral system, but as a way of social and political life based on equality, in which the will of the State is expressed with the consent of the majority and the free opposition of minorities.

164. However, in our view, the draft Covenants before the General Assembly are defective in that they do not embody an explicit and unequivocal statement of one of the essential conditions of genuine democracy, and it is our hope that this shortcoming will be corrected. It should be expressly stated that each political society should allow a multi-party system, for this is the supreme guarantee of freedom, of freedom of thought and association, and of freedom to participate freely in public affairs.

165. If this high ideal were attained everywhere, types of slavery which exist in certain sovereign States would disappear. Such slavery is fostered by certain ideologies and institutions which we hold to be inconsistent with the Charter and which embody the single-party system as an organ of the State. In such States, political ideas and ways of thought are suppressed; men are condemned without the right to defend themselves and forced to change their opinions, beliefs and even their ways of thinking, to conform to the line desired or imposed by the State.

166. In view of these and other no less important attacks upon fundamental freedoms, my delegation feels bound to reiterate the views it has expressed before on so many occasions. If the dignity and value of human beings are attacked within the boundaries of a State, the attack affects the legal rights of the whole world, and not only of the nation concerned. Violations of human rights were one of the underlying causes of the last world war. The dictators who unleashed that war had begun to build up their power by means of such violations before they embarked on their programme of conquest. This belief is embodied in the preamble to the Charter and is inherent in the powers which the Charter gives the Organization in this field; indeed, the Charter makes respect for such freedoms one of the essential foundations of peaceful coexistence.

167. In this belief, my delegation continues to hope that the draft International Covenants on Human Rights may be considered and approved by the Assembly within the near future. Nine years have already elapsed since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in Paris [resolution 217 (III)] and acclaimed by the world, but the principles embodied in that historic declaration are still mere statements of belief.

168. Our views as to what should be included in the Covenants are in accordance with the spirit of the Charter. As the presidents of the American Republics stated in the Declaration of Panama on 22 July 1956, "The State is the servant of man and not his master." These noble words recall the great and eternal truths of Western civilization, that human beings possess inalienable and imprescriptible rights, preceding and transcending those of the State, the latter's purpose being merely to preserve them and harmonize them in their respective spheres of action. Thus the aim of law, both national and international, is to ensure the freedom and the happiness of man. These views are radically at variance with other ideologies, which are, we believe, inconsistent with the Charter, since they hold that the citizen receives his freedoms from the State and that he cannot assert his rights at the international level except through the State.

169. In making these observations, I am concerned to emphasize the importance my delegation attaches to safeguards to ensure the effective enjoyment of these sacred rights, in particular the right of the individual to take his case to international authorities, either directly or through representative associations. The right of petition in this form affords the surest guarantee against abuses of power. Uruguay's traditional views on this subject have been fully stated in connexion with its proposal for the appointment by the General Assembly of a High Commissioner (Attorney-General) for Human Rights.^{1/} The text of this proposal was included in the basic working papers on the draft Covenants by decision of the organ concerned.

170. I should like, in concluding my remarks on this topic, to say, reflecting my country's traditional dedication to this cause, that in our view human rights cannot and should not be thought of in quantitative terms. We are as deeply concerned with the sanctity of a single human life, with all that it entails and signifies, as with the self-determination of a people.

^{1/} Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 7, annex III.

171. It is with these considerations in mind that I refer to the disappearance of Jesús de Galíndez, an incident which has made an impression on public opinion that cannot be overestimated or ignored. We know that the circumstances of this tragic disappearance are being investigated and we sincerely trust that the investigation will make it possible to establish the facts.

172. This is not, of course, an isolated case. Similar incidents have occurred, although not all have received the same publicity. Because of the recurrence of such incidents, I feel bound to mention them and to emphasize that human rights are a problem of concern to public opinion which can and should receive the attention of international bodies.

173. International co-operation to promote the economic and social advancement of the world's peoples has become one of the corner-stones of peaceful co-existence. As the Charter recognizes, the larger freedom to which the United Nations is committed depends on better standards of life, based on the increased wealth that man can create under conditions of peace and confidence. Our objective must be an expanding world economy, assisted by the financial agencies set up by the Bretton Woods agreements and later strengthened by the assistance furnished by the Government of the United States.

174. Immense sums have been invested in reconstruction and development. The total over the past eleven years is in the order of \$43,000 million. However, such investments might be even higher if the huge sums devoted to military expenditure could be made available for peaceful purposes. In such circumstances, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would be able to draw on greater funds to increase its lending activities.

175. A number of developments of first-rate economic and political importance relate directly to this topic, which is one of constant concern to the Assembly. I refer to the European Common Market, which the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned [681st meeting] in his admirable statement, and the proposed free trade zone which would, if established, embrace the European nations represented on the European Organization for Economic Co-operation.

176. I may say, on behalf of my delegation, that we have the increasing well-being of Europe at heart, and in this we share the views expressed [680th meeting] by Mr. Aranha, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil and a former President of this Assembly. Moreover, in the case of the European Common Market, we are gratified and encouraged by the efforts the nations concerned are making to set aside their past differences and quarrels to transform this area, which was the theatre of recent wars, into a strong bulwark of order and peace.

177. These significant developments enable us to appreciate the importance of economic regionalism as a powerful factor in the new world economic structure.

178. In the modern world, where the economic forces making for mechanized mass production for mass markets conflict with the "political factors" which set limits to expansion in the shape of national frontiers, regionalism can reasonably be considered as the syn-

thesis of a contradictory process in which free trade is the thesis and economic nationalism the antithesis. Regionalism can therefore be considered consistent with the Charter's goal of an expanding world economy if the greater strength resulting from regional unions has the effect of increasing the world's purchasing power, with a consequent rise in the consumption of goods and services.

179. Naturally, countries which, like Uruguay, belong to no economic or trade area, hope that this will happen, and we sincerely trust that regionalism will prove to be to the advantage and interest of the world.

180. In the Americas, it is also reasonable to hope that efforts will be made to achieve greater economic integration. Integration there is undoubtedly a more difficult undertaking, because of the similar types of goods produced, the differences in structure and costs, defective transport facilities and the various commercial systems in existence. We believe, nevertheless, that there are immediate prospects of progress, if other regions are prepared to understand our legitimate desires and help us to achieve them.

181. As a nation belonging to the southern part of the continent, we would suggest as a practical measure in that direction that our right should be recognized to grant the Latin American countries preferences without prejudice to the most-favoured-nation clause. This principle has been recognized and established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in the case of the British-French Union and Benelux preferential systems, and the principle has been approved in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community. In Uruguay's case, this would mean that we would be able to extend to the other Latin American republics the preferences already granted to Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay under our trade agreements.

182. We also suggest that the American countries and the Common Market countries should conclude agreements establishing a multilateral payments system on the lines of the arrangements between Argentina and Brazil and the French and Netherlands currency unions. The importance of such arrangements to the countries of southern Latin America, which trade under bilateral payments systems, cannot be overemphasized, for they would enable us to use our favourable balance from trade with the European Common Market to increase our purchases in Latin America.

183. In making these suggestions, we are prompted only by the understandable desire that regionalism should serve the great aims of the Charter and promote economic advancement and social well being in the various parts of the world.

184. Because of its universality, the United Nations is a mirror of the world, where the invincible strength of public opinion cannot be disregarded. In this community of States, the greatest States are those with the most friends. Friendship and trust are won through respect for law and international morality. In the words of Ibsen's famous character, the small countries can tell the great: "Those who stand alone are not strong." In the case of nations, as in the lives of men, there is no worse ally than isolation.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.