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AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (*continued*)

SPEECHES BY MR. PÉREZ PÉREZ (VENEZUELA), MR. LLOYD (UNITED KINGDOM) AND MR. DU BOSQ DE BEAUMONT (FRANCE)

1. Mr. PEREZ PEREZ (Venezuela) (*translated from Spanish*): At this time, when the General Assembly is beginning its yearly session, we must recognize, in a spirit of cold reality, that there has been no relaxation of tension in the international situation during the time which has elapsed between the adjournment of the eighth session on 9 December 1953 and the opening of the present session.

2. One of the immediate beneficial effects of the end of the conflict in Indo-China should have been a relaxation of international tension, but it is not possible to say that such a result has been produced, as may be seen from certain incidents which have occurred in the international field since the Geneva Conference. One of those incidents was recently brought to the notice of the Security Council as constituting a threat to world peace. Encounters have taken place in Chinese waters between the armed forces of the Nationalists and the Communists, thus endangering peace. The situation in the Middle East is far from encouraging. If to all this we add the fact that the Foreign Offices of many countries have been more active than ever in negotiating agreements, mainly of a regional type, to serve as bulwarks against aggression, we can hardly say with conviction that there has been any great relaxation of world tension since peace in Indo-China was agreed upon in Geneva. My delegation is, of course, glad that hostilities have ceased in Indo-China.

3. Similarly, in 1953, there were great hopes that the world situation would improve after the conclusion of the Korean armistice. Why, then, have the peace negotiations in Korea and Indo-China failed to achieve the good results expected of them in the way of relaxation of international tension? It may be that world peace is contingent upon more weighty matters and

that, until such questions are settled at higher levels, nothing can wholly succeed in allaying the fears of the world. The armistices achieved in Korea and Indo-China are no more than petty and partial solutions within a problem of far greater magnitude. Such achievements are worthless so long as the graver problems threatening world peace are left unsolved.

4. Nevertheless, in the midst of these problems a ray of hope has appeared in the unanimous agreement to study the proposal of the President of the United States of America relating to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. This beginning of an acceptance by the Soviet Union may open a practical and sure way to future negotiations on the problem of the use of atomic energy in war. This hope was strengthened by the speech made by the Soviet Union representative on 30 September in this hall [484th meeting]. Let us hope that when in due course his proposals are put into clear and concrete form they will constitute an unequivocal step towards an understanding with the Western Powers on a problem whose solution is a matter of concern to us all.

5. A matter which is closely linked to the maintenance of international peace and security—and hence of capital importance to us all—is the report [A/2713] submitted to the General Assembly by the Collective Measures Committee on the session which it held this year. As everyone knows, this subsidiary body was entrusted with the difficult task of studying ways and means of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to maintain peace. The organization of collective resistance against aggression is naturally of paramount importance in this connexion. The Committee has this year drawn up a series of general principles whose application by the United Nations it considers both useful and necessary in the matter of collective action. In formulating these principles the Committee was particularly careful to establish safeguards to guarantee the absolute independence of States and their freedom of action in taking part in any future collective action for the maintenance of peace.

6. International peace and security do not, however, rest solely upon the settlement of political problems but also on the solution of the problem of eliminating the causes of want among nations, in which economic problems play a large part. We may point out in this connexion, that in recent times economic progress in the different parts of the world has been very unequal. We are certainly pleased to see the fine recovery the majority of the industrialized countries have made, especially those which had to face the acute problems of post-war reconstruction.

7. With a few exceptions, however, the underdeveloped countries are still struggling with vast problems and it cannot be said that up to the present they have received the broad and positive assistance that their individual efforts deserve. I venture to say that

although international public opinion may be conscious of them, the problems of the under-developed countries are not yet receiving the necessary attention.

8. It cannot be too often emphasized that the welfare of all is, like peace, indivisible, for any international structure based on the radical difference between the standard of living of the developed countries and that of the under-developed countries will always be vulnerable. The economic needs of the under-developed countries have been clearly stated, both in the United Nations and its specialized agencies and at various regional meetings. The under-developed countries need stable and fair prices for their exports, a sure market without the disturbing shadow of possible restrictions, and international financial and technical co-operation. During this session, the Assembly should give prior consideration to the problems connected with the public and private financing of economic development. My delegation's attitude towards these problems has already been stated.

9. On the matter of private capital Venezuela has maintained, and continues to maintain, a clear-cut policy: private foreign capital is fully safeguarded by the State within the framework of our legislation. The maintenance of this favourable atmosphere and the absence of any restrictions on the free flow of capital and interest are effective contributions which we offer as a capital-importing country. We have always felt, however, that this action should be supplemented on the part of the capital-exporting countries by the adoption of measures tending gradually to decrease and eliminate the burden of taxation with which the income derived from these foreign investments is encumbered.

10. A flow of healthy capital investments which do not drive out the undertakings already working with technical and administrative efficiency in the country of investment but lead to the establishment of new sources of production which would be difficult to operate with national financial and technical resources would in many cases be a valuable contribution to the efforts the under-developed countries are making to improve the standard of living of their peoples. The greater part of the foreign investments in my country are of the type I have just mentioned. To this fact, and to the Venezuelan Government's co-operation, we can to a great extent ascribe the atmosphere of confidence and security which has become traditional in Venezuela in this connexion.

11. Nevertheless, although the contribution of private capital is important, we do not feel that the problems connected with the foreign financing of economic development should be viewed solely from this angle. There are many projects in the under-developed countries which do not offer much attraction to private capital; again there are others which may not be suitable for capital; lastly, there are projects of great national interest which require a type of financing on conditions of time and interest which cannot be offered by present foreign investment sources, either private or public.

12. It is for this reason that we feel that the proposals for the establishment of a fund for economic development and of an international finance corporation are of undoubted merit. Consequently, we have always supported any recommendation made for the establishment of such bodies. As is known, these recommendations are directed specially towards the

countries which have the greatest capacity for contribution, so that they may continue to study the possibility of giving definite support to such necessary instruments of economic development.

13. While speaking of economic matters, I do not wish to overlook one fact which I consider to be of great importance to our Organization's work: I refer to the setting up by the Economic and Social Council [*resolution 557 F (XVIII)*] of a permanent advisory commission on international commodity trade. As a member of the Economic and Social Council my country supported the establishment of that body because we considered that its activities would be of great value for the proper consideration of the important problems of international trade.

14. Lastly, I feel that the concern with which the United Nations and the various regional bodies are studying the main economic problems of the under-developed countries and suggesting solutions to them is highly encouraging. It is with great interest that my country has followed the work done by the Economic Commission for Latin America, some of which will be of value in the discussions of the Conference of Finance Ministers that is to take place in Rio de Janeiro in November of this year, at which the American States are to study the main economic problems affecting the countries of that area.

15. A well constructed programme of technical assistance as an expression of international economic co-operation will always be an effective contribution to the general improvement of countries in process of development. In fact, at this year's sessions the Economic and Social Council has reorganized the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the main virtue of the new system being that the granting of technical assistance will be co-ordinated with the national plans prepared by the respective governments. This reorganization has been made possible by the fact that, as the Expanded Programme prospered, governments have submitted better co-ordinated plans.

16. It is from this type of international co-operation that the countries in process of development are perhaps obtaining the most obvious results. That is why the Venezuelan Government is using technical assistance to help in the carrying out of the vast development programme which is now fully under way and which includes, among other undertakings, the setting up of an iron and steel industry, the maximum development of hydroelectric resources, the development of the national railway system, irrigation works, increased construction of popular housing projects, and, generally speaking, all types of work designed to raise the standard of living of the Venezuelan people—an indispensable basis for the social advancement of any community.

17. As regards the problem of the Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, the Charter shows how their legitimate development is to be guaranteed by their economic, social and educational advancement, which will of necessity lead to their political advancement. Perhaps the most effective thing that Member States can do at the present stage is to try above all to strengthen those bases of political prosperity and for this purpose to examine the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, with the firm inten-

tion of co-operating effectively in meeting both the traditional needs of such Territories and the new needs which will arise as the result of the advancement of these peoples. We must, of course, perform this duty in the firm conviction that these Territories are part of our world. We must remedy their ills in the spirit of Chapters IX and X of the Charter, adhering, that is, to the concept that national or local prosperity is beneficial and legitimate only when it contributes to the welfare of the world.

18. This year we have an excellent basis for doing good work on the Non-Self-Governing Territories in the report [A/2729] on economic conditions in those Territories submitted by the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Paragraph 110 of this important document refers to the setting up of the Commission on International Commodity Trade and to the work of that body, to which I have already referred. This is additional evidence of the great value of such a commission in making an active contribution to the solution of important political problems, which in many cases arise from economic factors and particularly from the trade in basic commodities, from which the Non-Self-Governing Territories gain their livelihood.

19. It is to be hoped that these and other fundamental problems will be considered and solved in a true spirit of co-operation at this session of the General Assembly. It is in this spirit that my delegation is attending this session, as it has always attended the various meetings of the United Nations. The Venezuelan Government has shown the same spirit of co-operation in making available the necessary facilities for holding important regional conferences in Venezuela, the most recent being the Tenth Inter-American Conference held this year at Caracas. The enthusiasm and zeal with which my Government contributed to the holding of the important session of that body, which is the highest organ of the Organization of American States, is well known.

20. Mr. President, you have been elected President of this session of the General Assembly because of your personal merits and qualities. My delegation is happy to congratulate you on your well-deserved election and is sure that your experience, tact and equanimity will be the determining factors in making the deliberations upon which we are now embarking prove fruitful for our countries and for the United Nations itself.

21. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): Unfortunately, I was not able to be present when the election for the office of President of the General Assembly took place. I should like, therefore, to take this opportunity to pay my tribute to the charm and devotion to duty of the President's predecessor, Mrs. Pandit, during her tenure of office. We are delighted that she is to represent her country in London. At the same time I should like to offer my congratulations to the President and to his country, upon his election. We know that he will discharge the duties of his high office with skill and wisdom.

22. This general debate gives us a unique opportunity for the exchange of views and the development of ideas about foreign affairs. Many interesting and eloquent speeches, worthy of thought and study have been made. May I, in the early part of my speech, say that the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, deeply regrets

that he cannot be here. Last year in the general debate, as his convalescence was ending, I said that the whole world would have cause to rejoice when his wisdom and experience were again at the service of the cause of peace. I think that the last twelve months have certainly proved the truth of that statement. Unfortunately, man has not yet learned how, in his attempts to master time and space, to be in two places at the same time, and Mr. Eden's presence in London during the last few days, as I think everyone will understand, has been essential. Therefore, he has not been able to take part in the general debate, but he does hope that an opportunity may present itself for him to come here later in the session.

23. I shall begin with a review of events since last year's general debate. It has always been our belief that there is no single formula for peace. It is too much to expect that all the complicated problems of this troubled world should be settled in one comprehensive agreement. We have to tackle our problems one by one, and I should like to adopt that principle in reviewing the past twelve months.

24. First of all, Korea, which was very much in our thoughts this time last year, affords us negative cause for satisfaction. There has been no fighting during the last twelve months. We have not still to talk about the future of large numbers of prisoners of war. The armistice is in force. It has proved possible to reduce foreign troops. A political conference took place in Geneva. It did not reach agreement, but no discussions about Korean affairs have ever reached agreement on the first attempt, and failure to agree now does not mean that there never will be agreement. Time may prove the necessary solvent.

25. I think everyone feels that there must be no more fighting, that unification must be achieved by peaceful means. The Western Powers, the countries which sent troops to fight under the United Nations flag in Korea, believe in unification on the basis of elections in which there will be genuine freedom of choice by the individual elector, who will be free in fact as well as in name. That will require, at least, impartial international supervision of the elections, and the United Kingdom Government will continue to work for that objective. We are not prepared to compromise upon that. We cannot see why that international supervision should not be under the auspices of this Organization. We hope for the resumption of negotiations between the appropriate parties at the appropriate time; that is to say, at a time when there is hope of some real progress. We feel that there is no point in hurrying further discussions which may be used solely for propaganda purposes. So much for Korea.

26. Then there are the problems of Germany and Austria. Last January and February a four-Power Conference was held in Berlin. It did not reach agreement. The position of the Western Powers was clear. They stood for the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections throughout the whole of Germany under some kind of international supervision. A unified Germany would thereby be brought into being which would have the necessary authority to negotiate and sign a peace treaty. This would lay the foundation for a settlement in Central Europe. The Soviet Union Government took a precisely opposite view. It maintained that the first step was to bring into being an all-German Government which would be a coalition be-

tween the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Communist authorities in Eastern Germany. A peace treaty would be negotiated and signed with this coalition government and elections would follow at some later, unspecified date, under no form of international supervision. We were convinced that, if this plan were accepted, not only would it be extremely difficult to negotiate the peace treaty, but elections would have been delayed on one pretext or another until the Communist Party was in a position of "fix" them, as other elections have been "fixed" before, with consequences of which we are all aware. Therefore, agreement on that basis was impossible for us.

27. With regard to Austria, as Mr. Dulles has pointed out [475th meeting], we were prepared to sign a State treaty accepting the Soviet Union version of the five articles whose text had not yet been agreed upon between the four Powers. Unhappily, this was not accepted. The Soviet Union Government was unwilling to agree to any arrangements which would provide for the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Austria. It accordingly put forward new and, what were to us, unacceptable conditions for the signature of the treaty. First, the Soviet Union Government wished to amend the draft treaty in such a way as to restrict Austria's right to choose its friends, and, secondly, to add a proviso which would allow foreign troops to remain in Austria until the German treaty was signed. In putting forward this last proposal, the Soviet Union Government added, as part of it, that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Vienna. As Vienna is within the Soviet zone of occupation, the implication is obvious. There has accordingly been no treaty, and Austria remains occupied.

28. Mr. Vyshinsky made the strange allegation on 30 September [484th meeting] that the Western Powers had wasted two years by putting forward an abridged treaty and, therefore, were to blame in the matter. I do not want to enter into the whole history of the Austrian question, but inaccurate statements have to be rebutted. Briefly, the facts are that in 1952, unable to reach agreement on a longer draft of a State treaty, on which agreement had proved impossible owing to the attitude of the Soviet Union, the Western Powers put forward the draft of a shortened treaty confined to eight articles relevant to the single issue of the restoration of Austrian independence and the withdrawal of occupation troops. The Soviet Union Government rejected this draft, alleging that it failed to make provision for the protection of human rights in Austria, democratic government, and the suppression of Nazi activities. The Western Powers then offered to cover these matters in the shortened treaty, if that would secure Soviet Union agreement; but this effort was in vain. The Soviet Union Government refused and, therefore, as I have stated, in a final effort to reach agreement, the Western Powers at Berlin eventually announced their willingness to accept the Soviet version of every one of the unagreed parts of the longer treaty; but again, that was in vain. Austria remains occupied. We deplore that fact and have nothing but admiration for the courage and patience of the Austrian people.

29. The Berlin Conference did not produce a settlement of either the German or the Austrian problem for reasons which I have just outlined. It was, however,

conducted with courtesy and good temper. The attitudes of the parties were clearly defined. The Conference, in spite of the failure to agree, lessened, rather than increased, world tension. It paved the way for the Geneva Conference.

30. During the past year the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission was constituted in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution of 28 November 1953 [715 (VIII)] and met in private in London during May and June. It held some nineteen meetings, and was certainly the fullest international discussion on disarmament at which I have been present. A frank and useful exchange of views took place, a number of constructive and, I think, valuable proposals on various aspects of disarmament were made by the representatives of the Western Powers. I shall say more about them later.

31. Then there is Indo-China. The Geneva Conference brought to an end fighting which had gone on for many years. The terms of that settlement were not perfect, but they were terms which both sides could and did accept. Her Majesty's Government hopes that as a result of this settlement the Associated States will be able to take their place among the nations of the free world as fully sovereign States. We hope that they will be able to build their national independence and prosperity in peace, and that their efforts towards this end will not be marred by interference from their powerful neighbor. The Geneva Conference, without doubt, also contributed to the lessening of international tension.

32. Progress has been made during the past twelve months in another South-East Asian matter, the evacuation of Chinese nationalist troops from Burma. Her Majesty's present Government in the United Kingdom has thought from the time it took office three years ago that the presence of these troops in Burma was a real danger to peace. Thanks to the proceedings in the United Nations, and thanks to the Joint Military Committee in Bangkok, constituted as the result of action here, large numbers of Kuomintang troops have been evacuated. The task has yet to be completed, but without doubt progress has been made and tension eased.

33. I come now to the Middle East, where, during the events of the past twelve months, the United Kingdom Government has made great efforts to play its part in trying to produce a better atmosphere. Disputes which were damaging some of Britain's traditional friendships have been solved, or are on the way to being solved.

34. In Iran, agreement has been reached over oil by means of a settlement which takes into account both the national aspirations and rights of the Iranian people and other legitimate interests. On personal grounds, too, it gives me great pleasure that friendly relations between the United Kingdom and Iran have been restored. One of the most respected figures at these meetings is our former President, Mr. Entezam, the representative of Iran. I am very happy that our personal friendship, maintained throughout the two last difficult years, has once again become public and formal.

35. Secondly, we have initialled the heads of an agreement with the Egyptian Government which we hope will shortly be embodied in a formal treaty. We have had many ties of friendship with Egypt in the past. In the last six or seven years, however, our relations had

steadily grown worse because of the dispute over the base in the Canal Zone. Here, also, we believe that the terms of the new treaty will have regard to the national aspirations and rights of the Egyptian people and, at the same time, be of solid worth in the defence of the whole area; and, not less important, it will provide a basis upon which Anglo-Egyptian relations can once more develop in friendship.

36. Thirdly, an agreement has been reached between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of neighbouring rulers, about methods of settling troublesome boundary disputes which had been causing much bad feeling.

37. We are all aware of the many difficult and pressing problems which still remain to be solved in the Middle East, but I think that the four countries concerned, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, are entitled to take credit for having made great efforts, helped by friendly nations, to arrive at settlements of the disputes to which I have referred.

38. An outstanding event of the past twelve months has been President Eisenhower's atomic energy proposals. This generous conception was a constructive attempt to break down the barriers which have so far prevented the international use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Of course the plan is not, and could not be, a solution of the disarmament problem. But by creating an international relationship on the question of atomic energy—a degree of co-operation in one field—this proposal, if acted upon in good faith, is bound, in our view, to contribute to a general lessening of tension and to progress on disarmament itself.

39. I can only regret the reaction of the Soviet Government to the plan up to very recently. It has seemed unwilling to consider it on its merits, apart from the general question of atomic disarmament and the unconditional ban on the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, on 25 May, at the eighth meeting of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission in London, Mr. Yakov Malik said:

"Thus this proposal would not only fail to halt the atomic armaments race but would lead to its intensification."

No amount of explanation by the United States representative caused Mr. Malik to modify this rather curious proposition, which he reiterated on more than one occasion, and this, I think, could only be interpreted as a rejection of President Eisenhower's proposals. I can only hope that as a result of our debates in the Assembly the Soviet Government will now be convinced of the desirability of co-operating and participating in this great work.

40. So much for the developments of the past twelve months.

41. There are still plenty of dangers to peace. Apart from divided Austria, divided Germany and divided Korea there are difficulties in carrying out the Indo-China settlement. There is the present situation off the coast of China. There are the tragic differences between Israel and the Arab States. The past year has been one of almost unparalleled natural disasters; floods, earthquakes and typhoons have caused so much loss to so many. And the grim spectres of hunger, poverty and disease still range over much of the world's surface and trouble the conscience of mankind. From time to time there comes to our ears the distant rumble

of one nuclear explosion after another, from one side of the iron curtain or the other.

42. Therefore, complacency would be absurd. On the other hand, pessimism can be overdone. Let us not overlook the items, some of which I have sought to recount, where solid progress has been made. I submit that the record of achievement that I have outlined is not a bad one, and on balance, in my belief, the chances of a third world war have receded during the past twelve months—I repeat, have receded.

43. Even with regard to nuclear weapons, it is as well that the public should have the sombre facts brought to mind. My own view is that, whatever the weapons used, another world war will be the end of civilization. If, as a result of all the talk about nuclear weapons, the world realizes that fact, so much the better. One of the reasons for which, quite apart from the political and military arguments, I have always opposed the banning of one particular weapon in isolation is the implication that, thereby, in some way we are making another world war safe for humanity. I do not believe that at all; I think it is complete nonsense. When it is everywhere understood that recourse to war is going to mean the complete destruction of both sides, may that not be the supreme deterrent to war which has hitherto been lacking?

44. Our task, therefore, is to consider how we can consolidate such gains as have been made, and how we can maintain the momentum towards a more peaceful world. In this assessment, in the assessment of the possibilities of doing this, the role of the United Nations is a very important factor. The Secretary-General has referred in his valuable and thoughtful annual report [A/2663] to the dangers of neglecting United Nations machinery for the discussion and settlement of problems affecting the peace of the world. I agree with other representatives who have referred to this aspect that the position of the United Nations must not be weakened.

45. I ventured to suggest a year ago [443rd meeting] that the role of United Nations is threefold. First, there is the role which the United Nations should play to maintain international peace and security by taking effective collective measures, in the words of the Charter, "for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Second, there is the role which the United Nations should play as a conciliator in the settlement of disputes and disagreements which, if left to themselves, may lead to a breach of the peace. Third, there is the role which the United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly, should play as a world forum for the debate of current issues falling within its competence.

46. With regard to the first role: in the Security Council, the Soviet Union has applied its veto on many occasions—Korea, of course, was an exceptional case—to prevent action in disputes which affect sometimes only in the most indirect way the interests of the Soviet Union itself, action which would have had on frequent occasions the unanimous support of all other members of the Security Council. I am not seeking to praise or to blame; I am merely stating facts. I think this has to be remembered when Mr. Vyshinsky sheds, as he did on Thursday, what I think we can only describe as crocodile tears about the ineffectiveness of the United Nations. But the effect of all those

veto, the effect of the Soviet Government's policy in the Security Council, has been to force the rest of the world to rely more than was originally intended upon such collective self-defence arrangements, based upon Article 51 of the Charter, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As I have said, I am not seeking to praise or to blame. I am just giving the course of events: one action has led to the other. When I talk of organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization based on Article 51, I am not dealing with matters falling within the scope of Article 52. But it is a fact that in present circumstances it is upon the existence of effective arrangements under Article 51 that our hopes for the maintenance of world peace must in the main be founded.

47. In the second role, that of promoting conciliation, our Organization, and particularly the General Assembly, has been more effective. It is true that many of the more important negotiations of the post-war period have been held outside the United Nations. A number of them have been successful. Well, there is nothing wrong in that, because Members are indeed enjoined, in Article 33 of the Charter, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. Thus it is quite right that Member States should make use of one or another of these various methods of settling differences. When they succeed, using those methods, United Nations aims are achieved also. But the Assembly has itself contributed in a number of cases, and contributed decisively.

48. Thirdly, there is the role of the United Nations as a world forum. It is possible through our Assembly, to mobilize world opinion on an issue. We all remember how, at the seventh session, after long and arduous debate, the Assembly adopted resolution 610 (VII) about Korean prisoners of war originally proposed by India. This undoubtedly paved the way for a settlement, at a later date, of a hitherto intractable problem. Our debates therefore may not have an immediate result, but they can certainly prepare the way for ultimate settlements.

49. Of course, in the view of the United Kingdom, it is not wise even for a world assembly to indulge in unlimited debate on every topic. I have had words to say upon that matter already during the course of this session. The Assembly, in our view, should debate only matters which are within its competence and which it is wise to debate. I will not reiterate the dangers of any alternative course, but they are real.

50. There is a further, most important aspect of United Nations work. Many speakers have mentioned it and none, so far as I know, has failed to praise it. I refer to the work of the specialized agencies and other similar bodies. We warmly support this work, we are conscious of its value, and we are sympathetically considering the extent of our support. I have spoken at greater length upon these matters in previous years, but let no one think that the compactness of my reference this year shows any diminution of United Kingdom regard for this work or of our realization that there can be no real stability in the world until standards of living are progressively improved throughout the whole world. I am certain that all of us listened with great interest to the most thoughtful remarks of

the representative of Venezuela just now upon that matter.

51. But, before seeking to determine the progress which we are likely to make in the next twelve months, we have to put to ourselves the question which I raised in my speech in the general debate last year and which, judging by the speeches this year, still perplexes most delegations: what is really in the minds of the rulers of the Soviet Union when they express a desire for peaceful coexistence?

52. Mr. Vyshinsky said quite a lot about it in his speech. He reaffirmed the Soviet wish for coexistence. He rejected the idea that it was just tactics, or the desire for a breathing-space. I am afraid that many people, as has been shown by the course of this debate, still have grave anxiety upon the matter and do fear that the basic aim of the Soviet is still world revolution. One thing is clear: that we have as yet no proof that the aim is peace in the real sense of the word. There have been indications of a desire for lessening of tension. The Soviet co-operation at Geneva was an example of that. The tone at international discussions like those at Berlin and Geneva has improved. Some minor agreements have been possible. Courtesies have been extended. Travel restrictions have been modified.

53. On the other hand, the propaganda and the name-calling continue. We have again had in Mr. Vyshinsky's speeches all the old stuff about "fascist beasts", "United States bullies", "Wall Street monopolists", "aggressive blocs", and again we have had misrepresentation of our objectives and our actions. These statements were sadly out of tune with any idea of progress in the field of disarmament. But no doubt they will be repeated a thousandfold in the various organs of Communist propaganda. I beg the rulers of the Soviet Union to believe that that sort of language is not in accordance with our mood here at this Assembly—the mood of dedication to the cause of peace. There continues to be the wildest misrepresentation about living conditions in the free world. Communist Parties everywhere, whether in Europe, Africa or Asia, seek to infiltrate, to subvert, to overthrow. Methods vary, but the aim is constant: it is called "the creation of a revolutionary situation"—in other words, the bringing into disrepute and disarray of all existing forms of government, all forms of social and economic organization, other than the Communist system. Every government this side of the iron curtain has experienced this. An attitude of neutrality between East and West is no protection.

54. It cannot be denied that the inspiration—and a good deal more—comes from Moscow and Peking. There are disturbing reports of activities all along the southern borders of China, to which reference has already been made. The situation in Laos, for example, is disquieting. A Communist-front youth organization met in Peking last month to discuss the struggle for what was called "national liberation", not only in non-self-governing territories but also, so they said, in India, Burma and Indonesia. We know that such a meeting could only take place if it was in accord with government policy—for, if we know anything, I think we know that spontaneous expression of opinion about political matters is not exactly encouraged on the other side of the iron curtain. All that is inconsistent with real peaceful coexistence. A change of attitude in Mos-

cow and Peking would quickly be reflected, I believe; a real change of policy would speedily be carried out. We in Britain remember the speed with which the Communist Party changed overnight its attitude to the war against Nazi Germany. We know that it lies within the power of the Governments in Moscow and Peking to stop this sort of activity.

55. Some people may criticize me for having taken this opportunity to speak out plainly. I have done so not to threaten or to provoke or to recriminate, but to explain the causes for our anxieties and our actions. I believe that if we deal in realities, if we put our points of view to one another for the purpose of reconciliation, then we serve the cause of peace by speaking out.

56. We, the countries on this side of the iron curtain, want peace; we seek peace; we are ready to negotiate for peace; we are prepared, as we have shown in the case of Austria, to make great concessions to achieve success in such negotiations. Democracies—countries where there are free elections, real freedom of choice—hate armaments, hate preparations for war. We long for peace and friendship. We may be foolish sentimentalists, but we remember the comradeship of the war. We want to demolish the iron curtain. We want normal processes of trade, travel and social intercourse. However, there is much evidence at the present time that peaceful coexistence in the eyes of the Communist rulers represents coexistence to the extent of the avoidance of an atomic world war, but, apart from that, continued support of disruptive and subversive elements everywhere working for the Communist world revolution. It really lies with the Moscow and Peking Governments to refute by deeds that evidence and that belief in the minds of many people. That would be a decisive contribution to world peace. That would transform the whole world scene.

57. Mr. Vyshinsky spent much time on 30 September in attacking the European Defence Community, the proposals for a German defence contribution, and the General Federal Government. He attacked them in unmeasured terms. He alleged that what was in mind was the restoration of Germany as a militaristic State. The Western purpose is, of course, not to recreate German militarism, but to enable Germany, in partnership with allies, to make a contribution to its own defence, with safeguards and limitations mutually agreed upon and mutually accepted. That seems to us to be essential if Germany is to take its rightful place in the comity of nations. The United Kingdom therefore wholeheartedly welcomed the successful conclusion of the London meetings. The agreement reached is no threat to anyone. We believe it will make for peace and stability. I would ask representatives carefully to examine the provisions for the restriction and control of armaments which are embodied in that agreement.

58. After all, the alternatives to this policy with regard to Germany are completely unsatisfactory. Germany cannot be kept disarmed by force forever. The kind of Germany which the Soviet Union Government appears to desire is one in close alliance with the Soviet Union—a so-called "people's democracy". Would that mean a disarmed Germany? I must say that the Soviet Union attitude on this matter appears to me to be quite cynical. For what has the Soviet

Union been doing all this time in East Germany? Under the guise of police forces, there is an East German army. It consists of about 90,000 men. They are organized into two Soviet-type rifle corps, each of two infantry divisions, and one mechanized division. There is, in addition, one independent, mechanized division. It is estimated that, altogether, there are about 1,300 tanks and self-propelled guns held by these forces, and about the same number of field, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. This is a police force, mark you. Since October 1952, these men have ceased to wear police uniforms. They now wear olive green uniforms with a mixture of old Soviet and Wehrmacht features. Police ranks have been dropped, and military ranks and insignia adopted. In addition, there is a navy 6,000 strong and an air force, called the "People's Air Force", training in Soviet aircraft. Quite apart from all that, there are the security, frontier and ordinary police. In view of those facts, the Soviet Union campaign to deny Western Germany the opportunity to have any military forces at all on principle is, I repeat, cynical. There is no other suitable epithet.

59. However that may be, a united Germany—united on the basis of free elections and accepted into the community of nations—must be the aim of all of us if there is to be permanent stability in Europe.

60. I must also comment here on the alternative Soviet Union policy for Europe, which is illustrated by its proposal for a European security pact. Some people may say that I am entering into unnecessary controversy with the Soviet Union representative, but, after all, these matters were raised in his statement and, if we are to have what can be described as a general debate, we must surely try to answer the points that are made.

61. This proposal for a European security pact was first put forward at the Berlin Conference in February and has been repeated on several subsequent occasions. The proposal is designed to put an end to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and leave unsolved the vital problem of the reunification of Germany. In fact, the proposal is based on an inferior status for Germany, its neutralization and continued division; while leaving unchanged the Soviet Union Government's political, economic and military control of the countries of Eastern Europe.

62. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being as a direct consequence of the policy of the Soviet Union in Europe. It was an effort to prepare joint defence in response to overwhelming Soviet Union strength. NATO is for us the foundation of our policy. It is the basis of security in Europe. It threatens no one; and as time goes on and, as we hope, the need for military defence becomes less, the economic, cultural and other features of the Atlantic Alliance will become relatively more important. The Soviet Union now proposes the end of NATO. It wishes to substitute a security arrangements to which all the European nations, together with the United States, shall subscribe—in other words, an organization constructed upon the basis of universality.

63. I do not understand how that would improve upon the United Nations itself. The United Nations should be the comprehensive organization. Mr. Vyshinsky was very critical of the way in which the United Nations was working. Well, why does the Soviet Union Gov-

ernment assume that a comprehensive pact in Europe would be any more effective? If the Soviet Union is thinking of the value that an organization constructed on the basis of universality would have, then let it permit the United Nations to function as the Charter intended, and so diminish the need for collective security arrangements based on Article 51 of the Charter.

64. Mr. Vyshinsky talked about the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. He alleged that it was, as he put it [484th meeting, para. 90] "a perfidious scheme to set one group of Asian peoples against another". That, of course, is a complete misrepresentation of the facts. The Treaty is purely defensive. It is in no sense a breach of the Geneva agreements, either in letter or in spirit. At the Geneva negotiations, Mr. Eden made it absolutely clear to the Chinese Foreign Minister and others that the United Kingdom Government for its part proposed to join in such a defence organization. It is an agreement between States having a common interest to defend themselves against aggression. It is made clear in article IV that no action will be taken on the territory of any State other than the signatories except with the consent of the government concerned. It is a purely voluntary arrangement. We believe that it will contribute to the stability of South-East Asia—a stability which is essential if all the under-developed countries of South-East Asia are successfully to go ahead with economic and political development on democratic lines.

65. Finally, I come to the question of disarmament. My country took a lead in pressing for a meeting of the Disarmament Commission in April and for the appointment of the Sub-Committee. We felt that the time had come to make another attempt to reach agreement. We were gratified that our invitation to hold the Sub-Committee meetings in London was accepted by the other four member countries. At those meetings I ventured to suggest that we should discuss the problems of disarmament in three groups. First, we should decide upon the scope of any disarmament plans, that is to say, what it was we wanted to prohibit and what it was we wanted to limit, and the extent of the desired limitations. That was the first group of problems. Secondly, we should seek agreement upon the nature and powers of the international control organization which is essential for any internationally-supervised disarmament plan. Thirdly, we should seek agreement on a phased programme for bringing into existence the control organization and for putting into effect the prohibitions and limitations agreed upon.

66. Certain memoranda were put before the Sub-Committee on behalf of various countries, including a most valuable one by the United States delegation [DC/53, annex 4] on the rights, powers and functions of the international control organ. This is not the time to survey these memoranda in detail, but on 11 June Mr. Moch and I put forward on behalf of the French and United Kingdom Governments a memorandum [DC/53, annex 9] as a basis for compromise which seemed to us to constitute a great effort to meet the Soviet point of view. The United States and Canadian representatives warmly supported our memorandum. At the risk of wearying the Assembly, I wish to quote the final passage of the speech I made at the 17th meeting of the Sub-Committee when introducing that memorandum. This is what I said then:

"I have expanded our proposals paragraph by paragraph. Let me now put them another way. So far as nuclear weapons are concerned, we are suggesting: first, a conditional ban on use, followed by a ban on manufacture, followed by a total prohibition and elimination. So far as conventional armaments are concerned we"—I was speaking of the views of the Western Powers—"are suggesting two stages for the agreed reductions. Our position is as follows: we are ready to list the weapons to be prohibited and those to be reduced; we are ready to negotiate at once on the reductions to be agreed in armed forces and armaments; we are ready to draw up detailed rules for the international control organ along the lines of the proposals submitted; we agree forthwith to a declaration banning atomic weapons except in defence; we agree that as soon as the control organ is set up there should be a freeze on all military manpower and expenditure levels. We propose that after that, in two phases, we should attain total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of other armaments and armed forces to the agreed levels. We propose that the timing of these processes should be controlled by the international control organ; this organ, endowed with the necessary powers, shall decide in accordance with its estimate of its own capabilities and authority the timing of each phase.

"These are our proposals. They are an outline, in my submission, clear, comprehensive and realistic. They are a blueprint for world disarmament. At the risk of appearing to labour my points, I will repeat the respects in which we have sought to meet the Soviet Union point of view: first, our plan includes specific provision for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons; second, our plan provides that conventional armaments and nuclear weapons shall be dealt with together; third, when the treaty comes into effect those who have ratified it are committed from that moment to a process which ends and is bound to end in comprehensive disarmament. There is no question of first having complete disclosure and verification of conventional armaments and then deciding whether or not to prohibit nuclear weapons; fourth, we have made it abundantly clear that disarmament and not disclosure and verification is our essential objective.

"These proposals are put forward in good faith as a realistic and sincere attempt to break the deadlock between us, and I sincerely hope that they will be carefully examined in that spirit."

67. That was the spirit in which we put forward our proposals of 11 June. The Soviet Union representative at these discussions declared that the French and United Kingdom proposals did not represent any change and, in effect, he refused to accept them as a basis for discussion then. I was not unduly depressed by that and said so, because I hoped that after time for reflection the Soviet Government would come to see the value of our initiative. That appears now to have happened, and the Soviet draft resolution on disarmament [A/2742], introduced by Mr. Vyshinsky at the end of his speech on 30 September, specifically accepts the Anglo-French plan as a basis for a draft international convention.

68. The Soviet draft resolution contains what it describes as certain fundamental provisions. The lan-

guage of these is not altogether clear and will require careful examination. Such examination is not appropriate in a general debate. I will, therefore, confine myself to some general comments and say that, on the assumption that the clear and precise principles of the Anglo-French plan have been accepted by the Soviet Union, I see a distinct possibility of progress.

69. On the first group of problems, the scope of a disarmament plan, we should be able quickly to list what we want to prohibit and what we want to reduce. It will be a more complicated matter to decide on the levels to which the reductions will have to be made in types of weapons, manpower, resources and so on. However, I sincerely hope that there will not be years of protracted negotiations on these matters. Let us aim, all of us, at speed and simplicity.

70. On the third group of problems, the phased programme for bringing into existence the control organization and the putting into effect of the prohibitions and limitations, I hope that we are nearer common ground. If the Soviet Government has really abandoned its demand for an unsupervised ban on nuclear weapons in advance of a scheme of disarmament, that is a step forward. I have always felt that, from a practical point of view, the Western concept of stages—a phased programme—was the only possible way to achieve practical results. If the Soviet Government has accepted that, it certainly is to the good.

71. The timing and bringing into existence of the control organization is an important matter within this group of problems. Our view has been that, before anyone can be expected to carry out substantial prohibitions or reductions, the control organ must be in existence and its officials stationed in all the countries concerned, ready and able to supervise the prohibitions and reductions agreed upon. That, throughout, has been a vital point in our argument. The Soviet draft resolution is not clear on that very important matter, and it is a point upon which we shall focus attention in the Committee discussions. It is a point of timing, but a basic point.

72. Perhaps the most important area for examination between us in the Committee is that covered by the second group of problems to which I have referred, the nature, functions and powers of the control organ. The nature, functions and powers of the control organ, together with what I have just said about timing, are the crux of this disarmament problem. The Soviet Government proposes first the establishment of a temporary control commission under the Security Council to supervise the first stage in the disarmament programme. We have to be very sure that that would provide the necessary certainty that the agreed reductions were in fact taking place. When I say "we", I mean from the point of view of both sides, which seems to me to be a commonplace. Would this temporary commission have real power to do more than request information from participating countries? What exactly is meant by the phrase: "The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them"? Are we to read that as meaning that the commission would be given overriding authority? What would be the rights and powers of its servants? Are its decisions to be subject to veto in the Security Council? These are questions which will have to be answered.

73. The proposal for the permanent control organ suggested for the second stage will also require clarification. The moment when its control measures will begin to operate is not specified. As I have indicated, it is unrealistic to expect nations to carry out prohibitions and reductions before agreement is reached on the nature and functions of the control organ which is to enforce those prohibitions and reductions.

74. I am not quite clear why it is necessary to have two systems of control. Why do we need a temporary commission for the first stage of disarmament? The Anglo-French proposals for a control organ, which would be in existence at the beginning of disarmament, which would gradually assume greater powers and functions, would seem to us to provide a far better guarantee for the observance of a disarmament treaty than the proposals for the two types of control organ now suggested by the Soviet Union. All these matters, however, we can explore in committee.

75. The Soviet Union Government appears to have moved towards the Anglo-French proposals. That is a fact to be welcomed. Some people say that this resolution may have been put forward solely to confuse the domestic political situation in countries considering a German defence contribution. However that may be—I make no comment on that point—the United Kingdom is prepared to deal with these proposals on their merits and to press on with the work in the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the technical bodies which will have to examine certain aspects of these matters. The sincerity of our desire for effective disarmament was shown by the proposals of 11 June 1954 which, I still maintain, are a blueprint for world disarmament. The fact that our proposals have at length been accepted as a basis—I hope there is no mistake or misunderstanding about that—is a step forward. It is a cause for satisfaction that after years of apparently profitless debate, the Western proposals of 11 June, and the Soviet acceptance of them as a basis, hold out the possibility of progress in this all-important field. I promise you, we will never give up our efforts to seek agreement.

76. I have tried to indicate lines upon which we should fashion our conduct and steer our discussions, ways by which the momentum towards real peace can be maintained and increased.

I have endeavoured to speak objectively. I may have said some unpalatable things, but I have been trying to deal with real problems, about which I feel deeply, in real terms. I have tried to deal with some of the matters which have already been raised in the course of the general debate.

77. Whatever may be said about the practice and performance of the United Nations, I still believe that the only chance for permanent peace lies in a world organization such as this, endowed with the requisite authority and enabled to use that authority. We are, many of us, conscious of the force of public opinion in our own countries. One of our primary tasks here is to create a climate of world opinion. In this materialistic age let us not underestimate the moral force of the world opinion that can be generated here.

78. The road towards peace is hard and certainly uphill. There are many curves and gradients; travellers along it are weighed down by national responsibilities and interests. On the other hand, those travellers along

the road to peace carry with them the hopes of mankind, of those who have lost loved ones in the wars that are past; of those who fear the consequences of another world war; of ordinary men and women in every land, the patient simple folk who want only to be left in peace to achieve a fuller, freer, better life. Let us decide together to persevere together on that journey, seeking not only the approval of our fellows but also the inward satisfaction of knowing in our own souls that we have, each one of us, according to our individual capacities, tried to play a worthy part in leading mankind towards the haven of lasting peace, the heart's desire of a troubled world.

79. Mr. DU BOSQ DE BEAUMONT (France) (*translated from French*): For the first time in many years the world is living through a period free from war. For the first time the world can hope that men will no longer die on battlefields or devote their energy and creative genius to works of destruction. For the first time, a General Assembly of the United Nations can proceed without its representatives feeling deep within themselves this contradiction which exists between their intentions and hopes and the cruel reality of cannons.

80. Unfortunately, fate never permitted our predecessors in the League of Nations to say, as we are entitled to do today: "We have halted aggression; we have proved that war does not pay; we have shown that an organized will for peace exists in the world which will always oppose might and oppression."

81. Thus, in Korea we demonstrated that henceforth any act of aggression will be doomed to fail. But the fate of that country, so sorely tried and divided, compels us today to take the path of mutual understanding and agreement. Our negotiations must no longer be encompassed in a vicious circle and hedged round by notoriously impossible conditions. We simply have to refer to the evidence.

82. I wish now to make a remark which I think is important because it pays a tribute to our Organization which has too often been denied it.

83. It has been said that this year, during which a start was made towards a solution of some of the problems vital to world peace, activities were carried on outside of the United Nations and without its effective participation. Personally, I think that this manner of presentation takes a rather short-range view historically of the era upon which we have entered. I feel that the peace in Indo-China, obtained after patient and untiring efforts, had its roots in the realistic concept of this new era which has been brought upon us by the extraordinary progress of science, an era in which the means of destruction have assumed such inhuman forms that our very instinct for self-preservation and our reason refuse to believe that they could ever be put to use.

84. To argue that the United Nations had no part in this settlement would be to display a strange ignorance of the constant efforts it has made since its inception. It would also be tantamount to a grave disregard of the devotion and faith which we all place in our Organization.

85. Its ideal is ours. It was not merely in order to save our own sons and those of the Indo-Chinese States that we tried unceasingly during the negotiations at Geneva to reach an agreement to end a war which threatened at any moment to envelop the whole world. In striving for peace in Indo-China we were

not thinking merely of our own sons and those of the States of Indo-China, of our own villages and towns. We were also thinking of your children, your villages and your towns, for we knew that our failure would have as serious consequences for all of you as for ourselves.

86. Thus, we were merely following the United Nations example of resolve in the service of peace. There are no more widely used and sometimes misused words than "the spirit of the Charter" or "the spirit of the United Nations". I think that these words will henceforth have a more tangible meaning because of the sacrifices that have been made and because it has been demonstrated that the path which humanity must follow is that of conciliation and the pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the problems which divide it.

87. I should not, however, wish my confidence to be interpreted by you as a sign of excessive optimism or of a willingness to close my eyes to the threats which continue to beset us and the problems which we still must solve.

88. Unfortunately, the negotiators at Geneva were unable to achieve any positive results with regard to Korea. The fact remains, nevertheless, that on certain points they arrived at what I would cautiously term the beginning of a solution. In particular, it seems that the principle of free elections throughout the whole of Korea, under the supervision of an international commission and the principle of a gradual withdrawal of foreign troops were generally accepted. We may thus hope that a solution can be found to the problem of the reunification of this country which, we firmly believe, will thus discover those mornings of calm and that aura of happiness which it knew for so long.

89. We also hope that a solution can be found to the Austrian problem. In his speech of 30 September [484th meeting], Mr. Vyshinsky seemed to lay upon the Western Powers the responsibility for the delay in the conclusion of a treaty with Austria. These statements do not correspond precisely to the true facts. Without recapitulating now the history of these lengthy negotiations which have been going on for eight years, I shall merely state that, at the recent Berlin Conference, the principal, if not the deciding, factor in our failure was the new demands submitted by the Soviet Government at the last minute after the Austrian Government and the three Western Powers had entirely agreed to all the conditions previously laid down by the Soviet Government.

90. The continued occupation of Austria, like the division of Korea and of Germany, are only local manifestations of the opposing views of two worlds. But I have not mounted this rostrum to set myself up as an arbitrator, and France is still too closely associated with this problem to try to elevate itself above the fray.

91. Our country, in the words of Mr. Mendès-France, belongs to the alliance of the Western world "by reason of its mission deriving both from geographical and historical factors". The French Government is particularly attached to this alliance because it is in no manner an aggressive alliance and its sole purpose is the defence of a concept of life and of an ideal for which my country has made the most grievous sacrifices during two world wars. It is time to realize, however, that more danger is to be found in suspicion

than in trust. Today no responsible head of State is unaware that in this hydrogen-bomb age, war is a monstrosity which solves nothing and which would destroy both sides with complete impartiality. Thus, this tragic situation has arisen in which two worlds are arrayed face to face, encased in their armour, waiting for some stroke of a magic wand to save them from each other. Thus the Soviet Union seems to be waiting for heaven knows what sort of comforting vanishing act and keeps repeating to whoever is listening its favourite maxim that the Western world "will disintegrate of itself owing to its inherent contradictions", while we of the West are anxiously scanning the Soviet world for a sign heralding some miraculous transformation. For many long years now the two blocs have been questioning each other. I think that we both are beginning to realize that we are here for some time and that if we change it will be slowly and with difficulty. This realization, or more correctly, this realism, should induce us to make every effort to dispel the fear which bedevils the solution of the real problems, the problems of hunger, of raising the standard of living, of education and health, while nations are crushed under the burden of armaments.

92. That is why, if there is one question which is the main preoccupation in France, it is certainly the question of disarmament. We are determined to do everything in our power to cure this disease of distrust which undermines the best of intentions and dooms to failure any attempts at a *rapprochement* between the two worlds which watch each other so anxiously.

93. So long as ideologies are so different and sources of inspiration so diverse, the mounting burden of armaments will by its very existence work against a restoration of confidence. France for its part considers that disarmament is the first necessary and inevitable step which history calls upon us to take, and this call is made in the name of human genius and its prodigious achievements in the development of atomic energy.

94. I know that hitherto our efforts have not met with success. I know that many men shrug their shoulders wearily when the work of the Disarmament Commission is mentioned. But this Assembly meets in a new atmosphere and it should approach this problem with new heart. We should not give way to pessimism or weariness on this vital point. There is no human family which does not lift its eyes to us, and from the imploring gravity of that look we must surely muster the passionate determination to persevere in our efforts until we achieve complete success. After all, are we going to continue to transform the world into a vast military camp where the holy places themselves will finally become nothing more than strategic points and where the first thing that children will be taught in school is the way to the underground shelter? Are we going to let our age go down in history as one of the shameful eras of mankind? I do not think so.

95. My country will never cease to believe in the triumph of reason. Scientists and engineers have not only given us a terrible weapon of destruction, they have also achieved something which may very well force us to take our greatest step forward. They have given humanity a common enemy. Nuclear weapons proclaim in irrefutable terms the total solidarity of mankind. The French delegation has submitted, together with the United Kingdom delegation, a memorandum [DC/53, annex 9] which reiterated certain

ideas put forward as early as the beginning of 1952 by our representative Mr. Moch and which attempts to solve the fundamental problem of the timing of a general disarmament programme.

96. In this connexion I am happy to be able to express from this rostrum the satisfaction we experienced in listening to the proposals and statements put forward by Mr. Vyshinsky in his speech on 30 September. They are worthy of all our attention. For the first time, the Soviet delegation has taken a step forward, and we welcome it all the more because attempts to bring the opposing views closer together have hitherto mainly come from us alone. This fact is important to the future of our discussions. It remains to be hoped that this effort of understanding and co-operation will be continued without mental reservations or calculations, and above all that it will be translated by us into deeds. Let us never forget that we are working for the future of mankind. Let us, who have seen the horrors of war, join forces to eliminate this scourge which must not befall our children. Let us defend a cause which will never be a lost cause; for man is not, and never will be, a lost cause.

97. I should like in this connexion to recall the generous proposal put forward by President Eisenhower on 8 December last [470th meeting] and repeated in this Assembly by Mr. Dulles [475th meeting]. We welcomed from the outset the project for the setting up of an atomic power agency whose activities are to be directed exclusively to peaceful ends, and we firmly intend to do all we can to promote its success. The European Organization for Nuclear Research was set up for these same ends. These are projects vital to the progress and well-being of mankind. It will then be possible for the United Nations to devote itself mainly to the pursuit of the economic and social objectives which it has set itself and which relate primarily to the under-developed countries.

98. As various recent resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council recalled, remarkable achievements such as the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance show what the United Nations can accomplish, and afford a glimpse of the decisive aid which it could bring to the under-developed countries in the way of international co-operation if the armaments race could one day be halted. As long ago as 25 July, Mr. Mendès-France stressed in the Economic and Social Council [308th meeting] the depth and sincerity of our desire for the success of the great enterprise brought before world public opinion and the United Nations. The growing support which the Programme enjoys in the recipient under-developed countries, the increasing interest with which the work of the Technical Assistance Committee is followed, and the recent accession of certain great countries such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Japan, prove that the original idea was sound and that the experiment was worth continuing. France, being fully aware of the results which there is every reason to expect from this great work of international co-operation, is anxious to take an increasingly active part in this bold enterprise which is designed to ensure a livelihood for everyone.

99. The regional economic commissions, by comparing their experiences and making a systematic analysis of problems, are contributing effectively in their respective fields to strengthening the international eco-

conomic co-operation without which world economy can be neither stabilized nor developed. The debates in the Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council and in the specialized agencies, and the resolutions adopted—especially in connexion with the financing of economic development—show clearly that each has become alive to the solidarity which binds it to the others and that the task with which we have been entrusted can and must be brought to a successful conclusion. In particular, we think it desirable that in such specific fields as the economic and social we should not restrict ourselves to abstract resolutions which do not give our peoples a true or fair picture of the Assembly's work. We consider it essential—and this remark applies to other international organizations also—that we should put forward concrete resolutions. It is better to set ourselves modest objectives that are easily attained than to issue texts which are more grandiloquent than substantial and whose application will always be vague and problematical. In my view we must set a simpler pattern for our work and not neglect the practical side of our decisions, for we are here to help the peoples to live and to hope. By easing their daily lives we shall increase their hopes and justify the role which the breath of freedom inspired us to assume in 1945.

100. It is to this defence of freedom that we must devote ourselves. Free—that is how we picture man: free to think, free to work, to find truth for himself in the ideas and the religion of his choice. As far as we are concerned, I can assure you that the liberation of the human being from the toils of want and ignorance continues to be the French Government's constant concern.

101. The very word "evolution", however, implies the necessity of proceeding along this road with prudence if what is accomplished is to rest on a lasting foundation. As our Premier said on 17 June 1954, France intends to fulfil the promises it has made to the peoples for which it is responsible. We have promised them that we would enable them to manage their own affairs. We shall keep that promise. By having Tunisia assume sovereignty over its domestic affairs, France has shown that it is faithful to its word and to the traditions which it has so often been called upon to defend in the course of its history.

102. Responding likewise to the aspirations of the Moroccan people, France intends to call upon it gradually, but as quickly as possible, to manage its own affairs within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. In carrying out this mission which it has set itself, France has found—and still finds—critics who draw on their passions rather than on their experience.

103. France will not share with anyone the responsibilities which it has thus assumed and which it proposes to discharge. We have assumed them because they derive from our Constitution, from treaties that have been concluded, from our traditions and from our loyalty to the spirit of the Charter. But I wish to repeat once more what all those, regardless of political party, who have had the honour to represent France on this rostrum have proclaimed: while we abide by the spirit of the Charter, we demand that this Charter should be equally respected by all.

104. Let us recognize that the United Nations has hitherto allowed too free scope to nationalist passions,

and that at times it may even have seemed to encourage them without sufficient regard for the effects which such an attitude might have on the purposes for which it was set up. We have seen that happen at previous sessions. The prestige of the United Nations in our respective countries is too great and we listen too attentively to the voices from this rostrum, for us not to have weighed properly the consequences of the words that have so often been uttered within these walls.

105. If this century is to be the century of all-out nationalism, let us openly say so to our peoples, and stop beguiling them with false hopes and illusions. If, on the contrary, we are to recognize the interdependence of the nations—and that is our profound conviction—these appeals to the very nationalist passions from which at the same time we claim to be emancipating ourselves must stop. The United Nations must make its choice and refrain henceforth from representing two faces and speaking with two voices.

106. France has clearly stated where its preferences lie. We reached the age of reason long ago, and we shall proceed unswervingly in the full exercise of the rights and guarantees granted to us under the Charter. We call upon the United Nations, under the vigorous leadership of the Secretary-General—a man whose wide culture, knowledge of the problems involved and unflagging energy we appreciate—to rise once more to the level of its true tasks and to work for the elimination of this sometimes all-too-glaring discrepancy between the real purposes for which it was set up and the substitute purposes to which it sometimes addresses itself.

107. The ideal for which all of us must strive is to make the United Nations universal, and we French are among those who most deeply deplore the fact that its doors are not yet open to some countries whose history, civilization and traditions command respect. It is to be hoped that in the not-too-distant future we shall be able to welcome other countries here—all the countries which have given unmistakable evidence of their sincere desire for peace, and that in this way the regrettable but no doubt involuntary tendency which exists in some quarters to confuse the concepts of admission and of the recognition of a State will be eliminated. Although I am an obscure author, I have been quoted by name from this rostrum, and for that reason I was anxious to make this brief reference to the concepts of recognition and of admission and to stress that they are two totally distinct problems.

108. I believe that everything I have just said is evidence of the importance which my country attaches to the work of this Assembly, and of the attention with which it follows our discussions. We, who have given proof of our desire to solve all problems in the spirit of the Charter, are ready to accept whatever sacrifices may be necessary to contribute to the Assembly's work.

109. Every year we come to this gathering with our hearts full of hope and with a will to do our best. With perseverance we shall accomplish the task we have set ourselves, to enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations, from which everything we hope for may be expected so long as it is able to recognize the faces of its true friends.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.