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The Korean question: (a) report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea: report of the First Committee (A/2621)

[Agenda item 18]

1. The PRESIDENT: We turn now to the report of the First Committee on the Korean question [A/2621]. In addition to the draft resolution contained therein, the Assembly has before it an amendment proposed by the Polish delegation [A/L.173]. Does any member propose a debate should take place on this item?

2. In the absence of any proposal under rule 67 of the rules of procedure, the Assembly will proceed immediately to a decision on the proposals now before it. The draft resolution recommended by the First Committee would recess the present session of the General Assembly. Inasmuch as there still remain reports from some of the Main Committees which must be dealt with before any recess takes place, I believe that the Assembly should take this fact into account when it votes upon the present draft resolution. I therefore suggest to the Assembly that in voting on this draft resolution it should do so with the understanding that, if it is adopted, the recess will take effect only after the Assembly has disposed of the main reports now pending.

3. The adoption of the draft resolution proposed by the First Committee would have the effect of changing the previous decision of the Assembly with regard to the closing date of the session. I consider, therefore, that it will require a two-thirds majority for adoption.

4. If there is no objection, we shall proceed to the vote on the draft resolution with these understandings.

5. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The General Assembly has before it the draft resolution on the Korean question which was originally submitted by

Brazil and India. In that draft it is proposed that the General Assembly should resolve to recess the eighth session and request the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the session under specified conditions.

6. During the discussion in the First Committee, it was pointed out that certain serious difficulties had arisen in the negotiations at Panmunjom. Mr. Menon, one of the authors of the present draft resolution, pointed out, on the basis of information he had received from Panmunjom, that although the position with regard to the negotiations in Korea was not catastrophic, it was extremely serious. The representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, also pointed out that serious difficulties had arisen at Panmunjom.

7. The very difficult situation which had developed in the negotiations there is also referred to in the letter [A/2616] from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Chou En-lai, which was distributed to delegations today. Mr. Chou En-lai draws the General Assembly's attention to the fact that the situation in Korea has reached a critical stage. Then he states that the explanations to prisoners of war by the Korean-Chinese side were carried out for only seven days out of the appointed ninety-day period. Since the explanations were forced to come to a halt for the fifth time—they had already been thus stopped four times—twenty days have already elapsed and there has been no resumption, so that the agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war set forth in the Korean Armistice Agreement has already been seriously violated. Mr. Chou En-lai also states in his letter, which representatives have probably read, that the Panmunjom discussions on the question of the political conference have encountered serious difficulties, and that the convening of the conference is deliberately being delayed.

8. Certain representatives in the First Committee nevertheless expressed the certainty that these difficulties would be overcome without any assistance from the General Assembly. They maintained that the discussion of the Korean question in the General Assembly at the present time could only aggravate the situation; they said that such discussion would not only fail to lead to any positive results, but might even have an adverse effect on the negotiations at Panmunjom.

9. The USSR delegation cannot agree with those views, being deeply convinced that, if a real desire exists to advance the negotiations, the General Assembly could succeed in removing all obstacles to the convening of a political conference in Korea. Accordingly, the Assembly could also promote the successful solution of the whole Korean question.

10. It should be noted that, in spite of all obstacles, the Korean-Chinese side in the negotiations at Panmunjom is making great efforts to reach agreement on

questions relating to the convening of the political conference on Korea. This cannot be said of the other side, which is permitting breaches of the Armistice Agreement and, in particular, of the annex to that agreement on the terms of reference of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. In particular, I have in mind paragraph 11 of that annex, which lays down the time limits and procedure for explanations.

11. Although the agreement stipulates a ninety-day time limit for explanations to prisoners of war, this period has now become a mere fiction, since explanations to Chinese and Korean prisoners of war have been systematically obstructed by all kinds of acts of provocation and other illegal activities engaged in by agents of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek. This has been pointed out by the Repatriation Commission, which has recognized the need to prolong the period of explanations by the whole amount of time lost as a result of the illegal activities of the aforesaid agents.

12. The fact that special agents infiltrated into Korean-Chinese prisoner-of-war camps in order to obstruct the explanations and to prevent the repatriation of Korean and Chinese prisoners of war is clear from the incident which took place on 2 December 1953, when the Repatriation Commission intercepted a letter from a secret agent of Syngman Rhee who was trying to penetrate into a prisoner-of-war camp at Taejon, under the control of the United States Command. The letter contained instructions from the chief of the South Korean police and the "Embassy" of the Kuomintang about the necessity of preventing explanations in the camp and doing away with Korean and Chinese prisoners who insisted on repatriation.

13. At the same time, the negotiations are being systematically protracted. To this end, all kinds of questions giving rise to lengthy and fruitless arguments are deliberately raised. One of these questions is that of the participation of neutral countries in the political conference. This is a question which, despite the clear and just position of the Korean-Chinese side, has been turned by the other side into one of the obstacles to the successful conduct of negotiations at Panmunjom.

14. Such is the position which has arisen in the Panmunjom negotiations. It is self-evident that the General Assembly cannot disregard such a situation if it wishes to carry out its bounden duty of promoting the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, which affects the question of the maintenance and strengthening of peace and international security. This means that the conditions laid down in the decision to reconvene the eighth session to discuss the Korean question if necessary should be such as not to hinder the implementation of that decision, but as to ensure the most rapid and easiest resumption of the session.

15. A perusal of the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee to the General Assembly shows that paragraph 2 of the draft absolutely fails to meet the aforesaid prerequisite. Paragraph 2 of the draft puts considerable difficulties in the way of reconvening the session of the General Assembly, if that should prove necessary. We must say that this paragraph is quite unacceptable. It lays down a number of conditions for reconvening the eighth session. The first condition is the concurrence of the majority of Member States in the decision to resume the session. The second condition is that the President should express her opinion

on whether such reconvening is warranted by "developments in respect of the Korean question". Absolutely no explanation is given, however, of the turn which these "developments" should take before the President decides to reconvene the eighth session of the General Assembly. The third condition is that one or more Member States should make a request to the President to reconvene the eighth session of the General Assembly by reason of such developments.

16. A close study of these conditions shows that the reconvening of the eighth session is a very complicated procedure. Moreover, as I have already said, the main question, that of the nature of the "developments" referred to in the draft resolution as the basis for reconvening the eighth session, is left unanswered. There are no explanations and not even a hint of what particular "developments" should be regarded as factors in deciding to reconvene the eighth session. This remains an absolutely unknown quantity, the content of which we do not know. Thus each of the sixty Members of the United Nations is free to interpret these developments and their significance in its own way. There can be no doubt that such procedure is not only complicated, but also dangerous, if we take into account the need for rapid action in such cases, without any delay or postponement. Such a procedure cannot serve our purposes. On the contrary, it can only play into the hands of those who want to ruin all work for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It is absolutely obvious that no one who really wishes to make it possible to reconvene this session for the discussion of the Korean question, if necessary, can agree with such a complicated and absolutely unjustified procedure.

17. It is also obvious that the stipulation laid down in paragraph 2 of the First Committee's draft to the effect that the majority of Member States must concur in the decision to reconvene the eighth session weakens the assurance that the work of the session will be resumed at the proper time. The words "with the concurrence of the majority of Member States" must, of course, be deleted from paragraph 2, if the whole matter is not to be complicated and if there is a real wish to facilitate as far as possible the reconvening of the eighth session to continue the discussion of the Korean question.

18. That is the purpose of the amendment submitted by the Polish delegation [A/L.173] to the draft resolution of the First Committee. The USSR delegation supports this proposal, considering that it is useful and that its adoption would make it far easier to resume the work of the eighth session of the General Assembly, if necessary, than would the adoption of the draft resolution as it now stands.

19. In conclusion, I should like to state on behalf of the USSR delegation that the reason why the General Assembly does not insist on discussing the Korean question now is that it believes that, should such discussion become necessary, it will be possible to reconvene the eighth session at any time. We should do everything we can to facilitate the reconvening of the session; to that end, the President of the General Assembly should be empowered to reconvene the eighth session without any limiting conditions, which can only obstruct the resumption of the work of the present session and prejudice the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The USSR delegation held this position in the

First Committee when the vote was taken on the Polish amendment and on the draft resolution submitted by the Indian and Brazilian delegations. The USSR delegation intends to adhere to that position now. We therefore abstained from voting on the draft resolution at that time and will do the same now.

20. The PRESIDENT: Since it would be desirable for the Assembly to complete its consideration of the present item by 3.40 p.m., I would request representatives to adhere to the seven-minute time limit.

21. Mrs. BOLTON (United States of America): As the First Committee's report indicates, fifty-five members of the Committee voted in favour of the draft resolution proposed by the representatives of Brazil and India. It would therefore appear that that draft resolution satisfactorily meets the requirements of the situation confronting the General Assembly.

22. Under the draft resolution, the President of the General Assembly, with the concurrence of the majority of Member States, is requested to reconvene the eighth session if, in her opinion, developments in respect of the Korean question warrant it. She is also asked to reconvene the session—again with the concurrence of the majority of Member States—if one or more Member States make a request to her for such a procedure, by reason of developments in respect of the Korean question.

23. As the representative of my delegation stated in the First Committee, although the negotiations in Korea have been and continue to be difficult, some progress has been made. There are signs of a narrowing of differences. The United States, representing the Members of the United Nations, is straining every nerve to overcome all difficulties. If the Communists show a reasonable spirit of accommodation, it is by no means beyond the realm of possibility that the discussions will come to a successful conclusion. If, on the other hand, circumstances arise which make it desirable to reconvene the eighth session, that can be readily accomplished under the terms of the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee. Most Member States have permanent representatives at the Headquarters of the United Nations, here in New York. The President can easily communicate with those permanent representatives, and they can, on short notice, present their governments' views.

24. We therefore strongly support the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee. We particularly rejoice in the high order of statesmanship exhibited in the Committee, particularly by the Brazilian and Indian representatives, who helped to achieve a constructive and, at the same time, virtually unanimous decision by the Committee.

25. The United States delegation cannot support the Polish amendment, since, if that amendment were adopted, the reconvening of the eighth session would be a matter completely within the President's discretion. In our view, the procedure which would result would not be in the spirit of the United Nations Charter or the rules of procedure, which indicate that, with regard to decisions of importance, the General Assembly should act through a majority vote. If the Assembly were to adopt the Polish amendment, it would also be departing from the satisfactory precedent set last year in connexion with the reconvening of the seventh session to deal with the Korean problem [resolution 705

(VII)J. We shall therefore vote against the Polish amendment.

26. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (*translated from Russian*): I should like to state briefly the position of the Polish delegation on the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee on the question of recessing the eighth session of the General Assembly.

27. The Polish delegation does not share the view, expressed by certain delegations in the First Committee, that a debate on the Korean question might react unfavourably on the conduct of the Panmunjom negotiations for a political conference. On the contrary, given the fact that the tactics of the United States representative at Panmunjom—the statement which the United States representative has just made here notwithstanding—are to create absolutely unjustified obstacles to the settlement of questions relating to the convening of the conference, and given also the rejection of the compromise proposals made by the Korean-Chinese side, it would be very proper for the Assembly to hold a debate on the Korean question. The telegram received yesterday by our Organization from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Chou En-lai, addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the Secretary-General, serves as a fresh proof of the fact that the present position in Korea calls for the most careful attention on the part of the United Nations.

28. Moreover, even if we take into account the position of the delegations which consider that the discussion of the Korean question at this stage of the Panmunjom negotiations is undesirable, and if we do not insist on its discussion at the present time, the Polish delegation still considers that the reconvening of the session should not be governed by conditions which would seriously complicate and undoubtedly delay the discussion of the question at a time when such a discussion became very urgent.

29. Nevertheless, there are such conditions in the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee. The draft resolution does not confine itself to empowering the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the session, which would be quite enough, but makes this depend on the concurrence of the majority of the Members of our Organization. Thus a limiting condition is established *a priori*, which will obstruct the further discussion of the question and enable delegations which do not want a solution of the Korean question to postpone its settlement indefinitely.

30. The Polish delegation, which has always been guided by the wish to make a constructive contribution to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, cannot approve of such an attitude to the problem and will therefore abstain from voting on this draft resolution.

31. Mr. MENON (India): In normal circumstances, my delegation would not desire to repeat the arguments and statements it made in the Committee, but, given the special connexion that my country and my delegation have with the whole of this problem, in relation to the present phase of repatriation and the present or impending deadlock, and given the gravity of the circumstances to which I referred yesterday, and given also the references which have been made by the representative of the Soviet Union and others who followed him, I feel it incumbent upon me to say a word or two.

32. My delegation took the initiative in asking for the recession of this session of the General Assembly and for its reconvention on a specific date. That date was not limited by our whim, but by the facts governing the situation contained in paragraph 11 of the annex to the Armistice Agreement, namely, the repatriation agreement. We also provided that that fixed date could be moved at the discretion of the President, by which we meant her individual judgment, "for good and sound reasons".

33. We found at that time that there were other views in the Committee, which took form in an amendment submitted by the representative of Brazil. In the conversations that went on outside the Committee, we discovered that, while there was considerable realization of the necessity for the General Assembly to meet again in circumstances of gravity, and, indeed, in many quarters the feeling that it would have to meet, it was not our estimate of the opinions that the particular presentation we had made would have gathered to itself the necessary support for it to pass through this Assembly, or, indeed, to gain the unanimity or near-unanimity which is necessary in these circumstances.

34. So far as my delegation is concerned, we still consider a fixed date, with freedom of movement in the individual judgment of the President, as the proper and wise course. But wisdom does not stand isolated from the practical realities of the situation. We claim no monopoly of this wisdom, and our wisdom must be conditioned by the collective wisdom of the rest of the Assembly. For these reasons, and realizing that the Committee itself had an appreciation of the gravity of the position, because, on the motion of the representative of New Zealand, there was an adjournment for discussion among those concerned, and as a result of long consultations and exchanges of views over the weekend, it was possible for us to agree with the representative of Brazil on the draft resolution we have before us.

35. At this moment, it is necessary to point out what became evident yesterday in the Committee, that I believe there must be errors in the translation of this draft resolution in the Russian and other texts, because there is no question in this matter of imposing three different conditions. What we have said is, first, that the initiative for reconvening the General Assembly rests with the President on the basis of the developments in regard to the Korean question; secondly, having decided to take that initiative, the President will seek the concurrence, not the previous assent, of the majority of the Member States, and also her initiative would be affected by the fact of a request for a reconvening made by a Member State—but that is an alternative and not a separate condition. Therefore the judgment of the President, and the seeking, on her own initiative, of the concurrence of the Member States, is a factor which governs both these procedures.

36. We have no reason to think, from the conversations we had over the weekend or from the speeches which were made in the First Committee, that the majority of the Member States would refuse to consent to the initiative of the President in a matter of this kind. As the representative of my country here, I feel it is quite needless for me to assure the General Assembly that there is no question in our mind of not

relying upon the wisdom or the initiative of the President. Yesterday, this matter was mentioned from one quarter, and today it has been mentioned from another quarter, and we take the strongest exception to this particular approach. We did this as part of the procedure, knowing very well that you, Madam President, as elected President, would desire the concurrence of everyone. What is more, that is the best possible solution we could have found.

37. Therefore, thanks to the willing co-operation of the delegation of Brazil, we were able to agree on this formulation of words, which means that if developments in respect to the Korean problem reach a stage when the reconvening of the General Assembly is warranted, we shall look to the President to take the initiative in calling the Assembly together, and, in order to effect that, in seeking the concurrence of the Member States. If the concurrence of the majority of the Member States is forthcoming, then the General Assembly will be reconvened.

38. Finally, there is no doubt at all in our mind that the situation in regard to Korea, whether it be the political or the repatriation issue, is one which requires the consideration of the General Assembly if there is a further deterioration. We do not subscribe to the view that the discussion by the General Assembly of an important matter is likely, in all circumstances, to be an impediment to its solution. Therefore, before the General Assembly votes on this draft resolution, we want our own position to be made quite clear. We moved from our original position in order to obtain the widest degree of support and to ensure that the General Assembly would meet again. If we had insisted on our own position, and if our draft resolution for the recessing of the General Assembly had not been carried, we would have defeated our own purpose. It was for that reason, and as a matter of taking into account the views of many delegations, that we put forward what may appear to be a draft resolution different from our original one. It is different, certainly, in formulation and different in its provisions, but certainly it is the same in purpose and, we hope, if circumstances should warrant it, the same in its effect.

39. The PRESIDENT: We shall now vote on the Polish amendment [A/L.173] to the draft resolution now before the General Assembly. This amendment would delete from paragraph 2 the words "with the concurrence of the majority of Member States".

The amendment was rejected by 48 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.

40. The PRESIDENT: We shall now vote on the draft resolution of the First Committee [A/2621].

The result of the vote was 55 in favour, none against, and 5 abstentions.

The draft resolution was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

Election of two members of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Fourth Committee (A/2556/Add.1)

[Agenda item 35]

41. The PRESIDENT: In its report, the Fourth Committee informs the General Assembly of the election which was held in the Committee to fill the two

vacancies on the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Committee reports that Burma and Guatemala have been elected to the Committee. No further action by the General Assembly is required on this matter.

Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China: report of the First Committee (A/2607)

[Agenda item 25]

Mr. Thors (Iceland), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of that Committee (A/2607).

42. Mr. TSIANG (China): In connexion with this question, my Government and my delegation here have always followed a policy of extreme caution. We know only too well that the Anti-Communist Nationalist Salvation Army of General Li Mi is beyond the control of my Government. We have, therefore, consistently promised less rather than more than what we could perform.

43. I am glad, however, that I am in a position to state to the General Assembly upon specific instructions of my Government that there is good reason to hope that the number to be evacuated from Burma will far exceed the 2,000 which we have agreed upon so far. We have reason to hope that the final number to be evacuated may even exceed the figure of 5,000 asked by the representative of Burma in the Bangkok Conference.

44. I stated in the debate in the First Committee in April that whatever influence my Government had over General Li Mi's army would certainly be exercised to further the wishes of the Government of Burma and the wishes of the United Nations.

45. In order that the efforts of my Government may be fruitful, a certain measure of co-operation on the part of the Burmese Government is essential. The present cease-fire agreement is good up to 15 December. For the evacuation of the present agreed number of 2,000, the target date, 15 December, is adequate and sufficient. For the evacuation of soldiers beyond and above the number of 2,000, the present time limit is obviously insufficient. I hope the Government of Burma will see fit to continue the present cease-fire agreement beyond 15 December for the purpose of conducting the evacuation of others above and beyond the present 2,000. The process of evacuation, in order to be smooth, must be conducted in an atmosphere of confidence. If the men about to be evacuated should feel that the army of Burma would take advantage of the evacuation process to resort to military action, the evacuation would be instantly stopped.

46. Furthermore, in the ranks of General Li Mi's army, there are a number of people whose nationality is in dispute. Now, the tribesmen who joined General Li Mi's army, whether of Chinese or Burmese nationality in a technical sense, are regarded by Li Mi's men as comrades in arms. I hope that the Government of Burma will see fit to allow these tribesmen to leave. We in Taiwan have no desire whatever to get the tribesmen to my country. We are not short of manpower. In the end, the Chinese to be evacuated would

be in the thousands, whereas the number of tribesmen would be at most in the hundreds. It is only this feeling of comradeship between the Chinese and the tribesmen in General Li Mi's army that my Government must keep in mind.

47. If the Government of Burma should co-operate with my Government in these respects—namely, strict observance of the cease-fire, extension of the cease-fire and a liberal interpretation in regard to the nationality of the evacuees—I state again that my Government has good reason to hope that the number to be evacuated will far exceed the present agreed number of 2,000.

48. Since this problem is so near to its solution, I should like to say a word in regard to the character of these men. They did not go to Burma to violate the sovereignty of Burma. They did not go to Burma to occupy the territory of Burma. They had no enmity whatever towards Burma. On the contrary, they had and still have friendly feelings towards the people of Burma. But the love of family and the love of country have driven them to the jungles of Burma and to take an anti-communist stand there. They are, therefore, not anti-Burmese, but they are anti-communist. It is for this reason that my Government and people have given these men returning from the jungles of Burma the welcome of heroes.

49. My delegation did not participate in the First Committee in the vote on the draft resolution now recommended by the Committee. We regard it as superfluous and, if it is put to the vote now, my delegation will again not participate in that vote.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom), Vice-President, took the Chair.

50. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): The delegation of Poland wishes to explain its position on the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee on the complaint of the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Kuomintang bands.

51. The aggression of the Kuomintang bands in Burma makes it clear that despite the resolution adopted at the seventh session of the General Assembly [*resolution 707 (VII)*] the situation has not improved. On the contrary, the threat to the independence and sovereignty of Burma resulting from the presence of Kuomintang bands on its territory has grown, both because of the numerical increase of the bandits and because of fresh deliveries of weapons and equipment. The general threat to international security and peace in Asia has also increased because of the operations of Chiang Kai-shek's military units, shielded by the armed forces of the United States, in Asia and on the open seas surrounding the far-eastern part of the continent of Asia.

52. During the discussion in the First Committee, the United States delegation concentrated its efforts on dragging out the debate in order to gain time both for the purpose of concealing the responsibility of the Kuomintang and to create conditions which enable the Kuomintang to avoid carrying out the recommendations for evacuating Burma.

53. At the same time, it is well known that the United States Government exercises political, military and economic control over the Kuomintang clique, which it supplies with arms, planes and ships. Moreover, it is the United States Navy and Air Force which have under-

taken the illegitimate defence of the Kuomintang remnants on the American-occupied island of Taiwan, a sovereign and integral part of Chinese territory. It is this armed defence and the extensive military and economic shipments which alone have enabled the Kuomintang clique to survive until today. In the light of these facts, it is clear that the aggressive activity of the Kuomintang in Burma has been able to continue only because of the assistance of the American groups responsible for implementing the foreign policy of the United States in the Far East.

54. The only argument which the United States delegation has constantly used is the so-called repatriation of the members of the Kuomintang bands in Burma, a repatriation which, as the facts show, is a pure farce. For we know from official data and from the Press that this so-called repatriation has consisted only of a few hundred ill, wounded and aged men, and of 200 women and children. The true character of this repatriation is also highlighted by the fact that, despite the United Nations recommendation, the evacuees turned in only nineteen weapons, a sub-machine-gun and a few knives. This so-called evacuation has therefore enabled the leaders of these Kuomintang bands to regroup their forces and to improve their fighting potential. According to official data, they have more than 10,000 individuals equipped with the most modern heavy weapons. Furthermore, the statement made by the Kuomintang representative, George Yeh, to the effect that the Kuomintang authorities do not bear responsibility for those who have refused to be repatriated, is designed to reject guilt for the continuing criminal activity of these bands and to make a new intervention by the United Nations more difficult.

55. The discussion on the problem of Burma in the Committee showed that the aggression against Burma's independence and sovereignty was not an isolated factor. I have no intention at this time of listing the various aggressive actions carried out by the Kuomintang in the Far East. Nevertheless, as a representative of Poland, I cannot remain silent on the armed attack carried out by a military vessel of the Kuomintang, with the active assistance of units of the United States Air Force, against the Polish merchant marine vessel *Praca*.

56. The *Praca* was intercepted on the open seas on 4 October 1953—while the present session was meeting—and forcibly taken to the port of Kao-Hsiung, on the island of Taiwan. The *Praca* crew was illegitimately interned and its further fate is unknown. The Polish Government, fully aware of the fact that the responsibility for the activities and the very existence of the Kuomintang clique rests upon the United States, and possessing proof that the military vessel was led to the Polish ship by a unit of the United States Air Force, addressed on 12 October a note of protest to the Government of the United States in which it demanded that that government take immediate steps to bring about the release of the merchant vessel and its cargo and to free the crew and enable the ship to continue its peaceful course. In reply to this note, the United States Government attempted to make a blanket denial of the facts and to reject any responsibility for the situation. In a second note, the Polish Government confirmed its attitude and placed upon the United States Government full responsibility for the infringement of the rights of the Polish flag on the open seas.

57. These facts were presented by the Polish delegation during the discussion in the First Committee. Our delegation pointed out that attacks upon peaceful vessels on the open seas—vessels bearing the flags of sovereign States—were violations of the elementary right to free navigation and might result in international complications. Despite our clear accusations, we have to date received no reply to the Polish Government's note of 26 November 1953, nor to the charges presented before the First Committee. In the First Committee, the United States representative found himself in an awkward position and chose to remain in deep silence.

58. This piratical act of the Kuomintang aroused profound resentment in the wide circles of world public opinion. It particularly aroused the indignation of the Polish people who, at numerous protest rallies, demanded that the Polish ship be returned and that those guilty of the attack should be punished.

59. I wish to make it clear that the Polish Government will not cease its efforts to recover the vessel and its cargo and to have the crew released from the hands of the Kuomintang. In conformity with the rights of nations to free and peaceful navigation on the open seas, we continue to demand that the United States liberate the ship and its crew, and we shall claim payment for all damages incurred as a result of this attack. We shall continue our peaceful navigation on the Pacific Ocean and we shall continue to maintain normal international trade relations with all the countries of Asia.

60. The threat to the independence of Burma, the attacks against peaceful navigation, the conspiracy of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee aiming at a renewal of military operations in Korea—all this clearly points up the danger to peace constituted by the United States policy of maintaining and supporting reactionary and aggressive circles such as the Kuomintang clique.

61. In the First Committee, the delegation of Poland, considering that the draft resolution did not correspond to the seriousness of the situation which had arisen as a result of the threat to the independence of Burma created by the aggression of the Kuomintang troops, and taking into consideration that paragraph 3 of the operative part expressed appreciation of the efforts of the United States in this problem, which, in the light of all the existing facts, is unwarranted and unjustified, abstained in the vote. However, taking into consideration the fact that the most interested party in this case, Burma, attaches certain hopes to this draft resolution, we shall vote for it in the Assembly in spite of its shortcomings.

62. Mr. CAREY (United States of America): The United Nations, in dealing with this matter of the complaint by the Union of Burma, is carrying out one of its primary functions under the Charter of the United Nations; the pacific settlement of an international controversy.

63. As was pointed out in some detail during the committee discussions, there has been considerable progress in securing the evacuation of the forces which are the subject of Burma's complaint. The reports of the Joint Military Committee which is supervising the evacuation indicate that, as of today, 1,843 persons have been evacuated. These include 1,574 troops and 269 dependants. The movement of personnel is con-

tinuing and may easily exceed the target figure of 2,000 troops by the end of this week.

64. In the First Committee, a motion was made to exclude paragraph 3, which expresses appreciation of the efforts of the United States and of those who have served in this matter. May I point out that that move was defeated by a vote of 49 to 5, with 2 abstentions, which my delegation regards as a resounding and convincing reply to the unwarranted slander directed against the Government of the United States, an attack which, as I have said before, was waged with heat if without light.

65. The draft resolution which was adopted by the Committee with no dissenting votes places in proper perspective the progress that has already been made and our hopes for the future. The United States supports this draft resolution and believes that it should receive the unanimous approval of this Assembly.

66. U MYINT THEIN (Burma): As I ventured to express in the First Committee yesterday, the Burmese delegation is not enamoured of the draft resolution in its present form. Our case is that nobody can deny that aggression has been committed against my country, and we should have liked a resolution along these lines. But life is one long compromise, and if the Member States feel that the draft resolution before us is one that the General Assembly should adopt, I shall not be obstreperous and argue with them.

67. Representing as I do a country dedicated to peace, I seek a solution of problems by peaceful means, and I shall therefore pledge Burma's support of the resolution, which shows unanimity of thought, a unanimous decision which should forcibly remind the authorities at Formosa that they stand morally condemned for what they have done to the Burmese.

68. I am grateful to the representative of Poland for the change in his stand, and I expect that his other colleagues will do likewise. That will make the decision nearly unanimous, and I am grateful to them and am very glad that they have decided to put up with it along with me.

69. We have been sceptical about the earnestness of the evacuation. During the last month, it is true that the Chinese have been forced into removing some 1,400 men, even if they included the dead, the wounded, the lame and the infirm. But the tragic part of it is that no arms worthy of being called arms have been surrendered. I hope that Mr. Tsiang's statement that more than 2,000 would leave has a basis in fact, and that it will come to pass. But, as I said before in the Committee, if some 2,000 or 3,000 should leave, leaving their arms behind them with those who are staying behind, the situation will remain as bad as ever. We do hope, however, that world public opinion will make the authorities in Formosa see the folly of their ways and that the Generalissimo will recall these troops who, instead of doing what they loudly proclaim to do, that is, liberate the mainland, are antagonizing the Burmese people and the entire world.

70. I thank my colleagues for the kindness and sympathy shown to the Burmese.

71. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The USSR delegation explained its position on this question when it was considered by the First Committee.

72. We have no objection to the draft resolution as a whole, with the exception of paragraph 3. That

paragraph proposes that appreciation should be expressed to the United States for its alleged efforts in striving for the evacuation of Chiang Kai-shek troops from Burmese territory. We consider that there is no reason for adopting such a proposal.

73. The evacuation of these forces, which are in Burmese territory illegally and for aggressive purposes, has not yet begun. The removal of sick and wounded Chiang Kai-shek soldiers and officers unfit for service and of women and children cannot be regarded as evacuation. As many representatives rightly stated in the First Committee, such evacuation not only does not weaken the Chiang Kai-shek bands in Burma, but, on the contrary, strengthens them from a military point of view. Such a situation increases the military threat against the Burmese people constituted by these bands, which are armed with the latest American weapons, and therefore represents a threat to peace and security.

74. The General Assembly resolution adopted in April of this year directly and unequivocally declared that the Chiang Kai-shek troops must be disarmed and must leave the territory of the Union of Burma forthwith. Since then, seven months have passed, but only 8 per cent of the total number of these forces have been evacuated and these, as has already been noted, are only the sick, women and children. As for disarmament, as has also been pointed out, only nineteen rifles and carbines, most of them unfit for use, have been handed over. Such a situation shows that both the Kuomintang clique and its protectors have ignored and violated General Assembly decisions.

75. In the light of these facts, it is absolutely obvious that not only have no efforts been made to implement the General Assembly resolution on disarmament and evacuation, but, on the contrary, that efforts have been made to prolong the stay of these bands in Burmese territory and to increase their military strength for specific aggressive purposes.

76. The USSR delegation cannot accept paragraph 3 of the draft resolution before us, because that paragraph does not reflect the real situation. The United States has not only done nothing to bring about the evacuation of the Kuomintang troops, but, on the contrary, is encouraging the lawless behaviour of those troops in Burmese territory. That is precisely why the First Committee rightly notes in its draft resolution that the evacuation is limited in character, expresses concern that the Chiang Kai-shek troops have surrendered few arms, and urges that the countries concerned should continue their efforts for disarmament and internment. With the aforementioned reservation with regard to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, the USSR delegation will support the draft resolution.

77. The question of the Polish ship *Praca* raised by the Polish representative shows that the Chiang Kai-shek clique is carrying on its lawless activities not only in Burma, but also on the high seas. The General Assembly must pay attention to this also.

78. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution proposed by the First Committee [A/2607].

The draft resolution was adopted by 56 votes to none, with 1 abstention. 717

The meeting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.

Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America

79. Mr. Dwight D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America: Madam President and Members of the General Assembly; when Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's invitation to address the General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France. Our subject was some of the problems that beset our world. During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honour. That honour is mine today as I stand here, privileged to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.

80. At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly. Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these sombre years have already realized part of those hopes.

81. But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the wisdom, of the courage and of the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well-being for all men.

82. Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present to you a unilateral American report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I assure you that in our deliberations on that lovely island we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so clearly etched in your Charter. Neither would it be a measure of this great opportunity to recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes. I therefore decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates, and on mine, for a great many months: thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people.

83. I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all. Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

84. I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new, one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare.

85. The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they

must be armed with the significant facts of today's existence.

86. My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

87. On 16 July 1945, the United States set off the world's biggest atomic explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic bombs are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

88. Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of the Second World War. A single air group, whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all the Second World War.

89. In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.

90. But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone.

91. In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, the United Kingdom and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs.

92. The secret is also known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions.

93. If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance. First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others. Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.

94. The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large programme of warning and defence systems. That programme will be accelerated and extended. But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defence can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such

easy solution. Even against the most powerful defence, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage.

95. Should such a atomic attack be launched against the United States, our reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to say that the defence capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor, for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor's land would be laid waste, all this, while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hopes of the United States.

96. To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed, the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us from generation to generation, and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery towards decency, and right, and justice. Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction? Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the "great destroyers", but the whole book of history reveals mankind's never-ending quest for peace and mankind's God-given capacity to build.

97. It is with the book of history, and not with isolated pages, that the United States will ever wish to be identified. My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants itself to live in freedom and in the confidence that the peoples of every other nation enjoy equally the right of choosing their own way of life. So my country's purpose is to help us to move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward towards peace and happiness and well-being.

98. In this quest, I know that we must not lack patience. I know that in a world divided, such as ours today, salvation cannot be attained by one dramatic act. I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world. But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps—now.

99. The United States and its allies, the United Kingdom and France, have over the past months tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table. On the record has long stood the request of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to negotiate with the Soviet Union the problems of a divided Germany. On that record has long stood the request of the same three nations to negotiate an Austrian peace treaty. On the same record still stands the request of the United Nations to negotiate the problems of Korea.

100. Most recently we have received from the Soviet Union what is in effect an expression of willingness to hold a four-Power meeting. Along with our allies,

the United Kingdom and France, we were pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable pre-conditions previously put forward. As you already know from our joint Bermuda *communiqué*, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have agreed promptly to meet with the Soviet Union.

101. The Government of the United States approaches this conference with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to the single purpose of emerging from that conference with tangible results towards peace, the only true way of lessening international tension.

102. We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what rightfully belongs to it. We will never say that the peoples of the USSR are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.

103. On the contrary, we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a freer mingling of the peoples of the East and of the West—the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful relations.

104. Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Germany, occupied Austria and the countries of Eastern Europe, we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of the USSR. Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of Asia, we seek peaceful opportunity for these peoples to develop their natural resources and to elevate their lot.

105. These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies a story of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of war, but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a record already written of assistance gladly given by nations of the West to needy peoples and to those suffering the temporary effects of famine, drought and natural disaster. These are deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations of peaceful intent.

106. But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible, should be explored.

107. There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been well explored—an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In its resolution of 28 November 1953 [*resolution 715 (VIII)*] this General Assembly suggested: "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report . . . on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954".

108. The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be "principally involved", to seek "an acceptable solution" to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world.

109. We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception.

110. The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

111. The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here today. Who can doubt that, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage?

112. To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of the people and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now.

113. I therefore make the following proposals.

114. The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I referred to earlier.

115. The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

116. Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.

117. The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

118. The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the

peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world.

119. Thus the contributing Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

120. The United States would be more than willing—it would be proud to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

121. Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

122. I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would, first, encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that the investigators had all the material needed for the conducting of all experiments that were appropriate; second, begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great Powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth, open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiative at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive progress towards peace.

123. Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace.

124. The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly, in the capitals and military headquarters of the world, in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governed or governors, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace.

125. To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you, and therefore before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

126. I again thank representatives for the great honour they have done me in inviting me to appear before them and in listening to me so graciously.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.