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General debate [continued]

SPEECHES BY MR. ZEINEDDINE (SYRIA), MR. MAURICE SCHUMANN (FRANCE), AND MR. VAN ZEELAND (BELGIUM)

1. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria): The General Assembly convenes in this eighth session to meet the complexity of world problems, many of which are old acquaintances. The Assembly's agenda this year, as in previous years, covers a wide range of political and economic questions which are centred around two main issues: the issue of maintaining peace and ensuring collective security, to which are related the questions of Korea and disarmament, and the issue of colonialism and the unequal treatment of nations.

2. Around this second issue arise a variety of questions, such as Tunisia, Morocco, the Palestine refugees, *apartheid* in South Africa and the items related to the development of under-developed countries. Although these questions are varied, they are all the result of the ominous fact that over a thousand million people, about half the human race, still live in under-developed countries and are still subjected in one way or another to destructive foreign domination, economic poverty and exploitation, social instability and cultural frustration. This situation is imperilling the national development of these nations and making it difficult for them to contribute their rightful part, out of their own national genius, to general civilization and culture. These thousand million people are considered to be a part of the free world and are called upon to defend a free world which many of them have not yet discovered.

3. These two issues before the Assembly, therefore, that of maintaining peace and that of the liberation and development of the less developed countries, are the two fundamentals of the present world situation. Indeed, they are the two phases of the reality of our day, and neither of them can be divorced from the other, because their relationship is vital.

4. Peace cannot be maintained amidst dangerous and explosive situations, nor can it be rendered durable without the genuine and active help of half the human race. Peace can be achieved only by eliminating the causes which generate strife and developing positive conditions of well-being. The prerequisites of peace and international co-operation have been made clear

in the Charter as comprising the right of self-determination, the equality of nations big and small, equal protection to all, and the sustained promotion of political, social, economic and cultural development, especially in the under-developed areas.

5. But since San Francisco our world horizons have changed. They are today nebulous and confused. Resurgent colonialism, revolutionary ideologies and power politics have again taken the field. They are trying to make the world an arena of their contentions and struggles because war is upon us, sucking into its vortex all other issues. Whither are we tending? Today that is a question—a basic one—which, like a leitmotiv, is written across the political, economic, social and cultural horizons. The answer to this question cannot be delivered by revelation. It has to be delivered either by the United Nations or by war. The choice is clear. The United Nations is the only hope, and the General Assembly of the United Nations is the principal organ which can produce results.

6. A moment of reflection, however, would make us admit, although reluctantly, some discernible practices or tendencies in the Assembly which are of a nature to undermine its foundations and disrupt its functioning. I should like to take the liberty of mentioning them.

7. First, there is the practice in our deliberations—or the tendency, rather—that *a priori* opinions are at times definitely formed before the deliberations even start. Debate in the Assembly on the merits of the problem under discussion seems at times to be a forlorn hope. Opinions may be changed through discussion but there is less change in votes: opinions tend to become one thing and votes another. As a result of this situation many portions of the text of the Charter have gained in practice a multiplicity of meanings inspired by expediency and opportunist tendencies. When, at times, draft resolutions are put forward, their language is rationalized, with these passages of the Charter sapped of their spirit and real meaning. My country, for one, has experienced the effects of such trends in the case of Palestine and other questions. This tendency, however, is not always the prevailing one.

8. Secondly, when recommendations are made in the spirit of the Charter, in spite of all difficulties attending our deliberations, these recommendations are often disregarded, flouted or ignored. Disregard, by this or that Power, of the recommendations of the Assembly is indeed encouraged and made possible by the fact that such an attitude is sure to meet with complacency on the part of the group to which that Power may belong. That complacency is in itself very detrimental to the functioning of our Assembly.

9. Thirdly, there is a tendency influencing the functioning of the Assembly to use two yardsticks for measuring right and two yardsticks for measuring

wrong, so that either one of the two yardsticks may be used, as suits the interests of this or that Power. When, for example, Israel aggression—the most cruel of its kind—destroyed the people of Palestine and made them disinherited refugees, the yardstick then employed amounted to a condoning of aggression and help to the aggressor. When, in another case, a situation arose within Korea, fostered by outside influences, the yardstick then used was very different indeed from that used in the case of Palestine.

10. Let us consider a more recent happening. When Member States were called upon to uphold collective action in Korea, we were told that that action was undertaken on behalf of the collectivity of nations. Later this affirmation was reiterated by the belligerent Powers. But when, upon the signing of the Korean armistice, we came to the matter of peace-making, another theory, another mode of thinking, another criterion was initiated: a theory, a criterion, based upon discrimination between the so-called neutral Members and the belligerent Members of the same side, as if the latter formed an exclusive alliance. That theory found its way into the United Nations, not to strengthen collective security but to impair the meaning of collective action. A new yardstick was developed to suit the needs of the moment and belligerency was used as a criterion of United Nations action both in peace and in war.

11. The effect of such an experience upon the thinking of various peoples in relation to possible future actions should not be underestimated. Decisions once taken should of course be upheld until they are changed by the Assembly, and my reference to that decision on Korea is made simply to illustrate my point; that in the functioning of the Assembly a system of double standards is at times applied to suit the subjective considerations of this or that Power or group of Powers.

12. Last but not least there is a tendency to relegate to the second or third place those questions which pertain to national liberation and self-determination, as well as those which pertain to the self-fulfilment of nations, their self-realization through the development of the less developed countries. These questions, I dare to say, do not receive in the Assembly the degree of attention which is commensurate with their real value and their international importance. In fact, the consideration of these questions usually ends with no practical or substantial international measures adequate to help either in promoting liberation or enhancing development.

13. I have mentioned these tendencies in no spirit of destructive criticism; I have mentioned them not to indicate in the least a lack of hope in the United Nations on our part. I have simply mentioned them in order to call for constructive efforts to remedy them and thus to increase hope in the United Nations and ensure its efficacy.

14. These practices or tendencies in the General Assembly are described at times as being realistic. In San Francisco, however, not only was an ideal born but an international treaty was concluded, an organized co-operative international body was shaped and instituted. The Charter, born of stern realities, is not a set of idealistic principles far from reality; it is a set of mutual obligations assumed. It was not drawn up in order to acknowledge norms of behaviour to which people can aspire but to establish standards of international conduct which Member States should actually follow in good faith and practice.

15. My Government, therefore, feels entitled to require that the treaty should be respected in practice and in good faith. We are deeply concerned with any trend which, under the pretext of the cold war and international tensions, causes the functions of the United Nations Assembly to be unduly affected by the policies of Powers or blocs of Powers. We hold that the atmosphere of the cold war should not furnish the air we breathe in the Assembly. The Assembly, in order to fulfil its mission, must seek to free its practices from the influences of power politics and the psychosis of war, so as to be enabled to set itself on the path of peace and healthful international co-operation.

16. The excesses in the effects of power politics, as they have revealed themselves in the functioning of the Assembly, have prompted my country, among many other Arab, Asian and African countries, to react to them and to try to remedy them. If these excesses should continue they might render this Assembly as inoperative as the Security Council. The Asian-African countries, I submit, have grouped themselves together not in order to oppose any bloc, but rather to safeguard the independence of their views and policies from bloc action, and to be able to do their duty in the United Nations by ensuring greater objectivity in deliberations, more clarity and efficacy in resolutions, and more respect for the recommendations made; they especially desire to activate and strengthen measures connected with problems of national liberation and development in less developed countries. This group is often qualified as the "uncommitted" group. Yet it is a group which, in our humble view, is committed to the taking of constructive political action. Today this group of countries comprises about one-third of the human race. Let us hope that it will at least exert a beneficial influence upon those who have respect for the decent opinion of mankind.

17. My country fully supports the Asian-African group as a beneficial force in the United Nations, and constantly seeks to align its policy with that of the other members in a common endeavour.

18. Much can be done to reform the prevailing conditions in the Assembly within the provisions of the Charter as they now stand. At San Francisco, my country held views concerning the composition and functioning of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, views which were not ultimately adopted. Our views at that time were overruled. But the Charter became our agreement—ours, one and all. It should today govern our international actions. The Charter itself, however, provides for its own revision. In our view, the United Nations would be well advised to bring about revision in the light of experience.

19. Allow me at this stage to refer to a question related to representation in the Security Council, and to observe that the present practice as to the distribution of seats in that Council seems to leave no practical possibility for the whole region of South-East Asia to be represented. In San Francisco, some of the countries of that region had not yet joined us. The present practice cannot have its foundations in the Charter inasmuch as it denies representation to that area. It is timely, therefore, to find means to enable the South-East Asian States to perform their duty in matters of security. This should provide us with some food for

thought as to what might be done in the elections to the Security Council in future years.

20. The General Assembly, despite some tendencies which have developed in its functioning and despite the limitations laid down by the Charter on its actions, has nevertheless been evolving towards self-fulfilment. It has in fact developed into a world forum and an annually recurring international conference where the attitudes of nations, large and small, are heard. None can ignore that the recommendations of the Assembly, more so than those of the Security Council, command wide international support and constitute a moral force which is undoubtedly finding its way to the hearts and minds of men. Governments may choose to disregard its recommendations, but the peoples of the United Nations will ultimately influence their governments and help to mark out the course of history as peoples have always done.

21. I speak as the representative of a country which is part of the Arab homeland; its people are an Arab people. My country was subjected between 1920 and 1945 to foreign domination which took the form of a mandate. The Syrian people never recognized the mandate which was imposed on them and continued to struggle by every means until the mandate was ended, the foreign troops evacuated from our soil and, with them, the last remnants of foreign authority. We have therefore, like many nations, had our experience of colonialism which lasted for about a quarter of a century.

22. With liberation in Syria, and in other Arab countries, there arrived national construction and development, particularly in the last three years. That development is today gaining strength and momentum, forging its way ahead amidst internal and external difficulties. The difficulties are immense but they are difficulties of growth. With liberation came, too, international co-operation. In Syria we have always had an admiration for the great French people, but Syrian-French relations were never more friendly than they are now. Never before was co-operation between us and other countries more real and healthful than that which now stems from liberty and from the Charter.

23. In the light of our experience with colonialism, the beneficial effect of liberation on national construction and its effect on international co-operation, we feel ourselves unable to condone colonialism anywhere. We take this attitude in common with many other countries which have had similar experiences, particularly those of Asia and Africa. It results not only from our will to support the right of self-determination but also from a realistic consideration that colonialism is beneficial neither to the colonizer nor to the colonized.

24. Since the Second World War, over 600 million people have by their own means achieved national liberty in a complete or almost complete form. In no case was liberty granted to them; in all cases they had to take it. The world-wide trend towards national liberation is a sign of our times for countries to note and contemplate. Resurgent colonialism, wherever it seeks to assert itself in any territory, is today meeting with ever-mounting and active discontent, summoning the dependent people to mass action for liberation. The colonial Powers have to spill much blood and spend money in what seems to be a futile effort to turn the tide of history.

25. These Powers seek to continue the so-called white man's burden, which burden is becoming heavier and heavier. The rational course to be taken in colonial matters is almost self-evident; it consists in furthering the orderly and active evolution of dependent peoples towards self-government and independence, so that foreign domination may be replaced by free international co-operation. If, however, the General Assembly chooses to discuss rather than to act diligently on matters of colonialism, then orderly evolution may really become unrealistic in the minds of the colonized peoples. They may then seek to serve the very purpose of the Charter by means other than those of the United Nations. They may then resort to more realistic means, such as those used by Washington, Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín, for promoting liberty and international justice.

26. Turning to the Middle Eastern scene, we find some burning questions today which call for special attention. The Palestine problem as such is not on our agenda this year. No inference should be drawn from that that the Palestine problem is withdrawn from international care or that there is in any form a *fait accompli* definitely accepted in the Middle East. There is no accomplished fact in Palestine. By not bringing this question to the Assembly we simply preferred not to occupy the Assembly with repetitious discussions while the way to a solution had already been traced by previous resolutions. The way to a definite solution can come in sight only after the implementation of existing United Nations resolutions with regard to Palestine, whether they concern the refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem or territorial and other aspects of the problem. Stability cannot be achieved in that area as long as Zionism is bent upon a policy of immigration and expansion through foreign help secured by pressure groups.

27. Last year the Assembly concluded its deliberations on Tunisia and Morocco by adopting resolutions [611 (VII) and 612 (VII)] the meaning and implementation of which can be summed up as follows. First, the objective to be attained in the case of these two countries is the exercise by them of their national sovereignty and independence. Secondly, this objective should be arrived at gradually, through a process of negotiations between each of the two countries and France. Thirdly, the United Nations by its action upheld its competence on these matters. The North African questions emerged from the restricted and heavy shadow of French-Moroccan and French-Tunisian issues to the true broad light of day as United Nations issues of importance. The stand of Morocco and Tunisia is not theirs alone. It is upheld and adopted by fifteen other Asian and African countries.

28. What has happened since last year? I do not aspire to have the eloquence and clarity of vision of Mr. Zafrulla Khan speaking on the subject [437th meeting] as he has done lately. But facts can eloquently speak for themselves. The evident facts which cannot be contested are the following.

29. The first is that the recommendations of the Assembly have been disregarded. It is for the Assembly to account for that in a further action.

30. Secondly, both the Moroccan and Tunisian sides were insistent upon negotiating with the French side. The French Government preferred, however, to institute so-called reforms. Upon the refusal of the Sultan

of Morocco to obey the wishes of France, and his heroic stand in support of the aspirations of his people, he was banished. Hundreds of Moroccans and Tunisians are now in jail and hundreds have been either killed or executed.

31. Thirdly, these so-called reforms are in fact composed of three main elements which I should like to mention. In the first place, these reforms consist of provisions which render the favoured French colonials in Tunisia and Morocco the real masters of these countries to the detriment of the peoples of Morocco and Tunisia. The sovereignty of these countries is thus virtually destroyed. Where is there here that consent of the governed about which, in another context, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, used his innate ability to speak? Where is the right of self-determination proclaimed in the Charter? Secondly, with the French colonials enjoying the exercise of real sovereignty in Moroccan and Tunisian affairs, together with the French Resident-General, Morocco and Tunisia are pushed against their will into what is virtually a form of annexation to a French empire; or call it, if you prefer, a form of forced union in a colonial system, which system is to be kept away from United Nations vigilance behind a curtain, not of iron but nevertheless a thick curtain of domestic jurisdiction. I request my fellow representatives to read the text of these reforms attentively and to see whether they could find in them any substance beyond what I have submitted. Thirdly, these reforms, as they stand, are a retrogression from the treaties of Bardo and Fez, called the Treaties of Protectorates, both of which have at their very basis another act of force.

32. This is the gist of the situation. These are the fundamental facts of it. We shall try to elaborate them when the two items come under discussion in committee. Our stand is clear. We believe that the Tunisian and Moroccan peoples should be full masters of their own destinies, and that the United Nations General Assembly would be fulfilling its duty by assisting them to achieve an orderly evolution along the course set by the Charter and by the General Assembly resolutions. Surely a very big sector of the French people themselves is in favour of such a course.

33. In his speech [434th meeting] the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, toured the world from Korea to Europe, passing through Indo-China, without setting a foot on the African continent. Certainly one stride over the whole Middle East and Africa is a remarkably big one, but it is not surprising. The United States also helped to prevent the Security Council from having even a possibility of discussing an investigation of the North African situation, so as to see what kind of internal friction there was and what was the remedy that might be used. The forgetfulness of Mr. Dulles of the Middle East and Africa was evidently a matter of policy. In his speech the Secretary of State stopped for a length of time at Indo-China, apparently because he saw there a reddish banner and violent action. He gave his explanation of the situation in that country. The traditional banners of Morocco and Tunisia happen to be redish, too, but not out of communism. Popular action in those countries has been largely peaceful up to now. Evidently only communism and violence can attract the attention of the powerful in council and war.

34. Should North Africans then infer that in order to attract such high attention North Africa should

import communism or should resort to violence on a large scale? Should the North Africans beget a Ho Chi Minh? Should they consider it unfortunate that Arabs have not been favourable to communism? Should we infer that the right of self-determination, the principle of the consent of the governed, the recommendations of the Assembly—taken with the concurrence of the United States—that all these have been heartily swallowed into the vortex of the cold war? If this is the case in a cold war, what would be the situation in a hot one? Should we conclude that orderly evolution in North Africa through United Nations means is not realistic?

35. Any of these inferences is hard to admit. Admitting the first one would amount, on the part of the United States, to an implicit call for communism and violence. Admitting the second would be a negation of the Charter. Silence on these issues leads nowhere except to serious questioning.

36. I question this stand. There are many who prefer to think that France would not have disregarded the recommendations of the Assembly so lightly and banished the Sultan had it not been for the expected complacency of other governments.

37. One thing, however, is certain. Sovereign Morocco was the first country to recognize the United States of America in the days of President Washington. That country merited better attention under President Eisenhower. I do not like to take the Assembly's time to read some correspondence which passed between the United States, under Washington, and Morocco, or to read present-day agreements on the bases in North Africa, no matter how influential these agreements may be in forming opinions, but I assure you that the peoples of North Africa and the Middle East and Asia are pondering over this situation and scrutinizing it with deep concern. They expect a more rational and positive way than that of silence in dealing with this problem. They turn to others and say "a friend in need is a friend indeed". The Moroccan and Tunisian peoples realize, however, that their destinies ultimately are in their own hands, supported by freedom-loving peoples everywhere.

38. My country, in common with Arab, Asian and African countries, supports the Tunisians and Moroccans with clarity of purpose, tranquil conscience and determination.

39. The question of the evacuation of troops from Egypt has been well aired in international circles. I need not, therefore, dwell on it. Needless to say, my country fully supports the Egyptian people in their stand and also their well-guided leaders.

40. Syria finds itself in the category of under-developed countries, which comprises many other countries in South America, Africa and Asia. Although Syria for the last two years has progressed towards a favourable balance of trade, its trade balance at present is approximately equal as between its imports and exports. Syria cannot, however, but look with deep concern upon the ominous fact that the deficit in the balance of trade of the under-developed countries taken as a whole amounts to about \$4,000 million a year. The continuation of this deficit, the continuation of this process, would cause further inequality between nations and further poverty to some. This fact is aggravated by two others no less important. Investment by inter-

national means to increase the productive capacity of those countries through self-liquidating productive projects is exceedingly limited, and investment in non-self-liquidating projects by international means is practically non-existent. Certainly the resolutions taken to help remedy the situation are welcome, but some of the most important among them await further action.

41. What the under-developed countries need primarily is investment outlays, much more than they need technical assistance. Armaments are diminishing and practically eliminating possibilities of investment and healthy economy and social growth. This situation is detrimental not only to the under-developed countries but also to the more fortunate and advanced ones. That would certainly not be the case if the more advanced countries were willing to depend upon encouraging productivity, international trade and exchange. The more advanced countries can no longer depend on the exploitation of other countries through investments of a colonial or semi-colonial nature.

42. My country is willing and ready to co-operate in any United Nations effort or other international efforts with a view to remedying present prevailing conditions in these matters. At this session we intend to do our best, in co-operation with other under-developed countries, to ensure a better understanding of these conditions and the taking of effective international measures to deal with them.

43. The countries of the Middle East have had both an old and a recent common history, and they belong by and large to a common culture. Their reactions to international situations which arise are therefore similar, and their solidarity is strong and natural. This solidarity is a factor which we can well mention here.

44. But across the ocean we Arabs find in Latin America other brotherly nations. Nine radiant centuries of common Arabo-Spanish history have not been lived in vain. Creative Spain, a mother to many South-American countries, has been for us all not only a former common land. It has been, rather, a continuous mission of the greatest international importance, a mission whose concepts have not been fossilized in the Alhambra or Alcazar, or other sites of culture, but a living one whose results we can now see, a mission whose concepts continue to vibrate, living in both Latin-American and Arabic countries and cultures. It is therefore no mere coincidence that over a million Arabs have emigrated in the last few decades to South America, to find themselves hospitably received and easily and freely assimilated into the communities in which they live. It is no mere coincidence that on the question of Morocco the attitude of Spain has turned out to be in contrast to the attitude taken by other countries. Spain continues to recognize the representative of the upright and heroic Sultan of Morocco.

45. I am not in the least attempting to put before this Assembly on behalf of Syria any idea of groupings or blocs born out of war—cold or hot. I am, however, trying to convey my country's readiness for warm friendship and solidarity between peoples, born out of centuries of the creative processes of history and culture and explained by present conditions. That solidarity existed before the United Nations was established. It exists now, waiting to be turned from a latent into an active state in order to become effective in serving the purposes of the Charter.

46. In 1923 all the Arab countries were under some form of domination. It is now 1953, and within the span of thirty years over half of the Arab land has become free, after a struggle for independence which produced tens of thousands of martyrs. So much was done in thirty years. How much will be done in the future? That is the question, and it is written on the Middle Eastern scene. Certainly the question is not there to comfort imperialism, no matter what form that might take. It is there to indicate that the Arab nation, still possessing an area approximately as large as Europe, a people of long historical experience and vigorous culture, is today on the move towards self-realization and freer international co-operation. It is on the move towards a position in which it can again contribute abundantly to human culture, as it did of yore.

47. As the Arab nation emerges again to a state of liberty, hope and creative action, it stretches out to Spain and the Latin-American countries a hand warm with genuine friendship. It feels a strong and abiding solidarity with other peoples of the Middle East. It realizes how vital are peace and international co-operation in achieving the aims of the Charter of the United Nations.

48. Mr. SCHUMANN (France) (*translated from French*): Just a few months ago, when some signs appeared of a lessening of the tension in Europe and therefore in the world, two voices were raised, on either side of the Atlantic, telling us where to look for the key to the kingdom of peace.

49. President Eisenhower, reckoning in terms of capital and consumer goods the expenditure in money and labour necessitated by a chronic state of insecurity, said that a limitation of armaments carried out simultaneously and under supervision would enable each country to ensure its defence with smaller forces, and that the enormous savings thus effected could be spent on raising the living standards of the peoples.

50. At the same time, Mr. Bidault, welcoming the delegates to the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in Paris, declared:

"No problem in the world today can really be settled so long as the armaments race continues. Even those problems which look most difficult will become less difficult as soon as the use of force ceases to be a practical possibility at any moment. The key to the future, and, we believe, the only one that warrants hope, lies in substantial, simultaneous and controlled disarmament, and nowhere else."

51. In reminding you of these facts today, I am not appealing to this Assembly alone. When all those who bear the responsibility of leadership in the world finally realize that there is no certainty of salvation for anyone, no possibility of any kind of just and lasting settlement, in a world resounding with the din of armaments factories and atomic explosions, the technical problems of simultaneity and control will be seen to be more simple. As yet, we are still at the starting line, marking time, while month by month the technical difficulties of disarmament and control increase, while the scientific improvement of weapons keeps the world in a state of agonizing uncertainty, while the atmosphere is charged with threats.

52. Why should we hide the fact? The differences on this point between ourselves and the USSR have never perceptibly diminished. We never lost hope, how-

ever, and when, last April, Mr. Vyshinsky invited us to meet him half-way, we thought that his country was prepared to arrange a settlement, to take action on certain points. We knew that we had done our share only a short while earlier, and the French delegation had never given up hope of a constructive response to the proposals it had put forward either alone or jointly with the United States and the United Kingdom. But nothing came—neither fresh proposals nor a reply.

53. Now we are offered formulas which have not only been rejected time and again by the United Nations in the last five years or more, but which, in recovering what I hardly dare term their original purity, have lost all trace of certain conciliatory efforts. Is that really the prospect offered us on the eve of the resumption of the debate on disarmament? What is clear, however, is that the attempt to secure agreement on the technical aspects of this essential matter must go forward *pari passu* with the endeavours to settle the major problems; if progress could be made in that respect we should be entitled to expect that, with success in one point leading to success in another, and so on, by possibly rapid stages, the mistrust felt by the protagonists for one another would diminish, the contacts thus made would bring about some partial improvements in the general situation, and the scene would in time be set for genuine negotiations and for agreements on an ever wider scale.

54. But disarmament is of necessity a gradual process and all States, especially those which claim the contrary, will agree to large-scale disarmament only after they have tested the system, to see whether it works fairly and effectively, by taking preliminary steps on a smaller scale. Although, therefore, we still need to frame a general plan, it may be that the method of partial agreements would be the best to adopt in embarking on the great task that the Charter has laid upon us. A limited reduction and a limited control would result. That would be but a modest first success, but it would quickly open the way to further progress, and it would greatly help to ease the general situation. The United Nations can encourage that process by acting wisely and firmly in pursuance of its primary mission.

55. We have already been reminded from this rostrum that the revision of the Charter will appear on the agenda in 1955. My country intends to make an effective and considered contribution to that necessary rectification. A revision of the text would be futile if we did not prepare for it by honestly examining our own positions. Experience has already shown that if we wish to pursue the common task undertaken in 1945 and guard against the moral collapse that threatens us, we must be guided by two mutually complementary rules. The first, a positive rule, is to do as much as possible and to do it in the light of the principal objectives which are clearly set forth in the Charter. The second, a negative rule, is to avoid barren and endless debates which, under the pretext of extending the competence, powers and responsibilities of the Organization, in fact misapply the laws that govern it, poison the atmosphere of our debates and thus render them ineffective.

56. When we establish something constructive like the United Nations Children's Fund; when, slowly but surely, we achieve progress in the international control of narcotics; when we gauge the results of the patient work done by the regional economic commissions;

when we make sure that the great international programmes of technical assistance will bring to the peoples of the recipient countries not a passing alleviation merely, but will help them to help themselves—then we can be sure that we are not being deceived by appearances or falling into traps, that we are reaching to the heart of the matter, that we are bringing men, countries and continents closer together, in short, that we are fulfilling our obligation, which is to join forces to sever the chains so rightly denounced by the Secretary-General in his report [A/2404]—the chains of poverty, ignorance and hatred.

57. What serves it, on the other hand—and I take but one example—to spread suspicion and irritation in the Fourth Committee's debates by trying to use Chapter XI of the Charter as a means or pretext for just the kind of interference which the authors of the Charter wished to prevent? The whole moral value of Chapter XI resides in the fact that it is a voluntary declaration.

58. The fact is that in 1946 only eight nations responded to the appeal made to them and consented to name the Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration. Is it right that a reward for their good faith and goodwill those eight States should be exposed to criticism and attack, sometimes malevolent attack? It should be clearly understood, and realized once and for all, that we recognize our special responsibilities, that we are in agreement with the United Nations as to the scope and character of those responsibilities, but that for that very reason we cannot agree to share them.

59. I am in a position to repeat this, since the principles laid down in Article 73 of the Charter have been written into the preamble of my country's Constitution, and since France has long repudiated the objectionable and obsolete notion that States responsible for administering dependent territories should enjoy discretionary rights. Where do we find the true spirit of the Charter? In the labour code of Overseas France, which is a full and guaranteed declaration of the social rights of the individual and the citizen? In the policy of association, which encourages the development of indigenous communities as well as of their individual members? Or in a sort of mixture of xenophobia, racialism and reactionary nationalism directed towards nonsensical fragmentation? To answer that question we have only to remember the perils threatening peace and civilization on every side of this second half of the twentieth century.

60. Let us ponder, rather, the lesson that comes to us from Asia. In Korea, a bloody conflict has just ended. But though the guns are silent, peace has yet to be restored, and that is not the least arduous of our tasks. Only a genuine and lasting peace, peace in men's minds as well as in their deeds, can justify the sacrifice of those who gave their lives to defend the principles of the United Nations Charter. To that end, we must do all we can to expedite the opening of the political conference on Korea within the time limit laid down by the Armistice Agreement. In that connexion the French Government is firmly opposed to the reopening at the present Assembly of the discussion on the composition of the conference. The position of the United Nations has been clearly defined on the basis of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations has appointed its representatives to the political conference; it is waiting for the other

party to do the same. Time is running out. We must not allow ourselves to become involved in another procedural wrangle which might delay the examination of the real problems. The shape of the conference table, after all, is very unimportant. The essential thing is that the conference should meet and that it should be able to consider the means of restoring peace and security to Korea, that unhappy country, devastated and rent in twain, and that we should achieve the ultimate aim of all the Powers that fought under the United Nations flag, the aim so happily defined by the representative of the United States, "a united Korea for free Koreans".

61. Korea can be united only by peaceful means; and the freedom of the Koreans, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada reminded us on 23 September [441st meeting], can be assured only under the aegis of a democratic government established as a result of free elections conducted under United Nations supervision.

62. France fully realizes that these two objectives cannot be attained at once and that they will require a protracted effort, immense patience and great political realism on the part both of the principal Powers concerned and, above all, of the Koreans themselves. The most urgent task is assuredly to staunch the wounds inflicted by the war and, so far as possible, to obliterating the unnatural division of Korea by re-establishing relations and exchanges of all kinds between the two parts as soon as possible. In this way, and given time—which will cool passions and quell hatreds—suitable conditions may be created for a general settlement of the Korean problem.

63. Useful advice might have been given us in this respect by certain Asian Powers, particularly India. Although, to our regret, it has been impossible to include these countries from the outset, as participants in the political conference on Korea, my Government firmly hopes—and it will do all in its power to make it possible—that the conference will be able in the near future to associate them in the study of problems with which they are directly concerned and which have a bearing, over and beyond the problem of Korea itself, on all questions affecting the restoration of peace in the Far East.

64. As I stated at the seventh session of the Assembly, there is a war still raging in Asia, a war that has lasted already more than eight years and the main burden of which is borne by my country; the toll in human lives is great and the international atmosphere is poisoned by its continuance. I thank the United Kingdom representative for having said so yesterday [443rd meeting] in such moving terms and with such accuracy. The fact that France is not conducting the war in Indo-China for its own advantage, but in the interest of its associates and of the whole free world, was demonstrated more clearly than ever on 3 July last when the French Government announced its intention of granting complete independence to Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam at the earliest possible date. The negotiations which are in process with the governments of those three States will translate the principles contained in that declaration into reality. The situation is now quite clear: on the one side, three governments, fully independent, recognized by a large section of the international community and united to France by their freely accepted membership of the French Union; on

the other, a faction trying to seize power by violent means.

65. Certain unofficial statements may have given the impression that the two foreign Powers which are encouraging and arming the Vietminh rebels are prepared to consider opening negotiations to put an end to this war. It remains for them to prove that these ambiguous hints are not purely propaganda and that the French Government's often reiterated desire for peace finds its counterpart in an equally sincere desire in the opposite camp. Diplomatic negotiations which might be opened, for instance, either during or after the political conference on Korea with the object of putting an end to the hostilities in Indo-China, would make it possible to envisage the restoration of more normal international relations in Asia.

66. No one any longer dares maintain that France and its associates could threaten anybody at all in that part of the world. Having accomplished in Indo-China a task of which it is proud, and having guided the peoples of that country to the haven of independence, my country's only object is to defend the liberty of those young nations until they can defend it on their own account. France is conscious of having in that way implemented the principles that inspired the foundation of the French Union, a voluntary community whose purpose is to organize and ensure the interdependence of free peoples.

67. Interdependence and democracy: these two inseparable principles are also the golden rules of our African policy. Is there any need to mention those problems with which, under the Charter and the treaties in force, our Organization is not called upon to deal? Is there any need to repeat that in the measure in which our Assembly oversteps the limits of its competence, it needlessly brings discredit upon itself? For we shall never agree to discuss either the principles or the methods of an illegal interference whose only result has been to multiply illusory encouragements to hatred and disorder. More and more representatives are coming to realize that recourse to violence has become a form of blackmail for attracting the attention of our Assembly.

68. As the representative of the United Kingdom said in the Security Council on 27 August [620th meeting], "experience has shown, unfortunately", that certain United Nations debates "are usually accompanied by immediate outbreaks of violence" in the countries concerned. And Sir Gladwyn Jebb added: "This, I believe, is by no means a coincidence. Let us therefore act with restraint, and let us not forget that words spoken by us here may mean perhaps tears and bloodshed there."

69. My Government is firmly determined not to encourage this odious form of blackmail. It prefers to devote its efforts to the task which France, not without faith and calm pride, has undertaken, is carrying out and will continue to carry out: the task of guiding the peoples united to it by treaty and by ties of memory and confidence, towards freedom in the democratic management of their own affairs.

70. Is it possible that at the moment when France, the champion of international co-operation, is boldly taking the initiative of calling upon the ancient peoples of Europe to sacrifice part of their sovereignty in order to achieve the military, political and economic integration of their continent, is it, I say, possible that at

such a moment those who congratulate it on doing so should at the same time reproach it for enabling the peoples for whose advancement it is responsible to join a far-flung community which will ensure their material prosperity, guarantee their safety and foster their spiritual growth? Would they forbid France to offer those peoples the help of its experts and advisers, to offer them the outlet of its own markets and those of the French Union, and to throw wide the doors of its universities to their young men and women? Do they censure us for proposing to set up elected representative assemblies at every level of public life, to grant magistrates a status ensuring their independence, to establish a procedure which will safeguard the rights of the individual before the law, or legal provisions conferring on workers the right, not only in fact but in law, to associate in trade unions? Are they trying to suggest facile comparisons which, in the words of the President of the Republic and of the French Union, can prove only how much easier it is to give lessons than to set a good example? Or are they asking, at the risk of contradicting themselves once again, that the African continent should be disintegrated while Europe is federating and uniting?

71. To unite Europe, to bring about a lasting agreement among the great Powers—these are the two primary objects which France is resolved to attain; they are not alternatives but the two mutually complementary expressions of our determination that general prosperity shall be based on general security. This effort to achieve agreement among the great Powers was reflected in proposals made to the USSR by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. France looks forward hopefully to a conference which should enable us to put an end to the division of Germany and so, perhaps, to the division of Europe. The problems which France, in agreement with its allies, suggested should be examined are the key to any European settlement. Those problems are not insoluble. All they amount to is the conclusion at long last of an Austrian treaty which, to say the least of it, has been adequately examined in all its aspects, and an agreement on the conditions for the establishment of a provisional government of Germany based on free elections. It is perfectly clear that these problems are by no means insoluble, given goodwill on both sides. Be that as it may, and whatever the development and outcome of the conference, the French Government wishes to state that it will not relax its efforts to settle by negotiation all the problems now facing Europe.

72. I should like to take this opportunity publicly and frankly to convey to Mr. Vyshinsky the feelings of a country that has not forgotten the immense sacrifices made by the Soviet people to ensure the common victory. No nation realizes better than France the meaning of the spectre of invasion or what is involved in an obsession with security. We are anxious to believe that the Soviet Union will cease seeking what it calls political security in the greatest possible disunion between States which are independent and determined to remain so; or what it calls geographical security by bringing more and more territories directly or indirectly under its control. The Soviet Union must have learned that an expansionist policy inevitable results in a realignment of the threatened countries.

73. Yet if that is really the case why should it fear the policy of European organization initiated by France?

What deters it from supporting the persevering efforts made by the French Government, in concert with the United States and United Kingdom Governments, to achieve a settlement of the German and Austrian problems? That policy and those efforts, far from being in conflict with each other, are mutually complementary and are based on the same overriding consideration, the same basic truth which all of us can and should support—that, to set peace on a firm foundation, we must ensure the security not of this country or of that, but of all.

74. Mr. Vyshinsky fears the revival of a militarism that has inflicted cruel suffering on his people, as on ours and on all the peoples of Western Europe. He is resolved that the resources on which that militarism was based shall never again be used for aggressive ends. But he certainly knows that, in every refusal and in every choice we have had to make since 1950, these legitimate anxieties have been uppermost in our minds. Why, then, should we agree, nay, even offer to make the sometimes heavy sacrifice entailed by conformity with the rules of a European community if not so as to prevent any member of that community from being in a position to use its power to further its own ambitions, and to prevent any country from again diverting its industrial resources and its manpower to preparations for a war of conquest or revenge against anyone? I repeat, Mr. Vyshinsky, against anyone.

75. But it is not only for that basic reason that the policy of European construction now pursued by the governments of Western Europe is by definition a policy of peace. It is in harmony with the United Nations ideal on two counts: first, because it comes within the framework of the regional arrangements mentioned in the Charter; and secondly, because it will help to create a zone of prosperity which will make a powerful contribution to the economic equilibrium of the world by bringing about—as we have never ceased to hope—the resumption of a universal flow of trade.

76. Even if the problems of common defence had never arisen, even if their countries had never been threatened by aggression since 1945, the governments of Western Europe would have been bound to establish rules and common institutions to regulate vaster markets and wider spaces, that is to say, to create appropriate conditions for raising the living standards of their peoples. That is why the building of a European community, strictly defensive in itself, is in addition a factor making for stabilization and hence for a lessening international tension.

77. The day will come, Mr. Vyshinsky—I feel sure of it—when the Soviet Union will realize that in refusing to admit the truth of these two facts it will be betraying its own most vital interests. On that day, I can assure you, you will find us ready to seek with you the means of completing the organization of the West—which is in itself a guarantee against the recrudescence of aggressive militarism—by a system of additional guarantees, in particular, against the modification of existing frontiers by force.

78. At San Francisco, fifty-three nations expressed their faith in United Nations action to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Together we have witnessed and have been subjected to developments different from those we dreamed of eight years ago. Have we the right to abandon our mission and our

hope? Everything tells us to reject any such idea—the courage with which Mr. Hammarskjöld has confirmed the Secretariat in its tradition of hard work and efficiency, while expending the most praiseworthy efforts, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, to ensure the necessary independence of its members, as recently reaffirmed by the Administrative Tribunal; the presence of Mrs. Pandit in the Chair, and the high moral qualities which make her an example to us all; and, lastly, that faith in an ideal which, in the words of a great French historian and poet, “alone can guide our perseverance along the difficult paths of life”.

79. In a speech he recently made, Mr. Georges Bidault said:

“If man needs to measure himself against an adversary in order to gauge his full strength, must that adversary necessarily be his brother? Is not the fight against hunger, that scourge from which a large part of humanity still suffers today, a fine crusade? And to make the desert fertile to that end, to replant forests, to harness energy in all its forms, is an undertaking which surely is not beyond the resources of a generation which has seen the most astounding and, so far, the most frightening discoveries in history. We have lived together through a war which is still fresh in our memory. Were it not for fanaticism and constraint, which stand in the way of men of good will, great things could be achieved with the help of all peoples. To develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, to draw up development plans for the whole of mankind—these are plans which are neither fantastic nor selfish. A tremendous task awaits the men of goodwill. The challenge should make co-operation less difficult for those who think of the future. If it is a dream, it is a beautiful dream. There is a common task for us on this earth, this earth which we can destroy tomorrow or make a more just and kindly place to live in.”

80. Mr. VAN ZEELAND (Belgium) (*translated from French*): It is, of course, not easy at this stage of the general debate to offer any ideas which are both original and constructive. The general situation in which we find ourselves has been adequately and usefully described in a number of statements to whose high quality I must pay a tribute.

81. My delegation was even reluctant to intervene in the debate, but we feared that complete silence on our part might be misinterpreted and might appear to some to indicate a diminishing interest in the work of the United Nations. Nothing could be further from the truth. The faith and hope that we have placed in the Organization remain unshakeable. Our faith is of course sorely tried from time to time. Let us admit frankly that many of our hopes have been deceived. There have been abuses of the privileges and rights which the Charter reserves or grants either to the great Powers or to the Members as a whole.

82. Belgium has repeatedly raised its voice in protest against the restrictive interpretation which too many States place upon the provisions of the Charter concerning the non-self-governing peoples. At the last session I myself stressed the fact that to limit the advantages of such safeguards to a certain number only of those peoples was unjust to all the others. That is a mistake which the League of Nations never made. Our attitude on this point is well known and

we had occasion quite recently to make it clear once again.

83. If we wanted to compile a list of complaints that have been made of the United Nations in one quarter or another, it would not be difficult. Worse still, however, is the fact that ever-increasing sections of public opinion are adopting a critical and sceptical attitude towards our efforts, our methods and our potentialities. We regard that, however, as one more reason for reaffirming our conviction. A universal organization working side by side with, as well as over and above, regional groups, is and remains a necessity in the narrow and divided world in which we live.

84. The fundamental principles on which this Organization is based—the peaceful settlement of international relations, and collective security—are today even more essential to human progress than they were before and will be no less so in the future.

85. At this moment the Organization is undergoing a decisive test. Its existence, its future, and the principles which it embodies are at stake, and everything depends on the solution which finally will be found for the Korean drama. By the grace of God, the conclusion of the armistice has made it possible at least to envisage a solution which will demonstrate that aggression has been thwarted, will strengthen the principle of collective security and will restore peace to at least one corner of the world.

86. But while we may be allowed to take comfort from such hopes, it would be folly to close our eyes to the obstacles, the dangers and the delays which still separate us from this goal. Let us have patience, let us stand firm on our principles and let us be broad-minded concerning the methods to be used, let us show understanding and even generosity. I am certain we shall have great need of all these qualities.

87. The political conference on Korea will endeavour to settle a specific problem in which the United Nations is directly and irrevocably involved. There is no doubt, however, that this problem, in common with all the acute issues arising in so many other parts of the world, forms part of a single whole. We have used the term “cold war” to describe this general situation. But we must beware, for beneath the cold surface the fire continues to smoulder—a fire which is neither more nor less than the danger of war. We shall not be safe from the explosion until we have succeeded in putting an end to the cold war, that is to say, until we have succeeded in defining and achieving the conditions—even empirical—under which the two great ideological camps into which our poor humanity is divided may live peacefully side by side.

88. The words I have just used—and I used them deliberately—make it impossible and even unthinkable for us to resort to aggression or to preventive war, in a word, to violence, in order to settle these problems. We know from experience that war never solves anything, that its price is always terrible and that, once the war is over, the edifice of peace will still have to be rebuilt, as should have been done before the conflict broke out. We know, too, that a single individual can sometimes bring about war, and that in that case the only thing free men can do is to fight, and to fight on until victory is won. We know, moreover, that it takes two to make peace or to maintain it.

89. In the last analysis, however, if war is to be avoided there must sooner or later be negotiation, for negotiation, after all, is the only alternative to violence. That is why we have always declared ourselves ready to negotiate with those who do not share our views; that is why we are still prepared to do so, and we show that we are by our deeds. How often, since the last war, have we not extended our hand, in all sincerity, to the Soviet Union! Nothing will destroy my conviction that if the other side had shown one-tenth of the goodwill that we ourselves have never failed to show, the world would already be much closer to real peace than it now is.

90. But we have not the right to grow weary; we have not even the right to grow impatient. Those who negotiated the armistice in Korea on our behalf have given us an incomparable example of patience which we have not the right to disregard. If it is our policy to negotiate, how should this be done? Let us first ask ourselves whether or not the atmosphere in this debate in the United Nations is favourable to such an undertaking. I see both good and bad signs.

91. One of the good signs is the moderation that has characterized many of the speeches. It was to be noted in the fine speech with which the United States Secretary of State opened our general debate [344th meeting]. And did it not impress you, as it impressed me just now when listening to the moving speech made by the representative of France? It reflected moderation and good will from beginning to end. And I feel that this attitude of moderation has been maintained in most of the other speeches. I myself would even say that despite the excessive language and individual criticisms which we deplore, the USSR representative's speech [438th meeting] was not altogether an exception to the rule if we compare its tone with that of his previous interventions. Is this sufficient? Certainly not. But we cannot disregard any factor, and, unless I am mistaken, we may conclude that the debate as a whole has shown that most of us, without attempting to delude ourselves, are nevertheless eager to keep every door open, or at least ajar, just in case. I am happy to see in this an indication of goodwill and perhaps a reason for hope.

92. But this same sincerity and this desire to see things clearly compel us to other, less comforting observations. We listened attentively to Mr. Vyshinsky, and we have carefully perused his speech. We would have wished—and perhaps we had even hoped—to find in it a new concept, an opening, no matter how small, in short, something different from what we had heard heretofore. As he spoke, however, we had the impression of listening to the echo—fainter, and almost inaudible—of ideas, statements and proposals that we had already heard so often from this rostrum in recent years. Equally often we have put forward our arguments to the contrary, and we believe that our reasoning was decisive. To proposals which we considered illusory, we have each time replied with other proposals which were sounder and more equitable in our eyes and in the eyes of most of the non-Soviet nations.

93. But despite these unfruitful and irritating discussions, it is obvious that a lie does not become the truth by being repeated twenty times over; it is not by repeating the same ideas *ad nauseum* that any progress can be made in an exchange of views; and, most im-

portant of all, it is not by holding rigidly to an idea or an attitude that we can keep pace with reality, which changes and develops as does every living thing. The least that can be said is that such an attitude is made completely obsolete by facts and events.

94. I should like to state our views on this subject. All negotiations imply and presuppose a minimum of goodwill on both sides—a minimum, I say. There is surely no need to refer once again to the sincerity, the complete good faith and the fervour with which the free peoples long for peace and loathe war. But is such an attitude to be found on both sides? During the early years after the defeat of nazism, we fed our hopes on illusions, and when we were compelled to give up those illusions and launch upon a policy of rearmament, a *sine qua non* of the balance of forces and therefore of peace, our was a cruel awakening. But the lesson was not in vain. Today we shall not run the risk of being mistaken.

95. Does that mean that we should go to the opposite extreme and believe in nothing? Certainly not. We must do neither the one nor the other. But we mean to act henceforth with prudence or, I prefer to say, with realism.

96. In that spirit, how should we judge the gestures which Moscow has been making for the past few months? Are they really indicative of a relaxation of tension? Do they reveal a complete change of attitude, in short, a new policy? I must admit that I cannot answer those questions. I cannot enter into the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union. How often have I not been completely baffled by their reactions! I myself do not think that the general line of communism has changed. I think it is still unwaveringly directed towards the ideological purposes and practices at which it has always aimed.

97. That, however, is not the question. We do not intend to abandon our principles either; we consider them right and we shall uphold them, come what may. The question now before us, the question of sovereign importance, is whether we can avoid war. It seems to me that the reasons which have prompted the Soviet Union to make such gestures are of little importance; whether those gestures are based on diplomatic tactics or on a more long-term strategy matters little. What is important is whether they constitute a new element, an opportunity for resuming discussion on a wider or on a newer basis. We are therefore prepared, until the contrary is proved, to accept all manifestations of goodwill at their face value, and we are prepared to respond to them in the same spirit.

98. We have therefore welcomed the manifestations of a more conciliatory spirit which have appeared in the course of the past few months. We have noted with satisfaction that the keynote of the spokesmen of Soviet policy has been action with a view to decreasing international tension. That is the object of our hopes and endeavours too. But we have no illusions; we shall not achieve any concrete and lasting results in this direction unless we find a remedy for the underlying causes of the tension which has been created by a long series of events, of which the division of Europe, the Berlin blockade, and the Korean and Indo-Chinese wars have been only the most outstanding.

99. The armistice signed two months ago in Korea is of great importance in our eyes because we hope that

it constitutes a halt in the sinister course of events to which I have just referred, and perhaps the first step in a systematic and continuous action which will enable us to regain the ground we have lost. We are well aware, however, that if we enter into negotiations, they will be not only long and difficult, but they must inevitably, if successful, result in a compromise formula. Does acceptance of the idea of a possible compromise mean that we are ready to sacrifice principles? Not at all, quite the contrary. There are lines drawn by convictions which are more precious than life itself or than any other good. Beyond those lines there are inscribed but two words, to which there is no reply and from which there can be no turning back: *non possumus*, "we cannot". Never, at any price. We have clearly shown that that is our attitude every time we have taken up the challenge and repelled aggression, whether in Europe, Korea or elsewhere. But once principles are preserved, there is always a place for empirical solutions, based on a happy medium which must be found by dint of patience, tenacity and ingenuity. The whole life of democratic, free and orderly States is based on that conviction.

100. Of course, if negotiations are to be pursued and to be fruitful, they must first be organized. They need careful preparation. There can be no question of rushing headlong into something which can have no successful outcome. Negotiations without proper preparation are sometimes liable to do more harm than good. We still have disappointing memories of the Palais Rose. If, however, there is a real desire for negotiations, we do not think there should by any question of laying down in advance conditions whose acceptance by one of the parties at the outset would make it appear that the other party was in the right, even before the discussions had started.

101. A word of warning, however: although we must enter into negotiation with free hands and open minds, we must also do so with our position firmly determined and our main points beyond dispute. Just as it appears to me useless to lay down preliminary conditions, so does it seem necessary to determine with clarity and strength and with all the decision that arises from consciousness of a good cause the positions upon which the exchange of views will be initiated. In the meantime, that is, until the negotiations have clearly led to final agreement, there can be no question either of abandoning any point or, above all, of changing policy or, more particularly, of relaxing the defence effort. The negotiations will have no chance of achieving favourable and lasting results unless both parties speak the same language, as between equals.

102. We find here some of the leading considerations which decided the Powers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to combine their efforts to organize a common defence in the face of growing threats. I am sure that no one will be surprised if we take this opportunity to declare once more, with all the conviction and sincerity of which we are capable, that, in both its letter and its spirit, the North Atlantic Treaty has and can have one purpose only—to avert war by restoring the balance of power which renders aggression impossible or at any rate fruitless. It will never be put to any other purpose. It is our right and

our duty to say that it is a work of peace; it is an indispensable safeguard for peace as long as the threats which it was designed to meet have not entirely disappeared. If the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were to be weak enough to break off or to slow down their defence effort before the negotiations had begun or had produced any result, they would in my opinion be making a very serious mistake, because they would be robbing the negotiations in advance of one of their principal chances of success—that chance which always stems from approximate equality of strength among the parties concerned.

103. Once that has been said—or rather, repeated, for it is certainly not the first time that these self-evident truths have been proclaimed—would it not be agreed that the time had come to seek new formulas? Without going beyond the framework which we have just outlined, we think it is possible to find solutions adapted to the requirements of the moment. The international situation seems to us today more fluid than it has been for a long time. It doubtless conceals quite as many dangers, but it also offers more possibilities. Now is the time to bring constructive imagination into play. We should like concrete and positive proposals to be placed before international opinion. They would doubtless be criticized by some and rejected by others, but they might produce useful reactions; they might even produce possibilities hitherto unknown or unrecognized. They might perhaps place the negotiations on a realistic plane.

104. I should like to say here that I was happy to hear Mr. Schumann speak as he did today, because I thought I discerned in his statement certain signs which I felt were already pointing in the right direction. As far as the Belgian delegation is concerned, we are making a similar effort: we are trying to express scattered ideas and to synthesize them. But it seems to us desirable that such an attempt should from the outset be a joint venture; the sooner that becomes possible, the better it will be.

105. I shall now conclude. I think that I have said enough to inform the Assembly of the spirit in which the Belgian delegation will participate in the work of the various committees.

106. Until such time as the wishes and hopes which I have just put forward can take shape the United Nations will go on striving to bring to a successful issue the work of faith and courage which it has undertaken in Korea. Preparations for the political conference alone will demand an enormous amount of goodwill, skill and perseverance. We have to do no less than to restore peace in the East and thus build up peace in the world. No effort can be too great to achieve such a purpose.

107. Risks must be taken, it is true. But our sincerity is so deep, our desire to restore order, equilibrium, justice and love throughout the world and in face of all obstacles is so strong and so ardent, that we shall endeavour, all of us, I hope, together, in the future as in the past, to make ourselves equal to the tasks before us, whatever may be the demands of destiny.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.