



Thursday, 24 September 1953,
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General debate (continued)
[Agenda item 9]

SPEECHES BY MR. UNDÉN (SWEDEN), MR. LUNS (NETHERLANDS), MR. LLOYD (UNITED KINGDOM) AND MR. POPOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA)

1. Mr. UNDÉN (Sweden): As the General Assembly convenes, our interest is without doubt concentrated primarily on the Korean question. The Swedish delegation expounded during the resumed meetings of the seventh session in August its views on the questions which were under discussion at that time. We were among those who wanted the political conference to have the character of a round-table conference in which countries other than those having contributed armed forces in Korea should also participate. I do not intend to deal with the Korean question at this stage. It will no doubt be debated further in the First Committee. It is of the utmost importance, I think, that the planned political conference should take place and that considerations of prestige should not make impossible even a preliminary agreement on the convening of the conference.

2. My intention is to limit myself in this general debate to some remarks concerning the revision of the Charter, an item which has now been included in the agenda of the Assembly.

3. Article 109 of the Charter provides that the question of a revision of the Charter is to be considered at the tenth annual session of the General Assembly at the latest. In view of that provision, there may be good reasons for the Netherlands proposal [A/2442] to request the Secretariat this year to review the manner in which the machinery of the Charter has functioned during the last few years and to put together the amendments that have been presented. It may perhaps be said that available literature gives sufficient information regarding the functioning of the United Nations up till now. The Swedish delegation, however, has no hesitation in voting for an instruction to the Secretariat to analyse the practice developed in the Security Council and in the General Assembly regarding the interpretation of important provisions of the Charter and to point out gaps in the system of rules or incompatibilities between various regulations.

4. Only a short time after the creation of the United Nations, proposals for an extensive revision of the Charter were presented from many quarters. Now that the first ten-year period is drawing to an end the provision in Article 109 has given rise to numerous contributions to public debate. In particular, I am sure that we have studied with great attention the observations on these problems made by the leader of the United States delegation in his recent speeches.

5. Many of those who are taking an interest in the development of the United Nations are obviously inclined to think that the imperfection and shortcomings of the Organization are due to the wording of the articles of the Charter. We have often heard it said, for instance, that the fundamental fault with the United Nations is the right of veto of the permanent members of the Security Council. If only another voting rule were established, it is argued, the United Nations would be transformed into an effective organization. Others have voiced the opinion that the United Nations should be given, in a higher degree than at present, the character of a real international legal system based on precise rules, as in the case of the individual State, and on a general obligation to accept the jurisdiction of courts in legal disputes. A comprehensive codification of international law should logically be the basis of the Charter.

6. Among the adherents of a general revision of the Charter are also those who aim at the creation of a world government. They wish to transform the United Nations into a supranational organization and to give the Security Council—or a council more suitably organized for the purpose—the position of a world government with extensive supranational powers.

7. As far as the more far-reaching proposals for a revision are concerned I should like to say first a few words about the right of veto.

8. From a recently published work on the United Nations I permit myself to quote a few observations concerning the veto rule. The authors write as follows:

"The campaign to 'eliminate the veto', however, tends to confuse cause with effect. One negative vote, blocking unanimity of agreement, is merely a reflection of the power and inclination of the Soviet Union to pursue policies not acceptable to the other great Powers. It does no good to reach decisions by a majority vote if the minority has the power to prevent the decisions from being carried out. In such cases, the majority can prevail only by inducing the minority to co-operate or by finding some other means to make its opposition ineffective. Reaffirmation by balloting that the majority is the majority certainly does not reach the heart of this problem."

The same observation has been made by the *London Times* in the following words:

"It is not easy to see how the revision of any document can change the awkward facts of international life."

9. The political situation in the world is not such that either of the two most powerful States is prepared to accept in advance important and binding political decisions which may be dictated or influenced in a decisive way by the other. It is supposed that the Soviet Union would refuse to participate in the work of an international political organization where binding decisions on important questions influenced by the wish of the United States were as a rule to be expected. It may also, I am sure, be confidently argued that the United States would not care to be a member of an organization with rules of such a kind that binding decisions on questions of great importance to the United States could be expected to go against the United States.

10. In the League of Nations even the small countries had the right of veto in the Council; in the United Nations, on the other hand, their position is weaker. My own country, when it entered the United Nations as a Member State, agreed to waive the right of veto in the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter. But Sweden, as well as many other small Powers, regards the great Powers' right of veto on decisions concerning, for instance, military action, as a guarantee that our countries will not be bound, as the result of a decision of the majority of the Security Council, to take part in military action in cases where the great Powers stand very much divided.

11. I have dealt with the use of the right of veto in questions of paramount importance to the country concerned. It seems, however, that that right in the Security Council has also been used in connexion with questions having no real importance to the national interests of the State exercising it. It may even be argued that most of the cases in which the right of veto has been exercised have related to less important matters—and, above all, to the admission of new Members.

12. We have noted with satisfaction that the majority of the permanent members of the Security Council—including, I believe, the United States but not the Soviet Union—have expressed their intention to waive the right of veto so far as questions of the admission of new Members are concerned. I presume that that declaration would also apply to questions as to which government should represent a State already a Member of the United Nations. Furthermore, we have heard from Mr. Dulles [434th meeting] that the United States Senate, as long ago as 1948, adopted a resolution calling for the exclusion of the right of veto from all questions relating to the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

13. Such a reform would mean that the Security Council would be able to recommend the solution of a dispute despite the fact that a permanent member of the Council had voted against the recommendation. A Security Council recommendation is not a binding decision, and the above-mentioned reform would not encroach upon the sovereign right of determination of the disputing parties. Nevertheless, it would be of great psychological value if all the big Powers would, in conformity with the resolution to which I have just referred, declare that they were prepared to waive

their fight of veto so far as that group of questions was concerned.

14. The inconveniences of a too-far-reaching rule of veto should not, however, be exaggerated. Since the right of veto does not exist in the General Assembly the raising of a question there may in many cases result in the adoption of measures which have not obtained unanimity in the Security Council. As an example I may mention the commissions set up by the Assembly for various purposes: the Balkan commissions, the Korean commissions, the commission to investigate the racial policies of the Union of South Africa, and so forth. The Assembly has also solicited the International Court of Justice for a considerable number of advisory opinions—requests to which all the permanent members of the Security Council would not have agreed. I may also draw the General Assembly's attention to the resolution [377 (V)] of 3 November 1950, entitled "Uniting for peace". Furthermore, the General Assembly had discussed and adopted resolutions on such items as Tunisia and Morocco—questions which would not have been taken up in the Security Council.

15. As I have just mentioned, the right of veto has perhaps been used most often in connexion with the question of the admission of new Members. It is not, however, exclusively the right of veto which is the cause of the negative result in connexion with that question. In some cases applications for membership have been rejected owing to the negative vote or the abstention of a group of members within the Security Council. In those cases the term "veto" cannot be used.

16. It is well known that, as the United Nations Charter is now drafted, no revision can be made without the affirmative vote of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The abolition of the right of veto constitutes a change which has no chance of obtaining the approval of all the permanent members of the Security Council. This profound revision of the Security Council's voting rules cannot, therefore, be legally attained at the present time. There are perhaps those who hold that the present United Nations should be dissolved and a new and more homogeneous organization created, without the right of veto. If such a conception exists, it should be expressed openly, but the truth is—and here I quote once again from the *Times* of London:

"... that a United Nations which did not seek—and, indeed, depend upon—co-operation with the communist countries would be failing to do the work for which it was created. In the view of most of its Members it would be a disastrous setback for the future peace and order of the world if the United Nations were allowed to deteriorate into a permanent anti-communist alliance."

I am in complete agreement with that statement.

17. To mention another kind of demand for far-reaching reforms, to which I referred earlier, I would ask this: how would it be possible to achieve a world government without the consent of the governmental and legislative authorities of the countries which would be members of the organization and would thus be placed under the authority of the world government? Do the enthusiastic and well-intentioned supporters of the idea of world government believe that they can force countries to accept this goal? Do they hope to surmount all obstacles by drawing up a constitution

for the future supranational organization and then by tempting the peoples with its promises of a secure and rosy future? If the world were ripe for world government there would be no difficulty about giving an adequate legal form to an organization which would, in that case, meet a need acknowledged by all. But to write a charter for a Utopian world State now would be to begin at the wrong end. We shall not reshape the political reality merely by drawing up a constitution for the contemplated ideal State. The submission of a proposal—no matter how perfect—for such a constitution would not bring us a single step nearer to the goal.

18. It has sometimes been suggested, as I have already mentioned, that the United Nations should, to a greater extent, be given the character of an organization built on a basis of legal principles and rules. That is not a new suggestion. Even before the adoption of the Charter that idea was widely maintained—particularly here in the United States, where a large number of prominent jurists wished to endow the new Organization with stability by means of a skeleton structure of legal rules. For my part, I, as a jurist, have great sympathy for this opinion.

19. I recently heard about a man in the street who was philosophically inclined and who held the idea that, if everyone could learn to play chess, peace would be secured. A chess player understands the importance of the rules of the game and learns to respect them. He would also be prepared to respect the rules of the game with regard to human beings and States, this philosopher believed, in his optimism. Chess is a particularly popular game in the Soviet Union, but I do not have the impression that respect for international law—that is, the rules of this kind of game—is particularly striking in that country.

20. Perhaps it is right that future development must be directed towards firmer international legal rules if we are sometime to achieve more secure international relations. Why, then, were the recommendations of the United States jurists not followed in 1945? Presumably because their proposals did not find sufficient support among the countries organizing the United Nations. Experience has shown that opposition to the attaining of more clearly defined juridical rules for the United Nations in particular cases may come from unexpected quarters. We all knew the interest of the United States in binding legal pledges rather than in vague rules of a moral character. I shall, however, cite an instance of a contrary attitude on the part of the United States.

21. In the Preamble of the Charter the United Nations affirms its "faith in fundamental human rights". For several years the General Assembly has tried to define this declaration of principle in precise legal terms—a task very difficult in itself, since it is necessary to take into account to a certain degree the constitutional rules of the Member States. In the Council of Europe, however, a convention in that respect has already been signed, so the goal is not unattainable. But we have observed that objections of principle have been raised in the United Nations against the very thought of giving these general principles a legal aspect in the form of an international convention.

22. In this connexion the new representative of the United States on the Commission on Human Rights—the successor to Mrs. Roosevelt—declared recently¹

that the climate of world opinion was not at the moment favourable to the conclusion of the two proposed conventions on human rights. She added that her Government had concluded that, at the present stage of international relations, it would not ratify the covenant. The United States representative read a message from the President of the United States confirming the fact that the United States believes that a formal international treaty or treaties does not provide the way to further understanding of and respect for human rights. This line of argument appears to be a criticism of the very idea of a stronger legal character in the rules of the Charter. One would otherwise be inclined to believe that the supporters of the idea of a firmer legal system would be prepared to begin with the codification of the rules regarding human rights.

23. Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter declares that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to promote and encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion". How many Member States still continue to retain in their legislation a policy of discrimination as to race or sex? The policy of racial discrimination has been censured many times by the General Assembly, but a number of countries have failed to amend their legislations in regard to discrimination against women in certain fields. Are there any prospects for the abolition of all discrimination in the proposed revision of the Charter by transforming the "purpose" of the Charter into legal reality? I think the answer must be in the negative.

24. Article 73 of the Charter enjoins the countries which are responsible for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government to ensure, among other things, the political advancement of the peoples concerned. If this maxim were made a definite legal rule, with legal sanctions, it would be necessary as a consequence to accept international control of the observance of the rule. Again, it may be questioned whether such an amendment to the Charter has any chance of being accepted. Several of the States administering such territories have so far denied the United Nations the right even to be officially informed of the political development of those territories. I have no doubt that they can be brought gradually to agree to a practice which would render the general exhortations of the Charter more real in substance, but they would hardly, at the present time, accept a definite legal rule in the Charter.

25. If the United Nations system were given a more accentuated legal character, such a system would have to include an obligation on the part of the Member States to accept a judicial decision in all legal disputes. In my opinion this would be a most desirable reform, and in this connexion I might say that I had the opportunity, during the last session of the General Assembly [379th meeting], to expound the views of my Government on the value of compulsory arbitration in international disputes. But a reform could be achieved technically without any amendment to the Charter. A number of States already have accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in legal disputes—in many cases, however, with more or less far-reaching reservations which have not always been consistent with the idea of an actual legal system. We have made considerable progress in relation to the situation existing during the nineteen-twenties, when

¹ See E/CN.4/SR.340.

the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations began to function. Unfortunately, the members of the Eastern bloc are not among these States. However, neither by amending the Charter nor in any other way can we force them to change their attitude.

26. In my intervention I have aimed at illustrating concretely the significance of the idea of revision. I believe that a scrutiny of the suggestions for significant amendments to the Charter would reveal that they either reflect illusions as to the political reality in which we are living, or that they have some other aim than the realization of the proposed changes.

27. I should like to summarize my remarks by expressing the opinion that a revision of the basic parts of the Charter constitutes no immediate or important goal. As a matter of fact the Charter is, on the whole, satisfactory. Provided that there is sufficient will to co-operate, the machinery of the present Charter can render excellent service. I have no doubt that a review conference will confirm this fact.

28. It may be objected that the Charter is impaired by contradictions. Certain declarations of principle have been given a Utopian character and reflect the goals of a distant future rather than the reality of today. A reader of the Charter may easily gain the impression that the United Nations is an association of only such States as have accepted the principles of political democracy: whereas the fact is that the Organization was intended to become universal and that it embraces States with the most varying forms of government. A study of the Charter gives the impression that the Security Council can provide forces which may be dispatched promptly to take action against any aggressor. In actual fact, of course, that is not the situation. I have already cited other instances of contradictions between declarations of principle and political reality. However, I do not think that anyone will insist on a revision in order that the solemn principles may be translated into language corresponding more accurately to imperfect reality.

29. The demands for revision which have been presented in the general debate rather tend to take the opposite direction. They would render the contents of the Charter more Utopian; they would remove its provisions still further from reality. The general public should not, however, have the illusion that such proposals would constitute a short-cut to a more secure world order and a more stable peace. The prospects for a lasting peace depend on the international policies pursued by States, particularly by the great Powers, and not on the drawing up of perfect provisions in the Charter of the United Nations.

30. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands): May I be permitted, first of all, to offer Mrs. Pandit the most sincere congratulations on the part of the Netherlands delegation upon her election to the high office which she now so graciously occupies. I have the greatest confidence that she will give this Assembly the wise and impartial guidance of which it stands in need for the successful performance of its task.

31. The eighth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations will not be the only international gathering to claim the attention of the world during the current year. It may well be that it will not even be the most important one. Our session here in New

York will feel the influence of three other international conferences which—if all goes well—will meet elsewhere in the world. The issues to be discussed there will be left untouched, or almost untouched, in our deliberations. But the whole international situation will nevertheless to a considerable degree undergo the impact of what is or is not achieved at those other gatherings. The three conferences which I have in mind are the political conference on the future of Korea, the four-Power conference concerning Germany and Austria, and the conference recently opened on the statute of a European political community.

32. It is not my intention to enlarge here in detail upon problems which have not been submitted to the United Nations. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof", and sufficient unto the eighth session of the General Assembly are the cares thereof. Indeed, we need not go in search of extra-curricular worries. The only reason I mention the three other conferences is to remind us here of the wider political framework within which some of the seventy-three items of our agenda must be evaluated. During the coming weeks we in New York cannot afford to neglect entirely that which is maturing elsewhere. The influence thereof will eventually make itself felt in many of the problems now before us.

33. The future of Germany and of Korea is to be the subject matter of highly significant exchanges of views. This autumn a new effort will be made to close a tragic chapter of the recent past. In the Armistice Agreement, the parties concerned have agreed to call a political conference on Korea. As concerns Germany, an invitation to a four-Power conference has been sent to the Soviet Union. Only bad faith on the part of the Soviet Union could cause such an effort to fail. Today both Germany and Korea still are divided nations for the main reason that the victors of the Second World War remain unable to agree on the conditions for a just and reasonable peace treaty with Germany and for the unification of a free, independent and democratic Korea.

34. These unsolved consequences of war have for a number of years remained a serious threat to real peace. In Germany we witnessed dangerous conflicts about Berlin when the Soviet authorities chose to deny access to those parts of the city administered by the other occupying Powers. In Korea the United Nations, for three long years, had to wage war in defence of the very principles of the Charter. Neither in Berlin nor in Korea has it as yet proved possible to work out a satisfactory solution.

35. Today we face a situation which differs little, if at all, from the dividing lines drawn at the close of the Second World War. The great conflict of our day, which has led to the continuation of this unfortunate dismemberment both of Germany and of Korea, is responsible for our deep anxieties, just as it has caused our impotence in many other sectors of international conflict. Thus the past throws its shadow over this Assembly. It clouds our horizon when we talk about such matters as disarmament or the future of the Charter. It darkens our endeavours towards the economic development of under-developed countries or our care for refugees. It embitters our debates on security or human rights.

36. This is neither the time nor the place to penetrate deeper into the problem of Germany. Nor do I desire

to enter into the substance of the Korean question. As to these issues, the United Nations knows perfectly well, and has repeatedly stated, who it was that fomented the situations which endangered the peace and who did not. The United Nations is also fully aware of the fact that both these issues could readily be solved, provided the peoples of Germany and Korea were allowed, in East and West, in North and South, to avail themselves of that right of self-determination which is allegedly being held in such high esteem by some who in reality are bent upon destroying it. Free elections in the whole of Germany and in the whole of Korea could settle the pending issues justly and rightly. The United Nations is not in doubt as to who oppose this self-determination or these free elections and who do not. There is consequently no need for me to demonstrate what is common knowledge and abundantly clear to all of us. But it is useful to recall these facts at the outset of our proceedings.

37. It is therefore fitting that this General Assembly should bear in mind the fact that in the coming months security and self-determination are elsewhere equally at issue. Nor should we forget who in these other meeting places have the Charter on their side. May this awareness increasingly fortify the solidarity of the great majority of the Members of the United Nations during this eighth session and thereafter.

38. During the years there have been moments when within the United Nations an overwhelming consensus has manifested itself. Only as recently as four weeks ago we witnessed such a unity of opinion, when fifty-three Member States expressed their satisfaction on the issue of the first collective military action under the banner of the United Nations. Only five Members voted against. Now we know that, according to the nature of the problems under discussion, various groupings of countries are formed. But with respect to one issue, that near-unanimity to which I referred a moment ago appears from time to time. That issue arises when we are called upon—and here I quote from the Preamble of the Charter—"to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security".

39. It is indeed our sincere hope that in other fields too this great measure of unity of mind may be achieved and that at least we may succeed in moderating and restraining our criticisms of one another. Perhaps the awareness of our basic interdependence in respect of our common striving for peace and security may lead us to more unity when dealing with other major problems. This is particularly the case when the problems of Germany and Korea are discussed at the two conferences I have mentioned. Should we succeed there, the shadows of the past will eventually recede and fade away as an ugly dream.

40. The third international conference is concerned with the examination of the statute for a European political community, and not with the removal of the inheritance of the past. It concerns the future. It does not directly affect our immediate problems here. But I would fail in my duty as a member of the government of a European State if I did not voice the hopes awakened in our part of the world by the increasing intensity of European co-operation.

41. It is as yet too early to predict whether the gradually maturing plans for a Western European federal structure will be successful. It is not too early, however, to invite the very serious attention of the

Assembly to a development in which a considerable part of Europe, hitherto divided against itself and having twice been the centre of a world war, is now trying to pool its constructive forces. Those of the European partners co-operating in this vital enterprise, and which are represented in the General Assembly, will doubtlessly be mindful of their endeavours in the common European field when dealing with the work before us here. This time it is the future which illuminates the present. If this light should penetrate into the atmosphere of our discussions here, it would not resemble the shadow of the recent past—a sign of death—but rather a promise of hope, the fulfilment of which may become a vitalizing factor for the consolidation of world peace.

42. I now turn for a moment to the work performed by our world Organization during the last year. This time I would prefer to limit myself to a number of the brighter spots in the annals of our recent history. It would of course be easy to declare once again that the United Nations has fallen short of the impatient expectations raised at San Francisco, that the Security Council is frustrated by the lack of unanimity among the great Powers and by the abuse of the veto, and that the economic and social work is not yet sufficiently great to become a determining weight in the scale of political events. It would require no great stretch of imagination to give warning that our Organization is running the risk of deteriorating into a forum where mutual accusation often takes the place of collective effort. All that is true. All that has been repeated so often that I feel disinclined to analyse it once again.

43. I prefer to choose another approach. I prefer to direct our thoughts towards a number of encouraging developments during the past year. I believe that at this moment such an evaluation could perhaps be more instrumental in serving our peaceful ends than the elaborate enumeration of our multiple shortcomings and weaknesses.

44. The political event which during the past year has overshadowed all other developments has been the signing and implementation of the Armistice Agreement in Korea. Nobody can pretend that in and by itself the armistice is a satisfactory and just solution of the Korean problem. But it is by far the most important step for attaining such a satisfactory and just solution and therefore we gratefully welcome it. In this respect I should like to pay a well-deserved tribute to the great sense of self-restraint and moderation shown by the United Nations negotiators at Panmunjom.

45. It is only natural that those especially who so cruelly suffered at the hands of the aggressors should feel a certain frustration and disappointment at the compromise embodied in the armistice. It is, however, more than doubtful whether the attainment to the full of the political goals of the United Nations in the whole of the peninsula would be commensurate with the enormous additional sufferings and destruction that would result from imposing them by force of arms.

46. In an atmosphere of highly dangerous international tension, only moderation in our methods can keep the road to peace open, and my Government likes to believe that along these lines the agreement in Korea has been realized. Therefore, and in the full knowledge that the results so far obtained in Korea cannot be considered as a solution in itself, we are,

I think, justified in being grateful for the lesser good which has been achieved. It is altogether fitting to bear testimony to the fact that somewhere in our world the guns have been silenced and that the United Nations, in the spirit of the Charter, has not failed in its primary purpose.

47. It is proper likewise to record the satisfaction with which we have followed the recent session of the Economic and Social Council. I believe that the Member States represented there may look back upon a fruitful and constructive gathering. Undoubtedly they will also remember the excellent and expert manner in which their work was guided by the Belgian Chairman, Mr. Scheyven.

48. That session of the Council demonstrated again how much the quality of the work of an international conference improves when its participants give evidence, even in a modest way, of constructive intentions. This, of course, applies in particular to the Soviet bloc. Where obstruction ceases, the work of the United Nations at once improves. In this connexion the Netherlands Government hopes that the discussions in the General Assembly concerning the financing of economic development will bear fruit, and that the relevant resolutions of the Economic and Social Council will provide a new and forceful stimulus in this field. The preparatory work of the Council in this matter has been useful and merits our serious attention.

49. I should also like to focus attention on two specific fields of activity of the United Nations which serve an essential purpose. I refer to the activities for technical assistance to under-developed countries and to the work of the United Nations for the benefit of refugees. We shall have occasion in the appropriate committees to present our views in greater detail. At this stage I merely wish to say that, in the opinion of my Government, the United Nations has done excellent work in these two fields. I must add, however, that the work has often been too modest in scope. Yet experience has proved that here the United Nations has a specific and vital task.

50. The Netherlands Government in the past has repeatedly raised its voice against any form of waste, financial or otherwise, in the United Nations, and it has often suggested possible economies. We shall continue to do so if and when it becomes necessary. At the same time we should sincerely regret any inclination in the General Assembly for underestimating the financial needs for technical assistance, as well as the needs of the High Commissioner for Refugees. I do not want at this stage to go into details, but I do want to say that in these fields the United Nations is not doing too much but too little. I only hope that this Assembly will examine with the greatest sympathy and understanding the financial implications of this vital and necessary work. Here the United Nations can stimulate new energy or allay great sufferings. Here it has an obvious duty which it cannot and may not neglect.

51. I should now like to recall the fact that the United Nations elected this year a new Secretary-General. The Netherlands Government warmly welcomed the coming into office of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld. It is my privilege and pleasure to declare that we place the greatest confidence in the new head of the Secretariat.

52. What we have witnessed of his initial activities confirms our impression that, under the influence of

Mr. Hammarskjöld's declared concepts, the morale of the staff has of late considerably improved. The General Assembly, during the beginning of its seventh session, witnessed what might have turned out to be a serious decline in the self-confidence and efficiency of the Secretariat. It is obvious that in such circumstances no organization can perform the highly skilled team-work which we are entitled to expect from the Secretariat. The action of Mr. Hammarskjöld, however, as well as the debates on personnel policy during the latter part of the seventh session, has undoubtedly contributed considerably to the restoration of the confidence placed in the Secretariat, as well as to the self-confidence of its members, both individually and collectively.

53. In this connexion I wish to stress the happy significance of the fact that the great Powers in the Security Council could reach agreement on the appointment of the new Secretary-General. Here was an instance—alas, too rarely experienced—of wise co-operation in the general interest. To use a somewhat daring comparison, Mr. Hammarskjöld may prove to be—if I may say so—the first swallow heralding a new summer.

54. Our appreciation for the new Secretary-General in no way makes us forget the great merits of his predecessor. When Mr. Trygve Lie submitted his resignation in the fall of last year, he left behind him a worthy monument both in the political as well as in the material sense. Politically it was he who had been faced with the task of organizing the United Nations machinery from the start and out of next to nothing. He did so with devotion and skill. The impressive new Headquarters may perhaps be called the material expression of the organizational work which it was given to Mr. Trygve Lie to achieve.

55. Finally, may I be allowed to make a few brief remarks about the proposal of the Netherlands Government [A/2442] which may be found in our agenda under item 70. I was happy to record the agreement of the representative of Sweden, and my remarks will express what Mr. Undén has said, because our purpose is simple and is based on paragraph 3 of Article 109 of the Charter, prescribing a discussion at the tenth session of the General Assembly in 1955 on the question as to whether or not to call a special conference for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter. We believe that the deliberations of the tenth session of the General Assembly in this respect can and should be facilitated by preparatory documentation and by the preliminary opinions of Member States. All this may serve as guidance for those who, in 1955, will have to decide on this question. Therefore the preparatory work must start right here and now.

56. It is not our intention at this time to ask the Assembly to commit itself either for or against a revision of the Charter in part or as a whole, but merely to do the necessary spade-work for our activities in 1955. Our present item is therefore of a completely non-political and non-controversial character. We sincerely hope that the General Assembly will judge our proposal in this light.

57. I have confined myself to these few items of our agenda. I am aware of the possibility that in this Assembly there will be serious controversies and sharp differences of opinion. It is to be feared that the discussions will sometimes be bitter and that sometimes

with regard to fundamental values disagreement will emerge. Such is the reality of our torn world. But whoever has the privilege to live and work in a democratic State knows that one of the greatest advantages of democracy lies in the fact that people are free to disagree amongst each other. "*Du choc des idées jaillit la vérité*" is a well-known French phrase.

58. To be allowed to express a different opinion is moreover wholesome, because no human being is wise enough to possess all truth. Consequently the possibility must always remain unimpaired to disagree with the opinions of the majority. On the other hand, a democracy has never truly succeeded when free opposition and genuine differences of opinion were not superseded by a fundamental sense of solidarity and respect for the commonwealth.

59. I therefore fervently hope that in our deliberations here we shall endeavour to respect each other as Members of the United Nations who all are pledged to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, even if we must sometimes differ about means and methods. Let us not forget that we are all but human mortals and that it is the Lord who sits in the Seat of Judgment and holds dominion over us. He guides our destiny. May His blessing be upon the work of this Assembly.

60. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): It is not simply to conform to convention that I open my speech with a reference to Mrs. Pandit's election as President of the General Assembly. It has given the United Kingdom delegation great satisfaction and pleasure that she should be elected to this high and honourable office, not only because of the honour which is thereby conferred upon her country, but also because of her own outstanding qualities. We congratulate Mrs. Pandit and the Assembly and wish her a most distinguished term of office.

61. I should also like to join in the good wishes which have been extended to our new Secretary-General upon his assumption of his most important office. The United Kingdom Government is very happy that Mr. Hammarskjöld should be the chief officer of this Organization.

62. May I also state that I deeply regret that the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, is not here to speak to the Assembly in the general debate on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. He is happily in the concluding stages of his convalescence, and I say without fear of contradiction that the whole world will have cause to rejoice when his wisdom and experience are once again at the service of the cause of peace.

63. I agree with those speakers who have pointed out that we meet for this session of the General Assembly in circumstances substantially different from those of the last three sessions. In 1950, 1951 and 1952, large-scale hostilities were taking place in Korea at the time of our meetings—large-scale sea, land and air operations causing heavy loss of life and great destruction. We all rejoice that after these three years of warfare and two years of negotiation the fighting has stopped. The toll of human lives has ended and the risk of the conflict's spreading has been avoided. It would be wrong to forget how real has been that risk, certainly since February 1951.

64. But our heartfelt thankfulness at the armistice does not blind us to the fact that there are still many

difficulties ahead. Fighting nourished from behind the Iron Curtain continues in Indo-China. Terrorist activities on a large scale are taking place in Malaya and other parts of the world. We here already know something of the difficulties of translating a Korean armistice into a Korean peace. Certainly there is no shortage of problems still to be solved.

65. I would weary this Assembly indeed if I attempted to state our views upon all the interesting points raised in the speeches made in this debate. I do, however, wish to say something about what we regard as the roles of the United Nations and then to examine some of the dangers to peace at the present time and to consider what this particular session of the General Assembly can do to help.

66. To my mind, the primary responsibility of the United Nations is to work for a situation in which aggression will be unlikely or impossible. If, in spite of these efforts, aggression should nevertheless occur, it is of the utmost importance that the United Nations should be prepared to take, or to authorize, action against the aggressor. Small countries and, indeed, large countries will be encouraged to stand up to pressure only if they know that there is a world authority, backed by powerful States, able and willing to go into action quickly should an acknowledged act of aggression be committed.

67. It was in accordance with this conception that the great decision of 27 June 1950 [474th meeting] was taken by the Security Council—one of the decisive decisions, in our view, in the history of the world—and it was in discharge of this obligation to resist aggression that fifty-three nations subsequently endorsed that decision in the Assembly, declaring North Korea to be an aggressor; that sixteen nations sent combatant forces to Korea; and that various other Member States helped in a variety of ways.

68. In our debates in the First Committee, at the last session, Mr. Vyshinsky spent considerable time in attempting to prove that South Korea had committed the original aggression in Korea. On 21 September [438th meeting], he said he was not going to reiterate all his old arguments but simply wished to produce one piece of evidence to show that South Korea had intended to attack North Korea. Well, whatever may have been said by Korean leaders on either side before the attack took place, the fact is that North Korean troops in large numbers did cross the thirty-eighth parallel at many places on 25 June 1950. This was reported by the United Nations Commission. Frontier incidents are one thing, but a full-scale offensive of this nature, which could only have been planned months ahead of the moment when it was staged, is quite another. However, like Mr. Vyshinsky, I do not intend to develop this theme. The facts are well known. If anyone has any doubt, I advise him to read again the report of the United Nations field observers dated 24 June 1950 [A/1350, annex 4].

69. What matters is that the aggression has now been repelled and the aggressors driven back whence they came. The United Nations, thanks chiefly to the outstanding leadership and sacrifices of the United States, has functioned successfully. As Sir Winston Churchill said in his speech to the United States Congress on 17 January 1952:

"...I am sure our soldiers and your soldiers have not made their sacrifice in vain. The cause of

world law has found strong and invaluable defence, and the foundations of the world instruments for preserving peace, justice and freedom among the nations have been deepened and strengthened. They stand now not on paper but on rock. Moreover, the action which President Truman took in your name and with your full support in his stroke against aggression in Korea has produced consequences far beyond Korea, consequences which may well affect the destiny of mankind."

70. But the nations of the world will certainly not be able to enjoy a full sense of security unless it is made clear that any similar aggression in the future will be met by similar action recommended by the United Nations itself or taken by organizations, based on Article 51 of the Charter.

71. It is wrong for the Soviet Union representative to think that this conception is directed against the Soviet Union. It applies equally, in our view, to all acts of aggression, whether or not the aggressor is a member of any particular bloc. The repression of aggression, as I have suggested, is a primary task of this body.

72. Another vital role of this body is to mediate, and indeed to intervene, in disputes threatening peace, in the hope that such intervention will prevent those disputes from developing into hostilities. If I may give a topical example of a case in which I think the Assembly has tried to act in this capacity, it is the case of the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma. We have tried, and I hope will continue to try, in that case to remove something which is causing friction and might lead to hostilities between States.

73. It is not inappropriate to remember in this connexion some of the successes of this Organization. It was due in large measure to the conciliatory processes of the United Nations that fighting was stopped in Greece, in Kashmir and in Palestine. Other disputes which could have led to breaches of the peace, such as the dispute between Iran and the Soviet Union, were settled partly in consequence of the activities of the United Nations. Other disputes have been the subject of decisions by the International Court of Justice. This Organization, I claim, has played a much larger part in the post-war years than is commonly recognized in preventing controversies between nations from developing into something very much worse. What I have said shows how wrong it is to suggest, as is sometimes done in certain quarters, that this Organization has accomplished nothing.

74. A third role of the United Nations is to provide a forum in which the issues of the day can be debated. We believe that a debate such as this annual general debate is of value. Also, on occasion, a debate such as that in the First Committee, at the last session, on the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea, can be of great help in creating an international public opinion or an atmosphere in which some deadlock can be resolved. This is not always the case; it is not true that a problem has only to be debated in the United Nations for it to be solved. Sometimes public debates can only exacerbate hard feelings. Parties to a controversy may be forced to take up publicly rigid positions and to indulge in acrimonious propaganda speeches for domestic consumption.

75. Anyone who has attended our proceedings during the past two or three years at least will readily be able

to call to mind debates to which what I have just said unfortunately applied. That also affects the timing of a debate. I feel that nothing will cause us as an Organization to lose ground more than year after year to debate particular controversies in the same acrimonious, unproductive and inconclusive manner. If anyone has any doubt as to what I mean, let him survey the list of items on the agenda of this session of the Assembly.

76. Parallel with these roles of the repression of aggression, of conciliation and peace-making, and of constituting a forum for international debate, there is the social, economic and humanitarian work of the United Nations, and in particular that carried out by the specialized agencies operating under its auspices. We believe that that work is complementary to the political work of the United Nations; that hunger, poverty and disease will impair the best of political solutions and that the progressive raising of living standards throughout the world will of itself contribute to political settlements.

77. We shall be debating these matters fully in the proper committees. I do, however, want to pay a special tribute to the work of technical assistance now well launched. We think that the last session of the Economic and Social Council did valuable work to improve and give firmer direction to the administration of technical assistance. I should also like to say a word of praise for the United Nations Children's Fund, whose efficiency has deservedly won genuine admiration.

78. In a different field, I hope that the proposed five years' renewal of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees will, with improving world conditions, see an end to this tragic human problem.

79. One of the considerations which must drive us on in our efforts towards a relaxation of international tension and the reduction of armaments is the knowledge that progress in those directions should enable substantially greater resources to be devoted to improving living standards.

80. Finally, there is the role of the United Nations with regard to dependent peoples. There is a difference of opinion, which I am not going to develop here, as to the extent or scope of that particular role. Mr. Eden made the position of the United Kingdom Government on what is called "colonialism" abundantly clear in his speech to the General Assembly last year [393rd meeting]. I quote one brief passage:

"Either these lands can continue, with the help of countries like my own, their orderly progress towards self-government. Or they can be prematurely abandoned by us and exposed to anarchy or despotism, so that all liberal tendencies are smothered, perhaps for generations. There is no question in my mind as to which of these courses most closely fits the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations."

81. Having restated these views on the role of the United Nations and the way in which it can discharge its responsibilities under the Charter, I wish to turn to the matters now threatening world peace. I shall begin by referring again to the basic problem already touched upon by several speakers. It is the ideological split between the countries on each side of the Iron Curtain, the split running along the line of the Iron Curtain. I shall try to put the position simply and not offensively.

82. We, on our side of the Iron Curtain, believe in progress by gradual evolution, by reform, by compromise, and in the preservation of the liberties of the individual to worship as he pleases, to associate as he pleases, to speak, to write, to vote as he pleases. We believe that this process of gradual evolution should apply not only in our own societies but also in the political development of the dependent peoples for whose well-being we are responsible. These peoples must be allowed to develop, to build up the political institutions which best suit them, and to establish with our assistance the economic and social functions of self-government.

83. On the other side of the Iron Curtain there has been the belief in the suppression of human liberties in the interests of the State, in monolithic unity at home—to use the phrase we heard on Monday [438th meeting]—and in the forcible overthrow of existing systems of society in the rest of the world; to put it shortly, in the classic communist aim of world revolution.

84. The problem which we have to consider is: is it possible for these two systems to exist side by side? Is peaceful coexistence possible? Or is war inevitable? That is the question we have to try to answer, the riddle or conundrum which must perplex many hundreds of thousands of people in the free world.

85. Mr. Malenkov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, in his speech of 8 August 1953, made the following statements:

"We firmly maintain that at the present moment there is no disputable or outstanding issue which could not be settled in a peaceful way on the basis of mutual agreement between the countries concerned. This refers also to those issues under dispute which exist between the United States and the USSR. We stood and stand for a peaceful coexistence of the two systems."

Again, later, Mr. Malenkov said:

"...the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence of two systems is an obligation not only of the countries of the democratic camp, but the obligation also of all countries; any other way is the way of hopeless adventures and inevitable failures."

86. On the other hand there has been plenty of evidence in the past to support a contrary view, the view that coexistence should continue only until the Soviet leaders consider that the time is ripe for them to pursue another policy. George Dimitrov, when he was Secretary-General of the Communist International, put it quite clearly. He used these words:

"We are sometimes accused of departing from our communist principles. What stupidity, what blindness! We should not be Marxist and Leninist revolutionaries, nor disciples of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, if we were not capable of completely altering our tactics and our mode of action as circumstances may dictate. But all the deviations and all the 'ins' and 'outs' of our tactics are directed to a single end—the world revolution."

87. That is a rather different view from the view that peaceful coexistence is the desirable end, and this is a perplexing riddle. Where does the truth lie with regard to that? Which view are we to accept today? What are really the basic purposes of the rulers in the

Kremlin? Have we had any further indications of the answer to that question at this session of the Assembly?

88. In the General Committee, on 16 September [87th meeting], Mr. Malik welcomed the improved international climate and Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that the improved climate was conducive to the resumption of co-operation among States.

89. I confess with regret that I was not clear from his speech in the Assembly on 21 September [438th meeting] where Mr. Vyshinsky stood on this issue. Much of what he said seemed to me to be in conflict with the spirit of Mr. Malenkov's speech of 8 August. Surely if we are to make progress we must get away from the stereotyped language of abuse and the dreary reiteration of the slogans and catchwords which have so long bedevilled these public international discussions. We thought that there was a new note of realism to be detected in Mr. Malenkov's speech of 8 August, but I do not see how anyone could say that the speech made on 21 September on behalf of the Soviet Union delegation contributed very much towards the relaxation of international tension.

90. Nevertheless, in spite of Mr. Vyshinsky's speech in this debate the attitude of the United Kingdom delegation is one of cautious optimism. No one should blame us for our caution. Deeds and the passage of time are needed to convince us that this coexistence of which Mr. Malenkov speaks is not just coexistence during an armistice or a lull—a sort of armed truce—but that it means living side by side in a state of peace which is genuinely intended on both sides to be lasting. Deeds and the passage of time are needed to throw light on the answer to that.

91. It would therefore be the height of folly for the countries of the free world immediately to cast aside their defences or to relax their efforts to maintain their strength.

92. Mr. Vyshinsky made the stock allegation that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an aggressive military alliance which constitutes a major threat to the cause of peace. It is hardly necessary, in this Assembly, to refute such allegations. This defensive alliance came into being solely because of the surge westwards of Soviet power and military might. Rather than be swallowed up one by one, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began to concert measures for common defence. We believe that the leaders of the communist world are realists who respect facts. We have no intention of being put in the position of having to negotiate with them from weakness. That would not help to bring real peace. That is why the United Kingdom Government remains determined to play its full part in maintaining the strength of this defensive and non-aggressive alliance within the framework of the Charter, an alliance which, so far from threatening the peace of the world, is in present circumstances one of its main buttresses.

93. We have therefore to be cautious. On the other hand, are we to be censured for our optimism? Since the death of Stalin there has been a certain change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union. There have been changes at home and to some extent abroad, in domestic and in external policies. The United Kingdom Government has welcomed these changes and we wish to avoid in any way checking any favourable reactions which may be taking place. Of course, as I have just

said, it is the deeds and not just the words which really count. That has always been our view.

94. The most significant deed of the Soviet Union in the field of foreign affairs since Stalin's death was the abandonment of the position taken up last November by their representatives on the subject of the forcible repatriation of Korean prisoners of war. We welcomed that change. It made possible the Korean armistice. It contributed towards an easement in international tension.

95. Sir Winston Churchill said in May that we believed it to be a mistake to assume that nothing could be settled with the Soviet Union unless and until everything was settled. A settlement of two or three of our difficulties would be an important gain to every peace-loving country. That is why we favour taking outstanding problems one by one and seeking to negotiate settlements. Above all, we desire to maintain some momentum behind the improvement which has been perceptible during the past few months. In this connexion I should like to pay my tribute to Mr. Dulles' temperate and statesmanlike speech of 17 September [434th meeting] which, in our view, set an admirable tone for this debate and made it possible for what I have described as this momentum behind the improvement to be maintained in this discussion.

96. One matter on which we are very ready to try to make progress is Germany. In his speech on 21 September the Soviet Union representative stated that as early as March 1952 the Soviet Union Government had submitted for consideration a draft of the bases for a peace treaty with Germany, but that the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom had not yet submitted their comments or counter-proposals. That is not really in accordance with the facts. The Government of the United Kingdom and the other two Governments associated with it have repeatedly addressed the Government of the Soviet Union on this subject since March 1952. They have emphasized that no lasting settlement for Germany can be negotiated until there is an all-German government based on the will of the German people as expressed in free elections. No other government would be qualified to take vital decisions concerning the future of a united Germany.

97. As recently as 2 September, following upon other offers, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, together with the United States and French Governments, invited the Soviet Union Government to participate in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four countries which, it was suggested, might take place on 15 October at Lugano. We suggested that this meeting should devote itself to the German problem and should concentrate in the first instance on the question of free elections and the status of the future German government. There has not yet, so far as I am aware, been any answer to that invitation but we sincerely hope that it will be accepted and that some progress can be made upon this matter.

98. Before I leave the topic of Germany I should just like to add one word with regard to Mr. Vyshinsky's criticism of the proposal that the Federal Republic of Germany should be a member of the European Defence Community. As Mr. Dulles pointed out in his speech, the European Defence Community will merge German military strength into the structure of a non-aggressive European community. That should be welcomed by

the Soviet Union because neither Germany nor any other member of the Community will be able to take independent military action to serve national ambitions. There is in this plan really much greater security for the Soviet people against the risk of another German aggression than in the sort of peace treaty which the Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward, under which an independent Germany would have national armed forces.

99. Austria also provides a problem which we think is capable of very speedy solution. I will not repeat what Mr. Dulles said on that matter except to remind the Assembly that the offer of the three Western Occupying Powers to conclude an Austrian treaty at a meeting of Foreign Ministers has so far met with no response; but that offer is still open.

100. A region of the world where undoubtedly there is danger to international peace is Indo-China. All our sympathy goes out to the soldiers of the French Union fighting in Indo-China where, under the guidance and inspiration of France, a cruel and exhausting war against an internal enemy, financed and supported from abroad, is being fought in the territory of the three Associated States. There can be no lasting peace in Asia so long as the war continues in these three States, whose admission to the United Nations has been recommended by the General Assembly. The ending of the war in the Associated States of Indo-China is an essential step along the path of pacification and conciliation in Asia which began with the armistice in Korea.

101. That brings me to the most immediate and pressing problem, that of Korea. The armistice has been achieved in spite of differences which at one time appeared to be insoluble, and the next step is to set up the political conference called for by the Armistice Agreement. The opinion of this Assembly on the way in which that conference should be set up was made clear less than a month ago, and proposals were made and communicated to the Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities. These were reasonable and helpful and in no way prejudiced the right of the other side in the Korean conflict to be fully and adequately represented at the conference.

102. It is, of course, well known that the United Kingdom Government, among others, thought that the participation of India would benefit the work of the conference, but I repeat the view which I expressed in the General Committee on 22 September [88th meeting], to which I invite the Assembly's most earnest attention: that the setting up of the conference is of more importance than the participation of particular Member States which were not parties to the conflict.

103. We have learnt to our regret that the Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities are not in full agreement with the proposals of the United Nations. This, however, is certainly not the appropriate moment for the Assembly to debate again issues on which they have so recently taken decisions, and we fervently hope that the Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities will on reconsideration find themselves able to accept the proposals which we have made and to join in a conference next month. For the urgent and important thing is to get the conference started. The longer we delay, the more we debate publicly and discuss the formation of the conference,

the more extraneous and irrelevant issues may be brought in and the harder it may be to get agreement in the long run. So let us get the conference started, and started quickly, in the most simple and straightforward manner possible.

104. I hope that very careful consideration will be given to the new and constructive suggestions which were put forward by Mr. Lodge on 22 September in the General Committee [88th meeting] and repeated in the General Assembly [440th meeting]. The first suggestion was that the question of the participation of so-called neutral States should be left to the political conference, without any country being committed beforehand to a rigid position on this matter. That seems to me to be a most sensible and statesmanlike way of resolving the present situation. The second suggestion was for a representative of the United States Government and a representative of the other side to meet as quickly as possible to discuss all arrangements for the conference. Attempts have been made to insist on an exact definition of that word "arrangements". Why? Why not leave it at the word "arrangements"? Is it impossible ever to leave a little flexibility? It seems to us that that suggestion also is an initiative to be welcomed.

105. Mr. Vyshinsky ridiculed these suggestions without any pause for consideration. We regret that attitude. We hope that there will be second thoughts and that these proposals, when considered, will receive a favourable answer, because the verdict of history is going to be harsh upon all of us if, because of a difference of opinion on composition, we fail to get this vital conference started.

106. When the conference does begin, the participants will have a difficult task. The reunification of Korea by peaceful means will not be easy; at the same time we certainly appreciate the need for giving assurances of security to a reunited Korea and its neighbours. I agree with what the representative of Canada said in this connexion yesterday [441st meeting].

107. Towards the end of his speech, the Soviet Union representative made a reference to disarmament. I think that no one will disagree that one of the great dangers to peace is the uncontrolled expansion and development of national armaments and weapons of mass destruction. These have made the prospects of a war not only repugnant but appalling, and we now know that if it came it might well wipe life off the surface of the globe. We are presented with a challenge which we have to meet if civilization is to survive. We have to devise a system of disarmament sufficiently comprehensive and so well safeguarded as to command the confidence of all nations. For this to be achieved, we obviously have to create conditions of mutual confidence between nations, and the obvious way to do this is to remove causes of friction.

108. The representative of the Soviet Union argued that the reduction of armaments would of itself reduce international tension. That may be, but it is surely ingenuous to suggest that there can be any significant progress in putting a disarmament programme into effect until a greater degree of international confidence has been created or restored.

109. Nevertheless, we think that preliminary agreement on the requirements for a comprehensive and co-ordinated disarmament programme, which would include the prohibition and abolition of all weapons

of mass destruction, would of itself contribute towards the easing of tension. As the United States Secretary of State said on 17 September, attempts to reach agreement on these requirements can and should be made concurrently with attempts to find solutions to the various political problems. Now it was precisely to meet this need and to make such preparations that this Assembly established the Disarmament Commission at the beginning of last year [resolution 502 (VI)].

110. The commission has made no progress in the last few months. I do not think that the fault lies with the United Kingdom Government or with the other governments associated with it. Last year we gave clear proof of our earnest desire to get the commission moving. I do not need to remind the Assembly of the series of working papers submitted in the commission by my delegation and the delegations associated with us. There is the United States paper on disclosure and verification, and on the essential principles of a disarmament programme; there is the tripartite working paper on the numerical limitation of all armed forces; there is the supplementary paper dealing with the distribution of men between the armed forces, the limitation of armaments, and other necessary aspects of a disarmament programme. There were several other suggestions put forward in the Committee's discussions.

111. We do not regard these working papers as hard-and-fast proposals. We want to hear comments on them or constructive counter-proposals. But I think it is better to speak frankly. All that we received were general accusations from the Soviet Union representative that our only interest was in espionage and that our suggestions meant that we did not genuinely want disarmament; or else bald restatements of those slogans which are again set forth in the draft resolution [A/2485/Rev.1] submitted on 21 September.

112. The Soviet Union proposals do not seem to have evolved in any way since they were first put forward. At the sixth session, in Paris nearly two years ago, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control should be put into effect simultaneously and that inspection should be on a continuing basis. We have tried repeatedly in the Disarmament Commission to find out what these expressions mean in terms of practical arrangements. It really is up to the Soviet Union to tell us definitely whether it is prepared to agree to the minimum safeguards necessary to make a disarmament programme secure, and to discuss with us in detail those essential safeguards. We really cannot get anywhere without frank and detailed discussion about practical arrangements.

113. We have repeated again and again the reasons why we cannot accept these very general proposals of the Soviet Union as they now stand. A cut by one-third of the existing armed forces and armaments of the five permanent members of the Security Council would produce an arbitrary and quite inequitable redistribution of strength, even if we could be sure, without some kind of supervision, that such a reduction would be made in fact by all, or even if we knew from what existing strength the reduction would take place. A decision to abolish atomic and other weapons of mass destruction seems to us to be impractical except within the framework of a system which will ensure that the dangerous material involved will be used only for

peaceful purposes. Also this matter must necessarily be linked with the limitation of conventional armaments.

114. Mr. Dulles intimated that the views of the United States Government on disarmament were not inflexible. I only wish that we could have some indication of flexibility or novelty in the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals. However, I sincerely hope that we shall decide to continue the Disarmament Commission for a further period. That, it seems to us, will provide the appropriate place where this particular matter can be discussed further, and the United Kingdom Government, for its part, is ready and anxious to take its share of the work. If we can get a conference upon Germany, if we can get the Korean conference set up and functioning, and if we can give some sense of reality and urgency to the work of the Disarmament Commission, then we shall indeed be beginning to make progress.

115. There is just one other subject, before I finish, upon which there are signs that tempers have been unnecessarily roused. We have on our agenda three items referring to Charter revision. It is obviously too soon for any Power to commit itself on any respect of this complicated subject. I think no one can claim that the Charter as drafted at San Francisco was in every way a perfect instrument. Little in this world is perfect, and we have all of us to consider between now and 1956 whether the instrument can be improved.

116. I feel that the best attitude for all of us at the present time is to refrain from taking up rigid positions one way or the other on any of the particular controversies, and to seek to prepare ourselves so that the discussions on this matter at the tenth session of the Assembly in 1955 can be fruitful. I am sure that all of us should ponder very carefully indeed the wise words spoken in this Assembly this morning by the representative of Sweden in this connexion. I fail to understand the extreme nervousness apparently shown by some delegations at any idea of any Charter revision. Surely this is one topic to which we should be able to give dispassionate consideration, and in any case, as the representative of Sweden pointed out, it must be remembered that any proposals for the revision of the Charter are subject to the exercise of the veto.

117. To sum up, I feel that it would be foolish to expect sensational results from this Assembly. No series of speeches, however profound, no batch of resolutions, however comprehensive, can cure the sicknesses afflicting the world today. But we have a decisive role to play. A great step forward was taken when the fighting stopped in Korea. A new hope was born and we are now at a critical phase in the development of relations between the free world and the communist countries. The future hangs in the balance. Much may depend upon the turn given to events during the next few weeks or months.

118. It has been proved that a limited agreement is possible and I feel that we must do nothing by our debates to forfeit that gain, to prejudice the possibility of further agreements. Let us, by the atmosphere we seek to create at this Assembly, help rather than hinder, and contribute to the maintenance of the momentum of the improvement—the relaxation in tension of which I have spoken.

119. As soon as any agreement with the Iron Curtain countries is mooted, there are some people in the

countries of the free world who start to talk of "appeasement", using that word as a term of abuse, denoting dishonourable surrender. I do not think it can be emphasized sufficiently that negotiation is not the same thing as appeasement. The twentieth century has had little experience of making peace by negotiation. The great wars of this century have been fought to a finish and the victors have dictated the peace terms to the vanquished. In older, and perhaps more civilized, times wars were usually ended by negotiation, by compromise, before one nation had completely torn the heart out of another nation. Perhaps this modern age of ours has more than a little to learn about the techniques of earlier and less destructive centuries.

120. Of course the thought can never be far from our minds of the terrible consequences of failure. However, I affirm by own belief that there is a real hope of further progress in the next twelve months. Cannot we, all of us, by our conduct at this Assembly, sustain and forward that hope, and so bring some comfort to the anxious and perplexed hearts in every land, poised between hope and despair and longing for the leadership necessary to guide the world towards a lasting peace?

121. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) (*translated from French*): I have the honour and pleasure to convey to the President the sincere congratulations of the Yugoslav delegation on her election to the presidency of the Assembly, an honour well deserved both by her country and by herself.

122. The concrete problems that we must attempt to solve together have been imposed on us by the shifting reality of international relations and economic and social issues. In spite of many failures and disappointments, the United Nations has proved to be an indispensable instrument and force for the solution of problems and, I would add, for the very existence of the modern world.

123. There has been much talk in the last few months of a *détente*, or decrease, in international tension. Its causes, the stage it has reached and its possible evolution have been much discussed. The answers given to these different questions have been extremely varied and often contradictory. The immediate cause has undoubtedly been an obvious modification of certain political moves and gestures of the USSR Government, which proves that it is that government that has been chiefly responsible for the international tension. In this connexion everyone has wondered whether this is a real or a transitory change, whether it belongs to the sphere of strategy or of tactics, whether it is sincere, and so on.

124. The Yugoslav delegation does not consider that the question has been put correctly: tactics need not necessarily be identified with ill-will, nor strategy with sincerity. What is important here is something quite different. Are we dealing with real trends towards a permanent *détente* or not? The answer to this question no longer depends solely upon the course and realism of Soviet policy, but also on other factors such as the permanence of the very causes of the change and the realism of the policy of other governments. It is obvious that, among all these factors, that of relative strength plays a primary part. Let us not forget, however, that broadly speaking this factor embraces almost all the others, and especially that it cannot possibly be reduced to relative material strength.

125. As regards Yugoslavia and its relations with the countries of the Soviet group, we must admit that there has been no positive change of anything like a decisive character. This is all the more regrettable because relations between those States and Yugoslavia, through the formers' own fault entirely and primarily that of the Soviet Government, have for many years been very bad. As we know, diplomatic relations have recently become more normal, but what could have been regarded as a good sign and the beginning of a general process of normalization will cease to be so if nothing further than that is proposed.

126. It is evident that the Soviet Government's behaviour is primarily due to the absolutely free and independent position adopted by a small country like Yugoslavia, which the Soviet governments regarded as belonging by the very nature of things, as it were, to their domain or, in more modern terms, to their sphere of influence. In the interests of co-operation between all nations, large and small, we cannot but deplore the fact that this entails a radical misconception, fundamental and not fortuitous, of the limitations of the great Powers' spheres of influence—limitations which are one of the most positive and promising features of contemporary history, including the history of the United Nations. The Yugoslav delegation does not propose, however, to appraise the international situation by taking as a starting point and basis merely its own relations with other countries, including those of the Soviet group.

127. Without seeking to enter into a detailed analysis of its causes we feel there has been an undeniable decrease in tension. The armistice in Korea is sufficient confirmation of that. We believe, however, that there is every reason to begin to wonder whether the climax of this *détente* has not perhaps already been reached and passed and whether we are not once again faced with a stiffening of attitudes and actions. This apprehension merely serves to emphasize our joint responsibility.

128. The Yugoslav delegation believes, therefore, that we must make every effort to favour the common trends towards a prolongation, a renewal, an active extension of the *détente*, at the same time preventing its being used as a means of self-interested manoeuvre by any country whatsoever. We do not believe that the cold war has ended and that the signs of a *détente* have removed the tension itself, which is still very acute. It is for us, however, to produce good results from what has already been achieved by the concerted action of the peace-loving countries, so that something greater and better may be attained. We must seek to transform the still slender results of our efforts into efficient means of achieving new and better results along the same lines.

129. What would be the real danger of such a policy? We are told that it would benefit those who are less naïve and who might act in bad faith. We do not hold that view. In the first place we are still, alas, very far from a general *détente* which would render obsolete and unnecessary the efforts which have already been made for the effective defence of peace against all possible threats. Furthermore, there is no question here of allowing ourselves to be impressed by the temporary advantages of a policy of bad faith. Nations and peoples are not blind; we may be confident even now that bad faith will certainly not be rewarded.

130. In short, if the Soviet Government has also derived benefit from certain of its actions which might be interpreted as conciliatory, we need have no cause for anxiety, from the point of view of an actively peaceful policy. Even if those actions were merely manoeuvres their success would have been achieved at the price of the temporary and partial abandonment of an aggressive policy. The permanence of such a renunciation certainly remains to be proved by further actions. In any case it is a victory for the forces of peace, even if it is only temporary. In the interests of all peoples who are vitally concerned in dissuading all countries from using force as an instrument of their foreign policy, we must now perpetuate that victory.

131. It is precisely at this point that the knot may continue to loosen or may tighten again. It is here that we meet the danger arising from the tendency which the great Powers have developed spontaneously, and almost naturally, towards a policy in which they alone would play the leading part and make the final decisions.

132. It is difficult, and frankly it is impossible, to deny that the great Powers have a special responsibility in major international problems. If that is the case, however, the consequences of their errors cannot but be particularly dangerous, and since vast interests are at stake in the conflict between the great Powers they cannot always remain impartial without the corrective support and co-operation of the smaller and less powerful nations. In our view that is one of the major reasons which justifies the existence and the aims of an organization such as the United Nations.

133. Thus one of the dangers is that the great Powers will again tend to seek a settlement of their disputes at the expense of other interested countries or without consulting them. Such attempts, as we have seen, can only in the long run increase the disequilibrium which they were designed to remove, stir up further tension and finally sow the seeds of war. It is not right that the only choice left to smaller and less powerful nations should be that of submission to one or other of the great Powers. A similar danger derives from the dictum, whatever its origin or exact terms, that one should take advantage of the weakness of one's neighbour in order to extort substantial concessions from him.

134. As soon as one State starts aiming at hegemony, or even if there is only a possibility that it may do so, other forces interested in maintaining the equilibrium, which here means the peace, at once start seeking new alignments. The danger continues for some time, however, simply because of the possible delay on the part of the great Powers concerned in assessing the new relative strengths. That perhaps explains the oscillation in their practical policies between making overtures and adopting an uncompromising attitude. The initiative passes from one to the other in turn: at one time, a country over-estimates the weakness in the ranks of the adversary, while at another time it is the latter which over-estimates the speed of its own recovery. The task of the community of nations, and particularly of the United Nations, including the great Powers, is *inter alia* to eliminate these manifestations of the cold war. The only way to do this is to eliminate both the theory and the practice of the balance of power—which is always, by definition, unstable—between the great Powers by a progressive strengthening of peace-

ful co-operation, based on equal rights, and of democratic relations among all nations, great and small.

135. Finally, without denying the connexion between the social systems and the foreign policies of governments, we should be making a big mistake and betraying the interests of peace if we assumed the right to judge the foreign policy of a government according to the name given to the social and political system operating in that country. The one policy which must be unmasked and resisted is an aggressive policy, whatever its origin.

136. Here we return to the question of ideological warfare, which has already been criticized from this rostrum by previous Yugoslav representatives and other speakers. To give an ideological interpretation to an act of aggression or an aggressive policy is really equivalent to claiming for oneself the right to engage in an aggressive policy in the name of contrary ideology. Is it not yet apparent, for example, that arbitrarily to identify the progressive popular movements with the Soviet régime—and it is just as arbitrary, in our view, to identify that régime with communist doctrine—is to play into the hands of the Soviet Union, with its policy of domination, which policy is itself disguised beneath the cloak of ideology?

137. That is why the struggle of ideas is permissible and desirable only in so far as it tends towards constructive solutions designed to maintain and strengthen peace and to contribute to the progress of mankind. Otherwise what point would there be in speaking of the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social régimes? The possibility of such coexistence is the corollary and logical complement of the condemnation of ideological warfare.

138. I should like to emphasize that the arrest of armed aggression in Korea by the collective action of the United Nations, which has led to the armistice, has created conditions which are favourable for the making of serious efforts to ease tension in Asia and throughout the world, despite the many inadmissible measures taken by the South Korean Government which gravely hinder the implementation of the principles of the United Nations with regard to the Korean problem.

139. We still have to solve the fundamental problem of that country, namely, its peaceful unification as a democratic and independent State. Moreover, at the international level this problem remains open and constitutes a danger to world peace, even after the conclusion of the armistice at Panmunjom. Consequently the United Nations, as an international organization whose principal aim is the strengthening and maintenance of peace, must bear in mind primarily the way in which the results already achieved, namely, the conclusion of the armistice in Korea, can lead to new successes.

140. We note with particular pleasure the unanimity achieved in the United Nations on the occasion of the armistice. Serious misunderstandings have arisen, however, concerning the character and composition of the political conference, thus impeding a prompt solution of the Korean question. In the belief that General Assembly resolution 711 A (VII), originally submitted by fifteen countries, does not reflect the role that the United Nations should play in this problem, my Government is of the opinion that the United Nations should fulfil the task entrusted to it by the

Charter and approach the solution of this problem in its capacity as guardian and universal architect of peace, rejecting any tendency to transform this Organization into an ideological or political bloc or into a party to the armed conflict.

141. Furthermore, we cannot disregard the link between the Korean situation and the general problems affecting Asia. I am thinking primarily of one which is continually before us—that of the representation of China in the United Nations. The continued postponement of a solution to that problem will undoubtedly prevent the United Nations from playing its due part in the improvement of international relations in Asia and the Far East.

142. While I have no intention of examining all the problems of Asia I should like to stress the importance which Yugoslavia attaches to the question of the presence of Kuomintang troops in Burma. From the information at present available it would appear that the negotiations undertaken on the basis of the resolution [707 (VII)] adopted at the seventh session of the General Assembly have come to nothing, which means that effective measures are needed to ensure that these troops are withdrawn in the near future.

143. The events which have taken place in Morocco and Tunisia since our last session are such as to justify their inclusion in the agenda of this session. My delegation must voice its concern at the fact that, despite the efforts of the United Nations, no way has yet been found of reaching an equitable solution to the problems arising between those two countries and France, a solution which, by satisfying the basic aspirations of the peoples of Tunisia and Morocco, would put an end to the existing tensions and disputes.

144. In Europe, eight years after the end of the Second World War, no peace treaty has yet been concluded with Austria and the independence of that country has not been restored. The primary responsibility for that situation lies with the Soviet Union.

145. The problems of the peace treaty with Germany and the unification of that country necessarily occupy a central place on the European political scene. I can only express the hope that increased efforts on the part of the responsible Powers, which should bear in mind the safeguards which must be provided against renewed German aggression, will result in the solution of the problem, for until that is settled it is hard to see how the situation in Europe can return to normal.

146. In their desire to ensure their independence and security and thus to contribute to the common efforts of the nations for the maintenance and safeguarding of peace, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia have, in accordance with the Charter, concluded a treaty of friendship and co-operation. I wish to associate myself wholeheartedly with the words spoken here on that subject by the representative of Greece [439th meeting]. I should like to recall particularly his statement that the agreement remained open to any countries in that area who would be prepared to co-operate on a basis of equality, and that it had already helped to restore normal relations between those three countries and some of their neighbours. We are convinced that that agreement will lead to a development of friendly collaboration among the three countries which may serve as an example to other countries concerned in the maintenance of peace. We think that regional agreements of this type are a necessity today and are the best method of securing peace.

147. Furthermore, my country has always endeavoured to settle all disputes with other countries by peaceful means, by negotiations. It has never been in favour of unilateral solutions or those imposed by force or by armed demonstrations, which can only be harmful to the interests of peace in general. My country considers its participation in the common peace front to be a permanent moral obligation, independent of contingencies and vicissitudes in the relations between individual States.

148. The existence of the problems I have mentioned, together with the general atmosphere of tension and distrust caused by these unsolved problems, has led to an enormous increase in armaments. That does not mean, of course, that the General Assembly should relax its efforts to achieve a controlled international reduction of armaments. On the contrary, its efforts should be redoubled in order to reduce the burden of armaments and armed forces on the economies of the various countries and on world economy. Such efforts can and must help to ease this atmosphere of tension and distrust which encourages the progressive increase of armaments. In our opinion the present situation is propitious to the achievement of substantial results in the field of disarmament. My delegation thinks that it can now discern factors which might make it possible to reopen consideration of the problem of disarmament on a more acceptable basis. It is prepared to encourage any initiative and any proposal to that end, in its eagerness to contribute to progress in that highly important field.

149. We must not forget that the threat of aggression will not be removed simply by praiseworthy intentions. In that connexion I must refer to the contribution and experience of my country. It is the domestic stability and the strengthened defences of Yugoslavia which, in conjunction with our strenuous efforts to reduce international tension, constitute, in the circumstances, my country's greatest contribution to the cause of peace and security in the world.

150. Although all the problems to which I have referred should be constantly in the forefront of our attention and our endeavours, they are only one aspect of the present-day problems with which our Organization is concerned, that of direct action for the maintenance of international peace and security. Before a genuine and lasting relaxation of tension can be achieved in the world, and before peace can be established on firmer foundations, we must find new methods and extend the activities of the United Nations. In this connexion I am glad to be able to express my delegation's agreement with the views put forward by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report [A/2404].

151. A definite place is given in the Charter to the activities of the United Nations in the economic and financial fields. Thanks to the efforts made, United Nations technical assistance has already made progress. Despite the limited means at its disposal, that work deserves our full approval, both for the efforts made and the successes achieved.

152. Furthermore, the idea of establishing a special fund, the importance of which has been universally recognized, has now reached the point where it has become possible and even necessary to take practical steps to bring it about. My delegation, which has taken so prominent a part in the efforts to make this idea

a reality, will lend its full support to any initiative in that direction, since this idea is closely linked to the needs and problems of the various countries of the world. May I be permitted, in this connexion, to quote some alarming figures taken from a report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations:² in 1938, more than 38 per cent of the world population was under-nourished, while by 1952, fourteen years later, that percentage had risen to 60 as a result of increased poverty in the under-developed countries. The Yugoslav delegation does not regard the idea of the special fund as a miraculous panacea, but it does believe that it is one of the most appropriate and effective forms of strengthening international co-operation and confidence among nations.

153. The United Nations has been very active in the social, health and cultural fields, through many organs and the specialized agencies. I am thinking of the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization and others, in whose work my country has taken an active part, as it will continue to do in the future.

154. On the other hand, the United Nations has not been able to overcome the difficulties which have arisen with regard to the adoption of the covenant on human rights and the declaration on the rights and duties of States. Nor has it succeeded in finding effective solutions to the problem of freedom of information. These facts cannot be glossed over, for they concern important and difficult questions.

155. With regard to the vast territories of Africa and certain parts of Asia, we are forced to note that the conditions obtaining there are not satisfactory. The peoples of those territories are becoming increasingly conscious of their political and national individuality and they are demanding their independence and the right to administer their own countries. It would be unreasonable and unjust to ignore their claims and to turn a deaf ear to their voices. It is, in our opinion, as necessary as it is inevitable that in the present circumstances the United Nations should make appropriate efforts to guide dependent and semi-dependent peoples, particularly colonial peoples, on the road to freedom and independence. Such an endeavour towards the extension and strengthening of United Nations authority would, by a series of constructive actions and decisions, contribute to the elimination of the conditions in which disputes become armed conflicts and the enemies of world peace and the freedom of peoples are encouraged to pursue their ends.

156. I do not think that it is necessary to lay too much stress here on the part which the United Nations has already played and is still called upon to play in the settlement of the great international problems. It is our duty to do everything in our power to ensure that the United Nations may become an even more effective instrument.

157. We have known from the outset that we could not hope for complete harmony in the United Nations as regards the approach towards various problems and the manner of settling them, for the simple reason that the United Nations itself was established only because world opinion had become aware that the international contradictions and the unsettled problems which were dividing the world called for solution by international collaboration.

² *Second World Food Survey*, November 1952, table 9.

158. One of the gravest hindrances to the work of the United Nations is the fact that the principle of universality has not yet been fully applied, as the Secretary-General rightly points out in his report. Practice has shown that the absence of a large number of countries is raising many difficulties.

159. The fact that at the most critical moments the great majority of Members have formed a united front against aggression and aggressive tendencies has been one of the most valuable experiences of the United

Nations. It is our duty to strengthen and extend that unity, the purpose of which must be to strive for the maintenance of peace and the progress of humanity. That purpose can be achieved only if the principle of equality of rights between nations great and small is respected and supported. We are firmly convinced that the United Nations will continue its efforts to achieve its task of safeguarding peace and developing international co-operation.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.