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Adoption of the agenda: second report of the General Committee (A/2486)

[Agenda item 8]

1. The PRESIDENT: The General Committee today considered two requests of the Soviet Union [A/2484 and A/2485/Rev.1] for the inclusion of additional items in the agenda of the eighth session. The General Committee has reported on its consideration of these two requests, and the report [A/2486] is before the General Assembly.

2. The Assembly will consider the two requests separately, and I now place before the General Assembly the recommendation of the General Committee with regard to the request for the inclusion of the item entitled "Note by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII), adopted on 28 August 1953".

3. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): On 18 September, the delegation of the Soviet Union proposed that a new item, entitled "Note by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII), adopted on 28 August 1953", should be included in the agenda of the General Assembly. What led us propose this item for inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly, and to insist today, in the General Committee [88th meeting], on the need for meeting our request by including this item in the agenda of the eighth session?

4. We attach considerable importance to General Assembly resolutions on any question. Obviously, then, we cannot but attach particular significance—and we shall continue to do so in future—to resolutions on such important matters as the Korean question and, more especially, the question of the composition of the political conference which is to complete the task of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the first step towards which was taken with the signing of the Armistice Agreement in Korea. We attach particular importance to resolution 711 C (VII), because it requires the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly, after duly communicating to the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of

Korea the decision taken by the Assembly on the question "together with the records of the relevant proceedings of the General Assembly". The resolution says "to report as appropriate". But there is no doubt that "to report as appropriate" means to report to the General Assembly, because it is the General Assembly that is dealing with this question.

5. An argument arose in the First Committee during the final stage of the seventh session of the General Assembly. Objections were raised to the draft resolution [A/C.1/L.50] introduced by the four delegations of Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia, which was subsequently to become resolution 711 C (VII). Some representatives said that it was absolutely unnecessary to enter into any negotiations with the Governments of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. Those representatives expressed their views in very definite terms. As a result, an amendment [A/C.1/L.51] was subsequently submitted by the representative of Peru and, after consideration of this amendment and further debate, the sponsors of the draft resolution and those who had objected to it agreed to delete the words "report to the General Assembly as appropriate", so that the phrase was restricted to the words "to report as appropriate".

6. I know that there was some doubt after that as to whether the Secretary-General should submit such a report at all, but the Secretary-General himself dispelled those doubts by submitting a report [A/2480].

7. Because we attach considerable importance to this report—for reasons which I shall explain later—it was quite natural for us to propose that it should not be regarded simply as a General Assembly document, distributed for the information of members, but that it should be submitted in the form of a report, so that the General Assembly might state its views on all the various questions which of course arise in that connexion. A report of this kind cannot be ignored in view of its importance and of the subject with which it deals. This proposal that the report should be included in the agenda and that representatives should thereby be given an opportunity to take up any matters connected with it which might occur to them, would therefore appear to be perfectly natural and logical, politically and rationally justified. We are in no way prejudicing the course of the debate on this question in the First Committee or in any other Committee to which it might be referred by decision of the General Committee. We are not prejudicing in the slightest the ultimate fate of the report, but are simply saying that the report itself should be included in the agenda.

8. We failed to understand, and I admit I still refuse to understand, why exception is taken to the inclusion of such a report in the agenda, why an attempt is being made to give it a kind of semi-legal status. The Secretary-General's report exists, yet there seems to

be some hesitation about discussing it when someone wants it discussed. But if we start discussing it and the majority finds that the discussion is not leading to any useful result, that majority can at any time close the debate. Provision is made for that in our rules of procedure. Any representative can, at any time, move the closure of the debate. According to the rules of procedure, such a motion must be put to the vote and, if it is approved and the President makes the necessary ruling, the debate is closed. What, therefore, is there to be afraid of? Why should there be this reluctance to include the report in the agenda, as if it were something explosive, some bomb which, no sooner placed on the agenda, would immediately go off? I still quite fail to understand the motives for not wanting this question included—the real motives, not the ones given out officially.

9. I shall now proceed to give my own views about these motives and hope that someone will perhaps agree with me, although that is a somewhat rare event in the General Assembly. I shall not, of course, speak of the reasons why people rarely agree with us. I believe that, if I were to begin to speak of those reasons, it would call forth even more friendly laughter from my audience. But I consider this question a serious one, and that while we are discussing it laughter is out of place. Not that I am ever against laughter, for it always relieves the feelings, while at the same time being a deadly weapon against those who are laughed at. I do not think that what I said deserved such treatment. What, then, are the real motives for such stubborn reluctance to include this question in the agenda? The General Committee has just decided not to include it by 10 votes to 2—those of the USSR and Poland—with one abstention. Why be afraid of including it? You have failed to place an official document, the Secretary-General's report, on the agenda. If you do not want it to be discussed in the First, Fifth, Third or Sixth Committees, you can always strike it off. You have, procedurally, every right and every opportunity to do so. But you do not want even to include it on the agenda, although other questions of a more simple, less complex character, which are of less importance and less deserving of the General Assembly's attention, are freely placed there. Why your unwillingness in this case? I think there are serious reasons for it, which must be gone into.

10. In the first place, let me take the significance of the report. Why are we insisting on its inclusion? We are insisting because discussion of this report will make it possible to form a clearer idea of how things stand in regard to the forthcoming political conference on the Korean question, particularly in regard to the replies to the Secretary-General's cablegram received from the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

11. I believe that it is not a matter of indifference, but of great importance, to define more precisely the position of the different sides at this juncture, and to consider the whole complex question of the forthcoming conference, closely connected as it is with general problems of an international character, particularly since the time-limit for the convening of the political conference on the Korean question, 28 October, is literally upon us. Any delay in adopting measures which could facilitate the convening of the conference, or ensure that it is convened, is unneces-

sary and dangerous. On the other hand, support should be given to anything which might help to expedite the conference and, in particular, to secure its success—because it is not enough simply to convene the conference, it is also necessary to guarantee, by its composition, the success of its work.

12. Such is our view, and the Secretary-General's report affords every opportunity for doing this. I believe that when the General Assembly endorsed the First Committee's decision in respect of resolution 711 C (VII), it also considered that this report might be helpful to a future decision on the subject, that is to say, to a decision about the conference. Otherwise, there would have been no object in adopting such a resolution. It would, I think, be correct not to include the report in the agenda if no one had asked for its inclusion, but there are delegations asking for it to be included. What grounds are there for restricting these delegations' rights and placing them on a footing of inequality *vis-à-vis* the majority? If there were no one who insisted on the report being included in the agenda and discussed, it would of course be right not to place it on the agenda. But, if even a single delegation insists on the inclusion of this item, having regard to the principle of the equality of all nations, which are present here in the person of their representatives, a principle which is fundamental to our Charter, what lawful grounds are there, without violating this vital principle and violating the Charter, to refuse our demand (for it is a demand, and not a humble request), a demand based on our sovereign rights?

13. This question, which is in accordance with resolution 711 C (VII), that saw the light as a result of that resolution and arose out of it, must be opened for discussion. You can place it on the agenda and then boycott it, prevent it from being discussed, strike it off again—that is up to you, the majority, who will decide these matters here one way or another. But our legal right to have it included in the agenda for the purpose of discussion, so that we may see what is going on round us today, on 22 September 1953, cannot be refused.

14. Since 28 August, sufficient time has passed for the situation to have altered. We have received a telegram from the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Chou En-Lai [A/2469], defining the Chinese Government's position on the future conference. We have received a communication from Mr. Li Don Gen [A/2476 and Corr.1], Deputy Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, giving the views of his Government on the subject. The General Assembly had not received it when, on 28 August, it adopted the resolution on the composition of the conference on the Korean question. At that time it did not know the opinion of the Korean and Chinese side, although that side is interested in the composition of the conference. It cannot decide who is to represent the sixteen States. That is a matter for those States and the Assembly to decide. It is, however, interested in seeing that the conference is properly and logically constituted, and that its composition is such as to preclude its transformation into a conference of former belligerents, or of parties even now expecting a renewal of hostilities; it wants the conference to be a round-table conference at which the opinions and views of States other than the belligerents can be heard, namely, neutral States and the Asian States which have a special interest in the

matter. The Soviet Union, India, Burma, Pakistan, Indonesia and a number of other countries are interested in this matter, and I would stress that Korea's closest neighbours are particularly concerned. The situation today is therefore not quite the same as it was a month ago. On 28 August the General Assembly did not know the position of the Korean and Chinese Governments. Now it is aware of it, for it has certain documents before it. In this connexion, it is not enough for the Secretary-General to inform us that replies have been received and circulated to us. In our opinion, it is not enough to circulate documents; what is important is to take a definite stand in regard to them.

15. What do the letters and replies from Mr. Chou En-Lai and Mr. Li Don Gen mean? What is their significance? What prospects do they offer? What dangers are looming ahead, and what difficulties confront us? Can we and should we take any measures which might eliminate these dangers or difficulties? Surely all this should and does concern us, if we really wish to reach a fundamental and not merely a formal solution of the problem. Moreover, even from the formal point of view, the General Assembly has no right to refuse to discuss the question in the form proposed by our delegation.

16. It is therefore our contention that when certain representatives said today in the General Committee that nothing had changed, as only three weeks or so had elapsed since we finished discussing the question in the First Committee and the General Assembly, they were wrong. They ask what has changed. A great deal has changed. Two very important new elements have appeared, from "the other side", as you would say, which cannot be ignored in war and still less in discussing questions of peace. There have, moreover, been changes not only in regard to the sector of international relations represented by the Korean question, to which these replies pertain, but also in the whole field of international relations, and those changes necessitate a more careful approach to the Korean question.

17. This is the sum total of the considerations by which we are guided. These considerations remain before us. What we are raising is a procedural question, that of including an item in the agenda. Our request is rejected on the grounds that no good will come of discussing the substance of the matter. But we cannot decide procedural questions by references to their substance, particularly when we do not have a sufficiently clear picture of all the circumstances, owing to the fact that we have not yet discussed the replies—the positions—of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China.

18. What objections to our request were raised in the General Committee? First, as I have already said, we were told that the question had been discussed recently and hence that there was no need for further discussion. I regard this as a completely arbitrary assertion, which completely fails to take into account the really important changes that have occurred since that time. Secondly, we were told that renewed discussion of the question in the General Assembly, during the current session, would only delay matters at this juncture and that the conference must be convened quickly.

19. Since when, however, has the discussion of a question in the General Assembly been regarded as

slowing down efforts to establish or maintain peace? Since when has the General Assembly acted as a brake on the successful development of activities to strengthen peace? And that is precisely the task with which we are now confronted in discussing the composition of the political conference. I consider this argument completely inadequate for the additional reason that, as I said, the First Committee and the General Assembly, taking into account the short time available, can always conduct the discussion of this question in such a way that it cannot possibly delay matters. This is a matter for the United Nations itself, that is, in this case, the First Committee, which should consider the question, and the General Assembly.

20. We are further told that there is no need to include this additional item in the agenda because it would lead to a new discussion and would involve the necessity for or attempts to secure reconsideration of the General Assembly's decision of 28 August. I admit that is quite possible. Discussion of this question might make it necessary to reconsider the decision taken in August but, if that is really necessary, we must bow to necessity. We cannot refuse to reconsider the provisions we adopted earlier, and possibly amend them, should this be justified by political considerations. "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath." Resolutions must be subject to political considerations, and not the reverse.

21. This is the only logical conclusion for serious politicians and men who understand what they are doing and know where they want to go—whether towards peace or war. Hence, when we are told that the course of events might so develop that the discussion would force us to change some of the provisions we adopted on 28 August, my answer is: did we ever swear on the Koran never to make any changes in that resolution? If, for political reasons, and given the present circumstances, it becomes necessary to modify our previous ideas and decisions, and if it is recognized that such changes will facilitate the convening of the political conference on Korea which offers hope of peace in that country, then we must make those changes. The dignity and honour of our Organization demand that we should not refuse to make changes or be afraid to correct things and to improve them. Even if we recognize that what has already been done is good, it is our duty to improve it. Some people are afraid to discuss this question because they might turn out to be wrong and have to put things right, and their vanity will not allow them to put things right. This sort of vanity is dangerous, particularly in connexion with important political matters such as those confronting us at the present time, namely, the composition of the political conference on the Korean question.

22. Finally, an utterly ridiculous argument is invoked, namely, that we need not discuss the possibility of changing the composition of the conference or extending its membership as requested, for instance, by the North Korean Government or the Government of the People's Republic of China, for the simple reason that when the conference meets, with the membership decided by the General Assembly on 28 August, it can change its own composition. But it cannot change its own composition.

23. In my opinion this is an utterly ridiculous argument, because it is scarcely conceivable that the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, the United

States, Canada, Australia, the Philippines, Colombia, Turkey, Greece, and so on, will come to the conference and adopt decisions contrary to the General Assembly's recommendations. Would Mr. Kyrrou, Mr. Sarper or anyone else, really instruct their representatives—or to be more correct, would their governments instruct their representatives—to act as they pleased without regard to the decisions and recommendations of the General Assembly? Would they tell them that recommendations of the General Assembly were of no importance and could be ignored and that they could act in accordance with any agreement that is reached on the spot? No, this cannot and does not happen in politics. When I asked Mr. Lodge in the General Committee today whether he would be prepared to give the United States representatives at the conference instructions to the effect that he did not insist on the recommendations and left them free to decide whether or not to extend its membership, he shook his head in a categorical negative. I understood that Mr. Lodge was confirming that the recommendations were inviolable.

24. In those circumstances, how can anyone say that the conference itself can extend its membership, despite the recommendations embodied in the General Assembly's resolutions? It is hardly credible that you should feel that this is possible. It would mean that you do not believe in the correctness of your own recommendations. In that case, you should think again and change them. Or do you feel that you are bound to strict and exact compliance with these recommendations even at the cost of disrupting the conference? In that case that means that those who argue in this way are consciously seeking to disrupt the conference on Korea.

25. But to disrupt the conference on Korea is not the same as to disrupt a Press conference. It is a completely different matter. It would endanger the success of the endeavour to reinforce and complete the Armistice Agreement in Korea by a peace treaty and, once a peaceful settlement of the Korean question had been secured, to open the door to the settlement of other important international issues which are still outstanding. This is not, therefore, a laughing matter. To joke about it will cost both you and us dear, because the collapse of the Korean conference will not reduce international tension. It will amount to encouraging the adventures Syngman Rhee has in mind when he says that he will walk out of the conference if a satisfactory decision is not reached. It will play into the hands of those who want to walk out of the conference with Syngman Rhee. That would mean ruin and collapse for the conference.

26. The argument that the conference itself can extend its membership, if it so desires, will not hold water. It cannot be taken seriously. It could be taken seriously on one condition only, namely, if it were to be admitted that the decisions taken in the form of General Assembly recommendations on 28 August were not binding on the representatives of the sixteen States who are to attend the conference. But such a decision cannot be taken without producing an extremely irregular situation, both politically and ethically. Alternatively, we can go to the conference adhering at all costs to our earlier recommendations, though feeling that they might be different and might be changed, but only by the conference itself. If we do this, we shall be setting the conference above the United Nations and giving it even greater rights than the United Nations, and at the same time we shall be

undermining the Organization's authority by questioning its recommendations; this is quite inadmissible.

27. These are the reasons why we consider it essential to insist that this item should be fearlessly included in the agenda of the General Assembly. It can only serve to improve matters. There is an old proverb: "Look before you leap." If you have to look again, you had better do so. If this second look shows that is no need to change the recommendations, then you are free to vote as you like. But if it shows that something needs changing, then, I repeat, we owe it to mankind to change it. It is our duty to peace, the prospect of which is drawing nearer but which may come to a standstill a long way off, and even turn its back on us, to be replaced by other, less acceptable and pleasant prospects. That is the duty of our Organization, the United Nations.

28. Mr. LODGE (United States of America): The action taken only a few hours ago by the General Committee in making a recommendation not to include the item proposed by the Soviet Union delegation, which would have had the effect of reopening the discussion in the General Assembly on the arrangements for the Korean political conference, speaks for itself. I speak at this time in order to state briefly the reasons for which the United States delegation opposes the inclusion of this item.

29. It was just about three weeks ago that we met in this hall, on 28 August, to adopt a resolution by which the General Assembly expressed itself on this problem. It would be not only the height of folly to reopen a matter on which the General Assembly has decisively spoken after searching and thorough-going debate, but it might well, as many representatives said this morning in the General Committee, be extremely dangerous to our objective, and that is the prompt convening of the political conference. The deadline for this important meeting is fast approaching, and the proposal before us would cause serious delay. Any action that we take now could but repeat what took place some three weeks ago and would simply jeopardise what most of us here have at heart.

30. Let me repeat two statements I made this morning in the General Committee on behalf of the delegation of the United States.

31. The United States, acting in conformity with the General Assembly resolution of 28 August 1953, is prepared, in consultation with the designated group, to deal with the arrangements necessary to ensure the convening of the conference, as recommended by the Armistice Agreement; the conference itself, when it is convened, can discuss any matters not otherwise disposed of to the satisfaction of both sides.

32. We observe that the note of the Korean communist régime states that "the question of the composition of the political conference cannot be solved unilaterally, but only by agreement between both sides" [A/2476 and Corr.1]. The United Nations side has been selected and is functioning; the other side is defined in the Armistice Agreement—it may include the Soviet Union, if the other side desires it. The question whether any neutrals should be invited is, as the North Korean note declares, a matter for agreement between both sides. If, therefore, developments during the conference warrant it, and the other side desires to raise the question of additional participants, it will, of course,

be open to them to do so, since both sides will be present at the conference and will be able to consider the matter. Through the good offices of the Swedish Government, we again proposed to have the substance of this statement communicated to the Chinese and North Korean Communists, and urged that they reply promptly.

33. We are most anxious to facilitate the work of the conference. Indeed, in view of the urgency of the situation, if it facilitated the negotiations for the arrangements of the proposed political conference, we would be prepared at once to dispatch a representative to meet with the Chinese and North Korean Communists at any of the places which we have already suggested for the conference, namely, San Francisco, Honolulu, or Geneva.

34. There seems to be an impression here that because there is an armistice in Korea the fighting has therefore stopped for good and that we can thus assume that the whole Korean difficulty is behind us. This has predisposed some of the members here to act as though the time had arrived for making political gestures and for striking attitudes for propaganda purposes. But, if we are candid with ourselves, we must see that the time has not come when we can indulge ourselves in the luxury of political gestures and manoeuvring. We are up against the very stark fact that all that exists so far is an armistice which, even though it purports to be indefinite in duration, is highly vulnerable to incidents and charges and counter-charges of violations. If we are to do our duty to suffering humanity, our conduct here must be realistic. That means prompt action to hold the conference as an indispensable first step towards lasting peace, and not a rehash of the whole debate of last August on how the conference is to be composed.

35. In conclusion, it would seem to us that the best course to follow—and it is both constructive and reasonable—is the one already approved by the General Assembly. We await with hope the answer of the other side to the two communications sent by the United States on behalf of the sixteen Member nations acting under the authorization of the General Assembly in its resolution of 28 August 1953. We say to the Communists, in good faith and complete sincerity: we offer to meet you half-way.

36. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): There was a full debate on this matter in the General Committee this morning, which resulted in an overwhelming vote against the Soviet Union proposal. I do not propose to go at great length into the arguments which were already deployed in the General Committee, but as many delegations are not members of that Committee, perhaps I may just briefly repeat the reasons which led the United Kingdom delegation to vote against the Soviet Union proposal.

37. I do think that in these matters, although we should have a due regard for questions of procedure, we should not forget that the overriding first test to be applied to any proposition is whether we think it is going to help or hinder the promotion of peace. The first reason why the United Kingdom delegation voted against the Soviet Union proposal is because we did not think that the inclusion of this item in the agenda would serve a useful purpose. In fact, we think that it would be likely to hinder or to delay the setting up of the political conference.

38. Mr. Vyshinsky, in his speech just now, said that even if it was placed upon the agenda it would still be open to us to vote against it, to block it, to delay its consideration. What use would it be to put the item on the agenda if we were going then to block actual discussion of it? We feel that if this item is put on the agenda, it will freeze the position until the item has been debated, and we do not think that a debate in fact would help towards a settlement. The arguments were publicly ventilated at great length. The varying positions of the Member States were fully deployed in the August discussions. We feel that this is an occasion when diplomatic channels should be able to function privately, to see whether there cannot be some solution to the differences which still exist. Public debate, open diplomacy and public controversy are sometimes helpful. But we had all that in August. Both sides having stated that they want a political conference, can we not see whether we can smooth over differences which may still exist and, as I say, by ordinary diplomatic methods achieve something which will be acceptable to both sides? That is the first reason why we voted against the Soviet Union proposal. We do not think it would serve a useful purpose. We do not think it would help towards a political conference.

39. The second reason was that in fact the report which we are asked to include or to debate is really an interim report. It is an incomplete document; it does not deal with the whole story. There has already been one further communication between the parties since that report was put in on 17 September, and even if we did agree that there should be a public debate at this point, we do not think that it is a very convenient document upon which to hang a public debate.

40. The third reason—which I really think is a conclusive reason—is that in fact there is already on the agenda an item entitled “the Korean question”. Mr. Vyshinsky gave notice in the General Committee that the Soviet delegation was going to press, by every means in its power, for the First Committee to debate that item first. Personally, I think it would be a mistake to debate that item first, but if Mr. Vyshinsky succeeds in his avowed intention of getting that item considered first, what is the point of placing this further item dealing with Korea on the agenda?

41. Those are the three reasons why we invite the General Assembly to accept the report of the General Committee. But there are these two further matters to which the representative of the United States has just made reference. Mr. Lodge indicated this morning, as he has again done just now, that the United States Government really was prepared to make and did make two fresh suggestions with regard to this difficulty in which we find ourselves. The first suggestion was that it would be open to the conference, when it assembles, to discuss the addition of other members, the co-option of other members.

42. I think that is a most valuable suggestion, judging by the test which is not always applied here, the simple test of common sense, really would appear to provide a suitable way of trying to resolve the difficulty. Mr. Vyshinsky, after a very brief consideration of the idea, denounced it and said that it would be ridiculous for the conference to change its composition. In other words, the Soviet Union is taking the position that the resolution passed in August was really meant to fetter the freedom of action of the

conference, and that that conference should have no power to co-opt any additional members.

43. We think that that is a most unfortunate interpretation to put upon the General Assembly resolution, and if anyone will study again the resolutions passed in August, they will see that the main resolution simply purported to state which countries should represent the United Nations side at the conference, and it was in no way meant to be exclusive of further agreement between the parties as to what I have described as the co-option of additional members.

44. Really, if we want to get this political conference going—and I think most people here really think that in the interests of peace in the Far East it is vital to get this political conference set up—if we really are sincere in our statements upon that issue, is this not a good common sense suggestion, which is at least worthy of detailed and serious consideration?

45. The second suggestion which has been put forward by Mr. Lodge is that, if the other side agrees, there should be a speedy meeting of representatives of both sides to discuss the arrangements for the conference. Again, is that not a very good and practical idea? Is there not a chance that that will break this atmosphere of public acrimonious discussion and debate, and get representatives of both sides talking together and trying to make the detailed arrangements for the holding of the conference?

46. Those two suggestions, which we heartily support, seem to us to add reason for avoiding at this time not only a further public debate, but also the placing of an item on our agenda which, in fact, if people want, is already covered by the item entitled "the Korean question". So I do hope that the representative of the Soviet Union will not persist in this suggestion but will accept the will of the majority, so strikingly shown this morning, and give further consideration, and recommend that his friends should give further consideration, to what we believe are two practical proposals which may resolve our difficulties and lead to the conference which we think is essential if an armistice is to be turned into a peace.

47. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): The delegation of Poland considers the decision of the General Committee rejecting the request of the delegation of the USSR for an additional item to be included on the agenda of the present session under the title "Note by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII), adopted on 28 August 1953" is unwarranted and unjustified.

48. As we all know, the Secretary-General's note contains the report on the implementation of the resolution originally submitted by India and adopted at the last meeting of the second series of resumed meetings of the seventh session of the General Assembly. In accordance with the terms of that resolution, the Secretary-General had a duty to transmit to the Government of the People's Republic of China and to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea the text of the resolution adopted on the Korean problem as well as the records of the meetings of the General Assembly dealing with the problem of the convening of a political conference concerning Korea.

49. On 13 and 14 September, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received replies from the

People's Republic of China and from the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. It is therefore logical that the General Assembly should consider these replies, and, basing itself on the proposals contained therein, should adopt constructive decisions concerning the political conference. That was the intention of resolution 711 C (VII), otherwise no resolution would be necessary.

50. The delegation of Poland considers it unacceptable that the General Assembly should disregard the replies of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and pass over them in silence. The contention of some delegations that the General Assembly has already decided on this matter is as unconvincing here as it was unconvincing in the General Committee. We consider that no conference could be called contrary to the views of China and Korea, on the basis of a unilateral decision, without the previous agreement of those countries.

51. The delegation of Poland rightly warned the United Nations during the second series of resumed meetings of the seventh session of the General Assembly against the tendency to change the political conference on Korea into a bipartite one composed of belligerents only. That would only make it into a prolongation of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. The tendency for a bipartite conference has been strongly moved by the United States, under whose pressure the resolution submitted by fifteen States which were belligerents in Korea and which voted on the side of the United States, was adopted. That resolution, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement, is opposed to common sense. It tries to force a conference of belligerents only. What is more, every effort was used during the seventh session of the General Assembly to prevent the participation of neutrals, in particular India, in the conference, showing complete disregard for the special rights of Asian States, which are particularly and vitally interested in the solution of problems concerning the peace and security of Asia and the Far East.

52. It should be clear by now that this is not the road leading towards a solution of the Korean problem. The Government of the People's Republic of China, as well as the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, in the letters directed to the Secretary-General, submit new proposals for the convening of a political conference in accordance with the terms of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, and with the participation of neutral States, namely, the USSR, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma. This new initiative of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea constitutes additional proof of their readiness to solve all problems through negotiations and by peaceful means.

53. If we are to evaluate the situation realistically, we must know here that the ignoring of the opinion of the Government of the People's Republic of China, one of the five great Powers, representing over 500 million people, will bring no beneficial influence to international relations and will by no means help the solution of the Korean problem. One cannot hope that the position of China and Korea can be stifled by silence. The hopes that one can force a decision on China and Korea are futile, as is also all dictation

and pressure when applied to sovereign States. The history of the last few years fully confirms that contention. The delegation of Poland, therefore, considers that the proposals of China and Korea should be given most careful consideration and should be fully discussed by the present session of the General Assembly, and as early as possible. They constitute a basis for a proper approach to the problem of the political conference.

54. The vague promises of the representative of the United States that the conference itself will decide as to its composition are only an attempt to dispel the impression created by the intransigent position of the United States, the disregard of the special interests of the Asian States, and the will to impose a decision upon China and Korea. They constitute, at the same time, an attempt to force a conference upon the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, without consulting them as to its character and composition. What, in reality, does the position of the United States representative mean? We heard this morning, and at this meeting, his expression of his Government's readiness to send its representatives to meet representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, to make the necessary arrangements. We have never been told that what is meant by the word "arrangements", or what arrangements are to be made—whether they concern purely technical matters, such as the seating of delegates, or whether they might be arrangements which are contrary to, or different from, those recommended by the resolution of the General Assembly.

55. The representative of the United States also warned the Assembly that the deadline was very near and that discussion of the composition of the political conference might delay the conference. We disagree with that opinion. We consider that only a discussion as soon as possible—indeed, immediately—can speed up the convocation of the conference, composed in such a manner as to promise success in the carrying out of its tasks.

56. If the position of the United States as expressed here is to be interpreted as a withdrawal from the position forced upon the General Assembly on 28 August, then, more than ever, the problem requires a new discussion and new decisions.

57. We also beg to disagree with the representative of the United Kingdom, who considers that it is unnecessary to place a new item on the agenda. Although we consider that the item on Korea covers the Korean problem, it is our opinion that the composition of the conference should be discussed separately so as to have a speedy decision which will help to bring about the early convocation of the conference. A debate will not freeze the starting of the conference. On the contrary, the rejection of the position of Korea and China is what has been freezing and is freezing the starting of the conference.

58. The delegation of Poland calls upon the General Assembly to accept the proposal of the USSR to include in the agenda an item entitled: "Note by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII), adopted on 28 August 1953."

59. The representative of the United States spoke of meeting Korea and China half-way. I think he never

had a better opportunity to show his readiness to meet the other side half-way than by supporting the request of the Government of China and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to start a discussion and to arrive at mutual agreement, through mutual concessions, on the composition and character of the conference. A debate under the item proposed by the delegation of the USSR would be of extreme value for the future solution of the Korean problem by peaceful means in the interests of peace in Asia and the Far East and in the interests of world peace.

60. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): In addition to what has already been said by the USSR representative and by the representative of the Polish Republic, who has just spoken, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR feels obliged to recall its statement at the end of the seventh session of the General Assembly, to the effect that the draft resolution on the political conference on Korea, which was sponsored by fifteen Powers and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly, was not in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. That resolution clearly laid down the principle that the political conference on Korea should be held on a bilateral basis only, without the participation of representatives of neutral States. It is quite obvious that a political conference of that kind could not ensure the achievement of a lasting peace in Korea and throughout the Far East. All peace-loving men and women wish such a conference to be called, in order that it may lead to final settlement of the Korean question and play an important part in the strengthening of peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

61. The United States ruling circles, whose position was stated here by Mr. Lodge, the United States representative, when he spoke here just now on the question of the composition and order of business of the political conference, oppose the participation of neutral States. All these objections are groundless and therefore arouse the rightful censure of peace-loving forces and peoples throughout the world.

62. As a result of this attitude, India and certain other Eastern States have been left out of the conference, although the usefulness of their participation cannot be doubted. The General Assembly took an important step forward by inviting the USSR to participate in the political conference. Everyone knows that the USSR is a neutral State which has made a considerable effort to settle the Korean question by peaceful means. By taking that decision, the General Assembly recognized the need of inviting to the conference interested States other than those which took part in the military action in Korea. In these circumstances, the exclusion from participation in the political conference of the largest countries of Asia, which are directly concerned in the successful settlement of the Korean question, can be regarded only as an attempt to distort the meaning of the Armistice Agreement and to condemn the conference to failure.

63. The General Assembly should also examine most carefully the position of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. It would be naive to think that the question of peace in Korea can be settled successfully if the point of view of these States, which are most interested in a successful outcome of the conference, is ignored.

64. In the Secretary-General's note of 17 September, it is stated that all Members of the United Nations have been sent the replies of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to the texts of the most recent resolutions on the Korean question transmitted to them by the Secretary-General. Thus representatives are already aware that these replies contain a number of concrete proposals which make it possible to ensure the success of the conference and a lasting peace in the Far East.

65. I should like to remind representatives that it is stated in these replies that the participants in the political conference should be all the States which took part in the fighting in Korea, including the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and South Korea, and also the following interested neutral States: the Soviet Union, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma. The political conference should be organized on the principle of a round-table conference, but all its decisions should be adopted with the consent of both belligerent sides in Korea. In order that the question of the political conference may be settled successfully, and also in order to set an example of the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, when the question of broadening the membership of the Political Conference is discussed at the eighth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea should be invited to send their representatives to take part in the relevant discussions in the General Assembly. As soon as the question of the composition of the political conference is settled by means of negotiation, both the belligerent sides in Korea should consult and decide on the time and place of the conference. These are the proposals of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

66. The General Assembly should give very careful consideration to these proposals of the Korean and Chinese Governments. The interests of all peace-loving peoples and the interests of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world make this mandatory upon the Assembly.

67. That is why the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR fully supports the USSR delegation's proposal for including in the agenda of the eighth session of the General Assembly an item entitled "Note by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII), adopted on 28 August 1953". My delegation hopes that the members of the General Assembly will support this proposal, which is designed to promote the establishment of a lasting peace in the Far East.

68. Mr. KYROU (Greece): If I may, I should like to explain as briefly as possible the reasons why my delegation supports the recommendation of the General Committee not to include in the agenda the item proposed by the Soviet Union delegation. In doing so, I shall limit myself strictly to the procedural point of view and not refer at all to the substance.

69. In submitting this item for inclusion in the agenda, the USSR, from the procedural point of view, based itself on resolution 711 C (VII). But what does this resolution say? It reads:

"The General Assembly

"Requests the Secretary-General to communicate the proposals on the Korean question submitted to the resumed meetings of the seventh session and recommended by the Assembly, together with the records of the relevant proceedings of the General Assembly, to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and to report as appropriate."

It does not say at all that this item shall be included in the agenda.

70. The Secretary-General has drawn the appropriate conclusion by not placing this item on the provisional agenda, as would have been his right and his duty under rule 12 of our rules of procedure had the interpretation given to the resolution by the Soviet Union delegation been the correct one. That is why my delegation is going to support the recommendation of the General Committee.

71. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): As the sponsor, at the end of the seventh session, of an amendment [A/C.1/L.51] that was subsequently withdrawn by agreement between the Indian delegation and my own, I find myself obliged to take part in this debate. I do not wish, however, to engage in polemics. I wish rather to be Socratic in my approach, and should count myself most fortunate if any remarks of mine, put forward in a calm and friendly spirit, were to contribute towards a solution.

72. In the first place, the purpose of the Peruvian amendment, to the effect that the Secretary-General should not report to the General Assembly but should inform the Members of the United Nations of any communication received, was to avoid giving rise to an immediate Assembly debate which we felt would be dangerous and perhaps useless. But—and I stress the point—it was never the Peruvian delegation's intention, in making this proposal, and in securing the generous agreement of the Indian delegation to delete from its draft resolution [A/C.1/L.50] the words "report to the General Assembly", to freeze the communications of the Governments of communist China and North Korea, much less the very important communication or memorandum which the Secretary-General might produce on this subject. That was not our intention, and indeed it could not be our intention, for a very simple reason. The Korean question is permanently on the agenda of the Assembly, and accordingly the replies of the Governments of China and North Korea, and the memorandum on them to be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Member States, were automatically included among the documents pertaining to the relevant item of the agenda. Thus there is no justification for the impression that we underestimate the Secretary-General's note or the replies of the Governments of China and North Korea. We do not underestimate them. We consider that these replies have their special place: they must be included among the documents relating to the item on Korea which is on the Assembly's agenda and which will be discussed in due time.

73. So much for that point. At some time the question of the considerations put forward by the Governments of China and North Korea, and the Secretary-General's observations on them, may come before

the Assembly for discussion, especially if difficulties arise. The Assembly cannot discuss for the sake of discussing; this is not a debating society, and it would be criminal to turn it into one. Every debate has an aim and a purpose, and a debate on this subject can be held only in the event of definite failure to set up the conference; and we cannot say that the conference has failed. It has not failed yet; and it can fail only if the Governments of China and of North Korea, as well as the Government of the USSR, take on themselves an even greater responsibility.

74. A new situation exists, one which could be anticipated: the possibility of agreement, in which many of us believed, was envisaged in the generous and timely statements of the United States delegation in the General Committee this morning and in the Assembly this afternoon. How does the United States delegation, and how does the United Kingdom delegation, which differed from the former as to the functions and powers of the General Assembly in deciding the membership of the political conference, construe the resolution adopted?

75. There are two sides, one side consisting of the members nominated by the Assembly, which participated in the armed action to resist aggression in Korea, and the other being the Sino-Korean Command with, of course, the USSR Government, which has not denied its support of the Sino-Korean forces.

76. The Assembly, far from denying, recognized the Sino-Korean Command's absolute right to decide its own representation at the conference. It recognized that right by implication, since not only did it concede the explicit right to choose the Soviet Union but, plainly, the Sino-Korean Command and the Chinese and Korean Governments have the right to any other representative they may care to appoint.

77. Nor, and this is an essential point, did we limit our own mandate. We appointed our mandatories. Some delegations considered that mandate to have been pre-established and in a sense restricted, but many delegations, and the Peruvian delegation in particular, maintained that they were really mandatories and hence invested with full powers. This being so, if these sixteen countries were our mandatories with full powers, and if the Sino-Korean Command moved to include another government—which offered it guarantees and earned its goodwill—and to which the sixteen did not object, then that government would attend not only, if we may so express it, under mandate of the Sino-Korean group, but, in a sense, with the agreement and even, to a certain extent, by extension of the mandate of the United Nations or of the group representing the United Nations. I accordingly consider that this formula is a particularly happy one, and that it shows great understanding and unusual diplomatic address; and in view of this formula, in face of this bridge cordially thrown open to the Soviet Union, I really fail to comprehend the latter's outright opposition.

78. But there is something more, something about which, as a Latin American, I have stronger personal feelings. Besides adumbrating the possibility of the conference's solving the problem of its composition in this intelligent manner, the United States representative has just said that, in his country's desire for immediate contact with the Sino-Korean Command through channels other than those of cold diplomatic

notes, it would dispatch representatives to meet with those of the North Korean and Chinese Governments at San Francisco, Honolulu or Geneva. This would be the application of an unusual and excellent American method inherited from Bolivar and admirably expressed by Argentina at the Pan-American Conference in 1936: the method of consultation. What would these representatives do? Armed with full powers, conferred in the one case by the group representing the United Nations and in the other by the Soviet and North Korean bloc, they would meet, make arrangements, discuss, and exchange ideas in a calm atmosphere, guided by humanitarian aims, with the idea of peace uppermost in their minds; they could reach agreement, not merely on subsidiary and secondary objectives, such as rules of procedure for the conference, the place of meeting and so forth, but on the substance of the burning and essential question.

79. Accordingly, in a completely friendly spirit, with my intellectual sympathy and admiration for the person and talents of Mr. Vyshinsky, I ask him what we stand to lose by trying this fruitful method, which would lead us towards the goal we all desire, instead of discussion? Discussion has lost face in the world and among intellectuals, because we have sadly misused it. Someone has said that freedom of thought—I would say the effectiveness of thought—has an enemy: excess of words. Why should we hold a useless discussion rather than take generous and practical action? Furthermore, since Mr. Vyshinsky has quoted a Russian proverb, I, who admire proverbs and folklore and who esteem Russian literature, will quote some other common-sense maxims. Mr. Vyshinsky said that one should measure the cloth seven times before cutting it. But let us measure rightly; let us not do our measuring in useless debate; let us measure, let us work, let us take up our task in deeds.

80. Lastly, I would repeat to Mr. Vyshinsky the maxim that everyone must have his chance. Let us, as the Americans say, give the political conference a chance; let us give a chance to the representatives Mr. Lodge proposes. To fly a little higher, if I can, I should like now to quote what Goethe said when, turning from theology, where he was on unsure ground because he wished to correct the Gospels, he trod on the firm ground of sociology and truly said: "Before the word is the action"; discussion would be words, and what we want and what Korea needs is action. That is my view.

81. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): Since the signature of the Armistice Agreement in Korea, the attention of all peoples, and especially the peoples of Asia, has been concentrated on the political conference on Korea, a further stage in the struggle for the maintenance and strengthening of peace and the relaxing of international tension. There can be no doubt that this conference is of decisive significance to the establishment of peace in Korea. The political conference can play an outstanding part in the efforts to strengthen peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

82. The conclusion of the armistice in Korea aroused great hopes throughout the world. Simultaneously with these hopes, however, great anxiety is growing as to whether events in Korea will develop in accordance with the Armistice Agreement of Panmunjom, or whether the forces of aggression will manage to

undermine this successful development. From the moment of the signature of the Armistice Agreement, ever more obstacles have been placed in the way of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the success of the political conference. Syngman Rhee, who unleashed the war in Korea with a view to the forcible annexation of North Korea, is again speaking of his plans for a campaign to the north as far as the Yalu River.

83. The United Nations Charter imposes on Member States the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. It is obvious that an international dispute cannot be settled without the participation first of all of the States which are most immediately concerned in a satisfactory and peaceful settlement. It is in the light of that obligation, laid down in the Charter, that we must discuss the composition of the political conference within the framework of the United Nations.

84. Unfortunately, at the end of the seventh session of the General Assembly, the United States succeeded in having a resolution adopted which excluded the countries directly and vitally concerned in a peaceful settlement in Korea and the Far East from participation in the political conference. According to the arguments advanced by the United States at that time, India, which had made great efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict, should not take part in the political conference. That view was adopted in spite of the fact that the majority of the Members of the United Nations and an overwhelming majority of all the Asian and European States were in favour of India's participation in the political conference. The purpose of the United States ruling circles was, and still is, the initiation of so-called negotiations between the two belligerent sides in an atmosphere unpropitious to the success of the political conference—in fact, a continuation of the talks at Panmunjom—and hence preparation for the failure of the political conference.

85. At the end of the seventh session, the Czechoslovak delegation protested vigorously against this concept, because it could not lead to satisfactory results. The Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea also protested in their cablegrams against this point of view which had been imposed on the General Assembly. The cablegrams from the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea contain new proposals which rightly stress the role of the Asian peoples in the work of the political conference on Korea.

86. The moment has come for the General Assembly to take steps to revise some of the recommendations adopted at the end of the seventh session and thus to make it possible to convene the political conference in the very near future. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore considers that the USSR delegation is perfectly justified in proposing, on the basis of the replies received from the Korean and Chinese side, that the eighth session of the General Assembly should reconsider the question of the form and composition of the political conference.

87. From the outset of the eighth session of the General Assembly, we saw how, under United States pressure, obstacles were placed in the way of discussion

on the participation of representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the work of the United Nations, although in their absence the United Nations cannot carry out its tasks successfully. The General Assembly must not continue along this path and close its eyes to another problem which requires an urgent solution.

88. All peace-loving peoples are anxious that the political conference should begin its work in a propitious atmosphere and be able to achieve satisfactory results. For this it is essential to comply with the basic prerequisites for successful negotiation, which were stressed in the USSR draft resolution [A/L.157] submitted at the end of the seventh session of the General Assembly. The same conditions are stipulated in the cablegrams from the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

89. A prerequisite for successful negotiation is that the talks should be of a round-table character, with the participation of the Asian and neutral States which are most closely concerned and without whose participation the conference cannot achieve satisfactory and lasting results. It is also an undeniable fact that a round-table conference would give greater opportunities for mutual understanding than any other method. If the United Nations wishes to remain true to its mission, it must not abandon the only successful method of conducting negotiations for the sake of one State, whose interests are contrary to those of the Asian peoples, who desire a settlement of the Korean problem by peaceful means. The Armistice Agreement and, in particular, paragraph 60, contains nothing to prevent the convening of a political conference on those lines. On the contrary, the purposes and principles of the Charter, and all feelings of justice and decency, oblige us to reject the United States concept of a conference confined to the two belligerent sides as unrealistic, unjust and insulting to the Asian peoples.

90. It is impossible to expect any success from the dictatorial policy and the high-handed refusal to allow the Asian peoples to participate in the political conference which was shown in the reply to the Korean and Chinese side. The United States reply is an insult to the Asian peoples and shows how the United States conceives of negotiations at the political conference.

91. The United Nations, however, cannot agree to negotiations in that way. The proposals submitted by the Korean and Chinese side arise from a sincere wish to achieve a peaceful settlement of the situation in Korea. The discussion and adoption of these proposals might bring a peaceful settlement of the Korean situation nearer.

92. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore welcomes the proposals of the Korean and Chinese side and is in favour of including the item proposed by the Soviet Union in the agenda of the eighth session of the General Assembly.

93. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia): In the General Committee we abstained from the vote on the USSR proposal that an item concerning the Korean political conference should be included in the agenda of this session. We shall also abstain from the vote on the question during this meeting of the General Assembly. I should like briefly to explain the main reasons for that abstention.

94. Our general attitude towards the question of including new items in the General Assembly's agenda is this: there should be as great an opportunity as possible for the discussion of controversial questions in the General Assembly. We are very happy to note that the General Assembly has followed the practice of including in its agenda the majority of items proposed, even though many members were sometimes more or less convinced that a discussion of a certain item, in the form in which it was proposed, would not necessarily lead to positive results. That practice has been followed in a desire to maintain the Assembly as a forum in which the free discussion of all controversial questions could take place.

95. The principle which I have just described applies to a case where the inclusion of a new item is necessary in order that there may be an opportunity to discuss a certain question. In the present case, however, it must be noted that the agenda already contains the Korean item, and all aspects of the question can be discussed—in the First Committee and, subsequently, in the General Assembly—in connexion with that item. Hence, from a purely procedural point of view, the principle that items should be included in the agenda so that there may be a discussion of all questions which delegations believe should be discussed is not relevant.

96. We cannot, however, dissociate the matter now before us from its political implications, and I should therefore like briefly to state our views on that point.

97. As we explained before, during the last meetings of the seventh session of the General Assembly, we consider that, with regard to the aspect of the Korean question which is now before us, the United Nations should take an active role as a universal organization, not as a party to a conflict. Now that the armed aggression in Korea has been checked, we are faced with the question of the unification of Korea, with all its complications. The United Nations must approach that question in accordance with the task conferred upon it by the Charter; that is, the task of strengthening peace in the world and resolving situations which, if they were allowed to continue, might create a threat to the peace.

98. We have accepted the idea of a political conference, but we have not accepted the idea that the conference should be a continuation of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. We believe that the political conference should constitute an instrument for a peaceful settlement of the question now facing the United Nations and the world. We believe that the political conference can succeed if there is a spirit of co-operation, rather than a continuation of a fight between two sides.

99. We opposed the draft resolution on the composition and character of the conference which was submitted by the USSR delegation during the seventh session. That draft resolution did not conform to the views I have just expressed. We abstained from the vote on the draft resolution originally sponsored by fifteen Powers, and submitted to the Assembly by the First Committee [A/2450, draft resolution A], because we believed that we could not support it and, at the same time, maintain our general views, as we expressed them during the seventh session and as I have briefly summarized them now.

100. Because the Korean question is already included in our agenda, and because our consideration of the background and political implications of the problem before the Assembly has led us to the conclusions which I have set forth, we shall abstain from the vote at this meeting, just as we abstained from the vote in the General Committee.

101. Before concluding, I should like to say this: We do not believe that the adoption of the USSR motion to include the item in question in the agenda would, from a procedural point of view, facilitate the General Assembly's work. Furthermore, we do not believe that it would facilitate the solution of the political problem before us. If there was any doubt that the substance of the matter proposed for inclusion in the agenda could be discussed in connexion with the general item on Korea, that doubt has, I believe, been dispelled by the discussion in the General Committee and at this meeting of the General Assembly.

102. I come now to the question of priority. That question cannot be decided upon by the General Assembly; it must be decided upon in the First Committee. We fully understand the urgent desire to give priority to the consideration of the Korean question, because that question is important and the situation is delicate. We shall not vote in favour of including the proposed new item because we believe that a discussion of all aspects of the Korean question will take place when the matter is considered in the First Committee. We believe that the Korean question, which is already on the General Assembly's agenda, should be given due priority in the First Committee's deliberations.

103. The statements made in the General Committee and here in the General Assembly by the USSR representative and those supporting him have further convinced us that the adoption of the USSR proposal would hardly serve the aims of the United Nations and might even harm the possibilities of success in our endeavours to solve the Korean question.

104. For all these reasons, we shall abstain from the vote on this question in the General Assembly, as we abstained from the vote in the General Committee.

105. The PRESIDENT: I now put to the vote the recommendation made by the General Committee in paragraph 2 of its second report [A/2486], that is, that the item proposed by the Soviet Union should not be included in the General Assembly's agenda.

The recommendation was adopted by 40 votes to 8, with 10 abstentions.

106. The PRESIDENT: The General Committee has also reported on its consideration of the request of the Soviet Union [A/2485/Rev.1 and Add.1] for the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations". With regard to this request, the General Committee has recommended in paragraph 4 of its second report [A/2486] that this item should be included in the agenda and that it should be referred to the First Committee for consideration and report.

107. As no representative has asked to speak, we shall proceed to the vote on the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 of the report.

The recommendation was adopted by 56 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

General debate (continued)

SPEECH BY MR. TSIANG (CHINA)

108. Mr. TSIANG (China): In ordinary house-keeping, good housewives of all lands agree that they should not be penny-wise and pound-foolish. In the kind of housekeeping in which the United Nations is engaged, I suggest that we should try to avoid being moment-wise and years-foolish. The main task of our housekeeping here is, of course, the preservation of peace. This is what this Organization was established for. This is what all peoples of the world ardently desire. I suggest that we, who are entrusted by our governments and peoples with the task of peace preservation, should always keep in mind that it would be utterly foolish to win the peace of weeks and months and lose the peace of years and decades. The world has rightly condemned Munich because the peace of Munich lasted only a few months and paved the way for the Second World War. I am a Chinese, and therefore I do not speak here about eternal peace or perpetual peace. We Chinese find metaphysical speculation to be uncongenial. On the other hand, being a Chinese, I am philosophical enough to try to look beyond weeks and months and to strive for something that may endure for years and decades.

109. The subject of Munich has been made threadbare. It is in fact too trite even for rhetorical purposes. Nevertheless, I feel compelled at the beginning of my intervention in this general debate to refer once more to Munich. The trouble with Munich was that the agreement signed by Chamberlain and Daladier was of that kind which was moment-wise and years-foolish. As I recall, Chamberlain and Daladier were not alone in advocating the peace of Munich. When they returned from Munich to their respective capitals, they were acclaimed by vast numbers of their fellow countrymen. They honestly and sincerely told the grateful crowds that they had secured "peace in our time" and that their peace was "a peace with honour". In the fall of 1938, if my memory serves me right, almost all the peoples of Western Europe agreed with Chamberlain and Daladier. It is not the individual action of Chamberlain and Daladier that alarms me. It is the momentary popularity of those men in the fall of 1938 that indicates to me that we should try, in this matter of peace, to profit by the experience and, therefore, the wisdom of the ordinary housewife.

110. What, after all, was the trouble with Munich? In the first place, Chamberlain and Daladier had no proof of the peaceful purpose of Nazi Germany other than the speeches of Hitler and Goebbels. In fact, the domestic policies and the diplomatic efforts of Hitler all pointed to war. So long as the nature of Hitlerite Germany remained what it was, the propagandist assurances of Hitler and Goebbels should have been disregarded. In the second place, Munich turned out to be a great tragedy because Chamberlain and Daladier, by the Munich agreement, strengthened Hitler for further aggression.

111. Today, in seeking peace through the United Nations, we must not repeat the mistakes of Munich. We have the right and the duty to demand from the Kremlin actual evidence of peace-loving intentions other than and in addition to speeches and editorial comments. In the second place, we must be on our guard against strengthening the forces of world com-

munist and weakening the strength of the free world. After all that has been said in the peace offensive of the Soviet Union, we have no evidence whatsoever that world communism has changed its purpose or its nature. All the evidence that we have points to the fact that world communism strives today, as it has striven through the last thirty years, for world domination. If we wish to have fresh evidence on this point, the speech of the Soviet Union representative here in this Assembly on 21 September [438th meeting] is ample proof. There was nothing new whatever in that speech. So far as that statement is concerned, the policy of the Soviet Union seems to be unchanging and changeless.

112. The Charter furnishes us with some guidance in our pursuit of a peace that can endure. When the Charter was framed, the events leading up to the Second World War were fresh in the minds of the representatives who assembled in San Francisco. They knew that the Japanese militarists could not have launched the full-scale war against China in 1937 or their Pearl Harbor attack against the United States in 1941 unless and until the military leaders of Japan had secured absolute control of life in Japan. In the six years before Japan's full-scale war against China, the militarists in Japan executed a series of terroristic acts to get rid of political leaders who stood for peace and moderation. They succeeded in controlling Japanese political life and public opinion to such an extent that by 1937 their régime was totalitarian. The suppression of freedom in Japan was a precondition and a prelude to aggressive war.

113. The representatives at the San Francisco Conference undoubtedly remembered also the development of the Hitlerite régime in Germany before the German army occupied Bohemia and Moravia in the spring of 1939. Hitler did away with the Weimar Republic. In its place, he established a totalitarian régime which enabled him not only to rebuild the army and to sacrifice butter for guns, but to remake the mind of the German people. I was in Germany in the winter of 1934, that is, almost at the beginning of the Hitlerite régime. I noticed that the common people of Germany in the winter of 1934 were not only devoted to peace, but were absolutely terrified by the mere mention of war. The control which Hitler managed to achieve converted a peace-loving German people into a fanatical warlike aggressor people. In Germany, as in Japan, the establishment of a totalitarian régime was a precondition and a prelude to aggressive war.

114. The events leading up to the aggressive war by Japan and Germany were fresh in the minds of the framers of the Charter. It is for this reason that we find throughout the Articles of the Charter two consistent and intertwining themes. One theme is, of course, peace. The other theme is human rights and fundamental freedoms.

115. In the Preamble of the Charter, we find the second paragraph declaring that "we, the peoples of the United Nations", are determined

"to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small".

Article 1 of the Charter, in stating the basic purposes of the United Nations, mentions

"encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion".

Chapter IV of the Charter is devoted to the General Assembly, and Article 13 enjoins on the General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of

"assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion".

Chapter IX of the Charter is devoted to the subject of international economic and social co-operation. I should like to quote part of Article 55, which states:

"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote...

"c. Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

Chapter XII of the Charter is devoted to the International Trusteeship System. In defining the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System, Article 76 states that one of these objectives should be

"to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion".

116. The Charter makes very clear the basic importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms as such, and also shows the direct and intimate relationship between respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the preservation of international peace. This emphasis on the relation between human rights and peace, or between freedom and peace, as attested by these articles which I have quoted, was due not only to the general enlightenment of the twentieth century, but it was also due to a clear and deep recognition of the causes which had led to the Second World War. I am happy to note that the representative of Chile, in his speech before the General Assembly on 18 September [436th meeting], made this very point.

117. If the United Nations is to promote, not the peace of the moment but the peace of years and decades, it must also keep in mind the intimate connexion between peace and freedom. Peace and freedom are inseparable, just as tyranny and war are inseparable. In seeking peace today, we must ever keep in mind that we cannot achieve peace through the sacrifice of freedom. There are today peoples behind the Iron Curtain, both in Europe and in Asia, who are struggling for freedom. Their struggle is part of the world struggle for an enduring peace. If we understand correctly the task of the United Nations, we must recognize that the fighters for freedom and the fighters for peace are, in fact, two wings of the same army and that their efforts should be co-ordinated. It would be utter foolishness for one wing of the army to destroy the other wing of this same army.

118. Having suggested a guiding principle for our pursuit of peace in the world in general, I now proceed to discuss the strategy of peace in the Far East. In working for an enduring peace in Korea, we must

keep in mind the basic importance of unification. I humbly submit to this Assembly that the achievement of national unity by the Korean people is the key to an enduring peace in that part of the world. The Korean people are one people—one in race, one in language, and one in tradition. The geography of the peninsula furnishes the natural foundations for national unity. In fact, Korea is basically more united than some of the oldest nations represented here. It is even more united than the United Kingdom.

119. Now, let us stop to consider what unity or division in Korea can mean to peace in the Far East. A united Korea would be strong enough, if not to repel aggression, at least to deter aggression. On the other hand, a united Korea can never be strong enough to commit aggression against its neighbours, even if the Korean people should ever be misled into launching a war of aggression. It is for this reason that during the last fifty years my fellow countrymen have all, without distinction of political party, favoured the establishment of a united and independent Korea. We desire such a Korea as much as the Western European countries have desired an independent Belgium. The perpetuation of the division of Korea, on the other hand, would make for instability, fear and suspicion, and dreadful and costly efforts at armament. The United Nations, therefore, must remain loyal to the declared objective, that is, the establishment of a united and independent Korea.

120. In the Far East, my country occupies a position as central and important as the position of Germany in Europe. It is impossible to promote peace and security along the fringe of China if the communist régime remains in control of the mainland. Some of the free nations have already devoted considerable blood and treasure to ward off communist aggression, not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Malaya. I humbly submit that these sacrifices cannot create an enduring peace so long as the mainland of China remains behind the Iron Curtain.

121. Press reports in recent weeks and months have stressed the so-called five-year plan of the Chinese Communists and economic aid from the Soviet Union to its puppet. I wish to call the attention of the General Assembly to one important feature of all these economic plans. That feature is the emphasis put upon the development of the north-west and south-west of my country. The work of construction in the north-west paves the way for further Soviet penetration and exploitation of the resources of that vast region. The work of construction in the south-west, such as the building of railways to the border of Indo-China and towards the border of Tibet, is relatively unimportant for the well-being of the Chinese people, but very important in the development of imperialism towards South-East Asia.

122. In international relations, the traditional and universally accepted principle in China is "live and let live". In the long history of my country there were, of course, periods when Chinese armies occupied and conquered neighbouring lands, when Chinese emperors sought glory through the expansion of empire. These periods were the Han dynasty, the first part of the Tang dynasty and the first part of the Ming dynasty. I should like to call the attention of the Assembly to two important features of ancient Chinese imperialism. In the first place, the conqueror-emperors of China never tried to impose Chinese ways of life on the

neighbouring peoples. How the subject peoples lived and worshipped their gods was not considered the business of the imperial power to control or regulate. The second important feature of historical imperialism in China is that the philosophers and poets of my country never joined in approving imperialism. In all China's literature, there is not a single poem or philosophic essay approving of imperialism. On the contrary, Chinese writers have stressed the misery which conquest and war involve and the hatred which conquest has generated among China's neighbours. The final result of China's historical development was a policy of defending China and the Chinese ways of life for the Chinese people and letting other countries alone.

123. Now, under the Communists, the traditional principle governing China's international relations is reversed. In this respect, the communist régime is as un-Chinese as in its domestic politics. The Chinese Communists, instead of preserving the pacifism inherent in Chinese culture, are reviving the views and ambitions of the conqueror-emperors of old, under the guise of "liberation".

124. Representatives from countries of South-East Asia must know that there are in their countries right now underground Chinese communist organizations. They must know that some of their fellow countrymen are right now being trained by the Chinese Communists in the arts of political subversion and guerrilla warfare. The representatives of these countries know, or ought to know, that when the Chinese Communists speak of friendship between China or India, or between China and Burma, or Ceylon and Indonesia, the Chinese Communists make a significant distinction; they befriend not the governments of these countries, but the peoples, and they add that these peoples are suffering under exploitation. The revival of imperialism by the Chinese Communists is one of the most basic facts in Asia today.

125. How does Mao Tse-tung himself feel about this matter? In the winter of 1945, shortly after the surrender of Japan, Mao published a poem. He is very proud of that poem. He presents autographed copies to his followers and friends. Let me read to you two stanzas of what Mao has to say on this matter.

"There spreads the land in winter's northern light,

For thousands of ice-bound miles the whirling dance
Of snowy mist holds it as in a trance.

Behold, beyond the Great Wall a blanket of white,
And up and down the Yellow River the flight
Of raging torrents, the choppy rugged plains,
And the snow-clad mountains' silvery manes—
How they heave and arch to reach the heaven's height!

"These lands, these rivers, their bewitching charm
Inspired the conqueror-emperors of Ch'in and Han,
Tang and Sung, in splendour striving to expand.
Alas! All short of stature! And even Genghis Khan
Knew only how to shoot a hawk for play.
For the towering figure watch the scene today!"

Mao thinks that he, in the middle of the twentieth century, can outshine the conqueror-emperors of the remote past. As a part of the communist repudiation of the Chinese traditional culture, Mao discards the Confucianist condemnation of war and imperialism.

126. Some people say that, since the Soviet Union and the satellite States are already in the United Nations, the addition of communist China would not make much difference. I contend that, if the peoples of the world in 1944 and 1945 had had the knowledge of the Soviet Union which they have today, the United Nations would have been differently organized, most likely without the participation of the Soviet Union. The question which the General Assembly should consider is not the admission of Red China but the expulsion of the Soviet Union. Some people argue that the admission of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations does not imply approval. They say that it is nothing more than the recognition of a fact, just as the Himalaya mountains or summer heat or winter cold are facts. In the history of my country there have been a number of dictators who established new dynasties and appeared, for a time, to possess some measure of permanence. Many of these dynasties were short-lived, only mushrooming in seeming vigour. In fact, in Chinese history, the number of short-lived dynasties is much larger than the number of long dynasties.

127. Nothing the United Nations does can be or should be divorced from morals, however we might try to rationalize our conduct. We cannot escape the consequences, be they good or bad. In the present instance, the consequence of the admission of the Chinese Communists would be the consolidation of that régime and the enhancement of its prestige, not only in China but throughout Asia.

128. The Chinese people know the communist régime to be both a tyranny and a foreign imposition. We are determined to win back both our national independence and our basic human freedom. We have not asked the United Nations to give us aid in this struggle, which is in strict accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. We ask the United Nations not to add to the difficulties and the burdens of the Chinese people. If we are ever to understand the strategy of peace in the Far East, the United Nations must recognize that the struggle of the Chinese people today is, in fact, a part of the world struggle for an enduring peace.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.