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**General debate [*continued*]**

**SPEECHES BY MR. MAZA (CHILE), MR. CASEY (AUSTRALIA) AND MR. WEBB (NEW ZEALAND)**

1. Mr. MAZA (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): Since the beginning of the last session, the international situation has substantially changed. We have seen the end of the war in Korea—the end, that is, of the hostilities to which communist aggression gave rise in that republic. If the present promising situation is compared with that of the world in 1948, when the Berlin blockade was in progress, or with the more recent period of war in Asia, it might be thought that international tension had diminished and that the aggressive groups had realized what risks they were running in pursuing a policy of provocation. World opinion wants nothing so much as a feeling of security. This may be seen from the enthusiasm which any peaceful gesture on the part of those who have the power to cause conflict or promote peaceful coexistence arouses.

2. Upon reading the Secretary-General's report [A/2404], however, and especially the chapter on political and security questions, we realize that there are still problems and difficulties which could dangerously disturb this precarious coexistence. Moreover—and this is much more serious—there is no sure sign of a change of heart in those who have long compelled the other peoples to live in fear. It would seem that the world has resigned itself to living in a state of permanent danger and that the cold war makes the peoples long for peace but without hope. In order to meet the threat of aggression, a level of rearmament has been reached which suggests that a world war is expected to break out any day.

3. But international life is fraught with difficulties other than those caused by the totalitarian menace. There are latent conflicts, resulting from previous arrangements, which are now coming to the surface again, because the atmosphere of fear is so wide-spread as to give cover to any kind of violence. In our time, too, dogmatic fanaticism of every conceivable kind has renewed its strength. As we live in a state of constant anxiety, opposing sides, instead of seeking a friendly solution, prefer the path of violence. This menacing

prospect might suggest that lasting peace is unlikely of attainment and that the only course is continued rearmament.

4. Nevertheless, material forces are strengthened by moral values. The fact that war has not yet broken out and may not break out is due primarily to the existence of the United Nations. In many quarters the United Nations is criticized as ineffective. But the United Nations was organized to maintain peace, not to create it; that was the responsibility of the great Powers which were victorious in the recent world war. The United Nations has worked under difficult conditions in the political field, but its moral authority has prevailed; if war has not broken out, it is because the aggressor would have had to face the rest of the world.

5. For this reason, in this time of unceasing vigilance, my delegation reaffirms its adherence to the United Nations; it believes that only in so far as the United Nations is supported by governments and peoples will peace be maintained even among those who doubt the possibility of it, so that even the aggressors will be compelled to live in peace.

6. Faith in the United Nations is indivisible. The Charter signed at San Francisco conceived a system of collective security based on the restoration of normal relations among States, steadily increasing respect for human rights and a constant improvement in the standards of living of the peoples. It was considered that, in order to maintain peace, it was not sufficient merely to prevent the outbreak of war, and the last world war showed that a bold and imaginative effort was required to eradicate the causes of such great disasters. That was why there was talk of respect for human rights and why it was tacitly agreed that the individual was the real subject of international law. While there remain regions or countries where human beings are despised and abandoned, the fear of war will persist, for it is impossible to believe that a State can be peace-loving in international affairs if it denies a peaceful life to its people at home.

7. We must note with regret that very little progress has been made in the vast field of human rights. There are States which take refuge behind Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter and claim that anything relating to the abridgement of freedom in their territory is a matter of national sovereignty, of no concern whatsoever to the international community and entirely outside the competence of the United Nations. But for those who still believe, and with reason, that any country which denies freedom to its own people is not likely to behave in a democratic fashion in the world at large, that attitude constitutes a threat to the system of collective security.

8. The Chilean delegation is therefore anxious that this General Assembly should take a decision on the draft international conventions on human rights, so

that States may be given the opportunity of ratifying these instruments which, taken together, will encourage greater respect for those rights.

9. Neither formal good relations among States, nor even a general respect for human rights, are in themselves enough to make possible a lasting peace. Good neighbourliness among all peoples and the full enjoyment of individual rights cannot be ensured until poverty and want have been eliminated. That was why the United Nations Charter stressed the importance of better standards of life and the possibility of building a society where there would be equal opportunity for all and industry could eliminate poverty.

10. The industrial countries had to recover from the disaster of war. The under-developed countries sought to attain a satisfactory level of production and consumption. The effort required was too much for national resources and made international co-operation essential. Loans, gifts, technical assistance, credits and other forms of aid had to be mobilized to carry out this joint enterprise with all due speed. All were directly interested in a victory over want because all knew that until that victory was won peace was in danger.

11. Unfortunately, the cold war too is indivisible. The democracies have had to arm to meet the danger of totalitarian aggression. The technique of destruction has reached a level at which the expenditures involved are tremendous. More than \$80,000 million has been spent on armaments in the past few years. That is the price that has so far had to be paid to keep in check those who would engage in violence. If the same sum had been invested in production and the means of production, we should now have a flourishing and prosperous community, a world of common effort and well-being. During these years we have lost the greatest opportunity offered by history and the whole responsibility rests on those governments which, dominated and consumed by an anti-human dogma, believe that war is inevitable, that it is a historical necessity and that it is almost a duty to precipitate it. The cold war has deprived the under-developed areas of capital. It has diverted civil industries to unproductive ends. It has hindered the economic recovery of the countries devastated during the last war through the conversion of some of their factories to armaments production. It has limited the scope of technical assistance by leaving it a tiny budget, the total amount of which is less than the cost of twenty military aircraft.

12. The United Nations Secretariat has prepared valuable material on the world economic situation; we see, once again, that it has been impossible to halt inflation, that international trade has not returned to normal, that the pace of development in the under-developed areas is extremely slow, that economies are being bled white by the cost of rearmament and that the standards of living of the peoples have remained stationary. All this, and much more, is the result of the cold war. It is the price the peoples who wish to remain free have paid to prevent aggression by those governments which have no respect for the human person.

13. Unsatisfied needs afford a breeding ground for misunderstandings of all kinds and contribute to the campaign of hate, dominated by a war psychosis, that has been launched against the free world. The democracies are wrongly accused of having provoked rearmament, when in fact they have merely used some of their resources to prevent aggression from devas-

tating Western Europe and other parts of the world. They are accused also of denying their peoples better standards of living when the fact is that, to safeguard their existence as nations, they have been compelled to sacrifice some part of their legitimate right to a better life so as to be prepared, albeit insufficiently, to meet the aggressor. It has been asserted that the United Nations forces used bacterial weapons in the war in defence of the Republic of South Korea, when in fact its armies deliberately refrained from using certain modern weapons in order to respect the moral principles of the United Nations.

14. Nevertheless the propaganda machine of the totalitarian régimes has persisted in its campaign of hate which, unfortunately, has been able to affect a part of world public opinion.

15. The Korean armistice and the appearance of quiet on the front of aggression would seem to show that the free world's determination to defend itself has contained the totalitarian advance. If this interpretation were correct, the United Nations would begin its eighth session in a more favourable atmosphere. Nevertheless we are anxious lest what has been gained in the political field should be lost in the economic and social fields.

16. It is essential that the effort that made military rearmament possible should be directed to economic ends and that from now on the cold war against want should be fought and won. A depression, a world economic crisis or the continuation of the present imbalance between production and consumption could cause as much harm as war and disrupt the democratic system. The most important thing at this point is to tackle the problem of financing programmes of economic development, to increase the resources of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to set up an assistance fund—in short, to enable all the peoples who desire freedom to live their lives in real freedom without the constant fear of want and poverty. For that reason, my delegation believes, now as always, that the economic and social questions on the General Assembly's agenda are closely linked with recent victories in the political field, and if we do not make headway in dealing with those questions, the little we have gained in one sphere may well be lost in the other.

17. The Chilean delegation, as the spokesman of its Government and of the people of Chile, believes that the eighth session of the General Assembly should be concerned principally with the mobilization of international effort to raise the standards of living of the peoples and to avoid an economic crisis whose consequences would be as calamitous as war. Now, more than ever, imagination is needed to surmount the difficulties that beset us. Although the international situation may seem to lead to scepticism, my delegation has confidence in this General Assembly, for faith has always risen above disillusionment.

18. Mr. CASEY (Australia): May I start by offering the President of the General Assembly the sincere congratulations of the Australian Government on her election. I think she knows of my special interest in and regard for her country, in which I have lived and worked. I am confident that her work as President of the Assembly will bring the highest credit both to her country and to herself.

19. I have noticed that she said, in connexion with her high appointment, that she did not wish the fact that she was a woman to be stressed; rather, she wished the fact that she was a citizen of India to be stressed. I remember that when her brother, the Prime Minister of India, had to meet some comment in his own country at having nominated a woman doctor for a certain post in India, he replied: "I have not sent a woman; I have sent an officer." Notwithstanding this, I do not believe it will be possible to conceal the fact that the women of India—and, indeed, I believe, the women of the world—will be greatly encouraged by Mrs. Pandit's election.

20. I should also like to give a sincere welcome to our new Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, who has come to us from his native Sweden with a high reputation and who, I have no doubt, will be a very able Secretary-General. To Mr. Lie, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Australia wishes every good fortune for the future.

21. This general debate in the United Nations General Assembly has, over the years, come to assume the character of an annual stock-taking by the peoples of the world. It is a unique opportunity for assessing the hopes and fears of the peoples of the world for their future.

22. At this time—and, indeed, at any time since 1945—the problem of the world is, as it has been, the rivalry between international democracy and international communism. It would be only too easy for most of us here to make a bitter case against the Soviet Union for what we have suffered at its hands since 1945. In addition to the many well-known instances of overt military and political aggression, I expect that there is not one of the democratic countries that has not suffered by reason of the disruptive activities of the clandestine agents of the Soviet Union. We in Australia, among other countries, have bitter memories of this underground and covert warfare—because there is no other realistic way of describing it. The communist dictum, "The easiest way to take a fortress is from within", has not been lost on us. We know very well what it means—and we are taking our own measures to protect ourselves.

23. However, I do not propose to dwell on these matters. We have, as I have said, some evidence in recent times of a tendency on the part of the Soviet Union to employ gestures of less malignancy, less hostility than formerly. We may be excused if we treat these gestures with some reserve, if we do not become too greatly impressed with their sincerity. We understand very well the tactics of retreat and of advance—indeed, the leaders of the Soviet Union have been frank enough to explain it to their followers, and to us, in published volumes. The turning on and off of international tension is a tactic to serve a purpose. Our minds have become quite sensitive to such manoeuvres.

24. However, for myself—and in spite of what I have said—I do not find it impossible to believe that these gestures may be genuine and that, if they are not thrown back in the face of the Soviet Union, they may possibly lead to a more civilized relationship between international communism and the democracies, even to the extent of the two systems living side by side in the world without dangerous friction. The possibility of bringing this about is vastly more in the hands of the Soviet Union than of our side. Suspicion and hostility are cumulative, as are goodwill and tolerance. For

some years the Soviet Union held something close to a monopoly of suspicion and hostility, and our side, inherently, a near-monopoly of tolerance. But hostility breeds hostility, just as tolerance breeds tolerance. Every action has its equal and opposite reaction. The present situation is not very unlike that of the Roman leader who said to the Carthaginians: "I have in my toga peace or war. Choose which you will."

25. The gestures made by the Soviet Union during this year may be important or unimportant. Nobody knows except the handful of men in Moscow who control Soviet policy. If they were designed to secure a response by the democracies, and so to lead to a genuine easing of world tension and to the eventual possibility of the two sides living together, then they have not yet succeeded—nor, indeed, have they yet failed.

26. If, in the course of, say, the coming year, the tentative approaches of the Soviet Union towards the easing of world tension are continued; if, perhaps, they gain momentum; if, in particular, we see signs that carry conviction to us that the Soviet ambitions to communize the world have given place to some less offensive and less all-embracing objective, then I believe that the Soviet Union is likely to get real reciprocity. We, for our part, have every right to remember that, while tactics may change, the repeatedly stated ultimate objective of communism is the communizing of the world. Perhaps I may be allowed to quote the old Biblical warning: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

27. The Soviet Union, in framing its plans and its strategy, has taken a great many factors into account. It has shown great skill. It has made itself master of many techniques and much *expertise*; but I would believe that it has left almost completely out of account a matter on which we in the democracies set great store and importance—and that is the human element in life and in politics. In communist circles it would appear that politics come from the head and not the heart, whereas with us it is, at any rate to a very great extent, the reverse. We believe that politics that leave the interests and the feelings of individual human beings out of account are doomed, and rightly so. They are to us the politics of the Middle Ages, from which we believe mankind has developed a very long way. I believe that, for this reason, if for no other, the theory of communism does not ring true.

28. These observations are commonplace truisms, blinding glimpses of the obvious, to us in the democracies. Maybe they have something of the charm of novelty to those who have not been brought up and lived their lives in democratic surroundings. I am led to believe that not much thinking has been done on these lines in Moscow by the fact that the Soviet Union representatives to the United Nations do not seem to have devoted more than a passing moment of their many hundreds of hours of speaking in the Assembly to the question of the welfare and the happiness of the individual human being. Perhaps it would be too much to believe that these simple, homely matters have begun to receive some attention in Moscow, and that they may have been responsible for the slight easing in the asperity of Soviet policy at home and abroad that has been noticeable during 1953.

29. At the sixth session of the General Assembly, in Paris, two years ago, I suggested that it would not be wise for the Soviet Union to provoke world tension beyond the point of no return—the point beyond which



there could be no turning back along the road which appeared in 1951 to be leading inevitably to another world war. I am not one who suffers from the malady of *folie des grandeurs*, but I may be excused for believing that some such consideration as this must have influenced the minds of those in control of Soviet policy. Such changes in direction as we have seen during 1953 do not come about by simple chance, but rather by hard calculation of the probable results.

30. There are internal stresses and strains in every country—democratic and communist—by reason largely of the unfulfilled ambitions of the human beings who make up all our populations. In the democracies these stresses and strains can be resolved—or at any rate eased—through the operation of the well-known machinery of democracy. In the communist countries no such safety-valve exists. The condition of the people—of the ordinary common people—in a dictatorship can be altered for the better only by changes in high-level policy dictated by the person or the group in undisputed political control.

31. We, on our side, are not fools. We have had some experience in the drawing of inference from history and from events. From the experience of the last forty years we have learnt some lessons. One of them is that totalitarian régimes always look—always, in the nature of things, they have to look—more durable than they are, until, as in two notable instances, they crack irrevocably. They seem, while they are viable, to present an impervious front; whereas, in democratic countries, every small difference is magnified and emphasized to the world. Mr. Vyshinsky has himself taken advantage of this from time to time by quoting from scraps of newspaper clippings from obscure journals in democratic countries.

32. It has been one of the shibboleths of communism that democracy, as we know it, contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Since this theory was first advanced over one hundred years ago, democracy has weathered many storms and crises—domestic and international—and it has survived and prospered, except where it has been overcome and stamped out by force of arms. I expect it may have occurred to the Soviet Union leaders—occurred only to be anxiously rejected—that it is not at all impossible that the thesis might more properly be true in reverse—that communism may hold within itself the seeds of its own destruction, particularly if the human element is to be left continuously and entirely out of account.

33. However, the incidence of these human observations—whether or not they have been taken into account and, if so, the weight given to them in Moscow—is no more than speculation. Certainly the facts of the past provide but little hope that such matters have even been considered by the Soviet Union leaders—much less that their policy has been influenced by them. Rather would it seem that consideration for the individual has been regarded as a weak bourgeois conception which has no place in the armoury of those whose god is force and to whom domination of others is the only desirable aim.

34. Men's minds develop, whatever the form of society. The Soviet Union has gone far in learning and applying the material facts of life. Maybe they are coming round to considering, if not the spiritual, then at least some of the social—or perhaps, rather, the sociological—lessons that the democratic world has

learnt in many centuries of development, and that such lessons are now in the process of beginning to influence their minds, as practical considerations. Perhaps—we do not know—the great thaw may be starting in the Ice Age of Soviet politics. All this may be hopelessly wrong. One's common sense tells one that it is, but there is just the hope that we may be seeing a gleam of light at the end of the tunnel, and this bare possibility is my excuse for taking up, for a short time, the time of the General Assembly in referring to it.

35. I am not blind to the fact that the Soviet leaders show all the signs of being intensely suspicious of us, the democracies. They profess to believe that we are plotting and working towards the downfall of the communist régime. It would be more true to say that we are devoting ourselves whole-heartedly to trying to stop the aggressive expansion of communist domination beyond its present borders. Those communist officials who know the democracies—and surely some of them do—can have no logical fear of aggression by the democracies. But I can appreciate the fact that it is impossibly dangerous for these few men to attempt to communicate their views to their leaders, and still more, of course, to get them accepted. The communist leaders either have an innate, ingrained and unreasoning suspicion of the democracies that no facts, no logic, no argument will dispel, or, alternatively, they may have decided to adopt an attitude of suspicion and to propagate it as a considered part of their policy and as a means of maintaining the offensive spirit in their peoples. The Iron Curtain enables the lack of knowledge of the rest of the world to be maintained and the suspicion of the democracies to be fostered.

36. Of the two alternatives—that the Soviet suspicion of the democracies is real or that it is synthetic—I would tend to believe that the latter is more likely to be the case. If this is so, then it is capable of change. The Soviet leaders have never been afraid of a radical change of policy. They explain it away or, more often still, they do not bother to explain it at all.

37. Now it seems to me that all this adds up to this, that if the policy-makers of the Soviet Union have genuinely decided to try a more human and co-operative policy for the future, the way is clear ahead for them to do so. We will not, however, lower our guard and they cannot expect us to be notably responsive until the process has gone a good deal further than it has up to now.

38. We shall watch out for communist initiative in positive co-operative action. Areas of co-operation are not hard to find. Moreover, let us not forget that we have had experience of the policy of relieving tension from time to time before this. It is an old technique of communism, the step back before taking two steps forward. The mere turning on or off of international tension is not an index to the good faith of communist negotiators. It has been a tactic, in the past at least, to serve a purpose; and it is the nature of the purpose that we have to explore. We are thankful for the cessation—or perhaps I should say the diminution—of the campaign of hate and vilification. But the welfare of mankind is not immediately affected by the manners, good or bad, of international communism. The test of Soviet intentions lies in communist initiative, as I have said, in positive co-operative action in directions of importance, as distinct from the matters of small consequence on which the Soviet Union has experimented so far.

39. As I have said, such areas of co-operation will not be hard to find. They exist today, for instance, in Germany, in Korea and in Indo-China, each of them areas in which the Communists can establish their bona fides and their sincerity in a practical and convincing way. They exist, again, in the problem of the international control of atomic energy.

40. If, however, the Soviet gestures of 1953 turn out in fact to be no more than a minor manoeuvre in world politics—and we are likely to discover whether or not this is so in the coming year—then the disappointment, and even the anger, of the ordinary people all over the world will be very real.

41. And now perhaps I might be allowed to speak a little on the major current problem of Korea.

42. Most of us had hoped that this Assembly would have been able to avoid a recurrence of the discussion of the Korean question and of the constitution of the political conference, and that all that had been disposed of in the recently concluded seventh session of the General Assembly. There seemed little that could be added by this session and, indeed, it might be thought that further discussion of this matter in New York would tend only to complicate the issues facing the political conference and possibly burden and embarrass it with an even less easy atmosphere than it will inherit in any event. Whether this General Assembly can avoid further argument about the constitution of the political conference, and about the Korean problem generally, is dependent mainly on the authorities in China and in North Korea.

43. We believe quite simply that the settlement of the Korean War and the Korean problem generally should be the affair of the countries directly concerned, and that the problem would only be further complicated by the addition of other countries which have had nothing to do with this problem during the last three years. In our view, it is for the Communists to proceed to appoint their delegation to the conference and to agree to a time and place for the conference so that it may start its work, and not to seek to interfere with decisions made by the United Nations General Assembly affecting our representation.

44. It is well known that for our part—I speak for Australia—we might have preferred a somewhat different representation at the conference and, in fact, we made suggestions to that effect at the recent General Assembly discussions. But we have accepted, as an expression of the will of the General Assembly, the resolution [711 (VII)] that has been forwarded to the Chinese and North Koreans. We believe that the United Nations, for its part, has taken a proper decision concerning the political conference, and that the communist Chinese and North Koreans should be advised accordingly.

45. One must refer, however briefly, to what the United Nations action in Korea means in its historical context. It represents the first action by a world-wide organization to resist armed aggression by collective force. What the United Nations did in Korea is, and will remain, a lasting deterrent, I believe, to aggression. I have said more than once, both here and in Australia, that it is my belief that had the United Nations not acted as it did in Korea, then the world by now would have been faced by aggression in some other quarter. The history of the nineteen-thirties is too clear a lesson for us to reach any other conclusion.

46. We cannot note the conclusion of the fighting in Korea—one hopes the permanent conclusion—without paying a tribute to the courageous leadership and unstinted contribution of the United States. This is not only true so far as the military action in Korea is concerned, but it is also strikingly true in respect of the relief and rehabilitation of devastated Korea. The action taken in Korea under the leadership of the United States was the right action and it will, I am quite sure, be known in the years to come as one of the really decisive actions in history.

47. The end of the fighting in Korea has brought to many people a new hope for the future, but, as an offset to this hope, another and more dreadful anxiety has arisen. It has become clear, during 1953, that both the United States and the Soviet Union have the knowledge and the capacity to make the hydrogen bomb. From what the layman knows of the effect of such a weapon we can imagine the unspeakable devastation to both sides in a war in which such weapons are used.

48. We must face, before very long, a situation in which both sides will have reached saturation point in the possession of atomic weapons, saturation point being the point at which both sides possess a sufficient quantity of bombs to destroy all the major defences of the other side. The approach to this saturation point makes international agreements for control, through an effective system of inspection of manufacture of atomic weapons, not only urgent but imperative. It is something to which the great Powers which possess these weapons must set their minds if the world is not to be destroyed by itself. They must realize the deep anxiety of all the peoples of the world that the ever-present fear of complete destruction should be removed.

49. Apart from the direct destructive effect of atomic bombs—and more so of hydrogen bombs—the poisoning effect on the world's atmosphere of the explosion of these weapons must be taken into account. It might well be that all the population of very large areas of the world would be killed by atmospheric poisoning, by the explosion of any considerable number of these dreadful weapons.

50. Lenin is credited with having said: "It would not matter a jot if three-quarters of the human race were destroyed. The important thing is that the surviving quarter should be communist." A more dreadful thing could not be said.

51. I have already spoken about the situation in Korea and what my country hopes will come from the armistice, from the political conference to discuss the Korean question and, if all goes well, possibly wider questions in the East more generally. The achievement of peace in Korea, itself, has affected greatly the atmosphere of international relations. It is difficult to stop hostilities, as we all know, when they break out. But this has been done and it is a great achievement. The whole world wants peace in Korea, and lasting peace in Korea. The reaction of relief and hope brought about by the end of fighting in Korea reflects the attitudes of the peoples of the world generally towards war.

52. Now, perhaps, I might say something, towards the end of what I have to say, about my own country, Australia.

53. The place of any country in the world today is made up of several factors: its population, its inter-



national associations, its geographical situation and its performance over, say, the last generation. I believe it is true to say that the combination of these factors, so far as Australia is concerned, adds up to our having a position in the world more substantial than our population would otherwise warrant. I need not enter into these factors in detail, other than to mention our traditional and greatly valued membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, in which we have all the advantages that flow from our close association and co-operation and consultation with our mother country, Great Britain, and the members of the Commonwealth, whilst at the same time we have our own autonomy and our own ability to determine our own policies.

54. We are, relatively speaking, a young country, and we like to believe that we have shown that we are determined to pay our way in the world both in peace and in war, and not to be a liability to our friends.

55. We are in no doubt, we people in Australia, to which camp we belong. We are a democratic country and we believe that we are a not unimportant link in the world-wide chain of democratic countries, and that in the dreadful event of another world war we would again have a positive part to play as a strategic base against the common enemy.

56. We Australians are not in any proper sense a warlike people, but we believe that the part that our fighting services have played in two great wars is evidence that we would not hang back if another threat were to develop against our democratic way of life.

57. I believe that all of us in the United Nations are well aware of the situation in the world today. I have tried, so far as it is possible to do in a short statement, to put the point of view of the Government and people of Australia. We are heartily sick and tired of the suspicions and distrust which divide the world, the seeds of which have been sown by the Soviet Union, and we look forward to the day when we can all devote ourselves again to what is, in truth, the constructive task of leadership: that of making the world each year a progressively better place for the average man and woman to live in.

58. Mr. WEBB (New Zealand): As Mr. Lester Pearson said when laying aside the presidential gavel, the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations could be described as the Korean Assembly. Let us hope and pray that, with the cessation of hostilities in Korea, that particular issue will not continue to dominate the deliberations of this session.

59. The New Zealand Government, while fully aware of the immense and baffling problems which lie ahead, has received the armistice with profound relief and thankfulness. There is relief that the guns are at present silent in a country where for three years the fighting forces have suffered grievous loss and the civilian population unspeakable hardships. There is gratitude to the men of the United Nations forces whose labours and sacrifices have produced this result. There is also, I believe, ground for satisfaction that the United Nations has up to this point performed its international duty.

60. In my opening speech at the Assembly last year [380th meeting] I said that I disagreed with those who were wont to describe our efforts in Korea as a failure. True, we had not progressed as far or as fast as many of us hoped, but our primary objective, to repel aggression, had been achieved. I pause here to emphasize

that when we speak of aggression we mean military aggression, not political or ideological aggression. Someone has rightly and aptly said that you cannot kill an idea with bullets, and I think it as well, therefore, to make it plain that we took up arms in Korea to resist military aggression. Political or ideological aggression, unaccompanied by military aggression, needs counter-measures of a different kind.

61. The fact that after these terrible years the whole of Korea is not united and free may seem to some not to warrant any degree of satisfaction with the past or of confidence in the future of the United Nations. The deliberate decision of the United Nations to seek the objective of the unification of Korea by peaceful means is sometimes classed as an act of appeasement. This pessimistic conclusion would be justified if talk about the unification of Korea were no more than a cover for acceptance of the partition of the country. This is not our view of the spirit of the Charter or of the intentions of the United Nations.

62. We have fought back the aggressor and, by so doing, have prevented him from gaining anything from his break of world peace. We have demonstrated that military aggression does not pay. Even when the desired prize of peace seemed within our grasp we held out for months on a point of moral principle—the question of the forcible repatriation of prisoners of war.

63. Our record to date, therefore, should be sufficient to inspire confidence that our declared aim—the unification and rehabilitation of Korea—will be pursued by us tenaciously, though peacefully. I do not minimize the grave difficulties, or attempt to foretell just how or when they may be overcome. But the determination of the United Nations to work resolutely for the reunion of a divided people is a force not to be regarded lightly. Such a reunion would, I believe, be impeded by further recourse to arms, and we can only hope that the measure of peace which has been so dearly won will not be broken by any unilateral resumption of hostilities.

64. Above all, I would express the hope that the holding of the political conference on Korea will not be delayed by technicalities and those endless procedural disputes which tend to lead only to frustration and despair. So much depends upon this conference for the peace and welfare of the Pacific, and indeed elsewhere in the world, so many hopes turn on its success, that it behooves us all to do everything in our power to ensure that the conference gets under way at the earliest opportunity.

65. The leader of the United States delegation, in his challenging survey, reminded us of the disappointment of great numbers of people in the achievements of our Organization. While the United Nations may not have fulfilled the high hopes of its founders, any disappointment is, I agree, due rather to the fact that people expected the United Nations to fulfil purposes beyond the bounds of practicability, and I would most earnestly remind my fellow representatives that the United Nations, despite its imperfections, is the one body capable of becoming an effective instrument for the preservation of world peace. We can, I feel, derive satisfaction from the fact that in the case of Korea we have for the first time seen an international police force in action.

66. I have always felt that the method by which the United Nations can best exert its influence is through

the pacific settlement of disputes. On more than one occasion, back in my own country, I have expressed the view that the democratic nations should be ready at all times to meet conciliation with conciliation, but I regret to say that so far we have not been able to discern much in the way of conciliation from those whose political and ideological conceptions differ so fundamentally from our own. If we could only have some tangible proof, some convincing evidence, of change of heart, rather than merely a change of tactics, on their part, we could face the future with greater hopes or, at any rate, less anxiety.

67. If it is true that there is a will to peace on the part of the Soviet Union, if there is really a change of heart, now is the time to prove it by deeds. The political conference on Korea offers an excellent opportunity for such proof. We are all only too familiar with the frustrations and delays over the peace settlements with Germany and Austria. Surely the conclusion of these two peace treaties must be regarded as one of the tests of Soviet intentions. Surely, after some 250 meetings of deputies of Foreign Ministers have been held, it is too late in the day to argue, as it is now being argued, that a meeting at this level is not the proper forum for the discussion of an Austrian treaty.

68. One further matter upon which the Government of the Soviet Union can give proof of its good intentions is the admission of new Members to the United Nations. At each session of the Assembly numbers of States, in every way qualified for membership, are excluded with monotonous regularity. It would be equally monotonous for me to repeat the arguments we have advanced in favour of their admission. I do not wish to do more, at this stage, than to record my deep regret that nations so fully qualified to enter the United Nations should continue to be excluded. So long as they are excluded, we shall have the spectacle of the United Nations being used by one country as a means of imposing its will upon the rest instead of being, to quote the words of the Charter itself, "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends".

69. I was particularly impressed by the following passage in the Secretary-General's annual report on the work of the Organization:

"I hope that the governments will find occasion, in the months and years ahead, to give greater attention to the importance for world peace of extending the scope of international law, of building up respect for its disciplines and of resorting more willingly to the International Court. I hope also that they will reaffirm in their policies the respect they have pledged in the Charter for the independent position of the Secretariat of the United Nations and the recognition there given to the essential role of an international civil service in an irrevocably interdependent world. As Secretary-General, I shall uphold the policies concerning conduct of members of the Secretariat which are a condition for this interdependence" [A/2404, page xii].

70. The New Zealand Government endorses the principles laid down in the paragraph I have just read. The need to make all proper use of the International Court of Justice is a matter to which, on more than one occasion, we have drawn attention. No less important are the Secretary-General's references to the Secretariat, emphasizing as they do the duty of the Member

States to uphold and respect the independence of the Secretariat and the correlative duty of the staff of the Secretariat to avoid any conduct which might reflect upon their position as international officials.

71. At the seventh session of the General Assembly [416th meeting], the New Zealand representative drew attention to the importance of developing along sound lines the "jurisprudence" of the Secretariat in personnel matters on the basis of the rules laid down by the General Assembly. If the Secretary-General will permit me again to quote him, may I say that certain words which he used in an address to the United Nations Correspondents' Association on 10 July 1953 express very clearly the consideration which the New Zealand delegation then had in mind. This is what the Secretary-General said:

"I don't believe very much in general statements and sweeping rulings, but more in orderly developments building up a sound body of rules by decisions in individual cases, creating a kind of common law."

72. When I addressed the Assembly last year [380th meeting], I gave at some length my country's view on the manner in which the United Nations could assist the administering Powers to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories. I do not propose to labour again the points I then endeavoured to make. I deeply regret the tendency manifested by some nations to ignore the true nature of the task which confronts the administering Powers. In establishing stable forms of government on a democratic basis, in encouraging development in the economic and social fields, and in promoting the health and welfare of the populations of these territories, the administering Powers have a notable record of achievement. We do well to remember the nature of the obstacles which the administering Powers have overcome in this process.

73. What these problems are in the Trust Territory of Western Samoa, the New Zealand Government has recently explained in a statement of policy regarding the future of the Territory. New Zealand is offering to the Samoan people the opportunity to make known, in a fully representative constitutional convention, their views on the nature of the institutions through which they desire to exercise full powers of self-government. May I quote a few words from this statement:

"The recommendations of this Convention, and the date on which the Constitution will be put into effect, will be carefully considered by the New Zealand Government, which is fully prepared to implement any scheme which seems to it to be consonant with its responsibilities as Administering Authority and its natural regard for the welfare of the Samoan people. Naturally the New Zealand Government will fulfil its duty of keeping the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations informed, and would give due consideration to its views and advice" [T/1057, annex I].

74. My Government greatly appreciates the helpful and constructive spirit in which the proposals were received by the Visiting Mission which recently went to Samoa and, indeed, by the Trusteeship Council itself. When their reports come before the Assembly, all Members will have the opportunity to consider the progress so far made in pursuit of New Zealand's stated aim, which, as I have said on more than one

occasion, is the promotion of the welfare and advancement of the Samoan people. This, I believe, is an example of how the trusteeship principle was intended to work. It is the only spirit in which it will work. If, however, the United Nations is used as a forum for propaganda, and if unrelated political overtones, inimical to the interests of the peoples of the dependent territories, are introduced into issues confronting us, the system will not and cannot function as it should.

75. New Zealand's support for United Nations activity in the field of economic development is given practical expression by our participation in the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. These programmes have been in operation for only a few years, but they have already brought benefits to under-developed countries in various fields where technical knowledge is most in need of improvement. We commend the United Nations for its initiative in tackling this problem; we hope that this process of sharing skills will be continued on a basis which will bring about a lasting improvement in the standards of living of all countries.

76. New Zealand has made a substantial monetary contribution in each year of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. We have endeavoured to have this contribution used as fully as possible in the provision of the particular forms of assistance which New Zealand is best fitted to offer. New Zealand is a small country, itself needing capital development; however, this by no means disqualifies it from providing technical assistance to less developed areas. There is, in fact, an obvious advantage when the receiving country is also a small one, because technical trainees can see things being done on a scale similar to that which would apply in their home countries.

77. I wish to reiterate that this assistance, together with that provided by New Zealand to other United Nations programmes for economic and social betterment—for instance, UNICEF [*United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund*], Korea and Palestine refugees—is a practical example of our support for United Nations action in these fields. These programmes, in my opinion, will be not only of lasting value to the countries receiving aid, but will also add greatly to the stature and prestige of the United Nations.

78. In speaking to the General Assembly last year, I threw out the suggestion that at the present eighth session it would not be too soon to begin the prepara-

tions for the possible holding of the conference for the revision of the Charter as envisaged in Article 109. We therefore welcome the decision of the Netherlands Government to propose the inclusion of the item which now appears as agenda item 70. What is required is the adoption by the Assembly of a procedure which will permit an orderly and systematic preparation for the conference. At this stage there should be no question of any particular proposal for amendment or, indeed, of going beyond the discussion of the procedure of preparation. As the representative of the Netherlands said yesterday [*435th meeting*], it is simply a matter of carrying out the purpose of Article 109.

79. Before I conclude, I would like to say a word or two on the question of the jurisdiction of this Organization. On a specific issue it came before this Assembly yesterday, and I have no desire to reopen that discussion here, particularly as it will no doubt be continued in one or more of the committees. My purpose now is to deal with the question of jurisdiction, not as it affects any particular country, but as it affects the future of this Organization.

80. I believe that this Assembly should take a more realistic attitude in regard to questions claimed to lie within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. I am far from denying that in particular cases it is extremely difficult to determine just where domestic jurisdiction ends and the Assembly's competence begins. It is hard to reconcile several articles of the Charter. For that reason we should have welcomed greater readiness on the part of Members to consult the International Court of Justice on these disputed points. I feel that the Court might well have been able to devise a formula that would enable us to give a workable interpretation to these conflicting, or apparently conflicting, provisions of the Charter. I feel, too, that no one who has candidly studied the record of the United Nations over these eight years can justifiably deny that its tendency has been to give too little weight to the plea of domestic jurisdiction. I am afraid that many of us have been too ready to see the mote in the other man's eye when we might have been better occupied in taking the beam out of our own. I think it must be conceded that in several of these matters the competence of the United Nations is at the best doubtful, and I have a growing feeling that if we attempt too much there is a risk that this Organization will lose in authority and effectiveness.

*The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.*