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President: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Tribute to the late President of Israel

1. The PRESIDENT: Before proceeding with the business on the agenda, I feel that I should, on behalf of the General Assembly, express to the delegation of Israel the profound sympathy which is felt by us all at the passing of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the President of Israel. I am sure that it is the desire of the General Assembly to request the delegation of Israel to transmit to its government and to the family of the late President our expression of sympathy in their loss of a great humanitarian, scientist and statesman. I call upon the General Assembly to rise and observe a minute of silent tribute to the memory of the President of Israel.

The representatives stood in silence.

Statement by the Secretary-General

2. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Before you resume the general debate, I feel it is my duty to inform you of the text of a letter I handed this morning to the President of the General Assembly. It reads as follows:

"Dear Mr. Pearson,

"I wish to refer to our personal and confidential conversation on 11 September, in which I informed you that I had decided, after lengthy consideration over many months, to submit my resignation as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"It had been my intention—as I informed you then—to take this step at the opening of the seventh session of the General Assembly. I have delayed until today, when the Foreign Ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council are all present for the first time during this session, in the hope that this will facilitate agreement on my successor.

"I shall be grateful if you would propose as a new item on the agenda, 'Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations'."

3. I have also informed the President of the Security Council, Dr. Tsiang, about my decision.

4. I think you all should know that it was last summer, after long talks with my family and a few close friends, that I finally decided. Since then a very few others whom I consulted have tried to persuade me to go on. I thank them for that. But I am quite sure that this is the time to leave without damage to the United Nations, and that it would be better for the United Nations if I did so now.

5. First of all, I ask you to remember that I wanted to retire in 1950, at the end of my five-year term. I agreed to continue only because the aggression in Korea created circumstances that put me under an obligation to carry on.

6. Now I feel the situation is somewhat different. The United Nations has thrown back aggression in Korea. There can be an armistice if the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and the North Koreans are sincere in their wish to end the fighting.

7. If they are sincere, then a new secretary-general, who is the unanimous choice of the five great Powers, the Security Council and the General Assembly, may be more helpful than I can be. On the other hand, if the world situation should go from bad to worse, at least I would not want the position of secretary-general to hinder in the slightest degree any hope of reaching a new understanding that would prevent world disaster.

8. There are other reasons why it is now more appropriate for me to retire than in 1950. The permanent headquarters buildings have been completed. It is not necessary for me to stay on for the last finishing touches—for the lawns to grow green, the trees to be

planted, the gardens to flower and the murals to be painted.

9. The Secretariat also is better established and organized as one of the principal organs of the United Nations. It can still be improved, of course, and made more efficient. But the United Nations now has a good Secretariat. I have placed before this session of the Assembly proposals [A/2214] for the reorganization that I believe might contribute to improved administration in the future. I think a new secretary-general should be elected now so that he may have time to make his own judgment about these proposals, before the next session of the General Assembly acts upon them.

10. I know there is a risk that my action today may be misunderstood. Still, I must say as strongly as I can that my resignation is caused by the reasons just stated and by no other. I should like the Members to know that I am stepping aside now because I hope this may help the United Nations to save the peace and to serve better the cause of freedom and progress for all mankind.

11. The PRESIDENT: At this time, as President of the Assembly, I can only say that the Secretary-General's request for the inclusion of this new item in our agenda will be referred to the General Committee.

General debate (continued)

[Agenda item 8]

SPEECHES BY MR. VAN ZEELAND (BELGIUM), MR. ROBERT SCHUMAN (FRANCE) AND MR. LUNS (NETHERLANDS)

12. Mr. VAN ZEELAND (Belgium) (*translated from French*): When we try to understand our times, we soon find ourselves in a bitter quandary. The simplest questions remain unanswered. Are we at peace or at war? Are we living in a period of economic progress or of recession? Are the principles of law and justice in which we believe gaining or losing ground?

13. The United Nations is fighting in Korea; men are dying every hour of the day. Where men are not killing one another, the tactics of the cold war fray men's nerves and harden their hearts. Even the most peace-loving nations are forced to rearm on a gigantic scale to ward off an ever-growing threat which hampers post-war recovery and retards or even prevents the advance towards better standards of living.

14. Economic activity remains intense in large areas of the world, but even where the danger of inflation is not increasing, there is a feeling that the balance is precarious because no lasting solutions have been found for the fundamental problems of economic relations among peoples. In many countries there is an apprehension, if not of crises, at least of recessions, some of them actually taking place, some only potential.

15. Never have the rights of man been so widely proclaimed, but it can hardly be said that they are being satisfactorily implemented.

16. No doubt it might be replied that an equally gloomy general picture could be drawn of any period in human history. Our era, however, has one characteristic which sets it apart from all others: never have men been so much responsible for their own fate as they are today. What has not changed, however, is the power of ideas. In our times, as in all others, men are

closely dependent on ideas. In the final analysis, the civilizations that survive, grow strong and endure are the ones that succeed in evolving the highest and purest motives, while maintaining the closest possible contact with human realities, material or other.

17. It is for this reason that I believe in the value of general discussions, such as those which take place in this Assembly year after year. They are useful not only because they offer the occasion for explaining certain things but also because they allow us to set forth before the most representative audience in the world the principles on which our actions are based and the facts to which they are applied.

18. Taking a modest part, on behalf of Belgium, in this joint effort of the Members of the United Nations, we shall try to distinguish a few guiding principles. They will be divided into two groups: the first concerning political and moral problems, and the second some important economic and social questions.

19. In the political sphere, the overriding question to which we are forced to return year after year, and each time in the same atmosphere of harrowing anxiety, remains unchanged: the defence of peace. The fundamental idea on which the United Nations is based—the idea of collective security—seems to us today to be wiser and more necessary than ever. Is there one among us who is not profoundly convinced that if for any reason the ideal of collective security were to grow dim, the danger of war would be immensely increased?

20. It is in defence of this ideal, that is, for the protection of peace, that United Nations troops are fighting in Korea. Unhappily, the Korean drama is being drawn out. The quest for the terms of an armistice—surely the object of all our hopes—still continues. This is certainly neither the time nor the place to repeat what has been so clearly and sometimes so courageously said in the First Committee, where there have been long debates on the last remaining obstacle to an armistice—the forced repatriation of prisoners of war. Yet I cannot help noting, with surprise and sadness, that some of our conceptions of human rights do not appear to meet in all quarters with the response which their generosity should have evoked. Still, in spite of everything, we are not debarred from cherishing the hope that a settlement will be reached. On balance, it seems to me that, notwithstanding the repeated disappointments and misunderstandings, wisdom requires that we should leave every door open.

21. So much goodwill is being lavished on efforts to find a formula which, while respecting the principles on which our action is based, would give the parties on either side the guarantees they demand, that it cannot be wasted. Perhaps we are on the eve of a decision which, if favourable, would be a first step towards a just peace. The day such decision is reached, the principle of collective security will once again have been vindicated. Let us therefore wait and hope.

22. I should like to express before you our feelings on another subject. I refer to the debates concerning the Non-Self-Governing Territories. During the last few years these debates have taken a form which is ill in keeping with the spirit of co-operation that the Members of the United Nations pledged themselves to maintain among themselves. The resulting uneasiness

might, in the long run, even injure the United Nations itself.

23. We often hear colonialism spoken of as an evil which should be eradicated with the least possible delay. If the evil still existed, I should agree with those who denounce it. The word "colonialism", as traditionally used, conjures up a picture of the exploitation of people at a lower stage of civilization by others at a higher stage.

24. Belgium is among the resolute opponents of that kind of colonialism. It has fought against it, not only with words but with deeds. As long ago as 1909, King Albert I said in his speech from the Throne: "For a people who love justice, the effort in the colonies can be nothing else than a civilizing mission". We have followed the path which had been mapped out for us. We abhor all forms of exploitation of labour, and more particularly of labour supplied by backward indigenous peoples. But we believe that with a few rare exceptions—which, incidentally, do not always occur where people tend apparently to look for them—this type of colonialism is obsolete.

25. I hope that no one in this Assembly will confuse colonialism as thus defined with a different and indeed contrary activity, based on the highest motives and entirely consistent with the provisions of the Charter. In saying this I am thinking of the systematic exertions made by a highly developed people with the object of helping the backward indigenous peoples under its administration in their efforts towards political, economic, social and educational advancement.

26. The Charter itself regards this action as a "sacred trust"—this is the term it uses. In our eyes, this sacred trust is not limited to the few States which administer the territories hitherto known as colonies. It is a trust binding on any State, no matter which, in whose territory there live native peoples who have not attained the normal level of civilization. If I am not mistaken, more than half the States represented in this Assembly are in that position. Is there one among them which would think of being indifferent to the fate of these backward populations or disregarding the character of its obligations towards them? I do not think so, and I am glad to be able to note that several of them have already established services which apply themselves to this task with enthusiasm and devotion. By way of example, I might mention, among others, the authority responsible for the Scheduled Tribes in India or the service for the protection of Indians in Brazil.

27. There can be no doubt that these great countries and the services they have set up realize the difficulties of such a "sacred trust", the patience and perseverance which it requires—above all in the case of peoples living in tropical forests or almost impenetrable jungle. An immense effort is needed to inspire them with confidence, disarm their hostility, pacify them, eradicate barbarous customs, build roads, introduce hygiene, combat illiteracy and so on. We are familiar with these problems too, because we have been trying to solve them in the Belgian Congo for generations.

28. However, since these problems are common to all States which bear the sacred trust spoken of in the Charter, what basis is there for distinguishing between them? Why, so far, have only a few of these States sent information to the United Nations, and not the

rest? Is it not obvious that they should all be invited to pool the results of their efforts, so that they may reap the benefit of each other's knowledge and experience?

29. All backward peoples whose advancement is in the hands of representatives of a more highly developed race have the same rights; they are entitled to the same protection. Under the League of Nations they received it; why should we deprive them of it in the United Nations? To claim that only some of them ought to receive the rights proclaimed in principle in the Charter would be unfair to all the rest. Such, in our view, is the meaning and scope of our Charter. Let us all see to it that its greatness is not diminished.

30. Let us turn now to the economic and social aspect of this brief analysis. No matter how confused and complex the present world economic picture may appear to the observer, one outstanding truth can be reaffirmed with greater assurance than ever; that is, the close and striking interdependence of all regions and all national economies, no matter which.

31. Of course, in speaking as I do I am thinking particularly of the free world, that is to say, of that part of the world which is not held in the autarkic grip of the communist régime. This does not mean that the communist countries, despite their wish to isolate themselves, escape completely from the rule I have just mentioned. If we went to the heart of the matter, we should soon see that a number of major laws—for example, those relating to the increase of productivity—prove to operate under the communist system as in the free régimes. In certain analogous cases, the same causes produce the same effects on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Thus, for example, the Soviet economy is suffering like our own from the inevitable consequences of large-scale rearmament; I might compare this rearmament to an ogre whose appetite is satisfied only at the expense of the standard of living of the people, irrespective of the régime under which they live.

32. However, in order not to start unnecessary discussion, let us confine our observations to the free world. The analysis of this economic interdependence of the peoples can be approached from many angles. I shall consider only two or three, while recognizing that other angles of approach would be quite as important and as useful.

33. First I should like to speak of Europe which, despite considerable progress, has not yet resumed its rightful place in the world. There, we shall encounter one fact which dominates the problem: the reversal of the positions of debtor and creditor among the great economic Powers. Our analysis will then lead us logically to examine certain problems which face, on the one hand, the countries which are producers of raw materials and, on the other, the under-developed countries. Let us, then, begin by examining the position in Europe.

34. At the end of the war, the European peoples were truly confronted with an overwhelming task. They had, simultaneously, to rebuild their ruins, to put things into working order, to increase their production and to raise the standard of living of their inhabitants. To all this was shortly added the necessary effort for defensive rearmament.

35. Europe's economic recovery was of course essential to the Europeans themselves, but it was not less so for the nations of the American continent, and it was quite as pressing from the point of view of the economic and political equilibrium of the world as a whole. Such recovery depended on one condition, one major condition which was recognized by all, at least in theory: the need to transform Europe into a single market, to create one vast economic space where goods, merchandise, men and capital could circulate freely, with adequate safeguards.

36. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) has devoted itself to bringing about this condition. It has been pursuing this aim unceasingly for years.

37. Unfortunately, after an initial effort towards recovery—and I venture to think that its boldness has been under-emphasized—Europe began to stagger under the burden. Aid came to Europe from the United States in the form of the Marshall plan. The four years which the authors of the Marshall plan intended it to cover have now elapsed. In retrospect, I think it must be admitted that the plan was necessary and that it has fulfilled its purpose. But it is also probable that its authors were right to confine its conception and its aim to a limited period of time. It is clear that other methods of mutual co-operation should be found. I consider that the time has come to seek them in all frankness.

38. Allow me to recall—and surely it is worth while doing so—that the European countries, with the help of their friends across the Atlantic, have, in order to ensure the rehabilitation of their economic position, performed deeds and taken steps which required courage and boldness. The process has involved three main stages.

39. First, the eighteen countries of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation succeeded in reaching an agreement—and it is not so easy for eighteen countries to agree—to eliminate up to 60 to 75 per cent of the quantitative barriers to the circulation of goods.

40. Secondly, they created among themselves a European Payments Union. This met with many difficulties; it worked under conditions which demanded an extremely lofty view on the part of certain Powers of their interests and duties. It has been in operation for about two years. It serves the economy of Europe every day.

41. Finally, some European countries found a way to link their economies more closely. You will excuse me if I recall the Benelux customs union, since it was the first one. From the very outset it was symbolic, and it is still developing; it would be unfair not to mention it. Today, however, I should like to emphasize the importance of the European Coal and Steel Community—by force of habit we still call it the Schuman plan—which was recently formed by six countries and with which we may hope that other European peoples will establish an ever closer and more organic relationship.

42. A little more than a year ago, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation realized that success could be assured only if the eighteen member countries, uniting their efforts, were able to increase

their total production considerably. They set themselves a target which they felt confident they could reach: a 25 per cent increase in five years; this was moderate, sufficient and necessary. But recent months have not borne out the hopes that had then been entertained. The total production of the European countries, instead of increasing, is, on the average, slowing down. The gap between United States and European production, which had begun to narrow, is once more widening, and the payments deficit in trade relations between Europe and the United States is still excessively heavy.

43. In mentioning the dollar deficit, we have probably put our finger on one of the most sensitive spots of the world economy. It is this deficit which reflects the lack of balance in the relations between the dollar and the non-dollar areas. Clearly, such a lack of balance cannot be permanent. The balance will have to be redressed. But how?

44. Let us begin by stressing the obvious fact—almost a platitude—that a creditor country can really benefit from its position only if it accepts settlement of its claim in any form. How, then, can the countries of the dollar area, and in particular the most powerful of them, the United States, receive the payment of their credit balance?

45. In gold? It is no secret that most of the gold of the world is already concentrated in one place, and that the fraction of the precious metal which remains in the hands of the non-dollar countries is scarcely sufficient to enable their monetary systems to operate approximately normally.

46. Is there another way? The creditor country could, of course, waive payment. It could make the debtor a gift of the debt. But is this a long-term policy? Certainly not. The creditor could not entertain it, and neither could the debtor. From the point of view of the creditor, this would mean depriving him of the actual advantage of his position, of the fruit of his efforts to improve and to increase production. From the point of view of the debtor, the reason is perhaps less obvious, but just as weighty. First of all, there is a normal consideration: in the final analysis, what has not been earned and deserved soon loses its value—if not its real value, at least its psychological value. But even from a strictly economic point of view, movements of goods with no immediate or long-term counterpart are not exchanges. In such circumstances, one of the necessary elements for the establishment of a true economic balance would be lacking. In the long run, its lack might prove to be of major importance.

47. Accordingly, if a country hopes, as it legitimately may, to benefit from its creditor status, it must agree to be paid eventually, a little sooner or a little later, in property, goods or services.

48. The creditor is indeed in a privileged position in our modern world, but his position is not as simple as might be imagined at first sight. We have experienced this ourselves, on a smaller scale, in Belgium. That position involves duties and obligations as well as rights. The creditor's interests are closely bound up with the debtor's, and there are rules which govern the position of the creditor country at the international level, when that position is, on balance, a permanent one. These rules can, I think, be reduced to two. The first is that it is normal for a strongly and perma-

nently creditor country to show an adverse trade balance, in other words, to import more goods than it exports. The second rule is that there is an inducement for the creditor country to export investment capital to the debtor countries, which is likely to help the debtor countries to produce the goods necessary for the satisfaction of the debt.

49. I must apologize but, for the sake of clarity, I have to pursue this analysis a little further.

50. In order ultimately to discharge their accumulated debts, the debtor countries must therefore in their turn export goods and services to their creditors. However, before they can do so, they must first produce a surplus of exportable goods and, what is more, produce them at a cost which makes such exports feasible, acceptable and marketable.

51. On the other hand, experience dating back as far as our own statistics shows that there is no such thing as a perfect trade balance, either bilateral or multi-lateral; the balance always inclines to one side or the other, subject to reversal when the general trend shifts. Even when a creditor country, applying the first rule I have mentioned, imports more than it exports, the difference does not, save in exceptional cases, cover the aggregate of the sums due. This means that another factor is required to bring payments into balance. This other factor is credit. I need hardly say that the credit used in this way can assume a great variety of forms. But in the case I am describing, one particular form is inescapable, it is the long-term investment of capital in the debtor countries.

52. These are fundamentals. They are well known to you. The international economy has never been able to evade them with impunity, nor will it be able to do so at any future time. If it is our true wish, as it is our duty, to restore conditions of economic equilibrium in the world which favour expansion and progress, we shall have to accept both the truth of these rules and the need for applying them.

53. The difficulties will, of course, multiply as we pass to the sphere of practical implementation. Thus there is no doubt that long-term investments, to be of real value, must be made at rates of interest and on terms of amortization which do not threaten to increase the debtor countries' deficit before these new investments have succeeded in increasing their productivity. Be that as it may, I think I can state without fear of contradiction that a country which is mainly a creditor cannot hope to export more than it imports, to refrain from making large investments abroad, and at the same time expect repayment.

54. In short, one conclusion which in my opinion can be immediately deduced from the general views I have just set forth is that it is high time to find ways and means for bridging the gap between the dollar and the non-dollar areas. This is of equally direct interest to creditors and to debtors, and the experience of the past provides lessons which it would be well to examine without delay.

55. In order to do so, it would surely be common sense for the leaders of the main creditor countries to meet the leaders of the main debtor countries round the same table and together, in a spirit of mutual co-operation, to inquire how their own legitimate interests

and, at the same time, the interests of the international community could best be served. This suggestion has been made before; it has been reiterated quite recently, from both sides. Let us therefore hasten to adopt it.

56. This brings us to another aspect of our analysis. The flexible and vital equilibrium which we should like to see in international trade will, in our opinion, be reached only through a policy of expansion, not of restriction. It is true that we shall have to concentrate once more on the removal of barriers hampering the circulation of goods. We shall be faced once more with that all-too-familiar list—excessive, unstable or prohibitive customs duties, improper administrative practices, quotas, currency restrictions and so forth. All that is true. But is it not time to consider other, more direct and more constructive methods? Now, if ever, is the time for a constructive imaginative effort, not, as in the past, to curb but to encourage trade.

57. Among these methods there is one to which I would once again draw your attention today. There is nothing new about it; it has been used before and fortunately, therefore, is supported by the results of previous experiments which, in my opinion, have been successful. I am thinking of the possibility of stabilizing the prices of some of the principal international raw materials. When I say "stabilize", I am by no means suggesting that the prices of these raw materials should be frozen at an arbitrary level. On the contrary, we must find formulæ to allow for justifiable and reasonable price movements. The economic value of such variations in certain circumstances can easily be proved. It would be a mistake to attempt to put certain aspects of economic life into a straitjacket. Yet producers and consumers alike are anxious to avoid abrupt and excessive fluctuations in the price of basic commodities. These fluctuations lead to dislocations and repercussions harmful to both parties, as has recently been proved by the bitter but convincing experience of the Korean war and rearmament.

58. Of course, such a result can be achieved only through carefully weighed and sound international agreements which take all the interests involved into account. By way of clarification I should like to offer a simple example: the wheat agreement. Is it a perfect instrument? By no means. Will it survive all ordeals, all difficulties? I should hesitate to make such a prediction. Nevertheless, as it stands, with its disadvantages and weaknesses, it has rendered undeniable services to all concerned. I can speak about this, because I belong to a country that is, on the balance, a heavy wheat importer. I consider that the authors of this agreement found a practical formula. Why could not similar agreements be devised for other essential products? On this point, too, suggestions have come from various quarters; searching studies have been carried out, by the Organization for European Economic Co-operation among others, and the sooner these questions are taken up, the better it will be.

59. We have now come to our last point. Let us for a moment consider the preoccupations of the under-developed countries.

60. Due prominence should be given to the great efforts made in this field under the auspices of the United Nations to promote, first, technical assistance and, secondly, financial aid to the under-developed

countries. Some first steps have been carried out, with initial success, and constructive solutions are emerging. This effort in international co-operation is of paramount importance, and we Belgians unreservedly support it.

61. We do so for many reasons, of which I shall mention only one. Since we have to export in order to live—to live in the literal sense of the word—we realize that we can sell only to those who are able to buy. We know—because we have experienced it so often—that the more goods a country produces, the greater its willingness, and the greater its ability, to buy other goods outside its own frontiers. It is therefore with sincere conviction that we wish to see an increase in economic production and an improvement in the standard of living throughout the world and the introduction of the best techniques of both agricultural and industrial production in all countries without exception.

62. This is the spirit in which we have followed the work relating not only to technical assistance but also to financial aid to the under-developed countries. Among the methods which have been studied there are four which, in our opinion, should be singled out for special mention.

63. The first relates to the action taken by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We are aware of the invaluable services already rendered by this agency, and we do not doubt that its activities will continue to expand in the future.

64. Secondly, we have followed, perhaps with some scepticism, but certainly with sympathy, the suggestions put forward by certain countries for the establishment of an assistance fund, to make capital available to under-developed countries on terms which would constitute no more than a very small or negligible burden for those countries. If that is possible, so much the better.

65. Thirdly, we believe that the formula for the creation of one or more international financing institutions may, in certain circumstances, and for a carefully specified period of time, be fully justified by the facts and make it possible to solve important individual problems. I would recall, in this connexion, that this idea was considered and extensively studied long before the war. I am still convinced that attractive formulæ, though of limited scope, can be devised along these lines.

66. But when we review the totality of the problems which have to be solved, when we measure the magnitude of the needs to be met, we cannot but feel that all these means, however necessary and however useful, are still, even when pooled, entirely inadequate. If we do not wish to postpone until a too distant future the economic and social effects which we expect from these measures, there must be a considerable movement of investment capital. Is there a possibility of reaching the desired levels by using only the methods to which I have just referred? Certainly not.

67. That is why a fourth method has been mooted, the resumption and expansion of private investment. But the problem of private investment throughout the world calls for the widest and most realistic approach. It concerns the under-developed countries, admittedly, but beyond them it affects the whole free world. Such

movements of capital will be resumed only if a whole series of conditions is gradually fulfilled.

68. Some of these conditions are of a very general political nature. It is clear, for example, that the stronger the threat of war, the less inducement there will be for capital to look for probably advantageous but definitely risky opportunities of investment abroad.

69. Certain other conditions are luckily more within our reach. These investments ought to be freed from the risks which derive not from business itself but from the will of the political authorities, that is to say, in the words of an old legal expression—which incidentally corresponds to a reality as old as the world—the hazards of acts of State. Shall we reach this goal? I do not know, but I would rather put the question in another way, why, after all, should we not reach it?

70. At all events, the sooner we face these problems squarely, the sooner we are likely to be able to solve them. What chance have we of solving them? Even the few points we have touched upon seem to form an intimidating array. And yet there are many other questions of equal urgency. For example, we may mention once more, first, monetary problems in the proper sense of the term—relative currency exchange rates, the inter-convertibility of currencies—and, secondly, the distressing inadequacy of the production of the commodities required for feeding the peoples of the world.

71. But we must stop. We have mentioned a few practical suggestions concerning a few isolated points. Let us try to draw a general conclusion. In these general considerations I have felt it necessary to match, as in real life, ideas and principles on the one hand, and the most concrete realities and anxieties, on the other. The conclusion which emerges might appear either very disappointing or perhaps, and in spite of everything, encouraging, depending upon the angle from which it is viewed.

72. Who could help yielding, at times, to a feeling of discouragement? The problems are really too numerous. They are overwhelming. They appear under conditions where the experience of the past can often be of no assistance. Moreover, the solution of any one of these problems appears each time to be closely linked to the solution of all the others. No sooner do we try to grasp one of these problems than we realize that it is only a link in a long chain, and that any attempt to raise it involves dragging in the whole chain. Are we not entitled to wonder, at times, whether we can be equal to the task which fate has thrust upon us?

73. But perhaps it will be possible, after all, with all due humility, for us to view this complex of difficulties in a different light and to find some ground for hope. It is true that the difficulties before us are interconnected and interdependent. But, at the same time, our analysis shows that any effort made in one direction is equally helpful in most of the others.

74. Let us suppose that we succeed in reducing the threat of war and strengthening all the chances of peace; by so doing we make the solution of all economic problems easier and more effective. Conversely, by building up our economic strength, we reduce the risks of aggression. If we manage to produce more, our peoples will enjoy greater well-being. And by reducing social tension we will promote economic progress. If we progress both in the economic and in

the social fields, we shall be giving those who do not share our ideas, but who do not deliberately close their eyes and their minds, a proof of the soundness of our principles and of the quality of our methods. Finally, if we are strong in every respect, if we do our duty everywhere, we shall not be attacked. And, if we are not attacked, peace is assured; for we ourselves will never attack.

75. If peace is finally vouchsafed us, then, despite errors, setbacks and misunderstandings of every kind, we shall none the less succeed in translating into reality the principles of our civilization and the discoveries of modern science; and, little by little, our great dream will in the end materialize—the world of tomorrow will have a chance to be freer, wider, more comprehensive and more just for the children of man.

76. Mr. Robert SCHUMAN (France) (*translated from French*): The purpose of the general debate with which our annual gathering opens is to make known, on the one hand, each country's contribution to the common task and, on the other hand, our assessment of the Organization's functioning, its progress, its failures and its perils.

77. Common task? I do not believe that there can be any disagreement among us concerning our objectives as defined in Article 1 of the Charter—peace and security, relations based on friendship and respect for the freedom and rights of others, and co-operation in the attainment of our great common ends. Yet are we sure that we are always completely and fundamentally in agreement on our definition of all these concise formulæ?

78. Unfortunately, when it comes to choosing the means of achieving these ends, there is no longer any doubt of the answer. Differences arise not only with regard to the settlement of specific cases and the study of appropriate measures; they go deeper than that, and in some cases concern the very principles upon which our collective action is based.

79. It would be useless and even dangerous to conceal from ourselves the cracks in a structure conceived by us as an immense hope and built with burning faith.

80. Its universality, for example, is one of its essential objects: it should bring together all countries loyal to the principles of the Charter. For years, however, several countries sincerely devoted to freedom and international co-operation have been victims of an arbitrary exclusion dictated solely by the desire to maintain the present proportion of ideological strength within the Organization. We act as though peace could be the product of such a delicate balance and as though war were a latent threat artificially and with difficulty held in check by abuse of the right of veto. This gives rise to a system of opposing clienteles and groups, a system which sometimes, unfortunately, recalls the period when certain Powers proclaimed their right to hegemony, and at other times brings nations together according to their antagonisms rather than their affinities.

81. These are disturbing symptoms of disintegration. We must never tire in our efforts to break the deadlock, so that the States which have won the incontestable and uncontested right to sit among us may no longer suffer a veritable denial of justice, and so that we may

end this self-mutilation which is weakening the whole Organization. Meanwhile, this persistent denial of one of its essential principles thwarts the proper application of the Charter. That being our present frame of mind, we may well ask ourselves, not without sadness, whether after these seven years' experience our faith is still sufficiently strong and our confidence in each other sufficiently firm for us to be able to undertake today what was successful at San Francisco in 1945.

82. To ask such a question is not to dispute the Organization's services to the cause of peace, to forget certain evidences of solidarity, or to underestimate what we have accomplished. What we must admit are our grave and growing disagreements on the application of certain fundamental principles.

83. These differences are apparent, above all, in the way the Organization is prevented from functioning effectively, and in our inability to resolve most of the problems before us, which are invariably brought up year after year on our agenda and are too often discussed inconclusively.

84. We disagree also on the extent of our responsibilities, on the limits of our powers and our competence. One has the feeling that the less we succeed in the tasks that we undertake, the more we tend to assume others. It is as though we sought to divert attention from our disappointments, and as though by creating difficulties for others we could more easily overcome our own.

85. The essential thing is to abide strictly by the Charter. Its strength lies in the fact that it exists; it was conceived and accepted at a time when its underlying principles had not yet suffered any deviation and seemed to us to be free from illusions. Today, our duty and common interest is to oppose any distortion of the Charter, any extension brought about by innovatory interpretations, apart from the regular procedure laid down for amendment.

86. I regret that I must dwell at greater length on this problem, which is serious in itself and which is of particular and direct concern to France.

87. In spite of the objections we have expressed, the Assembly has decided to include in its agenda two complaints concerning the situation in Tunisia and Morocco. I shall speak of these in all candour, without failing at any time in the respect we owe to a great idea and the confidence we have in the institution which embodies it.

88. The representative of France is compelled to warn this Assembly not only against the injustice which some persons would have it commit, against the insult which this accusation represents to his country, against the repercussions which any intervention, whatever form it took, would inevitably have outside the United Nations, but also and above all against the harm which would thereby be done to the Organization itself.

89. It is the Assembly's duty, in its wisdom, to remain within the confines of its duties and not to assume before history the responsibility, fraught with incalculable consequences, of exceeding its powers and thereby jeopardizing a task which France has undertaken, is continuing to perform and will pursue in North Africa with faith and pride.

90. I must emphasize, in the first place, that our Organization is incompetent to discuss these questions; doubly so, it might be said, because of the nature of the treaties which bind France to Tunisia and Morocco, and of the very text which defines the competence of the United Nations—that is to say, the Charter.

91. France is bound to Tunisia and Morocco by treaties concluded as between sovereign States. In accordance with those treaties, the foreign relations of Morocco and Tunisia can be conducted only within the framework provided for in the treaties, that is to say, through France. The treaties also provide that the reforms to be carried out in the two countries are to be effected in close and exclusive co-operation with France and on the latter's initiative. Thus we are faced with bilateral treaties which establish a special legal system and constitute the charter of the contracting States, defining the relations between them and their relations with the international community. It is a frequent occurrence for two States to set up special arrangements under contractual agreements, and no one would think of conceding a general right of intervention or interference in such arrangements either by a third State or by an international organization.

92. As the Assembly is aware, the United Nations has not been given competence to proceed in any manner, even indirectly, with the revision of treaties. This is apparent not only from the preparatory work of the San Francisco Conference, but also from the discussions which have already taken place on specific issues. No intervention or interference is possible, therefore, in the situation created by the two treaties between France and Tunisia and Morocco respectively. What State, among those here represented, would accept the principle of such intervention, of supervision of the application of any bilateral treaties it had concluded or might conclude?

93. This is clearly one of the situations referred to in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which was designed to prevent the Organization from exceeding its competence. What, indeed, is the competence of the United Nations? It is defined by the Charter itself and only by the Charter. It does not exist by presumption. It is a competence that is actually granted and that can derive only from an explicit text. Its authors undoubtedly wanted it to be very broad, but it was never conceived as being unlimited.

94. The sovereign States which signed the Charter thereby assumed commitments which represented considerable limitations of their sovereignty and provided for intervention by the United Nations in matters formerly within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of those States. These limitations of sovereignty are expressly and exhaustively stated. To avoid any ambiguous interpretation, the list of fundamental principles in Article 2 includes that of non-intervention by the United Nations "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State". The text of Article 2, paragraph 7, originated in the joint amendment to the original Dumbarton Oaks draft¹ submitted by the four Powers which sponsored the San Francisco Conference. The text of this amendment, which became paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter, is as follows:

"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

95. In contrast to the former Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, this new text does not constitute a mere procedural exception whose sole effect would be to prohibit the recommendation of a solution. It goes much further. It forestalls any action, precluding not only any resolution or recommendation, but even any consideration of such a question. It applies automatically to all matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

96. This rule applies even where a question has or assumes international implications. These international implications are not sufficient to destroy the basic character of the question, since the national aspect remains the essential factor. The only eventuality in which the United Nations could be led to intervene is that provided for in Chapter VII, that is, in the case of "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". No one, however, either here in this Assembly or elsewhere, whatever his prejudices, can claim with any semblance of justification that the present situation in North Africa in any way constitutes a threat to international peace, that is, a threat to the security of other States, or that it is likely to provoke a breach of the peace. In the absence of any such situation, which is expressly provided for, though by way of exception, the United Nations is not competent to examine the situations brought about by the two treaties or to intervene to any extent whatever in the relations existing between the two North African States and France.

97. Since 1946, the French Government has communicated regularly to the Secretary-General, for purposes of information, statistical and technical data concerning the economic, social and educational conditions in Tunisia and Morocco. These data have been submitted each year and have been comprehensive.

98. It is a point of honour for France to fulfil, everywhere and at all times, the obligations it has entered into under the Charter. But it will not do more than that.

99. The discussions which have taken place for several years past in the Fourth Committee of this Assembly show that certain parties are contriving systematically to violate both the letter and the spirit of the Charter in order to criticize our work and impose new obligations upon us for which there is no justification in the undertakings assumed at San Francisco.

100. France claims no privileges for itself, but neither will it submit to any adverse discrimination. Those who disparage France may be tempted to believe it particularly vulnerable because of the freedom of expression which it practises without reservation and because of the controversies, even though unfair and tendentious, which it tolerates within its territories. The plaintiffs do not enjoy the same freedom everywhere; they do not perhaps practise it in their own countries. By listening to them too readily, by giving your Organization automatic and general competence

¹ See document 288, G/38, of the San Francisco Conference.

to deal with any matter referred to it, you would counterbalance the paradoxical situation whereby a country in which criticism is free and agitation easy would be more readily indicted before you than a country in which contradiction is not permitted.

101. No, as the President of this Assembly so rightly emphasized on the day of his election [377th meeting], our Organization is not a universal court, nor is it a world government. It has neither the vocation nor the means to be such. Its purpose is to develop friendly relations and co-operation among the nations. Would this purpose be served by involving it in every dispute which might arise? In the present disturbed situation, so often systematically fostered by vehement propaganda, is it reasonable or desirable for the United Nations to interfere in affairs which ordinarily can and should be settled by the countries themselves? I repeat that the United Nations was not established and is not equipped to perform that task, and if it tries to do so it will be overwhelmed by the weight of its imprudently accepted responsibilities or by a storm of provocative and sterile recrimination. I say this as a general statement of principle.

102. It remains for me to show, by describing the problems to be solved, how this statement applies in particular to Tunisia and Morocco.

103. In 1881, France concluded the Treaty of Bardo and later, in 1883, the Treaty of La Marsa with the Bey of Tunis. In 1912, France's concern, then developing rapidly, for the security of North Africa, induced it to intervene in unhappy and strife-torn Morocco and to conclude the Treaty of Fez with the Sultan.

104. What is the general relationship between France on the one hand and Tunisia and Morocco on the other, first, as embodied in those treaties and, secondly, in practice. Essentially, there is an exchange of reciprocal rights and duties between the signatory States. In return for the special powers conferred by the treaties on France as possessing sovereignty over Tunisia and Morocco, those two territories receive various kinds of advantages.

105. In the first place, in dealings with other States, they are represented by France, and their citizens, when abroad, are protected in the same way and to the same extent as French citizens.

106. As to security, Tunisia and Morocco are included in France's national defence perimeter and plans. This is an economic advantage to the two territories and relieves them of the crushing burden that States must bear in these times.

107. As to national economy, the economic systems of those countries were originally quite rudimentary, but through the efforts of France have now become prosperous, complex and stable. They are now developing with the aid of France, and find markets and economic assistance within the more extensive economic system of our country, which equips them, balances their budget, and stabilizes their balance of trade and of payments. Here are some figures in this regard. Last year, Tunisia's imports amounted 59,000 million francs, and its exports to only 35,000 million. The deficit of 24,000 million francs was met by France. In Morocco, in 1951, imports amounted to 159,000 million francs, but exports only to 88,000 million. The deficit of 71,000 million francs was also met by France.

108. As to social progress, France has introduced social legislation and practices in these States, which it is thus assisting, that enable the workers to reap the benefits of the great emancipating movement of our times and to enjoy conditions, in respect of health and sanitation as well as of the general standard of living, which are infinitely superior to those prevailing before and also to those which still prevail, unfortunately, in many other countries. I shall be excused if I refrain from making specific comparisons.

109. Finally, as regards culture, the nationals of Tunisia and Morocco have access to the cultural heritage of France on the same terms as French citizens; at the same time France has scrupulously respected their traditions, institutions, civilization and religion.

110. The arrangement resulting from the treaties may be briefly described as a partnership in which each partner both contributes and receives. If, especially in the beginning, one partner must be junior, the reason is not the desire to give a privileged partner special benefits, but rather the inequality of means and resources. The intention is that this inequality shall progressively disappear and the partnership remain.

111. What was the situation in Tunisia and Morocco when these treaties were signed? Politically and administratively, they were crudely organized and almost in a state of anarchy. The standard of living was very low and conditions of health and sanitation terrible. Their very rudimentary economic systems could not support even their decreasing populations. The financial situation was so bad that foreign creditors had to come in and set up controls. Culturally, these countries had not yet opened their doors to the new trends in human thought and co-operation.

112. In both Tunisia and Morocco France began, as it had agreed in the treaties, by strengthening the sovereignty of the reigning dynasties, whose stability and authority had been threatened in Tunisia by financial difficulties and in Morocco by internal dissension. We sought, thereby, to transform the ancient province that was Tunisia, and the mass of warlike and mutually hostile tribes that was Morocco, into true States as understood in the language of modern public law. Far from impairing the sovereignty of those countries, as is sometimes claimed by those who deliberately ignore historical facts, France has actually re-established and strengthened it and is helping it to reach full maturity.

113. While strengthening the political power of Tunisia and Morocco, France has also helped them to build up administrative bodies and public services adapted to the political, economic and social needs of our times. I think I may say that in the usefulness and efficiency of those administrative bodies, and public services, Tunisia and Morocco compare favourably with many other States whose position has been similar to theirs but which have not achieved anything like the same level of progress.

114. The first concern of France was to raise the standard of living and improve the social conditions of the people, who were living in misery. By establishing peace and order, France was able to give them the hope and confidence without which no human effort is possible.

115. Although Tunisia and Morocco were then exclusively agricultural countries, their production was

very low. Various reasons accounted for this—the defects in the land-tenure system, the nomadic habits of a large part of the population, the fact that farm implements had not been improved for centuries, and the absence of any kind of economic system, especially of credit facilities, so that usury was rampant. The reorganized land-tenure system, which over much of the territories has become one of the most modern in the world, has given Tunisian and Moroccan peasants a firm title to their holdings and thereby firmly established their rights and met their financial needs. At the same time, the government services began to modernize agriculture, chiefly by establishing model plantations, the most famous of which is at Sfax in Tunisia, where thousands of hectares of sand and scrub have blossomed into a magnificent olive orchard, 80 per cent of which is owned by Tunisians. These results have been achieved either by reforestation and small-scale irrigation schemes, which have gradually improved the former miserable conditions of the peasants, or by large-scale irrigation schemes with great dams which have either already been constructed or are now under construction. These long-range plans have together greatly influenced water control generally and, through it, the climate.

116. No one can justly maintain that the French have carried out these achievements for their own benefit. Statistics show that in Tunisia 90 per cent of the farm land is owned by Tunisians, and in Morocco 94 per cent is cultivated by Moroccan owners. In both countries there is a large reserve of arable land that by well-tried methods, can be made to meet the needs of a constantly growing population. I should like to give some additional figures. In 1881, the farm land in Tunisia amounted to 700,000 hectares [*1,729,000 acres*]; today it amounts to well over 4 million hectares [*9,880,000 acres*]. In Morocco, 3,000 tons of fertilizer were used in 1925; the yearly figure now is 60,000 tons.

117. It was at the same time urgently necessary to improve health and sanitary conditions, first of all by conquering the diseases and epidemics that were decimating the population. The plague, cholera and typhus, regularly recurring horrors of past centuries, have now disappeared. Let us hope that the methods that have succeeded in Tunisia and Morocco may ultimately rescue all countries still ravaged by those diseases. Statistics show that the systematic campaign against malaria, smallpox and tuberculosis has greatly reduced their incidence. Infant mortality, which formerly was widespread, has been reduced by more than one-half. In Tunisia, the death rate is being rapidly reduced and is now 140 deaths per 10,000 inhabitants, a figure below that of many other countries. In Morocco, free clinical treatment was given in 1919 to barely a million people, but today the figure exceeds 13 million a year.

118. At the same time, a developing social legislation, modelled directly on that of France, has given the workers a minimum wage (which, incidentally, is really observed, as is not everywhere the case), maximum working hours, weekly rest and, generally, the various protective measures which it is to the credit of our age to have initiated. The law is effectively enforced by labour inspectors. France has also furthered the protection and welfare of workers by introducing trade unions. They have had a remarkable growth in Tunisia

and are bound to become much more important in Morocco, where, by the way, Moroccans are admitted to European trade unions—the practice here being ahead of the law.

119. A tangible, irrefutable proof of how beneficial all these measures have been is the growth in population. A glance at the population graphs will give ocular proof of what has been accomplished. I shall cite only two figures, but they are conclusive. The indigenous population of Tunisia has tripled since 1880 and that of Morocco has doubled since 1920, whereas formerly, as I said before, they were steadily declining.

120. This very increase in population, however, has brought new problems. In order to adapt and develop their economies while remaining in essence agricultural countries, Tunisia and Morocco have had to develop their other resources, especially minerals, and to establish industries. The technical and financial contributions of France have here again been a decisive factor. It is clear that these countries would never have found within themselves the means to exploit their wealth. Mines, modern communications—roads, railways, and now air transport—ports, the most famous of which is Casablanca, electrification, especially by water power—all these have enabled Tunisia and Morocco to become countries with complex economic systems which, with a growing variety of resources and activities, should be able to cope easily with the population increase that I have just referred to. Everyone knows that in 1881 Tunisia had only trails, and that now there are more than 15,000 kilometers [*9,360 miles*] of carriage roads; that it then had no port but now has 22 ports open to trade and navigation. Everyone knows that whereas in 1912 the port of Casablanca in Morocco handled very little traffic, it now handles by itself 7,500,000 tons of goods, while the total traffic handled by all Moroccan ports amounts to almost 10 million tons.

121. This economic expansion originated in the harmonious partnership between France and Tunisia and Morocco. French technical methods and equipment, and the investment of French and local funds, government and private, have aided the indigenous inhabitants and the Europeans in their work and have welded together their efforts and interests, producing an ever closer and more powerful solidarity among all elements of the population. It is thus that Morocco has become the world's largest exporter and second largest producer of phosphates.

122. France is a strong supporter of the Point Four programme, and will therefore accept and solicit whatever outside assistance may be capable of fully developing these territories, which have a great future before them. As to what my country is doing, suffice it to say that, in 1951 alone, French Government funds directly or indirectly invested under the Plan de modernisation et d'équipement of the French Union amounted to 23,500 million francs for Tunisia and 67,000 million francs for Morocco.

123. Thus provided with a suitable livelihood and delivered from the plagues that were destroying them, the people have been given access to the benefits of culture. France has consequently been anxious to develop all forms of education. A systematic programme enables the schools to accommodate a larger percentage of Tunisian and Moroccan children each year and

makes it easier to satisfy the needs of a rapidly growing population. It is well to recall that the educational system had to start virtually from scratch. I shall say no more than that, at the present time, the number of pupils is increasing at the rate of 20,000 a year in Tunisia and 25,000 a year in Morocco, and that 16.5 per cent of the general budget in Tunisia and 17.18 per cent of the Moroccan budget is devoted to education. Once more, let me discreetly add that the same cannot be said of some of the countries that are accusing us. When these pupils leave school, the French universities are open to them just as to the French themselves, while at the same time their traditions and religion are respected. France remains faithful to its liberalism, which accepts all trends of thought and all aspirations of the human soul. Far from hindering or neglecting the development of the peoples under its care, it encourages and desires that development as one of the essential purposes of its presence among them.

124. All aspects of this joint undertaking, which is constantly developing, are closely linked to each other, and it is hard to imagine on what theory some persons base their claim to isolate political problems and ignore their close connexion with economic, social and cultural development. Political institutions must be an expression of that development and of the increasing maturity of a people. France has undertaken to educate and initiate those peoples in democracy, as provided in the treaties, and it is responsible for completing its task. Considerable strides have already been made. Many, of even greater importance, are being prepared, and France is ready to discuss them with properly authorized representatives.

125. Everything is done completely in the open. These are not secret negotiations carried out under cover to force the weaker party to agree. The Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunis are perfectly free to make their attitude known, and can state it formally in public. Who, then, can allege that freedom is being stifled? The fact that lengthy and laborious discussions are sometimes inevitable in matters of this complexity is no cause for surprise; still less should it arouse indignation, in which passion plays a greater part than reason. Simple solutions can doubtless be applied in countries still in the initial stages of their economic and social evolution, but no longer in Tunisia and Morocco, because of the great complexity of their problems, which cannot be dealt with by improvisation or by a breach in continuity.

126. Is it really intended to challenge France's right to discuss the various stages and the pace of this evolution, seeing that France first started and directed the process? Who, then, is to take these decisions in France's stead? Without going back to the legal aspect which I dealt with a moment ago, without asking under what power, what text, the United Nations would seize itself of these problems, I should like to know how our Organization could possibly define what reforms should be undertaken, by what stages, and through what institutions. For that is the proposal. You are to be made the judges, not only of the existing situation, but also of what should be done in the future: that is to say, of the way to protect the interests of 3 million Tunisians, 8 million Moroccans, 500,000 and 150,000 other Europeans who are at present working hard together

to lead the two territories towards a maximum of prosperity and welfare.

127. The Moroccan and the Tunisian problems alike consist basically of how to ensure for the future, as in the past, that all these elements in the population, each essential to the life of the country, shall be able to live and work together in peace and friendship. The indigenous populations themselves are not homogeneous; they differ in their origins, traditions, beliefs and aspirations. The successes achieved under the authority, the responsibility and the protection of France in the past must be maintained and guaranteed by a new régime. That is the political problem before us.

128. It is relatively easy to criticize and to express wishes. It would, I think, be extremely rash to attempt to burden the United Nations with the responsibility for determining the future organization of two rapidly developing countries.

129. Some perhaps might not be sorry if they merely succeeded in ousting France, without caring what happened afterwards. Well, France is not going to let itself be ousted. I give them that firm and solemn assurance, supported up to the hilt by the vast majority of the affected peoples, who know better than anyone else that France is essential to them and that no one could effectively take its place.

130. The goal which France has set itself is dictated by its conscience, inspired by its ideals and imposed by the principles laid down in the preamble to its Constitution and by its commitments to the United Nations. It intends—and I quote the words of our Constitution: "to guide the peoples for whom it has assumed responsibility towards the freedom to govern themselves and to manage their own affairs democratically". That is the aim. France will not disavow this mission. Did anyone challenge this mission when together we founded the United Nations and signed its Charter? In those days no one thought of making any reservations about our right to be in North Africa, or our conception of our duties. If this mission is to be fruitful and lasting, it must be carried out by means of friendly contractual agreements, freely debated and entered into, without external interference of any sort, either individual or collective. It must be carried out progressively and quietly, with full regard to the aspirations, concerns and interests of all sectors of the population, irrespective of race, language, religion or social status.

131. The policy which France has set itself is perfectly clear; it cannot be suspected by anyone. Need I recall that it was at the request of the French Government that Tunisia and Morocco were both unanimously admitted last year to associate membership in the World Health Organization? Need I refer to Cambodia, Laos or Vietnam, which have gained their independence within the system of the French Union, which are today members of most of the international organizations, and whose application for admission to the United Nations recently received the favourable votes of all but one of the States members of the Security Council? France's policy is flexible; it is adaptable, and it adapts the progress of political institutions to the resources and requirements of each territory. The same arrange-

ment would not be applicable everywhere at the same time.

132. With regard to Tunisia, the French Government has submitted to the Bey a detailed programme of new reforms which would constitute a step forward towards internal self-government. They would bring about extensive participation by the Tunisians in public affairs. Our purpose is that the Tunisians should be able to assume ever-increasing responsibilities. We particularly want the support of young Tunisians, who are given priority in all the administrative careers in their country. In this way we are trying to spread democratic organization at all levels, starting at the bottom, in the municipalities and other local communities. Then, as these reforms are gradually put into effect and tested in practice, France will be prepared gradually to give up the powers which it holds under the treaties and exercises at present on behalf of sovereign Tunisia by virtue of a contractual delegation.

133. In Morocco, the development started thirty years later than in Tunisia and has proceeded along very different lines. The final objective, however, is the same: to establish Morocco with its dynasty as a sovereign State, to develop its political and social institutions on democratic foundations within a progressively expanding area of self-government, to protect all interests, and to make the best use of all resources and help, so that, working harmoniously together, we may ensure the welfare of Morocco and all its inhabitants. We have recently given an assurance of these aims to His Majesty the Sultan, and we are always prepared to reach an understanding on these principles and the methods of applying them, just as we have been and still are prepared to do in Tunisia.

134. In Tunisia, unfortunately, some have preferred violence and intimidation to free and friendly understanding. Terrorism is always a most hateful method; it will never serve as an argument against us. It is criminal and cowardly to murder innocent victims, women and children, the great majority of them Tunisians, by the haphazard explosion of bombs thrown or placed by ill-doers who have been turned into fanatics or hired by those who prefer to remain under cover. Those who organize terrorism do irreparable damage to the cause they claim to serve.

135. You could not be deceived by such methods, become the pawns of coldly premeditated terrorism, or give way to such criminal blackmail. France alone is responsible for the maintenance of order and security; it protects both French and Tunisians impartially and will continue to do so firmly and with composure in spite of all provocations.

136. An assembly such as this must weigh its responsibilities very carefully, for they are commensurate with its high authority. The mere possibility that the Assembly might intervene in Tunisian affairs has encouraged the agitators. It has caused great bewilderment and has troubled the negotiations, which were previously conducted quite calmly. A minority of extremists would like to delude the masses by the mirage of a fruitless debate in this Assembly. Foreign propaganda is also being used to mislead people, and the result is the useless sacrifice of several dozen human lives, loss of time, and a slowing down of activities at a time when the people as a whole want merely to work

and live in peace and security. Some persons are fostering the dangerous illusion of being granted an audience by the Assembly; they are speculating about your possible intervention against us. This is the only remaining expedient, the last resort of those who have undertaken the serious responsibility of breaking off the negotiations in which the French Government has never ceased to associate with them.

137. You owe it to yourselves to put an end to these speculations, to this uncertainty. As long as you go on discussing, as long as there remains the slightest chance of your intervening, the fanatics will do everything to prevent the possibility of a friendly solution.

138. This is the case with Tunisia, this could become the case with Morocco, but it would also end by being the case with other States as well.

139. Is there a single country without any difficulties arising out of antagonisms based on race, language or religion? Let me ask whether such countries believe that they could remain free from all outside interference or from any attempt at interference if the United Nations admitted the principle, or even the possibility, of such interference in the case of Tunisia or Morocco? Sooner or later the United Nations would be asked to set itself up as the judge of these extremely delicate problems of minorities. Does anyone really believe that that would serve the cause of peace among nations, in accordance with Article 1 of the Charter?

140. To take action on the suggestions made to you would, moreover, jeopardize the internal cohesion of States by giving rise within them to misgivings and dissensions which would thenceforth be encouraged from outside. The more I think of it, the more I am convinced that what is involved in this matter is not only North Africa, not only the interests of France—vital interests which France is entitled to protect and will protect with all its strength—but also a sound conception of the United Nations itself. The Organization is threatened by a distortion which would be pernicious to itself, to the Member States and to the cause of peace.

141. I tell you this with the absolute frankness which I owe you, whether you are friends or enemies. I tell you this because you all, without exception, are aware—you have yourselves experienced during the history of your own peoples—that France has traditionally defended the cause of the oppressed, that France is deeply attached to the freedom and dignity of the human person and of nations. More than any other country, France respects the feeling of nationhood, which it is proud to have served in every circumstance and which it does not confuse, and will never confuse, even if it calls itself nationalism, with blind and criminal fanaticism. More than any other nation, France endeavours for its own part to rise above the outmoded concept of colonialism, which it has repudiated once and for all in its Constitution and in its institutions, and even to rise above nationalism itself, selfishly confined within its narrow frontiers.

142. France considers that it is neither failing in its national duty nor disregarding its true interests by joining enlarged communities which are the result of historical development or are made necessary by geographical or economic factors; for such communities always express solidarity among men and nations.

143. One of them is the French Union, established by our Constitution of 1946, contemporary with the Charter of San Francisco and born of the same spirit. The French Union is the outcome of a development towards an association of States and territories in which each retains its identity and chances for the future, each is given institutions adapted to its particular status and its capacity for self-government and responsibility, but in which all the participants, whether in Europe or overseas, subordinate themselves to the performance of a common task, the service of a common interest, and in which each co-operates in the defence and development of the whole. In that common setting, each people must progress, materially and politically, towards ever higher levels at which their native abilities, their aptitudes for the free management of their own affairs, will unfold and assert themselves.

144. For the peoples thus bound to France by a common destiny, it would be a mistake to follow a policy that might dissociate or disunite them, or set them against one another. I can assure you that we are imbued with the spirit of the Charter and wish to attain its objectives. Some believe they can attain those objectives by establishing separate entities and leaving them to waste away in an isolation where racial passions might have free rein and at the same time lead to economic ruin. We, however, wish to attain those objectives by forming large political and economic communities. To a policy of division, we oppose a policy of association.

145. We regard as an all-too-common fallacy the belief that the supreme good for a people lies in unlimited and absolute independence. Just as freedom is an inalienable right both of the individual and of the nation, so independence is relative and involves degrees. One is truly independent only to the extent to which one is able to face one's responsibilities and satisfy one's needs. All peoples today are subject to the imperative requirements of solidarity and interdependence. No problem of importance can any longer be solved within the frontiers of a single nation.

146. The same is true of the concept of sovereignty, which has lost its absolute validity. France, as permitted by its Constitution, accepts for itself—but only under the condition that there is reciprocity—the idea of a freely agreed transfer and division of sovereignty in favour of supra-national agencies. France sees in this idea a means of building a new world, a more coherent and more peaceful world, in which vast tasks extending beyond national structures would be jointly undertaken in the interests of all, in which peace would no longer rest only on fragile treaties, on transactions rapidly repudiated or forgotten at the behest of ephemeral power groups, but in which peace and peaceful co-operation would be organized by joint and permanent institutions, expressing the solidarity of merging and intermingled interests.

147. That is the idea which is also at the basis of our European policy. It is no longer a mere project. Two months ago it took substance and became a reality in the form of a coal and steel community established among six European States with a total population of 156 million inhabitants, which by a fifty-year treaty have pooled the production of those two basic industries. In the same way, there will be established a

common army—no longer a coalition army, an aggregate of national armies, but a single and unique institution serving a jointly determined policy. By taking such an initiative and—it must be said—this risk, France has shown the way which will lead us beyond nationalism. France submits of its own accord to this common discipline; by its own example it evinces a new ideal which will be the foundation of a renovated organic structure.

148. All this, however, presupposes education and a prudent and methodical development. France considers that it would be making a serious and unpardonable mistake if territories still imperfectly developed, for which it is now responsible in varying degrees, set themselves up as independent States before they were able to meet the heavy responsibilities which that would imply. The dangerous mirage of a premature independence, fictitious rather than real, would imperil not only the legitimate interests of France and of others, which France has undertaken to safeguard, but also the further development of those same territories, which we cannot expose to chance and anarchy.

149. For all these reasons, which we have frankly explained to you, my Government declares itself compelled in all conscience to warn the Assembly against the consequences of an interference to which in no case and under no conditions could it consent. Consequently my Government can agree to discuss neither the principle nor the manner of such interference.

150. France will not be failing in the respect it owes the United Nations, or in the loyalty which it has pledged and still pledges in respect of all its international commitments, if it feels bound to protest against what it regards as a fatal mistake and a dangerous misunderstanding of one of the fundamental principles of the Charter.

151. Against these misgivings and reservations which I have just expressed on my country's behalf, there is fortunately a positive side to the balance sheet, an aspect which reveals the continuity of our joint efforts. That continuity is in a way embodied in our Secretary-General. I shall be sorry if Mr. Trygve Lie's resignation is to be regarded as final, for it would break the personal continuity of which I have spoken.

152. In all justice, we must recognize that in some respects the United Nations has achieved tangible results. Thus, so far as economic and social matters are concerned, I pay tribute to its successful efforts to give effective aid to the under-developed countries. Such aid also promotes solidarity, and is an enterprise with which we shall always associate ourselves to the full extent of our resources.

153. Similarly, France will remain closely associated with other countries in the defence of peace and freedom. In that connexion, my country is gratified at the success which the United Nations has achieved and must still achieve in political matters. It considers that disarmament remains an ideal to be attained, and it hopes the Organization's present and future work will not disappoint the peoples of the world.

154. In Korea, the United Nations has achieved the triumph of international justice. It has opposed flagrant aggression with its collective force, and, thanks to the sacrifices which have been made, the brunt of

which has been borne by the American people, our Organization has remained faithful to its calling. Its principles have survived; at the price of severe fighting, the armies under its flag have stopped and driven back the aggressor and freed all the invaded territory.

155. Thus aggression has been punished, and for a year and a half the United Nations has been attempting to re-establish peace. We knew already that except on one point—the exchange of prisoners—the armistice negotiations had succeeded. The discussions in the First Committee have confirmed that. They have also fully revealed all the complex aspects of this problem of the liberation and repatriation of prisoners, whose solution, we think, can be based only on the immediate liberation of all prisoners as soon as hostilities come to an end and the exclusion of any method involving repatriation or detention by force. I entertain the firm hope that the means whereby that principle, which is intended to ensure the protection of the prisoners, can be put into practice, will be worked out by the First Committee, in which all delegations have unanimously expressed their desire to reach a just and honourable settlement which would put an end to the suffering and distress of an unhappy country.

156. This picture of our fears and grounds for hope would perhaps seem gloomy and discouraging, were it not illumined by our absolute goodwill and our faith in the future of the work that was undertaken seven years ago. Even criticism is constructive if it is intended to ensure a better knowledge of our task, to guide our joint efforts. In voicing such criticism, we are discharging a duty towards all the countries represented here, towards our Organization and towards ourselves.

157. I should like everyone to be able to feel the sincerity, the feelings, which have motivated my words, and to realize that what is most important for France is not the protection of its national interests, however legitimate such an aim might be, but the future of the United Nations, which is now at stake. A crisis like that which now threatens the United Nations cannot be resolved by a trial of strength or by adopting some motion or resolution. Just as a surgeon avoids operating when the patient's condition is at the acute stage, so just and lasting solutions cannot be worked out when feelings are at fever heat.

158. Though France remains ready to take its large share in all dangers and in all enterprises of common interest, it has no intention of placing on others responsibilities which are its own and to which it lays claim before you with full consciousness of its duty.

159. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Iraq wishes to speak on a point of order.

160. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq): The distinguished leader of the French delegation certainly did not make a general speech in this general debate. He especially discussed and debated the question of Tunisia and Morocco. This question was so discussed, in view of the nature of the general debate, that it is only fair that it should be answered right away. That is why I wish to ask the President for permission, although it is not quite in order, to reply to such an important speech immediately.

161. The PRESIDENT: In reply to the point which has just been raised, I would suggest to the General

Assembly that nothing whatever stated by the representative of France was out of order. It is quite customary in general discussions, as the representative of Iraq must know, for any representative to discuss any matters on the agenda in the general debate which are of particular concern to that representative. I think the representative of France was quite within his rights in dwelling on any particular item on the agenda. Therefore, I would have to rule that the representative of France was quite in order in anything that he said.

162. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq): I do not wish to be misunderstood. The representative of France is entitled to say all that he pleases. We all welcome anybody to express his views freely. But my question is, in view of the fact that he did deal with such a subject, would it not be fairer and more appropriate that the other side of this question should be given priority?

163. The PRESIDENT: In reply to that, all I can say is, I am not sure that is a point of order, and that there are a good many speakers on our list who have not yet taken part in our debate. I am quite sure that, included in that list, there are the names of representatives who will take advantage of the opportunity to express another point of view on the subject which has been raised by the representative of France. Therefore I would suggest that we continue our general discussion in the order of the list of speakers that I have before me. Following that order, I should now like to call on the representative of the Netherlands.

164. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands): Seven years have passed since the establishment of the United Nations, and we are now foregathered in our new magnificent home. Does the fact that we possess a permanent workshop indicate that we are definitely entering an era of better international relations? The Secretary-General—whose intention to resign we have with sincere regret just learned—in his opening statement [376th meeting] remarked that in 1945 the United Nations had no home except in the hearts of the people.

165. Today we do possess an impressive house of steel and stone, but are we quite sure that we are still as deeply rooted in the hearts of the people as we were seven years ago? That, in our opinion, is an important question, because it is only in the hearts of the people that our Organization and the principles for which it stands can really prosper. We serve an ideal but we must also be realistic; and the realistic approach must take account of the fact that politics is the art of the possible, and that the desirable cannot always be achieved overnight. Over-statements in criticism could turn this Organization away from whatever possibilities for synthesis there are, and lead us astray into a jungle of sterile quarrels of words. The man in the street everywhere expects more than mere oratory and eloquence. First and foremost he needs and expects peace and security, on which basis developments in other spheres—social, economic, cultural—should be built.

166. Now it is exactly in the sector of peace and security that thus far the United Nations has not been able to live up to the high expectations roused in 1945. We all know the reason for this deficiency. In 1945, towards the close of the Second World War, there was reason to hope for continuing agreement among

the nations which had combined their forces against their totalitarian aggressors in the East and in the West. Today we see that this ideal is still far from realized and that our world is divided and once again faced by aggressive intent. Once more the political climate is tense with threatening storms. Once more we are obliged to devote our greatest energy to self-defence and to building up collective security and collective resistance against aggression or the danger of it.

167. In one case, Korea, the Organization has been able and willing to take action in this field, made possible by well-known exceptional circumstances. The aggression in Korea in 1950 did confront the United Nations with its prime responsibility. The response to the appeal of the Security Council for armed and other assistance to repel the attack and to restore peace and security in the area has been wide, courageous and magnanimous. The General Assembly, or at least a great majority of its members, has also understood the need to provide the means for collective action in cases where, as a result of disagreement between the permanent members of the Security Council, action would be frustrated, and impotence would take the place of strength. I refer to the "Uniting for peace" resolution [377 (V)]. But we must be on our guard to head off the danger that the unity of purpose displayed on those two occasions may be weakened by those whose interest it is to split our ranks, to sow mutual distrust and to play one part of the world against the other.

168. We are ready and eager to conclude an honourable armistice, now that the aggressor has been largely thrown back to where he came from. But our firmness to uphold the United Nations principles as applied to the Korean problem must not be shaken.

169. Our world today, except where in actual armed conflict it is compelled to resist aggression with force of arms, lives in the atmosphere of the so-called cold war or, as some would have it, of cold peace. Nobody will maintain that this is a satisfactory state of affairs, or that cold war or cold peace is particularly conducive to the promotion of the purposes laid down in the Charter.

170. Although cold war and cold peace are far less disastrous for humanity than a real hot war, we must not close our eyes to the many anomalies and injustices which are inherent in the present uneasy world situation. In other words, we ought not to resign ourselves to an indefinite continuance of the post-war *status quo* in some parts of the world and we should, by peaceful means, seek redress of obviously unjust or unhealthy situations. As a result of the Second World War there are countries which are still artificially divided and under foreign occupation, and where no peace treaty has normalized free life as it should be restored. I am thinking of divided Korea, divided Germany, occupied Austria, and that does not complete the list.

171. Furthermore, there still exists a dangerous imbalance of forces which has threatened the fate of the free world ever since the Second World War came to a close. In our opinion, therefore, we should welcome, be it in a restricted regional sphere, the gradual building up of forces on the side of the free world and the resulting growing correction of this intolerable situation, unless we can remove this imbalance by an effective system of balanced reduction of armaments and

armed forces under equally effective international control. But we deeply regret to say that the attitude so far taken by the Soviet Union Government in the Disarmament Commission does not leave us with great hopes in this respect.

172. I have referred to regional defence for lack of wider security. I mean first of all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We are witnessing today all kinds of communist manoeuvres to sow discord between the countries of the Atlantic community, which are trying to unite their defensive means in accordance with the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter. Opponents of the free world apparently are under the misapprehension that honest difference of opinion—which, after all, is but the logical consequence of freedom of mind and of varying national responsibilities—is a sign of the falling apart of those who are determined together to resist aggression if and when it comes. We know that the totalitarian mind is unable to understand this frankness of expression amongst free countries, since in the enslaved totalitarian orbit no free, individual opinion is permitted when directed against the supreme law as laid down arbitrarily by the central overlords.

173. But it would be a serious mistake if this misapprehension should lead the communist world to think that, where the essential purposes of NATO are concerned—and again I stress that these purposes do not conflict with the security purposes of the United Nations—the unity of will and purpose of the NATO countries could be undermined or impaired. It is in the interest of the peace of the world that nobody should draw so wrong a conclusion. In this common determination of the NATO countries lies a fundamental, vital force. There may be occasional, and very natural, divergences of views on ways and means, but there is no such divergence concerning the ultimate aim: collective security against aggression.

174. We conceive NATO to be one of the most important contributions to that wider collective security which the Charter requires us to bring about. We realize that, in this wider field, the Security Council, for reasons well known to all of us, has failed to organize a permanent international armed instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. In these circumstances, other means had to be devised within the framework of the Charter, and this has had to be done. There is reason for all free countries to be thankful that frustration in the wider field did not result in passive acceptance of that failure. There is equal reason to hope that other examples of collective organization in other parts of our world may further strengthen security in specific regions and the United Nations as a whole.

175. In this connexion, I wish to say a few more words on the significance of regional organization, since our Belgian colleague has just now so brilliantly and so thoroughly dealt with this subject.

176. In Western Europe, we are witnessing the process of growing integration. There again, the national struggle for life recognizes the necessity for international, and even supranational, co-operation in order the better to guarantee the political, economic and social existence of all the parties concerned. I do not have

to remind you of Benelux, whose union constitutes for its three partners the first successful experiment in inter-European co-operation. The Council of Europe has been doing most valuable spadework in this field.

177. In the economic and financial sector, the generous Marshall aid provided by the United States has brought to life the European Organization for Economic Co-operation. The European Payments Union is acting as a clearing house through which today no less than 60 per cent of the world's commercial payments are being channelled. The Coal and Steel Community—a plan to which the name of the Foreign Minister of France is attached, the so-called Schuman plan—as has been the case with other far-sighted initiatives of these last years, has become a genuine supernational body.

178. In the security field, the basis has been laid for a European defence community which may well finally lead to the acceptance of an over-all Western European political authority, in other words, to some kind of Western European federation or confederation. True, many difficulties still have to be overcome, but I submit that what is happening there is a most noteworthy evolution, where national authority recognizes the vital necessity of breaking down the walls of outdated absolute sovereignty.

179. The regional idea, often based on a natural similarity and community of positive interests, seems to be gaining ground. Does that make the more universal conception of the United Nations less desirable, less indispensable? The answer must, in our opinion, be most emphatically in the negative.

180. The significance of the United Nations remains entire, not only as an act of faith, but foremost as an instrument for implementing this faith and for applying it in practice to the promotion of universal peace and universal well-being. Yet the ways towards universal agreement and understanding are inevitably long, because in the universal organization the divergences of views and interests are necessarily greater and more numerous than in the smaller and more homogeneous group. Therefore it should astonish nobody that where urgent, immediate needs of security or of mutual assistance have to be met, the possibility of more rapid solution in smaller circles is not neglected.

181. It is only by proving that it can be as realistic and as effective as these more restricted international groupings, that the United Nations can vitalize the wider community. It cannot—it must not—for a moment forget or neglect its high purposes and principles, but neither must it try to force unrealistic or premature solutions which do not correspond to realities. We must organize our common forces and resources rather than spend them in sometimes needless and avoidable quarrels.

182. If, on the one hand, we witness this growing tendency amongst sovereign nations towards regional or international integration in different degrees and for various purposes, we see on the other hand the emergence of new, free nations which for very understandable reasons are emphatically jealous of their newly-born independence and authority—and impatiently anxious that these blessings should within the shortest possible time also be granted to all other peoples and territories which have not as yet attained self-government. They urge an acceleration of the implementation

of a charter which engages its adherents to respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

183. We have all, by our own free will, pledged ourselves to act in accordance with the principles of the Charter. But that does not and cannot mean that, in a world so varied in circumstances and degrees of social, economic and political development, patent remedies can be found which can be identically applied everywhere. Therefore those who administer Non-Self-Governing Territories must be realists as well as idealists, lest they should, by the premature abandonment of their responsibilities as promoters of development and self-government, fail to live up to the fulfilment of their engagements.

184. I may say, in passing, that this problem is in no way confined to States administering outlying or overseas Non-Self-Governing Territories. There are a number of countries which, within their own metropolitan borders, contain groups of inhabitants too primitive, too under-developed to govern themselves. The fact that no obligation has been accepted to inform the United Nations about such non-self-governing populations can only confirm my thesis that the task of the responsible governing Power cannot be determined or cut short by the impatient emotionalism of well-meaning neighbours and friends.

185. These are delicate, difficult and complicated matters. We are faced in various degrees by a combination of territorial, national and international interests which are to a great extent interdependent. Where there is conflict or dispute, or where criticism is called for, a constructive attitude on the part of the General Assembly should take all these factors into account, and each case should be considered on its own merits. I believe that we should as a general rule be well advised to leave to the parties what can be achieved or settled between themselves. Where our competence is beyond doubt, we should encourage them to use the many means for peaceful solution which the Charter indicates, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

186. I said "where our competence is beyond doubt". There again we find ourselves confronted with a very difficult problem. Our Charter is a compromise between a variety of national individual opinions. The scope of Article 2, paragraph 7, is, as experience has shown, a debatable issue, and it would not serve the interests of the United Nations to neglect the fact that on this point not all of our members see eye to eye.

187. Our Organization, in the form in which it was accepted by its Members, is no super-State, nor is it a world government. We should not presume that it is, for this might well be the beginning of the end of the United Nations. The fact is that our Member States have accepted certain obligations, no more and no less. The fact is that what has been called the private lives of nations, or the sector of domestic jurisdiction and internal affairs, has been left to the responsibility of these nations themselves.

188. Where there is serious doubt, we should submit the question to our highest legal authority, the International Court of Justice, and my country for one regrets that this has not been done more often in the past. Where there is serious doubt as to just where we find ourselves between *jus constitutum* and *jus consti-*

tuendum we should not force the issue because of extraneous motives, which might endanger the loyalties to the United Nations.

189. In some quarters there is a tendency to read into the Charter more than it contains. I have mentioned the case of Article 2, paragraph 7. I would also mention the case of Chapter XI, regarding the Non-Self-Governing Territories and the administering Powers. The Charter rightly distinguishes between Non-Self-Governing Territories, dealt with in Chapter XI, and the International Trusteeship System, dealt with in Chapter XII. They are two different problems, with two different kinds of rights and obligations.

190. Here again we must be careful not to overstep the limits which the Charter itself has laid down. There is no justification whatsoever to endeavour arbitrarily to change Chapter XI into Chapter XII. Yet the kind of acrimonious criticism which each year, in increasing tone and volume is directed against the administering Powers responsible for Non-Self-Governing Territories, seems to be doing precisely that. The administering Powers which have endorsed Chapter XI of the Charter have thereby accepted certain obligations as a sacred trust. But they have not signed away their own and exclusive authority for the task they have undertaken. They surely have their duties, but they also have their rights. It would certainly not be in the interests of the Non-Self-Governing Territories if the indispensable balance between those duties and rights were neglected or disturbed. It is a well-known saying that too many cooks usually spoil the broth.

191. I do not intend in this general debate to express an opinion on all the major problems with which the Assembly is concerned. My delegation will have ample opportunity to do so in the Main Committees.

192. It is the determined policy of the Netherlands Government to promote the expansion and co-ordination of various forms of international co-operation in political, military, economic, financial, social and cultural fields, in which my country is taking part. Our faith in the work of the United Nations remains one of the fundamental pillars of our foreign policy. For that reason I have permitted myself to point out certain developments which, in our opinion, might, if not corrected, be detrimental to the strength of our world Organization.

193. In this connexion, I wish to say that the Netherlands Government—on the positive side of the work of the United Nations—is following with particular interest the problem of rendering assistance to underdeveloped countries, in order to bring about a sounder and better balanced world. It gives us ground for satisfaction that this kind of assistance increases from year to year. On the other hand, it is to be regretted that so far it has not been possible to place sufficient financial means at the disposal of these endeavours. The reasons are to be found in economic difficulties, in insufficient international *rapprochement*, and perhaps, most of all, in the fact that a heavy extra financial load has to be carried by the Western world for the defence of its own security.

194. There has been before us for some time a proposal made by the representative of Chile [A/C.2/L.77], Mr. Santa Cruz, for the establishment of an

international fund for economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. We welcome the fact that this idea is in the process of being placed on a businesslike basis, thanks to studies by the Secretariat and the Economic and Social Council. Last year, the Netherlands delegation expressed its sympathy for the principle of the suggestion put forward by Chile, but we are of the opinion that such a plan could only be put into effect if we succeeded in achieving a more constructive co-operation between the more developed and the less developed countries. As long as the relationship between these two categories of peoples, for a variety of reasons, remains sometimes highly controversial, we can hardly hope to achieve sound and realistic results. Here also there is a clear interdependence between political and economic factors, and here also we must endeavour to establish a favourable climate for closer mutual understanding concerning the legitimate interests of all the countries concerned; otherwise we shall merely create new conflicts or intensify old ones.

195. The General Assembly is no court of justice. We are a political body, and premature judgment or denunciation is not the best way to further the process of persuasion. After all, the General Assembly has no power to go beyond the making of recommendations. Its powers are thus limited, because its primary functions are not those of direct intervention, but rather of an advisory nature; that is, to discuss, to develop friendly relations, to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote economic and social progress, and so forth. Promotion, however, is not the same thing as imposition. Our progress, therefore, cannot be but gradual, since in our heterogeneous world the development of a generally accepted code of conduct takes time.

196. We live in a period of accelerated post-war transition, and the United Nations is called upon to be a co-ordinating and stimulating force. But if discussion and recommendation should become political ends in themselves, then such activity might well kill the effect which unprejudiced counsel could otherwise have produced. We should merely estrange nations and peoples from our Organization and encourage new isolationism.

197. We are faced with problems vital to all of us. World peace is insecure, and there are places where nations are fighting and men are dying. The desire for national freedom, where this has not yet been achieved, the struggle for human rights and for decent standards of living, are piling their increasing weight on top of a world already staggering under the load of unsolved problems of rehabilitation after the devastations caused by two world wars within a quarter of a century.

198. The United Nations can render great service as an institution where the nations of the world can pool their wits and energies in order to design a pattern of co-operation with which to overcome the obstacles in our common path. Let us try earnestly to understand each other's positions and motives, in order to find ways and means of reconciling diverging interests, on the basis of a common standard of fundamental political faith.

199. That standard is, or should be, the Charter. We know that it is not perfect. In 1955 it will come up for revision. That is a serious matter in which my Government is deeply interested. The ground should be thoroughly prepared, and for that reason we welcome the suggestions put forward in this Assembly to make timely provision for a preparatory commission. But for the present we have the Charter, and we have accepted it as it is now. It has given us hope, it has given us guidance, and it has given us the

beginning of strength. May it also give us the wisdom to harmonize our actions.

200. I pray that, under divine guidance, we may succeed in developing the United Nations ever more into a beneficial and efficient instrument for the achievement of the noble ends which it is pledged to serve.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.