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President: Mr. Luis PADILLA NERVO (Mexico).

Financial reports and accounts, and reports of the
Board of Auditors : appointment of members of the
Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds

[Agenda item 39]

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : Before embarking upon the consideration of today's agenda I have the following announcement to make.
2. On 7 December 1951, at its 352nd plenary meeting, when dealing with agenda item 39 (a) " Financial reports and accounts, and reports of the Board of Auditors : United Nations, for the financial year ended 31 December 1950 ", the General Assembly adopted a resolution which, among other things, requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint a Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, composed of seven members, for the purpose of consulting, as soon as possible during the current session of the General Assembly, with Member and non-Member States as to the amounts which governments may be willing to contribute on a voluntary basis towards each programme approved by the Assembly for which funds are not available through the regular budget of the United Nations and for which the Negotiating Committee is specifically requested by the Assembly to obtain pledges of voluntary contributions from governments.
3. In pursuance of that resolution, I have appointed the following countries as members of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds : Canada, France, Lebanon, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay.

Consideration of the various items on the agenda
of the meeting

4. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : Representatives have before them the agenda of this meeting. The nine items are all reports by Committees on different items assigned to them. It is my duty to ask the Assembly's opinion concerning the application of rule 67, which states : " Discussion of a report of a Main Committee in a plenary meeting of the General Assembly shall take place if at least one-third of the Members present and voting at the plenary meeting consider such a discussion to be necessary. Any proposal to this effect shall not be debated, but shall be immediately put to the vote ".
5. Unless I receive any proposal for discussion on these reports, I shall take it to be the wish of the Assembly to proceed to vote upon them.
6. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*) : The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR proposes that discussion be opened on item 69 of the agenda of the General Assembly.
7. We hope that the United States delegation, which has insisted on the discussion of this question in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, will support this proposal by the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR.
8. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : The representative of the Ukrainian SSR has requested a debate on the second item on the agenda of the meeting. I shall put the Ukrainian SSR representative's proposal to the vote.
The proposal was rejected by 28 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.

9. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : Rule 67 of the rules of procedure will therefore be applied, without prejudice to the right of representatives who wish to explain their votes on each draft resolution, statements on each item of the agenda being limited to seven minutes.

10. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) : In view of the fact that the Netherlands delegation wishes to present an amendment in connexion with the question of reservations to multilateral conventions [item 49 (a)] I wish to propose that the General Assembly should have a debate on the eighth item of today's agenda.

11. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : The Netherlands representative has requested a debate on the eighth item of today's agenda [items 49 (a) and 50]. I shall put his proposal to the vote.

The proposal was rejected by 21 votes to 10.

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments and International control of atomic energy ; report of the Committee of Twelve : report of the First Committee (A/2025)

[Agenda items 66 and 16]

12. Mr. THORS (Iceland), Rapporteur of the First Committee : I have the honour to present to the General Assembly the report of the First Committee on agenda items 66 and 16. Item 66 was originally placed before the General Assembly by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

13. The First Committee considered these two items concurrently at twenty-four meetings held between 19 November and 19 December. At the 447th meeting, held on 19 November, the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a joint draft resolution [A/C.1/667] to the First Committee. At the 453rd meeting, held on 24 November, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted an amendment [A/C.1/668] to the joint draft resolution.

14. At the 454th meeting, held on 26 November, the delegations of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria submitted a joint draft resolution [A/C.1/670] proposing the establishment of a sub-committee consisting of the President of the General Assembly, as Chairman, and the representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States, with a view to formulating agreed proposals concerning the control and reduction of armed forces and armaments and the abolition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction. At the 461st meeting, held on 30 November, a most unusual incident occurred in this extremely controversial Committee, when it was unanimously decided to establish the Sub-Committee. In one of the paragraphs of the draft resolution establishing the Sub-Committee, expression was given to the hope that, through the reduction and limitation of armaments and the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, the fear of war might be dispelled and the hope of providing a better life for the average man might be restored to anxious humanity. This Sub-Committee was given no small task, and its establishment constituted a new and most desirable opportunity for the great Powers to get together and discuss the divergencies of their views. People all over the world followed with the greatest interest and anxiety the work of the Sub-Committee, which met in closed session and held ten meetings. On 10 December 1951 the President of the

General Assembly, as Chairman of the Sub-Committee, transmitted to the Chairman of the First Committee a letter [A/C.1/677] forwarding a memorandum prepared by him at the request of the members of the Sub-Committee and unanimously approved by them, which memorandum was to be regarded as the Sub-Committee's report to the First Committee.

15. The Sub-Committee reached agreement on some minor items. This agreement was greatly welcomed, because any trifle of agreement gives rise to great expectations in our troubled world of today. However, and unfortunately, this agreement is still lacking on the main issues.

16. I shall now refer to the report of the First Committee which is necessarily a lengthy one. I take the liberty of presuming that all representatives are acquainted with it. It represents exclusively the usual objective account of the action of the First Committee on these items.

17. The tripartite draft resolution presented by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, as revised, was voted on at the 471st meeting, held on 19 December, and was adopted as a whole by 44 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions. This draft resolution is included at the end of the report, and I have the honour to recommend it for the consideration of the General Assembly.

18. May I call attention to the first three paragraphs of the draft resolution now before us, which read :

" The General Assembly,

" Moved by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war,

" Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world this burden and this fear, and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

" Reaffirming its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,"... therefore

" Establishes... a disarmament commission..."

19. All the world will wonder whether it will succeed. It has a tremendous task in front of it. Let us hope that it will be deserving of its name.

20. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : The First Committee recommends the adoption by the General Assembly of the draft resolution appearing at the end of document A/2025.

21. The USSR and Czechoslovak delegations have submitted amendments to the draft resolution which appear in documents A/2026 and Corr.2 and A/2035 respectively. The USSR delegation has informed me that it does not insist upon a vote being taken on its amendment [A/2026 and Corr.2]. I therefore consider this amendment as withdrawn.

22. I wish to inform representatives who desire to explain their votes on the First Committee's draft resolution and on the Czechoslovak amendment [A/2035], the only one still before the General Assembly, that it would be preferable that such explanations should be given in one and the same statement.

23. I suggest that we vote first on the amendments to the preamble and then on the amendments to the operative part.

24. I now put to the vote the first Czechoslovak amendment to delete the first five paragraphs of the preamble.

The amendment was rejected by 42 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.

25. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): Czechoslovakia's second amendment suggests the deletion of paragraphs 3 to 10 inclusive of the operative part.

The amendment was rejected by 42 votes to 5, with 9 abstentions.

26. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now vote on the third Czechoslovak amendment which proposes that after paragraph 2 of the operative part an additional paragraph should be inserted, reading as follows:

"3. Transmits to the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission for its consideration the draft resolution on item 66 of the agenda of the sixth session of the General Assembly submitted to the First Committee by the delegations of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and France (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) and the amendments to that draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/C.1/668/Rev.2).

The amendment was rejected by 41 votes to 6, with 8 abstentions.

27. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): As the amendments submitted to the First Committee's draft resolution have been rejected, we shall now vote on the draft resolution as a whole, in the form in which it was submitted by the First Committee [A/2025].

28. I call upon the representative of Yugoslavia who wishes to speak on a point of order.

29. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) (*translated from French*): I request that paragraph 3 (c) of the operative part should be voted on separately.

30. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): In accordance with the Yugoslav representative's request I shall put paragraph 3 (c) to the vote.

Paragraph 3 (c) was adopted by 32 votes to 5, with 9 abstentions.

31. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of France who wishes to speak on a point of order.

32. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): I wanted to raise a point of order before the voting started but I was not seen by the officers. I wanted to say that some delegations, including my own, would like to explain their votes and would like to have a single explanation of the basic text and all the amendments. We also think it would be better for all these explanations to be given before the vote rather than afterwards, because they might affect the stand taken by other delegations.

33. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I apologize to the representative of France for not having noticed that he wished to speak before the voting began.

34. As I explained previously, each delegation has the right to explain its vote. I did not notice anyone ask for the floor in order to explain his vote before the voting began. I therefore again apologize to the representative of France.

35. If no other representative wishes to explain his vote and as the voting has begun, I shall put to the vote the First

Committee's draft resolution as a whole, in the form in which it was submitted by the First Committee.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 42 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

36. Adly ANDRAOS Bey (Egypt) (*translated from French*): I must first confess that I fully support, although somewhat belatedly, the point of view expressed by the representative of France. I consider that in the normal course we should have been called upon to explain our votes and define our views prior to the vote. The other method, however, has the obvious advantage of being more expeditious, and I congratulate this Assembly on having, in record time, taken such important decisions upon which may depend, to some extent, the fundamental problem that is the very *raison d'être* of this Assembly, the organization of peace.

37. We have before us two proposals, two systems; I should even say that we have now before us a single proposal. It was pointed out that, since the Soviet Union had not insisted that this Assembly should take a decision on its amendment, we had before us only the tripartite proposals submitted by France, the United States and the United Kingdom, and we appear to have been asked not to be more royalist than the king and to support them.

38. The Egyptian delegation and some of the other delegations of the Arab and Asian countries decline to seek their inspiration either in the Rue de Grenelle or in the Avenue Gabriel. We express our views on questions that concern us by judging each case on its merits and not by taking sides.

39. The objections we raised to the tripartite proposals were perhaps more idealistic than practical. As the Chairman of the Syrian delegation has well expressed it in the course of the First Committee's discussions, the tripartite proposals are not so good that we can conscientiously support them and not so bad that we can reject them out of hand. For that reason, we have preferred to abstain. Not "neutrality"—it is very easy to coin words that satisfy the Press and to develop a mental apathy that refuses to analyse actual situations—not neutrality, I repeat, but a refusal to let ourselves join a side and a refusal above all to regard as the last word in human wisdom proposals which might easily have been improved, even in a very realistic spirit.

40. Our main objection to the tripartite proposals was that, under their terms, the prohibition of the atom bomb and other weapons of mass destruction was considered as a distant objective, an ultimate ideal only attainable at the end of a very long process. These proposals, in effect, provide for disarmament by stages, beginning with the simplest weapons and ending with the most deadly. It is as if we were told that, in order to cure cancer, the head cold had to be treated first. Everyone knows, and there is no mystery about it, that if the world today is living in constant fear of war, it is not the fear of ordinary war. Unfortunately, since the very beginning of human existence no means have yet been found of preventing war. An effort could and should be made, however, to humanize war and to confine it within certain limits.

41. The Egyptian delegation has felt, as several other Asian and Arab delegations have felt, that as the atom bomb is a weapon the effect of which can neither be described in terms of its objective nor delimited in time, and as it is, moreover, a weapon that cannot be classed as defensive, means should be found of outlawing it. The Egyptian delegation also believes that that was no fanciful project, that bans such as, for example, the ban on the use of

poison gas in warfare, have already been imposed and that in the past we have actually succeeded, with no sanction other than a moral sanction, in avoiding the use of poison gas. It is true that, besides the moral sanction, there was also the fear of reprisals. That fear also exists today where atomic weapons are concerned, since they are no longer the secret or the monopoly of one of the two blocs into which mankind is divided.

42. On the other hand, we also felt unable to vote for the USSR amendment, because the Russian proposal for disarmament by one-third on the basis of conventional armaments would not radically alter the present situation and because reduction of armaments in equal proportion would not diminish the risk of war.

43. Such, in brief, has been our attitude. I cannot, in the seven minutes allowed me, enter into the technical details of how, even before the establishment of the Disarmament Commission, we envisaged, not the banning of the production of atomic weapons but at least the banning of the use of such weapons and how, to our mind, that ban on their use should be a provisional measure that would have enabled the world to work for peace until more definite solutions had been found.

44. All that is a thing of the past ; but what is not of the past is our attitude, still unchanged, of contributing to any positive work for peace, and of voicing our objections whenever we encounter those who are not sufficiently receptive and who have no desire for a loyal contribution on the part of all.

45. I shall summarize my position by quoting from one of the seventeenth century masters of French thought. In his *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, Bossuet in a few words defined the position of ancient Egypt, which is also that of the Egypt of today. With extraordinary prescience, he wrote :

" Egypt loved peace because she loved justice, and had soldiers, only for defence. Satisfied with her land where everything was found in abundance, she did not in the least aspire to conquest. But she expanded in another way, by sending her people throughout the world and, with them, her courtesy and her laws. "

46. That is what we have wished to do in this Assembly ; we have sought to lend our aid so that courtesy and law may prevail in the relations between States. We shall continue to persevere and shall return to the next session of the Assembly, God willing, and again recommend moderation, wisdom and reason.

47. Mr. H. S. MALIK (India) : I should like to make a brief statement in explanation of the vote which my delegation has cast on the resolution on the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments.

48. I should like to say at the outset that we welcome the initiative taken in this matter during the present session, and we warmly support the proposal to set up a Disarmament Commission. We hope that the deliberations of this commission will see at least a beginning made towards the formulation of an agreed plan. My delegation, it will be recalled, has been strongly in favour of the amalgamation of the functions of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and we are glad that this proposal has been accepted almost unanimously. This, we feel, is in itself a significant step in the right direction. We are glad, also, that the proposal to have a world conference and to consider proposals for a draft treaty has received similar wide support.

49. During the discussions in the First Committee and in the Committee of Twelve my delegation consistently urged that if general agreement could not be obtained on the guiding principles and terms of reference of the proposed disarmament commission, these should at least be left elastic enough to accommodate different points of view. This principle, we notice, has been partially accepted in paragraph 3 (c) of the tripartite resolution but, on some other directives sharp divergencies of opinion still, unfortunately, remain. It was our hope, in common with that of many other delegations, that the Sub-Committee of the four Powers, set up by the First Committee, would have succeeded in smoothing them out. I am sure that we all regret that, although that Sub-Committee did to some extent narrow the area of disagreement, differences of opinion still remain on certain matters of principle.

50. In the vote on the tripartite draft resolution in the First Committee, my delegation voted for paragraphs 1 and 2, the first part of paragraphs 3, 8 and 10 of the operative part, and the first, second, fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble. It abstained on the rest largely because of the failure of the great Powers to agree. It seems to us to be a condition precedent to the success of any plan of disarmament that the Powers which possess the largest armaments should themselves first agree as to its fundamental principles. In the absence of such agreement my delegation has been constrained to abstain on the resolution as a whole.

51. My delegation is glad that a disarmament commission will now be set up. We hope not only that it will be guided in its deliberations by the directives contained in the resolution, but that it will be prepared to consider any other reasonable and constructive proposals which may be submitted to it from time to time. My Government, which has always been greatly interested in the problem of disarmament, will, if called upon by the commission, be glad to give such assistance and support as may lie in its power.

52. The vital importance of the task entrusted to the commission is obvious. The world today is sick with fear and apprehension of another large-scale armed conflict with all its dreadful prospects for humanity. All those who long for peace—and who does not ?—will pray for the success of the commission. They will follow anxiously the work of this commission in the hope that the representatives of the great Powers will succeed in working out agreed solutions of the urgent problems before them and so bring to the world relief from the present tension and usher in an era of peace.

53. Mr. SANGUINETTI (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*) : In spite of the vital importance of solving the problem of disarmament satisfactorily, a result which my Government earnestly desires, the Argentine delegation did not take any part in the debate on this subject in the First Committee. I should therefore like to take this opportunity of explaining our vote.

54. At the opening meetings of this session of the Assembly, the Argentine delegation outlined in general terms our Government's sincere hope that the countries represented here might find positive and concrete solutions of the problems which afflict mankind today, in order to ease the international tension and thereby also ward off the dangers of a new world war at this time when there are problems of real need and even utter wretchedness among a large part of the world's population while another part enjoys a high standard of living and all the benefits of progress and wealth.

55. At the same time, we pointed out that the people of the world should be able to enjoy peace based on a programme of social justice really suited to their actual

living conditions. I reaffirm that aspiration now because it has become a reality in my country today through the resolute action of our Government.

56. The Republic of Argentina can say that throughout its history it has been a peace-loving country. We have never attacked any country but, on the contrary, we settled the problems arising from the colonial era by friendly negotiation or arbitration and we were even able, when the time came, to agree on a balanced limitation of naval forces with our sister country, Chile. The Republic of Argentina sincerely welcomes this item submitted to the General Assembly for the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments as a first step towards lessening the existing international tension, so that we may achieve the necessary harmony among the great Powers to dispel the threat of a new world war which overshadows the world today.

57. We must point out that this feeling is shared by all the nations represented here, as we have had an opportunity to learn from their spokesmen. Moreover, in one way or another we have been shown how the heavy burden of armaments is weighing on the economy of many countries to the detriment of their development in various fields. In particular, it is preventing or seriously curtailing the assistance needed by countries which suffered greatly in the last war, as well as by those which, because of their precarious situation, are still far from being able to give their inhabitants the living conditions to which they are entitled and where the conditions are an anachronism in this century of progress.

58. As if that were not enough, we are all aware of the terrible damage of all kinds caused by wars. Both the victors and the vanquished suffer the disastrous consequences for many years, not to mention the effect in present circumstances, of the destruction of a civilization built up with so much sacrifice and effort through the centuries.

59. That is why the Argentine Government viewed this draft with sympathy, and we had hopes of reaching the desired solution. We stated in the First Committee that there could be no positive solution until the great Powers had reached agreement on the fundamental issues of disarmament. We are convinced that only through mutual understanding and by smoothing away the difficulties will it be possible to dispel the threat of war. We firmly believe that the blocs into which most of the world is now divided can exist side by side. This will be possible if these blocs develop harmoniously along parallel lines, if they give up, if necessary, some of their interests for the sake of the peace of the community of nations. However, if the two blocs strive in opposite directions, a clash might become inevitable, leading to a new war which nobody wants and which the whole world fears.

60. What have we seen so far? The First Committee, acting on the praiseworthy initiative of the delegations of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria, recommended that the Sub-Committee, consisting of the representatives of the four great Powers, should try to settle their differences. We all realize how intelligently and effectively Mr. Padilla Nervo, the President of the Assembly, worked throughout those difficult negotiations.

61. However, we also know the results. It is true that some progress was made, but not on the fundamental questions, which still remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the door remained open for further discussions at a later stage, as we were told by the representatives of the four Powers but, in spite of that, their subsequent statements did not hold out any hope of a solution of the problems under consideration.

62. That is why the Argentine delegation abstained on that occasion. We have now come, in plenary meeting, to the end of the discussion on this item and we are still virtually in the same position as the First Committee was at the end of its debate. We are all fully agreed on the need to reduce and limit armed forces and armaments; we all want to mitigate the horrors of war; but there are still serious differences among the great Powers which bear the burden of responsibility for the peace of the world.

63. I should not like to end these few remarks explaining my delegation's vote without emphasizing once more that my country is a peace-loving one, as General Juan Perón, the President of the Argentine Republic, has repeatedly stated.

64. Sirdar Mohammad NAIM (Afghanistan) (*translated from French*): During the debates in the First Committee on the disarmament problem, my delegation abstained from voting on the various draft resolutions submitted by the western Powers and the Soviet Union.

65. The Afghanistan delegation's attitude, like that of the delegations of several other countries, was based on the hope that by supporting the establishment of a sub-committee in which the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France participated, there would be greater probability of agreement between the great Powers. It was on that firm foundation, agreement between the great Powers, that the problem of the reduction of armaments would have the greatest chance of being successfully solved. This agreement would have enabled us to foresee the end of the ominous armaments race which, at the present time, in spite of all the arguments for a balance of forces, makes the imminence of a catastrophe felt throughout the world.

66. Unfortunately, our hopes were not justified. At the end of the Sub-Committee's negotiations on disarmament, there was no tangible result to show that the two opposing contentions had been brought any closer together.

67. Today we have had to vote on the only draft resolution which secured a majority of votes in the First Committee. That draft resolution is not perfect, because it cannot claim to have secured unanimous support. In the absence of something better, however, it clearly makes a step towards the goal which the whole of mankind would like to reach.

68. The work of the Disarmament Commission, as provided for in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the resolution, would no doubt give appreciable results when the discussions are resumed at the next session of the General Assembly.

69. Thus, in pursuance of my Government's policy, which is based on the ideal of peace and co-operation among the nations, and with the profound conviction that there can be no other safeguard of human dignity than peace, I voted for the draft resolution as a whole.

70. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia): I wish to make a very short statement to explain my delegation's vote. The opposing great Powers are agreed that there should be a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and that atomic weapons should be prohibited. This is an established fact. However, a basic distrust impels both sides to seek different ways for the realization of these aims. Unfortunately, this also is an established fact. The three western Powers outlined their method in their tripartite draft resolution, and the USSR in its amendment which it has now withdrawn. We do not dare to believe, however, that the views of the USSR have changed.

71. Being determined to bend every effort towards reconciling these two conflicting points of view, my delegation

refused to follow one or the other of the roads pointed out to us. The problem we have to solve here and now is how to diminish and, if possible, how to dissipate the distrust that exists between the opposing parties. This cannot be achieved by voting for either of the views that have been put forward by the two sides.

72. My delegation, therefore, abstained from voting on the tripartite draft resolution, and we shall do the same in regard to any resolution that dangerously divides the opposing great Powers.

73. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): The General Assembly has just taken its decision on the draft resolution on the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and on the international control of atomic energy with a view to its use for exclusively peaceful purposes.

74. The French delegation, as one of the co-sponsors of the draft, thanks the Members of the General Assembly for approving the text which, in its final form, is the result of painstaking study by the First Committee and the Sub-Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo.

75. In explaining why France voted for the draft resolution, I should like to say that we were animated by feelings of regret as well as hope.

76. We feel regret, most sincere regret, that the delegation of the Soviet Union should have been unable to support the draft, that Mr. Vyshinsky should have devoted his great talents to defending to the very end—although not today, in this Assembly—the principle of the prohibition of the atomic weapon without the prior establishment of control and that of a one-third reduction of the armaments of the five great Powers within a period of one year. You know why we cannot accept an increase in the superiority of the Soviet Union where it exists or destroy the democracies' superiority in the fields where they are better equipped.

77. In spite of the impossibility of conciliation, in spite of the futility of any attempt to disarm without the unanimous and sincere agreement of the Powers possessing large forces, we believe that today's vote may be regarded as of hopeful augury. The reasons for our belief are many.

78. In the first place, as other speakers have observed, some not insubstantial results were obtained in the calm and privacy of the Sub-Committee, in particular with regard to the establishment and functions of the Disarmament Commission which is to start work before 11 February 1952.

79. Finally, Mr. Vyshinsky's statement that the Soviet Union would co-operate in the Commission's work offers encouragement to those who persist in their efforts to build a lasting peace. We thank the representative of the Soviet Union for that contribution to the common effort.

80. The third reason is that we, the people of France, who have suffered so cruelly in so many wars, refuse to give up hope when peace is at stake. We wholeheartedly believe in the value of negotiations, even in apparently desperate situations, because we have faith in human wisdom.

81. Our fourth ground for hope is our belief that the text just approved is the only one capable of lessening the mistrust by which international relations are poisoned. As Mr. Robert Schuman said in this Assembly on 16 November [348th meeting, para. 143] "mistrust distorts everything, blocks every avenue". I should like, not from any desire to be polemical, to show, within the short time at my disposal, how that mistrust arose and, above all, how our recent vote may help to reduce it.

82. The Soviet States are full of mistrust of the democracies. Trying for the moment to place myself in the position of one of their representatives—which it is not easy for me to do—I would say that I understand the misgivings they felt at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the establishment of inter-allied headquarters, the construction of bases in Europe, Asia and Africa and the arrival of new American, British and Canadian forces in Germany. The representative, whose identity I am temporarily assuming, already regarded the Powers called by him the capitalist Powers as possible aggressors. He attributes evil intentions to them while he is persuaded of the purity of his own. He muses on the threat of encirclement. Is his fear genuine? Or does he pretend to believe in it for propaganda reasons? As I am anxious not to be polemical, I will assume that he is absolutely sincere. But I would ask him in turn to attempt to comprehend the standpoint of a western representative. Thus transmogrified, if I may use the word, he will first of all perceive our desire for peace, our horror of war, our refusal to contemplate any aggressive or preventive action. He will also realize that as early as 15 March 1946, three years before the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Chairman of the Gosplan, the State Planning Commission of the Soviet Union, Mr. Voznessensky, when explaining the 1946-1950 plan before the Supreme Soviet, said that the fifth essential objective—I quote his words—was "the need to increase still further the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union and to equip the armed forces of the USSR with ultra-modern material. It is the desire of the Soviet people, he said, "that their armies should be even stronger and more powerful in order to ensure peace against all dangers; for," he added, "monopoly capitalism is capable of breeding new aggressors". Those statements were made at the very time when we in the West were demobilizing and reducing our military budgets. The result is that the Soviet Union has four classes with the colours, 175 combat divisions, some 30 of them in Germany and eastern Europe, 20,000 aircraft, 250 submarines, 5 million men in the services, including police and security forces.

83. As a Westerner, our representative could not regard as being all equally legitimate the annexations of the three Baltic States, the Finnish provinces, Königsberg, eastern Poland, the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, Bessarabia, northern Bucovina, the Tannu Tuva area, the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin and Dairen, totalling 698,000 square kilometers and with 23 million inhabitants. He would not find it so easy to accept the establishment by active minorities of so many Soviet régimes in Europe and in Asia, the aggression in Korea, the disturbances in Malaya and Burma, the war in Indo-China, the signature by the Soviet States, between April 1945 and April 1949—that is to say, before the North Atlantic Treaty—of nineteen treaties of mutual assistance, or even, I am sure, the activities of fifth columns in the democratic countries. He would then understand our mistrust and also the defensive measures which formerly increased his suspicion of us.

84. And yet I say that our conscience is clear, that we are members of open societies where men and ideas move freely and without mystery. In all sincerity, can we say the same of the countries on the other side of the "iron curtain"?

85. I should like to say that we as Frenchmen do not challenge the political or social organization of the USSR, for we affirm the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of different régimes and hold that a State's internal affairs are the concern of its inhabitants alone. But what we cannot understand is the secrecy with which the Soviet political system surrounds itself. There will be no beginning to

disarmament until that veil of secrecy is progressively lifted.

86. That will be the essential function of the Disarmament Commission whose establishment you have just approved. It will remain to your honour that you have confirmed, by this vote, a month's efforts in committee in which many delegations took part by submitting constructive amendments. You have just contributed by an overwhelming majority—unfortunately unanimity was out of the question—to the reduction of the mutual mistrust which poisons international relations and is the primary cause of the armaments race. For you have conferred on the Disarmament Commission the mandate of casting light on the preparations of all countries without distinction, of destroying secrecy and thus lessening the international tension which we, the representatives of the three Powers sponsoring the resolution, sincerely and honestly believe is not our responsibility. Thus you have performed a signal service to peace and to humanity in distress.

87. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): The vote today marks the completion of a long and rigorous legislative task, the task of establishing and providing terms of reference for the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It also marks the beginning of detailed work in the Commission on the programme of disarmament. For this reason, the United States regards the vote today as one of the most important events of the current session of the General Assembly.

88. The Disarmament Commission will be an international planning agency dedicated to an essential task, "the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments". This includes the prohibition of atomic weapons through the establishment of an effective system of international control of atomic energy. Step-by-step progress in the Commission's work will bring with it the progressive diminution of those fears of renewed world conflict which plague the hearts and minds of people everywhere. Similarly, progress towards disarmament will bring about the restoration of men and productive might to the fruitful occupations of building a better and safer world.

89. This new Commission will be, in our opinion, a significant step towards peace. Working in a broad realm, the entire arsenal of mankind, the Commission will have at its disposal, and will build upon, all the specialized knowledge which has been patiently accumulated by the United Nations and its several Members. Our hope is that in the Commission's deliberations all States will come to recognize that a comprehensive programme of disarmament will safeguard the security of every State and will contribute to the peace the world wants. As that recognition grows, it will become progressively easier to agree on the details of such a comprehensive disarmament programme.

90. I am fully aware that the problems confronting the Commission will not be easy of solution. We all know the difficulties which were faced in merely framing the resolution before us, in merely defining the responsibilities of the Commission and outlining fruitful avenues of approach. But the important point is that, after thorough and searching debate, and aided by the wisdom and good offices of the President of the General Assembly, the First Committee was successful, not only in providing for the establishment of the Commission but also in helping to chart the Commission's course through the difficult problems which lie ahead.

91. In consequence—and using as points of departure the substantial accomplishments of the Atomic Energy

Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments—the Disarmament Commission will be able to begin at once on such problems as disclosure and verification, the structure of an international control organ, measures to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes, and ways of developing and applying effective safeguards. As agreement is reached, the Commission will be able to draft treaties embodying the concrete plans it has formulated. When these treaties have been fully negotiated and adhered to by all nations of significant military potential, we can begin to disarm.

92. Under the resolution which has just been adopted, the new Disarmament Commission is required to begin its work within thirty days, and to submit its first report by 1 June 1952. These provisions of the resolution are signs of the urgency of the Commission's task. The faster the Commission can progress, the sooner it will be possible to begin operating an effective disarmament system and to release for constructive human purposes the resources and energies now spent upon essential defence. The United States will present specific proposals to the Commission. We hope other governments will do so as well. The best thoughts of all of us will be needed to ensure the success of the Commission's work.

93. In a time of rising tension and the necessity for rising armaments on the part of those of us who have largely disarmed, my Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and France have sought the support of the General Assembly for the launching of this programme of world disarmament. When we first made our proposals, they were met with invective in some quarters and with derision in some others; but the Members of the United Nations have made it plain that they view the character of the resolution which has been before us this afternoon as neither cynical nor visionary. Free men do not trifle with peace. They will fight if attacked. They will build their defences when they feel that their existence is threatened. But they will always see a world in which recourse to arms will be neither possible nor necessary. This is what we of the free world are doing today: building our strength because we must, planning for disarmament because we desire a world free from the danger of war.

94. It will be the task of the Disarmament Commission to help plan the way to that better world. It is a task in which all have an equal stake. By our vote today, we shall have made a start upon that task.

95. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union voted against the draft resolution on the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments and of international control of atomic energy because we are deeply convinced that this draft is absolutely unsatisfactory and in no way solves the problem which the authors of the draft say they have set themselves.

96. Although the resolution deals with unusually important and highly significant questions, for which millions and millions of people—in fact, all peace-loving peoples—expect and demand a solution from the General Assembly, this resolution not only fails to provide any even remotely satisfactory solution of those problems, but indeed constitutes an attempt to divert the United Nations into a path of falsehood, concealed by false and absolutely insincere phrases, merely directed towards masking certain purposes which bear no relation to the real purposes and tasks confronting the United Nations in this sphere. The time limit set for explanations of votes prevents me, of course,

from explaining the matter in detail. I can only refer generally to the radical shortcomings and faults of the resolution, which our delegation and the delegations of several other countries indicated in detail when the problem was considered in the First Committee and which were partially indicated by the representatives of certain countries who explained their abstentions on this resolution.

97. In spite of the grandiloquent title of this resolution, a close perusal of it cannot fail to show that it represents no progress whatsoever towards the reduction of armaments and armed forces or the real prohibition of atomic weapons, still less towards the unequivocal prohibition requested by the Soviet Union in connexion with the real establishment of effective international control, not the control under the Baruch Plan, which is a mere mockery of real international control.

98. The resolution contains nothing that could give any kind of ground for regarding it as an attempt to prohibit atomic weapons, to reduce armaments and armed forces and thus really to remove from the shoulders of peoples, from the shoulders of the populations of those countries which are conducting a senseless armaments race, the heavy burden which has been laid upon them and is increasingly lowering the standard of living of the populations of those countries. Indeed, it is impossible to associate the prohibition of atomic weapons with the empty phrases of this resolution, which merely consists in directing a committee of twelve members—which is moreover called the "Disarmament Commission"—although, as you know, the resolution makes no reference to disarmament—to work out proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty for the establishment of international control of atomic energy, with a view to ensuring the enforcement of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. You will see how cunningly all this is worded, so cunningly that it may be searched completely in vain for any actual prohibition of atomic weapons, for the simple reason that there is no question here of any real prohibition.

99. Obviously there is no question in this resolution of any prohibition of atomic weapons, of any prohibition of conventional armaments or of any establishment of international control. That is made even more clear by the fact that in that connexion the whole resolution is based on the notorious Baruch Plan, which makes no sort of provision either for the prohibition of atomic weapons or for the establishment of real international control. Its purpose is the legalization of further uncontrolled production of atomic weapons and the use of atomic bombs for the mass destruction of people.

100. If the delegations headed by the United States which sponsored this resolution indeed wished to prohibit atomic weapons and to establish real and effective international control, why can they not say so clearly and definitely in their resolution, as is proposed in the amendment of the USSR delegation, which insisted that the resolution should include the first paragraph contained in document A/2026 and Corr.2 submitted by the USSR delegation?

101. Nevertheless, the sponsors of the resolution, headed by the United States and other members of the aggressive Atlantic bloc, did not follow that course, since they considered it more convenient to substitute for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments the vague and evasive wording of their draft, which in fact conceals a refusal to prohibit atomic weapons, a refusal to establish effective international control. The sponsors of the resolution have acted similarly with regard to the reduction of armaments. If you have studied the resolution carefully, and I have no doubt that you have

done so, you cannot have failed to notice that part of the resolution attempts to substitute for the reduction of armaments and armed forces a proposal on the collecting of information on armed forces and armaments and, as before, it is directed towards preventing any reduction of armaments and armed forces. This is made especially clear in paragraph 3 of the operative part of the resolution, which reduces the whole matter to the progressive disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments, and to nothing else. This is also shown in paragraph 5 of the resolution, which directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armaments and armed forces. It is obvious that the whole matter is reduced to a mere census of all armaments and armed forces and to the verification of that census, as we stated at the outset of the work of this session when we spoke after Mr. Acheson and criticized these proposals.

102. It is quite clear that such proposals cannot be accepted as serious measures directed towards the effective reduction of armaments and armed forces. This becomes especially obvious if we consider the Soviet Union's proposals [A/2026 and Corr.2], which were supported by a number of other delegations. As we know, those proposals recommend the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and China—to reduce the armaments and armed forces available to them at the time of the adoption of the proposal by one-third within one year of its adoption. Just compare the two: on the one hand a census of armaments, and on the other hand their reduction by one-third!

103. I cannot of course embark now on a discussion of the arguments for and against any given proposal or develop a defence of my own proposal. I merely intend to compare the two proposals in order to reveal the full hypocrisy of the proposals contained in the resolution which has been adopted at the plenary meeting today. I should like to emphasize again that the resolution submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which was adopted by a majority of the members of the First Committee—with a considerable number of abstentions, be it said—cannot be regarded as a serious attempt to solve the problem of the reduction of armaments with which the United Nations is faced.

104. There can be no doubt that the United States and its supporters, the United Kingdom and France, are not anxious to reach a solution of this problem in the real interests of peace and of the security of nations. Otherwise, how can we explain the indisputable fact that, simultaneously with talk of the reduction of armaments and armed forces, a frenzied race for armaments and armed forces is not only continuing, in these countries, and specially in the United States of America, but that we are witnessing an incessant, systematic and ever-increasing growth of these armaments and armed forces. How can we explain the fact that they are not being reduced, but increased? How can we explain the ever-increasing attempts—and they are successful—of the United States of America, supported by its satellites led by the United Kingdom and France, to involve other countries in its policy of a frenzied race for armaments?

105. Of course, this is absolutely incompatible with any talk of the reduction of armaments and armed forces. It is surprising, therefore, to hear of the recent message of the President of the United States to Congress, in which he stated that the United States of America, together with the

United Kingdom and France, had submitted to the General Assembly a plan for the reduction and control of all armaments, providing for an effective system of control. The President of the United States of America asserted that that was a concrete and practical proposal on disarmament. We have seen, however, that the proposals in this resolution in fact contain no mention of any disarmament or even of any slight or inconsiderable reduction of armaments and armed forces. It is not surprising, therefore, that such proposals could not, cannot now and never can be regarded as serious in any way.

106. It is also impossible to regard seriously the assertions in the communication of the President of the United States that, if this proposal of the three Powers, the one which has now been adopted by a majority, were accepted by the Soviet Union, the burden of rearmament would be lightened and world resources could be used for the welfare of humanity. This was obviously said to divert public opinion from the aggressive plans of the Government of the United States of America and from those unprecedented violations of the principles and elementary rules of international law which have become a habitual practice of the United States of America and of certain States which always give their unreserved support to the United States in all spheres of its activity.

107. The same may be said of the statements of other members and representatives of the Atlantic bloc, such as the representative of France and of the French Government, Mr. Jules Moch, who has just spoken. I do not really know whom he is representing here at the present time, but let us assume that he is the representative of the French Government that has just fallen. This, of course, only lends greater authority to his statement, which represents an energetic attempt to mislead public opinion, to mislead the peoples and to conceal his aggressive plans by all sorts of slanderous accusations against us.

108. It is not surprising that this is being done, because in fact the resolution we are discussing here provides no grounds whatsoever for the assumption that it will result in the use of world resources for the welfare of peoples; indeed the authors of the resolution are little concerned with that. On the contrary, it is the proposals of the Soviet Union which would make it possible to end the armaments race in such countries as the United States of America and its allies and enable them really to use their resources for the welfare of humanity. The resources at the disposal of the Soviet Union are used exclusively for the welfare of the Soviet people and of all other peace-loving peoples.

109. I must dwell on Mr. Jules Moch's statement for he chose to refer to the Soviet Union's five-year economic plan with a view to revealing our warlike and aggressive intentions. In spite of Mr. Moch's inventiveness in that connexion, however, he was unable to read into the document which he had before him and the quotation which he gave here anything over and above what he read out. What he read was that a certain part of the plan—not, by the way, a considerable part compared with corresponding parts of the State plans and the total amounts of all military programmes of other countries—was devoted to ensuring the defence of the Soviet Union. Mr. Jules Moch intended to prove something which would compromise us. But all that he proved was that he could prove nothing and had proved nothing conclusive on this score.

110. What are the real facts of the matter raised here by Mr. Moch? I should like to answer that by referring to the reply of our leader and teacher, the head of the Soviet Government, Joseph Stalin, to questions asked by a *Pravda* correspondent. When this correspondent asked why certain

influential persons in the United States were raising the alarm and creating a hue and cry about threats to the security of the United States and whether there were any grounds for this, the head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, replied: "There are no grounds at all for such anxiety. The leaders of the United States cannot fail to be aware that the Soviet Union is not only against the use of the atomic weapon, but is in favour of its prohibition and of the cessation of its production". As is known, the Soviet Union has frequently requested the prohibition of atomic weapons, but has always met with a refusal from the State of the Atlantic bloc. That means that in the event of an attack by the United States on our country, the United States' governing circles will use the atom bomb. That is the consideration which has obliged the Soviet Union to develop the atomic weapon, so as to be able to meet any aggressor fully armed. Of course as Stalin says, the aggressors want the Soviet Union to be unarmed if they attack it; but the Soviet Union does not agree with this, and considers that the aggressor should be met fully armed.

111. Mr. Jules Moch should realize that that is the meaning of the quotation which he read out here from the speech of the Chairman of the State Planning Commission with regard to our State Plan for the years 1946 to 1950.

112. What was the purpose of Mr. Moch's whole statement? Its purpose was to divert public opinion from the present plans for war, from the armaments race and from the swollen war budgets which are forcing the countries engaged in that race and adopting such budgets to strain their resources to the utmost. Its purpose was to divert public opinion from those facts and to use as a scapegoat the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. That is a policy of deluding peoples, but those who adopt it never succeed in deluding their peoples completely. The people always have exposed and always will expose such machinations.

113. With regard to the amendment submitted by the USSR delegation [A/2026], our delegation did not feel obliged to insist on a vote on this amendment at this plenary meeting, as the President has already announced. For this it had two fundamental reasons.

114. In the first place, the delegation of the Soviet Union supported the amendment of the Czechoslovak delegation [A/2035], which was exclusive in character.

115. In the second place, in view of the fact that tomorrow, on 12 January, the First Committee will begin to discuss the sixth item on its agenda [item 67], "Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations", and since some of the questions involved refer to the proposals contained in the amendment to the resolution of the First Committee which has been adopted here today, the USSR delegation considered it inexpedient to insist on a vote on our amendment at this plenary meeting, the more so as, when the relevant questions are discussed in the First Committee tomorrow, the USSR delegation may possibly insert in its draft resolution some new proposals which will differ considerably from those in its original text.

116. These are the clear and unequivocal reasons why we did not call for a vote on this amendment here, since we shall return tomorrow in the First Committee to the questions referred to in this amendment in what may prove a more favourable atmosphere than that which prevails here today.

117. The representative who stated that the fact that we did not ask for a vote on our amendment today in no way implied any change in our position was perfectly correct. We have expressed our position in that amendment, but

it is possible that we shall include in those proposals certain formulae which will fundamentally alter the proposals and will hold out hope for success in our struggle and our work for the prohibition of atomic weapons, the establishment of international control and the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

118. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I shall try to explain the vote of my delegation in seven minutes. This resolution does mean the end of a month of arduous work. We had many controversial debates, tempers on some occasions were high and on other occasions were low, and speeches were sometimes long and sometimes short. The work of the Sub-Committee under the President's guidance, we felt, fulfilled a very useful purpose, and we did, in a comparatively short space of time, manage to survey a very large field and I think we did make some contribution towards mutual understanding. Perhaps that is because the meetings of the Sub-Committee were held in private.

119. I have always held the view that the attack upon war, the furthering of the cause of peace, is a many-sided operation. There are many ways in which simultaneously that task must be attempted. Individual problems causing tension must be tackled one by one.

120. We must attempt—and I am certain that this is a condition precedent to substantial progress for the cause of peace—to stop these propaganda speeches. Surely it is possible for us for once to be able to talk about a resolution without the kind of phraseology to which we have just been listening during the past twenty minutes. I am certain that, if we are to mobilize world opinion for peace and if we are to make possible the negotiations which must take place and the consideration of the detailed measures in a reasonable atmosphere, we must moderate the language in which we talk about one another's proposals. If we look at this resolution and the suggestions which are made in it, is it really fitting to talk of spurious and insincere phraseology, of hollow words of cunning, of notions of lies and all the rest of it, because what we do in this resolution is to establish a new commission? That is not a hollow phrase; it is a matter of agreement between us, a useful forward step in the cause of peace. Then we suggest that that Commission should prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty. Again, is that not a perfectly reasonable thing to suggest and put forward? Then we maintain that that draft treaty must include proposals for regulating and limiting and for the balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. Again, is that not a perfectly reasonable proposition? Then we ask for international control of atomic energy, to ensure the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. Is that not a perfectly plain and straightforward thing which anyone who wants to understand can perfectly easily comprehend? And we suggest that for any system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification. We attach no value at all to suggestions that there should be immediate reductions in armaments by a fixed percentage without any knowledge of the strengths from which that production is to take place or the strengths to which the reduction should be effected.

121. Mr. Vyshinsky said something about a mad race in armaments. Well, we show in this resolution that it is essential to have effective international inspection. I should have thought that was one of the best ways to detect whether in fact there is a mad race in armaments and who is taking part in it. So far as atomic weapons are concerned, we say in paragraph 3 (c) of the resolution that we are perfectly prepared to consider any proposals that anybody can put

forward with regard to effective international control of atomic energies. We start that paragraph by saying that:

"The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy".

So we are giving this Commission freedom to consider any methods, although we have given it certain directives that it shall set about planning an international control organ. Is that not a perfectly reasonable proposition? How can you have effective disarmament unless you have an effective international control organ? We ask this Commission to do what we believe will be a useful task in working out how we can regulate and reduce armaments.

122. I was, as I am sure everybody else was, very interested to hear of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement towards the end of his speech that he is going to put forward new proposals with regard to disarmament. We shall examine in good faith and with care any proposals that anybody puts forward with regard to disarmament and see if we can hammer out amongst ourselves, with good temper and with goodwill, practical measures which will take the whole world forward on the path to peace.

123. We have the eyes of an anxious and suffering humanity upon us at the present time when we engage in this task. I say that by establishing this Commission and giving it these tasks we have done a little to help forward the cause we all have so much at heart. If Mr. Vyshinsky can bring forward tomorrow new proposals which will help us in the same way, along the same path, we shall examine them with good faith, as I have said. However, I am perfectly certain that if those proposals are to receive reasonable consideration it would be very much wiser that they should be introduced in an atmosphere very dissimilar from the speech which he has made today.

124. Mr. HRSEL (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): The Czechoslovak delegation voted against the three-Power draft resolution because its adoption in the form proposed constitutes no advance whatever towards the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of the atomic weapon or the maintenance of peace. The resolution is, on the contrary, a propaganda manoeuvre by the western Powers to deceive world public opinion. It is the culmination of the so-called United States peace offensive, the sole object of which is to disguise the real plans of the United States' imperialistic policy of unleashing a new war.

125. Our delegation has already, during the debate in the First Committee, given its views on this resolution, which destroys the possibility of alleviating international tension, since it contains no prohibition of the atomic weapon but postpones such prohibition indefinitely by proposing a lengthy and unrealistic procedure of "stages", which could impede rapid and effective solution of all those problems.

126. The authors of the resolution make it quite clear that they have not yet by any means given up the Baruch-Lilienthal-Acheson plan. The reference to "collective" measures in the third paragraph of the preamble shows that the three-Power resolution is part of the collective measures designed to give the United States of America a dangerous weapon with which American expansion could be pursued under the United Nations flag.

127. The whole course of the discussion in the First Committee has shown beyond doubt that the United States of America rejects the immediate prohibition of the atomic weapon, effective reduction of armaments and settlement of the problems threatening peace. The United States is

continuing to pursue a policy of aggression and preparation for a new world war. The most eloquent proof of this is its longing to conclude more and more aggressive pacts; its remilitarization of western Germany, which is to act as springboard in a war against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies; and the fact that it is deliberately and by every possible means preventing the speedy conclusion of an armistice and cease-fire in Korea.

128. The real object of the three-Power resolution is to deceive world public opinion, which persistently calls for immediate prohibition of the atomic weapon. During the discussion in the First Committee the real meaning of the three-Power plan was exposed in the American Press, from which we learned that the object of the plan was simply to take the initiative and deprive the Soviet Union, as the Press put it, of its monopoly of the struggle for peace. All honest people desire peace so ardently and their demand for it is growing so loud that the ruling circles in the United States thought it expedient to resort to this so-called United States peace offensive, the real purpose of which was soon disclosed. The leaders of the United States also thought the manoeuvre necessary because opposition and discontent are constantly increasing in the North Atlantic Treaty countries because of the huge burden of military expenditure, which is endangering those countries' economies.

129. The Czechoslovak delegation is opposed to the three-Power resolution because it is convinced that the United Nations ought consistently and effectively to defend the purposes laid down in the Charter and provide mankind with sure safeguards of peace. The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the first necessity for achieving these purposes is agreement between the great Powers. Because agreement was not achieved on important points in the Committee, our delegation submitted a proposal that only points upon which agreement had been reached should be included in the resolution. We proposed that the points upon which agreement had not been achieved should be referred for consideration to the new commission on atomic energy and conventional armaments, since such a procedure would open the way to final agreement.

130. The Czechoslovak people, which firmly takes its stand in the ranks of the mighty world-wide movement for peace, is convinced that the efforts for peace made by the Soviet Union—that is to say the proposals for the immediate prohibition of the atomic weapon, for the establishment of strict international control over its enforcement and for effective reduction of armaments—are the tangible expression of the desires and hopes of peace-loving people the world over, irrespective of political conviction, nationality, race or religion, since peace is a matter that concerns them all.

131. For these reasons our delegation rejects with the utmost firmness the three-Power resolution, which exclusively promotes the interests of the western Powers' aggressive policy, and has voted against it.

132. Mr. MACAFAGAI (Philippines): A country like the Philippines, which is small and has a population of about 20 million people, cannot but strongly support the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. But the boon which springs from this regulation, including the international control of atomic energy and the reduction of conventional armaments, is not confined solely to the small countries. Its blessings are showered upon all mankind. The world has just emerged from a devastating war, the most wide-spread and horrible in history, and as a result there is an urgent need for the peoples of all lands to rise from the economic prostration which has followed in the wake of that war.

133. The great effort to which mankind should dedicate itself in our time is the husbanding of the resources which nature has given unto the earth in abundance, in order to provide a higher standard of living for the masses of the people inhabiting it. Nevertheless we see the nations today engaged in an armaments race, thereby withholding the bounty of their wealth and their resources from the masses of the people who need them vitally. This madness which, unless checked in time, might well be the "writing on the wall" which will spell the end of our civilization in an atomic war, leads the Philippine delegation whole-heartedly to vote for the recommendation of the First Committee with regard to the approval of the draft resolution presented by France, the United Kingdom and the United States for the establishment of a disarmament commission.

134. This Disarmament Commission is to be charged with the task of devising an effective system of control of atomic energy and providing a plan for the rational reduction of conventional armaments. In voting for this draft resolution of the three Powers, my delegation, by implication, rejected the USSR counter-proposal which recommends the immediate and unconditional abolition of atomic weapons and the reduction of existing armed forces and armaments by one-third. Were it not for the attempt which we have just heard made by the representative of the Soviet Union to justify this proposal, it would not be necessary to make reference to this counter-proposal, the sophistry of which has been exposed on many occasions and is now well known to the widest sector of world opinion. The unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons without any assurance of an effective system of international control and inspection would oblige the western Powers to cease the manufacture and production of atomic weapons which now constitute their best insurance against aggression, whilst the Soviet Union may continue to manufacture them in the vastness of its domain. The mathematical reduction of conventional armaments by one-third, in which the Soviet Union at the present time enjoys a preponderance, would only serve to enhance that perilous advantage and superiority.

135. In voting for the three-Power draft resolution and, by implication, rejecting the USSR counter-proposal, my delegation has not ignored the background of the present armaments race. The responsibility for this race rests squarely upon the Soviet Union, for we all know that after the recent war the western Powers, heedful always of the voice of peace, quickly disarmed themselves, demobilized and reduced their armed forces to the bare minimum; but the Soviet Union has maintained the bulk of its wartime military organization and has indeed, since the end of the war, dedicated itself to investing that organization with the maximum striking power. In the face of unmistakable indications that this gigantic military power is intended to support forcible aggression or subversion in the free countries, the western Powers have been compelled to engage in the armaments race for their self-preservation.

136. In voting for the three-Power resolution my delegation desires to express the hope that a divine light may illumine the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union in order to make them realize, if indeed they do not at the moment, that it is Soviet policy that is causing the nervousness of all the peoples of the world who thirst for peace. No country desires any harm to the Soviet Union. It has the right to keep its way of life and even to propagate it through peaceful means, provided that it does not seek to extend it to other peoples by forcible aggression or subversion. If the Soviet Union can thus confine her unwanted communist paradise within her own borders and leave other countries in peace, then the world will be at peace and all the countries will have no need to produce atomic weapons.

and to have huge forces, but instead they will be able to concentrate their efforts on providing a fuller life for all mankind.

137. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): During the discussion in the First Committee on the draft resolution entitled "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments", the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR pointed out that, in submitting the above-mentioned draft resolution, the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and France were planning, with the help of outwardly peaceful declarations, to conceal the armaments race and the preparations for a new world war being conducted by the Anglo-American bloc. By means of pressure on their associates in the Atlantic bloc and on a number of countries dependent on the United States, these countries have now put through a new decision furthering the realization of American aggressive plans and making the United Nations still more subservient to the foreign policy of the United States of America.

138. The Ukrainian SSR examines this resolution in the light of the line at present followed by the United States of America in international relations, and calls the General Assembly's attention to the clear discrepancy between the proposals for a "balanced reduction of armaments", which the United States and its associates have submitted for the General Assembly's consideration and which have been adopted today, and the simultaneous headlong armaments race being carried out by the European countries in accordance with the plans and under the pressure of the United States of America.

139. We are therefore of course unable to accept the resolution entitled "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments" as a document reflecting the alleged desire of the United States and its partners in the Atlantic bloc for a genuine reduction of armaments and armed forces, for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and, as its authors have stated, for the consequent easing of the present tension in international relations. In our opinion this resolution is diverting the General Assembly from the solution of the problem of prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, and also entirely evading the question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The resolution replaces these problems by a census of armaments and armed forces, which is, moreover, to be carried out in stages. Thus, instead of genuine international control over the prohibition of the atomic weapon, this resolution drags out again the plan for the establishment of American control over atomic energy based on the recipe concocted by Baruch, Acheson and Lilienthal, and now presents it as a plan of the United Nations.

140. We must again stress that this plan is not only a long way from fulfilling the aims which the United States delegation and the delegations of a number of countries supporting the United States are at great pains to ascribe to it, but also makes no provision whatsoever for the prohibition of the atomic weapon or for the establishment of international control over that prohibition. It is high time the Philippines representative, after all the days he has spent in the First Committee, grasped this elementary truth, which unfortunately does not come home to him. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly contains absolutely no provision for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, but only a reference to the need to elaborate proposals for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments, with the idea that those proposals should

later on form part of a scheme of bilateral agreements between various governments.

141. Surely it is obvious that the working out of these proposals by a gradual, progressive method—in stages, as I said—which the resolution envisages is only a camouflaged refusal to reduce armaments and armed forces at all and, as we have already repeatedly pointed out, reduces the whole affair to collection of information on armaments and armed forces.

142. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR fully shares the position of the Soviet Union on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the simultaneous establishment of effective international control of that prohibition, and on the reduction of armaments and armed forces. On the grounds just indicated it considers the resolution on the "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments" unacceptable, and has therefore voted against it both in the First Committee and again today in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

143. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation wishes to explain its vote on the resolution concerning the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments and the international control of atomic energy.

144. We have already pointed out in the First Committee that the most important aspects of the whole problem are the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of genuine effective international control over that prohibition, and the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The draft resolution submitted to and adopted by this plenary meeting of the General Assembly makes no provision whatsoever either for the immediate and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons or for measures to reduce armaments and armed forces.

145. The discussion on this question in the First Committee revealed the unwillingness of the United States, the United Kingdom and French Governments to agree to the prohibition of atomic weapons, as weapons for the mass destruction of human beings, and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of that prohibition.

146. The peoples of the world are demanding with ever greater determination that the General Assembly should declare the use of atomic weapons incompatible with the conscience and honour of mankind, because they are weapons for aggression and the mass destruction of human beings. The peoples of the world also expect the General Assembly at its sixth session to adopt specific and practical decisions on the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

147. The resolution which has been considered by the General Assembly does not reflect the demands of the peoples or provide for the solution of what is the fundamental and by far the most acute problem: the prohibition of atomic weapons. Proposals for the introduction of control without the prohibition of atomic weapons can have no practical results. The resolution which has been considered by the General Assembly is based in its entirety on the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal plan, put forward in 1946, which provides neither for the prohibition of atomic weapons nor for the establishment of effective international control.

148. Instead of solving the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict effective international control over the implementation of the prohibition of atomic weapons, the United States of America,

pursuing its aggressive aims, has at all times diverted attention solely to the solution of the second problem, the institution of a method of control over atomic energy which would suit itself, and left aside the first task, that of prohibiting atomic weapons. The USSR delegation has repeatedly submitted proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons, but the representatives of the three Powers have systematically rejected them, thus demonstrating their fear that agreement might be reached on the prohibition of atomic weapons. That same fear is apparent at the present session of the General Assembly.

149. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution, the Commission on Disarmament is directed, in working out plans for the regulation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, to determine how overall limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed. Thus, the question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces is now replaced by the question of the continuous submission of information on the armaments and armed forces of the different countries. The whole matter is therefore reduced to a mere census of armaments and armed forces and its verification.

150. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly is not directed towards the reduction of armaments and armed forces, but is designed to conceal and camouflage the efforts of the Anglo-American bloc, led by the United States of America, to continue the armaments race.

151. If the General Assembly had recommended that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the USSR should reduce their existing armaments and armed forces by one-third within one year, as proposed by the USSR delegation, it would have met the aspirations of people all over the world. Such a decision would have facilitated the cessation of the armaments race and helped to strengthen international peace and security.

152. A statement was made in this Assembly by the Philippine representative, who tried to throw the blame for the present armaments race upon the USSR. That is incorrect. It is a slanderous statement. All peoples of the world are well aware that the USSR was responsible for raising the question of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, the establishment of strict international control, and the reduction by one-third of armaments and armed forces. These proposals are supported by hundreds of millions of persons throughout the world and some 600 million persons have already subscribed to them. This clearly shows that all attempts to throw the blame upon the great Soviet Union have failed and will also fail in the future, and the Philippine representative will not succeed in convincing the peoples of the world that the USSR is to blame for the armaments race.

153. The real culprits are none other than the United States, the United Kingdom, France and their supporting allies, which do not wish to reduce their armaments or to declare an unconditional ban on atomic weapons.

154. My delegation voted against the resolution submitted by the First Committee and also against the resolution which has been voted upon at the present meeting, because it will in no way lead to the prohibition of atomic weapons, the establishment of effective international control over such prohibition, the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the cessation of the armaments race or the lightening of the burden of taxation upon the peoples.

155. These are the reasons why my delegation has voted against the adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution concerning the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments and the international control of atomic energy.

156. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) : We have before us a resolution the pompous and high promising title of which is " Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments ". The Polish delegation voted against this resolution. In order to avoid all misunderstanding and to make our position clear even to those who might be misled by the very promising title of the resolution, we feel it our duty to state once more the reasons for our decision and to explain the motives guiding our vote.

157. During the deliberations concerning disarmament, two points of view, two different concepts, showed up in opposition to one another. During the twenty-four meetings of our Committee these two concepts have become clear. One of them is the proposal for real and immediate disarmament which would deal first with its most essential and dangerous aspects. The other concept is one which merely gives the appearance of disarmament and which is to serve the interests of one Power as a part of cold-war propaganda. Those two positions were too far apart to lead to a compromise in the existing situation.

158. The concept of disarmament presented by the Soviet Union is so clear and so simple that neither the highly complicated discussion nor the attacks of its adversaries were able to cloud it. It contains the demands which are understood and accepted by the common man who sincerely desires peace. First and foremost it envisages the unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, combined with the simultaneous introduction of efficacious control over the application of that prohibition. To all mankind, wracked with uncertainty and the fear of this terrible weapon of mass destruction which can be used at any moment as a result of a mad and criminal decision of one man or of a group of war-mongers, this demand is, of course, the most obvious and the most important. We cannot bargain with those who are blackmailing us with mass murder. The prohibition of the use of atomic weapons must be at the forefront of every honest and true resolution and decision concerning disarmament. A resolution which opposes this principle cannot be considered either honest or realistic.

159. The further demand of the Soviet Union, that of reduction of all armed forces of the great Powers by one-third within a year, does not require further comment. Such an important reduction in the number and strength of the armed forces would not only reduce the possibilities of the outbreak of a new armed conflict, but it would also bring about an easing of the existing tension. We must also realize the economic consequences of such an action. Hundreds of thousands of people in every country of the world could return to peaceful and productive endeavour. At the same time there would occur a substantial reduction of the financial burdens arising out of armaments, a burden which lies heavily upon the shoulders of the nations of the world.

160. Again we must state with all emphasis that the resolution which opposes such principles cannot be considered honest or realistic. Linking those two basic principles into one logical unity, through the proposal for creating an international organ of control of all types of armaments, the Soviet Union advances a concrete proposal to the effect that in addition to the adoption of the above proposals, an international disarmament conference should be called, not later than 1 June of this year, with the participation of all countries including those which are not members of the Organization. This conference would work out a long-term basic programme as well as practical recommendations for the limitation of armaments and their efficacious control in

the future. Of course, the countries led by the United States which nearly every month are calling armament conferences did not want to agree to that principle. We are not surprised that Mr. Moch does not want to agree to it. In his speech a few minutes ago he demonstrated not only his ill will and ignorance in politics and in his knowledge of international agreements, but also in geography in calling part of the Ukraine and White Russia a part of Poland.

161. The resolution representing the American concept of disarmament upon which we have to vote not only omits the above-mentioned fundamental condition of real disarmament but it gives us instead a series of generalities and empty phrases behind which its authors attempt to hide, though not very successfully, the selfish and dishonest aims of their action. First of all the resolution does not contain any decision. It does not prohibit the atomic weapon. It does not demand the reduction of armed forces. It contains no decision concerning the calling of a disarmament conference. The resolution calls only for the consideration of projects, for the examination of possibilities and for the preparation of proposals. We remember that language well from the League of Nations. We also remember the effects of such dishonest formulation of pious desires.

162. The Polish people know well the results of armaments and destructive wars which are usually the logical outcome of the armaments race. Therefore, the Polish delegation is very glad to support every proposal for disarmament which can achieve sincerely and realistically a real cessation of the armaments race. Unfortunately, the resolution we have before us does not fulfil these conditions. It is neither realistic, nor sincere, nor purposeful.

163. In an endeavour to reach a compromise we support the Czechoslovak amendment which, taking into account the creation by unanimous decision of a commission for all types of armaments, transfers to it all the proposals concerning disarmament for consideration and the eventual finding of possible common proposals.

Complaint of aggressive acts of the United States of America and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, as instanced by the appropriation of 100 million dollars to finance the recruitment of persons and the organization of armed groups in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and a number of other democratic countries, as well as outside the territory of those countries : report of the First Committee (A/2030)

[Agenda item 69]

164. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The next item on our agenda is the report of the First Committee on agenda item 69. I give the floor to the representative of Peru on a point of order.

165. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): I take the liberty of asking the President to allow representatives to explain their votes before the vote is taken, as was requested on the previous occasion by the French representative.

Mr. Thor Thors (Iceland), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of the Committee (A/2030).

166. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): As stated in the report, the First Committee is not submitting to the Assembly any draft resolution on this item. The delegation of the Soviet Union, however, has submitted a draft resolution which is contained in document A/2031. Before putting the draft resolution to the vote, I should

like to know, in accordance with the Peruvian representative's request, if any representatives wish to explain their votes.

167. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia): The discussion in the First Committee showed that the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951, signed by President Truman on 10 October 1951, contains provisions which represent the grossest violation of the most fundamental principles of international law, of valid treaties and of the spirit and letter of the Charter. It is particularly section 101 of that act which is incompatible with normal relations between nations, the section which provides for the financing and organization of military and terrorist groups from traitors, diversionists and selected persons who are residing in or who are escapees from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other peoples' democracies for the purpose of subversive and hostile activities against those countries.

168. It follows inevitably both from the clear text of the act and from statements made by its authors that it attempts, with the aid of organized terrorists and traitors, to undermine the political, economic and social systems that the peoples of those countries have freely chosen.

169. The discussion in the First Committee again proved the full justification of the position of Czechoslovakia, which had already been expressed in its Note of 7 December last year, in which it protested to the United States Government about the adoption of the Mutual Security Act and called its adoption an open and gross violation of the most fundamental norms of international law, and a gross interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.

170. This illegal act of the United States Congress signed by the President of the United States is a particularly revealing document, showing as it does the tendencies of United States foreign policy. Considering that the Chairman of the United States delegation said in his first speech from this rostrum in November [335th meeting] that we must work for peace, for understanding and for the elimination of the danger of conflict, the Mutual Security Act which had been approved only a month before is indeed an impressive illustration of how the United States in its foreign policy understands and carries out its work for mutual understanding.

171. It is characteristic that the hostile activities which grossly violate the United Nations Charter and the fundamental principles of international law are by this act directly linked with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The representatives of the United States try to pretend that this treaty is merely a defensive one. It is precisely the Kersten amendment, which earmarks 100 million dollars for hostile activities in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is another convincing proof of the aggressive nature of this act directed against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies.

172. In the debate in the First Committee nobody could deny or disprove the detailed analysis and the weighty arguments put forward by the head of the USSR delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, and by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian SSR, Poland and the Byelorussian SSR. It was proven that the members of Congress during the hearings on the Act very well understood its meaning, that they were well aware it did not entail any humanitarian action for refugees but that it entailed the creation, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, armies of foreign legions of escaped traitors and criminals and the systematic organization and support of such elements, again within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, directly in the territories of the Soviet Union and other countries

of the peoples' democracies for subversive activities against the legal governments of those countries.

173. The real meaning of the amendment is shown, naturally, not only by the statements of members of Congress, but primarily by the United States policy in practice. The United States authorities have for a long time carried on, on a large scale, precisely those activities to be financed under the Mutual Security Act. In many instances in my country it has been diplomats and other employees of the United States who have organized and directed espionage groups. For its hostile activities against Czechoslovakia, the United States has misused also its position as occupation Power in western Germany. In the territory entrusted to it by international agreements, it builds broadcasting stations which incite to acts punishable under common law. From western Germany it sends trained terrorists to carry out, in Czechoslovakia, espionage, sabotage and murder. The extent of such activities is witnessed by the fact that the United States Government deemed it necessary to order its puppet, the so-called Bonn Government, to direct by special regulations the passage of the agents of the western Powers by the border police when they illegally cross the frontier from Czechoslovakia. Under this order the Minister of Finance of the so-called Bonn Government issued, on 10 February 1951, Order No. II-0-30052294/50 II Ag in which he instructed all the organs of the border police that in the case of persons who were agents of occupation Powers they must not search them or disarm them and that when these agents returned illegally from Czechoslovakia they should accompany them to the United States military authorities.

174. All such activities are now to be given a "legal" basis by the adoption of the amendment to the so-called Mutual Security Act. The adoption and implementation of this Act represents open and gross violation of the most elementary principles of international law and of the principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter.

175. The Czechoslovak people are enthusiastically building up their country. Any attempt to hamper its peaceful development is condemned beforehand to defeat. Such attempt will be broken by the firm assurance of the Czechoslovak working people, every one of whom enjoys the results of the economic, social and cultural development of his country. It will be broken by their faithful alliance with the Soviet Union, one of the solid elements of world peace which Mr. Moch dislikes and fears so much. It will be broken by their firm determination and will to prevent a new war and preserve world peace.

176. For all these reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation must whole-heartedly support the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union asking the General Assembly to condemn the Mutual Security Act of 1951 as an act of aggression and as interference in the internal affairs of other States and to recommend to the Government of the United States to repeal it.

177. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) (*translated from Russian*): On behalf of the Polish delegation I should like briefly to rehearse and explain our reasons for supporting the USSR proposal condemning the United States Government for aggressive acts and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. These have consisted in the appropriation of 100 million dollars by the United States Congress to finance the recruitment of persons and the organization of armed groups in and outside the Soviet Union, Poland and other democratic countries.

178. Everyone here will remember the meetings of the First Committee at which the matter was fully discussed. Our committee room was turned into a court of law. The

Government and Congress of the United States of America were charged with innumerable crimes, with patent, deliberate and shameless organization of mass acts of sabotage and treason, espionage and diversion, with the open appropriation of vast sums from the national budget to finance underground organizations in other countries, and with the creation of detachments of hirelings, a foreign legion, to fight against their own country, government and people.

179. Never in history has there been such a trial. The committee room rang with the accusations of all the governments present against which the United States' subversive activities were directed. Although the representatives of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania were unable to present charges there directly, a great abundance of material was produced, supported by evidence, quotations, dates, names and figures. That material was not refuted and the charge was not disproved. The United States representative's arguments were hypocritical and false, meaningless in law and altogether worthless.

180. The United States representative tried to make out that the indisputable allocation of funds for activities against the State in another country did not constitute intervention in that country's internal affairs; that the organization of armed detachments of traitors was a humanitarian enterprise; that the appeal to fight against one's own country was practically a cultural and educational measure; and that though the act providing the blood-money had indeed been passed by Congress and signed by President Truman it had yet to come into effect. Is that true?

181. We should like to ask what dollars have already been spent since 1945 on supplying arms and assistance to diversionary bands and criminals committing political assassinations in our country. Where did the money come from to feed and clothe, to arm and train in their criminal avocations, the traitors and collaborators of the "Holy Cross" brigades in western Germany? Who supplied the funds for the "guard companies" and "workers' battalions", the chief purpose of which was and still is preparation of cadres for sabotage and diversion in Poland? What currency is financing the attempts to prevent displaced persons from returning to their country, and who is paying for the campaign to enlist them for service in the United States army? In whose pay were the five American spies and diversionsists who were sent from western Germany recently and tried in Warsaw last week? What is the source of the funds financing the "Voice of America" and the so-called "Free Europe" campaigns, which day in and day out spew a spate of lies and slanderous fabrications?

182. It is not difficult to guess what funds have financed these activities in past years. Now they are clearly to be financed out of the funds of the North Atlantic Treaty. This shows more clearly than ever that the treaty is aggressive.

183. The nature of the treaty cannot be disguised by hypocritical assurances that certain countries will employ those funds for economic or social purposes. The peoples of Asia, Africa and the Near East, to whom the United States representatives have addressed their speeches, know what such assurances are worth. They realize that aggressive alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty can only give rise to imperialist war.

184. This brief recital of the main facts—and I have only mentioned some of those concerning my own country alone—shows that the Government of the United States has not only violated all the basic principles of international law and become the author of and an accomplice in individual criminal offences, but at the same time has broken the

international agreements under which it solemnly undertook not to intervene in the internal affairs of other States or to encourage subversive activities against them.

185. Lastly, the United States Government has broken all the rules of international law, which rightly regards such activities as acts of inadmissible and manifest aggression.

186. The resolutions of the League of Nations, the Havana Convention and the Treaties of London of 1933 provide instances of such rules.

187. We realize that the United States Mutual Security Act we are discussing is no isolated phenomenon, but a link in a chain of aggressive activities which can have still more dangerous and tragic consequences, such as aggression in Korea, or which constitute a still greater threat to peace in the future, such as the aggressive Atlantic pact.

188. The Polish delegation deems it a sacred duty to expose, denounce and condemn any crime against humanity, peace and international law. We believe, therefore, that in supporting the USSR draft resolution we are doing our duty to our country and the peoples of the world, and our duty before history, which will brand the United States act for the financing of crimes as one of the most cynical actions of the United States' aggressive policy.

189. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic wishes to explain its vote on this question.

190. It is common knowledge that the President of the United States of America, Mr. Truman, signed on 10 October 1951 a law entitled the Mutual Security Act, providing for a special allocation of 100 million dollars to finance, in the words of the act, "any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania... either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes".

191. This act clearly provides for the financing of armed groups to fight against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies, recruited from traitors and war criminals who have fled their own country and taken refuge in the territory of the United States of America and other countries.

192. Such actions of the United States of America constitute an unprecedented interference in the domestic affairs of other States, and also a breach both of the generally-accepted rules of international law and of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations forbidding interference in the domestic affairs of other States. Never before in the history of international relations has any State interfered as openly and cynically as the United States Government has now done in the domestic affairs of other States, with which, moreover, that Government maintains diplomatic relations.

193. This law was enacted by the Government of the United States of America in violation of the agreement of 16 November 1933 between the United States and the USSR whereby the United States and the USSR mutually undertook not to subsidize or support any military or other organization which had as an aim the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the other contracting party.

194. During the debate on this subject the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic asserted that the Mutual Security Act conduces to further exacerbation and deterioration of the international situation, and is designed exclusively to further the aggressive aims of the United States of America, which are directed to the preparing for

and launching of war against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies. In the First Committee the Byelorussian delegation adduced numerous facts to show that the United States is already conducting espionage, sabotage and subversion against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies, and that the act now passed by the United States Government is designed to reinforce these hostile activities. During the debate in the First Committee the facts we cited were not disproved, and fully confirm that the 1951 Mutual Security Act constitutes an act of aggression against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies.

195. Expressing the indignation of their peoples, the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Albania and Bulgaria have addressed to the United States Government notes condemning this historically unprecedented act of provocation.

196. Ruling circles in the United States are attempting to exploit, for purposes of espionage and diversion, persons they still hold in the refugee camps. Traitors who formerly collaborated with the Gestapo and have lost all touch with their native land are regarded by the United States as cheap cannon-fodder for the North Atlantic aggressive bloc, as potential spies and diversionary agents. There can be no doubt that the aim of this aggressive act of the United States Government is to collect up all the dregs of collapsed fascist régimes, traitors, renegades and sundry other demoralized persons, and use them for aggressive war being prepared by ruling circles in the United States against the USSR and the peoples' democracies.

197. This unprecedented act of the Government of the United States, and other similar hostile acts directed against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies, fully expose the true motives of the American "peace-lovers" who have lately been delivering from the rostrum of the United Nations Organization speeches on peace and peaceful collaboration while actually pursuing a policy of provocation, diversion and aggression.

198. Although, owing to United States pressure, the draft resolution of the Soviet Union was rejected, the results of the voting in the First Committee nevertheless showed that many States were in fact opposed to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 adopted by Congress and signed by President Truman.

199. The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic approves the draft resolution of the delegation of the USSR calling for condemnation of the Mutual Security Act adopted in 1951 as an act of aggression and of interference in the domestic affairs of another State, and recommending the Government of the United States to take the necessary measures to repeal that act. The Byelorussian delegation gives its entire support to that draft resolution and will vote in favour of it.

200. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The plenary meeting of the General Assembly has before it the report of the First Committee and the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union accusing the United States Government of aggressive acts and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

201. This complaint is based on the adoption by the Government of the United States of America of an act containing provisions for a special appropriation of \$100 million for recruiting and organizing armed bands in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and a number of other democratic countries, and also outside those countries, with the object of carrying out diversionist and subversive activity against them.

202. The United States delegation has vainly attempted to justify this law by representing it as an ordinary measure to maintain the security, promote the foreign policy and provide in the words of the United States representative for the general welfare of the United States.

203. However, no mere verbal statements can hide the undeniable fact that the United States Government, although maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and bound to it by the agreement of 1933 obliging both parties to refrain from subsidizing or supporting military or other organizations for the purpose of bringing about a violent change in the political or social structure of the contracting parties, has now grossly violated that agreement and has proceeded to create precisely those organizations which it had bound itself not to finance or support. The adoption by the United States of America of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 constitutes a gross act of interference in the domestic affairs of other countries without precedent in international relations.

204. During the discussion in the First Committee of the complaint by the Soviet Union against the United States of America, a number of delegations pointed out that the purposely vague phraseology of this American Mutual Security Act of 1951 contains elements which give rise to the most serious apprehensions. Even the reactionary American Press, which is not usually inclined to criticize the actions of the United States Government, could not deny that the 1951 act is patently aggressive and has been obliged to acknowledge that a large number of delegations to the General Assembly expressed, by their voting on the draft resolution of the Soviet Union in the First Committee, their plain disapproval of this Act, which is unprecedented in international practice. The representatives of eleven countries with a population of 571 million people abstained from voting in the First Committee, a fact which in itself represents a condemnation of the American act of 1951 and a moral and political defeat for the United States of America. The United States succeeded in defeating the USSR delegation's draft resolution, submitted for debate in the First Committee, on aggressive activity and interference by the United States in the domestic affairs of other countries only by applying pressure shamelessly.

205. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR again points out to General Assembly representatives that this American Act, the avowed purpose of which is to collect and use betrayers of their country, traitors and criminals to attack the political and social structure of the Soviet Union, the countries of the peoples' democracies and a number of other democratic countries, is intended to impair relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the peoples' democracies and further to aggravate the international situation. The Act undoubtedly creates a threat to peace and clearly cannot be tolerated.

206. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR considers it to be conclusively proved by the numerous facts adduced, in particular in the statements of the representatives of the Soviet Union and a number of other countries in the First Committee, that the Mutual Security Act of 1951 passed in the United States of America is an act of aggression and constitutes unprecedented interference by the United States of America in the domestic affairs of other countries, incompatible with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with the established rules of international law.

207. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic therefore supports and will vote for the draft resolution on this item submitted by the USSR delegation, proposing that the General Assembly should condemn the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and recommend the Govern-

ment of the United States of America to take the measures necessary for its repeal.

208. Mr. MANSFIELD (United States of America): I should like to ask the President a question in connexion with our procedure. Is it his intention to enforce the seven-minute time limit in this debate?

209. The PRESIDENT: Does the representative of the United States require more time?

210. Mr. MANSFIELD (United States of America): In putting my question, I was thinking not so much of myself as of certain other individuals. If the rule is not to be enforced, however, I, too, should like to speak longer than seven minutes.

211. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the United States may proceed.

212. Mr. MANSFIELD (United States of America): When the Government of the Soviet Union first insisted that the General Assembly should condemn the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951 as an "act of aggression", many delegations undoubtedly wondered why the Soviet Union chose to make this particular attack on my country. This question loomed steadily larger as, in speech after angry speech in the First Committee, the USSR representative utterly failed to substantiate his serious accusations against the United States.

213. When the First Committee had finally rejected the charges of the Soviet Union, the representative of one of the smaller nations asked a question which had occurred to so many of us sitting round the Committee table. Mr. Cooper, the very able representative of Liberia, pointed out that the representative of the Soviet Union had seemed unconcerned about the outcome of the vote. "What", he asked, "had the USSR representative hoped to achieve—propaganda?" Now that this exceedingly bitter debate is behind us and we can see the problem in more accurate perspective, the answer to the question put by Mr. Cooper becomes increasingly clear. It was, indeed, propaganda, but not necessarily propaganda against the Mutual Security Act. It was part of a general assault launched by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the beginning of this session against the United Nations collective security system and the regional collective security systems which strengthen it.

214. The purposes of the USSR statements became increasingly obvious as the representative of the Soviet Union substituted invective and abuse for hard facts. He piled his whole case, as Mr. Wilson of New Zealand put it, on a mere pin-point of documentary evidence. That pin-point was a unilateral interpretation by the USSR Government of an amendment to the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951 as an "act of aggression" and domestic "interference". This provision in the law permits the President of the United States to spend up to 100 million dollars to organize refugees from iron curtain countries into "elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization". Whether the money will be spent for this purpose, of course, will depend upon the common decision of all the NATO Powers.

215. During the course of the debate my delegation explained the broad purposes of the Mutual Security Act. Those purposes are to strengthen the individual and collective defences of free countries and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system of collective security. I made a statement to the First Committee of the intention of Congress when it passed the refugee clause and that statement was fully agreed to by Mr. Vorys, also a member of the United States delegation to the General Assembly and a member of the Republican Party in Congress. Mr. Vorys and I joined in this statement both as

members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee which considered the Mutual Security Act and as members of the United States delegation to the General Assembly which represents the executive branch of the American Government.

216. I have just returned to Paris from Washington, where Mr. Vorys and I had the opportunity of discussing the amendment to the Mutual Security Act with many of our colleagues in Congress. I also took up the question with the President. On the basis of those talks I wish to repeat the statement I made to the First Committee: The intention of Congress is that the funds provided under this amendment, to be used at the discretion of the President, allow refugees who have escaped from eastern Europe or residents of the area who may escape in the future to take part in the defence of the North Atlantic community if they choose to do so.

217. Now the Soviet Union is not objecting merely to the language of this permissive amendment to the Mutual Security Act. It calls for the abrogation of the entire law and for a finding of an "act of aggression" by the Assembly against the United States. It is at once obvious, if you examine the Mutual Security Act, that its abrogation would strike a tremendous blow at the growing collective security system of the free world and to important programmes of economic assistance to free countries.

218. Mr. Vyshinsky based his entire case for abrogation of the law on a clause in Title I of the act, which deals with the defence of the North Atlantic community. But Title I also provides for a substantial amount of economic assistance to western Europe for use in the European Recovery Programme.

219. Title II provides for continued military assistance to Greece, Turkey and Iran. It also underwrites a large programme of economic and technical assistance for areas in Africa and the Near East. It authorizes a contribution of up to 50 million dollars to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and still further funds for refugee relief and resettlement projects in Israel.

220. Title III of the Mutual Security Act authorizes the President to spend more than half a billion dollars for military and economic assistance to countries in Asia and the Pacific. For example, the sum of 45 million dollars is authorized as a contribution to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, established by resolution [410 A (V)] of the General Assembly on 1 December 1950.

221. Title IV of the act authorizes the expenditure of still further funds for military and economic assistance to countries in Latin America.

222. Thus it can be seen that the Government of the Soviet Union has, indeed, been aiming at a very large target. It wants nothing less than the wholesale collapse of a vast free world programme providing both for the strengthening of collective security through military assistance and for human welfare through economic and technical assistance.

223. The attack of the Soviet Union on the Mutual Security Act, in short, is alarmingly consistent with its efforts to smash the Marshall Plan and the Schuman Plan, and with its hostile attitude towards United Nations programmes of technical assistance. It is consistent with its constant barrage of propaganda against the North Atlantic Treaty, against the collective United Nations effort to repel aggression in Korea, against the work of the United Nations Collective Measures Committee.

224. The USSR Government seems unsure of itself in a world which is economically healthy and mentally and physically alert against attacks on freedom. It prefers instead to have us weak, divided, uncertain about ourselves

and our future, or the future of our children—ripe, in other words, for the so-called victory march of the communists. But as Mr. Lloyd of the United Kingdom put it so well during the debate in the Committee, they will not march to victory over us. The steady flow of thousands of refugees from iron curtain countries indicates that the victory march is hardly over even in those countries where régimes of the Soviet type are actually in power. Nor do we see any reason why these unfortunate people, who have risked everything to flee to freedom, should not be allowed to fight back against any effort to extend westward by force the very system they have escaped. Many delegations were shocked to hear the USSR representative speak scornfully of iron curtain refugees as traitors and the dregs of humanity. Mr. MacDonnell of Canada quite appropriately stated that his attitude rested on what he termed the inhuman assumption that a government owned the human beings of its territory, and had the right to refuse them travel to other lands, or participation in other societies, or, indeed, any normal contacts with the world community.

225. This callous conception of human beings as faceless pawns, subject to the iron control of the total State, affects intimately not only the lives of citizens of iron curtain countries but frequently the nationals of foreign countries. While the Committee debate on this item was in progress, communist authorities in Hungary were holding *incommunicado* four American fliers who had wandered off their course while on a routine flight to Belgrade. Indeed, in arguing his case against the Mutual Security Act, Mr. Vyshinsky spoke at length about the American aviators, alleging that they had been on an espionage mission. It was the contention of the representative of the Soviet Union that this was still a further indication of American so-called interference in the domestic affairs of régimes within the Soviet orbit. And yet this very incident, in and of itself, provides still another reason why Americans have found it supremely ironic that a charge of domestic interference has been lodged against the United States by the USSR Government.

226. The world first heard that the plane was on Hungarian soil not from the supposedly sovereign Government of Hungary but from *Tass*, the Soviet State news agency. During the previous two weeks, the Hungarian authorities, in response to the inquiries of the American Legation in Budapest, denied any knowledge whatever of the plane or the whereabouts of its crew. Subsequently the Hungarian Government sent a note to the United States which was largely a repetition of the *Tass* account. We then heard that the fliers were about to be tried. But we did not hear this from the sovereign Government of Hungary; we heard it from the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union in the First Committee. His very words, as taken from the verbatim record of the Committee [472nd meeting], are noteworthy. He said:

"We shall take measures to see to it that American spies will lose their appetite for flights over Soviet territory... I assure you the flyers were arrested and that they received due attention from our border authorities and I hope that due attention will be given to them by our military and judicial authorities..."

227. Disturbed by this statement I spoke to Mr. Vyshinsky after the meeting and asked him whether he was speaking for the Hungarian Government or whether the men were to be tried by USSR authorities. He denied that this was the case and said that he had been speaking only in general terms. But the facts are that this American plane, hopelessly lost and appealing for help over its radio, was led to a Soviet airfield on Hungarian territory by a Soviet fighter. The crew were split up and each man held in solitary confinement

by Soviet authorities and extensively interrogated over a period of two weeks. At no time were they accused of espionage. The charge was a violation of the Hungarian frontier.

228. All this happened on the soil of the sovereign State of Hungary where the Soviet Union has the right to station military forces for the sole purpose of maintaining communications with the Soviet Zone in Austria. It had not the slightest right in the world to hold *incommunicado*, and without notice to the United States, flyers who had lost their way. Mr. Vyshinsky may have been speaking in general terms, but it is quite clear from his statement and from the Soviet treatment of the flyers who speaks for the Hungarian Government and people.

229. The representatives here know the rest of the story. There was a trial of the men by three Hungarian officials. The flyers were not allowed to see their consular representatives. They were permitted only the most perfunctory consultation with their defence attorney. There was no charge of espionage which was proof that the Soviet authorities found nothing to support this contention even by their own all-inclusive definition of the term. The charge was unauthorized crossing of the Hungarian frontier. A fine of \$120,000 was then imposed. There was an appeal to the sentence filed by the defence attorney, but nothing was ever heard of it. The American Government, knowing it was paying ransom, provided the money so that the lives of four American citizens would not remain in jeopardy. But in no sense do we consider the incident closed.

230. This gross violation of the most elementary human rights was put forward by the USSR representative in the First Committee as further evidence that the United States interferes in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and of the States under its control. It is on a level with the other proof of alleged domestic interference and aggression drawn by the delegation of the Soviet Union from the language of the Mutual Security Act.

231. Thus, as we look back on the debate in the Committee, we can only assume that the USSR Government wanted this item discussed for purposes that were purely destructive. It provided a new springboard for another attack by the Soviet Union on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the growing system of collective security under the United Nations—but that is all.

232. The USSR Government made the most serious charge that one Member of this Organization can make against another Member, the charge of aggression combined with domestic interference. It did so for sterile propaganda purposes and nothing else. No aggression has been or will be permitted by the United States, either under the Mutual Security Act or for any other reason. There has not been, nor will there be, any act of domestic interference by the United States in the affairs of any country. Nor was the USSR representative able to produce any evidence or proof that an act of aggression or domestic interference had been committed by the passage of a clause in the Mutual Security Act or in any other way.

233. The Chairman of the First Committee rightly stated during the debate that heated discussions of this sort complicate rather than facilitate the work of the United Nations. Mr. Vyshinsky has thrown another monkey-wrench at the machinery, and has missed again. We suggest that he put his monkey-wrench away for good and begin to seek openings, not for further attacks against us, but for constructive and co-operative efforts within the United Nations. The door for real co-operation continues to remain open to him and to the delegation of the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that one day he will lead his delegation through the door, shake hands and get down to working

with the rest of us for peace, friendship and international co-operation.

234. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I shall try to be as brief as possible. Speaking on behalf of the United States delegation, Mr. Mansfield, who preceded me, did his utmost, it seemed, to distract our attention from the main point at issue. I do not know how far he succeeded, but I must in any case note that indisputable fact.

235. What we all want to know now is the nature of the Mutual Security Act of 10 October 1951, what its aims are, and how far it does in fact constitute, first, a violation of international law and of agreements in force between the Soviet Union and the United States of America (I refer to the Litvinov-Roosevelt agreement of 1933), and secondly, a threat to peace and security and an intervention in the domestic affairs of other States (in the case in point the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies), an intervention, indeed, which might lead to an extremely serious conflict and to war itself. For those who first have recourse to arms will be paid back in their own coin.

236. Those are the questions involved in the matter before us—the Soviet Union's complaint against the United States Government in connexion with its promulgation of the Mutual Security Act of 10 October 1951. I shall attempt to deal briefly with these questions.

237. I shall point to the deductions to be drawn from the analysis made in the First Committee. Of course I cannot repeat now the innumerable proofs which were cited. The discussion of this item took up four meetings during which there were no time restrictions. However, I can cite the conclusions of that discussion here, and it seems to me that if Mr. Mansfield and his colleagues genuinely wanted a comprehensive examination and exhaustive discussion of this matter in the Assembly, they would take steps to exert their influence over certain other delegations which they find it very easy to influence when they wish them to act in accordance with the plans of the United States. Give me an hour and I could prove a great deal. If, however, I am to be given only seven minutes, I obviously cannot say everything which will dishonestly be cited to show that we produced no proofs. All the same, I shall try to prove certain facts, within the limits of the time allowed me.

238. First, I have pointed out that the Mutual Security Act of 10 October 1951 and the Kersten amendment to the act, which is of the highest importance, provide for the financing and recruitment of persons and groups from the ranks of the so-called "escapees" from the USSR and the peoples' democracies. Is that true or not? If you turn to the act itself, you will see that that is a fact. Are further proofs needed? It goes without saying that that fact has been fully established.

239. Secondly, under the act of 10 October 1951, a sum of 100 million dollars is appropriated for these purposes. Turn to the text of the act, and you can see for yourselves, without further proof.

240. Thirdly: what are the purposes for which these funds are appropriated? The act says that 100 million dollars shall be appropriated for the financing of armed groups. That too is a fact. It says that these escapees have fled from certain of the peoples' democracies and the Soviet Union for various reasons. You may approve of these reasons; we do not.

241. Thus we have already established three facts: first, that the Mutual Security Act of 10 October 1951 and the Kersten amendment provide for the financing and recruitment of persons and escapees; secondly, that the act

provides for financing the organization of armed units of such persons ; and thirdly, that a sum of 100 million dollars is appropriated for that purpose.

242. Furthermore there will be a large number of these armed groups as proved by the speeches made by Mr. Mansfield, Mr. Kersten, Mr. Vorys and a number of other Congressmen whose names I quoted carefully from the official documents in my possession, any portion of which I am prepared to quote if given the time. There are to be many of these armed detachments which it is proposed to form. I refer you to Mr. Dulles' official statement that powerful striking forces are being organized. That is a fourth fact. Mr. Dulles has said where they are to be deployed, namely, "around the perimeter of the Soviet Union", to use his own words.

243. A fifth fact is that these powerful armed forces are to be used to destroy the political régimes in the USSR and the peoples' democracies. That fact is borne out by statements of the actual sponsors of the act and their commentators, and by the leaders of the United States foreign policy. These armed forces are to be organized as national military detachments, with their national regimental emblems and insignia of rank, under their appropriate national command.

244. A sixth fact is that these detachments will be incorporated as national legions in the Atlantic bloc.

245. A seventh fact is that these armed detachments and persons are to be used for diversionary and other purposes. The words of the act are : "... or for other purposes". I must refer you in this connexion to the highly interesting correspondence which took place between Mr. Kersten and Mr. Austin on the subject of our General Assembly and which shows that these detachments will be used for "terrorist purposes" and "terrorist activities". I have discussed this correspondence in detail in the First Committee, but Mr. Mansfield and company have preferred to pass it over in silence. When the question of whether to consider the draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind at the present session of the General Assembly was under discussion, article 2 of which code condemns the organization or formation in any form of groups intended for diversionary, political or similar activities, Mr. Kersten wrote a letter to Mr. Austin personally, advising him to take steps to see that the code would not be considered at the present session, since if it were, the act of 10 October 1951 could not be put through Congress, being a terrorist law within the very meaning of the code. When Mr. Austin replied, telling Mr. Kersten not to worry since that was not likely to happen, Mr. Kersten sent him a letter which has been published and which I can read at any time, if Members so desire. Mr. Austin's reply was : "Don't worry, nothing like that can happen". And Mr. Kersten replied : "You are wrong ; these matters cannot be handled without terror, and the task we are setting ourselves cannot be achieved without terrorist activities".

246. Here are no less than seven conclusions, chosen from the discussion in the First Committee which show that no one can have the presumption, not to say the impertinence, to tell us here that we have failed to prove our case.

247. This act is a terrorist measure, designed to secure the perpetration of terrorist acts in the territory of the Soviet Union, by the dregs of humanity, as the Byelorussian representative rightly called them, by outcasts of society, renegades and traitors. We are told that we call everybody traitors, but that is false, we do not give everyone that name. We know that among the persons who for one reason or another have failed to return to the USSR and are still left

behind in various foreign countries, even here in France, at Paris, there are thousands of honest people who wish to return to the USSR and will in fact return when they see fit and when they have settled their affairs in their present countries of residence who will never join any group of the kind provided for by the act of 10 October 1951, but will on the contrary actively oppose the provocative, terrorist and diversionary act, a measure unprecedented in the law of international relations, promulgated in the United States on 10 October 1951. Those whom this act concerns are the traitors and renegades, all the Kravchenkos and Kasenkinas, traitors who left their country and betrayed their people. And they are being formed into units to fight, and being given a banner and they are taking up this banner as if they were so many Messiahs fighting in a great cause, the freeing of Europe. We know, however, what "freedom" is meant.

248. Mr. Mansfield himself asked why these people should not be allowed to fight against the country from which they fled. He asked this question before this very Assembly. But that in itself confirms our charge that the act of 10 October 1951 promulgated in the United States of America has as its object the organization of underground terrorist and diversionary activity, under the flag of this so-called European freedom, by the very people whom you are organizing into armed bands and whom you wish to launch into the war against countries from which they fled. That is what Mr. Mansfield himself told us today.

249. On 17 August Mr. Kersten made the following statement in the United States House of Representatives : "My amendment contemplates the possibility of aiding the underground organizations that may now exist and may come into existence in the future in these countries". He went on to say that this assistance would be used directly for the subversion of the existing legal governments in the countries referred to. On 25 July, he stated in the United States House of Representatives that the United States should aid the formation into national military units of persons in the eastern European countries who were fit for military service and who had escaped from behind the "iron curtain" or might do so in the future, with the object of incorporating them into the European army. He then explained to the United States House of Representatives the reasons for the concern which had led him to do everything he could to prevent the consideration of the draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind by the General Assembly, a fact to which I have already referred. One of the main purposes of a real liberation movement, Mr. Kersten said—referring to the underground movement which I have just mentioned and which is being discussed here—is to sow terror amongst the population. The task of liberation, he said, could not be successfully achieved by mere propaganda or parliamentary manoeuvres ; it demanded energetic action at the appropriate time.

250. The point must be clear to any honest person. Surely we are entitled to call a spade a spade, and to say that what is intended is the formation in the territory of the United States and its allies of criminal armed detachments of renegades and traitors who have fled our country and the peoples' democracies, with whom we have friendly relations, in order to let them loose on our territory when they see fit, to perpetrate diversionary and terrorist acts, burn, destroy and blow up our works and factories, and murder the best of our sons.

251. Such is the act of 10 October 1951. And our reply is, in the first place, to appeal to your reason and ask you to reconsider this matter with a view to repealing the act. Our draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly makes that appeal to the United States, just as the USSR

Government has twice addressed notes to the United States Government on this question. Up to now, at any rate, no satisfactory reply has been received to the first note, and it is unlikely that there will be a satisfactory reply to the second one, which was only recently sent.

252. That is how matters stand. It is shameful that such an ignoble measure should be defended here; far better revoke it. And that you can do, if you really wish to ensure peaceful co-operation with other countries, including the Soviet Union. But, of course, that is not what you want. I shall not continue on this subject, since I do not want to abuse our time; but I have been compelled to make these remarks in order to disperse the fog of lies and slanders with which some of the representatives who have spoken in defence of the act of 10 October have tried to surround us, and to bring the truth of the matter before the General Assembly, and, through it, before world public opinion.

253. May I say a few words on the subject of my conversation with Mr. Mansfield? When Mr. Mansfield asked me who was to try the American fliers held in Hungary and where the trial would take place, I replied, as he himself must confirm, that when I said in the First Committee that we would not allow American aircraft to fly over Soviet territory for purposes of espionage (and that is what I did in fact say) I had not been referring to the aircraft brought down in Hungarian territory. I said that the question of jurisdiction would depend on the place of the offence, in accordance with the normal principles of penal law and criminal procedure, and that consequently, as the American airmen had been brought down in Hungarian territory, they would be tried by a Hungarian court. I explained this clearly and unambiguously. To accuse me, therefore, of violating and ignoring the sovereign rights of Hungary and of speaking on behalf of the Hungarian Government, is entirely unwarranted, particularly in view of the fact that when Mr. Mansfield put this question to me, I made it clear that I was speaking for myself alone. But I repeat that we shall not allow American aircraft to fly over Soviet territory for purposes of espionage. If you wish to know what I had in mind, I was referring to the case of the American Flying Fortress which violated our frontier in the district of Libau, in the territory of the Soviet Union. And I wish to make it clear that because we respect our own State sovereignty and independence, and the State sovereignty and independence of our friends and all other countries, we cannot allow espionage to be carried out over these territories from aircraft which, as in the Hungarian case, are equipped with military topographic maps of the Ukraine and the Volga region.

254. Thus Mr. Mansfield's remarks to the Assembly are quite unrelated to the truth. But I must emphasize once again that this is an extremely minor matter which the Assembly might have been spared. The important fact is that the United States has adopted the act of 10 October 1951 and will be responsible for all the consequences which must inevitably ensue if it attempts to put that act into effect. We recommend the United States to revoke the act.

255. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) (*translated from French*): We followed with much interest and great attention the discussions in the First Committee on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. I am bound to say that neither in the speeches that were made nor in the documents that were distributed did we find any evidence on which the charge that was made might have been based.

256. Consequently, failing objective evidence, we were obliged to confine ourselves to a number of general standards

of judgment that were available. We took into consideration the fact that the States which made those charges against the Government of the United States were unfortunately the very States which in their own territories have organized, armed and fully equipped tens of thousands of partisans and sent them to our country, not merely to overthrow the established government, but also to bring about the dismemberment of our country for the benefit of our neighbours. At the very time when those charges were being made against the United States Government, thousands of persons were being trained in camps organized in those countries with the idea of continuing such activities in Greece, and perhaps also elsewhere. I am bound to say that with that example before us we cannot admit that those who made those charges have the necessary qualifications for advancing them here.

257. Moreover, we cannot but take into account the standards of judgment relating to the country against which the charges are made. We cannot forget that that country is the one which in these years, after the last war which left more than one part of the world in ruins, has been placing a considerable part of its resources at the disposal of those stricken lands with the sole purpose of providing the people with better prospects and a better life. And please note that the assistance was not offered only to the countries which are benefiting from it at the present time. It was offered to all those that wished to take advantage of it, including those countries which are now making that charge against the Government of the United States and which seek to represent as a kind of warmonger and an organizer of espionage and political revolution in other countries, that country which has offered to all the means of recovering from the war, the country which has distributed its constructive assistance so liberally.

258. In those circumstances we needed no other consideration in deciding how to vote than that which was provided by those general standards of judgment, and we voted in the First Committee against the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. For the same reason we shall also vote against that draft resolution today.

259. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now take a vote by roll-call on the draft resolution submitted by the USSR [A/2031]. It has been requested that the vote should be taken by rollcall.

A vote was taken by rollcall.

Lebanon, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Israel.

Abstaining: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran.

The draft resolution was rejected by 42 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.