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President : Mr. LUIS PADILLA NERVO (Mexico).

General debate (*concluded*)

[Agenda item 8]

SPEECHES BY GENERAL ROMULO (PHILIPPINES), MR. VYSHINSKY (UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS), SAYED HASSAN IBRAHIM (YEMEN), MR. ROBERT SCHUMAN (FRANCE) AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. General ROMULO (Philippines): Every session of the General Assembly since 1946 has been described as a crucial one. This perhaps proves nothing except that the United Nations since its birth has been moving precariously from crisis to crisis.

2. Today the superlatives are exhausted. They have all but lost meaning and the capacity to impress. Far more impressive than any qualifying adjective is the evidence we have heard from this rostrum of a dangerous freezing of attitudes towards peace. Infinitely more eloquent than any speeches are the atomic explosions echoing from the Siberian waste lands and from the deserts of Nevada.

3. The one salient feature of this debate has been the curious fact that everybody is for peace. The task of this Assembly would doubtless be easier if there were two clear-cut sides to this debate, one favouring peace and the other favouring war. But everybody is decidedly against sin. Yet it is this unanimous yearning for peace that must give us comfort in these parlous days. Without giving everybody equal credit for speaking sincerely, there is a certain consolation to be derived from the fact that nobody has so far come forward to proclaim the necessity and inevitability of war. We have, at least, been spared the brazen glorification of war by the dictators who are now happily dead and gone.

4. There was a time when war could be a seminal factor of progress, and when it was a fairly good gamble promising dividends to the victor. But there is no longer any percentage in a future atomic war. It has therefore been suggested that, since men cannot be expected to abjure war of their own free will, they may now, in this atomic age, be persuaded to do so by the compulsion of fear. Unfortunately, some of the speeches we have heard here have given us no cause to think so.

5. Yet the instinct of survival must remain strong even in the human species which seems to be hell-bent for suicide. It is not, I am sure, the unseemly derision with which some have greeted here a serious proposal for peace that bespeaks the deepest instincts of the human race, but rather the simple wisdom of the humble people of all lands who value the great boon of life above all things. This, in the end, must decide the great issue of war or peace, not the grim ironic humour which delights in ridicule and seems determined to win a debating point even at the cost of universal catastrophe.

6. Three of the great Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have formally submitted a proposal [A/1943] for proceeding with the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic weapons. It is an essential condition of this programme that there be a system of disclosure and verification of all armaments, in successive stages; and concurrently, an effective system of international inspection to verify the adequacy and accuracy of this information.

7. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has poured unmitigated scorn on this proposal. He has impatiently brushed aside a proposal that, to every honest mind, is fertile with possibilities for calm and orderly consideration. But his sarcasm cannot conceal the fact that this new tripartite proposal represents a substantial advance from a position previously held by the United States of America. For the first time we have the possibility of an actual census of atomic weapons, along with other weapons, organically linked to the objective of regulating and limiting armed forces and armaments of all kinds, including the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Mr. Vyshinsky admits that a method of inventory is appropriate for counting candles, boots and other household goods, thereby implying that it is wholly unsuitable for the ultimate purpose of regulating armaments, controlling atomic energy, and prohibiting atomic weapons. Strangely enough, Mr. Vyshinsky himself provided the best refutation of his own argument, for in the same breath he then proceeded to read out impressive statistics about industrial progress in the Soviet Union. Yet it is certainly not more important for our peace of mind to know how

many kilowatt-hours the Soviet Union now produces as compared with other States, than to know how many atomic bombs and jet planes each of them has and must forgo for the sake of peace. It would appear that Mr. Vyhinsky has no real objection to counting things, except the things that really count.

8. Since all the Powers must simultaneously agree to a common system of inventory, verification and inspection, it is difficult to understand why one Power alone should object to such a proposal. The dangers of disclosure, if there be any, will be suffered equally by all of them. Indeed, the situation will be that the one Power which now objects to the system will receive, in exchange for the information regarding its armed forces and armaments, analogous and comparable information regarding three Powers which it regards as its potential enemies. It is difficult to imagine a more advantageous deal than this. Therefore, unless and until a foolproof system of verification and inspection is first established and in actual operation, the United States of America cannot be expected to reveal, and we should, in fact, ask it not to reveal, any information which might endanger the security of the world.

9. Underlying this whole controversy, of course, is the absence of good faith. One regrets to have to say that the USSR proposals exhibit this vice to an extreme degree. We recall, all of us who have attended the previous sessions of the General Assembly, the original proposal of the Soviet Union for a reduction of all armed forces by one-third, at a time when the whole world knew that all the great Powers, excepting the Soviet Union alone, had disbanded their troops. We also recall the well-known USSR proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons, at a time when it was well known that the United States enjoyed a clear superiority in the production of such weapons which served as a counterpoise to the superiority of the Soviet Union in armed forces.

10. These proposals formed part of the so-called USSR "peace offensive", a very appropriate term to describe a calculated attempt to win the battle of propaganda with proposals on disarmament which obviously could never be accepted by the other side. All such so-called "peace offensives" must therefore be regarded with suspicion. For they proceed from motives which have little or nothing to do with the objective of genuine peace. They are bound to create counter-offensives in kind, and thus reduce the search for peace to a dishonest and even absurd competition for the applause of the gullible.

11. A certain competitive spirit can be useful in the quest for peace. But the object of the competition ought not to be the winning of an argument but rather the diminution of argument through mutual accommodation and conciliation. What the peace-loving peoples of the world would like to see—yes, even the millions who are said to have signed the so-called Stockholm Peace Appeal—is not any of the great Powers invidiously claiming that it alone is right and all the others wrong, but all of them working out together a sane and practical programme for the maintenance of peace. The peoples of the world are less interested in finding out whose claim to peaceful intentions is more eloquently advanced, than in knowing whether the great Powers are, in fact, ready to translate their repeated peaceful affirmations into deeds.

12. It is our humble submission that, in order to achieve this end, there ought to be a moratorium on argument merely for the sake of winning a debating point, as well as a moratorium on recrimination, with all the use of invectives, merely for the sake of heaping blame on each other. What

the world would like to see, I repeat, is an honest and sincere effort to get down to brass tacks: for the representatives of the great Powers to get together and apply themselves to the workmanlike task of securing all mankind from the unimaginable horrors of an atomic war. I have described this task as workmanlike, as a job akin to masonry and carpentry, in order to show that it cannot possibly be achieved by methods of incantation or legerdemain, nor yet by clever short cuts no matter how attractive these may seem. It is a process of laying stone on stone and fitting the joints together carefully, one step after another, taking care to smooth out the roughnesses, completing one stage before beginning the next.

13. The USSR disarmament proposal [A/1944] hardly conforms to this conception of our quest for peace. It depends almost entirely on the assumed magical properties of a prior and simple agreement to prohibit the manufacture and the use of atomic weapons. It glosses over the more laborious details of military inventory, verification, and inspection by an international or supra-national authority which are essential prerequisites for the regulation and limitation of armaments. It ignores the possibility that while all the great Powers may readily adhere to an agreement not to use atomic weapons, such an agreement would not in itself create the basic good faith which alone can give peace of mind and security to the world. It ignores the further possibility that even if the great Powers were to agree in good faith not to use atomic weapons for aggressive war, none of them would be likely to forgo its use for purposes of self-defence and retaliation unless there were absolute assurance against the clandestine production and stockpiling of atomic weapons. None of them, in short, will ever surrender its capacity for defence unless all the others surrender equally and simultaneously their power to attack.

14. It is precisely at this point where the proposal of the Soviet Union is weak, that the new tripartite proposal exhibits many features of strength. The tripartite proposal advances a flexible plan that can be studied, blueprinted, modified and worked out, stage by stage, in step with the growth of mutual understanding and confidence among the nations. Within its framework, the door remains open to the mutual accommodation of views and the conciliation of varying interests. In contrast, the proposal of the Soviet Union is based on fixed and inflexible premises. It starts from an assumption of mutual good faith and confidence which do not exist, and builds the whole structure of peace on the hope that all the Powers, including the Soviet Union, will keep their pledged word without verification or check up. This is to build on quicksand. A sense of realism compels us to suggest that the method of working gradually towards mutual confidence is to be preferred for the purpose of erecting a sound and durable structure of world peace.

15. This method is bound to be tedious and difficult, but the Soviet Union, which has accomplished prodigies of achievement in war and peace, ought not to be deterred by the prospect of laborious effort. This is a challenge to the Soviet Union, not to abandon its legitimate interests, but to co-operate in working out a common programme of peace that will be for the enduring benefit of all the world's peoples. For here is merely a set of suggestions in the elaboration and execution of which the Soviet Union will have the opportunity to express its views and make its own suggestions in a manner befitting its place and power in the world. But the first essential is a willingness to be reasonable and a desire for conciliation. This means that the one great danger that must be avoided at this stage is the freezing of attitudes towards peace.

6. In the meantime, and while the rest of the world waits or one clear sign of such willingness and desire on the part of the Soviet Union—and none has come so far from this rostrum—we are compelled to pursue the only alternative that remains in order to maintain international peace and security. This alternative is being pursued in two ways: through the development on paper as well as in the field of a United Nations collective security system, and through the establishment of mutual defence arrangements in various regions of the world.

17. Seventeen months ago the United Nations decided to repel communist aggression in Korea in the first collective military action ever undertaken by an international organization. Totally improvised and developed from scratch, the United Nations effort in Korea has today become a magnificent field demonstration of the potentialities of a system of collective security. Full credit must be given by all impartial men to the United States which has borne the brunt of the struggle. For our part, we in the Philippines are proud to have contributed our modest share to this historic undertaking. For what has sustained our men and the men of fifteen other nations in Korea has been the determination that aggression shall not go unrepelled and that potential aggressors shall draw the appropriate lesson from the action of the United Nations.

18. As a result of the communist aggression in Korea, the General Assembly decided at the last session [resolution 377 (V)] to proceed with the study and elaboration of measures, political, economic and military, which the United Nations may take in case of future threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The Collective Measures Committee has now presented its report¹ to the General Assembly. That report is, in effect, a monumental project on collective security, the first of its kind in the history of international organization. It is our hope that it will be considered with the care and imagination it fully deserves.

19. At the same time, progress has been made in the establishment and strengthening of mutual defence arrangements in accordance with principles sanctioned by the Charter. The purely defensive character of all these arrangements, including the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the North Atlantic Treaty, is patent, and nobody can read into them any aggressive designs whatever, unless it be those who see reflected in them, as in a mirror, their own hidden purpose of aggression. In particular, the series of new mutual defence treaties in the Pacific area and the project of a Pacific security pact, which owes its origin to the vision of the President of the Philippines, have been directly inspired by the fear of communist aggression. The measure of this fear is the fact that the Filipino people have had to swallow the bitter pill of an unsatisfactory peace treaty with Japan in order to permit the integration of Japan into a system of mutual defence against communism in the western Pacific.

20. As the whole world knows, the leadership assumed by the United States in effecting these arrangements has been virtually forced upon it by circumstances and accepted by it with considerable reluctance. Mr. Vyshinsky himself, on this rostrum, has pointed out the terrific burden which the American people are shouldering by reason of the vast commitments assumed by the United States to support the economy and strengthen the defences of friendly nations. No one should imagine that they enjoy the sacrifices which

these commitments will entail for a long time to come. It has been claimed on behalf of the Soviet Union that its resources are being used to raise the living standards of the Soviet peoples. Yet the vast uninterrupted armaments programme of the Soviet Union must inevitably slow down the elevation of the people's livelihood. How can anyone conceive that the American people, who have long been accustomed to the highest living standards in the world, would readily accept a diminution of those standards by reason of the rearmament programme unless they understand it to be absolutely necessary? The sacrifice is obviously unequal, for what the Soviet people have never had they will not miss, while the American people will miss what they have always had. Here again, the American people have no choice. They must give of their substance to other peoples in order that the latter may be saved from the misery, chaos and anarchy on which communism feeds. They must rebuild their abandoned defences and help other countries build up their own in order to redress the dangerous imbalance of power which, since the end of the war, has so greatly favoured the Soviet Union.

21. It is a favourite argument of the pacifists that an armaments race must inevitably lead to war. But the argument is really valid only in reverse. We can have assurance of enduring peace only if all the Powers agree simultaneously to give up their power to attack. In the present state of power politics, the surest way to provoke war is to maintain a condition of imbalance in military power, in short, a condition of unilateral disarmament which places one side at the mercy of the other.

22. The peace resulting from the establishment of these regional mutual defence arrangements and the consequent maintenance of a certain balance in military power will be at best a precarious peace. It is not the peace we want; it is not the peace we must continue to seek. It is an expedient that harks back to the makeshift remedies of classical diplomacy in the past and, hence, is inadequate to the needs of our present world. Our world in this atomic age requires guarantees of peace far more solid than those afforded by the conventional system of balance of power.

23. When Mr. Vyshinsky denounces these treaties of mutual defence, he should at least remember that they could almost immediately be rendered unnecessary at a single stroke by the Soviet Union itself. Here, indeed, is where a single peaceful act on the part of Moscow would work like magic in dissipating the fears and suspicions that have settled on men's minds like an incubus. Let the Kremlin but give such proof to the world, and this awful weight would be lifted from the nations and this mad race towards disaster halted at once. We have heard Mr. Vyshinsky several times in a few days from this rostrum. It is very sad to admit that no sign has so far come from him, that the word that heals has not been spoken. All that we have seen so far is a white dove of peace with which he was photographed just before the meeting this afternoon. All men who love peace must continue to hope that the dove will be more than a conventional symbol, and that men will not turn away from this session of the General Assembly in bitter despair and with a gnawing emptiness in their hearts.

24. In 1948, during the third session of the General Assembly in Paris, the Mexican delegation, under the distinguished leadership of our President, presented a resolution which, in our records, now bears the name of his illustrious country. That resolution [190 (III)], which called upon the great Powers to settle their differences by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter, was unanimously approved by the General Assembly.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 13*.

25. In 1949, during the laying of the cornerstone of the United Nations in New York over which it was my privilege to preside [237th meeting], I was so deeply impressed by the historic import of the Mexican peace resolution that I expressed the wish that it ought to have been included among the documents which were placed in the cornerstone along with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

26. Today we have the opportunity, under the guidance and leadership of our President, here in the United Nations, to work out the grave problems of our time in the spirit of the Mexican peace resolution which he himself sponsored in 1948. This is a significant coincidence which, I sincerely hope, augurs well for the effective use of the United Nations as a centre for harmonizing the views and actions of Member States, and for composing their differences within the framework of the Charter.

27. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

28. Mr. CASEY (Australia) (*speaking from the floor*): On a point of order, Mr. President.

29. The PRESIDENT: If you have a point of order will you come to the rostrum.

30. Mr. CASEY (Australia): I am grateful for the President's courtesy in giving me a few moments in which to make a point of order before calling Mr. Vyshinsky to the rostrum for the second time. It is not that I have the slightest objection in the world to Mr. Vyshinsky's speaking for a second time; in fact, personally, I would welcome it. It is merely to ask the President if he has proposed to assure himself that Mr. Vyshinsky, in seeking this rather unusual privilege, is about to contribute anything which is new, which is urgent and which is relevant to our discussions. If he has not, he may get a very lengthy addition to the time in which we have to sit here in plenary session. If he has not so assured himself, these plenary meetings may develop into a debate in the parliamentary sense.

31. I would suggest with the greatest respect that if Mr. Vyshinsky has new material to offer, then all of us will be only too willing to listen to him; but I must reserve for myself the right to ask for the same privilege that Mr. Vyshinsky is now, I imagine, about to have.

32. This is a democratic gathering. I am quite sure that in suggesting to Mr. Vyshinsky that he might have the privilege of speaking a second time the President has not been influenced by the fact that Mr. Vyshinsky is the representative of a very great Power. So far as this Assembly is concerned, the greatest and the smallest Powers are equal in the President's eyes, so that with the fifty or sixty countries represented here he may have an almost indefinite extension of these plenary sittings. If his indulgence to Mr. Vyshinsky extends to his speaking for a second time—I think that there is no particular virtue in numbers—why not a second, third, or even a fourth time for the rest of us, in which case we should have a debate of considerable dimensions in which one representative replies to another; he is replied to, and so on.

33. I shall not take up the time of the Assembly any further, but with great respect I shall simply ask whether the President has assured himself in the direction I have mentioned, or whether he proposes to do so.

34. The PRESIDENT: It was my intention to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to reply to the representative of Australia. However, the representative of Australia

asked me a very direct question and he made an observation which calls for a direct answer. He asked whether or not I, as President of the General Assembly, was impressed by the fact that the representative who asked to speak was the representative of a great Power. That observation calls for an answer.

35. I am not at all impressed, as President, by the importance of the countries represented here. My duty is a very limited one. I do not have any powers which are not given by the General Assembly. The President of the General Assembly is the servant of and is under the authority of the General Assembly. My functions are very limited, but I intend to perform those functions to the best of my ability, with absolute impartiality, and without being subjected to the pressure of any side or of any representative from whatever corner of the world he may come. That being so, I shall reply that according to the rules of procedure there is nothing particular about the general debate. Anybody who is familiar with the rules of procedure will know that the same rules apply both to the debate in committee and to the debate in plenary session. Rule 69 states that "The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak". That is the duty of the President. Any representative who presents his name to be inscribed before the list of speakers is closed, comes under this rule.

36. I am perfectly well aware that in the past no speaker has requested the floor for a second time, except during the plenary meetings in which the twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations, presented by the Secretary-General, was dealt with. In those meetings two speakers of the same country were allowed the floor. With that exception, no speaker has requested the floor for a second time. If they consider that the best thing to do is to speak only once in the exposition of their point of view, that is a point for representatives themselves to decide, but I agree that the precedent is that on other occasions no representatives have requested the floor twice in the general debate, with the exception I have mentioned.

37. However, I am bound by the rule I have mentioned and my duty is not to try to forbid in any way the liberty of expression of any representative, either of a small or great country. That is why I have put on the list, as being in order, the name of the representative of the Soviet Union. Therefore I did not ascertain beforehand what the representative of the Soviet Union intended to say but now that the representative of Australia has asked the question, it is for the representative of the Soviet Union to give the answer. I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union.

38. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I had never imagined that any representative, whether of a great or a small State, could have been placed in so humiliating a position as that in which the Australian representative has tried to place me, nor that any such attempt could have been made towards any representative enjoying equality of rights in our Organization. We have, of course, become used to all kinds of infamous proceedings, including police measures and police cross-examination, but I don't submit to the latter. It is humiliating to the Assembly—I am not referring to the personal humiliation inflicted on me—to reply to the question of the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has apparently not mastered the elementary rules of courtesy which prevail in international gatherings.

39. I must point out that I did not reach the rostrum at which I now stand by some devious way, but through the legitimate method of putting my name down two days ago

to speak again in accordance with rule 74 of the rules of procedure, and in the knowledge that neither the rules of procedure, nor the Charter upon which those rules are based, contain provisions depriving any delegation of the right to speak twice on any question. Thus the way I have chosen is the usual, constitutional way and no one is entitled to prevent me from speaking again in accordance with rule 74. I would ask the President to be guided by rule 74 as well as by rule 69. It is argued that in such circumstances the plenary meeting might turn into an endless "long parliament". But that depends on the members and on the President. If anybody wants to answer my statement, the President must permit him to reply under rule 74. Some representatives will probably desire to do so, the Australian representative himself, for instance. I am not going to ask him now what he intends to say; I have enough patience to wait a while and hear him.

40. It is suggested, if you please, that no objection would be raised if I had anything unusual to say. I might of course retort by asking the leader of the Australian delegation, who is also the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell me what he regards as unusual. I might answer his question by another; but assuming that the question is put in a friendly way my reply is that what I intended to say will be unusual from his point of view and entirely usual from mine. The Australian representative pointed out that this is a democratic assembly. But his speech proves that his position at least has nothing whatsoever to do with democracy.

41. To conclude these explanations, I would, with respect, ask the President to allow me to speak on the substance of the matter without wasting any more precious time in empty prattle and in a slanging match with the Australian delegation. By his leave I will now speak on the substance of the matter.

42. During the general debate which has now reached its closing stages, many representatives have touched on a series of extremely important questions arising mainly from the statements and proposals of the United States, United Kingdom and French delegations on the one hand and of the delegation of the Soviet Union on the other. Although considerable attention has already been paid to those proposals, not all the questions have been sufficiently clarified; they cannot therefore be regarded as exhausted.

43. We have already pointed out that these proposals of the three Powers [A/1943], submitted in their much advertised plan for the reduction of armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons, and allegedly aimed at reducing the danger of war and strengthening the security of all countries, by their very nature do not conform to the advertisement. A careful analysis of the tripartite statement containing these proposals is enough to convince us that this is so.

44. In my first appearance here [336th meeting] I was not able, of course, to subject that statement to the thorough analysis it fully deserved. I confined myself then to a few passing remarks, and shall not conceal the fact that I also informed the Assembly that the statement had made me laugh. But more of that later, if at all.

45. Take, for example, such an extremely important matter as the prohibition of atomic weapons; it turns out that the statement does not provide for the prohibition of atomic weapons at all. This is utterly unacceptable. It is certainly no accident that the tripartite statement, in paragraph 5, merely mentions casually that the basis "for the atomic energy aspects of any general programme

for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces" should continue to be the so-called "United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons". But we all know that this so-called plan for the control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons, which has already been imposed upon a majority of the States Members of the United Nations by the United States, although it may speak of international control of atomic energy and of achieving the prohibition of atomic weapons through such control, in reality contains neither international control nor prohibition of atomic weapons.

46. Have we already forgotten that as long ago as 1946 the United States Committee on Atomic Energy—the Chairman of which was the present Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Acheson, whom I am pleased to see among us—in a report² prepared with the assistance of its Board of Consultants, headed by Mr. Lilienthal, one of the authors of the "Baruch Plan", and composed of such prominent specialists in the production of atomic weapons as Barnard, Oppenheimer, Thomas and others, pointed out in referring to this so-called international control plan, which the tripartite statement now cites, that the plan did not require the United States to discontinue the production of atomic weapons even after the international control plan had been put into effect? Is that a fact or is it not?

47. Up till now I have received no reply to this question. Such eloquent members of the United States delegation as Mr. Austin, who, as we know, replies to any question with a wide variety of objections, have hitherto given no answer. Perhaps they will answer this time, if only under rule 74. I will gladly make room for them on this rostrum, which I shall not occupy forever.

48. Perhaps they will reply to the question as to the meaning of the letter, signed four or five years ago by Mr. Acheson, to the then Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, in which it was stated that even after the so-called international control plan had been put into effect the United States would by no means be obliged to discontinue production of atomic weapons, but that everything would still depend on ratification, on discussion of political conditions, on the international situation, which the Senate would be bound to take into account when it finally decided the question along with the House of Representatives.

49. Thus the plan which is now cited by the tripartite statement not only does not provide for prohibition of the production of atomic weapons but, on the contrary, stipulates that the United States may continue to produce atomic weapons after the international control plan goes into effect. This is one of the characteristic features of the Baruch Plan. Another is that it provides for the kind of international control system for atomic energy that must inevitably lead to the unlimited power of American monopolists, who would thereby become masters of the whole world's economy, including the resources of atomic energy. Thus this plan is not a plan for international control but for American control, which bears no relation to the objectives of a genuine international control organ. In the terse expression of the head of the USSR Government, Stalin, it is a take-off, a travesty of international control.

50. Note that this plan, which is supposed to be a plan for the international control of prohibition of the atomic weapon—notice this point particularly—not only fails to

² United States Department of State publication 2498.

provide for prohibition of the atomic weapon, but provides—and this in my opinion is monstrous—that the international control organ, responsible for ensuring that the future decision prohibiting the atomic weapon is correctly, honestly and conscientiously carried out, the very organ created for that purpose, should possess a research department of its own which would deal, as is stated in various American documents, with the development and use of the atomic weapon. It is enough to make a cat laugh! An international control organ is to be set up to ensure that no one should be able to produce the atomic weapon; and provision is made for that control organ to include a special research institution for the further study of the possibilities of further developing the atomic weapon!

51. That is the plan which, according to the tripartite statement, is to serve as the basis for that part of the general programme for the reduction of armaments which concerns atomic weapons. Naturally the Soviet Union was and still is unable to agree to a plan which instead of prohibiting atomic armaments, legalizes the production and use of those barbaric weapons for mass slaughter. The plan is entirely unsatisfactory and cannot be accepted by any sensible person who really wishes to solve the problem and really stands for prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and for its use exclusively for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the plan is praised to the skies here by Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden, who are attempting to win us over by advancing, among their other proposals, one for the inclusion of atomic weapons in the same "system of disclosure and verification" as conventional armaments. Mr. Eden calls this an advance with respect to atomic armaments, and says that had the three Powers made no other proposal their statement would nevertheless deserve study by the Assembly. Even for the wisest it is never too late to learn; the proverb contrasts "the light of leaving with the darkness of ignorance".

52. What is important, however, is not that certain proposals should be studied, but the content and value of those proposals; whether or not a real and absolutely necessary solution can be found to this serious, vital problem. And there can be no serious solution of the problem of atomic armaments without their unconditional prohibition, a subject which the United States of America, England and France persistently avoid in their statement. That is the fact.

53. The three Powers also propose in their statement that a resolution should be adopted concerning the provision of information on armaments, it being understood that this information would be furnished progressively, or, in the words of the statement, "in successive stages". Some people, including the last speaker, General Romulo, are enthusiastic about this proposal. I do not share his feelings, though I know him to be a very enthusiastic man and not very difficult to inspire with enthusiasm; to command his enthusiasm a proposal has merely to originate in the United States of America. We are used to that and must of course expect it. An enthusiastic man like General Romulo can be enthusiastic even about this proposal. But what, in reality, is this system of successive stages? I should, with your permission, like to go into that.

54. Mr. Acheson said—I should mention here that I am using a Russian translation: it is possible that in places it may not quite tally with some other Russian translation, and differ from the English text in some trifle of a comma or quotation mark; but in the main it is clearly accurate, since it is the work of responsible translators. I am using the text of the official translators of the General Assembly,

whose work is well known to be excellent. At any rate the delegation of the Soviet Union has no complaint to make against their translations; it finds them indeed highly satisfactory. I repeat, Mr. Acheson said [*335th meeting*] that "this system of disclosure and verification must be a system which progresses". That is the first principle: it progresses. "Which progresses from stage to stage as each one is completed": that is the second principle. "The least vital information", he continued, "would be disclosed first". Where did General Romulo get the idea, which made him so enthusiastic, that notifying, reporting and providing information concerning atomic armaments would begin immediately? Nobody said anything about that. On the contrary, Mr. Romulo, I must disappoint you and ask you to approach the study of this statement more carefully and without enthusiasm.

55. "The least vital information", said Mr. Acheson, "would be disclosed first, and we would then proceed"; here Mr. Acheson used a remarkably apt expression—you will observe that I can speak of him not only harshly and rudely, but also gently and kindly—"to more sensitive areas". The sensitive area, Mr. Representative of the Philippines, is ultimately atomic armaments, and the statement promises that we shall come to it later on. Even that would be all right if later on were not postponed to what the ancients called the Greek calends; you will remember that the calends only existed in the Roman calendar and never in the Greek.

56. This was confirmed by Mr. Eden in his speech of 12 November [*339th meeting*]. "We suggest", he said, "that this should begin with the less important categories of armed forces and armaments". Was I not right in saying that a start would be made with ordinary rifles, machine guns and so on, that is to say, with the less important weapons? That is what Mr. Eden said. I merely repeated it, though in doing so I evidently caused a certain person displeasure. Apparently one must not repeat what other people have said even when it is to the point; one must bring out something fresh, indeed unusual, as the Australian representative requested me to do today. Clearly he must be satisfied, as I am saying something really unusual. What I am saying now is probably absolutely new to him. And then, Mr. Eden said, that is to say, after going through the less important categories, we shall go on to the more important ones. He went on to explain what was meant by those more important categories. They are the more secret ones, and, consequently, he went on—another remarkable expression!—"more difficult to handle". You see, when we reach the last, or some later stage, and it comes to the disclosure of secrets, then, says Mr. Eden, we come up against the need to disclose even things which are difficult to handle.

57. What are those things? Atomic bombs, perhaps hydrogen bombs, tactical or maybe non-tactical ones, I do not know; at any rate some special ones which Mr. Eden places in the more important categories, to use his own expression, or which, in the words of Mr. Acheson, constitute "more sensitive areas". Those I believe are the delicate questions which the three Powers relegate to the last stage. We have not the slightest doubt that this cautious approach is due solely to the desire to avoid, in actual fact, providing any information on the atomic weapon, which of course belongs specifically to that most secret category which, according to Mr. Eden, is particularly difficult to handle. It is like, if one might say so, a very sensitive lady who must be handled with special care and tenderness, and never exposed to the public view.

58. Here is just where we see the real point of the system of successive stages devised by the three Powers. The actual shift from one stage to another will, according to Mr. Acheson's and Mr. Eden's statements, be made at the discretion of those who hold the mechanism controlling the reduction of atomic weapons and all armaments, as well as the prohibition of atomic armaments. Mr. Acheson underlined that "in a world charged as ours is with suspicions and dangers, our peoples want the safeguard that disclosure and verification can provide". It is entirely understandable and a matter of elementary logic that if this is in fact so, then an effort must be made to disclose as soon as possible the most important features which give the best safeguard. But the tripartite statement turns the whole matter upside down, or, as the English and Americans are fond of saying, "puts the cart before the horse"; or as it seems the Australians and Canadians say, evidently preferring oxen to horses, "puts the cart before the ox". Mr. Acheson says that safeguards are necessary and that only if such safeguards are forthcoming will transition from one stage to the next be possible. He states directly: "As we move from stage to stage, we would have increasing evidence of good faith and honesty. We would not go forward", he adds, "without that evidence". This way of stating the issue can only mean one thing: that the transition from one stage to the next in the submission of information on armaments under the three-Power plan will be made directly dependent on whether those States possessing the most powerful, dangerous and threatening weapons, on which information has to be published and made known at succeeding stages, will be prepared to accept as satisfactory the results of submitting the required information at the first stage. This can only mean that the fate of the whole plan for collecting data on armaments, for verifying these data and for implementing measures for the reduction of armaments will reside in the hands of the possessors of the more powerful and dangerous weapons. This, finally, may well mean that the decision as regards the transition from one stage to the next will be entirely up to those same Powers, which will decide in accordance with their interests. If they recognize that it is possible to make known the more secret and dangerous types and forms of armaments, they will accordingly do so, and will proceed to the ensuing stage; if they do not recognize this to be possible, they will not do so and will not transmit the information to anybody. Thus the whole affair will come to a standstill and stop at the preceding stage.

59. Naturally we cannot agree with this way of formulating the problem. A programme for the reduction of armaments in general, based on this principle, would be just as unacceptable as the similar system of stages underlying the Baruch Plan for the control of atomic weapons. This "system of stages", in the hands of the masters of the situation, which the United States of America aspires to be, would constitute a convenient means of refusing for an indefinitely long period to carry out inconvenient and, from their own point of view, embarrassing control measures, or of implementing these measures unilaterally with respect to others States.

60. The system of stages in the Baruch Plan for so-called international control was intended to confine such control to the first stage in the production of atomic energy, that is, to subject to control only the extraction of raw materials, including uranium and others, and to prevent the extension of international control to the subsequent stages of production of atomic weapons. Under the conditions existing when the United States held the monopoly of atomic weapons, this system of stages, elaborated in the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, admirably suited the United States in atomic matters, for it placed under control only

those engaged in extracting raw materials for atomic weapons, and freed from all control those engaged in the actual production of atomic weapons. An attempt is being made to apply this system even now, although the United States has lost its former monopoly of production of atomic weapons and so should realize by now that what is convenient for a monopolist is no longer convenient for him when he stops being a monopolist. The United States should know that it must find new paths to the solution of this problem and not repeat the same thing over and over again, like the magpie in our proverb which used to repeat the same things about everybody, no matter whom.

61. We have already said that all these proposals of the three Powers amount in substance to proposals for a census of armaments, which is to be carried out without any preliminary resolution for the reduction of armaments and before prohibition of atomic weapons, and which is designed to drown the main issue of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons in a flood of words. This, however, is the main issue. Until the Assembly passes two resolutions on these two supremely important questions, anything else will have no practical significance whatsoever and will remain empty verbiage.

62. That is why we are urging that the Assembly should not shelve this matter but should resolve to prohibit atomic weapons, to establish strict international control to ensure that this prohibition is conscientiously and honestly observed and to reduce all other types of armaments. This resolution must be adopted and duly registered in the miracle book of the General Assembly. Afterwards it will be easy to agree on the important practical measures. But until this is done, alas! we shall be unable to move from our present position owing to a number of circumstances about which I, with your permission and if the Australian representative has no objection, shall have to speak further.

63. I must state that, of course, as soon as resolutions are passed for the reduction of armaments and for the prohibition of atomic weapons by all States—I stress this, by *all* States—information on armaments must be furnished as soon as possible.

64. As long ago as the first session of the General Assembly, in New York in December 1946,³ the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to recognize the necessity for all States Members of the United States to furnish information on all their armed forces and armaments. The tripartite proposal, however, does not refer at all to military bases. It is of course impossible to ignore military bases in any reference to armaments and armed forces; for, when a military base is situated on foreign territory it is one of the ways of using armaments and armed forces which constitutes the greatest danger to peace. But, gentlemen of the American delegation here present, that is precisely the matter which we are discussing.

65. The tripartite proposal does not refer at all to military bases. You know, even under the strongest microscope you won't find a trace of them, no trace at all of military bases on foreign territory. But in the meanwhile these bases are being established month after month by the organizers of the aggressive Atlantic bloc, although they do not mention the fact, and although the issue of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons is closely connected with it. They cannot, however, be convinced of this.

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second part of first session, First Committee, annex 790 and annex 91.*

the story of the so-called defence of the Near East, which the United States is eager to defend without obtaining the consent of the Near Eastern countries?

77. With all his restraint, Mr. El-Khoury could not help pointing out that this bears a strong resemblance to preparations for American intervention in the Near East. I seem to have understood him correctly. At least, he is not correcting me now.

78. And what of the war in Egypt, which, as the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Salah-el-Din, has said, is now being waged against Egypt by a country purporting to be its ally? And what of this year's events in Iran, of which Mr. Entezam has spoken?

79. Do these events not indicate the nature of the present policy of the United States and the United Kingdom towards economically and militarily weaker countries?

80. What about all the continuing excitement over the armament and rearmament of Europe, which are crippling a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, one of the chief promoters of that armament, as well as France which has also joined in?

81. And what about the excitement surrounding the nervous activities of the American staff of the Atlantic bloc, of which we are now spectators here? And the present gathering in Paris of the leading figures of the aggressive Atlantic bloc, in which the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett, is playing an active part, with General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Harriman, not to mention Mr. Acheson, Mr. Perkins or Mr. Adenauer, who is said to have arrived in Paris, or even General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the bloc, and the other persons engaged in preparing for the forthcoming session of the Council of the Atlantic bloc in Rome on 22 November?

82. Even the Paris *Le Monde* has not been able to conceal the real meaning and significance of all these facts. An article in the issue of the day before yesterday, 14 November, entitled "From the Atlantic to the Rhine with the American Army" has a bearing on what I have said. I will quote only a few passages from this article.

83. First, *Le Monde* says:

"At present more than ten thousand American soldiers and officers are in France. This time they have not come to pay their respects to Lafayette. Their assignment is [the following]: ... the U.S. Army in the rear of its forces stationed in Germany is creating services and building up stores of food and munitions for use in the event of a conflict. This is the supply line, which is planned to run from the Atlantic ports to the Rhine...

"English as you might hear it spoken near the banks of the Potomac or Lake Michigan is heard on a Saturday evening in the corridors of first-class coaches of the Limoges-Paris trains. With every week more American passengers get onto the trains in Chateauroux and Orleans. Many of them have put aside their khaki or air force blue uniforms for the week-end, but they all have military papers in their pockets...

"Motor cars and lorries covered with dirty green tarpaulin impress the tourists more than the Packards and Chevrolets on the French roads. On their bumpers can be seen the letters E.C.C.Z., which signify 'European Command Communication Zone', since these vehicles form part of the fleet which the Americans are gradually building up in the rear of the occupation forces in Germany."

84. *Le Monde* goes on to make the melancholy observation that these activities have no regard for the sovereignty of France.

85. But, however tolerant our attitude to these facts may be, are we not justified in saying clearly, firmly and resolutely that statements to the effect that the removal of international tension is the essential prerequisite for the reduction of armaments are absolutely insincere? Such statements do not accord with the facts I have quoted. They are contrary to the activities which characterize the whole foreign policy of the United States.

86. We cannot in fact daily and hourly create complications which lead to tension in international affairs while simultaneously making hypocritical appeals for the elimination of such complications. Deeds speak louder than words. Words are judged by deeds and no reliance is placed on them unless they are borne out by deeds. We are faced with a glaring contradiction between the juggling with words of the United States leaders, who are playing the chief part in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, and their deeds.

87. This contradiction fully exposes the hypocrisy and insincerity of the proposal made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France for the reduction of armaments, and shows it to be a screen for their real aims, and for the continued arms race and the preparations for a new war which those aims envisage. These reservations, these numerous other reservations scattered through the speeches of Mr. Truman, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden and in the tripartite statement can be regarded only as an attempt to prevent the adoption of practical steps for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

88. The treatment of the Korean question by Mr. Truman, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden makes this particularly clear. They regard the end of the war in Korea as an essential prerequisite for the reduction of armaments. They have all clearly stated that no general programme for the reduction of armaments and armed forces can be carried into effect while the war in Korea continues.

89. But the United States should first apply that requirement to itself; to lay down such a condition is mere hypocrisy and deceit. The hypocrisy of the position on the reduction of armaments adopted by the United States Government and by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France is absolutely obvious, since the United States, the United Kingdom and France, with other governments of the member states of the Atlantic bloc, bear the full responsibility for the barbarous war forced on the Korean people, a fact which some representatives present here and speaking from this rostrum do not appear to understand.

90. It was the United States which started the war in Korea. It is for that country to bring this aggressive war against the Korean people to an end. For the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to put forward the demand for the termination of this war in Korea as an essential prerequisite for a so-called system of reduction of armaments can be regarded only as a mockery of the idea of peace, of the desire for peace of millions of people in all countries. This attitude of the United States proves more clearly than any words that that country does not in reality desire any reduction in armaments.

91. The attitude of the USSR delegation to the question of reduction of armaments has been sufficiently clearly

stated. It stresses the need to make a start with the reduction of armaments forthwith, whether the war in Korea is continued or ended.

92. We cannot agree with the statement made by Mr. Truman, and repeated by Mr. Eden and Mr. Acheson, that no what they term real progress towards the reduction of armaments is possible until the war in Korea has been ended or while, as Mr. Truman said, the political questions which at present divide the nations remain unsettled.

93. If the termination of the war in Korea really must be a preliminary condition of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the atomic weapon, why in that case are steps not taken to end the war immediately? Why in that case do General Ridgway and his associates at the Korean front in the extermination of the peace-loving population employ the most incredible chicanery to prolong the armistice negotiations themselves, as is apparent even from today's papers? Why? Evidently because it is necessary to prolong the armistice negotiations in order to defer and delay the end of the war in Korea. And it is necessary to defer the end of the war in Korea in order to avoid reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic energy. The logic of such an attitude is sufficiently clear. But it is a vicious logic calculated to appeal to the simplicity and, I must be outspoken, the foolishness of credulous people. I do not think that any people of that kind are to be found amongst ourselves.

94. It is quite impossible to agree with Mr. Truman's assertion that the end of the war in Korea is the essential condition precedent to the reduction of armaments. It is becoming quite obvious that in actual fact the tripartite proposal is nothing but a propaganda manoeuvre to enable the negotiations for the reduction of armaments to be used as a screen for the continuing armaments race conducted by the organizers of the Atlantic bloc.

95. It is no coincidence that even the American Press has been compelled to acknowledge that the so-called three-Power plan for the reduction of armaments, as described in the tripartite statement, was intended to serve purely propaganda purposes. I should like to refer to a number of organs of the American Press which have a large circulation and which in the view of many Americans are authoritative, for example, *The New York Times*.

96. On this matter *The New York Times* contains the open admission that one of the main reasons for the submission of the "disarmament" plan by the United States Government was that at the recent session of the Council of the Atlantic bloc at Ottawa the attitude of the European allies of the United States was marked by stubborn rebellion against the American plan of rearmament. We behind the Iron Curtain do not know what goes on there, it is all hidden from us; but, according to *The New York Times*, at that last meeting of the Council the attitude of the European allies of the United States was transformed into a stubborn resistance to the American rearmament plan.

97. *The New York Times* writes that western Europe is disturbed by the recent aggressive statements of American representatives.

98. *The New York Times* writes that this was just the reason why the United States had to stress its "peaceful intentions". For these propagandist purposes, writes *The New York Times*, the American plan is good, but it will not serve as a means of bringing the cold war to an end.

99. *The Washington Post*, a newspaper which presumably is also well-known to the United States delegation, states

in its leading article that the "disarmament" proposal advanced by Mr. Acheson is only a "propaganda gesture".

100. An article published on 9 November in the *New York Herald Tribune* affirms that the rejection of the western Powers' plan by the Soviet Union will be used by those Powers in their campaign to shift the blame for the present armaments race on to the Soviet Union, and that this was precisely the purpose—this is the most important point—which American official representatives had in mind when they proceeded to elaborate their plans many weeks ago.

101. The *New York Wall Street Journal* called the American "disarmament" plan a chimera and a figment of the imagination, and went on to say that in selecting "disarmament" as a means of wresting the initiative from the Soviet Union the United States was really clutching at a straw, since the plan ignored reality for the sake of propaganda effect.

102. It is characteristic that *The New York Times*, asserting emphatically now that the primary task of the United Nations is to "elaborate" the western Powers' plan for the purpose of displaying it to the whole world, at the same time affirms that the second task concerns the western Powers themselves, and is—according to *The New York Times*—to go full speed ahead with their rearmament programme.

103. What happens at Rome on 22 November will undoubtedly provide a rich illustration of the justice of this remark.

104. It is also impossible to ignore the statement by the American and a considerable part of the European Press that the tripartite proposal for the reduction of armaments was put forward because the idea of peace advanced by the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the part played by the Soviet Union as a champion of peace, has proved effective. The western Powers, as the *New York Herald Tribune*, for example, writes, have had to think in their turn of launching proposals for the reduction of armaments in order to win at least a propaganda battle at the General Assembly.

105. And was not this confirmed here by General Romulo, who declared in his speech that the United States had never introduced such proposals as on this occasion. Why were those proposals introduced precisely on this occasion?

106. *The New York Herald Tribune*, *The New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and so on, replied to this question as follows: Because the rulers of the United States had to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union and to make some kind of concession to their partners, who, according to *The New York Times*, had rebelled against the plan of the Atlantic bloc at the last meeting at Ottawa.

107. That is the situation so far as the so-called peace proposals of the three Powers are concerned. As we have seen, those proposals evade the main questions requiring immediate attention. These questions are the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments. In those proposals an attempt is made to attach primary importance to secondary matters, and thus to divert the attention of the General Assembly from the main problems I have mentioned.

108. The delegation of the Soviet Union has already proposed to the General Assembly its positive programme of measures for averting the threat of a new war and guaranteeing the peace and security of the peoples. At the very beginning of our general debate we introduced our

proposals [A/1944] on this matter under the following heads :

109. The incompatibility of membership in the United Nations with participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, and the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States, of military bases in foreign territory ;

110. The immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, the conclusion of a truce, the withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel within a period of ten days, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea within a period of three months ;

111. The convening of a world conference on the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the establishment of international control over the observance of that prohibition ;

112. The conclusion of a peace pact between the five great Powers : the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union.

113. As a development of these proposals, which were made on 8 November the Soviet Union delegation deems it essential at the present time, for the reasons just stated, to make a number of additional proposals.⁵

114. Firstly, we consider it essential that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution that : considering the use of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people, to be at variance with the conscience and honour of peoples and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, it proclaims the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition. We propose that the General Assembly should instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commissions to prepare and submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 February 1952, for its consideration, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of already manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the above-mentioned convention.

115. Secondly, the General Assembly should recommend the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to reduce the armaments and armed forces in their possession at the time of the adoption of this recommendation by one-third during a period of one year from the date of its adoption. The Philippine representative has, of course, grossly distorted the facts by saying that all countries have reduced their armed forces with the exception of the Soviet Union. He has forgotten or has not read a number of official documents. I shall not deal with this aspect of the matter, as I am prepared to postpone detailed discussion of it until it is taken up in the First Committee ; I shall merely say at this stage that we have demobilized thirty-three military age groups since the end of the war. It seems that Mr. Romulo is a general ; he should know what thirty-three age groups means. If he does know and appreciate what they mean, he had no right to say what he did say from this rostrum. As I have already pointed out, however, he is an enthusiastic person and in his enthusiasm is often led to make statements which are contrary to the truth.

116. Thirdly, the General Assembly should recommend that forthwith, and in any case not later than one month after the adoption by the General Assembly of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers, all States should submit complete official data on the situation of their armaments and armed forces, including data on atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories. These data should relate to the situation obtaining at the time when the above-mentioned decisions are adopted by the General Assembly.

117. Lastly, we make the additional proposal that the General Assembly should recommend the establishment within the Security Council of an international control organ, the functions of which shall be to supervise the implementation of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to verify the data submitted by the States regarding the situation of their armaments and armed forces.

118. The significance of the foregoing proposals is obvious and requires no special clarification. I consider it necessary to dwell merely on our additional proposal for the one-third reduction by the permanent members of the Security Council of their armaments and armed forces, in connexion with the proposal we made on 8 November for the convening of a world conference on reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons. We consider it expedient and essential that the General Assembly should adopt in principle a recommendation concerning the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and that a world conference, with a wider membership, including all countries of the world, should consider specific questions arising out of these recommendations and affecting all the countries participating in the conference.

119. I would also recall that during the general debate a number of representatives, including Mr. Pearson, the head of the Canadian delegation, who of course is also at the same time chairman of the highest council of the aggressive Atlantic bloc, endeavoured to thwart our proposals for convening a world disarmament conference by asking : " Why wait until June ? Is not the General Assembly itself a disarmament conference ? "

120. These representatives will perhaps now be quite satisfied that we do not wish to postpone the reduction of armaments until the world conference which will have to draft practical measures but are proposing, as a supplement to our proposal for a world conference to consider the reduction of armaments, that a reduction by one-third of the armaments of the five Powers and the prohibition of atomic weapons should be discussed at the present session of the General Assembly.

121. We are profoundly convinced that if the proposals for the settlement of outstanding international questions, for an endeavour to put an end to the aggressive American war in Korea, for the reduction of armaments and the like are not mere words but really express the desire of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the three Powers which lead the Atlantic bloc and whose conduct determines the political climate in government circles in a number of other countries, then indeed the way will be opened for the General Assembly to adopt serious and responsible resolutions.

122. We are convinced, profoundly convinced, that the proposals of the Soviet Union make it possible for the General Assembly to proceed boldly and resolutely along this path.

⁵ These additional proposals were subsequently distributed as document A/1962.

123. Sayed Hassan IBRAHIM (Yemen) (*translated from Arabic*): I wish to associate myself with my colleagues in saluting this generous city which has welcomed us to work in the very field which it has chosen itself, the field of freedom and social justice to all its nationals. Paris, the capital of the French Republic, has welcomed the United Nations twice within four years.

124. Six years have passed since this Organization came into existence. It was constructed to best serve the desires of the peoples who bear the burden of war and for whose sake peace is sought. These are the people of the world regardless of their size or strength. Efforts have been made in this Organization during past years, and every year before the session of the General Assembly the whole world expects the fulfilment of a hope which has been the sincere desire of everyone. That is the hope of peace and liberty. However, I believe that these very people, during recent years, have come to expect or to know what will be the outcome of our session. This fact is greatly regrettable as our work has already been understood and judged. In every session we have dealt with questions which are important to the whole world, the solutions of which are desired by the whole world, and which have been requested by the whole world. They are questions of peace and the realization of social, political and economic liberty. The result of every session has unfortunately been the same. We have listened to statements expressing divergent opinions and to declarations evoking pessimism and filling humanity with despair. I believe that you share with me regret for this state of affairs. We all know well that the Charter is adequate and perfect in so far as it embodies the desires of the people. We know that we have accepted this Charter in order to implement its purposes and to be able to live as brethren in this world which is so full of disputes, wars, suppressions of freedom, exploitation of nations and the domination of the weaker Powers by the strong Powers. This is the world which has entrusted us with the sacred task of fulfilling the principles of the Charter, and of guiding humanity towards its high ideals along the path of peace.

125. Yet it is really a fact regrettable—I say regrettable and I mean regrettable—from the point of view of all mankind that this Organization has achieved, irrespective of all that it has done, and regardless of all the good results it has brought about, nothing more than a partial and indirect fulfilment of our great goal, the goal which is being sought and pursued by humanity, namely, the prevention of war and making it possible for all nations to enjoy the full rights and liberties in all respects.

126. Here we may stop to ask ourselves who is responsible for this tension which has caused anxiety to women, children, the old and even the young? The answer is as simple as it is clear. Through their disputes and divergencies, dividing the world into two camps, the great Powers must fairly assume the responsibility for this state of affairs. The disputes amongst the great Powers have become so acute that the moment may not be so remote when we shall hear of the declaration of war. The international rostrums of peace may thus become the ominous signs of the third world war.

127. However, I wish to associate myself with my colleague the representative of Uruguay [*343rd meeting*], in sharing the belief that the small States bear equally the responsibility. Had the small States been co-operative and faithful to the principles of the Charter, not guided or expecting

to be guided by the great Powers, and had they formed a bloc to prevent anything, at any time or in any form, which would touch or impair the principles of the Charter, we, the small nations, would have been able to realize for the people of the world all that the great Powers have failed to achieve. We would have been the hope of the whole world. Owing to one reason or another, such a hope has never been fulfilled, but, had it been fulfilled, we would have spared the great Powers the efforts of dividing the world into two blocs, and those Powers would have realized that the world needs real peace, real prosperity and real brotherhood.

128. I have listened with great concern to some of my distinguished colleagues who have expressed certain views which are worthy of consideration. While speaking of the Middle East, reference was made by one representative to what he called a "supra-national" interest. With all due respect to the opinions expressed here, I believe that this is a very dangerous line of thinking, which drifts away from the spirit of the Charter as it does from the sacred desires of the peoples who want peace and liberty, and whose blood is the blood that is shed in time of war. Why then do we, the speakers from this rostrum, try to ignore the desires of the people? Why do we accept a policy of power politics which does not aim at the fulfilment of these aspirations? Why should we defeat the very purpose of the Charter by advocating such a dangerous policy?

129. I wish to state also that the primary concern of every nation is its security and its liberty. If its security and liberty are threatened, then such a nation will not find a great difference whether it alone is threatened and terrified or whether the whole world is terrified, since that nation is being threatened and its freedom strangled either from this side or the other, or by one principle or the other. I do not believe that the interest of international politics lies in the suppression of freedoms.

130. I have also listened with all respect to the representative of the United Kingdom who referred to an attempt which is to be made to proclaim a truce from name-calling and angry words. I wish to associate myself with his appeal that such an attempt should be welcomed and that agreement should crown the attempt. I look forward to the day when the good example will be applied in one of the most important centres of the world, namely, the Middle East. I do not wish to dwell on the problems of the Middle East. I wish to refer only to some of the problems which necessitate an immediate and fair solution in accordance with the Charter.

131. There is, for example, the case of hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees of Palestine who have been evicted from their homes, deprived of the use of their property and denied the most elementary rights of man. These refugees and the whole free world behind them expect the implementation of the United Nations decisions concerning their repatriation and compensation. The problems of Palestine and the repatriation of refugees are undoubtedly among the most important cases to be dealt with by the United Nations. In fact it may be said without exaggeration that the United Nations is directly responsible for the desperate conditions of the Palestinian refugees. Such conditions tend to encourage subversive movements and illegal activities, thus rendering the fulfilment of peace a matter far from realization. Every day, nay, every hour and every minute, adds to the misery of these refugees and detracts from the faith of nations in the justice of the Charter, or rather in the goodwill of those Powers which have made of the Charter an elastic instrument applying it or ignoring it according to their interest. These refugees,

* The above text is the English translation of the speech given in Arabic provided by the delegation of Yemen.

who have reached a state of misery and poverty not difficult to imagine, have observed with hearts full of anxiety the efforts which have been made during the past few years to obstruct the implementation of United Nations decisions. These refugees have also noticed with misgivings and suspicion the efforts which have been made by some States to replace and to abrogate the decision concerning their repatriation.

132. Can I be accused of exaggeration when I say that the reputation and justice of the United Nations depend on the extent to which these decisions are implemented and on the extent of the willingness of the concerned Powers to put aside their ambitions and their interests for the sake of justice ?

133. I wish to conclude my reference to the problem of Arab refugees of Palestine, without following the example of the representative of Israel whose aim was to distort this question. The injustice under the partition has been committed not only against the Arabs themselves but against their land and property in disregard of the decisions of the United Nations starting with the decision to partition Palestine [resolution 181 (II)]. The dangers of such a decision are that it could be used by Israel as a means of utilizing the property of the Arabs of Palestine and therefore to exceed the limits of the United Nations decision. Israel has repeatedly ignored the decisions of this Assembly regarding Arab refugees, the decision to internationalize Jerusalem, and others. My delegation does not wish to comment on the many difficulties caused by Israel, because we believe that responsibility for all these complications rests on those who started the existence of Israel in the first place. Furthermore, I do not wish to take up your time by commenting on any of the points referred to by the representative of Israel. However, my delegation wishes to say that, against that which the representative of Israel says in these meetings, Arab refugees are suffering and Arab men, women and children are dying, and all this because Israel continues to violate the decisions of this Assembly.

134. The problem of the Arab refugees of Palestine is but one of the problems of the Middle East and its peoples, these peoples who have struggled for their liberty and independence, and some of whom still struggle to achieve their full sovereignty. Yemen has asked with its sister Arab States for the inclusion in the agenda of the Moroccan question. We have been prompted to this action by our faith in the right of the people to decide their fate and also by our faith that France, cradle of the Revolution, which has so willingly sacrificed the blood of its youth for the causes of equality, liberty and fraternity, is more wise than to deprive a whole nation of the very principles of equality, liberty and fraternity.

135. The Yemen delegation has also defended and supported the independence of Libya as it has supported all the great questions taken up by the United Nations. The Yemen delegation would like to express its best wishes to the people of Libya, and to His Majesty the King for whom we have the highest esteem. Meanwhile, we look forward to the day when this nation will realize its unity as well as its complete sovereignty, so that it may co-operate with its Arab sister States in the realization of prosperity and international security.

136. The Yemen delegation believes that most of the nations of the Middle East have their problems and their claims, which do not conflict with the spirit of the Charter and which up to this day are still awaiting solution. The most important problems are the Egyptian and the Iranian

questions. We are confident that these problems will receive their share of the solutions which fulfil the national aspirations of all the people of the world. These nations have been working steadily with the big Powers concerned in the hope of achieving their aspirations and reaching acceptable solutions and fair settlements complying with the Principles of the Charter and preserving good, friendly relations. With such friendly relations, it would be possible to co-operate in the settlement of international political, economic and social matters. Such a stage cannot be reached, however, until the nations of the Middle East obtain their full rights and breathe liberty, as was very ably expressed by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan when he said that freedom was as necessary as the air breathed by man. Any attempt to strangle freedom by force can represent nothing but an attempt to impair world security.

137. In point of fact, the Principles of the Charter, which are the cornerstones of this Organization, cannot be observed and respected until the great Powers treat them with sincerity, a sincerity which will not be affected by competition or obstructed by disputes. Such a condition cannot prevail except through the path of honest goodwill and the realization by the great Powers that the United Nations represents a turning point in history, a forum where all States regardless of their size or strength have come to enjoy the right of equality, and that all peoples have attained a degree of national consciousness which does not permit the great Powers to ignore the voices of mankind.

138. Mr. Robert SCHUMAN (France) (*translated from French*): In a speech marked by nobility of thought and of feeling, Mr. Anthony Eden has told us of the disappointment he experienced on first coming into contact with the Organization, of which he was one of the principal founders. Like Mr. Eden, we do not wish to allow ourselves to be discouraged. Institutions which are still growing have their awkward age, like children. What matters is that, by means of proper education, they should pass through that stage unharmed.

139. The general debate is a sort of self-examination in which we must with complete frankness recognize the defects that exist, the failures we have suffered and our share of the responsibility for them. After that, we shall find it easier to define the frame of mind in which we shall henceforward tackle both familiar and novel problems.

140. My remarks are concerned in the first place with the instrument at our disposal. It would certainly require certain reforms. The misuse of the veto has prevented the proper operation of the Security Council. The refusal to admit certain democratic countries, such as Italy, is not only an injustice but a violation of the principle of the universality of the United Nations, whose authority is diminished thereby, as it is by the fact that it does not possess a permanent armed force capable of providing a minimum sanction to back its decisions. Other, less serious, imperfections could easily be remedied.

141. The increasingly poisoned atmosphere in which we work is, however, much more disturbing. Criticisms, which on occasion are full of hatred, are more in evidence than the spirit of co-operation; we are beset by a mutual distrust which paralyses action and distorts intentions. There is not, or at least there does not seem to be, any disagreement among us regarding the essential objective we have in common: the protection of peace. Despite that, we are all anxious regarding the peace which we are unanimous in desiring. We fear that war may break out

like an electric discharge between two opposite poles. We shall prevent it only if we succeed in reducing the fatal tension.

142. Are we sufficiently concerned with avoiding whatever might increase it dangerously? Are we at all times fully aware of the responsibility we incur when, by words spoken from this rostrum, we inflame feelings to add to the propaganda which divides us rather than to bring us closer together by persuasion? We are concerned too much with tactics and procedure, as if we wished to shut our eyes to the real problems which beset us but which we are sometimes afraid to tackle directly.

143. Mistrust distorts everything, blocks every avenue. Of what use are speeches if we are convinced that the person we are addressing does not wish to listen to us or understand us? Too often speeches give the impression of being brilliant monologues whereas what we need is frank discussion which would throw light on the points of view of both sides, for the purpose of bringing them closer together. Because we fear traps everywhere, we are tempted to take refuge in more or less hypocritical subtleties.

144. All of this takes us further and further from our goal which is to ease the tension and so consolidate peace. We must tackle the causes of this baneful mistrust.

145. For this mistrust your policy, Mr. Vyshinsky, is largely responsible. In the first place the mystery with which you surround yourselves breeds uneasiness and doubt: mystery regarding your objectives, mystery regarding the resources you employ, mystery regarding the connexions you maintain and the assistance you grant, mystery as regards public and private life alike; everything is mystery, a State secret. Our diplomats are confined to their hotels; kept under supervision like undesirables, prevented from performing their natural duty of informing us on the state of mind and on the economic situation, a function which elsewhere they carry out honourably and fairly. Our compatriots who live in your countries, some of whom have lived there for many years, who have family ties and have rendered great service there suddenly become suspect under a suspicious and intolerant régime. You are setting a record in spy trials.

146. This fiercely guarded mystery breeds natural, insufferable mistrust on our part, and officially organized tours cannot reassure us. Are you ready to lift the veil, to come forth from behind that screen of mystery and to stop cutting yourselves off from the rest of the world? A régime which is sure of itself and has no evil intentions stands to lose nothing through open confrontation with other régimes.

147. The same applies to armaments. The chief merit of our recent three-Power initiative is that it seeks to put an end to the mystery which shrouds the state of armaments and the size of the armed forces. You know perfectly well, Mr. Vyshinsky—and I apologize for addressing you personally—that the object is not to count boots and mess-tins, but rather to obtain the exact number of the frightful engines of destruction of all kinds which are threatening the existence of humanity. Here again, the removal of the mystery would be an essential element of security and trust, the starting point for the regulation of the manufacture and stocks of arms, and a progressive limitation on the dangers threatening peace. That is the unmistakable intention. Accordingly, it is hardly fitting for anybody who sincerely wants peace to answer our proposals by a quip or a jest. What we desire is to be able at last to make a resolute beginning with effective and positive measures.

148. This plan has already had an effect and a certain efficacy, for it prompted the head of the delegation of the Soviet Union to make a special supplementary speech. We are happy to note the importance which he attaches to our initiative. For myself, I prefer to await developments in committee. In any case, it would be sound procedure if everybody awaited the appearance of the final and complete text of our motion before discussing it in detail.

149. You are accusing us of desiring and preparing for war. That is a monstrous and senseless accusation. For myself, I am quite willing to believe that you do not desire war. I am trying to be fairer to you than you are to us. War like all things evil, is prepared in secret. Let us raise the curtain of secrecy frankly and in unison: that would be the first decisive step towards peace. Uncertainty is as serious as threats. Our peoples are agreeing to heroic sacrifices in order to remove this terrible feeling of insecurity. I am sure the same is true of your peoples who worry about their future and who are kept in that state of anxiety by a propaganda that is an official monopoly. We must come to an agreement to reassure the peoples—all the peoples. Speeches are no longer enough; they are entirely discredited. We are met together here to take joint action and to agree upon what joint action should be taken.

150. I know, of course, the argument that our régimes are opposed to and irreconcilable with each other. But they can exist side by side without making war upon each other; they can even agree on common tasks, as the victory in 1945 so clearly showed. Why should such co-operation be impossible in efforts for peace?

151. It is true that such co-operation also, or more especially, needs a suitable atmosphere. As a first step, there must be an end to that aggressive hostility to our institutions, to the vicious defamation of individuals, to the methods of violence and sabotage which your supporters and followers practise in our countries. The Comintern was abolished at a time of relaxed tension. When will the Cominform and its methods be abandoned?

152. Can we conceivably stretch out our hands confidently to those who, day after day, unremittently shower insults and threats upon us? We are prepared to co-operate with you in seeking a truce, and understanding, a gradual easing of the tension, in a dignified manner, by a kind of non-aggression pact—I am speaking figuratively—by outlawing weapons which are poisoned with hate and libel, as a prelude to a *modus vivendi* genuinely respected by either side, both without our countries and in our international relations.

153. Are you ready to proceed on these lines and to give instructions accordingly? Everything will be in vain unless we begin by purifying the atmosphere in this way. Every such effort would be greeted with immense relief. Could we not start here and now.

154. What would be wanted are not necessarily spectacular moves or carefully constructed texts followed by slender results. The opportunity to put this new spirit into practice is offered to us every day in connexion with the concrete problems which we have to deal with and solve together.

155. Firstly, there are the technical problems for which we desire the co-operation of all but from which, we regret to note, you hold aloof, if you are not openly hostile. On the generous initiative of President Truman, an expanded programme of assistance to under-developed countries has been adopted by the Economic and Social Council. Its

implementation will constitute one of the most productive activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. It covers all fields: administration, finance, industry, trade, agriculture, public health, labour, education, scientific research. It is consequently, an undertaking of solidarity which should raise us above our political antagonisms. France, despite its heavy liabilities in the territories for which it is responsible single-handed, despite the expenditure to which it is committed, for many years to come, to repair war damage, is making a substantial financial contribution to this technical assistance and also lends the co-operation of its experience and experts.

156. In the field of child care, much highly gratifying work has been initiated, but in view of the vast needs, they demand greatly increased efforts and resources. Surely, you ought to join us in these efforts.

157. Again, the refugee problem is one of the most distressing, both because of the human values involved and because of its political repercussions. A solution is urgently needed. France has been a land of asylum for centuries and has received waves of refugees of various origins without any discrimination. We in France are familiar with their unhappy lot. Our country's experience and traditional liberalism support every act of goodwill and of generosity on behalf of this very complex cause. This problem appears in different forms according to areas, ethnic differences and all other kinds of circumstances. As has already been rightly pointed out from this platform, no uniform solution is possible. One solution is repatriation, another is resettlement on the spot, another is immigration; sometimes it is a question of aid, sometimes a question of manpower. It therefore seems to us that action will inevitably have to take more than one form. France will co-operate in all of them, in the Council of Europe as in the international specialized agencies, in Palestine as everywhere else where, for any reason, national resources are insufficient to solve demographic difficulties. We are bidden to do so not only by a humane duty but also by the interests of peace, for any collective misery produces disturbances and conflicts.

158. The unanimous collaboration, which we hope to find in dealing with economic and social problems, would be even more necessary in the case of political problems. The United Nations has accepted responsibility for dealing with affairs in Korea, though, of course, without any thought of domination. Let us also recall that the conflict occurred shortly after the withdrawal of American troops. We are ready at all times to conclude peace without any advantage to any of us, on the one condition that the Korean people should be free to determine their own future. If this conflict were settled, it would be possible to approach the settlement of other Far Eastern problems with advantage. That part of the world has for so long suffered such grievous divisions that the difficulties which hamper its recovery and free development and which endanger the lives of hundreds of millions of human beings cannot be overcome piecemeal. They are interdependent by reason of their origin and by reason of the solutions which they call for.

159. Austria is another case offering scope for our common goodwill. The country is hoping for a peaceful settlement which would release it from its present crushing encumbrances. In the course of several years the four allied delegations have met two hundred and sixty times to work out a draft treaty of less than one hundred clauses—a record in dilatoriness. Why should signature be postponed indefinitely for reasons wholly irrelevant to the context of the treaty?

160. Even less progress has been made in the case of Germany. It has not hitherto proved possible to initiate negotiations for a peace treaty, and Germany is still under the occupation régime. The régime in the Soviet Zone is vastly different from the régime in the Western Zone. In the west, the population has been able to choose free democratic institutions, whereas in the east a people's democratic republic on the pattern of all those in the Eastern bloc is functioning. How will it be possible to merge the two sectors? On what basis is a peaceful Germany to be re-united? That is the problem before us. We all appear to be in agreement on the principle of free elections in the occupied territories as a whole. The way in which they can be carried out remains to be defined. For our part, we consider it necessary that international impartial observers, appointed by you, should conduct a preliminary investigation in both sectors so that the subsequent elections would be protected by all the necessary safeguards. We did not expect our proposal to meet with an opposition that is as vehement as it is unwarranted.

161. Our objectives in Germany cannot offend anybody. In the centre of Europe, where so many conflicts have arisen, as we all know to our cost, it is our desire to ensure the functioning of free democratic institutions and to associate Germany with a collective policy of peace, of a peace and peaceful co-operation covered by mutual guarantees. In order to achieve this aim, it is neither possible nor is it necessary to go back six years and to efface an evolution which has taken place freely in West Germany during that period. A unified Germany must be able to choose freely; the lessons of the recent past and the country's wish to take its place among the free nations show it the way.

162. The German problem is the problem of Europe. One cannot be settled without the other. We assert and repeat that only if it is united and organized in freedom, can Europe be safeguarded against both war and want. The divisions which, in the past, have separated European countries and set them against each other have been the cause of their misfortune. That is why France has proposed the creation of a European community. This community will first of all be achieved in the field of coal and steel production. We hoped that the peaceful nature of this initiative could not be questioned by anyone and that it would be viewed as an attempt to make Europe stronger and more independent, both economically and politically. We thought that this desire to improve production and to increase the welfare of our peoples would be welcomed by all. Indeed, in order to achieve this result, we have deliberately assumed risks and surrendered sovereign rights.

163. Yet, once again we are being reproached with harbouring warlike intentions and with preparing for war, whereas our purpose is to strengthen peace. A synchronized campaign has been launched against this plan, which is a purely internal affair; this suggests to us a deliberate wish to prevent Europe from improving its position and from organizing itself on any model other than the Eastern model.

164. Our answer is that we intend to remain masters of our own choice. As I have said, we respect the choice made by others for their own purposes. Peace means freedom of choice and the reciprocal respect of such freedom. Is that too much to ask?

165. How we should like to convince you! I am loth to believe that you do not wish to be convinced. Only too often, unfortunately, you give us the opposite impression. Did you remain unmoved by the touching appeal

made in the course of the last few days by our Danish colleague [343rd meeting] ? Do you really imagine us to be so full of ill will and cynical deceit, and do you really think that so many countries, proud of their independence, martyrs in their love of freedom and signally free of any desire for domination, would be our accomplices ?

166. The mere fact of being ready to listen to us, of agreeing to conversations between those who are responsible for the peace of the world and to exchange frank and honest explanations, that fact alone would achieve the more congenial atmosphere which we all desire, which we all seek and by which we should begin.

167. Acceding to the wish expressed by many of you to hold our sixth session in Europe, France invited you to be its guests in the hope that you would be able to find here a setting propitious to a closer understanding and to the establishment of trust. More than any other, our ancient country has witnessed the meeting and mingling of régimes, races and ideas. It ascribes a special virtue to personal contacts. We believe that this method of conversations as between man and man is especially appropriate in moments of crisis when there is a risk that misunderstandings and emotions may prevail.

168. On behalf of our country, a particularly well qualified spokesman has intimated the same idea to you, discreetly and with the emotion of a troubled heart, devoid of any calculating motives or polemical spirit. We are grateful to all of you who understood the message and, for the sake of peace, we hope that the idea will ripen.

169. I also thank the speakers who have spoken of France with feeling and confidence. We can achieve nothing without confidence, without confidence in each other, without that minimum degree of confidence which assumes and accepts a minimum of good faith in the other side.

170. I pray that during this session we may attain at least this result, triumph over deliberate deafness and, by frank and sincere words, reach the minds and hearts of all.

171. The SECRETARY-GENERAL : It has been my privilege and usual practice to speak briefly at the close of the general debate since the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization¹ is one of the documents now before you. I also want to take the opportunity of thanking the delegations for the fair and friendly references which so many have made to the Secretariat and myself during the discussion. Next, I should like, on behalf of the Secretariat and myself, to thank the Government and the people of France for all they have done to welcome the United Nations to their beautiful capital and to provide a temporary headquarters at the same time so graceful and so efficiently arranged and equipped.

172. As Secretary-General I address my thanks especially to three men, to Mr. Carlu, Mr. Cunin and Mr. Broustra, and to every one of the thousands who have been associated in this construction whether in high or in humble capacity, I desire to pay the most sincere and heartfelt tribute for a hard task magnificently accomplished. I remember in New York many occasions when representatives asked me : " Will we be able to go to Paris and open the sixth session on 6 November ? " I always replied, " Yes ", because we had such a good team working for the United Nations here in Paris, and here now for the next ten or twelve weeks will be the political capital of the world.

173. We are engaged in a labour that was begun six years ago with high hopes that have in many respects been grievously disappointed, but it is a labour that the present safety and future hopes of mankind require us to carry on with unflagging purpose, both now and for many times six years ahead, the labour of constructing peace.

174. No one could listen to the general debate or examine the questions on the agenda without feeling that here were reflected the troubles and fears of all humanity. The burdens of armaments, of poverty and hunger, the deep mutual distrust, the conflicts of interest and ideology, the universal sense of insecurity and fear of war that characterize this hour in history—all these are with us in the fullest and most disheartening measure.

175. Equally, however, the general debate has reflected the compelling desire of all peoples to extricate themselves from the morass of fear and danger in which they are now struggling. It has reflected their recognition that the United Nations, as the Organization embracing the whole world, provides the road that leads to permanent safety and security.

176. I am convinced that all the peoples of the world, Americans and Russians, British, Chinese and French, and the peoples of every other country without exception, want new efforts towards universal reduction of armaments. They also want new efforts to build collective security. They want new efforts towards economic and social development. In spite of every failure over the past six years, they want new efforts towards the step-by-step settlement of the political conflicts that divide the world, and above everything else the peoples of the world want peace with freedom, liberty and equality of opportunity for individuals and for nations. These are universal goals that have the universal support of the peoples of the world. Therefore they require the universal approach for which the United Nations stands.

177. I do not state these goals in any order of priority. I believe that the United Nations efforts in all these directions must be carried on concurrently. Furthermore, they are all interrelated and interacting. It should be the main business of this session of the General Assembly to seek out realistic means by which tangible progress can be made.

178. In the present time of tension, trouble and danger, the difficulties and obstacles may appear insurmountable. For that very reason the hope of peace requires that every resource of wisdom and effort be devoted to overcoming them. Even the smallest progress in any one of these directions will make it easier to make progress in the others. Even a single step forward might ultimately have decisive consequences in determining the final issue between war and peace.

179. It is important, and it may become very significant for the future of peace, that the question of reduction of armaments has been returned to a central place on the agenda. There has been a seemingly hopeless deadlock over this issue for three years in the United Nations and very little time and study have lately been given to it. Now there is opportunity for a fresh start. No matter how poor the prospects may seem at any moment of reaching the necessary measure of agreement, this question should receive the major attention and effort it deserves, both at this Assembly and throughout the year ahead. The United Nations must never stop planning and working for the reduction of armaments.

180. The creation of universal collective security under the United Nations will not be complete until Article 43 of the Charter comes into full effect. In the absence of the

¹ See *Officials Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 1 and No. 1 A.*

military agreements contemplated by the Charter, a beginning has been made during the past year towards building a United Nations collective security system that will be a protection against armed aggression in the meantime. To make this system fully effective, I appealed in my annual report to all the Member States to make more clear than heretofore the commitment of their foreign policies, their military strength and their economic resources in support of collective security through the United Nations. It has been encouraging to hear many expressions of support for a further strengthening of United Nations collective security in this direction.

181. Much attention has been quite rightly paid during the general debate to the great importance of more rapid progress in economic and social development. I firmly believe that the United Nations will not succeed in establishing peace and security in the world unless we do better in these respects than we have done so far. In fact, I believe that a world-wide crusade against hunger and poverty under the United Nations is an urgent necessity if we are to prevent the spread of violence and chaos.

182. This spring, I visited ten Member countries in South America and around the eastern end of the Mediterranean. I am grateful to all the Member Governments concerned for their hospitality and for all that I learned during these journeys. I was particularly impressed during my visits by the need of a greatly expanded United Nations programme of technical and financial assistance for economic development. I am equally certain that such a programme would contribute to peace and stability, especially in the Middle East. Such festering sores as that created by the plight of the Arab refugees from Palestine cannot be healed without this assistance.

183. We have been reminded by the Directors-General of the specialized agencies during this debate that over half the population of the world live with chronic hunger and chronic disease, that they have not yet been given the opportunity to learn to read and write or in any way to lead a decent life.

184. It is dangerous for peace, and it undermines the faith of over half the world in the possibilities of peaceful progress through the United Nations, that we have thus far made so small and slow a response to so great a challenge. I believe it is necessary for the nations—as things stand today—to arm for their own defence and for collective security. But we must also find the means to carry out a much greater United Nations effort to improve economic and social conditions in the world. You will not find the resolution and the courage to uphold peace, independence and freedom among hungry and hopeless men.

185. I come now to the last and, in my opinion, the most important, of the roads to peace that lie before this Assembly: the step-by-step settlement of the main political conflicts that divide the world today. Settlements of at least some of these conflicts are essential if real progress is to be made toward peace. The most serious divisions exist between the Atlantic community and its allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and their Eastern European allies on the other hand. Serious divisions also exist, however, between States of the Western world and the Arab world and even between some of the States of Asia themselves.

186. Something more than debate will be required to make progress towards settlement of any of these differences during the present session of the General Assembly. Negotiation—genuine negotiation—is necessary. May I say, however, that this session offers an unequalled opportunity for negotiation?

187. The Foreign Ministers and other leading representatives of Member States are here together. They have every possibility for quiet, straight-forward discussion among themselves and for conciliation and mediation by third parties should these be helpful. In this connexion, I am not thinking of myself. But we have here, besides the distinguished President of the General Assembly, a number of foreign ministers and other leading representatives, some of whom have not been with us for some time, who are especially well fitted by their skill, experience and positions of influence to encourage fruitful negotiation.

188. If we are to achieve settlements of any of the greater or lesser issues that divide the world, this is the place and the time to begin. The best beginning would, of course, be a settlement for Korea, if a cease-fire and armistice can be achieved there. All too long, now, we have been waiting for the military negotiations to succeed. A real settlement for Korea would do more than anything else to open the way to serious negotiation on other great issues between "East" and "West" that threaten world peace. Equally, a set-back at this stage might have very serious consequences indeed.

189. In so far as the questions between States of the Western world and the Arab world are concerned, I am sure that solutions can be found in time if they are sought in the spirit of the United Nations Charter. This means, in my opinion, negotiation on a basis of genuine equality of rights in every respect, a mutual understanding of national aspirations and interests, and recognition of obligations to the community of nations as a whole.

190. I wish with all my heart that the community of nations were universally represented in this Assembly. I am certain that it would be an important contribution to progress toward all the major goals before this Assembly, if the principle of universality could be laid down by the Assembly, and Article 4 of the Charter applied in the light of this principle to all applications for admission. This must always be the meeting place of the world, of all governments, all cultures, all political and social systems.

191. We know very well that it will take a long time to reach the goals of the United Nations Charter. We cannot make peace secure at one session of the General Assembly, nor satisfy the rightful aspirations of humanity for many sessions still to come. Equally, however, there is a supreme challenge before this session. It is the challenge to move forward by every possible means in the direction of peace and progress and away from war and poverty.

192. It is the duty, the sacred obligation, of the Members of the United Nations not to let pass a single opportunity to increase hope and lessen fear for the peoples of the world by the time this session of the General Assembly comes to an end. That is what the peoples of the world are waiting for.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.