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President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

Problem of the independence of Korea: reports of the First Committee (A/1422) and of the Fifth Committee (A/1424) (*concluded*)

[Agenda item 24]

1. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The debate on the Korean problem is drawing to a close. The General Assembly faces the task of adopting a decision on one of the most important matters on its agenda.
2. The discussions in the First Committee¹ and in the Assembly have brought out two clearly distinguishable approaches to the settlement of the Korean problem.
3. The delegations of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia have insisted on the need for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict.
4. The delegations of those five Powers have submitted a draft resolution [A/1426] to the General Assembly. Essentially, that draft resolution provides for putting an end to foreign interference in the settlement of the internal conflict between North and South Korea, and for giving the Korean people itself, by its freely expressed will, the opportunity to settle the problem of the unification of Korea in a single, democratic State and of the establishment of a legislative organ and a government of the Republic.
5. These proposals show the sincere desire of the Soviet Union and the peace-loving States united with it to stop the war at once and to create conditions pro-

pitious to the peaceful development of Korea, to which United States intervention and aggression have brought innumerable misfortunes and heavy losses. These peace proposals are designed only to put an end to the Korean conflict through the concerted efforts of the United Nations. Nevertheless, they have been opposed and countered by a number of delegations, headed by the delegation of the United States.

6. But however much the opponents of our proposals try to distort their meaning and belittle their importance by alleging that their only aim is propaganda, they will not succeed in concealing from world public opinion and from their own peoples the steadfast will for peace expressed in those proposals.

7. The other approach to the solution of international problems is expressed in the draft resolution [A/1422] submitted by eight delegations headed by the United Kingdom. What kind of a programme for the settlement of the Korean conflict does that draft resolution propose?

8. The basic difference between it and the five-Power draft resolution is that it does not provide for putting an end to the war in Korea. On the contrary, its aim is to extend the aggression to the entire territory of Korea.

9. Thus, on the one hand, there is an attempt to stop the conflict forthwith and end the war in Korea by peaceful means, and on the other an attempt to extend the area of conflict and to prolong the internecine war in Korea.

10. That is why it is difficult to reconcile the position of the delegations of the five States with that of the

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee*, 346th to 353rd meetings inclusive.

delegations headed by the United Kingdom and the United States. The two draft resolutions are fundamentally different in their aims and basic postulates because they represent two different views on the settlement of international problems. One approach is to strive for peace; the other, to unleash war. The preparation for the attack on North Korea and the unleashing of the civil war were a natural extension of the internal policy of the anti-national Syngman Rhee government.

11. The government of Syngman Rhee is the embodiment of a régime which suppresses not only all the elements inimical to it, but even those merely not in agreement with the government's policy of dismembering the country. It is a régime which abolishes democratic freedoms and shamelessly violates the Constitution. It is a régime with a corrupt administration; a régime which has brought economic ruin and poverty to the population. It is quite clear—and this is proved by numerous facts and documents adduced here or not yet mentioned—that the South Korean Government did not and does not now enjoy the support of the people, and can therefore exist only by help from outside.

12. The policy of the Syngman Rhee government long ago ceased to be a Korean policy and became the policy of the United States in Korea.

13. It is small wonder, therefore, that the puppet government of South Korea, following the general line of United States foreign policy, was concocting broad plans of aggression long before the actual attack on North Korea. It was banking on United States intervention in the internal affairs of Korea, an intervention aimed at destroying the democratic régime in North Korea and which was to be the first step towards the extension of United States aggression in Asia.

14. As early as 3 December 1948, Pen Ku-en, a minister of the Syngman Rhee clique, sent a letter to Syngman Rhee concerning what he called the future destiny of Asia. He wrote:

"After the liberation of our northern territory, the Korean and American armies should proceed across the Liao-tung peninsula and up to Harbin. A reconstituted Chinese nationalist army should restore the territories lost by China, including the province of Liao-tung . . . After the victorious completion of the war, the Korean and American armies should occupy Manchuria . . . At a subsequent stage in the reorganization of the Far East, Japan should be assured a preponderant influence, and should receive Vladivostok and part of Siberia . . . You no doubt have a better plan for the reconstruction of Asia than the one that I have outlined, but I am again expounding this point of view in full so that I, rather than you, the supreme head of 30 million Koreans, should be the object of attack and ridicule by our enemies if our plans should be discovered or intercepted."

15. Perhaps the United States delegation will say that the United States was not a party to the elaboration of these adventurous plans; but that cannot justify the United States Government. The United States Government bears the responsibility for the fact that such plans are made and implemented, and for the fact that in pre-

paring their plans of aggression the war-mongers are convinced that the United States will take a leading part in carrying them out.

16. The adventurous plans for the unleashing of war are the direct result of the foreign policy pursued during recent years by the United States, which has been seeking to create aggressive blocs and to establish military bases, and has embarked on a feverish armaments race; they are also the result of unbridled propaganda.

17. The aggressive policy of the United States, which is the accomplice in these adventurous plans of aggression, cannot be concealed by resounding phrases and hypocritical assertions of attachment to peace.

18. Thus the draft resolution submitted by the eight Powers seeks to disguise the aggressive measures against Korea as defence measures which, it is claimed, will help the cause of peace.

19. What kind of peace is it that the eight-Power draft resolution wishes to establish in Korea?

20. By what means does it propose that such a peace should be established? The answer is given in Mr. Acheson's speech to the National Citizens' Committee for United Nations Day, delivered in Washington on 7 September 1950.

"Korea," said Mr. Acheson, "is the workshop in which the United Nations has the chance to make the prototype of the kind of world which it wants to make universally."

21. This clearly confirms our assertion that a régime desired by the United States will be foisted on Korea regardless of the will and desires of the Korean people.

22. We know of numerous examples of such imposition by force of political régimes alien to the peoples concerned.

23. We still remember the bloody events in Greece and the ruthless vengeance wreaked upon the people, to the accompaniment of so-called "democratic elections" and the establishment of "order".

24. The United States aggressors wish to impose their kind of "peace" on Korea by force. Realizing that it can expect no support for its plans from the Korean people, the United States is concealing its intentions and acts behind the authority and flag of the United Nations, thus transforming this international Organization into a branch of the State Department. The delegation of the United States is hastening to ensure the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution justifying American aggression in Korea, and is trying to obtain the sanction of the United Nations for the occupation of the entire country.

25. That is why, yesterday [292nd meeting], Mr. Austin so insistently demanded the execution without delay of the purposes of the United Nations in North Korea, thus calling for the extension of aggression beyond the 38th parallel.

26. As was admitted by Mr. Spencer, the representative of Australia and one of the authors of the eight-Power draft resolution, the text was deliberately drafted in vague terms, leaving broad possibilities for any kind of interpretation or action. That point was stressed by a number of representatives during the debate, particularly by El-Khoury Bey, the representative of Syria.

27. The United States and the other countries participating in the Korean aggression do not wish to be bound by any restrictions. In order to have a free hand in Korea, they propose to introduce into all parts of the country armed forces whose bayonets will impose order and democracy, United States style.

28. But the United States and the other authors of that draft resolution base their proposals on false premises. They entirely ignore the masses of the people, who cannot be disregarded and to whom the final word belongs.

29. We know that the enemies of peace, among whom are a number of delegations to the present Assembly, will vote against our draft resolution. We shall not be astonished to find Mr. Spender at their head. It could not be otherwise. Mr. Spender brags too much about the illusory independence of his government's foreign policy and with affected indignation thunders at those who would question that point, passing over in silence certain well known facts. Those facts are that Mr. Chifley, former Prime Minister of Australia and leader of the Labour Party, connected the dispatch of Australian troops to Korea with the securing for Australia of a loan of 100 million dollars from the United States. He said that the Australian people was getting the impression that Menzies was trading Australian soldiers for a dollar loan.

30. That is no communist propaganda: it is a statement by the leader of the Labour Party and the former Prime Minister of Australia.

31. Naturally we cannot count upon support for our proposals from traders in human lives and human blood, or from their representatives in the Assembly. No one will be deceived by the theatrical pathos and menacing outcries made by Mr. Spender and his New Zealand or other colleagues in the anti-peace camp against the imaginary "aggressors". The aggressive intentions of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and some other countries towards Korea are clearly distinguishable through the camouflage of grandiloquent phrases which conceal the real intentions of the authors of the eight-Power draft resolution.

32. We repudiate the eight-Power draft resolution because it would bring to Korea a continuation and aggravation of the war, and an indefinite occupation. It would not give Korea democratic freedom or political independence. It would necessarily impose the Syngman Rhee régime, deeply hated by the people, on all Korea. It is hostile to the people, for it is designed to secure the enslavement of the country by foreign capital. The people of Korea would not accept a decision of the General Assembly which thus ignored its interests.

33. The United Nations should show its determination to resist Anglo-American pressure and should not permit the transformation of an international instrument of peace into a tool of aggression—a tool for the implementation of imperialist and expansionist plans in the Far East.

34. The governments represented at this Assembly should realize what the adoption of the draft resolution of the Anglo-American bloc would mean for them. It will not settle the Korean conflict. It can only further

exacerbate international relations and jeopardize the cause of peace.

35. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, therefore, appeals to the delegations of all those countries which are concerned for the maintenance of international peace and security, and urges them to adopt the five-Power draft resolution on the Korean question. That draft resolution is inspired by a sincere desire for the peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict and it points the way towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

36. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) (*translated from French*): Before dealing with my own subject, I should like to say a few words about the reference which has just been made to elections in Greece. I did not quite grasp the purport of that remark, but I should like to say that the whole world, and in particular this Organization, knows very well how elections are conducted in Greece. If the reproach, or insinuation, we have just heard refers to the fact that we have not yet reached the ideal stage of democratization in which the one-party system spares the electors the bother of making a choice, or if the intention was to reproach us with the fact that we remain impervious to a type of electoral magic which makes it possible to persuade more than a 100 per cent of the electorate to vote in favour of the party in power, I must say that we are indeed at fault.

37. In the First Committee we devoted eight full meetings to the consideration of the Korean question. All the arguments were set forth at length there, some of them several times and sometimes in the very same manner by a series of speakers. There we heard rather absurd theories expounded, such as that South Korea was the aggressor. I was nevertheless somewhat surprised yesterday morning to hear the criticism expressed that perhaps this matter had not been considered in sufficient detail. Even in the First Committee I at times had the feeling that the debate was being prolonged unduly, while the United Nations forces, composed almost entirely of the sons of this great democracy, were risking death and sacrificing their lives in defence of a people wilfully attacked. As for our delegation, we emerge from this debate thoroughly convinced of certain fundamental points, which I shall enumerate.

38. There was armed aggression, premeditated and organized well in advance.

39. That aggression originated in the part of Korea which is situated north of the 38th parallel, and from the very beginning the régime established there has ignored and up to this moment is still ignoring the United Nations; it has ignored its decisions and has stubbornly refused all contact with its most highly accredited representatives.

40. The Government of South Korea, the only government legally established by elections conducted under the supervision of the United Nations Commission, has offered the United Nations unlimited co-operation, assisting every inquiry and keeping its doors open to all the investigations which the Commission undertook.

41. Here, in its main outlines, is the framework in which this tragic affair is taking place. These are facts which leave no room for doubt to any man of good faith. They are pertinently set forth in the report of

the United Nations Commission on Korea²; it would be absurd to dispute its statements, which have been fully confirmed by events.

42. To remedy this situation, we must now choose between two draft resolutions which may have certain similarities but which are none the less essentially different. In our view, the fundamental difference lies in the fact that the draft resolution [A/1422] submitted by the First Committee, on the initiative of eight Powers whose names you know, provides for the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea as soon as the basic objectives which are laid down have been attained. And, of course, among these objectives is included the establishment of a legal authority in a united Korea. On the other hand, the draft resolution [A/1426] submitted by the group of Soviet Powers requests the immediate withdrawal of United Nations forces as soon as the guns have ceased to fire. Under that draft resolution, the United Nations forces would pack up their bags and leave as soon as the aggressors laid down their arms. That is to say, the day after the close of so bitter and bloody a conflict, with the ruins still smouldering and passions aflame, the aggressors and the victims would be left alone to discuss the unification of their country between themselves, to discuss it perhaps in the way of which the North Koreans have given us an edifying example. Is that not a curious challenge to our intelligence?

43. This situation, we know, is the one which existed before the aggression. It is the very situation which made the aggression possible, and we know the inevitable relationship between cause and effect. What guarantee does the five-Power draft resolution offer that the same thing will not happen as soon as the forces of the United Nations have been withdrawn?

44. Doubtless you realize that this policy of the *status quo ante* tells us nothing of value. The interesting speech of the Czechoslovak representative has given us a foretaste of what would happen then. We owe him thanks for his astonishing frankness in saying that the Korean people would already have been united if the United Nations forces had not intervened. United how? No doubt by fire and sword, by the completion of the conquest of the South by the North, by the enslavement of the 20 million South Koreans by North Korea.

45. Peace and the policing of the peace are the primary purposes of our Organization. Determined opposition to the exercise of this function, which is intended to ensure peace while the new State is being organized, is a repudiation of the most essential part of the Charter. Nevertheless, to judge by a later paragraph of the five-Power draft resolution—the penultimate, if I am not mistaken—the United Nations would be welcome to reconstruct the country ravaged by the aggressor and to rehabilitate the sorely-trying population. By virtue of what principle can the Charter be repudiated in some of its parts, and upheld in others, according to whether these parts are favourable or unfavourable to our designs?

46. These reasons are, in our view, sufficient for us to say here, as we did in the First Committee, that we are in favour of the draft resolution proposed by the

United Kingdom and the seven other Powers. We choose it without the least hesitation because it is the only text in harmony with the Charter. We choose it because it is logical and constructive. Lastly, we choose it because we prefer order and peace to violence and chaos.

47. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): I have already explained in the First Committee the views of my delegation on the main draft resolutions before us. Much of what I am going to say will therefore necessarily be repetition, for which I apologize in advance.

48. There is a great deal in the eight-Power draft resolution with which my delegation is in full agreement. Confining myself to its operative part, our main difference is with regard to sub-paragraph (d) at the beginning of the operative part, wherein the Assembly recommends:

“That United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified at (a) and (b) above”.

49. Whatever may be the strict technical interpretation of this clause, it has been widely regarded as authorizing, if not positively, at least by implication, the United Nations forces to enter North Korea and to remain there until the unification of Korea has been completed and stability achieved. If such is the intention of the draft resolution—and there is a widespread impression that it is—then the draft resolution authorizes the United Nations forces not only to cross the 38th parallel but to remain in North Korea for a somewhat indefinite period of time, because no one knows how long unification may take.

50. My government fears that the result may be to prolong North Korean resistance, and even to extend the area of conflict. Our fears may turn out to be wrong, but each government has to judge the situation upon the best information at its disposal and to act accordingly. Thus we view with the gravest misgivings the particular recommendation that I have mentioned.

51. There is another consideration that is very much in the minds of my delegation. For some time past India has done whatever it could to exercise a restraining influence on all concerned and to prevent at whatever cost the Korean conflict from extending to other regions and, as I have said elsewhere, even at the risk of being misunderstood, India has to go on doing so in the interests of peace in the Far East. My government feels that for us to support the recommendation in question would seriously diminish our effectiveness in this respect. During the past few days India has been charged with having no positive policy or definite view in regard to Korea. I thought I had made our position perfectly clear in the First Committee. Let me repeat it.

52. Our position, broadly stated, is that at this stage the General Assembly should first of all declare, or reaffirm, its objectives, namely, first, the creation of an independent and united Korea by means of free elections and, secondly, economic rehabilitation of the country.

53. On these two points there is complete unanimity in the General Assembly. Both these points are mentioned in almost identical language in both the eight-

² *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16.

Power and the five-Power draft resolutions. Therefore the declaration of these two objectives can be made with the assent of all the Members represented here or, at least, without the dissent of any.

54. Having done this, and before the United Nations forces advance further, we should call upon the North Korean forces to cease hostilities by a certain specified date. In the face of a declaration of objectives made by all of us here—unanimously, or at least without dissent—the North Korean forces would, in their present military situation, have every inducement to comply with the call. If they did comply, we could then go on with the implementation of the declared objectives; if they did not comply, we could review the situation and decide upon some other course. In this way we should minimize the chances of any further prolongation or extension of the conflict, and we should be in a position to achieve our objectives with the least possible friction or discord.

55. My delegation, in the First Committee, proposed the appointment of a sub-committee for co-ordinating, as far as possible, the various proposals and suggestions which had been made regarding the future of Korea. To give an example of the kind of service which such a sub-committee might have rendered, I would refer to the proposal in the five-Power draft resolution, that when Korea was unified the question of its admission to the United Nations should be considered. That was actually adopted by the First Committee by 18 votes to 10, with 31 abstentions. But it does not appear in the eight-Power draft resolution now before us. The proposal is along the lines of similar proposals which were adopted by us in the case of Indonesia and Libya [resolution 289 A(IV)]. It is obviously a useful idea which, suitably worded, might have been woven into the draft resolution. It is now lost unless we retrieve it by a last-minute amendment. This is only one example—which is almost before our very eyes—and it should suffice to prove that the sub-committee might have served a useful purpose.

56. A great war leader has somewhere inscribed, for our guidance, the motto which—I speak from memory—runs: "In war, resolution; in defeat, defiance; in victory, magnanimity; in peace, good will". It is the third part of this inspiring appeal that has a special appropriateness for us now: "in victory, magnanimity".

57. I am well aware that there is a school of opinion that generosity to a defeated enemy is at best an act of faith and is often apt to turn out to be downright foolishness. But let us look soberly at the facts. No one advocates that the United Nations forces should occupy Korea for all time or even for a long time. Once stable unification has been achieved, they have to withdraw. When they do withdraw, the Koreans will be left to manage their own affairs. We must make sure that when that time comes—and it may come soon—they will remember with gratitude the United Nations Organization and the countries taking part in the present action. We must therefore take care that the military operations do not last a day longer than is necessary, that the conflict is kept within the narrowest bounds possible, that there is no avoidable loss of life or property—for even economic rehabilitation cannot

bring back the dead—and that it will leave behind no bitter memories.

58. It has been said that the empires of the future are the empires of the mind, and we must do all we can to win the hearts and minds of the Korean people, whether of the North or of the South.

59. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The debate is closed. We shall now proceed to the vote. The first draft resolution which I shall put to the vote is that submitted by the First Committee [A/1422].

60. Abdel Hamid GHALEB Bey (Egypt): I would request that we should vote by paragraphs, beginning with the word "Recommends", which is the first word of the operative part. I do not request a separate vote on each paragraph of the preamble.

61. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The representative of Egypt requests that part of the text should be voted on separately, but not all the paragraphs. He refers only to the part which begins with the word "Recommends" and comprises sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). If there is no other request for a separate vote, we can proceed to vote on those sub-paragraphs.

62. I therefore put to the vote the preamble of the draft resolution, from the words "The General Assembly, Having regard . . ." to the words ". . . a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea".

The preamble was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

63. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): In accordance with the request of the representative of Egypt, we shall proceed to vote paragraph by paragraph.

Sub-paragraph (a) was adopted by 46 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (b) was adopted by 52 votes to 5.

Sub-paragraph (c) was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (d) was adopted by 42 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (e) was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

64. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall now proceed to vote on the second part of the operative part, which deals with the appointment of the commission. You will recall that yesterday [293rd meeting] we were in the blank in the text. Consequently the list of the seven countries which will comprise the commission has now been completed by the name of Thailand. I now put to the vote sub-paragraph (a).

The sub-paragraph was adopted by 53 votes to 4, with 1 abstention.

65. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have before me an amendment submitted by the Australian delegation [A/1429] to the effect that the first sentence of sub-paragraph (b) should be reworded as follows:

“(b) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, governments represented on the Commission should form an interim committee composed of representatives meeting at the seat of the United Nations . . .”

The rest of the sub-paragraph is unchanged.

66. I shall put this amendment to the vote.

The amendment was adopted by 43 votes to 4, with 2 abstentions.

67. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall put to the vote sub-paragraph (b) as amended.

Sub-paragraph (b), as amended, was adopted by 44 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.

68. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): As a separate vote has not been requested on the remainder of the draft resolution, I shall put to the vote the part of the text beginning: “(c) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly”, to the end.

The remainder of the draft resolution was adopted by 51 votes to 5.

69. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole.

The draft resolution as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 47 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

70. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): You will have noted that the Fifth Committee recommends in its report [A/1424] that the General Assembly should take account of the financial implications of the draft resolution which we have just adopted.

71. I take it that in voting on the draft resolution, you took into consideration the financial implications involved. It is therefore not necessary for me to put the Fifth Committee's recommendation to the vote.

72. I call upon the representative of Chile, who wishes to explain his vote.

73. Mr. SCHAULSOHN (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): We have just adopted a resolution of the utmost importance, the purpose of which is to unify the whole of Korea and to grant the country its independence as a democratic and sovereign State. At the same time, we have considered the measures necessary for its rehabilitation and, at the request of Chile, other measures designed to speed the economic and social development of the country.

74. In order to achieve these purposes, the General Assembly has seen fit to appoint a commission composed of seven members, among them Chile. My delegation therefore feels bound to say a few words about the importance it attaches to its appointment and the principles which will guide it in the fulfilment of the task which the United Nations has assumed.

75. In the first place, my country is greatly honoured by this mark of international confidence.

76. Secondly, Chile is aware of the serious responsibility it is undertaking: to put into effect an extremely important decision of the United Nations. For the first

time, our Organization has embarked upon action for collective defence against armed aggression, and it is preparing to take real, tangible steps in order that the principles of the Charter may prevail in a country whose birth and independence proceed from the resolutions of the United Nations.

77. My country does not shrink from assuming, together with the other members of the commission, the responsibility entailed by its appointment. In international and domestic affairs, Chile has observed and will continue to observe the principles of democracy and peaceful community life, and in such matters it really practises what it preaches. In international affairs, it has been indefatigable in its support of fundamental rights and the self-determination of peoples. Now, in Korea, Chile will make a resolute and honest contribution to the effective independence and unity of this nation of Asia numbering more than 30 million inhabitants. Together with the other members of the commission, it will take steps to see that this nation elects the government it wants freely and democratically, free from prejudices and foreign intervention. We shall study the country's economic problems and play our part in rendering the United Nations assistance for rehabilitation and development truly effective.

78. In the past, Chile gained its independence and now it knows what a real democratic system is, for that is the system under which it is living. Chile knows, therefore, what this resolution and its honest implementation will mean for the people of Korea. Accordingly, it will spare no efforts in furthering the interests of Korea. It knows that in doing so, it will be contributing to the prestige of the United Nations, and to the establishment of peace and security in the world.

79. Finally, we hope that, when our common task is completed, the General Assembly, world public opinion and, above all, the people of Korea will feel that we were worthy of this great mark of confidence.

80. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): In order to avoid any misunderstanding in the future, may I draw the Chilean representative's attention to the fact that the statement which he has just made is not an explanation of a vote. As however, his name was on the list of speakers before the vote, and as he kindly withdrew his name from the list in order to help the Assembly conclude the debate more quickly, I did not interrupt him now. I hope the other speakers who ask for the floor to explain their votes will come to this rostrum to make such an explanation.

81. Mr. AL-FAQIH (Saudi Arabia): I should like to explain the position of my delegation on the resolution just adopted by the Assembly.

82. Our vote should not be interpreted in any manner as implying that we are opposed to the principles and aims which the resolution embodies. I hardly need to reiterate the position of my government, which has been made sufficiently clear. My government is unequivocally opposed to all forms of aggression anywhere and in any circumstances. My delegation is in complete accord with the basic objectives of the resolution. We welcome the attempts to unify Korea and to establish there an independent and democratic government.

83. During the debate in the First Committee, how-

ever, several pertinent points were raised which needed clarification and which partly explain why we supported the draft resolution of India in committee. Unfortunately, neither the Committee nor the Assembly has dealt satisfactorily with those important aspects of the problem, such as the terms of reference of the commission, the competence of and relation between the three authorities to be functioning in Korea, namely, the army command, the South Korean government and the United Nations commission.

84. For these reasons, our delegation, although supporting most of the parts of the resolution, abstained in the vote on the resolution as a whole.

85. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call now upon the representative of the USSR, not to explain his vote, but on a point of order.

86. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union voted against the draft resolution on the Korean question submitted by the First Committee because it was completely unacceptable. The text provides for the occupation of the territory of Korea and does not in any way contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the creation of a unified, independent, democratic Korean State.

87. The USSR delegation must also point out the unprecedented nature of such political declarations on a resolution adopted by the General Assembly as that made today by the representative of Chile after the resolution on the Korean question had been adopted by the Assembly. Such statements go beyond the rules of procedure; they are contrary to the practice of the General Assembly and are without precedent.

88. The representative of Chile made his statement in the political and military interests of a special group of States in the Assembly.

89. The delegation of the Soviet Union considers that such statements on resolutions adopted by the Assembly are unacceptable and intolerable.

90. The PRESIDENT (*translation from French*): I permitted this last speech, but here is my ruling. I shall give the floor for an explanation of their votes only to those members of the Assembly who did not participate in the discussion which preceded the vote. It is inconceivable that some delegations should wish to speak again in order to explain their votes after speaking for two hours. Surely during their speeches they had time to give such explanations.

91. If any delegation wishes to challenge my ruling, I shall put it to the vote.

92. I see that my ruling is not challenged. Therefore we shall proceed to the vote on the draft resolution put forward by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia [A/1426].

93. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR proposes that the five-Power proposal on the independence of Korea should be put to a roll-call vote in parts.

94. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): In accordance with the request we have just heard, we

shall hold a roll-call vote, paragraph by paragraph, on the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers [A/1426].

A vote was taken by roll-call on the first recital.

Bolivia, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan.

Against: Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Belgium.

Abstaining: Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia.

The first recital was rejected by 35 votes to 19, with 6 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on the second recital.

Panama, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia.

Against: Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway.

Abstaining: Philippines, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, Pakistan.

The second recital was rejected by 27 votes to 19, with 14 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on the third recital.

Egypt, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Egypt, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Poland, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Belgium,

Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic.

Abstaining: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Cuba, Ecuador.

The third recital was rejected by 31 votes to 14, with 15 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 1 of the operative part.

Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Against: Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba.

Abstaining: Egypt, India, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma.

Paragraph 1 was rejected by 46 votes to 6, with 8 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 2 of the operative part.

Panama, having been drawn by lot by the President voted first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan.

Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon.

Paragraph 2 was rejected by 48 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 3 of the operative part.

Panama, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran.

Against: Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan.

Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Israel, Lebanon.

Paragraph 3 was rejected by 42 votes to 8, with 10 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 4 of the operative part.

Guatemala, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece.

Abstaining: India, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt.

Paragraph 4 was rejected by 47 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 5 of the operative part.

France, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Indonesia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia.

Abstaining: India, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Egypt.

Paragraph 5 was rejected by 45 votes to 6, with 9 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 6 of the operative part.

Chile, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Against: China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada.

Abstaining: Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Lebanon, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Afghanistan, Argentina.

Paragraph 6 was rejected by 33 votes to 16, with 11 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 7 of the operative part.

New Zealand, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Mexico.

Against: New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands.

Abstaining: Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Lebanon.

Paragraph 7 was rejected by 25 votes to 22, with 13 abstentions.

95. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The representative of Bolivia wishes to explain his vote.

96. Mr. ANZE MATIENZO (Bolivia) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation voted against part of the preamble of the Five-Power draft resolution. It did likewise in the First Committee, together with the Belgian delegation. It is aware that the draft enunciates a number of basic principles and it did not intend to commit the heresy of denying those principles, but bore in mind the fact that principles and even extracts of the Charter are often deliberately embodied in paragraphs of draft resolutions which are often contrary to the true principles of the Charter. Moreover, my delegation voted thus because it considers it logical to vote against various parts of a draft when it intends to vote against the draft as a whole.

97. Finally, we hope that this interpretation will gain general acceptance so that in future we may avoid these

tedious and tendentious roll-call votes on each paragraph of the draft resolutions submitted.

98. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [A/1427]. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

France, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia.

Abstaining: Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

The draft resolution was rejected by 52 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

99. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall now vote on the last draft resolution before us on this subject. It is submitted by the Soviet Union [A/1428]. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Burma, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil.

The draft resolution was rejected by 55 votes to 5.

Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council (*continued*)

[Agenda item 14]

100. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We have now completed the first item on our agenda. Before turning to the second item, the report of the General Committee, may I suggest that the Assembly should deal with the third item, the election of a non-

permanent member of the Security Council. Ballot papers will be distributed.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

At the invitation of the President, Faris El-Khoury Bey (Syria) and Mr. Jooste (Union of South Africa) acted as tellers.

Number of ballot papers:	60
Invalid ballots:	0
Number of valid ballots:	60
Abstentions:	0
Number of valid votes cast:	60
Required majority:	40
Number of votes obtained:	
Turkey	33
Lebanon	27

101. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Neither country has obtained the required two-thirds majority. Before taking another vote, I give the floor to the representative of Egypt on a point of order.

102. Mohamed SALAH-el-DIN Bey (Egypt): After these numerous attempts in which the results of the balloting have shown no appreciable change, I should like, on behalf of the delegation of Egypt, which is directly concerned with the matter as one of the Middle East countries, to announce, together with our colleagues, the representatives of the Arab delegations, who are also directly concerned with this matter, that we shall consider the situation in the light of these results with a view to finding a way out of the present impasse. I therefore propose the postponement of the balloting to give us time for this purpose. I hope that the representative of Turkey will agree.

103. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Does the representative of Turkey accept the proposed adjournment?

104. Mr. SARPEN (Turkey): Yes, Mr. President.

105. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall now take up the next question, which is the report of the General Committee.

Inclusion of new items in the agenda: report of the General Committee (A/1430)

106. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The General Committee has considered the inclusion of certain additional items in the agenda and has submitted a report [A/1430]. It proposes the inclusion of five new items. In order to make our work easier, we shall examine these one by one.

107. The first item is as follows: "The question of Formosa: item proposed by the United States of America." The General Committee recommends that this matter should be placed on the agenda and referred to the First Committee for consideration and report.

108. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union objected to the inclusion of the question of Formosa in the General Assembly's agenda when this question was discussed by the General Committee.

109. The USSR delegation continues to object to the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the fifth session of the General Assembly for the same reasons which it

outlined in the General Committee when the question was examined.

110. The raising of such a question in the United Nations is contrary to the Charter of our Organization and is an insult to the great Chinese people whose long fight for national independence and whose success in that struggle arouse deep respect on the part of the Members of the United Nations and the peoples of the world.

111. The question whether the island of Taiwan belongs to China is not a question which the United Nations is competent to consider. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 unreservedly recognized that Taiwan and the Pescadores belonged to China in the same way as the territory of Manchuria belonged to China. The Potsdam Declaration confirmed those provisions of the Cairo Declaration. The order for the surrender of the armed forces of Japan provided that the Chinese command should accept the surrender of Japanese troops on Taiwan, on the legal grounds that, pursuant to the Cairo agreement and subsequent international agreements concluded during the Second World War, Taiwan constituted an inalienable part of Chinese territory.

112. Since then no one has questioned, much less objected to the fact that Taiwan forms part of the territory of China. As recently as 5 January, and again on 8 February 1950, the United States Government reiterated its view that Taiwan belonged to China. Now, however, the fact that the island of Taiwan belongs to China is suddenly considered "not clear" by the Government of the United States, which demands that the United Nations should examine the question.

113. The United Nations cannot deal with the question of Taiwan any more than it can deal with the question of the Hawaiian islands, since the fact that Taiwan belongs to China has already been established by wartime agreements and is not subject to review. When the United States ceases to drag out the question of concluding a peace treaty with Japan, that peace treaty will merely endorse an international act which has already been completed and cannot be reviewed, and by which Taiwan has been handed over to China.

114. Consequently it is not incumbent upon the United Nations to consider the question of Taiwan, that is to say the status of this Chinese island, as the United States delegation is proposing. It is incumbent upon the United Nations to consider the situation which has arisen as a result of the invasion of Taiwan by United States forces and which threatens the peace of the Far East. The General Assembly should therefore discuss not "the question of Formosa", as the United States delegation proposes, but the question of United States aggression against China. That question has already been included in the agenda of the fifth session of the General Assembly at the request of the USSR delegation and has been referred to the First Committee.

115. The discussion of "the question of Formosa" by the United Nations would constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of China and would be a flagrant violation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, which provides that nothing in the Charter "shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are

⁸ *Ibid.*, General Committee, 69th and 71st meetings.

essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State."

116. It would also be contrary to Article 107 of the Charter which states that nothing in the Charter shall invalidate action—for instance, treaties and agreements concluded during the Second World War—in relation to any State which during the Second World War was an enemy of any signatory to the Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action.

117. It is therefore quite inadmissible that the United Nations should be drawn into an illegal discussion of "the question of Formosa", as proposed by the United States delegation in violation of the Charter and for reasons which are quite incompatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations concerning the strengthening of international peace, security and friendship among nations.

118. Mr. HAJDU (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation is against the inclusion of this item in the agenda. This attitude is a logical consequence of the factual and legal position of the question of Taiwan. There is no doubt, and it has never been contested, that the future fate of Taiwan was settled by the Cairo agreement of 1943, in which it was stated that the purpose of the Powers which were parties to that agreement was to restore Taiwan to China. That agreement was confirmed by the Potsdam agreement of the three Powers, which stipulated that the three Powers agreed that the Cairo agreement should be carried out. This means that this was a final settlement of the question. So it was conceived by the authors of the agreement, even the United States, which at that time, unlike now, was still keeping agreements in some cases. That this is the correct interpretation is proved by the fact that Taiwan was brought under the control and legislation of Chinese authorities.

119. Therefore the argument put forward by the United States in its explanatory note [A/1381] to the Secretary-General, to the effect that the transfer of Taiwan to China was to await the conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan or some other formal act, is a technical, formal and futile argument, and it cannot change the final and valid character of the stipulations of the Potsdam agreement. It is natural that only a peace treaty can formally settle a transfer of territory, but the signatories to an agreement comprising particular stipulations are bound to incorporate such stipulations in a peace treaty.

120. It follows from these undeniable facts that Taiwan has become an integral part of Chinese territory. Until the recent events, nobody—not even the United States—contested these facts. Therefore, in terms of international law, the action taken by the United States in regard to Taiwan constitutes an attempt against the independence and sovereignty of China and a violation of its territorial integrity. That means that it constitutes an act of aggression on the part of the United States. At the same time, it constitutes a breach of peace and security, and necessarily a violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

121. What is the reason for putting this question on the agenda when clearly it has already been settled? The reason is obvious. The United States is trying to

force the General Assembly to take a decision in this case which, first, would validate its action in violating an international agreement and, secondly, would sanction an act of aggression. In that way, the General Assembly would be made a party to a decision which would trample on our own Charter, the Charter of the United Nations. It is obvious that such a decision should not be extorted from this Assembly, either by threats or by pressure. That would be a mockery of our deliberations. Furthermore, the object of trying to force upon the Assembly a decision in this case is to get *carte blanche*, by an international decision, for an indefinite occupation of Taiwan, that is to say, of Chinese territory.

122. By doing this, the United States is pursuing many aims. First of all, its obvious intention is to build up there a strategic base for aggression. Then, too, the United States is trying to hinder the liberation of this last part of Chinese territory which has not yet been liberated from the bankrupt Chiang Kai-shek régime and the defence of which is another of the aims of the United States. Last, but not least, its aim is to void the existing stipulations to the effect that Taiwan must be regarded as an integral part of Chinese territory, so as to create a new situation in defiance of the United States existing international obligations, whereby it can dispose, behind the screen of the decision which it hopes the General Assembly will take, of the future of Taiwan.

123. In any case, these hopes are futile, because the unanimous will of 500 million Chinese people is manifest as far as the liberation of this part of Chinese territory is concerned. Nevertheless, it would be against all principles of international law if the General Assembly were to lend itself to these manoeuvres aimed at achieving these American objectives.

124. This reasoning emerges clearly from the very text of the letter from the Chairman of the United States delegation to the Secretary-General, which explains the motives of the United States in trying to put this question on the agenda of the General Assembly. In this letter, the United States delegation unscrupulously passes over the fact that international agreements stipulating the future of Taiwan are in existence and are valid. The United States delegation gives only one unheard-of argument for its aggressive action: that the occupation of Taiwan by communist forces is a direct threat to the Pacific area, and that therefore the United States has launched a sort of preventive aggression—something new in international law and international relations.

125. It does not matter that this argument is a ridiculous one, but it matters that it means a flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of China.

126. Out of all this it follows that there is not only no need, but not the slightest justification for the Assembly to deliberate on the item put before us by the United States delegation, the less so as it is proposed by the United States delegation with the aim of inducing us to approve an armed aggression and a flagrant violation of the Charter. For all these reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation is opposed to the inclusion of this item in the agenda.

127. Mr. TSIANG (China): On this particular occasion I find myself in strange company. I only hope that this Assembly will not condemn me on the charge of guilt by association. The question should be decided on its own merits. My delegation is against the inclusion of this item in the agenda.

128. First of all, let me state very briefly the elementary facts in regard to the island of Taiwan. It has today a population of 8 million people. Some people loosely speak of the Formosans. As a matter of fact, of that population only 150,000 are what you might call Formosans, that is, descendants of the original inhabitants of the island. These natives of Formosa were head-hunters centuries ago, but today they have adopted civilized ways of life. They have afforded tourists much amusement by exhibiting their dances. The vast majority of the population are Chinese, descendants of Chinese migrants. Chinese colonization of the island began in the seventh century. By the seventeenth century, at the time when the Pilgrim Fathers landed on Plymouth Rock, Formosa was already populated enough to serve as the base for China's resistance against the invaders of that time, the Manchus.

129. The national hero of China of the seventeenth century, Chen Chen Kung, known to the world as Koxinga, has his memory enshrined in many temples on the island even today. The island was made administratively a part of the province of Fukien. In the nineteenth century it was made a separate province. After the war with Japan of 1894 and 1895, the island shared the unfortunate fate, with Korea, of Japanese domination.

130. The post-war agreements with regard to the island are well known to you. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, to which the head of my government was a co-signatory, defined clearly the status of this island.

131. Today the island of Taiwan is the home of free China. On that island there is a practical and concrete demonstration to all Chinese, in fact to all the peoples of Asia, that one has a better way of living under freedom than under totalitarian slavery.

132. In the brief period of national administration of this island, economic recovery has reached its pre-war level. My government has carried out fundamental land reforms of the island. Local civil government is being promoted as fast as possible. Peace and order reign on this island. The percentage of literacy on this island is as high as in any other area in Asia. The standard of living on this island today is as high as in any other part of Asia. Therefore this island today is a worthy demonstration that human beings can achieve well-being better under a system of freedom than under a system of communist slavery.

133. So long as Formosa stands, the communist conquest of the mainland of China cannot be completed or consolidated. So long as Formosa stands, the puppet régime in Peiping cannot throw its resources into adventures in Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines, Korea or other adjacent regions.

134. This island is therefore the bastion of freedom in the whole Far East. It would be dangerous if the

General Assembly or any delegation should do anything to undermine this bastion of freedom. Discussion here creates uncertainty and spreads confusion. Such discussion calls into question the status of the island, and that is not in harmony with the principles of the Charter, for the basic and primary aim of this great Organization of ours is to have regard for the political independence and territorial integrity of its Member States.

135. My country has suffered and is still suffering from the same kind of aggression of which Korea has been a victim. The United Nations has gone to the aid of Korea. The United Nations has not come to the aid of China. Certainly, the least the General Assembly can do is to refrain from taking the step which may have the effect of pushing the 450 million people of China into the abyss of communist slavery and Russian domination. It is because we fear that this item will have the effect of pushing China into that abyss that my delegation opposes the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the General Assembly. I urge all representatives to vote against the inclusion of this item.

136. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Three speakers have opposed the inclusion of this item in the agenda. Now, therefore, I can give the floor only to speakers who wish to speak in favour of placing this item on the agenda. I call upon the representative of the United States.

137. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): I wish to thank the President for permitting the United States delegation to speak on this question of parliamentary procedure. It is quite natural, I believe, that the United States should be called upon at this point, because it was the United States which proposed the inclusion of this item in the agenda.

138. Let me say at the outset that I listened with tremendous sympathy to the remarks of Mr. Tsiang, who represents the sovereignty of China—the only China that has status before the United Nations. I respect the status of that sovereignty in the United Nations, but I am also moved by something very deep within me, and that is my high regard and great love for the Chinese people. In saying this I am not talking about Chinese governments—one or another—or undertaking to prejudge at all, in advocating the inclusion of this item in the agenda, the merits of the question of sovereignty over Formosa. I am speaking from an experience among the people of China that was very intimate and long enough for me to learn what a great people they are, and long enough to make me their advocate in the United Nations today and every day. It is in the last resort the people of China whom the United Nations will take into account in deciding upon this question.

139. With all this sympathy and understanding, I want to say to my colleagues in the United Nations that I disagree with Mr. Tsiang upon what is good for his people here at this moment. It would not be well, I think, for action on the merits of this question to be postponed, but that would be the effect of failing to include the question of Formosa on the agenda. Would it not be better to have this question placed on the agenda and to have the friends of the people of China,

regardless of governments, given the opportunity to consider the subject?

140. I am not going to say more because I do not want to try the Assembly's patience or violate its rules of procedure by entering upon a discussion of the merits of the case; I shall come immediately to the proposition before us. This case is not such as the representatives of the Soviet Union claims it to be, namely, a case which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction. Obviously, this should be classed as an international issue. On what has already appeared here, we have the issue of the use of the word "China." The word "China" means a different thing to the Soviet Union from what it means to China as represented by Mr. Tsiang. Sovereignty and title to the territory is in question, and it is a question of conflicting claims as to which government represents China. That is the kind of question which can raise the very devil with friendship between peoples and nations, which can cause trouble and even war. It is therefore a proper subject for the United Nations to discuss calmly and serenely, with faith in God and purity of purpose.

141. I do not believe that I need say any more. But there is much more that could be said, for international events have occurred since the signing of those agreements which have been relied upon. These events have made it necessary for the United States, as a Member of the United Nations, to adopt its present policy in the Pacific and to protect the armies, the property and the interests of the Members of the Organization which are carrying the flag of the United Nations in that area.

142. The question of Formosa affects those interests, and that is why we think the item should be placed on the agenda and the question decided, if possible, during this session of the General Assembly.

143. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): I have asked for the floor to make a short statement at this time because I believe that the matter with which we are concerned is of fundamental importance and that the divergence of views about it can only complicate the work of peace with which the United Nations is concerned.

144. The position of my government with regard to the situation in Formosa—or Taiwan—has been quite clear. The Government of El Salvador believes that what has been called the revolution in China was not solely the spontaneous movement of a people which, owing to its conflicting political opinions, tried to overthrow its government. My government believes that there was an element of foreign intervention, and consequently, although what is now known as the Government of the People's Republic of China controls the greater part of the territory—the whole of what is known as continental China—it has continued to recognize the Nationalist Government and regards Formosa as the last bulwark of a people fighting to preserve its independence and to repel foreign intervention.

145. In these circumstances, the delegation of El Salvador finds itself in a peculiar position, which may possibly be similar to that of many other, but not, of course all, delegations.

146. Because of its geographical position, Formosa has become rather closely connected with the develop-

ment of United Nations military operations in Korea. That alone would be sufficient reason for placing the question of Formosa on the agenda of the General Assembly.

147. The delegation of El Salvador greatly regrets that the delegation of the Soviet Union has opposed the inclusion of the item, because it is precisely the difference of opinion between the USSR and some other States which is the basic reason why it is essential that the General Assembly should adopt a definite attitude on the question of Formosa.

148. At the same time, the delegation of El Salvador regrets that the delegation of Nationalist China is also opposing the inclusion of the item in the agenda, because we believe that all aspects of the problem will have to be considered and that the legal situation of Formosa will have to be studied and defined once and for all.

149. We do not think that there is any question of attempting to prejudge the matter, because if we did so believe we should be opposed to the inclusion of the item in the agenda. We believe that the will of the people inhabiting Formosa must be taken into consideration when we take any decision which might affect the future of that region. The delegation of El Salvador has always believed that the future of a territory can never be decided without previous consultation of the people living in it. Consequently, my delegation cannot fail to be consistent with the views which it has expressed previously in similar cases.

150. Obviously the United Nations cannot pass over in silence Formosa's present situation in relation to the conflict in Korea, which has become a matter of concern to the peace of the world. The delegation of El Salvador, therefore, wholeheartedly supports the inclusion of the item on Formosa in the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly.

151. The President (*translated from French*): I put to the vote the General Committee's recommendation that the question of Formosa should be included in the agenda of the fifth session and referred to the First Committee for consideration.

The recommendation was adopted by 42 to 7, with 8 abstentions.

Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council (concluded)

152. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I apologize for proposing an alteration in the agenda. We had decided to postpone the election of a non-permanent member of the Security Council, but I have just learned that there is now some hope of agreement. With your permission, I shall call upon the representative of Lebanon.

153. Mr. TAKLA (Lebanon) (*translated from French*): Although we found the results of this morning's vote encouraging, they did, nevertheless, show that we were still in the same impasse as before [290th and 291st meetings]. My government would not like that situation to continue, nor would it like us to be taxed with the slightest wish to obstruct and impede the operation of the United Nations.

154. When Lebanon, with the support of all the members of the Arab League, put forward its candidature, my government said many times that it regarded the election as a sporting contest which should not, whatever its result, leave any bitter feelings on either side.

155. In these circumstances, I wish to state on behalf of my government that Lebanon withdraws its candidature. I do not want to do this without expressing on behalf of my country our deep gratitude to all those delegations which honoured us with their votes, and our thanks to the countries that they represent. I hope very much that, two years from now, Lebanon will again receive their votes, to which will be joined, I hope, those of other countries which this time have not supported our application for various reasons that, I am sure, do not in any way reflect on their friendship for Lebanon nor the friendship of Lebanon for them. I repeat, I hope that in two years' time you will all place your trust in us.

156. I should like once again to assure the representative of Turkey, in confirmation of what was said before, that we are retiring from this sporting contest with no hard feelings. The future will show, I hope, that the friendship which unites Turkey with Lebanon and all the Arab countries is not only in no way impaired but will be maintained and strengthened.

157. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The representative of Turkey has asked permission to speak, but I am sure he will forgive me if I do not give him the floor until after the vote.

158. I should like first to thank and congratulate the representative of Lebanon for his fine gesture. Any gesture of compromise made in a spirit of co-operation will always be welcomed with the greatest pleasure in this Assembly. I should remind you that our rules of procedure prohibit nominations. If the representative of Turkey were to speak now, his statement might fall foul of the rules. Accordingly, with his permission, we shall first take the vote and I shall then be glad to allow him to speak.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

At the invitation of the President, Faris El-Khourri Bey (Syria) and Mr. Jooste (Union of South Africa) acted as tellers.

Number of ballot papers:	60
Invalid ballots:	0
Abstentions:	3
Number of valid votes cast:	57
Required majority:	38
Number of votes obtained:	
Turkey	53
Lebanon	4

Turkey, having obtained the required two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting, was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

159. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I declare Turkey to have been elected to the Security Council. On this occasion, I should like to congratulate the three States, Brazil, the Netherlands and Turkey, on having been elected non-permanent members of the Security Council for two years.

160. I call upon the representative of Turkey:

161. Mr. SARPEN (Turkey): My delegation appreciates this realistic and constructive decision of our Lebanese friends. When I asked permission to speak before the elections, it was to convey that view to the Lebanese delegation as soon as possible.

162. I am sure that the question of the present elections will in no way affect the friendly relations among the countries of our region in general and our relations with Lebanon in particular. I further express the hope that in matters relating to the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, the principles embodied in Article 23 of our Charter, especially its provisions concerning an equitable geographical distribution, shall in the future be considered as the only approach.

163. Before concluding, I should like to extend, in the same sportsmanlike spirit with which the Lebanese representative was animated, the warmest thanks and gratitude of myself and of my country to the delegations which have voted in our favour, and also to those which have not, for their willingness to give so much of their valuable time to this matter.

Inclusion of new items in the agenda: report of the General Committee (A/1430) (concluded)

164. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall now resume our examination of the General Committee's report. We have reached item 2: "Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities: item proposed by Yugoslavia". The General Committee decided unanimously to recommend that the item should be included in the agenda and further decided by 10 votes to none to recommend that it should be referred to the First Committee.

165. If there is no objection, I shall consider that there is agreement on the inclusion of this item in the agenda.

It was so decided.

166. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Item 3 reads: "Establishment of a permanent commission of good offices: item proposed by Yugoslavia". The General Committee decided unanimously to recommend that the Assembly should include this item in the agenda and that it should be referred to the First Committee for consideration and report.

167. If there is no objection, I shall consider that there is agreement on the inclusion of this item in the agenda.

It was so decided.

168. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Item 4 reads: Provision of a United Nations distinguishing ribbon or other insignia for personnel which has participated in Korea in the defence of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations: item proposed by the Philippines". The General Committee decided by 12 votes to 2 to recommend that the Assembly should include the item in the agenda and refer it to the Sixth Committee for consideration and report.

169. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The USSR delegation protests against the inclusion in the agenda of the fifth session of the General Assembly of the question proposed by the Philippines concerning the provi-

sign of a United Nations distinguishing ribbon or other insignia for personnel which has participated in Korea allegedly in the defence of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

170. As the Government of the Soviet Union has stated repeatedly, the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June and 7 July 1950⁴ on the Korean question, which the Government of the United States is using to justify its armed intervention in Korea, were adopted illegally by the Security Council and constitute a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter.

171. As we all know, only three of the five permanent members of the Council, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, were present at the meetings of the Security Council at which those resolutions were adopted. The two other permanent members of the Council, the USSR and China, were not present at those meetings of the Security Council. Thus those resolutions were adopted at private meetings of certain members of the Security Council and are not legally binding.

172. In those circumstances, it is clear that these decisions of the Security Council and, in particular, the decision to use the United Nations flag in the course of military operations in Korea, cannot have any legal force.

173. In its reply⁵ to the telegram in which Mr Trygve Lie communicated to it the text of the resolution adopted by a group of members of the Security Council at the meeting of 7 July 1950, the Government of the Soviet Union pointed out that the purpose of the resolution was to permit the illegal use of the United Nations flag as a cover for the military operations of the United States in Korea, operations which constituted open aggression by the United States against the Korean people, and that that decision of the Security Council was illegal and tantamount to direct support of armed aggression against the Korean people.

174. It is absolutely clear that the military operations in Korea are conducted not by the armed forces of the United Nations, whatever words may be used to conceal this fact, but by the armed forces of individual States which, in contravention of the Charter, are usurping the name and flag of the United Nations. It is equally clear that the participation of those States in the United States aggression against the Korean people not only does not constitute a defence of the principles of the United Nations Charter, but is a flagrant violation of those principles.

175. The USSR delegation therefore objects to the inclusion of the aforementioned item in the agenda of the General Assembly and to consideration of the draft resolution [A/1421] submitted by the Philippines on this question.

176. Mr. ROY (Philippines): The delegation of the Philippines has taken the initiative in proposing a United Nations distinguishing ribbon or other insignia for personnel which has participated in Korea in the defence of the principles of the United Nations, because it believes that it is proper that the soldiers of peace should

be given a distinctive mark to distinguish them as such. We do not need to elaborate on this point. The need is evident, and no doubt those serving under the United Nations flag will welcome some such insignia which they can wear to distinguish them as the guardians of the peace and security of the world.

177. Such references as have been made here by the representative of the Soviet Union, denying the existence of the United Nations forces, have already been answered by this General Assembly by its overwhelming approval of the resolution on Korea.

178. In behalf of the Philippine delegation, therefore, I ask that the General Assembly should support the inclusion of this item in the agenda and that the item should be referred to the Sixth Committee for consideration and report.

179. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) (*translated from Russian*): We are considering a rather unusual question today. In accordance with the proposal of the Philippine representative, General Rómulo, the United Nations is called upon to establish a kind of decoration to be granted to participants in the Korean war who are fighting in the ranks of the United States army.

180. General Rómulo wants this decoration to be given to persons who are intervening in a civil war and who are fighting, in the interests of American imperialism, against the Korean national movement, against those who are struggling for their independence and freedom and for the unification of Korea. It would appear from the proposal that this decoration would also be awarded to soldiers of the South Korean forces.

181. I should like to draw your attention to the absurdities to which this might lead. The result would be that we, the United Nations, would be giving decorations for political convictions, that is to say, for convictions which are shared only by certain representatives and certain governments and which are foreign and hostile to hundreds of millions of people. We cannot and we have no right to decorate anyone for any political convictions. The Philippine delegation seems to have forgotten this fundamental principle. We know that generals are very fond of decorations and that they like to put multicoloured ribbons on their chests, but I do not think that this proposal will beautify General Rómulo.

182. This proposal would lead us along a dangerous path. Today the Organization will decorate the troops of Syngman Rhee and MacArthur; tomorrow someone will propose a decoration for the troops of Chiang Kai-shek; and so it will go on.

183. Not so long ago nearly all of us, nearly all of the States Members of the United Nations, were combating fascism; millions of people perished while defending their countries in the struggle for the realization of our common aims. And even then, although at that time there were no differences of opinion as to who was right and who was wrong, who was the aggressor and who was the victim of aggression, even then no one proposed that the soldiers of the United Nations should be rewarded. That was perfectly understandable. The United Nations has no right to reward anyone. The United Nations has no right to give orders, medals or ribbons. That right is reserved exclusively for States and governments, and we must leave it to them. Such activities

⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, fifth year, Nos. 15, 16 and 18.

⁵ See document 5/1596.

by our Organization are authorized neither by the Charter, by the rules of procedure, by precedent nor by common sense.

184. There is yet another fact that we should remember. The armies of aggression in Korea include persons, especially among the airmen, who have taken part in barbarous air raids against the civilian population, have bombed towns and villages and have machine-gunned the peaceful population, women and children. The decoration of such persons with any kind of ribbon would represent a cynicism bordering upon crime. Such a decoration would become a sign of opprobrium in the eyes of the majority of honest people, and our Organization would have to hang its head in shame for instituting such a decoration.

185. For those reasons, and taking into consideration the fact already mentioned by the USSR representative, namely, that the decision to call the aggressive forces of certain States the United Nations forces was illegal, since it was adopted by six members of the Security Council in the absence of two permanent members of the Council, our delegation considers the proposal of the Philippine representative to be wrong and contrary to the principles of the United Nations and international practice.

186. The Polish delegation will therefore vote against the inclusion of this item in the agenda.

187. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Two speakers have already spoken against the inclusion of this item in the agenda. I can give the floor only to one more, but I saw the delegations of the Ukrainian SSR and Czechoslovakia raise their hands almost simultaneously and I cannot say which of the two asked to speak first. If they would like to come to an agreement and appoint the speaker who will say least, I should be glad to call upon him.

188. Mr. BIHELLER (Czechoslovakia): I shall be extremely brief; as a matter of fact, I shall say only a few words.

189. The Czechoslovak delegation objects most emphatically to the inclusion of the proposed item in the agenda of the General Assembly. My Government considers, as it has declared a number of times, that the decision taken by some members of the Security Council by which the interventionist aggression of the United States in the Korean civil war was declared a United Nations action, is void of legality and therefore not valid. Consequently all and whatever actions, resolutions or recommendations are based on that decision must be considered as not legal and void of validity.

190. Hence the proposal that a ribbon or other insignia of the United Nations should be provided for the participants in that aggression committed by the United States and the countries which associated themselves with it in that venture should be rejected and its inclusion in the agenda voted down by the General Assembly, the more so because the mere discussion of the matter in itself or even its inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly must be considered by the Korean people, as well as by all people fighting for their liberation from colonial oppression and against aggression, as an impudent provocation. Such a decision would be a means of letting the participating soldiers forget that they took part in an unjust war, a war for the subjugation of the Korean people in the interests of United States imperialist expansion.

191. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore opposes the inclusion of this item in the agenda and will vote against it.

192. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall put to the vote the General Committee's recommendation that this item should be included in the agenda and referred to the Sixth Committee for consideration and report.

The General Committee's recommendation was adopted by 45 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions.

193. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall now go on to the consideration of the last item recommended for inclusion by the General Committee, namely, "Complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the violation of Chinese air space by the air force of the United States of America and the machine-gunning and bombing of Chinese territory by that air force, and against the bombardment and illegal inspection of a merchant ship of the People's Republic of China by a military vessel of the United States".

194. The General Committee recommends by 11 votes to one that the General Assembly should include this item in the agenda and by 8 votes to 2 that the item should be referred to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee for consideration and report.

195. I put the inclusion of this last item in the agenda to the vote.

The General Committee's recommendation was adopted by 43 votes to one, with 2 abstentions.

196. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The agenda of the fifth session of the General Assembly is now complete.

The meeting rose at 2.25 p.m.