

95. Furthermore, the USSR representative had not mentioned the Italian Government in the relevant part of his speech. Mr. Arutiunian had only repeated what the representative of Argentina had said concerning the reports in the American Press, namely, that after consultation with the representative of Italy, and at the request of the latter, he wished to state that the reports were untrue. Mr. Arutiunian emphasized that he had referred to the representative of Italy, not to the Italian Government.

96. He hoped his explanation would dispel the apparent misunderstanding. If difficulties had arisen through the misunderstanding, he regretted the fact; but the misunderstanding had been entirely unintentional. He did not see exactly how it had come about and could not accept responsibility for it.

97. The PRESIDENT announced that the Assembly would proceed to the vote at the afternoon meeting.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Monday, 21 November 1949, at 2.45 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines),

Later: Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan).

Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: report of the First Committee (A/1089) and report of the Fifth Committee (A/1109) (concluded)

1. The PRESIDENT drew the Assembly's attention to the text proposed by India and annexed to draft resolution A of the First Committee. He stated that the text would not be put to the vote.

2. He would put to the vote the Polish amendments (A/1110/Rev.1) to the First Committee's draft resolution A, beginning with the amendment to section A, paragraph 1.

The amendment was rejected by 23 votes to 12, with 15 abstentions.

3. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Polish amendment to section A, paragraph 2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Liberia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon.

Against: Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India.

Abstaining: Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel.

The amendment was rejected by 37 votes to 14, with 7 abstentions.

4. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Polish amendment to section A, paragraph 6 (a).

The amendment was rejected by 36 votes to 5, with 13 abstentions.

5. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Polish amendment to section B, paragraph 2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Luxembourg, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia.

Against: Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland.

Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Burma, Israel, Lebanon.

The amendment was rejected by 35 votes to 16, with 7 abstentions.

6. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Polish amendment to section B, paragraph 3.

The amendment was rejected by 36 votes to 10, with 8 abstentions.

7. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Polish amendment to section B, paragraph 4.

The amendment was rejected by 29 votes to 12, with 9 abstentions.

8. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Polish amendment to section B, paragraph 5.

The amendment was rejected by 33 votes to 7, with 13 abstentions.

9. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the text which Poland proposed should be substituted for section C of the draft resolution. A roll-call vote had been requested on paragraph 1 of that text.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Brazil, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Afghanistan.

Against: Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia.

Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Panama, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay.

The paragraph was rejected by 36 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions.

10. The PRESIDENT put to the vote paragraphs 2 to 7 inclusive.

The paragraphs were rejected by 40 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions.

11. The PRESIDENT put to the vote section A of draft resolution A submitted by the First Committee.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Uruguay, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, France, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Section A was adopted by 49 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

12. The PRESIDENT put to the vote section B of draft resolution A.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Syria, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq,

Israel, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia.

Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Poland.

Abstaining: Liberia, New Zealand, Sweden.

Section B was adopted by 48 votes to 7, with 3 abstentions.

13. The PRESIDENT put to the vote section C of draft resolution A.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Peru, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama.

Against: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Abstaining: Philippines, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Greece, Liberia.

Section C was adopted by 47 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions.

14. The PRESIDENT put to the vote section D of draft resolution A.

Section D was adopted by 44 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

15. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution A as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Denmark, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba.

Against: Ethiopia.

Abstaining: France, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Resolution A was adopted by 48 votes to one, with 9 abstentions.

16. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution B.

Resolution B was adopted by 48 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

17. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution C.

Resolution C was adopted by 32 votes to 13, with 6 abstentions.

18. In reply to a question by the PRESIDENT, Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he wished a vote to be taken on the USSR draft resolution (A/1082).

19. Mr. COSTA DU REIS (Bolivia) asked that the draft resolution should be voted on in two parts and by roll-call.

20. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), speaking on a point of order, stated that without wishing to involve the Assembly in any controversy, he would suggest, in conformity with the view normally taken by his delegation, that since the Assembly had by an overwhelming and decisive vote taken a decision upon what was to be done with the territories which it had been discussing, it was obviously illogical and not in accordance with normal procedure to put to the vote a draft resolution advocating a contrary solution.

21. The USSR draft resolution, and any other proposal which was incompatible with the decision the Assembly had taken, should automatically be dropped. He would not press his point if the President made a ruling to the contrary, but he would like the eminently reasonable and logical point of view of the United Kingdom delegation to be recorded.

22. The President stated that while he was in full agreement with the representative of the United Kingdom, he was following a practice that had been consistently followed in the General Assembly. The Assembly was master of its own procedure and if, after the United Kingdom challenge has been made, it still wished to vote on the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, he would put that draft to the vote.

23. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the General Assembly had been called upon to deal with two draft resolutions, submitted respectively by the delegation of the USSR and by the majority in the First Committee.

24. According to the accepted practice of the General Assembly, any draft resolution submitted to that body was put to the vote. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union should, of course, have been put to the vote first, as it had been submitted first and as it was much more far-reaching than the other draft before the Assembly. Mr. Arutiunian had not insisted that the draft resolution submitted by his delegation should be put to the vote first because he had believed that it would, in any case, be voted upon. He therefore strongly urged the President to follow the normal practice, despite the efforts of the representative of the United Kingdom to distract the attention of representatives.

25. The General Assembly in any case was bound to take a decision and indicate its attitude towards the USSR draft resolution.

26. The PRESIDENT drew attention to rule 83 of the rules of procedure, according to which the General Assembly could, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal. In accordance with that rule, he would put to the vote the question whether the USSR draft resolution was to be put to the vote.

27. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) objected that the United Kingdom representative had made no formal motion and that it was contrary to the usual practice for the President to put such a question to the vote.

28. The PRESIDENT reiterated that the customary practice of proceeding to vote on the next proposal had been challenged by the representative of the United Kingdom. That challenge having been made, he was obliged to apply rule 83, which was very clear.

29. He therefore put to the vote the proposal that the draft resolution of the Soviet Union should be put to the vote.

The proposal was rejected by 17 votes to 16, with 18 abstentions.

30. Mr. MEDHEN (Ethiopia) wished to make a reservation on behalf of his delegation. In conformity with the point made by the leader of the Ethiopian delegation at the 249th meeting, in the course of the general debate on the colonial issue, he desired to state briefly his delegation's position following the vote which had just been taken.

31. It had been repeatedly stressed in the General Assembly that Italy would be resuming the administration of Somaliland only in accordance with the provisions and requirements of the Charter in regard to trusteeship. In fact, the representative of Argentina had stated with particular emphasis (248th meeting), that when Italy assumed its duties as the Administering Authority in Somaliland, it would be the United Nations which would enter Somaliland, and that no power on earth would be able to assume any attitude which was not in accordance with the Charter and the purposes of the United Nations.

32. Numerous delegations, in addition to the delegation of Ethiopia, had pointed out that the frontiers between Ethiopia and Somaliland had not been demarcated and, in fact, the limits of the present administration in that territory bore no relation whatsoever to the question of frontiers.

33. Mr. Medhen had already had occasion to formulate certain specific reservations with regard to that problem and there was no need to repeat them.

34. In view of the statement made by the Argentine representative, and of the fact that the Trusteeship Council and the United Nations were dealing with the question, it was unthinkable that any organ of the United Nations, including the Trusteeship Council, should propose or suggest even the most temporary occupation by Italian forces or authorities of territory claimed by Ethiopia. It was his duty to call the attention of the Assembly to that extremely important aspect of the decision which had just been taken.

35. In that connexion, Mr. Medhen would also remind representatives that in view of the problem to which he had just referred, it was impossible to imagine a State more directly interested

in any trusteeship agreement concerning Somaliland than was Ethiopia. Whatever views other delegations might hold on the right of the four great Powers to whom the recommendations of the General Assembly were to be transmitted to be considered as States directly concerned, it was certain that, in any circumstances, Ethiopia was such a State.

36. As he had already pointed out in Sub-Committee 17 on 18 October 1949, Article 79 of the Charter of the United Nations provided that the terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the Trusteeship System, including any alteration or amendment, should be agreed upon by the States directly concerned. In other words, the Charter laid a positive obligation upon the States directly concerned to participate in the preparation of any terms of trusteeship.

37. It was for those reasons that the representative of Ethiopia had found it necessary to take the floor with reference to the projected work of the Trusteeship Council during the ensuing months.

38. The PRESIDENT stated that the meeting would be suspended for a short time. When it was resumed, the Assembly would be addressed by His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Iran.

The meeting was suspended at 4 p.m., and was resumed at 4.20 p.m.

Reception of His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahinshah of Iran

39. The PRESIDENT stated that he thought it an excellent custom that the General Assembly of the United Nations should occasionally pause in its labours to welcome Heads of State and other distinguished visitors. He was sure that the various occasions upon which the Assembly had availed itself of that custom during the previous three years had had beneficial results going far beyond the ceremonial amenities of the occasion.

40. The Assembly was honoured to have in its midst the ruler of an ancient nation whose historic contributions to human civilization and to the work of the United Nations had earned for it a position of great respect in the Organization.

41. His Imperial Majesty MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH PAHLAVI, SHAHINSHAH OF IRAN, expressed his heartfelt thanks for the warm welcome he had received and the moving words that had just been spoken. He accepted that greeting on behalf of the nation he represented—not one of the largest countries in the world, it was true, but one of the oldest and one of the most persistent in honouring all that pertained to the elevation of the human spirit.

42. In the Assembly of the United Nations, all countries, whether large or small, powerful or weak, should meet as equals. It was the pre-eminent forum of the world, where the most important questions affecting mankind's present and future were submitted to the impact of debate and where work was accomplished which was of the highest importance to man's progress in the perplexing modern age—an age which enveloped all with its demands and its pressures, without ever indicating a sure path to the future.

43. All were aware, however, what that path was. It was the path of peace. The United Nations represented the most solemn international pledge ever made to maintain peace upon earth. True, there had been other pledges, made and broken, in ancient and modern times. But the most solemn of all was the pledge made in the United Nations Charter, after a war of unparalleled scope and the most frightful cruelties, the effects of which were still felt.

44. No one could foresee the future. The present, however, was man's to deal with. The instrument was available if the will was there to use it. It was not a perfect instrument, but that it would grow in strength and effectiveness was the earnest hope of all peace-loving nations, including the beloved land which he had the honour to represent.

45. Through all the philosophic concepts that were part of the living traditions of Iran, through all Iran's great literature, ran the note of peace. It was part of Iran's national being.

46. Without peace, the smaller countries could make no advance in their efforts to attain high living standards and social justice. With peace, they could do all. For Iran, peace was not an abstraction; it was to be used to further domestic progress.

47. Speaking, therefore, on behalf of one of the smaller countries, he appealed to the Assembly not to fail them. He urged it to give them the inner assurance of peace, to assure them of freedom and independence, in which they could contribute to the progress of civilization, each land according to its national culture and tradition. He prayed that all countries, great and small, would compete with each other only in the fields of peaceful achievement. Then, but not until then, would mankind, released from fear, live in a brighter, happier world.

48. The PRESIDENT said he was confident of expressing the sentiments of all the representatives in the General Assembly in extending to His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahinshah of Iran, their gratitude for his visit and their best wishes for a fruitful and pleasant sojourn in the United States.

The meeting was suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 4.35 p.m. On the resumption of the meeting, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan took the Chair.

Report of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly

REPORT OF THE Ad Hoc POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/1049) AND REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/1073)

49. Mr. NISOT (Belgium), Rapporteur of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, presented that Committee's report and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1049).

50. He recalled that the Interim Committee, which had been established for one year by General Assembly resolution 111 (II) of 13 November 1947, had been prolonged for a further year by General Assembly resolution 196 (III) of 3 December 1948, under the terms of which it was to study methods for the promotion of

international co-operation in the political field. It was also to report to the General Assembly on any changes in the Committee's constitution, duration or terms of reference which it might consider desirable in the light of experience.

51. In the report it had submitted to the General Assembly,¹ therefore, the Interim Committee, while giving an account of its studies, had also submitted a draft resolution calling for the establishment of the Interim Committee. That draft had been adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which hoped that the General Assembly would approve it too.

52. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the report of the Fifth Committee (A/1073), which dealt with the financial implications of the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

53. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) stated that the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was the result of a very full debate which had occupied five meetings.² The thoroughness of the debate and the open-minded attitude of many of the participants in the matter of accommodating conflicting views had given strength to the draft resolution finally agreed upon.

54. Three facts had emerged from the discussion. In the first place, there had been the widest reaffirmation of the sound legal basis on which the Interim Committee rested.

55. Secondly, there had emerged a very widespread agreement on the desirability of having a committee of the Assembly authorized to meet while the Assembly was not in session. Some delegations, including the United States, had stressed the importance of that body in ensuring continuous responsibility by the General Assembly during the entire year. If the sessions of the General Assembly itself were to be organized to take place during a fixed period of the year, so that the General Assembly would not be permanently in session, a committee of the whole became of increasing importance in the light of the increased agenda which each successive session had to face.

56. Finally, there had been a wide and frank recognition of the desirability of affording to the USSR and those States which followed its lead every assistance in undertaking their responsibilities in the Interim Committee. As one speaker had said, the majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had tendered a friendly invitation of compromise. Yet the response to that invitation had been a refusal on the part of the USSR to participate in a sub-committee that was to consider a possible compromise. The unwillingness of that group of States even to sit on a conciliation sub-committee was the very negation of the principles on which the Charter was founded.

57. The draft resolution, then, represented the area of agreement of a large majority in the Committee. The United States delegation earnestly hoped that the General Assembly would concur in the recommendation of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee that the Interim Committee should be

re-established on an experimental basis, but for an indefinite period.

58. Mr. Austin had referred to the experimental basis because it seemed clear that, in view of the limited time during which the Interim Committee had been in existence and the work it had done, many delegations felt that a decision should not be taken at that juncture on a permanent committee of the whole or on its terms of reference. The United States delegation recognized that the Interim Committee could serve the General Assembly not only in its function of being available as a forum for the discussion of important and urgent political questions while the General Assembly itself was not in session; it could also assist and develop the responsibilities of the General Assembly by carrying some of the burden of detailed analysis and preparation. Resolution 293 (IV) of the General Assembly on the Korean question provided for consultation with the Interim Committee under the former function. The work of preparing items for consideration by the fifth session of the General Assembly was provided in two of the three resolutions concerning the former Italian colonies which the General Assembly had adopted at the current meeting.

59. The United States delegation was thinking of the future in terms of both those functions and was prepared to give sympathetic consideration to any suggestions for making additional use of the Interim Committee along those lines. Studies of international co-operation were a responsibility of the General Assembly which fitted usefully into the programme of the Interim Committee and which it was especially qualified to undertake. The draft resolution under discussion directed the Interim Committee to continue systematically that most useful service.

60. The United States delegation would therefore vote for the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's draft resolution concerning the Interim Committee.

61. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) wished to state briefly why his delegation had decided to co-operate in the preparation of a draft resolution which would bind the General Assembly over a period of several years.

62. Each year the agenda of the General Assembly became more heavy; the Assembly's sessions were consequently becoming longer. One way to overcome that difficulty had been to set up a subsidiary organ of the Assembly to which the latter could refer the preliminary examination of certain questions which might call for lengthy consideration or even for continuous supervision involving the participation of all Member States of the United Nations.

63. Moreover, the need for a permanent international forum was obvious. The United Nations had a number of organs, such as the Trusteeship Council, which met between sessions of the Assembly. But such organs were of limited competence and could not deal with questions of a general nature which exceeded their powers. Furthermore, the total number of Members taking part in the work of those organs at any given time was far from equivalent to the total number of the Members of the Organization. Hence the need to establish a body in which all Members

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 11.

² See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 16th to 20th meetings inclusive.

of the United Nations could constantly be represented throughout the year and could have the possibility of making known their views and of taking part in the examination of matters of world-wide interest.

64. Finally, the United Nations had recognized the need for an organ to which any State might appeal when a situation arose which might endanger public well-being. It was true that in the Security Council, the United Nations had an organ which was competent to deal with such problems, but it was not the only organ. The General Assembly itself had such competence.

65. The General Assembly, however, which was called upon to play such an important part in the maintenance of peace, was not always in session. The machinery for convening its special sessions required time. It should not be possible for any dispute which might perhaps be easily solved by the General Assembly to become more serious and perhaps even to threaten world peace simply because the parties had not found the General Assembly in session to settle the dispute.

66. It was in such cases that the Interim Committee could show its importance and its activity for, meeting as it did throughout the time that the General Assembly was not in session, it could at any moment take up the consideration of such a dispute, carry out the necessary studies and investigations, while the Assembly itself was preparing to meet, and thus curtail considerably the dangerous period during which a dispute was liable to grow worse.

67. Moreover, the very fact that the Interim Committee was open to all Members of the United Nations meant that any matter which it took up would be discussed in a democratic atmosphere, where all views were of the same importance. It was obvious that such an atmosphere was as necessary at the international as at the national level.

68. It was that particular function which had caused it to be said of the Interim Committee that it was a body which represented one more guarantee of peace.

69. All the above reasons were as valid at the moment as they had been two years earlier, and by the work which it had accomplished in those two years the Interim Committee had already proved how useful it could be.

70. The draft resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee showed one important change in comparison with resolutions of previous years on the same subject; that change related to the question of duration. Whereas in previous years the Interim Committee had been set up on each occasion for one year only, as an experiment, it was being proposed that the Committee should be kept in being for an indefinite period.

71. The reasons which had made the establishment of the Committee necessary were just as cogent for continuing it. Moreover, should a trial period be considered essential, it would have to be a long one if the experiment was to be conclusive. It would seem impossible to judge of the value of such an important international body as the Interim Committee, which might be called upon to assume serious responsibilities, in two or

three years, which was far too short a period where international problems were concerned.

72. In addition to the change in duration, the draft resolution before the Assembly contained a number of minor changes, which experience had shown to be necessary and which were self-explanatory.

73. Neither the Interim Committee nor the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had thought it advisable for the time being to make any changes in that part of the draft resolution which dealt with the terms of reference. As far as the Turkish delegation was concerned, those terms of reference were satisfactory for the time being, although the future might show that they could be extended in such a way as to increase the usefulness of the Interim Committee.

74. Certain objections had been raised to the establishment of the Committee. First among them had been the allegation that its establishment was illegal and contrary to the Charter. The point had been discussed at length and it had been proved that the Charter itself, in Article 22, gave the United Nations full authority to set up just a subsidiary organ as the Interim Committee. Article 7, paragraph 2, added further weight to that interpretation of Article 22. The argument based on the Charter itself was so strong that there was no need to develop other legalistic arguments in support of the legality of the Interim Committee. Moreover, the General Assembly had already decided the point in the affirmative on several occasions.

75. It had also been said that the Interim Committee might encroach on the prerogatives of the Security Council. The draft resolution before the General Assembly not only did not justify such a fear, but contained all the necessary provisions to guard against that possibility. It stated, and repeated clearly several times, that the responsibility for any activities for the maintenance of peace was the responsibility of the Security Council, and that the Interim Committee should not consider any matter on the agenda of the Council. There was therefore no reason and no occasion for any fear that the Interim Committee might encroach on the Security Council's authority.

76. Finally, the Interim Committee had been criticized for producing inadequate results. Such criticism could not be justified in the light of all that the Committee had accomplished during the two years of its existence. Furthermore, like all international bodies, such an organ owed its highest importance to the work it could be called upon to do. The great tasks entrusted to it during the current year by the General Assembly were further evidence of the need for its existence.

77. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stated that, as in similar discussions at preceding sessions of the General Assembly, the recent deliberations of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the re-establishment of the Interim Committee for an indefinite period had revealed the following issues: first, the question of the constitutionality of such a body; secondly, the question whether the Interim Committee infringed the Security Council's prime responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; and, finally, the influence of such a body on the efficacy of the United

Nations and on the confidence of world public opinion in the Organization.

78. It would be well to consider those issues in the light of the different pronouncements made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. The group of delegations headed by the delegation of the United States had still to offer even one convincing and valid argument to contradict the primary contention of the opponents of the Interim Committee that such a body could not be considered constitutional. That group had not hesitated to base its whole conception of the Interim Committee on Article 22 of the Charter. Despite the fact that Article 22 contemplated merely the establishment of a subsidiary organ with very limited powers, the draft resolution before the Assembly called for the continuation of the work of the Interim Committee, to which the Assembly was invited once again to delegate, illegally, some of its own powers.

79. The importance of the powers to be delegated to that body was borne out by the provision that in certain instances a two-thirds majority was required. Not content with that, several delegations, in particular Turkey and Panama, had expressed a desire that the terms of reference of the Interim Committee should be enlarged by making it competent to deal even with questions which belonged to the Main Committees of the General Assembly. That proposal, however, had not been carried further by those who supported the idea of creating a super-Assembly, because for the moment they were concerned only with the weakening of the Security Council. Anglo-American influence was still able, in the General Assembly, to muster a useful majority of countries which had a smaller or larger dollar gap, but that did not hold good for the Security Council; the emphasis, therefore, was still on the circumvention of the Security Council.

80. It was proposed that the Interim Committee should be continued for an indefinite period for the clear purpose of bringing before it all those disputes and situations which could otherwise be submitted only to the Security Council, where the principle of unanimity operated, or to the yearly sessions of the General Assembly, which still commanded the close attention of world public opinion, a much closer attention than did the more or less intimate sessions of the Interim Committee.

81. The Interim Committee was also to be given power to appoint commissions and sub-committees, and to conduct investigations, thus undertaking action which, according to the Charter, not even the General Assembly was empowered to undertake. The General Assembly could scarcely delegate powers which it did not itself possess. The Polish delegation most seriously submitted, therefore, that the Interim Committee, by infringing upon the responsibilities of the Security Council, violated the Charter.

82. The Polish delegation regretted to have to repeat its representations regarding the case; such, however, was its position, and no majority vote could change it. The Polish delegation maintained that the Charter of the United Nations was the law upon which the future of world peace must be built. Rigid adherence to its provisions would be hailed, if not by the majority of the General Assembly, then most certainly by the verdict of the people of the world and that of history.

83. Another aspect of the issue involved two considerations: the influence of the Interim Committee on the efficiency of the United Nations, and its influence on world confidence in the Organization.

84. Since the Conferences at Yalta, San Francisco and Potsdam, it had become clear that the structure of world peace had been built according to a very consistent and logical pattern. Peace-making had been left to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the great Powers, which had to agree on detailed arrangements for the treatment of the vanquished nations before a regular peace conference could decide upon the final terms for the total liquidation of the effects of war. It was only necessary to recall Article 107 of the Charter, which acknowledged that fact. Peace-keeping had been left to the United Nations, but both peace-making and peace-keeping were primarily based on the principle of the unanimity of the great Powers, which had assumed the major responsibilities for the course of world events. Mr. Katz-Suchy recalled in that connexion that Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his last address to the Congress of the United States before his death, had said that the major Powers of the world must continue without interruption to work together and assume responsibility for the solution of the problems which might arise to endanger the peace of the world, that they would not always have ideal answers, but would have to take the responsibility for world collaboration or bear the responsibility for another world conflict.

85. In order to achieve unanimity, which was still as necessary as it had been then, the major Powers had undertaken as early as 30 October 1943 to consult with one another. Article 106 of the Charter reaffirmed that solemn obligation, and the fact that some of the Powers had refused to undertake that consultation did not change the importance of the Article. The principle of unanimity, evolving from those declarations of intention, was embodied in the provisions concerning the voting procedure in the Security Council. That procedure, a cornerstone of the Organization, had prevented the Security Council from becoming a tool in the hands of a group of Powers under the leadership of one Power, and had prevented the Organization from forming blocs or groups of States directed against those in the minority. The Security Council had thus been able to escape the unfortunate practice which had been observed in the General Assembly on many issues—the practice of making decisions not on the merits of a case, but in accordance with the strategic interests of the Anglo-American majority.

86. It had been in order to circumvent the principle of unanimity, and to extend the improper practices which Mr. Katz-Suchy had described to issues solely within the competence of the Security Council, that the Interim Committee had been created, first as a temporary body, and then—as the Polish delegation had rightly foreseen during the first discussion—as a permanent organ of the majority of the General Assembly.

87. To circumvent the Security Council by the creation of the Interim Committee was to injure the most vital provisions of the Charter; it was tantamount to the destruction of the foundations of the United Nations. The Polish delegation con-

tended most emphatically that such an act could not contribute to the efficiency of the United Nations and to the creation of confidence in the Organization.

88. During the two years of its existence—an existence correctly and repeatedly called experimental—the Interim Committee had achieved nothing constructive but, on the contrary, had evinced the most destructive tendencies. It had been tampering with the Charter in the most dilettantish, but most destructive, manner. When studying the implementation of the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of peace and security, the Interim Committee had revealed revisionist aspirations, reflecting the desires for revenge of those whose viewpoint had not prevailed at San Francisco. That spirit was clearly revealed in paragraph 9 of section II of the report of the Interim Committee which the Assembly was asked to accept, where it was stated that the Interim Committee “held that it was entitled to go beyond problems of methods and to consider the substance of international problems, in so far as the study was undertaken with a view to the promotion of international co-operation in the political field”.

89. Thus, according to that statement, a supposedly subsidiary body could discuss the substance of international problems. That was more than a circumvention of the law of the Charter; it was sabotage of the Charter.

90. The Interim Committee was supposed to be a study group dealing with theoretical considerations. While it had not solved any of the problems submitted to it, it had succeeded in giving the General Assembly a great deal of work, and many a problem with which it had dealt had become only more involved and further removed from solution.

91. When dealing with the work of some of the quiring and investigating. Thus, the Interim Committee had clearly indicated, again in a revisionist spirit, its intention of entrusting to special committees of the General Assembly the task of inquiring and investigating. Thus the Interim Committee had sought to support the practice of such special bodies as the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans of undertaking functions solely within the competence of the Security Council.

92. The meddling of the Interim Committee in the Korean question had contributed towards a division of that unfortunate country, postponing its unification and arresting its rehabilitation and reconstruction. That experience, however, had not deterred the majority of the General Assembly from empowering the Interim Committee to embark upon other and even more risky adventures.

93. It had been decided that the Interim Committee should be allowed to deal with the future of Eritrea and the delimitation of frontiers in the former Italian colonies. That action, the clear purpose of which was that the problem of the Italian colonies should be dealt with in a body where a large segment of the peoples of the world was not represented, was a clear violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, which gave the responsibility for the final solution of the problem to the four principal war-

time Allies, as well as a violation of the principles of the Charter, in that it removed the discussion to a body where only the majority was represented.

94. It was, of course, unpleasant for the United States and the United Kingdom to hear their intentions exposed and their military designs in the former Italian colonies disclosed. And it was unpleasant for some countries, which had themselves been under colonial rule not so long before, to have it pointed out to them that they were helping to betray the trust which the colonial peoples had given to the United Nations. Such considerations, however, could not be allowed to influence a United Nations decision, and the Polish delegation was therefore fully justified in drawing attention to that further example of the violation of the principles of the Organization and to the role of the Interim Committee as an instrument of such violations.

95. The Polish delegation could hardly be expected to congratulate the trouble-makers under the Anglo-American command for again stirring up more confusion. It knew how that trouble-making had started and where it was leading, but it did not know where it would end if the Interim Committee was re-established for an indefinite period.

96. The Polish delegation would therefore conclude its brief analysis of the work of the Interim Committee with the statement that the majority of the Assembly had embarked upon a road which, being in fact a concealed revision of the Charter, was harmful to world confidence in the United Nations. It was simply a quiet supplement to the loud demands for the revision of the Charter, in the full knowledge that the provisions of the Charter stood in the way of a complete change of the Organization and of the removal of the basic principle of the unanimity of the great Powers.

97. The majority of the United Nations had chosen a quiet and concealed way, which nevertheless constituted in fact a revision of the Charter. It was a dangerous road; it was the same road which had led to the breaking of the Potsdam Agreement by the western Powers and, as a result, to the division of Germany and indeed of Europe into two opposing camps. It was the same road which had led to the creation of the unholy North Atlantic Treaty, which endangered world peace and postponed urgent economic development programmes, for the simple reason that the national income of many nations, in accordance with the United States' plans and aims, was being spent on rearmament instead of for the purpose of building new schools, hospitals, houses and new centres of production, and raising the general standard of living. It was the same road which prevented millions of human beings from enjoying peace because of the fear of the atom bomb. It was the same road which had led to the sufferings, destruction and loss of human lives during the Second World War.

98. That was why the Polish delegation did not find it possible to participate in the work of the Interim Committee. For those reasons it was not inclined to consent to the endeavours of some of the representatives who had been attempting to reach a compromise solution in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. There was only one solution:

The Interim Committee must be dissolved, for there could be no compromise between right and wrong, legality and illegality.

99. The attempts at compromise and the fact that many critics of the terms of reference and work of the Interim Committee had abstained from voting or had even voted in favour of the draft resolution, had strengthened the determination of the Polish delegation to speak out once more against the Interim Committee. Those facts demonstrated that it was not only the countries which refused to participate in the work of the Interim Committee which doubted the wisdom of the road chosen by all the other nations. There were some countries which, while participating in the work of the Interim Committee, shared that doubt.

100. The solution suggested by the delegation of Poland was a straightforward one. The Charter of the United Nations provided for the General Assembly, its six—and no more—Main Committees, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. The Charter made no mention of an Interim Committee or a Little Assembly, or of any organ to be a substitute for any or all the organs provided for in the Charter. The draft resolution which called for the re-establishment of the Interim Committee must therefore be rejected.

101. Should the majority take another decision, the Polish delegation would refrain from participating in the deliberations of the Interim Committee, as it had done in the past, because the obligation which arose from the Charter must supersede the obligation to accept a recommendation of the majority.

102. Moreover, since an important section of the peoples of the world would not be represented in the Interim Committee, that Committee would continue to have an unrepresentative character. Being contrary to the Charter, its decisions would be one-sided and would have no binding power. The continuance of its existence could therefore only complicate the situation in the United Nations still more.

103. The Polish delegation would continue to fight against the violation of the Charter represented by the Interim Committee until such time as the spirit and letter of the Charter prevailed. No slanderous accusations would stop it. No one would be able to blame Poland for the division among nations which was bound to continue as a result of the decision of the majority; the blame would rest upon those who had established that illegal body and who decided to prolong its existence for an indefinite period.

104. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the question of the Interim Committee had demanded much time and labour on the part of the United Nations and had scarcely contributed to increasing the Organization's prestige.

105. As far back as 1947, when the General Assembly, at its second session, had examined the United States proposal for the creation of an interim committee, the leader of the USSR delegation had emphasized¹ that that proposal had resulted from the dissatisfaction felt by certain

representatives with the procedure practised in the Security Council. He had said that an attempt was being made to weaken the Security Council and to defy its authority, regardless of the fact that the Council, under the Charter, had been entrusted with the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and had to act on behalf of all the Members of the United Nations.

106. The supporters of the Interim Committee relied on Article 22 of the Charter, which provided that the General Assembly might establish such subsidiary organs as it deemed necessary for the performance of its functions. They affirmed that the Interim Committee was a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. That aspect of the question had been fully discussed at the second session. The Soviet Union delegation had shown at that time that the functions which it had been proposed to assign to the Interim Committee made it impossible to regard that Committee as a subsidiary organ.

107. Turning to the draft resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, Mr. Tsarapkin stated that the enumeration of the functions of the Interim Committee contained in that draft showed that they were activities which could be assigned only to a principal organ and which did not come within the competence of a subsidiary organ. The Interim Committee was in fact being given the right to deal with any political question which might be referred to it by a decision of a majority in the General Assembly or in virtue of the powers conferred on the Committee by the General Assembly. It was stated that the Committee, being a subsidiary organ, could not confer powers or give directives to any one. But the situation was really quite different. Thus, in accordance with resolution 112 (II), adopted by the General Assembly on Korea, the Interim Committee had given instructions to the United Nations Commission on Korea concerning the elections in Korea. All those instructions had been carried out. No one could deny that in that case the functions assigned to the Interim Committee coincided entirely with the functions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Only one conclusion could be drawn: the Interim Committee was supplanting those two organs of the United Nations.

108. There were other indications showing that the Interim Committee did not limit its activities to preparatory work; it was given the right to make substantive decisions on the most serious political questions connected with the problem of the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, for example, the Committee had been called upon to take part in solving the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies and one of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly invited it to study the question of methods of delimiting the boundaries of those colonies.

109. Everyone was aware that according to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies should have been settled by the four great Powers, namely, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. It was in accordance with those same provisions that the problem had been sent to the General Assembly,

¹ See *Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly*, 110th plenary meeting.

The Treaty of Peace had established that procedure in case the four Powers should themselves be unable to reach a solution.

110. It was obvious to everyone that the General Assembly should have taken into account the special responsibility incumbent upon those four Powers in the question of the former Italian colonies and should have adopted a procedure for the final settlement of that problem which would have permitted the four Powers to take part in the efforts made to solve the various important issues involved. Nevertheless, the majority in the General Assembly had just adopted resolutions whereby the question of the delimitation of the boundaries of all the former Italian colonies and certain questions regarding Eritrea were referred to the Interim Committee. It was perfectly clear that that had been done in order to prevent the Soviet Union from taking part in the settlement of those questions. All those who had voted in favour of the resolutions had been well aware that the USSR did not participate in the work of the Interim Committee, which it regarded as an illegitimate organ established in violation of the Charter. It was an example which showed clearly how the Anglo-American majority, instead of trying to strengthen international co-operation on the basis of respect for the equality of all sovereign States, made every effort to use the United Nations to achieve their own ends; it also showed clearly that the Interim Committee was a useful instrument for putting that policy into effect.

111. The Interim Committee was increasingly being called upon to examine serious political questions which should be examined only by the Security Council and, in certain cases, by the General Assembly. In point of fact, those problems did not fall within the competence of any other organ of the United Nations, still less of a subsidiary organ. It was sufficient to examine the Interim Committee's report, to take note of its work and to see what tasks were entrusted to it by the resolutions of the General Assembly, to realize its true character and to understand that it was being called upon to take the place of the Security Council. Every paragraph and subparagraph of the Interim Committee's report contained elements weakening the United Nations.

112. Thus, according to paragraph 2 (e) of the draft resolution attached to the report of the Interim Committee and approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Interim Committee would have the right to conduct investigations and appoint commissions of inquiry, whereas Article 34 of the Charter conferred that right upon the Security Council. Paragraph 2 (d) gave the Interim Committee the right to consider, in connexion with any matter being discussed by it, whether occasion might require the summoning of a special session of the General Assembly, a prerogative which was contrary to the provisions of Article 20 of the Charter. Paragraph 3 authorized the Interim Committee to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, whereas Article 96 of the Charter reserved that right for the General Assembly and the Security Council. Other organs of the United Nations, such as the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, as well as the specialized agencies, could request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice when they were

authorized to do so by the General Assembly. But no Article of the Charter either implicitly or explicitly gave that right to subsidiary organs. Paragraph 3, therefore, constituted a flagrant violation of Article 96 of the Charter.

113. A careful study of the report of the Interim Committee and of the activities of that Committee showed that those activities had been directed towards establishing such procedures and methods for settling situations and disputes which would either prevent the Security Council from settling questions within its competence, or bind the Council entirely and to oblige it to act within the framework established by the Interim Committee, thus depriving the Council of its freedom of action. At the same time, the Interim Committee did not take into consideration Articles 36 and 37 of the Charter, which instructed the Security Council to prepare studies for the settlement of situations and disputes.

114. The Interim Committee went even further in its report. It considered that it had the right not to confine itself to the consideration of methods, but to deal with the substance of international problems. The discussion which had taken place in the Interim Committee proved that that Committee had freely engaged in the problem of settling situations and disputes, although that problem lay within the exclusive competence of the Security Council. Thus, the statement in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution that in discharging its duties, the Interim Committee should at all times take into account the responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, was intended merely to mislead naive persons. A study of the report of the Interim Committee, with special reference to paragraphs 12, 13 and 20 of Annex I, part II, proved that the Interim Committee was working to deprive the Security Council of its functions in connexion with the settlement of situations and disputes, and to transfer those functions to the General Assembly. As, however, the General Assembly met as a rule only in the autumn and as disputes might arise at any moment, the supporters of the Interim Committee proposed that that Committee should be retained for the settlement of such disputes, while totally ignoring the fact that that task had been entrusted to the Security Council by the Charter.

115. Mr. Tsarapkin recalled that at the meeting of the Interim Committee held on 10 August 1949, the representatives of Turkey, Canada and the United States had stated that in the intervals between the sessions of the General Assembly, the Interim Committee might play an extremely important part when complications in the international situation required urgent solution. Their statements had clearly proved that they considered the Interim Committee to be an organ which should take the place of the Security Council in the settlement of questions of threats to peace, breaches of the peace and the pacific settlement of disputes. Two years after the establishment of the Interim Committee, no one could maintain that that Committee was merely a weak subsidiary of the General Assembly and that it had no rights. The facts proved the contrary. They proved that the Committee was actively preparing itself to play the part that certain States wanted it to play, which was to replace the Security Council.

116. The Interim Committee had even dealt with measures to forestall military operations or put an end to them, and had raised the question as to whether the General Assembly had at its disposal the requisite means for that purpose. It had thus shown that it was preparing methods for the General Assembly which would enable the latter to act in the place of the Security Council. It was obvious, therefore, that the Interim Committee was attempting to destroy the Security Council and, consequently, the United Nations.

117. The question of the Interim Committee was of the utmost political importance; it affected the interests of the United Nations as a whole, its various activities, and the problem of its very existence as an international organ for the maintenance of peace and the safeguarding of world security. For the USSR delegation, that question was very closely linked with the question of the place which the Security Council was called upon to occupy in the structure of the United Nations.

118. Everyone knew that the Charter laid very particular emphasis on the difference between the competence of the Security Council and the competence of the General Assembly. The Charter strictly defined the functions of both those bodies. Everyone knew, moreover, that it was to the Security Council, not to the General Assembly, that the Charter entrusted the settlement of disputes likely to endanger the maintenance of peace or to lead to armed conflict, to say nothing of disputes accompanied by military operations.

119. It was precisely for that purpose that Article 24 stated that the Members of the United Nations conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agreed that in carrying out its duties under that responsibility the Security Council acted on their behalf.

120. In view of the extremely important nature of the work thus entrusted to the Security Council, the Charter provided that its decisions on all matters other than procedural should be made by the affirmative vote of seven members, including the votes of all the permanent members, namely the USSR, the United Kingdom, China, the United States and France. That provision had been included in the Charter in order to ensure that, in all questions affecting the maintenance of international peace and security, decisions should be taken unanimously, with the greatest possible degree of impartiality, consideration and justice. In view of that provision, there was no room in the Security Council for combinations enabling one or more of the permanent members of the Council to impose their will on one or more other permanent members of that Council. It was precisely the existence of the principle of the unanimity of the five great Powers which had prevented the Security Council from becoming an obedient tool of the policy of the United States and the United Kingdom, although those countries admittedly had at their disposal the majority of the votes in all the organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It was that provision which had enabled the Security Council to preserve its freedom of action.

121. It was that provision also which led the United States and the United Kingdom to seek devious ways of securing decisions which suited

them on questions reserved for the Security Council under the terms of the Charter, regardless of the authority of that organ.

122. That was the real reason for the establishment of the illegal organ known as the Interim Committee, and it was for that reason also that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had adopted its draft resolution providing for the continuance of the Interim Committee.

123. It might be opportune to remind those who had forgotten it that the creation of the United Nations had been possible only because the main responsibility for settling questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security had been entrusted to the Security Council, both in the case of breaches of the peace and aggression, and in the case of disputes which had not yet reached the stage of armed conflict. Attempts were being made at the moment to do away with that essential condition.

124. Everyone knew that certain forces were at work in a persistent endeavour to undermine the very foundations of the United Nations. Unless something were done to put a stop to their disastrous activities, especially those directed against the Security Council, it would one day be discovered that the very cornerstone of the building had been loosened, and the whole United Nations would collapse.

125. The report of the Interim Committee showed that that Committee was devoting all its efforts to the examination of one single problem, namely, how to prevent the Security Council from exercising its functions and how to render it powerless and thus completely destroy its role and importance in the structure of the United Nations.

126. To achieve that purpose it had been necessary, by means of various manoeuvres and a tendentious interpretation of the Charter, to break down the division established by the Charter between the sphere of the Security Council and that of the General Assembly. In face of the specific terms of the Charter, that had involved declaring that the General Assembly was empowered to deal with questions within the purview of the Security Council, in order to create a quasi-legal basis to justify reference of those questions to the General Assembly. Without overmuch difficulty that body could, in turn, entrust the Interim Committee with the study of those problems in the intervals between sessions. Such was the programme which the United States and the United Kingdom had worked out in the Interim Committee in order to substitute that Committee for the Security Council.

127. That sordid task benefited only warmongers who were attempting to make the United Nations impotent in the new war of aggression they were preparing.

128. The USSR delegation had stated more than once that there was no legal reason for the creation and the maintenance of the Interim Committee. It did not, of course, entertain the hope of convincing those who, basing themselves on a docile majority and infringing the United Nations Charter had created the Interim Committee and were making all necessary preparations to secure the adoption of the draft resolution providing for its continuation. Nevertheless, the United States, the

United Kingdom and those who were supporting them in that illegal undertaking must know that the Soviet Union would not participate in the work of that body, and that no good would come of the measures which were taken not only without the Soviet Union, but even despite its opposition.

129. The USSR delegation wished once again to warn the Members of the United Nations that the adoption of the draft resolution on the continuance of the Interim Committee would constitute yet another action against the principle of co-operation within the United Nations and would embitter the dissensions within it.

130. Generalissimo Stalin, Prime Minister of the USSR Government, had stated in March 1946 that the strength of the United Nations consisted in the fact that that Organization was based on the principle of the equality of rights between countries and not on the principle of the domination of one country over the others. He had stated that if the United Nations continued to respect that principle of equality, it would certainly contribute greatly to the maintenance of international peace and security. The continuation of the Interim Committee was a step designed solely to void that principle by by-passing the Security Council. It would not fail to create new complications and new dissension within the United Nations and to weaken its authority and prestige.

131. Everyone was aware that the Interim Committee was in the process of becoming an illegal body existing side by side with the United Nations. The Assembly of the United Nations was sitting in the Assembly hall where, in accordance with the Charter, the representatives of fifty-nine Member States were gathered together.

In the periods between the sessions of the Assembly, another body, created in violation of the Charter, was going to sit. Therefore a number of Member States of the United Nations did not recognize that illegal body and would not take part in its work.

132. Nevertheless, the United States, which had promoted the creation of that body and was directing its labours, was continuing its efforts behind the scenes and, in pursuance of its dictatorial policy, was seeking to impose upon the General Assembly a draft resolution providing for the continuation of the Interim Committee.

133. The USSR delegation was very strongly opposed to the adoption of that draft resolution. It affirmed once again that it could not recognize the Interim Committee as a legal body. It declared once again that that body had been created in violation of the Charter, that its purpose was to substitute itself for the Security Council and that its activity was contrary to the aims and principles of the United Nations.

134. For all those reasons, the Soviet Union would continue to take no part in the work of the Interim Committee and would refuse to recognize its decisions, recommendations or conclusions.

135. The USSR delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution and believed that all those who had at heart the cause of the United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security should do likewise.

136. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1049).

The resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Admission of new Members: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1066)

1. Mr. Nisot (Belgium), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, presented the Committee's report on the admission of new Members and the draft resolutions accompanying it.¹

2. Ten of those draft resolutions proposed that the Assembly should request the Security Council to re-examine the applications for admission with regard to which it had been unable to make the recommendation provided for in Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's proposals covered all the applications which had failed, either because they had not received the required majority in the Security Council or because they had been voted against by a permanent member.

¹For the discussion on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 25th to 29th meetings inclusive.

3. An eleventh draft resolution, put forward by the delegation of Argentina, proposed that the International Court of Justice should be consulted on a question raised by that delegation with regard to the Assembly's powers in the matter. The question on which the Court would thus be invited to give an opinion had been the subject of frequent discussion in the Assembly in the past. It was advisable, therefore, that it should be elucidated, and as it was of a legal character, it had seemed that it would be in accordance with the Charter to refer it to the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.

4. The PRESIDENT said that the resolutions mentioned by the Rapporteur referred to the applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Portugal and Nepal. One resolution requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, and one contained a request to the Security Council with regard to the use of the veto and other considerations connected with the applications of non-member States.