

assist in the economic development of countries devastated by the war.

156. At its ninth session, the Council had examined the question of the development of the economically under-developed countries. It was known that that problem was of interest to a number of countries in which industry and agriculture were at a very low level, and in which the masses lived in destitution. That situation existed mainly in countries which for many years had been, or still were, subjected to ruthless exploitation by colonial Powers.

157. There was an attempt in some quarters to represent the United States plan of technical aid as one devoid of imperialistic aims. It was quite clear, however, that the plan was nothing more than an attempt by American monopolists to secure a political and economic hold on other countries, to ruin their domestic industries and to flood their markets with American goods. They sought to gain control of the resources of strategic raw materials with intent to use them for military ends. Thus, for example, the United States had bought up nearly all the supplies of raw materials in the Belgian Congo. American companies were ruthlessly exploiting the population of that region. Mr. Kiselev gave another instance in support of his argument: according to official statistics, to be found in the Trusteeship Council's report,<sup>1</sup> only three of the 331 industrial undertakings in Ruanda-Urundi belonged to the Native population. Those three companies were concerned with the manufacture of pottery, basket-making and tanning.

158. It was essential to take steps to prevent American monopolists from enslaving economically under-developed countries under cover of the United Nations. Generous aid must be granted to under-developed countries, provided that such aid

allowed them to promote their national economy and to progress towards political and economic independence.

159. Mr. Kiselev then alluded to the statement by Mr. Santa Cruz, representative of Chile, whom he accused of using the forum of the United Nations in an attempt to distract the attention of the General Assembly from the Soviet Union's proposals (226th meeting) for the achievement of world peace. The Chilean representative had used doubtful arguments, had maintained that the USSR proposals were simply ironical and had thus sought to confuse a perfectly clear issue. Slander on the part of the Chilean representative was nothing new. Everyone was equally familiar with the fact that it invariably came to nothing. There was no need to stress the point further.

160. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR wholeheartedly supported the proposals put forward at the 226th meeting by Mr. Vyshinsky. The Member States of the United Nations could not disregard the anxiety of all the nations of the world to prevent another war. They must develop close co-operation among themselves. They must take concrete steps for the speedy solution of such international problems as the control and reduction of armaments and of armed forces, the prohibition of the atomic weapon, and the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful ends. War-mongering must be forbidden and all preparations for a new war must be stopped.

161. In appealing to the great Powers to conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace, the Soviet Union had sought to free the peoples of the world from the fear of another war and to bring to fruition the highest hopes of humanity, which craved only security and a lasting peace.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Monday, 26 September 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).*

**General debate (*continued*): speeches by Mr. Clementis (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Kardelj (Yugoslavia), Mr. C. Malik (Lebanon), Mr. Tsaldaris (Greece), Mr. Pearson (Canada)**

1. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that, in surveying the achievements and failures and in analysing the problems which had concerned the United Nations during the past year, one important and positive fact had come to light, particularly when those achievements were compared with those of the preceding session of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his report for the year 1949,<sup>2</sup> had rightly stressed that the fear of war had decreased, and he was partly right to consider the breaking of the Berlin deadlock as the main factor contributing towards that improved situation.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 4.

2. Thus it had once more been clearly proved that the peaceful development of the world depended on the co-operation of the leading great Powers, and on the widest and most frequent application of the principle of unanimity, especially to the solution of post-war problems. There was no doubt that, if another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers were held at the same time as the General Assembly, as had happened in 1946, in order to solve further problems, there would be a relaxation of tension throughout the world and it would have far-reaching effects upon the results of the Assembly's deliberations. That would further prove to those who sincerely strove for the success of the United Nations in the spirit of the Charter, but who so far had not been realistic enough to recognize and respect the real prerequisites for that success, that the co-operation of the leading Powers was a *sine qua non*.

3. The daily practice of the United Nations supported that thesis. In cases where one of the great

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 1.

Powers or a group of great Powers had tried to achieve their own selfish and unjust aims within the United Nations with the aid of a mere mathematical and mechanical voting majority, the result had too frequently been failure to solve the problem in question. It was sufficient to cite the examples of Greece and of Korea or the series of questions concerning the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the reduction of armed forces and armaments in general.

4. The principle that it was absolutely necessary for all the great Powers to agree among themselves on the solution of important political questions was as old as the Organization itself, which had been born under the sign of that principle; it was so simple and obvious that even a political novice must understand it. Therefore the fact that it had not been and was not being applied, that attempts were being made to by-pass it, or even to abolish it from the Charter, as advocated by the crusaders against the veto, indicated that an effort was being made to attain aims other than those declared publicly. Thus, for instance, an attempt was being made to prevent much tried Korea from becoming free and united, and to maintain a controlled and divided Korea; efforts were being exerted to avoid prohibition of atomic weapons and rather to achieve monopolistic control over them.

5. There was no escape from the dilemma thus created. However, even if it were admitted that the fear of war had really diminished and that that achievement—however modest in scope but of fundamental significance—had been attained largely as a result of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in Paris in the Summer of 1949, one characteristic fact must be emphasized. It was that the official representatives of one of the great Powers participating in the Council, which had even been one of the initiators of the Paris meeting, had done their best to minimize the significance of that meeting in order to stem the relaxation which had followed it.

6. The great Power in question was the United States, which claimed a leading position within the United Nations as well as outside it. The United States stood at the head of the capitalistic States and determined not only their attitude towards the fundamental questions of world politics but often their internal policies as well. Yet, in the case of the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the United States could rightfully—as could all the other participants—have claimed that it had contributed towards an act of merit, which had been acknowledged with satisfaction by the whole of peace-loving mankind. Instead, it had behaved in a contrary manner without achieving any significant result.

7. Mr. Clementis did not intend to analyse the causes of that seemingly contradictory phenomenon. Obviously, a relaxation of the international tension was not convenient for a further application of the strong hand policy nor for a continued waging of the cold war, nor for the creation of an atmosphere of fear, all of which were so necessary to justify the tremendous expenditures for the increase in armaments and the political and economic subjugation of other countries.

8. Despite the attitude of the leading country of the capitalistic world, despite the North Atlantic Treaty and continuous provocative warmongering, there had been a lessening of international tension and of the fear of war, owing to the consistent attitude and activity of the Soviet Union and to the powerful and clear will of hundreds of millions of people all over the world to maintain peace and to struggle for peace. That spirit of hundreds of millions of peoples of all nations and races should not fail to influence the discussions of the General Assembly and their outcome.

9. Mr. Clementis pointed out that although there were many serious problems on the agenda of the General Assembly, there was also the usual number of items introduced purely for purposes of provocation. Those latter items were apparently intended to divert the attention of world public opinion from other more essential questions. The usual majority had insisted on reverting to problems which had already been discussed at previous sessions instead of approaching new questions constructively.

10. Even in connexion with the Palestine question, where the work of the United Nations had yielded many positive achievements, it should be emphasized that if the United Kingdom had not pursued its own particular policy in and around Palestine, and if the United States had not played a double role, the question would not have had to be referred to the Assembly for a final solution and, what was more, it could have been solved without bloodshed and the hardships which had befallen hundreds of thousands on both sides could have been avoided.

11. The substance of the majority of the other problems which were again before the Assembly was political. They could be solved only politically, and not by far-fetched juridical constructions or by a mathematical counting of votes. The question of the admission of new Members was a case in point. At the previous session, when the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice<sup>1</sup> had been adopted by an insignificant majority,<sup>2</sup> it had been pointed out that a formalistic juridical approach to the question was politically untenable and absurd. It had led to everlasting and futile discussions in the Committee on the Admission of New Members and later in the Security Council. Certain Powers intended to reopen those discussions while they continued to make speeches exhorting respect for the principle of universality of the United Nations and the need, which was truly very pressing, to shorten the period of the sessions.

12. Other questions which had been before the Assembly for several sessions were being dealt with by commissions and agencies which had been established by the usual majority and which were in fact undisguised instruments of Anglo-American power policy. The majority of those bodies had been created in violation of the spirit and the letter of the Charter or of other existing international agreements.

13. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, of sad renown, fell within that category. Its reports remained an unfortunate and

<sup>1</sup> See *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4), Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1948, page 57.*

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, 177th plenary meeting.*

warning chapter in the history of the United Nations. The faculties of observation of the members of the Committee were peculiar inasmuch as they failed to see any of the horrors which the monarcho-fascist units had perpetrated in all the regions of unfortunate Greece. Their auditory faculties were also impaired, for they did not seem to hear any of the provocative speeches about the preparation of military raids into neighbouring countries.

14. Moreover, it should be noted that the Committee had not been overly concerned with observing its terms of reference. Although, from an objective standpoint, all the conditions required for ending the civil war in Greece had already existed for some time, it had neither acknowledged nor given support to such a possibility, despite the fact that a concretely formulated proposal opening the way to the only possible and lasting solution had been presented to Mr. Evatt, President of the third session of the General Assembly. On the other hand, the so-called peace and order maintained by means of intervention and at a sacrifice of countless lives was not even a permanent solution.

15. Mr. Clementis added that his remarks concerning the Committee on the Balkans could be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the United Nations Commission on Korea, which had been constituted in violation of the Moscow agreement. Moreover, from the formal point of view, the illegal activity of the Commission, constituted on the principle of *pacta sunt non servanda*, had been confirmed by the Interim Committee, a body which had no competence and which had been created illegally in violation of the Charter.

16. What ventures was the United Nations embarking upon? The United Nations was an Organization which had taken upon itself the responsibility for the observance, reinforcement and respect of international law. The United Nations should be the institution to prevent rather than to permit a gamble with the destiny of a nation such as Korea, which had suffered so much in the past and should be allowed to shape its own future.

17. The case of Korea served to demonstrate the harm that could be done by an illegal body such as the Interim Committee. Normally a body which had carried on such activity would have been dissolved, even had it been created legally. Instead, a proposal was being made that the existence of the interim body should again be prolonged,<sup>1</sup> although the courage was lacking to designate it as a permanent committee. What was to be the activity of that body in the future? Was it once more to interfere with the competence of the General Assembly while the latter was not in session? The proposal for prolonging its existence became a question of principle which would reflect the attitude of every Member nation towards the Charter.

18. The most vital questions facing mankind were again before the Assembly in a not too encouraging form. Those questions, so constantly and justly placed on the agenda by the USSR delegation, were international control of atomic energy, prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction in armaments and armed forces. To

declare that those questions were beyond solution and to stop the work of the relevant commissions was to abandon the most important mission of the United Nations. Perhaps such action was designed only to justify the tremendous armaments taking place within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty?

19. Mr. Clementis recalled that the preceding year, in his reply<sup>2</sup> to Mr. Bevin's announcement of that treaty under the innocent cloak of a regional pact, he had stated that that road led to the abandonment of the principles of the United Nations and to the creation of opposing blocs of States. Recent developments clearly confirmed that thesis. No explanatory speeches or insincere references to the Charter in connexion with the North Atlantic Treaty could in any way alter that reality. The delegation of Czechoslovakia could not agree with those who defended the North Atlantic Treaty by maintaining that the spirit rather than the letter was the decisive factor in judging whether or not the treaty violated the Charter. What, indeed, was the spirit of an instrument which hid behind atomic bombs?

20. Although the submission of the question of the former Italian colonies to the United Nations, and even the activity of the Organization in the Indonesian war, had been cited as proof of the growing authority of the United Nations, the reality was quite different. On the eve of the opening of the Assembly it had been learned that the United Kingdom had generously granted a somewhat peculiar independence to Cyrenaica, keeping for itself all the prerogatives of sovereignty. Similarly, as had been the case before the opening of the second part of the third session, the Assembly had learned that another round-table conference was meeting at The Hague. It was clear that the tactics of postponement, of making it impossible to reach an agreement, as in the case of the former Italian colonies, and of failure to respect the resolutions of the United Nations, as in the case of Indonesia, were intended to present the world with a *fait accompli*, to arrive at the so-called internal legal solution which the Union of South Africa had undertaken in direct contradiction with resolutions 65 (I), 141 (II) and 227 (III) of the General Assembly in the case of South West Africa.

21. Those were just a few concrete examples to prove the oft-repeated statement of the Czechoslovak delegation that the United Nations was being by-passed, that its authority was being weakened and that efforts were being made to misuse it.

22. In the category of what Mr. Clementis had called the usual number of items introduced purely for purposes of provocation, were those concerning the violation of human rights, included in the agenda apparently for the sole purpose of providing the representatives with an opportunity to voice their prejudices against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies, and thereby offering the Press suitably prefabricated material for anti-Soviet propaganda and war-mongering. It was clear that those responsible for that campaign wished it to be continued not only because of deep-rooted industrial, economic and

<sup>1</sup> See Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11.

<sup>2</sup> See Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, 145th plenary meeting.

financial interests, but also because of the internal political need for fighting communism, which in some instances provided a convenient device for curbing strikes and weakening the trade union movement of the working class, and thereby for masking semi-fascist régimes and internal difficulties. It was, of course, also possible that the inclusion of those topics in the agenda of the Assembly was merely a smoke-screen, designed to hide cases of serious and systematic violation of human rights on the part of those countries which verbally, and in the Press, most warmly supported the proponents of the discussion of those items. Was it perhaps a manoeuvre to prevent prior accusations of flagrant crimes against freedom, equality and humanity from being lodged against those countries which most frequently invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

23. The campaign against the Hungarian People's Republic and in favour of the treacherous Cardinal Mindszenty had failed sadly. And the anti-Bulgarian attacks in favour of Bulgarian citizens who had committed high treason and were priests by profession, sounded hollow. Recently, in order to keep the issue alive, Australia had entered a complaint against the Romanian People's Republic (A/948).

24. Mr. Clementis recalled that during the second part of the third session,<sup>1</sup> the Czechoslovak delegation had clearly stated that the question did not belong on the agenda of the General Assembly, and had given the reasons for its position. It felt that the boringly identical accusations represented an endeavour to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. Legal punishment of high treason and other actions which were crimes according to penal law could not be considered as a violation of human rights.

25. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak delegation was willing at any time to discuss the positive contribution of the peoples' democracies in strengthening and broadening human rights. Mr. Clementis pointed out that, while Governments which frowned upon the peoples' democracies had been unable to guarantee freedom from fear of the atomic bomb to their citizens or freedom from want to their unemployed, the people of the peoples' democracies had launched a world-wide proclamation of man's inalienable right to peace. The peace congresses of Wroclaw, New York, Paris, Prague, Budapest, Moscow and Mexico City had been peace plebiscites at which the representatives of hundreds of millions of people had proclaimed their desire for peace, their will for peace and their firm resolve to destroy the evil work of warmongers and the grave-diggers of peace, both at home and abroad.

26. The working and thinking people of the world found support and expressed confidence in the Soviet Union, which rallied to its side all the truly peace-loving peoples of the world. Malicious attacks on countries which had punished those who were preparing for war in alliance with the enemies of peace from abroad, were ridiculous at a time when hundreds of millions of people were calling for the right to peace. That most basic right was still in danger and it was up to the United Nations to free mankind from the fear

that its right to peace could be violated, or, more accurately, that that right was being violated by the preparation for war.

27. That did not mean that fruitful, outstanding and worthy achievements in the field of protecting and strengthening human rights were not possible within the scope of the United Nations. It was sufficient to recall war as such, the way it was being waged in Viet-Nam, in Indonesia, in Malaya, the treatment of the Natives and the Indians in South Africa, or, less far afield, in the land of "Jim Crow".

28. The third session of the General Assembly had been told about a so-called self-imposed minority. Similarly, the fourth session was hearing about a small group which was allegedly insisting on a policy of threatening other members of the international community. That was peculiar logic and peculiar fact-finding. That small group, which devoted the major part of its material and spiritual resources to peaceful reconstruction of its economy, which, without outside help, relying solely upon itself and the spirit of unselfish mutual co-operation, had developed its economy to a level which showed constantly improving trends and which had no reason to fear economic crises—that small group was allegedly menacing all the others and causing a profound sense of insecurity. But the other group, which not long after the war had exhibited tendencies to revise solemn agreements and obligations concluded during the war in the spirit of friendship and understanding, had begun to proclaim doctrines and to strengthen old military bases and construct new bases around the socialist countries, that other group which even on the eve of the fourth session had announced the creation of organs for the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, was supposed to be the one which implemented the obligations of the Charter. The conclusions to be drawn were obvious.

29. The Czechoslovak delegation had already stated the causes which, in spite of those unpleasant realities, had eased rather than strained international relations. That situation certainly encouraged work within the United Nations where, in spite of obvious differences of opinion, in spite of real difficulties which could not be surmounted at once, activities that would be beneficial to all peace-loving men could be promoted.

30. Before the opening of the fourth session, and in the plenary meetings, it had been said that the United Nations could successfully further such activity, especially in the economic and social fields. The Czechoslovak delegation would welcome such a development. It had been gratified that, after discussion in the Economic and Social Council, the question of the implementation and the observance of Articles 55 and 56, and in particular 55 a of the Charter, had been included in the Assembly's agenda. Those provisions called for action to achieve or maintain full employment and higher standards of living and economic stability. Although those problems had definitely been solved in Czechoslovakia, as well as in the other countries that were building socialism, the Czechoslovak delegation would welcome discussion on them.

31. Perhaps those problems had been placed on the agenda of the Assembly as a result of the lessons learned from the failure of the Marshall

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II*, 189th plenary meeting.

Plan. Czechoslovakia had opposed that plan, among other reasons, because it had been established outside the framework of the United Nations and was contrary to the principles of the Organization.

32. The activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should serve as a warning to those who hoped that the United Nations would achieve success in the economic field. The Bank, which had originally been planned as an institution working in the spirit of the United Nations, had become an instrument of the power policy of the United States.

33. The foregoing survey of the problems included on the agenda of the General Assembly gave no cause for satisfaction; rather it should be taken as a very serious warning and a challenge to increase efforts so that the United Nations might finally fulfil its highest and most important mission, which was to secure peace and to further relationships among all peace-loving peoples of the world.

34. The contemporary movement for peace was not an expression of defeatism, but a manifestation of self-confidence and strength, qualities which characterized its representatives. The United Nations would be able to fulfil its great mission for peace only when it became strong, when it refused to permit its authority and competence under the Charter to be by-passed, misused and undermined through the creation of illegal bodies and the discussion of matters which had no place on its agenda. When those negative activities had been eliminated from the life of the United Nations, the Organization would really become what the whole of peace-loving mankind would like it to be. The attainment of that goal required ceaseless and patient struggle against such condemnable practices and, above all, a creative initiative which would enable the United Nations to develop its most essential activity, namely, the strengthening of peace in the world.

35. The USSR delegation, faithful to its great tradition, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vyshinsky, had once again come forward with proposals (226th meeting) which were a simple and workable instrument for solving the most vital problems of contemporary mankind. Under the terms of these proposals, the General Assembly called upon all nations to cease all preparations for a new war, to free the people from the ever-present burden of an armaments race, to draw the necessary conclusions from the solemn obligations they had assumed on entering the United Nations, to prohibit atomic weapons and secure an effective control of those instruments of genocide, and to settle differences between countries by peaceful means; it further exhorted the great Powers, which bore the principal responsibility for security under the Charter, to act in accordance with that responsibility.

36. The Czechoslovak delegation fully supported the proposals of the USSR delegation, for they had already been approved by the whole of the Czechoslovak people, by all the countries which desired peace and by millions of people from all over the world. It was unquestionable that the absolute majority of mankind sought peace and that the universal desire for peace could not be divided by any kind of iron curtain.

37. No one could possibly deny that the proposals of the delegation of the Soviet Union had been made in the spirit of the Charter, or that their adoption would tremendously increase the authority of the United Nations. Mr. Clementis felt sure that the attention of world public opinion would be focussed upon the fate of those proposals, for every one knew that their adoption would mark a revolutionary turning point, a historic turning point in the post-war development of the world. Mankind had paid a heavy toll in fighting, privations and often blood in order to achieve such gains. The proposals for peace did not entail sacrifices and suffering; on the contrary, they were intended to save mankind from them, and from something very much worse. The USSR proposals put a fateful question to the United Nations. Could any honest member of the world community hesitate even for a moment to give a positive reply?

38. Mr. Clementis concluded by recalling that General Rómulo had coined a new name for the fourth session of the General Assembly, namely, the "Peace Assembly". That name should enter the annals of the United Nations. The adoption of the USSR proposal would determine whether that would come about.

39. Mr. KARDELJ (Yugoslavia) stated that he wished to dwell on a few fundamental facts which, in his opinion, were of very great importance to the world in general, and especially to his country.

40. He wished, first, to point out that discrepancies between words and deeds had reached absolutely astonishing proportions; that was true even in the United Nations. It was undeniable that, even in the Assembly, most of the international questions which gave rise to controversy were presented in a guise very different from reality.

41. It was true that, during the preceding ten years, and especially after the cruel ordeal of the Second World War, democratic feeling had so increased among nations that it had become very difficult openly to defend the colonial system, inequitable relations between various nations, imperialistic expansionism, and the attempt of the great Powers to impose their will upon the weaker Powers. Whatever party they belonged to, workers expected an ever increasing consideration to be given to their democratic opinions.

42. That did not mean, however, that everything condemned by the popular democratic conscience had disappeared. The unsound policy was continued, under cover of propaganda tricks. Thus, although the enslavement of nations was considered to be a crime, such enslavement nevertheless continued owing to the use of a whole series of political and economic procedures.

43. The equality of rights of all the sovereign countries were solemnly recognized; some of those, however, who in words declared themselves in favour of that principle had scant regard for it in their own relations with other countries.

44. Moreover, a dangerous policy, based on the idea that, in order to defend peace, it was necessary to make the threat of war felt, had found widespread application.

45. Lastly, at the very time when there was so much talk about the principle of non-intervention



in the domestic affairs of other countries, it was clear that, in fact, such intervention had become the principal instrument of the foreign policy of the great Powers, and that it constituted the main reason for fearing a new war.

46. Such facts, however, which propaganda tried to present under a very different guise, were carefully hidden from public opinion. It even seemed that certain persons were eager to transform the United Nations into a platform for that kind of propaganda.

47. The question was whether the General Assembly would become the scene of appeals for peace, made for propaganda purposes, or would take effective measures for the maintenance of peace. If the United Nations was to be considered an important instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, it was necessary, above all, to combat the tendency to conceal the real meaning of international questions behind parades of propaganda and allegedly democratic watchwords.

48. One of the questions which constantly arose was whether States with different social structures could co-exist and collaborate peacefully for the purpose of ensuring a lasting peace among the nations. The answer must necessarily be in the affirmative, for if peace were desired, it must be ensured under the existing conditions of a world as it was, by taking into consideration the fact that different States had different social structures. If the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States were respected, it was obvious that difference of social structure did not constitute a threat of war.

49. The representative of China, at the 223rd meeting, had preached a real crusade against communism; in fact, he had advocated war against the Soviet Union. It was quite obvious that it was not possible to speak of peace when such appeals were made. Yugoslavia felt that, if it were recognized that every nation had the right to decide its own destiny and to organize its own social structure, peaceful collaboration among States of different structure was quite possible. On the other hand, if that principle was not observed, there existed a real threat to peace, not only in relations between States which had a different social structure, but also in relations between States with the same structure.

50. It could be said, therefore, that the threat of war was due, not to differences in social structure, but to the existence of imperialistic and anti-democratic tendencies in international relations, to the violation of the principle of equality of the rights of States and peoples, to the economic exploitation of other nations, and to intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.

51. Hence all efforts to strengthen peace must be indissolubly linked to the struggle for equality in relations between peoples and States, for the preservation of the independence of small States, for the establishment of conditions in which political or economic pressure would have no place in international relations. Those were the questions which really put the sincerity of statements in favour of peace to the test.

52. It was impossible to speak of peace while weak or small countries were threatened and their right to self-determination violated, and while

they were exploited or subjugated. The assertion that the principle of the sovereignty of States was out of date, and that it was necessary to set up a world government or State—which, in fact would legalize political and economic domination by one great Power or another—was equally incompatible with any desire for peace. It was impossible to speak of peace and at the same time heap insults upon a Government which called for a greater measure of democracy in international relations. Such contradictory assertions had been made, and the Yugoslav delegation considered that to be an extremely dangerous factor, which constituted a permanent threat of war.

53. It was obvious that the question of the equality of rights and the independence of small countries was closely linked to the problem of their economic development. It was clear to everyone that the existing discrepancy between the wealth of technical resources and general economic progress of highly-developed countries on the one hand, and the economic position of under-developed countries on the other, represented a clear danger to the pursuit of normal economic relations.

54. The United Nations must solve that problem by providing under-developed countries with assistance in the spirit of the Charter, in other words, the kind of assistance which would help to strengthen the independence of those nations.

55. It would be absurd to speak of economic and political collaboration with respect for the rights of all countries, if the basic premise was that the economies of under-developed countries should only complement the economies of the more developed countries. What should be sought was an increase in the well-being and strength of each country, the maximum development of its productive powers and the strengthening of its autonomy.

56. That was one of the most important questions before the United Nations, although it was among those in which United Nations action had been particularly ineffective.

57. It was true that by its resolution 200 (III) of 4 December 1948 the General Assembly had decided to provide technical assistance to under-developed countries, and that measures were being taken to make the assistance available through the United Nations and its specialized agencies. That might be a useful step. The under-developed country which received that assistance, however, had to have the means necessary to profit by it. It should be noted that the current situation was favourable to a rapid economic development of under-developed countries. The best solution of the problem would be one which permitted under-developed countries to rely on the United Nations for economic assistance. Any measure to that end would be a great step towards strengthening the independence of many countries, and thereby towards strengthening peace.

58. Yugoslavia's attitude on all those questions was well known owing to the position it had taken since the inception of the United Nations. Eighteen months previously, however, it had been faced with the new problem of defending its independence and sovereignty. A difference had arisen between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

59. As an instance of discrepancies between words and acts, Mr. Kardelj dwelt on the anti-democratic agitation instigated by the Government of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia, which had lately aroused world public opinion.

60. That agitation showed that the USSR Government was not always the champion of the world's current aspirations to democracy and peace. Yugoslavia appreciated certain positive and progressive stands taken by that Government in favour of peace and encouraging pacific co-operation between nations, and supported them. There was, however, a radical difference between the words and the deeds of the Government of the Soviet Union. That was particularly obvious in its relations with Yugoslavia.

61. It was impossible to talk about non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States while occupying a position such as that taken by the USSR towards Yugoslavia, an independent State. It was not possible to speak of peace and, at the same time, utter the threats which the Soviet Union had uttered against Yugoslavia.

62. That was the more significant since the USSR must be as well aware as any other country that Yugoslavia was not backed by any bloc of Powers and had not entered into any secret treaties or military alliances with any Powers hostile to it. That was probably why it thought it could employ, in regard to Yugoslavia, methods of diplomacy hitherto unknown in history and which moreover could not be considered as creditable to the country practising them.

63. The peoples of Yugoslavia who, by their own efforts and great sacrifices during the Second World War, had achieved their national and social freedom, wished to organize the socialist life of their country in their own way. They were convinced that by so doing they were serving not only their own interests, but also those of peace and of human progress. They were convinced that, in taking such an attitude, they were showing respect for the historic past and culture of other nations and for their right to live and develop on their own lines, thus bringing their individual contribution to the common cause of human progress.

64. As was always the case in similar historical circumstances, there had been an attempt to cloak the true ideological and material nature of the dispute. In order to establish a hegemony over Yugoslavia, every form of pressure, backed by a campaign of lies and under unparalleled in history, had been brought to bear on it. Organized economic pressure had all but brought about a complete economic blockade of Yugoslavia by eastern European countries. An attempt was being made to terrorize people with weak nerves by means of notes which were of inordinate length and which were not in accordance with diplomatic practice. That was accompanied by countless frontier incidents and by troop movements amounting to military demonstrations.

65. It would suffice to say that, from 1 July 1948 to 1 September 1949, 219 frontier incidents involving the use of arms had been provoked by Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. There had also been 69 violations of the Yugoslav air space. Moreover, the Greek democratic army command was being used for political slander of Yugoslavia although not long before Yugoslavia

had been blamed for its sympathies with that movement. A considerable section of the Press and broadcasting stations throughout the world had been mobilized to spread base calumnies against Yugoslavia and to insult it.

66. Furthermore, provocative trials, such as the Rajk case in Hungary, had been instituted. Those trials would take a major place in the history of international provocation, if only by reason of the Machiavellian ingenuity of the accusations against Yugoslavia. Brazenly, without the least concern for verisimilitude or any attempt to disguise self-evident contradictions, such calumnies had been hurled at Yugoslavia in the course of the trial that the moral outlook of those who could stage such sinister farces must raise a shudder. Yet those same people must needs try to demonstrate that Yugoslavia was an aggressive country, bent, it appeared, on launching an armed attack against all the eastern European countries. That was necessary in order to justify the brutal pressure on Yugoslavia.

67. Despite the fact that world public opinion had been engaged by those problems for many months, Mr. Vyshinsky had not said a word about them. The Yugoslav delegation, however, felt that those facts could not be passed over in silence, because it was not in fact merely a question of an ideological conflict, but of a desire for hegemony to be exercised over Yugoslavia, an independent country which was threatening no one, which was busied in building its own socialist economy and therefore had no other desire but peace.

68. In their struggle for independence and for the principle of equality of rights in international relations, the peoples of Yugoslavia were defending the right of every nation to the free development of its creative forces, in other words, the establishment of conditions essential to human progress. They were not guided by narrow nationalist considerations, by an absurd claim to a life independent of the remainder of the human race. They were aware of the fact that progress demanded an ever increasing development of the creative energies of nations and that such a development could be achieved only if it were protected from every form of foreign domination and every form of external pressure.

69. Mr. Vyshinsky had strongly denounced in his speech (226th meeting) both the policy of warmongering and recourse to the threat of war. He had emphasized that the USSR Government heartily supported the principle of the equality of rights as between States. He had submitted to the General Assembly proposals emphasizing his Government's wish that all disputes should be settled by peaceful means. The Yugoslav delegation must state that the Government of the Soviet Union should put its principles into practice, especially where it was easiest, namely, towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, a country which belonged to no bloc, which was no threat to anyone and was geographically close to the USSR.

70. That was all the more appropriate since Mr. Vyshinsky had declared that the USSR wished to collaborate peaceably and on equal terms with every country ready to adopt a similar attitude and since that was exactly the kind of collaboration which Yugoslavia desired and was always prepared to provide.

71. In conclusion, Mr. Kardelj returned to the proposals submitted to the General Assembly by Mr. Vyshinsky. The Yugoslav delegation was favourable, in principle, to the conclusion of a pact for strengthening peace. It considered, however, that such a pact could be useful only if it were open for accession to all countries, since all nations, whether great or small, had an equal interest in peace.

72. Yugoslavia did not overlook the importance of the part which the great Powers played in the welfare of mankind, particularly with regard to the maintenance of peace. It felt, however, that the collaboration on equal terms of the smaller countries in all efforts for peace was essential in order that such peace should not be confined merely to the great Powers but that it should also exist between the great and smaller Powers, that it should be a democratic peace, a peace of nations with equality of rights, a peace for all, not merely for those with force at their disposal.

73. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) congratulated the President on his election. There was a general hope among the President's many friends that the United Nations might, under his leadership, set a landmark in the all important effort for the strengthening of peace.

74. Mr. Malik wished to indicate in general but precise terms the views of his delegation on those items on the agenda in which it was particularly interested.

75. The Greek question had again come up for consideration by the Assembly. Ever since the dawn of history, Lebanon had had intimate and fruitful relations with Greece. In recent years, it had endeavoured to re-establish a community of interest and intercourse with the brave Greek people; while Greece had still been under German occupation, the free Greeks had held a decisive conference in Lebanon. The delegation of Lebanon would support every measure designed to strengthen Greece against any danger from the north and to restore to the Greek people their inalienable right to unity and security.

76. The struggle of the Indonesian people for freedom and independence had naturally elicited much sympathy in Lebanon. It was generally hoped that the conference which was being held at The Hague would culminate in the final solution of that problem, and that another free Asian republic might soon be welcomed into the family of nations. The Lebanese delegation therefore hoped that the natural rights of the Indonesian people would be satisfied by mutual consent in such a manner that the Indonesian question could be struck off the agenda.

77. The Lebanese position on the question of the former Italian colonies was the same as it had been at the third session of the Assembly. Lebanon desired that these territories should, in accordance with the wishes of their inhabitants, attain full self-government as soon as possible. With regard to Libya in particular, the Lebanese delegation was glad to note a general acceptance of the principle of granting unity and speedy independence. However, the mere political solution of that problem was not enough; Lebanon would also press for the inclusion of the former Italian colonies in any scheme of economic development under the United Nations. Political independence was a great blessing, but it would not

last where there was no sound economic organization having as its constant aim the raising of the standard of living of the people.

78. Mr. Malik did not wish to commit himself in advance to any judgment as to whether the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian Governments had or had not violated fundamental human rights in their respective countries. Indeed, he would be very happy if, as a result of the examination of the question; it became evident that no such violation had been committed. He emphasized, however, that the inclusion of that item in the agenda was a very significant fact, inasmuch as it constituted an historic precedent as far as the safeguarding of human rights was concerned.

79. The United Nations was bound by its own Charter to promote the universal and effective observance of human rights. Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the individual, as far as his fundamental human rights were concerned, had been exclusively the subject of his Government. But since the adoption of the Charter, the individual had also become the concern of the United Nations in that important domain. One important way of implementing that principle, which was fully embodied in the Charter and which had received further concrete expression in the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was for the United Nations to concern itself with any alleged specific violations of human rights. The tremendous significance of the item on the agenda was that the sovereign State was no longer the sole and final judge in the treatment of its citizens in the field of human rights; it was subject to the vigilance and to the moral judgment, at least, of the organized community of nations.

80. The Palestine refugees had been heartened when they had heard Mr. Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States, declare at the 222nd meeting that, as an interim measure, the General Assembly should make the necessary provision for the maintenance of those refugees until the time when they could again become self-sustaining members of the Near Eastern communities. The Lebanese delegation would place its full knowledge of the tragic problem of Palestine refugees at the disposal of the General Assembly when the matter came up for debate and decision.

81. While continuing the temporary relief measures, it was imperative for the General Assembly to take effective measures to apply the principles it had formerly affirmed. The problem of the refugees was much more than a humanitarian problem; it could not be adequately settled by measures of relief alone. The ultimate fate of one million human beings should not remain indefinitely undecided; the dignity and self-respect of those men and women could not be preserved or regained by precarious international charity.

82. The General Assembly had already committed itself, in its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, to the principles on which the permanent settlement of the problem must be based; namely, repatriation for those refugees who desired to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours, and compensation for those who chose not to return. There was also the implicit obligation that the General Assembly would guarantee to those who returned to their homes full observance of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.



83. But those principles had not so far been put into effect. It was therefore incumbent upon the General Assembly, at the current session, not only to reaffirm those principles, but also to give them concrete content and shape, and to set up adequate machinery for their implementation. To divert attention from those principles would serve only to prolong the agony of the refugees and to intensify the tension and potential struggle in the Near East. It would also bring about a serious deterioration in the social and psychological situation in that area.

84. The Lebanese Government's deep concern for the Palestine refugees did not blind it to the situation of other refugees in other parts of the world. The International Refugee Organization was to be dissolved in 1950. Mr. Malik recalled that he had taken part, both in the Economic and Social Council and in the Third Committee, during the second part of the first session, in the elaboration of the constitution of the International Refugee Organization. The Lebanese delegation believed that some organ capable of taking full care of the needs of refugees, and especially of the children among them, should be set up at the current session of the Assembly to replace the International Refugee Organization.

85. Mr. Malik then turned to the question of Jerusalem. The task facing the Assembly in regard to Jerusalem was to give effect to General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III) of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948. Both those resolutions called for the establishment of an international régime for Jerusalem and the surrounding area.

86. The current session offered what might be the last occasion to remove Jerusalem permanently from the danger of further damage or destruction, and to satisfy the deep desire of the Christian world, as expressed repeatedly in recent months by the Pope and many other Catholic spokesmen, as well as by the spiritual leaders of other denominations, for a truly international régime for the Holy City. It was also a unique occasion because, for the first time in history, the Moslem world was freely offering to share the custodianship of one of its most sacred places with the other great world religions. If at that historic moment the western Christian world were to allow itself to be overwhelmed by political considerations and, therefore, to falter in its determination to place Jerusalem above the struggle of Jew and Arab, history would one day reveal a tragic bankruptcy in Christian statesmanship. Jerusalem belonged to the whole world, not only to those who lived there. The Assembly would fail in its duty towards the international community if it did not grasp the opportunity to put into effect a régime in which the rights and interests of Christians, Moslems and Jews were made effective.

87. The past year had witnessed a war in Palestine in which Jerusalem itself had not been spared. The "City of Peace" was currently occupied by the forces of two sovereign States which only recently had been at war and which might perhaps be at war again in the near or distant future. Unless the entire city of Jerusalem with its surrounding areas were removed completely and permanently from the jurisdiction of

that it would not again be damaged and perhaps altogether destroyed.

88. Any plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem must fulfil the following conditions: it must eliminate the possibility that the area might again become a battleground; it must assure the protection of, and liberty of access to, all Holy Places and religious sites, buildings and institutions; and it must allow and make possible the restoration of private property and public trusts to their rightful owners in accordance with conditions prevailing before the termination of the British Mandate.

89. In order to fulfil those conditions, the elimination of sovereign authority wielded within Jerusalem by specific States was essential. In its place, the international community must exercise full, unrestricted, and inalienable sovereignty and authority. Any plan which concerned itself only with the internationalization of specific sites within Jerusalem was inconsistent both with the intentions of the Assembly as expressed in previous resolutions and with the wishes and interests of the three world religions. There could be no safety or security for the Holy Places within Jerusalem unless the whole city were removed from the sovereignty of either party currently occupying it.

90. The Lebanese Government's attitude to the plan presented by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/973) was governed by the extent to which that plan fulfilled those conditions. In so far as the plan was vague on the questions of the restoration of property in Jerusalem and the surrounding area to its rightful owners, and the degree of authority to be exercised by the Arabs and the Jews within their respective zones, it required further clarification and precision. The Lebanese Government would, however, be willing to take it as a basis for discussion and consideration.

91. The Conciliation Commission had held a long session in Lausanne. The French, Turkish and United States members of the Commission deserved sincere congratulations for the tact, patience and detachment with which they had carried out their difficult task. The delegation of Lebanon had played an active and constructive role at the Lausanne conversations. At a certain stage in those conversations, the Arab and Israeli delegations had agreed—it was, perhaps, the first agreement between them—to a certain definite basis for any further useful continuance of the Lausanne discussions. Certain presuppositions had been agreed upon as forming the basis for further discussion through the good offices of the Conciliation Commission. That procedural agreement, bordering also on the substance of the issue, had been one of the most important events in the recent development of the Palestine question. The Israeli delegation had later shown itself disinclined to abide by that agreement. If the Israeli representatives were to declare themselves prepared to honour in good faith what they had accepted four and a half months previously, there would be a new significant spurt of hopeful activity in the Conciliation Commission's work.

92. Since the third session of the General Assembly, three developments had occurred which had cast new gleams of hope into the hearts of

peoples of the Middle East. The first was the announcement by the President of the United States of his bold new programme for the development of the less developed areas of the world. Mr. Truman, in many of his subsequent statements, had expressly referred to the Middle East as one of the regions he had had in mind in connexion with point four of his inaugural address. Other United States leaders had also, in formal statements, associated the Middle East, among other regions, with the President's programme. It was a principle as old as Aristotle that potentiality must depend on actuality for its own realization; what was possible could not, by itself, realize itself. Consequently, when vast areas of the world, with immense human and material resources, heard the voice of a great country such as the United States proclaim its determination to help in their development, without imperialistic motives, the peoples of those regions had every right to be heartened. A new era might thus be beginning, an era in which increasing numbers of less developed peoples—whose lack of development was partly their own fault, partly the fault of certain historical contingencies, but in no event the unalterable imposition of doom—would be creatively swept into the historical orbit of responsibility and participation. The potential significance of President Truman's idea could not be over-emphasized.

93. The second hopeful event had been the elaboration by the Economic and Social Council of a plan (A/983) for the organization and financing of an expanded co-operative programme of technical assistance for economic development to be carried out by the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

94. During the four years of almost continuous consideration of the question by the Economic and Social Council, the delegation of Lebanon had played a very important role in the clarification of the purposes and principles of economic development. In fact, its contribution in that field could be regarded as second only to its contribution in the field of human rights. It was the Lebanese delegation which had sponsored and defended, against much discouraging scepticism, the first resolution adopted by the Assembly on technical assistance to under-developed countries, namely, resolution 52 (I) of 14 December 1946.

95. While the plan presented to the Assembly by the Council was not, in Mr. Malik's view, on a sufficiently large scale and lacked the boldness which the vast problem of under-development required, it was nevertheless an important step towards the practical realization of United Nations objectives in that important field. However, economic development required capital investment; without it, the productivity of the under-developed countries could not be increased and their standards of living could not be raised. No amount of technical assistance would bring about economic development if capital resources were not available for investment in productive undertakings in the under-developed countries. The United Nations had not yet fully faced the problem of the enormous gap between the capital resources of the industrialized countries on the one hand and of the under-developed countries on the other. As long as that gap existed, and as long as the flow of capital from the advanced to the under-developed countries was not properly

organized, economic development would be governed by the slow evolution of economic processes, with no prospect of any appreciable rise in standards of living for decades and even centuries to come. The Lebanese delegations would pursue its policy of emphasizing that not only in technical assistance, but also in the actual financing of schemes of development, the United Nations must play an original, active and constructive role for the promotion of one of the main purposes of the Charter, that of higher standards of living for all peoples.

96. Another important development was the establishment of the Economic Survey Mission headed by Mr. Gordon Clapp of the Tennessee Valley Authority. There again, the statement by President Truman which accompanied the setting up of the Mission had been encouraging. It appeared that the United States was going to lend both its moral and material support to the conclusions of that Mission, conclusions which, it had been asserted again and again by responsible authorities, would endeavour to steer as clear of politics as possible. The Assembly would have occasion later in the session to examine and pass on the recommendations of the Mission. Every scheme that that eminent American would devise to help the countries of the Middle East face and solve their ultimate social and economic problems would be most carefully and sympathetically examined by the Lebanese delegation.

97. The Arab world had a positive approach to those problems. It did not want to be isolated from responsible currents of opinion and action. The presence of genuine good will in many quarters was fully recognized. But the Arab States did require, and rightly, that no scheme, no matter how alluring, should be offered to them at a political price. It was one thing to attack economic and social problems on their own merits, without preconceived ideas and in a spirit of detachment, in the hope that once they began to yield to expert treatment, a favourable psychological climate would be created for tackling the formidable outstanding political issues. But it was an entirely different thing to proceed on the assumption that the economic and social approach could be substituted for the political, or that the basic political rights of the Arabs could be bought off by economic expedients. The Economic Survey Mission would make an historic contribution of the first magnitude to the cause of peace, progress and concord in the Middle East, and the injustice done to the Arab people would be partially redressed, if the former of those two approaches were strictly, understandingly and farsightedly adhered to.

98. The implementation of immediate and long-range schemes of economic development throughout the Middle East was undoubtedly one of the conditions of permanent peace in that part of the world. But economic development alone was not enough. Two other fundamental conditions were necessary for real peace. Those conditions were possible of attainment if only all the Powers concerned could come together and concentrate on their problems. Those problems would be perfectly manageable if they were not constantly put in the background by other more important matters.

99. Apart from economic development, the sense of deep injustice which rankled in the people's

hearts had to be removed. When that sense found expression in literature, poetry, folksongs and tales of horror handed down from parents to children, and when the situation was viewed as a world conspiracy between the great Powers and the Jews against the Arabs, the problem was clearly a very difficult one. Something had to be done to restore the balance of justice in the minds of the people affected and to convince them that the whole world was not against them. Mere economics, no matter how brilliant, would not restore the sense of justice, nor would prosperity alone remove a deep sense of loneliness.

100. The second condition was the removal of the deep sense of fear. Nothing was more obvious than that Israel, left to itself and to the dynamic forces it had set in motion, would tend to expand and to dominate the Arab world. It could be extensively shown that that was precisely the desire of Israeli visionaries. The great Powers might well wash their hands and tell the Arabs that they must agree with the Israelis, that that was their problem, that they would not interfere. But the whole affair, from beginning to end, had been one long series of interferences. To interfere up to a certain point and then, at the crucial moment, to withdraw, was in itself a most cynical form of interference. Peace could not endure in the Near East in the absence of effective international guarantees against aggression. It was the responsibility of the great Powers, with their vast and vital interests in that part of the world, to provide the necessary and sufficient external political conditions which would make lasting peace possible.

101. But all those issues really belonged to the periphery of the contemporary world situation. The heart of the matter was the great ideological conflict. A world that had amazingly shrunk was endeavouring to house at the same time two radically contradictory conceptions of reality. There was no agreement whatsoever, not even a distant hope of agreement, with regard to the ultimate categories. Man, matter, the individual, the soul, government, democracy, history, truth, God—all those ultimate things had utterly different meanings as between the East and the West. There were only three possibilities. The radical conflict would persist; or a reconciliation would be effected; or the difference of ideologies would break out into armed conflict. It was the function of the United Nations to promote the second possibility or at least to prevent the third.

102. Reconciliation was impossible without genuine interaction, meeting, debate, humility of spirit, openness of mind, belief in reason and objective truth, and a certain sense of humour. But one side in the existing ideological conflict had hermetically sealed itself from every outside influence, physical or intellectual. There was thus no genuine interaction, no real meeting ground, and the necessary objective conditions for the modification of fundamental positions were therefore lacking. True, the General Assembly was a meeting ground; but did one system really confront the other there, was it really challenged by the other, was there a genuine interpenetration between the two orders? It was hardly possible to assert that that was the case.

103. It was inevitable that, so long as one side was completely closed to the outside world, both in space and in time—and in a sense the self-

closure against history and tradition was the most grievous—the great ideological conflict could not be resolved. That meant that, in a crowded world, peace was precarious. Unless something happened to alter that whole situation and to render possible real communication between the two opposing concepts, the despairing feeling would remain that the world was, for the most part, at grips with shadows and not realities.

104. Mr. TSALDARIS (Greece) stated that Greece had come to the fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations with the confidence which it had always placed in that body as an instrument of understanding and good will among peoples. The task facing the Assembly was a heavy one, and the Greek delegation would not fail to join in the common effort of studying and solving the international problems enumerated in the agenda. The Greek delegation believed, indeed, that the work to be accomplished by the fourth session of the General Assembly would strengthen the structure of international peace, which was the common concern of all.

105. Greece attached particular importance to the work of the United Nations in respect of the world's economic and social problems. The economic development and the social progress of humanity and of each Member nation, in particular, were among the cornerstones of the United Nations and as such were given the utmost attention by the Greek Government. Greece was therefore eager to co-operate with fellow Members of the United Nations in the common effort to shape a new and universal policy capable of meeting the economic and social needs of mankind.

106. In addition, however, the Greek people faced other extremely grave problems. Without dwelling upon the price the Greek people had paid in defence of freedom and justice, Mr. Tsaldaris, speaking on behalf of the innumerable innocent victims of unjust aggression against his country, stated that those foreign attacks upon Greece must not be permitted to be launched again.

107. The delegation of Greece had listened with special attention to the references of preceding speakers to the threat to peace in the Balkans. It deeply appreciated and emphatically endorsed the insistence of the Member nations that the purposes and principles of the Charter and the recommendations of the Assembly must not be flouted with impunity. It agreed that the Assembly and the Members of the United Nations had an interest, an interest as direct as that of Greece, in seeing that armed attacks upon Members of the United Nations were stopped. It agreed that its northern neighbours should realize that their own self-interest demanded that they should support every effort to ensure respect for the independence of small as well as large nations.

108. The Balkan situation had entered upon a new phase. Within Greece, more and more of the people who had been lured into taking up arms against their Government had learned that they were being used as tools to destroy their country and endanger their own welfare. The virtual elimination of guerrilla bands from within its borders permitted Greece to go forward with carefully prepared plans of human rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. The success of Greece in defending its national integrity was a fact which was heartening to every other country

marked out for subjugation to Cominform dictation.

109. The real source of the threat to the peace in the Balkans had been unmasked. The agents used in the attacks against Greece had fled to Albania and, to a lesser degree, Bulgaria. The forces that had been launched against Greece were once more physically under the control of the Cominform. What would it do? Would the Governments of those countries be permitted to fulfil their international obligation to disarm those forces or would they be instructed to use them further to attack Greece?

110. In that respect the political and military leadership in Greece continued to be faced with a dilemma that could be solved only with United Nations support.

111. When the guerrillas, under the cover of Albanian fire, had retreated into Albania, Greece, under international law, had had every right to pursue them. The Greek Government, mindful of the explosive situation existing in the Balkans and resolved to co-operate towards a peaceful solution of the problems of the Balkan peoples, had ordered its armies to stop at the borders.

112. The purpose of the Charter was to ensure that any threat to the security of any Member would be resisted by collective action under the authority of the Security Council. Unfortunately, abuse of the principle of great Power unanimity in that body had so far dashed the hopes of the authors of that basic document. Fortunately, Article 51 pointed the way towards collective defensive action until the Security Council could itself employ effective enforcement measures.

113. In other areas where peace had been threatened, Members of the United Nations had established means of ensuring collective action to support the pacific purposes of the Charter. Reference had been made before the General Assembly to the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and the North Atlantic Treaty. If the efforts to make the Security Council effective continued to be frustrated, it was inevitable that similar conventions to ensure collective action in defence of the integrity of the Members of the United Nations would be developed. Eventually it was to be hoped that all such conventions would become unnecessary through self-imposed or agreed limitations on the use of the veto, which would enable the Security Council to exercise the responsibilities entrusted primarily to it under the Charter. In the meantime, Greece was confident that if peace in the Balkans were further jeopardized, means would be found, in accordance with the Charter, to support the efforts of the countries there defending their independence.

114. The facts were set forth clearly and succinctly in the reports of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. The established facts demonstrated the hollowness of the protestations dictated by the Cominform. The Assembly was not unaware of the abuse being levelled at other Members of the United Nations, similar to the propaganda against Greece. The problem had never been only a Greek problem. It was, however, clearer than ever before that it concerned the rights of peoples everywhere, particularly in the Balkans, to continue to be loyal to their own God, their own country and their own ideals of human dignity and honour.

115. Greece sought no vengeance for the destruction and misery brought upon it. The people of Greece wanted peace, the return of their children, the rehabilitation of their fellow citizens, the chance to perform constructive work. The Greek army, while it remained along the border of Greece, was a defensive army which was there to help guarantee international peace. In the future, as in the past, Greece would maintain its policy of respecting the principle of pacific settlement of all disputes, as Members of the United Nations had agreed to do. Greece would defend itself when attacked, but Greece would not attack.

116. Mr. Tsaldaris stated that the Greek people and their Government wished to stress once more their desire to co-operate in every way in the work of the United Nations. Their confidence in their own will to survive, and in the support of the United Nations and the Members which upheld the principles of the Charter, had not been misplaced. The Government and people of Greece believed that the Assembly would take every measure it could to ensure effective collective action to prevent a continuance of their sufferings. They joined the vast majority of the peoples and Governments represented at the Assembly in recognizing the importance of maintaining and enhancing the moral prestige of the United Nations, and were convinced that the peoples of the countries whose rulers had flouted the recommendations of the Assembly would increasingly insist that their Governments should comply with the duties entailed by membership in the United Nations.

117. Provided united defensive action was taken and friendship offered to all who chose to live in friendship, the principles of freedom, justice and well being would be preserved and restored in the Balkans and fostered throughout the world.

118. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) remarked that all speakers in the opening general debate were emphasizing—and rightly so—the vital role of the United Nations in upholding and ensuring peace. The vital question was whether the United Nations was fulfilling that role, and whether it was being given a chance to do it. The answer was indicated by the fact that, five years after the end of the war, even the formal processes of peace-making had not yet been completed. Yet even had they been completed, there would be no assurance in the prevailing international atmosphere—a compound of suspicion and fear—that the United Nations could convert a technical peace settlement into something that would be more than the absence of armed conflict. The major problems of the post-war period remained unsettled, and the conditions that would make possible their solution did not seem to exist. It was with increasing concern, therefore, that the peoples of the world regarded those unsolved problems and watched the United Nations Assembly in its efforts to make a contribution to their solution.

119. It was necessary at the outset to make a careful re-appraisal of the policies, activities and procedures of the world Organization, and to ask what, in the circumstances, the United Nations might reasonably be expected to accomplish.

120. The Canadian Government had tried to make practicability the touchstone of its attitude towards the United Nations. Where it saw any

real promise that a proposed course of action would contribute effectively to the solution of any particular problem, it was prepared to give it full support. On the other hand, it wished to avoid giving to the United Nations tasks that, in the light of the limitations under which it was suffering, and which must some day be removed, it was clearly unable to perform. It wished to be certain that, before any course of action was initiated, there was a reasonable expectation that it could be carried through to a good conclusion, and that the Members of the United Nations would support the Organization in that process.

121. Those were the principles which had guided the Canadian Government in determining more particularly the policy it should follow in the Security Council, where its first term of membership was about to end.

122. When it had accepted membership in the Security Council, the Canadian Government had been fully conscious of the great possibilities for good which the Council possessed. It had also known, however, that those possibilities would be largely nullified if the five permanent members were unable to work together on a basis of friendly co-operation and mutual concessions. Without such a basis, the veto would obviously be used to prevent political decisions being reached in the Council, and the Military Staff Committee would be unable to agree to put international force behind any decision, even if one were reached.

123. In spite of those handicaps, however, the majority of the members of the Security Council had tried to make it work as constructively as possible, and there had been some real successes.

124. As a consequence, the Council, although unfortunately still lacking the powers necessary to fulfil its primary function of maintaining peace and security, had worked out flexible and adaptable procedures which had often proved effective and which at least constituted a useful method of doing international business.

125. In the existing international political situation, what was surprising was not that the Security Council had done so little, but that it had done so much. In particular, very valuable experience had been gained, and some good results achieved, in the handling of three troublesome and dangerous questions: Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir. The Security Council had not solved any of those problems; it was clear that their ultimate solution must be worked out by the people who were directly responsible and whose daily lives were actually affected. The Council had nevertheless played an important role in preventing the outbreak of general war in all three areas. That had to be admitted even by those who were disappointed because the Council had not been able to take final and definite action in regard to any one of them.

126. The Canadian delegation hoped that, in carrying out its further responsibilities, the Council would be guided by certain principles of action which had emerged in the course of the preceding two or three years. Those principles, in default of an improvement in relations between the communist and democratic worlds, would seem to mark the limit that could be reached at that time.

127. The first was that the Security Council should not initiate action it could not complete

with its existing resources. The demand had often been made that the Security Council should intervene in some area or another with force, and that, when fighting occurred, the Security Council should take steps to halt it. There would be a great deal to recommend such intervention if it could be carried out firmly and quickly; but the fact was, of course, that the Security Council had at that time no effective way of imposing its will. In consequence, in many cases it could do little more in the last instance than call upon the parties engaged in the dispute to stop fighting and start talking, offering them the means by which they might work out a settlement by negotiation rather than by conflict. That was not a dramatic or spectacular method of procedure, but in the circumstances it had served well.

128. The second principle which, in the Canadian delegation's opinion, should guide the actions of the Security Council, was that the responsibility for solving a political problem should, to the greatest possible extent, be left with the people immediately affected by it. In respect of Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir, for instance, it was still the case that the parties directly concerned and the people living in the area must seek to determine the measures by which peace might be maintained there. That was not only the most practical principle of action; it also revived and strengthened a sense of responsibility at the point where it was most vital to healthy political life, and it set the objectives of an agreed rather than an imposed solution.

129. The third general principle was that the Security Council should in all cases immediately use its influence to put an end to hostilities or disorders whenever they occurred. By insisting on that principle, and by insisting equally that fighting should be stopped without prejudice to the ultimate political solution, the Security Council had been on strong ground. It had not, of course, been able to command complete obedience. Fighting had recurred even in areas where a firm truce had seemed to have been established, and it had not been possible to guarantee absolutely that the ultimate outcome of a dispute would not be affected by the military action which had taken place. In general, however, the primary concern of the Security Council, namely, that peace should be kept while negotiations proceeded, had been respected and had contributed materially to the progress made in the settlement of disputes. The moral authority of the Organization was no slight thing, and no State, great or small, lightly disregarded its decisions.

130. It was an encouragement to those who believed in the United Nations and hoped for its success to observe the practical results of the application of the principles outlined. It was encouraging also to have found that, as demands had been made on the United Nations, people had come forward and offered their services, often in dangerous circumstances, in order to meet those demands. There was no greater evidence of the vitality of the United Nations and of the role which it might play in the world than the loyal service which it had been able to command from nationals of its own Members.

131. The task before the United Nations was great, and its responsibilities were likely to be steady and continuing rather than brief and episodic. For example, all three of the major subjects



which had preoccupied the Security Council during the previous two years were related to one great, general and continuing movement. That movement arose out of the transformation of the colonial relationship between European peoples and the peoples of other continents into a new partnership of free communities. A great tide was moving in the affairs of men; it called for radical and complicated adjustment in political relationships. It was not surprising that the process of adjustment was producing strains and tensions, and that there was some impatience for greater speed. But every day brought new evidence that the process begun many decades before was accelerating and that a completely new relationship was being established between the peoples of the Western world and what had once been called dependent areas. The United Nations was playing an important part in that process. That was one of the reasons why the world should be most grateful for the existence of the Organization.

132. At the 226th meeting, as on many other occasions, the leader of the USSR delegation had accused the democracies of imperialism. The fact was, of course, that imperialism of the old kind was a rapidly diminishing force and a dying doctrine. The real danger lay in the new imperialism of the post-war period. During that period only one State in the world had extended its borders and the area of its domination. That State had annexed 179,000 square miles of territory, and had included within its borders in the preceding ten years more than twenty-one million people. Backed by its armies, it had imposed satellite régimes on neighbouring States. It had used its great material power and resources to impose its economic control on the peoples under its influence. Its leaders had talked freely of liberation and of national sovereignty, but its agents abroad had never hesitated to proclaim their obedience to its control and their determination to serve its interests above the interests of their own Governments and their own peoples.

133. How could there be a feeling of peace and security when an alien Power insisted on imposing its domination over other nations and peoples? The free democracies did not for a moment dispute the right of any State to maintain its own social and economic order, together with its territorial integrity. But they rejected the new imperialism which used the subversive forces of international communism to destroy the national independence even of communist States which would not accept its interference and its dictates. It was that new imperialism which the world watched with so much concern, partly because of its aggressiveness, partly because of its inherent instability. There was already evidence that because of its own internal weaknesses and contradictions it would not survive. As that new imperialism changed, a most just and equitable relationship among the States which it affected might come about. Mr. Pearson hoped that the United Nations would be permitted to play a constructive role in that change, as it was doing in other areas where the old imperialism of earlier centuries was disappearing.

134. The leader of the USSR delegation had also made a strong plea for support of the United Nations. He had said that United Nations bodies in their existing form were most unsatisfactory, but his appeal for support and improvement of

those bodies would have been more impressive if the Government which he represented had not refused to play any part in the United Nations specialized agencies which had been established since the war. That boycott extended even to those agencies dealing with questions of health and welfare, food and agriculture, civil aviation and cultural relations. A Government which followed that negative and sterile policy should not lecture the rest of the world on support for the United Nations or on the virtues of international co-operation.

135. The representative of the Soviet Union had also argued at that time, and in more detail on other occasions, that the international control of weapons of mass destruction must not bring with it encroachment upon national sovereignty. Such an insistence would make effective control futile and meaningless. It would be small comfort, if and when the first super-atomic explosion took place, to know that while everything else had been lost, national sovereignty had been saved. If a State put formal sovereignty before peace and security, then its support for international control of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction was hypocritical and meaningless.

136. The leader of the USSR delegation had also made a vigorous attack on warmongering, something which was, of course, generally detested and which must be combated from whatever source it came, whether from a bellicose general or a Cominform agitator. But Mr. Vyshinsky had ignored completely one despicable form of that crime against peace, namely, incitement to civil war, the direct attempt of one Government to destroy the authority of the Government of some other State by fomenting civil war. He had also ignored that kind of warmongering, which, by State decree and direction, poisoned the minds of peoples against each other; which prostituted the education of children to the end of aggressive ideological warfare; the kind of warmongering which distorted and misrepresented history, science and even letters in the interest of national policy and which prevented international understanding and co-operation by spreading a blanket of fear, ignorance and isolation over the minds and bodies of its people.

137. The leader of the delegation of the Soviet Union had made a plea for peace and had said that his country remained faithful to the principles of international co-operation. He could be assured of Canada's devotion to those ideals, and if the Canadian Government was sceptical of their acceptance by some others, that scepticism could be easily removed when performance matched promise. Mr. Vyshinsky had quoted the head of his Government as having said that the USSR was for peace; but there had been other statements from that same source, meant not for foreign but for home consumption, which had preached the gospel of inevitable and bitter conflict. Which was the world to believe?

138. The smaller Powers knew, with a special feeling of dread, that there was no real peace in the world but fear and insecurity. They knew that there was a great menace to their free institutions, their security, their very lives in the aggressive and subversive force of international communism which had behind it all the resources of a great Power, the most heavily armed Power in the world, where every male inhabitant was dedicated

and trained to the military or other service of his Government from the cradle to the grave. When some States, knowing that there was at the moment no prospect of universal collective defence through the United Nations, attempted to remove or alleviate fear by banding together in a pact which would make possible at least some collective resistance against aggression, the attempt was branded as aggressive and contrary to the Charter. The repetition of that charge did not make it true, especially when it was made by those who had already worked out a whole network of treaties and alliances in eastern Europe, only a few of which had been registered with the United Nations.

139. If and when the United Nations could organize effective arrangements for defence against aggression on a universal basis, all other alternative and second-best arrangements would have to be scrapped. In spite of all obstacles, all efforts should be directed to that end. Until it had been achieved, however, collective force, on a narrower front, should be put behind the will for peace. The actions of the North Atlantic nations would be the best proof that their intentions were not aggressive. They were willing to accept that test; others would also be judged by their actions and not by their words.

140. That test could be applied, for instance, to the proposals submitted to the General Assembly by the delegation of the Soviet Union (226th meeting).

141. The first proposal, by singling out two Member States for condemnation as warmongers, was obviously intended for propaganda and not for peace.

142. The second laid down, as the condition for prohibition of atomic weapons, a system of adequate and rigid international control. The majority in the Assembly had already translated those words into express conditions which represented the requirements for effective control and prohibition. If the USSR accepted those conditions, progress could be made in that most vital matter. If it did not, then its proposal did not achieve anything except, once again, in the field of propaganda.

143. The third proposal was an appeal to the Members of the United Nations—and especially to the permanent members of the Security Council—to settle differences peacefully. That specific obligation had already been assumed by all Member States by acceptance of the Charter. Furthermore, the inclusion of the words “the mighty popular movement . . . for peace and against the warmongers”, which had a peculiar meaning in the communist lexicon, seemed to bring that proposal also into the field of propaganda.

144. If the practice of introducing proposals for propaganda purposes persisted, the Assembly would find it difficult to make that contribution to peace which was so ardently desired. In spite of all obstacles, however, the task must be everlastingly continued. Only by so doing could there be maintained, in the minds and hearts of all peoples, faith in the United Nations as the best—possibly the only—hope for the prevention of a war, which, if allowed to occur, would engulf and destroy all mankind.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Monday, 26 September 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).*

**General debate (conclusion): speeches by Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Mr. Padilla Nervo (Mexico), Mr. Manuilsky (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), Mr. Arce (Argentina), Mr. Henriquez Ureña (Dominican Republic), Mr. King (Liberia), Mr. Eban (Israel)**

1. Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom) recalled that in his speech to the General Assembly at the third session,<sup>1</sup> he had made it clear that the United Kingdom was disappointed with the progress of the United Nations. He felt that it might yet recover its original spirit, but he was bound to point out that the apparent incompatibility existing between the great Powers had made it impossible to find a satisfactory basis for a world peace structure. It was useless to nourish delusions; the facts must be faced.

2. The United Nations had been created to achieve universality. That had been the concep-

tion behind the League of Nations, but it had never been achieved. It had been confidently assumed that if the great Powers could, in spite of their widely differing economic systems, find a basis upon which they could co-operate, there would be a reasonable chance of succeeding in giving effect to that principle of universality. He had come to the current session with a slight hope that in the course of it the General Assembly might take a step forward in that direction. The speech the USSR representative had made at the 226th meeting, however, could scarcely be called encouraging or likely to help in the achievement of that objective. It must be remembered that unless there was a firm universal foundation based on understanding between the five great Powers, there was little chance of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the subordinate agencies proving effective.

3. Scarcely any problem which had been referred to the organs or to the subordinate agencies of the United Nations had been approached or dealt with in an objective way. The hopes of the United Nations had been given a grave set-back by Mr. Molotov's speech during the Assembly in 1946, in which he had described what he called

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, 144th plenary meeting.*