

to tell the five great Powers that they should relinquish that great and pregnant privilege—that was their business—but he did say that unless and until they relinquished that privilege there could never be an effective system of collective security.

71. He believed it would be generally admitted that what he had said was true. It was proved by the necessity of establishing, for purposes of self-defence, two separate and limited systems of collective security, one on the American continent and the other among the North Atlantic community. He had nothing to say against those thoroughly justifiable and non-aggressive agreements for self-defence. They were—most unhappily—essential in existing circumstances. They were indisputably justifiable if and as long as they met, as they did at that time, the following three conditions: first, that they did not represent any threat to any peace-loving State; secondly, that they constituted a real and not merely a verbal reinforcement of security for the parties thereto, for the smaller countries in the groups concerned as well as for the greater; thirdly—and that was of primary importance to a country such as New Zealand—that they were not regarded as an excuse for non-participation in more general action by the United Nations in the case of acts of aggression or threats to the peace which were not covered by the terms of the particular arrangements. But no one could possibly suggest that the peace of the world could in the long run be

maintained by such limited and partial arrangements. He agreed wholeheartedly with what the representative of the United States had said in his opening address (222nd meeting) namely, that the problem of peace was a universal problem which could be solved only on a universal basis.

72. In short, while the world had in the United Nations something very precious, something, indeed, that was worthy of all support, it did not have the one thing, the means of defeating aggression, which, in the long run, man must achieve or perish.

73. He believed that if the world had the good fortune to enjoy a long enough period of peace, the United Nations would prove itself able to preserve the peace; that, if it had sufficient time, it would find means to free itself of the shackles of the veto and to establish an effective organization of all peace-loving and liberty-loving nations determined to protect themselves, all for one and one for all, against any aggression. But did it have the time? No one knew. One thing, however, was clear: the problem was not only fundamental and vital, it was pressing and insistent, it was on the very door-step of the United Nations, it was in every home. Man must solve the problem—and solve it in time—or perish.

74. The PRESIDENT announced that the list of speakers for the general debate would be closed at 6 p.m.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 23 September 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

General debate (continued): speeches by Mr. Stikker (Netherlands), Mr. Viteri Lafronete (Ecuador), Mr. Schuman (France), Mr. Belaúnde (Peru)

1. Mr. STIKKER (Netherlands) spoke of the necessity, in the troubled modern era, for a Foreign Minister to spend a considerable part of his time away from his country, being called upon to attend in person one international conference after another. There had been truly revolutionary changes in the exercise of the function of Foreign Minister in the preceding decades. Early in the twentieth century, personal contact between Foreign Ministers had been a great exception. Meetings in which those responsible for the foreign policy of their country gathered in great numbers and at regular intervals had been totally unknown, as had been the frank discussion of matters of international interest which was at the moment taking place.

2. The plenipotentiaries of fifty-nine States were assembled at Flushing Meadow in order to settle together the many important items of a lengthy agenda; mankind was indeed witnessing a profound change in international practice. That change would be considered salutary in its effects, provided always that the deliberations of the Assembly were measured by the criteria of justice and international law. Decisions should not be based on political considerations either of a purely

national character or serving the interests of groups of States; if they were, then all the smaller and weaker nations would have to submit to pressure from larger and stronger Powers.

3. Even more than the League of Nations in former days, the United Nations, comprising fifty-nine countries, had become the forum of the world where the vital interests of those countries were discussed. It must not be forgotten that each of the Governments represented at the Assembly acted as the exponent of its people, large or small, and that the interests of those peoples were peace and security, freedom from want and from fear, all of which subjects figured prominently in the debates. Hence hundreds of millions were directly concerned with the results of the Assembly's work and it was thus the duty of its Members to accomplish their task as effectively as possible.

4. Unfortunately, the ideal of a universal body, comprising all nations, had not yet been achieved. The Netherlands delegation would welcome the attainment of universality and would favour the admission of countries which were at the moment barred by what it considered an excessive use of the veto. In particular, the Netherlands delegation would be gratified if all Members of the United Nations were to be guided by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which had declared that the refusal to admit new Members could not be based upon considerations other

than those stipulated in Article 4 of the Charter.¹ On the other hand, the Netherlands delegation favoured the strict observance of that Article and objected, as a matter of principle, to the admission of Members which could not be expected to accept the obligations contained in the Charter or to be able and willing to carry out those obligations. The price of the ideal of universality would be too high if the conditions provided in the Charter were to be sacrificed to it. For the time being, the ideal of universality could be realized only partly, for the reasons which Mr. Stikker had explained. Moreover, the work of the Organization was still impaired by lack of agreement between the great Powers, which prevented the nations from being truly united. Hence the improvement in the international situation between the previous session of the Assembly and the current one to which the President had referred in his inspiring opening speech (220th meeting), appeared to the Netherlands delegation to be highly encouraging.

5. The United Nations had undoubtedly contributed to that lessening of international tension, although it would be unrealistic to attribute that development exclusively to the Organization. The Netherlands delegation naturally shared the views of the Secretary-General regarding the importance of the United Nations, but care should be taken not to over-estimate the results which in the prevailing circumstances had and could be achieved by the Organization.

6. On page xii of the introduction to his Annual Report², the Secretary-General stated that the desire for independence of non-self-governing peoples and the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had "far more significance" and would "give rise to greater events in the second half of the twentieth century than will the present ideological struggle". That was both an over-statement and an under-statement. It was an over-statement of the part which the United Nations was able to play in promoting fundamental human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, it was an under-statement with respect to the paramount importance of the ideological struggle to which the Secretary-General referred.

7. The ideological struggle resulted from two diametrically opposed concepts of human rights and freedoms. According to one concept, man as an individual had but a secondary significance; the State dominated all aspects of his life. According to the other, it was the duty of the State to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of man. There could be no doubt but that those two concepts could not be reconciled. Mr. Stikker could not accept the belittling of that ideological struggle which had led the Secretary-General to advocate an approach to the East-West difficulties "with less hysteria". To his delegation such an expression would seem to be hardly suitable in view of the all too real significance of the fundamental divergence between East and West. In the Netherlands, personal freedom had been the avowed ideal for many centuries. That, combined with the fact that the great majority of the people adhered to the Christian faith, explained why the violation of human rights and religious freedom by certain Governments had created such a deep impression there.

8. Petitions had been addressed to the Netherlands Government, and in some instances also to the United Nations. The Netherlands Parliament had emphatically voiced that concern. No feeling was more extraneous to the people of the Netherlands than hysteria. It must be hoped that the activity of the United Nations, within the scope of its competence, might contribute to improve the situation in the countries concerned, but a note of warning should be sounded with regard both to the true importance of the problem and to the danger of over-estimating what the United Nations could really achieve.

9. A realistic appraisal of the lack of understanding between the Powers and of the resulting impediments from which the United Nations suffered fully explained why so many treaties for regional co-operation had been signed in the previous few years. It should be realized that nations living under the same fears were brought together and forced to co-operate in order to preserve their independence. Naturally such co-operation had a regional character. It was strange that such co-operation was often said to be directed against certain groups of countries; was it not logical for countries to unite in order to foster common interests and jointly to protect their freedom and security?

10. The Charter itself recognized the importance of common defence and regional co-operation in so many words, provided, as stipulated in Article 52, paragraph 1, they were "consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations". There could be no doubt whatsoever but that the co-operation of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg in Benelux, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, the Western Union, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Council of Europe were in complete accordance with the provisions of the Charter. None of the participating countries had any aggressive design. They desired peace—peace and the right to maintain their own character. Only an aggressor had anything to fear from them. Peace-loving nations could not but welcome that process.

11. The most recent event in that sphere was the meeting of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. In that case also there was no question of sinister designs against any country whatsoever nor of a tendency to disintegrate the United Nations or to underestimate the importance and the potentialities of the Organization. The activities of the two bodies were entirely compatible. The Council of Europe should be fully aware of what was already being done by the United Nations in the field of international co-operation. There was no reason, however, for the United Nations to consider the Council as a rival institution. On the contrary, if Europe, which was feeling its way towards the restoration of its economy, with the invaluable assistance of the Marshall Plan, succeeded in achieving a better integration, if it succeeded in reducing the still existing obstacles imposed by its frontiers, especially in the economic field, that could only be welcomed by the United Nations.

12. The experience gained by Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the course of their efforts towards the realization of Benelux had

¹ See *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4), Advisory Opinion*, I.C.J. Reports, 1948, page 57.

² See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 1*.

taught them the extent of the difficulties to be overcome—even between very friendly States—on the road towards economic integration. But those difficulties should be squarely faced. They were by no means insurmountable. Only steadfast belief in the usefulness and necessity of further integration would make it possible to overcome the difficulties. The efforts of western Europe in that field were in accordance with its historical development and with the large measure of solidarity of its component countries. Western Europe had a character and a spiritual heritage of its own, as well as a common historical task.

13. To enter into a consideration of all the items on the agenda would take too long and would be the reverse of a contribution to shortening the duration of the General Assembly. The length of its sessions had become, indeed, a matter of concern to many. The Assemblies of the League of Nations had lasted about three weeks, a period which had been rarely exceeded. The third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations had had to be prolonged after it had been working three months. The tendency of the General Assembly to remain more or less permanently in session was entirely contrary to the design of the United Nations; measures for a drastic shortening of the General Assembly were therefore absolutely necessary. The recommendations of the Special Committee on Methods and Procedures of the General Assembly had been studied by the Netherlands delegation with great attention; they deserved close consideration. In that connexion, it was above all the responsibility of Chairmen of Committees to see to it that discussions were kept strictly in order and not unnecessarily prolonged. The heavy task of the Chairman could perhaps be lightened if it were decided at the beginning of the discussions to establish a time limit for speakers.

14. Mr. Stikker wished, however, to devote a few remarks to three subjects, namely, Indonesia, technical assistance, and the problem of the Holy Places in Palestine. On the matter of Indonesia he would be brief. The Round Table Conference, uniting the representatives of the Governments of the Netherlands, the Federated States and the Republic of Indonesia, and of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, was meeting at The Hague, and the progress so far made justified the hope that the discussions would lead to a solution. The Netherlands Government did not deem it useful for the time being to go deeper into the matter. It would do everything in its power to attain harmonious and lasting co-operation between the two sovereign States, namely, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia, voluntarily united in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

15. With reference to technical assistance, the Netherlands Government wished to pay tribute to the Secretary-General and to the executive heads of the participating specialized agencies, who had done a great deal of preparatory work by drafting the comprehensive report on technical assistance for economic development¹.

16. The resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council on the subject had taken into account the need for co-ordination, the utilization

of the resources of the specialized agencies, and the importance attached to the collaboration of experts in general². They seemed to show the solutions to many problems involved in the execution of the project.

17. The Netherlands Government felt that the activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the field of technical assistance had given rise to fresh hope for effective co-operation which might lead to better living conditions for millions of people in under-developed territories and to a better understanding among the peoples of the world. The problem of the under-developed areas was a complex one. Mr. Stikker would not touch upon the economic and financial sides of the question, as the Netherlands would be unable, at least for the time being, to contribute much to that end. He did, however, wish to draw the attention of the Assembly to the vast possibilities and scope of the Netherlands universities and technical schools, which yearly turned out a number of well trained technicians. Many technicians were therefore available for work in countries which could profit by, for instance, their vast knowledge of tropical agriculture.

18. The Netherlands Government wished to make as large a contribution as possible to those programmes, by providing under-developed countries with the opportunity of having their experts trained in the Netherlands and by mobilizing Netherlands experts to serve on United Nations missions or to advise other Governments at their request.

19. Turning to the problem of the Holy Places in Palestine, Mr. Stikker said that his Government had learned with great satisfaction of the termination of strife in Israel, but that that satisfaction was somewhat diminished by its concern for the safeguarding of those places in the Holy Land which were symbols of the highest spiritual values. In view of the specific significance of the Holy Places for mankind, the Netherlands Government considered it of the greatest importance that measures should be taken to safeguard them. The Netherlands delegation was of the opinion that it could not be left only to the Governments concerned to devise a way to safeguard them; that, in its opinion, was a matter for permanent international supervision. The Netherlands delegation therefore hoped that adequate measures for protection and safeguarding would be agreed upon during the current session. If no such agreement were reached, internationalization of the City of Jerusalem and its surroundings would have to be seriously considered.

20. The state of the world was such that the future, even the near future, could not be viewed with undue confidence and optimism. The unrest in China, which was spreading alarmingly, was a matter of grave concern for many; it might well spread to other parts of Asia and sow the seeds of economic disruption and political disintegration. If the significance of that phenomenon were generally understood, it would be easier jointly to achieve protection against the increasing danger.

21. In the economic field also, extremely serious problems, mostly resulting from the war, still awaited solution. That fact had been demon-

¹ See *Technical Assistance for Economic Development*; United Nations Publications, Sales No. 1949.II.B.1.

² See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council*, Fourth Year, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 1, resolution 222 (IX).

strated by the monetary measures which had been adopted during the previous few days. In the cultural and social field there were phenomena in a number of countries which could not but disturb profoundly all those who had freedom and human dignity at heart. The fact that, notwithstanding all those problems and tensions, the disaster of war had been averted, could undoubtedly be ascribed, *inter alia*, to the existence of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the United Nations should not close its eyes to the dangers which still beset the world. In the last analysis, the frame of mind of its Members was the decisive factor. Even if the Organization were perfect, it would not be able to achieve anything if its Members did not observe its principles and purposes. Where good will prevailed, however, all organizational imperfections could be conquered.

22. The mentality of men, of statesmen, could not be changed by resolutions or rules of procedure. Mr. Stikker prayed that the Assembly would be endowed with the true spirit and sense of what was right and just.

23. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) pointed out that the General Assembly's fourth session was meeting ten years after the beginning of the Second World War, which had taken place mainly in order to prevent an aggressor State from setting itself up as a dictator of the world.

24. During that decade, mankind had lived through a difficult period of intense activity, which in normal times would have sufficed to fill long periods of history.

25. The end of the war, however, had not meant the establishment of complete peace. The end of a struggle was always followed by long periods of transition, in which the most serious and complex problems accumulated and multiplied. They required definite and decisive action on the part of States, Governments and individuals; both cautious patience and exemplary perseverance were needed in order to solve domestic problems as well as the international problems awaiting settlement in the erstwhile enemy countries and, above all, the problems between the victorious countries which had been the Allies of yesterday.

26. The countries which had participated directly in the war had reserved to themselves the right to establish the peace. Under the Charter drawn up at San Francisco, the United Nations had been given the task of maintaining international peace and security and achieving international co-operation in the solution of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems which were international in character.

27. The United Nations had done much towards the accomplishment of the mission entrusted to it. If an impartial observer were to analyse the seriousness of the problems which had led to the war—the problems which had appeared during the war and those which had arisen since—he could not but admit that never before had mankind been faced with problems so vast in scope.

28. That was why everyone should appreciate the amount of positive work accomplished by a nascent Organization which was developing wisely and cautiously in an atmosphere of suspicion and even opposition, and had been able with care and good judgment to overcome obstacles and

prevent disputes which might have turned into armed conflict.

29. It was true that there were some problems, especially in the political field, which it had not been possible to solve, or which had been solved only in part. Had it not been for the obstacles known to all, the rate of progress towards the solidarity of peoples could have been accelerated.

30. No one would maintain that the United Nations had done all it might have done, or that its work had been beyond reproach. It would be interesting, however, to pick out on a map of the world the places where the multiple and complex activities of the organs and services of the United Nations were being carried on. It would thus be seen in how many places the shedding of human blood was being prevented. The fact that five hundred million human beings had escaped the scourge of war would be appreciated, as would the influence of the United Nations in helping various countries to establish themselves as independent States. Mr. Viteri Lafronte drew attention to UNESCO's cultural and educational work; to the protection of the rights of the worker, and to the preparation of peoples as yet non-self-governing for early independence and sovereignty.

31. An objective view of that panorama would lead to the conclusion that the United Nations had done much in its four years of existence and that its work would surely continue to the benefit of all States.

32. After mentioning some of the items on the agenda of the current session of the Assembly, Mr. Viteri Lafronte stated that, according to its report¹, the International Law Commission had selected for immediate study three of twenty-five subjects originally considered as capable of codification. As one of those concerned domestic jurisdiction of States, the Ecuadorean delegation considered that it would be advisable for the Assembly to recommend that the Commission should consider the matter as soon as possible.

33. The question of domestic jurisdiction had been repeatedly invoked during the Assembly's discussions, in defence of various and at times contradictory theses, and the unfortunate last moment expansion of paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter at San Francisco and the differing interpretations placed upon it would justify the International Law Commission in giving that matter precedence.

34. The previous year the Ecuadorean delegation had submitted to the Interim Committee a draft resolution² to the effect that, when one of the parties to an international dispute claimed that the matter was one of domestic jurisdiction, the International Court of Justice should, at the request of the party, of the General Assembly or of the Security Council, give its opinion on whether the question was within domestic or international jurisdiction. That draft resolution was of supreme importance and it should be studied, and an opinion be given on it, by the International Law Commission or the International Court of Justice.

35. The delegation of Ecuador still believed that the United Nations should take advantage of the services of the International Court of Justice to the greatest possible extent, especially when the

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 10.

² See A/AC.18/63.

Court was not overburdened with work. Mr. Viteri Lafronze felt that an excellent step had been taken in requesting the Court to study the problem of reparation for injury suffered in the service of the United Nations.

36. Special mention should be made of the work of the Economic and Social Council, which was intimately related to that of the specialized agencies and the technical departments of the Secretariat. Those activities touched on all aspects of human life, and all the Members of the United Nations had had an opportunity to participate in the consideration of economic and social problems. The continuous work of the subsidiary bodies of the Council was an indication of the way in which countries, great and small, were presenting their real human problems and their suggestions for solution. Such economic and social activity enabled the peoples to come into direct contact with the United Nations and to gain faith in the Organization.

37. The report of the Economic and Social Council on the economic development of under-developed countries¹ showed how conscientiously the instructions given by the General Assembly in its resolution 200(III) of 4 December 1948 had been carried out. That report might well be one of the most important topics before the current session of the General Assembly. The programme of technical assistance called for in the aforesaid resolution had already been started and the Secretariat deserved praise for the rapid solution of difficult problems arising in connexion with that first experiment. Each of the specialized agencies constantly received requests from Governments for advice and guidance in the solution of certain problems.

38. Ecuador came to the Assembly with deep faith in international co-operation. An unexpected catastrophe which had destroyed large areas of the territory of Ecuador had shown that the brotherhood of the American peoples was a working reality and that true universal solidarity also existed. The agreements adopted by various organs of the United Nations, the action taken by the Secretary-General, and the rapidity with which the specialized agencies had provided assistance warranted Ecuador's deepest gratitude.

39. Mr. Viteri Lafronze stated in conclusion that the President of Ecuador had officially reiterated his faith and confidence in the United Nations, his intention that his country should carry out its duties under the Charter and its obligations as a Member, and his unshakable fidelity to democratic principles in domestic affairs and international policy.

40. Mr. SCHUMAN (France) said that general discussion was a form of self-examination in the course of which members of the Assembly reviewed the shortcomings and failures of the past, and affirmed their resolve to persevere in their efforts to achieve better results in future.

41. No one could deny that some progress had been made in the past year. The deliberations of the Assembly during the first part of its third session, held in Paris, had been long and laborious. A second part of that session had had to be held in order to complete the agenda. Certain problems had seemed insoluble and had threatened the United Nations with a deadlock.

42. Although complete and lasting solutions had not yet been reached, at least those solutions seemed possible. At times it had even been possible to draw nearer to the goal. That should console the members of the Assembly for the disappointing regularity with which the same questions reappeared at each of the Assembly's sessions. There was a distressing resemblance between successive agendas, and the old problems lost none of their urgency. That was true of the Balkan problem, which was before the Assembly for consideration for the third time.

43. In that connexion, the French delegation had always indicated, with the greatest precision, what it considered to be the extent of the competence of the United Nations. The domestic affairs of each country, as the Charter expressly laid down, were solely within its sovereign jurisdiction. If the United Nations had been called upon—and rightly so—to intervene in a domestic dispute which had for years been ravaging a noble and courageous country, it was because intervention by other countries had threatened, and still threatened, to endanger international peace and security.

44. It was clearer than ever that such was the case at that point, since operations in the interior of Greece had ceased and were concentrated in border areas, and since there was little likelihood of their being pursued or resumed unless the authorities in neighbouring countries continued to render, or permit, various kinds of assistance to the partisans.

45. Those were the conclusions contained in the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans². For the first time all uncertainty on that subject had been dispelled by the declaration of certain implicated Governments that they would henceforth close their frontiers and disarm the guerrillas who had taken refuge in their territory, thus admitting that their former attitude had been open to criticism.

46. The Assembly should take note of that and hope that the tragedy was about to come to an end. It was still necessary, however, that those declarations should be solemnly confirmed and that an international body should see that they were put into effect. The Greek people would then be able to devote themselves entirely to their serious domestic problems and carry on the work of political and economic reconstruction in a spirit of reconciliation and respect for democratic principles.

47. The Assembly's task in that field was not yet finished. It would have to combine authority and conciliation in order to secure the good will and co-operation of all the countries concerned.

48. While the Assembly was still attached to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States, whether Members of the Organization or not, it could not ignore the violation of the essential rights which it had solemnly recognized as belonging to all human beings. The Assembly owed it to itself and to public opinion in every country to raise its voice, particularly against certain police or pseudo-judicial methods which were incompatible with the guarantees which every defendant should be able to claim if justice were not to be a cynical parody. It had been hoped that the victory of the democracies

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 3, chapter II A.*

² See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 8.*

over Hitlerism would preserve the civilized world from such abuses. How could Governments responsible for such a state of affairs rightfully claim a place within the United Nations? In that connexion, Mr. Schuman recalled that other countries which scrupulously observed the principles of the Charter were prevented from joining the United Nations by the improper linking together of various applications for membership, each of which should be examined on its own merits.

49. When the United Nations had admitted the State of Israel it had thereby intended to facilitate the restoration of peace and a normal situation in the Near East. That hope had not been completely disappointed.

50. The situation in Palestine was dominated by two facts. The first was that hostilities had been suspended on all fronts since the signing of the armistice agreements. The truce imposed by the United Nations had given place to a contractual situation. That essential result was largely due to the persevering action and flexible authority of the Mediator and the Acting Mediator, to whom the Assembly should once again express the gratitude felt by all men.

51. The second fact was that, since the conclusion of the armistice agreements, no progress had been made towards a more lasting settlement. It had been hoped that, once completely established, the armistice régime would enable the parties to enter into direct negotiations that would lead to a final stabilization of the situation. By its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the General Assembly had established a Conciliation Commission to bring about those contacts and promote agreements. It was a cause for profound regret that the countries concerned had not so far achieved the desired *rapprochement* and that, on that account, the peace which was to replace the armistice was not yet within sight.

52. The representative of France did not doubt that the General Assembly would unanimously appeal both to the Arab countries and to Israel to abandon their passive attitude, in their own interests as well as in the interests of international peace.

53. Two concrete problems affecting the whole of mankind in its sentiments and in its beliefs required the particular attention of the Assembly.

54. One of those problems was that of the Arab refugees, for whom only measures for immediate relief had so far been taken. An Economic Survey Mission had been set up by the Conciliation Commission to investigate the possibilities of repatriation or resettlement. Its terms of reference seemed to have given rise to erroneous interpretations which explained, though they did not justify, the suspicious reserve of certain Governments. It was incumbent on the Assembly to remove those misunderstandings and to prepare the way for constructive humanitarian action.

55. The second problem was that of an international régime for Jerusalem. The principles on which such a régime should be based had been clearly defined in General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948. In the first place, the Assembly had decided that the Holy Places were to be protected and free access to them ensured in accordance with existing rights and historical practice, both in Jerusalem and in all the

other areas of Palestine. In the second place, a permanent international régime was to be established for the whole area of Jerusalem, a régime distinct from that of the other areas of Palestine and placed under effective United Nations control. That régime was to provide in particular for the demilitarization of the area and was to ensure maximum local autonomy for individual groups so far as autonomy was consistent with the special international régime.

56. It was on the basis of those decisions of principle that the Conciliation Commission had studied the problem and established the proposals which had been submitted to the Assembly (A/973). The French Government had considered them with great care and would state its attitude at the time of the detailed discussion. In examining those proposals it would be guided chiefly by its desire to respect and to put into practice the spirit of the aforementioned resolution, which constituted a formal and authoritative decision on the highest international level. But although the aims were clearly defined, the means were less so. In the opinion of the French Government, what was most important was that the solution should be viable and that it should therefore be designed less to satisfy juridical preferences than to guarantee the practical objectives which the United Nations had set before itself. It should also do no more than impose the various indispensable obligations which, moreover, should be reasonably acceptable to all the parties concerned.

57. The question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had been referred to the General Assembly for settlement by the nations signatories to the peace treaty with Italy.

58. After thorough discussion and, in particular, after hearing the points of view expressed by the representatives of certain groups considered to be representative of the peoples concerned, the First Committee, at the third session of the General Assembly, had proposed a resolution (A/873), which was due to the initiative of two Governments which all recognized as being essentially concerned, but which had not finally been adopted, since it had failed by a few votes to secure the required two-thirds majority for certain of its parts¹.

59. The question must be taken up again, with due regard to the facts already submitted and the trends of opinion revealed in the previous discussion.

60. The first point that seemed clear was the general desire to make independence under a democratic Government the final goal of the territories. That had been shown unmistakably in the draft resolution of the First Committee and had not been contested.

61. Another point that was equally evident was that the immediate and complete achievement of that independence was not compatible with the current political and economic development of the territories concerned. That fact had been emphasized by the Assembly when it had rejected by a very large majority a proposal submitted to it providing for such unconditional independence. It had rightly considered, as the Charter itself stated in Article 73, sub-paragraph (b), that it

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II*, 218th meeting.

was first necessary to develop self-government among those peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.

62. It was upon the consequences to be drawn from that second essential principle that agreement had so far failed to materialize. It had been impossible to reach agreement on the best methods to be adopted in order rapidly to prepare the peoples for independence. It had been thought—and France, for its part, considered that there was justification for the view—that the normal method in most cases should be that of trusteeship, in pursuance of the Charter itself. The proposals submitted in that respect had not been adopted. Other ways must be sought.

63. France was willing to participate in the search for them in all good faith and with complete objectivity. It would not, however, be able to associate itself with a solution which, based upon sentiments that were no doubt praiseworthy but somewhat unrealistic and insufficiently concerned with the grave responsibilities of the United Nations, would not take into account the need for a progressive instruction. It would not be in the interests either of the peoples concerned or of international peace to run the risk of disorder, anarchy and affliction. The wisdom of the United Nations required that it should define the stages by which those territories were to advance towards a freedom which was neither a snare nor a hazard.

64. The French Government also believed that due account must be taken of the services rendered by Italy in the past in the development of its colonies and that special account must be taken of these services which it would be likely to render in the future, if it were given the opportunity. Italy, which was unjustly excluded from the United Nations, had regained its position as a great democratic nation. It might still make a great contribution to the joint work of civilization, and the United Nations had no right to disregard it.

65. While some of the problems before the Assembly were thus on their way—or appeared to be on their way—to solution, others remained in an impasse and were liable so to remain for a long time unless there were a radical change in people's minds and in international relations.

66. That was particularly so in regard to the problem of disarmament and the related problem of the control of atomic energy. Due caution should be exercised against words and appearances, even if those appearances sometimes provided grounds for optimism and some evidence of an easing of the situation. So long as a real spirit of confidence failed to predominate in international relations, in other words, so long as the most serious questions had not been tackled or settled among all the parties concerned, particularly the question of the form of government for Germany and Japan and the relations between the West and the East, it would be useless to open once again in the Assembly inconclusive discussions which could only become involved in controversy and propaganda, emphasizing and increasing the weakness of the United Nations.

67. The French delegation remained profoundly convinced that the earnest expectations of the peo-

ples would not be ultimately disappointed, that the spirit of peace would prevail in the end, and that international law would eventually be consolidated and respected.

68. Meanwhile, the responsible Governments had the right and the duty to take, within the limits laid down by the Charter, any measures which might help to strengthen the security of their countries until collective security had become a reality, until the Security Council was able to act effectively as a result of understanding among the great Powers, and until an international army had been established. Until that time, Member States were justified in organizing legitimate individual and collective defence and in concluding regional agreements for the protection of their common interests.

69. It was in that spirit that the French Government, after having signed the Treaty of Brussels with four neighbouring friendly countries in 1948, had acceded in 1949 to the North Atlantic Treaty, which grouped together twelve States united by a common Christian civilization and by close political and economic interests. That treaty, like the preceding one, was exclusively defensive. It neither aimed at nor threatened any State. Strictly in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the United Nations Charter, its sole purpose was to consolidate security and to achieve that end by means of unequivocal mutual undertakings and the building up of the defences of peace-loving countries in an area of the world which had so often been sorely tried. The French representative expressed the hope that the day would soon come when such agreements would become unnecessary, because the active and trustful co-operation of all its Members would have enabled the United Nations to play the part and to avail itself of the means which the Charter had envisaged for it.

70. It was in altogether different circumstances that another agreement to which the French Government was a party had been concluded during the current year, 1949, namely, the agreement which set up the Council of Europe. That, again, was a regional organization. Its purpose, however, was not to reinforce security but to initiate a vast structural reform of the European continent. Its purpose was to create among the States members of the Council of Europe, by progressive development and democratic methods, political and economic ties of such a nature that the totality of those States would end by constituting a unity, which would eliminate exhausting national rivalries and help to facilitate the development of production and trade by adapting them to the conditions and means of the modern world. It would be too bold an anticipation at that stage to speak of a federation, although such a federation corresponded to the aspirations of a considerable part of public opinion. The object in view was the progressive, prudent and ambitious erection of a rational structure which would be a valuable factor of political stability and material progress. That enterprise, likewise, was not directed against anybody. For the time being, it extended to only one half of Europe, but remained open to all those who agreed to contribute to it in a spirit of good will and strict respect for democratic principles and the dignity of the human person.

71. Co-operation among the countries of Europe, the removal of the barriers preventing

the free movement of individuals, goods and capital, the development of the feeling of solidarity and a judicious distribution of tasks, would contribute to the solution of the difficulties created by a succession of wars. Such were the hopes fostered by the peoples of liberated Europe. It was to be hoped that they would become living realities for the greatest possible good of all the peoples concerned, and an encouraging example to others.

72. Germany was situated in the heart of Europe and the German problem was at the centre of the European problem.

73. Following the unconditional surrender of Germany, the fate of that country had been placed in the hands of the four principal Allied Powers. It was not necessary to recall the vicissitudes of that Four Power régime. There again, as elsewhere, the impossibility of reaching agreement had led to an impasse, and Germany was cut in two by the insurmountable barrier which separated the western occupation zones from the eastern zone.

74. The blockade of the western sectors of Berlin, with which the Security Council had had to deal, had expressed that antagonism in a dramatic form for almost a whole year. The representative of France was pleased to note that the situation had eased. As a result of the efforts made at the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in Paris after eighteen months of adjournment, a *modus vivendi* had been arrived at. But it had been impossible to achieve a general solution whereby the policy of the four occupying Powers could be harmonized.

75. In those circumstances, when there was no possibility for the time being of achieving a peace settlement, the western Powers had had to take the responsibility of reorganizing provisionally the part of Germany which was under their jurisdiction. A constitution had been drawn up by the authorized representatives of the peoples of the States of western Germany. Ratified by those States and approved by the occupation authorities, that constitution had come into force at the same time as a new occupation statute transferring to the Germans themselves the major part of the powers previously exercised by the three Allies.

76. That experiment was still in its initial stage. The first President of the new Federal Republic of Germany had just been elected, the first Chancellor had been appointed, and the first Government had been constituted. The destiny of Germany had once again been entrusted to the Germans themselves. Events would show whether they were able to cope with the responsibilities which had been restored to them, and to prepare their future in order and liberty. The rate at which subsequent progress took place would depend on the results of that experiment. France hoped that Germany would embark upon a course which would enable it to regain its place in the community of free nations, beginning with that European community foreshadowed by the Council of Europe.

77. Although the Council of Foreign Ministers had failed to reach agreement on Germany, it seemed, on the other hand, to have paved the way for the conclusion of a treaty with Austria, a treaty which would make it possible to put an end to the military occupation of that country and to restore to it its real sovereignty. Negotiations

for the final drafting of the texts had been carried on throughout the summer and were being resumed that day in New York. The French delegation was very anxious to reach a successful conclusion before the Austrian elections on 9 October 1949.

78. Thus, on one point at least, the hope expressed in resolution 190 (III), which the General Assembly had adopted on 3 November 1948 on the initiative of the delegation of Mexico, and to which the President had appropriately referred in his opening speech (220th meeting), would be fulfilled. Austria would then be able to take its place in the United Nations together with other nations, which had not betrayed either the cause of international morality or that of democracy and freedom. The French delegation sincerely rejoiced in the moral support and spontaneous co-operation of so many nations, whose influence within the Organization was not to be measured by the size of their populations or by the extent of their material resources. France respected human dignity in every individual, and recognized the right of every State to develop freely and to accomplish its mission. That mission was enlarged by the possibility of each State to contribute to the common welfare of all. The egotism of States was not only an offence condemned by morality; it was an error repudiated by the solidarity which bound the destiny of all peoples more and more every day.

79. Every vote cast within the Assembly should be guided by that truth, which was the basis—nay, more, the *raison d'être*—of the United Nations.

80. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) observed that the fourth session of the General Assembly was being held under the anxiously watching eyes of humanity. A sincere self-examination would make it possible to say without exaggeration that the Organization had passed through a grave period of crisis.

81. Without denying the growing institutional and technical development, and the great services which were being rendered by the United Nations and its specialized agencies in various parts of the world, it must be conceded that in such an organization it was necessary to consider not only technical progress and institutional development, but above all the spirit, the moral atmosphere upon which international peace and justice were founded.

82. The League of Nations had also solved many technical problems, but it had not known how to safeguard the fundamental principles of community life among nations, namely, the principle of the supreme dignity of the human person and the principle that the State was subject to justice.

83. Hidden causes, incompatible with those two concepts essential to the international community, had sapped the life-blood of the League of Nations. And there was a danger that, despite technical developments and increasing institutional progress, the same erroneous concepts of life might infiltrate into certain sectors, creating an atmosphere of distrust in all humanity.

84. To deny the existence of that atmosphere of distrust would be insincere and positively dangerous, because the clearer and more emphatic the diagnosis of the ills which had beset humanity during the preceding years, the more effective would be the cure.

85. Mr. Belaúnde spoke of the spirit which had animated the San Francisco Conference, and recalled the profound emotion felt by the representatives of the younger nations when the representative of China had said that in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the word "justice" was not mentioned. It had then been proclaimed that the world community was not to be a super-State, nor was it to be a balance of absolutely sovereign States, but a true family of nations.

86. It was for the sake of the principles proclaimed in the Preamble of the Charter that the Peruvian delegation desired to safeguard that instrument. Just as it was impossible to conceive of biological life without air, so it was impossible to conceive of international life except in an atmosphere of justice. For that reason it was necessary to proclaim that international life would have no consistency unless there was a return to the old idea that the State lived and moved in an atmosphere of international peace and justice, an idea which had only disappeared because of the separatists, the exclusivists and the nationalists of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

87. Those standards had been established in the preamble and in the principles of the Charter, but unfortunately provisions contrary to those foundations of international life had filtered into the operative part of the Charter. In Mr. Belaúnde's view, two provisions were involved. One of those was not essentially unjust, but it had been worded in an equivocal fashion. Thus in the matter of international jurisdiction, no mention had been made of the principle set forth in the arbitration treaty signed in Washington in 1929, which proclaimed that matters which were within the domestic jurisdiction of a State in accordance with international law were excluded.

88. But more serious was the fact that a false principle concerning relations among nations had been adopted and had led to consequences which nations were suffering and would suffer for a long time to come.

89. For one moment it had been thought that unanimity would be achieved in all matters, and it had been established as an absolute rule. The smaller nations had wanted to differentiate coercive measures from pacific measures and had said that a normal situation in the international community was one where questions could be solved by peaceful means, where the rule to be applied was not that of unanimity but only the rule of a specified majority.

90. In the case of enforcement measures, the veto could be applied as Belgium and Peru had proposed; Peru, however, had gone so far as to accept the principle that in the case of enforcement measures which might jeopardize the political balance of the Organization, the rule of unanimity was necessary. The mistake was to have established unanimous decisions as the rule and majority decisions as the exception.

91. Mr. Belaúnde said that, in order to avoid any controversy likely to disturb the peaceful atmosphere in which the meetings of the Assembly were being held, he did not wish to reopen the discussion on that matter. The small nations should, however, take advantage of the opportunity to make a cordial and respectful appeal to the great Powers to look upon the exercise of the veto as approved by the Assembly as the moral expression of the obligation which they had

assumed at San Francisco. For at San Francisco the great Powers had declared that it should not be forgotten that the veto was to be used only in exceptional cases.

92. The veto, when used without any reason, was not consistent with the legal concepts underlying the Charter; when used in that way, the veto implied the idea of a State in which the Government was essentially a power and a political institution of absolute supremacy. The delegation of Peru therefore maintained that the idea that justice was more important than the State was incompatible with the veto; in its view, civil law was based on respect for the individual and human freedom. Sovereignty meant the liberty of the State to develop freely in economic, political and cultural spheres, but to develop with responsibility.

93. The delegation of Peru looked upon the rights and duties of the State from a different point of view from that of the International Law Commission. The rights and duties of States were closely connected with the actual concept of the State; if the State were considered as an entity based on force, its rights and duties would not be the same as those of the State considered as a moral entity, free and responsible before justice. Many rights which were different from those enumerated and considered in the draft declaration of the International Law Commission resulted from the latter conception. It was necessary to emphasize the right of free development, not merely from a political but also from a juridical and cultural angle, and to condemn not only political intervention, but also intervention in the economic and cultural spheres.

94. Mr. Belaúnde recalled the meeting of the Congress of lawyers in Lima which had condemned such forms of intervention. He added that his delegation did not understand why the International Law Commission had disregarded statements which Peru considered fundamental. The United Nations was not a super-state and within it each State had its sovereignty, its domestic and jurisdiction and its spiritual characteristics which were as important as sovereignty.

95. It was not possible to allow considerations of political influence, of ideological similarities, or any other such considerations, to govern votes concerning the admission of new Members to the United Nations. The idea of the universality of the United Nations which had been established in San Francisco required that any nation, any organized people which had fulfilled its international obligations and was peace-loving, should belong to the United Nations, *de facto* and *de jure*.

96. Consequently, the purely political criterion should be abandoned and the criterion which was in the Charter should be applied. In considering an application from a new country for membership in the United Nations, the fact that that country existed as a State, that it had a Government which controlled the administrative machinery, and that that Government was peace-loving, should be an adequate criterion.

97. Mr. Belaúnde said that the Assembly had a very high and noble mission, that it was the Charter of the United Nations in action, and that it should represent the juridical conscience of mankind. It must eschew any debate which divided the nations into groups whether racial or cultural.

98. From a practical point of view, the Assembly could do something which might seem modest, but which was really very important: it could consolidate and affirm existing law and facilitate its execution. In considering each particular case, the United Nations should carefully note whether it involved a principle of existing law, contractual or philosophical, which had been accepted and sanctioned by international law, and then give that principle all the weight and all the moral authority of a vote, by an enormous majority of the Assembly, if possible. The Assembly would then become, not only the guardian of the spirit of the Charter, but also the reformer of international law.

99. In conclusion, Mr. Belaúnde said that it had been from Lima that Bolívar had made his appeal to the countries of America for solidarity and international justice. Peru had repeated that message at all conferences, and all the sister countries of America would recognize the position that Peru had held in the vanguard of the defenders of the principles of international law.

100. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) stated that the election of General Rómulo, head of the Philippine delegation, as President of the General Assembly pointed to an advance of that democratic tendency which the Assembly wished to instill in the organs of the United Nations in order that that society of free States might ultimately become universal and representative of all humanity.

101. It was an undeniable fact that the General Assembly had elected its President because he was universally liked and because his ability inspired confidence, irrespective of the political, military or economic power of the Philippines.

102. It was the unavoidable duty of the General Assembly to meditate at the opening of its fourth session on the heavy responsibility resting on all representatives of free States who had met to work for peace and understanding among the nations of the world, to strengthen international order and to ensure to all peoples the security to which they were so fully entitled.

103. The United Nations should not, however, confine its meditations to that aspect alone. It should remember the mistakes it had made in the process of its development, mistakes often due to the fact that it was an agency of international peace, built up by human hands. In order to avoid a repetition of past mistakes, nations must consider future prospects, take stock of their strength and pray the Almighty to increase it, so as to reduce as much as possible the differences and suspicion which separated some States from others. They must do everything in their power to put an end to that so-called cold war which divided nations into hostile camps and which had prevented the strengthening of peace among the nations which had emerged victorious from the Second World War. Failure to sign peace treaties with the enemy nations had left the world in the shadow of war, in a painful period of transition from the Second World War to peace, a situation which made it impossible to say truthfully that the United Nations had, by a just and stable peace, contributed effectively to the strengthening of international order.

104. As the head of the Syrian delegation had stated at the 222nd meeting, no agreement among nations could be regarded as stable unless it was

based on justice. The General Assembly must therefore aim in its work to ensure justice among nations, irrespective of economic, military or political power.

105. It was one of the fundamental obligations of the Assembly as well as of the other organs of the United Nations to abide closely by the principles of the Charter in order to maintain real harmony among the Member States, since they had not renounced the whole of their sovereignty, but only a part of it under the provisions of the Charter. The United Nations was only an international agency for peace and its powers were limited by the mandate it had been given by the Member States. Consequently Mr. Castro did not share the opinion held by some representatives that all the Assembly's resolutions, no matter what form they took, should be carried out. In his opinion, the General Assembly and the other organs of the United Nations had not been vested with arbitrary powers, since none of the Member States had envisaged turning the Organization into a super-state with unlimited powers. On the contrary, the Assembly's authority was based entirely on the condition that its actions should be in conformity with the principles of the Charter. The only thing the Assembly was authorized to do under the Charter was to make recommendations—which by their very nature could not be mandatory—to the Member States. It was nevertheless essential to respect and carry out those recommendations as long as they were based on the principles of the Charter.

106. The representative of El Salvador said that the Assembly had unfortunately erred by departing from some of the basic principles of the Charter, namely, the principle that there should be no intervention in the internal affairs of States and the principle that all peoples should have the right of self-determination. Both those principles had been violated in recommendations which he would not specifically name, because he did not wish to reopen old controversies but rather to contribute to the spirit of harmony in which the Assembly's decisions should be made.

107. Since the United Nations had come into being at the San Francisco Conference of plenipotentiaries held in 1945, it could be regarded as having been created prior to the conclusion of the Second World War. At that time many statesmen had acclaimed that fact as a good omen for the speedy establishment of a just peace at the end of the war, but the results should now be considered carefully. It had to be admitted that, although four years had elapsed since the end of the armed conflict, some of the most important peace treaties had not been signed and there was no immediate hope of their being signed. World peace had not yet been organized. Some countries still had to be considered technically as enemy States and, what was worse, the differences between the victors and the vanquished were not as great as those between the victorious Powers themselves. The United Nations Charter, as opposed to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the charter of the Organization of American States, had a very serious basic defect in that it contained no provision guaranteeing the territorial integrity of States, not even that of the Member States. That grave omission had made it possible for the Governments—not the peoples—of some of the most powerful States to acquiesce in the fatal mistake of allowing Poland, the country in

whose defence the war had been started, to lose almost half the territory it had owned at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. The mistake of omitting to include in the Charter any provision guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all the Member States, as well as their political sovereignty over such territory, had certainly not been made because of some momentary forgetfulness on the part of the statesmen who had been present at the meetings of Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks, nor because they had been unaware of the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant. It was obvious that each of the representatives of the great Powers at those meetings had weighed all the facts from his own point of view and in the light of existing conditions and had arrived at the conclusion that it would be necessary to make several territorial changes at the end of the Second World War, changes which would have been contrary to the United Nations Charter if it had contained a provision guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the Member States.

108. The facts, however, were incontrovertible; the appropriate conclusions should be drawn from them. The delegation of El Salvador therefore intended to request the Assembly, composed as it was of the representatives of fifty-nine free States, to give serious consideration to the need so to revise the Charter that it would adequately safeguard the territorial integrity of Member States and of all States which co-operated in the maintenance of international peace.

109. The Argentine delegation had again proposed (A/970) that the General Assembly should examine the desirability of convening a general conference of the Members of the United Nations to adopt whatever revisions of the Charter might seem advisable in the light of the experience acquired in the preceding four years. The inclusion in the Charter of a clause ensuring respect for the territorial integrity of States might be contemplated, in order that justice might prevail in international relations and that universal peace might be secured.

110. The representative of El Salvador understood that one of the possible alterations in the Charter which the Argentine delegation intended to propose was the abolition of the requirement of unanimity on the part of the five permanent members in votes in the Security Council, a requirement which conferred on each of them the veto power and which had been used too frequently in the work of that Council.

111. The delegation of El Salvador associated itself with the Argentine delegation in its wish to see that change adopted, without, however, disregarding the obstacles in the way of obtaining the abolition or even the limitation of the veto power.

112. For such a revision of the Charter to enter into effect, it must be adopted formally by a General Conference of the Members of the United Nations, and the following two conditions required by the Charter must be fulfilled: first, the revision must be sanctioned by two-thirds of the Member States, and, secondly, that majority must include the five permanent members of the Security Council, namely, China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. If even one of those members refused to sanction the revision, it could never come into effect.

113. The representative of El Salvador therefore proposed that in the event that a general

conference were convened, a large number of modifications should be submitted, so that some at least among them might be accepted.

114. One of the questions which contributed most to the uneasiness throughout the world and gave rise to serious conflicts within the General Assembly was the failure on the part of certain Member States to carry out their obligation under the Charter to respect fundamental human rights. Those conflicts had spread to States which were not Members of the United Nations but had recognized in international treaties their obligation to respect those rights. In its resolution 272 (III) of 30 April 1949, the General Assembly had made appropriate recommendations with regard to Bulgaria and Hungary, countries accused of such violations of human rights. Nevertheless, there had not been the slightest sign of any improvement in those countries. To them must be added other countries, such as Czechoslovakia, which the Press throughout the world had accused of similar violations of fundamental human rights.

115. In accordance with international law, human rights were not subject to the arbitrary jurisdiction of any State, and should be recognized universally.

116. The delegation of El Salvador, which had always been a fervent advocate of the principle of non-intervention, had carefully studied the argument advanced in the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary. That argument invoked the principle of non-intervention, according to which the General Assembly of the United Nations had no right to intervene in problems relating to the rights of individuals in those countries and in the administration of justice, since that was the domestic function of their Governments. Essential human rights, in Mr. Castro's opinion, were outside the national or domestic jurisdiction of States. The General Assembly had initiated a basic activity of the United Nations in taking up the recognition and protection of fundamental human rights.

117. The delegation of El Salvador had given its closest attention to the problem of the final disposal of the former Italian colonies and to the question of Indonesia. It was the opinion of El Salvador, first, that the principle of self-determination should be applied whenever the population of a colony was desirous of obtaining its independence and was, in addition, capable of self-government; secondly, that in such cases the partition of the territory of a colony was not to be recommended without taking into account the wishes of its inhabitants; and, thirdly, that only if the population of a colonial territory were not ready to exercise the functions of self-government or to assume full independence should it be subjected to trusteeship, the territory being placed under the temporary administration of an administering authority or of the United Nations according to the circumstances of the case. The trusteeship should continue only until the protected territory was ripe for full independence, under the authority of a Government of its own.

118. Mr. Castro recalled that the attitude of the delegation of El Salvador towards the question of Greece, which was still threatened by the constant intervention of various neighbouring States, had already been clearly defined. The provisions adopted by the General Assembly of the United

Nations for the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Greek State had been fully supported.

119. The same could be said in regard to Korea. Two representatives of El Salvador were serving with the United Nations Commission on Korea which had successfully co-operated, with its observations and advice, in the organization of a Government in south Korea. There was a hope of uniting the Korean people on the democratic bases on which that Government had been established.

120. In regard to the problem of Jerusalem and respect for the Holy Places, the delegation of

El Salvador supported the principle of internationalization. It had defended that principle and would continue to do so to the best of its ability in order to prevent General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III) from being stultified and rendered inoperative by internal conflicts in Jerusalem.

121. In conclusion, Mr. Castro explained that his statements reflected the sincere desire cherished by the Government and people of El Salvador to co-operate in the work for peace which had been entrusted to the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 23 September 1949, at 3.p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

General debate (*continued*): speeches by Mr. Vyshinsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Rahim Bey (Egypt), Mr. Stolk (Venezuela), Mr. van Zeeland (Belgium), Mr. Jooste (Union of South Africa)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the general debate with which the General Assembly had begun its work, in accordance with its tradition, should enable it to evaluate what had been done in the past, to outline its future tasks and to create the conditions which would make it possible for the United Nations to solve the problems before it.

2. However, as the previous two days had shown, representatives were far from unanimously agreed that their task should be interpreted in that way. In fact, one of their number, Mr. Tsiang, speaking on behalf of the Koumintang Government, had attempted the previous day (223rd meeting), to use the rostrum of the General Assembly to make perfidious and libellous attacks on the USSR. Mr. Tsiang had tried to retrace historical events, but his statement had lacked basic honesty and he had grossly falsified the facts. Thus, for instance, concealing the truth of the matter, Mr. Tsiang had omitted to state that twenty-five years previously the Soviet Union had been the only country to conclude an agreement with China laying down the fundamental principles for the settlement of questions arising between the two countries. At the same time, the Soviet Union had renounced all rights granted to it under the agreements signed by the Tsarist Government in violation of Chinese sovereignty.

3. Mr. Tsiang had merely demonstrated the hatred of the Chinese reactionaries, who felt their power tottering, of the progressive and democratic elements which, in all countries of the world, were struggling for independence and for the destruction of the yoke of imperialism. But it would be undignified to enter into a controversy with Mr. Tsiang and his like.

4. Coming to the main point of his remarks, Mr. Vyshinsky said that, everyone knew that the activity of the United Nations was closely linked with the relations existing between the Member

States of the Organization and, above all, with the foreign policies of those countries which bore the main responsibility for activating its work. The attitudes of such Member States as the United States and the United Kingdom, leaders of the bloc of States which they had constituted, could not fail to influence conditions within the United Nations.

5. The past year had been marked by important events in the international sphere. Those events had shown that the Anglo-American majority in the General Assembly, far from seeking to strengthen the authority of the United Nations and thereby universal co-operation, was endeavouring to undermine the prestige of the Organization.

6. The facts demonstrated that while they gave lip service to the United Nations, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom were attempting to take action outside the Organization and often even against its interests. That became evident when it was noted that the Interim Committee had been established illegally, when it was observed that, despite the provisions of the Charter, the so-called United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and the United Nations Commission on Korea had been created, and when a determined campaign was being conducted against the principle of unanimity, despite the fact that that principle was one of the cornerstones of the Charter.

7. It was also significant to note that, upon the initiative of the United States and the United Kingdom, several countries had signed the North Atlantic Treaty, which represented an open attempt to undermine the prestige of the United Nations. Everyone recalled that in January 1949, the Secretary of State of the United States had stated that the North Atlantic Treaty had been motivated only by the desire to strengthen the authority of the United Nations. The authors of the Treaty had invoked Article 51 of the Charter, which provided for the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in case of an armed attack against a Member of the United Nations. In actual fact, the formation of a group of States signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty was in direct contradiction with the Charter and constituted a direct violation by those States of the obligations which they had assumed when they signed that document.