

33. According to the Washington, D. C., *Star* of 9 August 1949, Jewish ex-terrorists who had made Palestine too hot for British rule were confidently planning a new campaign, their objective being Jewish control of Jordan.

34. It was the responsibility of the United Nations to enforce its authority on the Jews to make them abandon aggressive intentions and to bring about a just territorial settlement. Otherwise there could be no peace in the Middle East and, in such circumstances, the seeds of future trouble had a mysterious way of growing. The settlement should be such as to minimize the agony of injustice created in Arab hearts. It was by that means and that means alone that faith in the United Nations could be partly re-established in the Middle East.

35. If, on the other hand, the Jews, relying on the support which they could always secure in the way of charity and political influence from a great country like the United States, continued to flout United Nations decisions and to deny Arab rights to Palestine, the United Nations would have to face a great blow to its prestige. By a decision which had led to trouble and unrest in the most sensitive part of the modern world, it would have achieved the greatest blunder in its history.

36. Mr. al-Jamali reiterated that material help to the suffering refugees, no matter how vital and urgent, could never be a substitute for a just and speedy territorial settlement, which must be the first achievement. The question of settling refugees who did not wish to return to Palestine might well be considered after territorial settlement, for in his opinion the question of refugees would be largely liquidated if a just territorial settlement were to be effected.

37. Another question which was a test of United Nations goodwill was that of Libya. According

to the fundamental principles of the Charter, the valiant people of Libya, who had fought for nearly thirty years to win their freedom, deserved to be free and independent. The Iraqi delegation believed that the world still had a great reservoir of goodwill and sympathy for freedom-loving peoples and that the enforced mutilation of any country or people was not calculated to win the approbation of the civilized world.

38. Palestine and the former Italian colonies were examples of a score of problems which required the careful consideration of the General Assembly. The guide in approaching all those problems should be the letter and spirit of the Charter, not power politics, expediency or secret machinations. Mr. al-Jamali urged Members not to think in terms of domination of other peoples and other lands, or of great Powers and small ones, or of developed and under-developed countries, but to look at the world as an integral whole and to give each section of it, irrespective of might, race, wealth, geographical situation, colour or religion, the treatment, sympathy and co-operation that it needed, applying one code of human rights, one code of international justice. He appealed to them to be true to the Charter in deed as well as in word, and pledged his country's full co-operation.

39. The PRESIDENT, having noted that the list of speakers for the meeting was exhausted, proposed the adjournment of the meeting until the afternoon.

40. He suggested that the time limit for the inscription of speakers to take part in the general debate should be 6 p.m.

The President's proposals were adopted.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Thursday, 22 September 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Agenda of the fourth session: report of the General Committee (A/989)

1. The PRESIDENT proposed that the General Committee's report should be considered paragraph by paragraph.

I. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

Recommendations of the General Committee

The proposal contained in paragraph 1 was adopted.

2. Mr. DROHOJOWSKI (Poland) wished to speak on paragraph 2, in which the General Committee recommended that item 27 of the provisional agenda and item 3 of the supplementary list should be combined to read: "Observance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania of human rights and fundamental freedoms". The subject had been considered very briefly by the General Committee and he thought that the majority of the members had taken it for granted that they were bound to include the item in the agenda because of resolution 272 (III) adopted by the General Assembly on 30 April 1949. Examining the text of that resolution, he noted that the only decision

it contained was to retain the question on the agenda of the fourth regular session of the General Assembly. The resolution did not, neither could it, in any way imply that the accusations against the Governments of Bulgaria and Hungary were true. The Assembly had certainly expressed its concern at the accusations, but all false accusations were surely bound to occasion concern. There was nothing in the resolution which could be taken as meaning that the debate should be reopened at the fourth session or that a report should be submitted.

3. He emphasized the fact that the entire problem arose out of the peace treaties—a question with which the Assembly was not competent to deal. It was a well established principle that the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belonged solely to the person or body which had the power to modify or abolish it. Any question arising out of the peace treaties, therefore came solely within the province of the contracting parties. If a treaty was clear, no interpretation was needed; if not, only the contracting parties could deal with it. Any interpretation of a

treaty by the contracting parties could be considered authoritative only as long as they had agreed, to that extent, to supplement the original treaty by a new agreement. Furthermore, the treaties concerned provided special machinery for use in cases of disagreement. That machinery had been set in motion and was still proceeding through the regular diplomatic channels. The United States Government had addressed a note to the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on 19 September 1949 and naturally an immediate answer on a matter of such importance could not be expected.

4. Mr. Drohojowski emphasized that simultaneous action on the part of the United Nations would hardly be conducive to a satisfactory settlement. Those who proposed such action had invoked several Articles of the Charter, but they had omitted to mention Article 2, paragraph 7. That Article stated clearly that the United Nations had no authority to intervene in matters which came within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. That meant that the United Nations could not intervene in cases which could be settled by an existing legal apparatus, which was clearly the case in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

5. The countries which had levelled accusations against Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, because of trials and sentences which were a daily occurrence in many countries, also had laws to deal with crimes against the State. The United States penal code set an example in dealing severely with offenders against the State and, in the United Kingdom, the Act under which traitors were prosecuted was nearly six hundred years old.

6. The Polish delegation, inspired by the remarks made by the President in his inaugural address, would refrain at the moment from discussing the moral qualifications of those who had brought the accusations. It was, however, prepared to do its utmost to prevent a few from using the religious feelings held sacred by many as a political instrument against the best interests of peace and of the United Nations. There was absolutely no legal basis on which the United Nations could deal with the case in question and, in Mr. Drohojowski's opinion, it had been raised purely for propaganda purposes. He therefore strongly urged the Assembly not to include the item in its agenda.

7. Mr. HOUDEK (Czechoslovakia) supported the attitude taken by the representative of Poland. His delegation had been opposed to the inclusion of a similar item in the agenda of the previous session and was still opposed to its inclusion for the same reasons, namely, that it was contrary to the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7.

8. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation merely wished to explain its vote. Considering the character of the accusation levelled against Yugoslavia's neighbours, namely Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, his delegation would have been opposed to the inclusion of that item in the agenda. Nevertheless, since some of the countries in question had violated their obligations towards Yugoslavia under existing peace treaties and had also violated several other agreements with Yugoslavia, his delegation would abstain from voting.

9. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation supported the Polish representative's proposal that the item should be deleted from the General Assembly

agenda. The inclusion of the item clearly amounted to interference in the internal affairs of another country and it was not for the United Nations to act in such a fashion. He could not, however, fail to express surprise at the statement which had been made by the Yugoslav representative. Indeed, while the item in question dealt with alleged violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, the Yugoslav representative had asserted that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had violated peace treaties. That assertion bore no relation to the item itself and was nothing but an attempt to dissimulate an inimical attitude towards the three peoples' democracies in question.

10. The PRESIDENT put the proposal contained in paragraph 2 to the vote.

The proposal was adopted by 38 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

The proposal contained in paragraph 3 was adopted.

The proposal contained in paragraph 4 was adopted.

11. Mr. ICHASO (Cuba) said that he did not wish to open a controversy at that stage, but he wished as a matter of principle, to place on record his disapproval of the deletion of item 32 of the provisional agenda, namely, "International Bill of Human Rights: right of petition (resolution 217 (III) B of 10 December 1948)". It had been the Cuban delegation, jointly with the French delegation, which had proposed the inclusion of the right of petition in the International Bill of Human Rights in the belief that it was one of the essential rights of the individual.

12. The right of petition—which was set out formally in the Cuban Constitution—was the only possible safeguard for the individual in appeal against the arbitrary abuse of public authority. It would therefore have been a great encouragement to humanity had the General Assembly supplemented the International Bill of Human Rights in one of its basic aspects.

13. The fact that world attention was concentrated upon the work of the Assembly must not be disregarded. The Assembly would be giving hope to the world and ensuring its future progress in the measure in which it could satisfy world opinion. If, however, the Assembly began by avoiding or unduly postponing the consideration of such questions, it would give the impression that it was unwilling to approach problems with the requisite courage and sense of responsibility.

14. It had been contended that the Commission on Human Rights had not yet submitted its report and that the Assembly could not therefore take cognizance of the question. The Cuban delegation wished to record its displeasure at that delay and urgently appealed to the Commission to make a comprehensive examination of the problem so that the right of petition could be incorporated into the International Bill of Human Rights. The Assembly was under an obligation to safeguard not only the interests of nations within the limits of their sovereignty, but also the rights of the human person.

15. The PRESIDENT said that, as a matter of clarification, he would call to the attention of the General Assembly the fact that the General Committee's recommendation had been made on the basis of a resolution of the Economic and Social

Council recommending that no action should be taken by the Assembly at its fourth session¹.

The proposal contained in paragraph 5 was adopted.

The proposal contained in paragraph 6 was adopted.

The proposal contained in paragraph 7 was adopted.

The proposal contained in paragraph 8 was adopted.

Agenda

16. The PRESIDENT stated that, as the General Assembly had adopted the proposals contained in paragraphs 1 to 8 of the General Committee's report, he would invite comments on the agenda recommended by the Committee.

17. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he wished to comment on two items of the agenda proposed by the General Committee: item 21, which dealt with the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, and item 49, on the report of the International Law Commission.

18. With regard to the first of those questions, he recalled that when it had first been put before the General Assembly, the USSR delegation had advanced a number of arguments to show that there was no legal basis for raising the question.

19. With regard to the substance of the question, everyone was aware that the problem of the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece had not been raised at the current session or at previous sessions of the General Assembly with a view to defending the true interests of Greece and of the Greek people. Everyone knew that Greece was in no way threatened by its neighbours to the north, amongst them Albania and Bulgaria, against which item 21 was directed.

20. It was certainly not a question of protecting the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece against alleged attacks by Albania and Bulgaria. The real intention was to hatch plots against Albania and Bulgaria, and the question raised had no relation to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

21. The allegation that Albania and Bulgaria were threatening Greece was pure invention and totally groundless libel. That was not what required discussion. What did require discussion, on the other hand, was how to put an end to the civil war in Greece and to restore normal conditions in that country. It was necessary to consider how Greece might be cleared at last of foreign troops and military missions. It was necessary to put an end to the terror which the monarcho-fascist Government of Greece, with the assistance of United Kingdom and United States armed forces, had unleashed against the Greek patriots fighting for the freedom and independence of their country. If the Assembly wished to raise its authoritative voice in favour of the Greek people, it should examine the very real danger to the freedom and independence of that nation presented by the foreign troops and chiefs of foreign military missions in Greece. He was thinking particularly of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

22. That was the proper way to look at the question; it should be stressed that by including

that problem once again in its agenda at the current session, the General Assembly would merely be adding to the chaos which was reigning in one part of the Balkans and would tend only to complicate and strain still further relations between Members of the United Nations.

23. From the procedural point of view, the question had not been raised in the proper manner, inasmuch as it was related to the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. As the USSR delegation had repeatedly stated at previous sessions, it was firmly convinced that the Committee had been set up in flagrant violation of the Charter.

24. For all those reasons, the delegations of the Soviet Union urged that the question of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece should not be included in the agenda of the fourth session.

25. Mr. Vyshinsky then turned to item 49 of the agenda. It was nothing new for the General Assembly to stand by, calm and unperturbed, while its own rules and the Charter, which was the fundamental law of the United Nations, were systematically violated almost day by day. He had had occasion to note that fact in connexion with item 21 of the agenda; he noted it again in relation to item 49, which raised a very important principle. The Assembly had before it a report of the International Law Commission on a very important subject, namely, the draft declaration on the rights and duties of States, based on the draft submitted by Panama. The work of the Commission was subject to the provisions of its Statute, articles 21 and 22 of which provided that when the Commission considered a draft to be satisfactory, it should request the Secretary-General to issue it as a Commission document; the Commission should thereupon transmit it to Member States of the United Nations with a request for comments within a reasonable time.

26. All members of the General Assembly knew that those articles had been violated. No Government had submitted comments on the Commission's draft, which must be distinguished from the original draft prepared by Panama. In point of fact, no one had requested Governments to submit their comments.

27. Mr. Vyshinsky considered that a most serious violation had taken place, and that it could not be permitted to pass unnoticed because of the great significance of the question involved. As the representative of the USSR, he claimed for himself and for his Government the right to deal with the matter in accordance with the rules and to submit his Government's comments on so important an issue as the rights and duties of States. Was there anything to lose by the faithful observance of rules which the United Nations itself had drawn up to govern its work? It had to be noted that in the case in point those rules had been violated.

28. Mr. Vyshinsky remarked that after the 65th meeting of the General Committee, held on 21 September, he had asked the Chairman how a proposal such as his own could have been rejected in the face of clearly defined rules. General Rómulo had replied that he was the Chairman, that he had put the proposal to the vote and that the Committee had voted on it. The reply was admirably concise; an order had been given and had been executed. But what Mr. Vyshinsky

¹ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fourth Year, Ninth Session, Resolutions*, No. 236 (IX) B.

wanted to know was what the order meant. He considered it a Chairman's duty to defend the law against those who were too eager to break it.

29. For all those reasons, the representative of the Soviet Union called upon the Assembly not to include item 49 in its agenda, and appealed to the members of the Assembly to observe the rules which they themselves had established.

30. The PRESIDENT pointed out that the recommendation for the inclusion of item 49 in the agenda had been made at the request of the International Law Commission, a body which had been set up by the General Assembly. The Commission had, by a large majority, decided to submit the draft immediately to the General Assembly and to place on record its conclusion that it was for the Assembly to decide what further course of action should be taken, in particular whether the draft should be transmitted to members for their comments.

31. He called for a decision on the first twenty items of the agenda as recommended by the General Committee.

Items 1 to 20 were adopted.

32. Mr. KYROU (Greece), referring to item 21, pointed out that the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had been set up by the General Assembly; he did not think therefore, that the examination of its report should be hindered in any way.

33. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) recalled the statement made at the 222nd meeting by the United States representative to the effect that the Assembly should make a renewed effort to restore peace along the northern Greek border and to re-establish normal relations between Greece and all its northern neighbours. If that statement represented an attempt at conciliation on the Greek question, Mr. Katz-Suchy felt that the United States had before it an excellent opportunity to show its desire to eliminate any threats to the independence of Greece by removing item 21 from the agenda and withdrawing United States troops and missions from Greek territory.

34. Past experience had shown that the discussion of the subject by the General Assembly would not contribute to a solution of the Greek question. In his opinion, the purpose of those who wished the question to be discussed was not to bring about a settlement, but rather to add fuel to the fires of the internal strife in Greece and to make the General Assembly a party to the actions of the United States in Greece.

35. Several attempts had been made to settle the question through conversations as well as through negotiations among the great Powers. Thus possibility of settlement still existed and it was the duty of the General Assembly to help the suffering Greek people by conciliation, not by discussing the question in the form of a threat to the independence of Greece from its northern neighbours. If any country's independence was being threatened, it was that of Albania, which was being threatened by the United States and the United Kingdom.

36. The fact that the Special Committee on the Balkans had requested that the matter should be considered did not in any way compel the Assembly to put the question on its agenda. No committee had the right to dictate the Assembly's agenda, and the Committee on the Balkans was

certainly not in a position to do so since, in the view of the Polish delegation, its creation had been illegal in the first place. The representative of Poland therefore supported the USSR representative's proposal that item 21 should not be included in the agenda.

Item 21 was adopted by 46 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.

37. The PRESIDENT asked the Assembly, before proceeding to item 22, to consider a proposal for a slight change in item 23, which would then read as follows:

"International control of atomic energy: resolutions of the Atomic Energy Commission (transmitted by the Security Council); report of the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission."

Item 23, as read by the President, was adopted.

38. Mr. HOFFMEISTER (Czechoslovakia) proposed that items 22 and 25 should both be deleted from the agenda. The United Nations Commission on Korea had been set up in contravention of the Moscow agreement and its activities were aimed at furthering the plans of the occupying Power in southern Korea. The approval of the Interim Committee—itself illegally constituted—could not possibly serve to legalize the activities of the Commission on Korea. Only by returning to the provisions of the Moscow agreement would it be possible to solve the problem and establish a free and united Korea, based on the interests of the Korean people themselves and not on those of external Powers in southern Korea.

39. It was for those reasons that his delegation proposed the deletion of items 22 and 25 from the agenda.

40. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) supported the proposal of Czechoslovakia for the removal of the so-called Korean problem from the agenda of the General Assembly.

41. The turn which the discussion of the Korean problem had taken at the previous session of the General Assembly was well known to all. The initiators of that discussion had found themselves in a very embarrassing position. Everyone remembered both the facts presented by the Soviet Union and the information supplied by American generals returning from Korea. Those officers had shown that they had only very vague ideas regarding the population of that country and that they had considered the Koreans as Japanese. That idea was the basis for their typically imperialistic policy towards Korea.

42. At the previous session of the General Assembly, it had been very clearly and definitely shown that there was a deliberate attempt to exaggerate the importance of the so-called Korean question in order to aggravate the differences within the United Nations.

43. It might be asked why the Korean question was being raised when it was common knowledge that what was known as the United Nations Commission on Korea had been established in open violation of the Charter. All those voting for the consideration of the report of that Commission would contravene the Charter and thereby diminish the prestige and the authority of the United Nations.

44. Moreover, the presence in Korean territory of the United Nations Commission merely com-

plicated and aggravated conditions in that country. The problems facing the Korean people were entirely different. Their principal problem was the unification of the country. Mr. Manuilsky asked the Assembly not to prevent Korea from achieving unification, and to allow the Korean people to determine their own fate as provided by the Charter of the United Nations. He recalled the important reforms which had been achieved in north Korea with the approval of an overwhelming majority of the Korean people.

45. The presence of the United Nations Commission in Korea merely served to help the reactionary group led by the so-called Government of Mr. Syngman Rhee. The work of the Commission had led to flagrant violations of the fundamental rights of the individual and the citizen. Thus several journalists who had supplied information to the Commission regarding conditions in the country had been arrested. The Assembly was being asked to approve that state of affairs. How could that fact be reconciled with the decision which the Assembly had just taken to discuss the alleged violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Hungary and Romania? Such action was proof of an obviously biased attitude which was harmful to the Korean people and which had been adopted at the instance of the selfish interests of the United States and the United Kingdom.

46. Mr. KISLEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) fully supported the remarks of the representative of Czechoslovakia with regard to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR had repeatedly stated at previous sessions of the General Assembly that the Interim Committee had been established illegally and in violation of Article 7 of the Charter. It therefore supported the proposal of Czechoslovakia that the question should not be included in the agenda of the current session.

Item 22 was adopted by 48 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.

Item 24 was adopted.

47. Mr. HOFFMEISTER (Czechoslovakia) proposed the deletion of item 25.

48. The PRESIDENT put item 25 to the vote.

The item was adopted by 48 votes to 6.

49. Mr. LACHS (Poland) proposed the deletion of item 26. The question of the United Nations Field Service was not a new one. The issue was clearly whether the United Nations was to have a military force at its disposal. Neither during the preparatory work for the San Francisco Conference nor in the Charter had it ever been contemplated that the United Nations should assume the functions of a State or of a body superior to all States. Such functions were regarded as being the province of the Member States themselves, acting on a basis of sovereign equality, as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter. The United Nations had accepted as its basic principle that of collective security, which implied concerted action and close co-operation between Member States, as reflected in Article 43 of the Charter. Under that Article, Members might be called upon to make armed forces available to the Security Council.

50. It could not be denied that the United Nations Field Service would be a form of military force. The tendency of such forces was always

to expand, as the current race in armaments clearly showed. The United Nations, however, should not and could not have any military forces of its own; it could have only those which were placed at its disposal, in certain circumstances, by Member States. Any precedent created to the contrary would conflict with the basic principles upon which the United Nations had been built. Although such a proposal should never have been entertained it was not too late to reverse the course of action, particularly since such a reversal would be in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. The practical method of doing so would be simply to delete the item from the agenda.

51. Turning to item 49, relating to the report of the International Law Commission, Mr. Lachs proposed that it should be deleted from the agenda on the ground that the scope of the question and the intricate problems of law involved called for detailed and thoughtful examination. In particular, the question of the rights and duties of States raised complex questions with which the General Assembly might not be fully qualified to deal at that stage. Further, the Assembly could hardly take upon itself, without fuller study, the codification of international law and international relations. Detailed consideration by the delegations and a thorough analysis of all the problems involved would make it possible to ensure more effective observance of the declaration in its final form.

52. The PRESIDENT explained, in connexion with item 26, that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee which had discussed the United Nations Field Service had never contemplated the existence of a United Nations armed force. The service would have only technical functions already performed by the Secretariat in such matters as transportation, communications and the guarding of United Nations property and personnel. That had been clearly stated in annex 1 of document A/959.

53. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) supported the Polish proposal that item 26, on the establishment of a United Nations field service, should not be included in the agenda of the General Assembly.

54. The obligations of the Secretary-General and of the Secretariat were laid down in section 2 of chapter VIII of the report of the Preparatory Commission, in Chapter XV of the Charter and, lastly, in resolutions 12(I) and 13(I) adopted by the General Assembly in February 1946. None of the documents which established the limits of the competence of the Secretariat and of the Secretary-General authorized the latter to establish units of a para-military nature attached to the Secretariat.

55. Mr. Tsarapkin went on to say that the President had just explained that item 26 did not in any way provide for the establishment of a military unit, but merely of a guard service. However, it was clear from annex 1 of the report adopted by the Special Committee on the establishment of a United Nations guard that it would be made up only of able-bodied men between the ages of 22 and 30 who had special military training. The Secretary-General's proposals stated that those men would be grouped in detachments which would be commanded by officers, that they would be housed in barracks, that they would wear uniforms and would be subject to military discipline. The President had not clearly stated

that they would not be armed. All that indicated that they would constitute units of a distinctly military character.

56. As was well known, only the Security Council was competent to deal with the question of the establishment of a militarized service. Moreover, the proposal as it had been submitted constituted a clear violation of Articles 24, 34, 36, 39 and 43 of the Charter.

Item 26 was adopted by 53 votes to 6.

Items 27 to 48 were adopted.

Item 49 was adopted by 49 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

Items 50 to 66 were adopted.

The agenda as a whole was adopted by 53 votes to none, with 6 abstentions.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF *ad hoc* COMMITTEES

The recommendations of the General Committee were adopted.

III. ALLOCATION OF AGENDA ITEMS TO THE MAIN COMMITTEES

The recommendations of the General Committee were adopted.

IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The recommendations of the General Committee were adopted.

General debate (continued): speech by Sir Carl Berendsen (New Zealand)

57. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) said he had not intended to take part in the general debate. An annual stock-taking, however, was of immense value to the millions of right-thinking men and women who pinned their highest hopes on the success of the United Nations. He felt, therefore, that it was his duty to give a brief outline of the New Zealand delegation's views on the progress of the United Nations, its successes, its failures and its prospects for the future.

58. There was much—and it was well to place that fact in the foreground of any appraisal of the work of the United Nations—on which Members could congratulate themselves, much for which the world should be truly thankful. That the United Nations existed at all was in itself a matter of great and happy moment to mankind; whatever its merits and defects, there should be such an organization if man was to discuss man's problems in a manly and sensible way. And even in the matter of achievement there was much that was gratifying, much without which the world would be less happy, less secure and less hopeful.

59. All agreed, for instance, that peace would be greatly strengthened by the removal or alleviation of the admitted economic and social injustices and inequalities which were so prevalent throughout the world; and that if the United Nations could make a determined, enduring and successful effort in the international field to ensure greater equality in the distribution of the material resources and amenities of life which were possessed in such full measure by the more fortunate nations, then one potential cause of conflict would be removed or greatly reduced. It was to rectify or alleviate that sort of injustice—and that was indeed within the power of man—that the Economic and Social Council had been established. There was very much in the work of that

Council which gave ground for encouragement, and the New Zealand Government felt that the steady and consistent work of international co-operation in the economic and social field was one of the most hopeful measures of the success of the United Nations.

60. New Zealand had had a very special interest in the Economic and Social Council during the current year—its final year as a member of that body—because one of its representatives had held the office of President of the Council. The work of Mr. Thorn in that office had been a matter of great pride and satisfaction to the people of his country. Another New Zealander, Mr. Sutch, had been chairman of the Council's Social Commission.

61. Those intimately associated with the Council's proceedings would agree that it was overcoming many of the weaknesses apparent in its early stages, and in particular that it was endeavouring to concentrate on measures of a constructive character.

62. In that connexion Sir Carl Berendsen had to point out a very serious difficulty. Members should not allow their hearts to run away with their heads; they should not allow their anxiety to achieve results, as quickly as possible over as wide a field as possible, to lead them too far and too fast. There was a danger that they might so dissipate their energies and their resources by endeavouring to do too much too soon that in the long run they might fail to do enough. All had probably been shocked and astonished by the figures quoted by the Brazilian representative (222nd meeting) as to the number of meetings held under the aegis of the United Nations alone, namely between 3,000 and 4,000 meetings annually. One wondered how such meetings could possibly be adequately manned and how the cost of such meetings could possibly be met. Clearly, if meetings went on multiplying at that rate, many Members, and certainly the smaller States, would be unable effectively to cope with those demands. The United Nations must see to it that first things came first.

63. The ninth session of the Economic and Social Council, held during July and August 1949 in Geneva, had been distinguished by the consideration given to the highly important question of technical assistance to under-developed countries. Hundreds of millions of people did not have enough to eat and to wear, and had neither the tools nor the skills which could help them to improve their living standards. Those people were mainly in the under-developed countries and they could be assisted by the nations which were fortunate enough to have more fully developed economies. The New Zealand Government firmly believed that the economically strong should assist the economically weak and, as its delegation had already announced in the Economic and Social Council, when the scheme of technical assistance for economic development came into operation, New Zealand would make a full contribution to that inspiring means of international co-operation.

64. Sir Carl Berendsen expressed his Government's earnest hope that the scheme for technical assistance for economic and social development would be quickly worked out and put into practice. In fact, to the extent of its capacity, New Zealand had already been assisting in international work for economic and social development. It had,

of course, contributed to UNRRA and to the International Children's Emergency Fund. In addition, it shared other work with countries which had interests in the South Pacific. He referred particularly to the South Pacific Commission, where the countries concerned had adopted a joint programme designed to raise the economic and social standards of the islands of the Pacific under their care. His Government had already undertaken substantial obligations in that field of international assistance. He thought it proper in that connexion to pay tribute to the spirit animating President Truman's "fourth point" and to the activity of the United States Government, which was endeavouring so strenuously to give effect to the proposals under consideration. That, indeed, was one way in which the sufferings of a large proportion of mankind could be relieved, provided—and that condition applied to many of the matters discussed in the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies—that activities were not confined to words but were translated into deeds. Words, however noble, were not enough. One of the greatest and most common fallacies was the apparently unshakable belief that when people had passed a resolution they had done something. That belief in words, and words alone, could bring to naught the noblest of intentions. The aim of the United Nations should be words which were followed by deeds.

65. The New Zealand Government noted with interest and warm approval the importance attached by the Economic and Social Council, and by very many Members of the United Nations, to the adoption of policies calculated to lead to full employment everywhere. That was a fundamental requirement and it had been an essential policy of the New Zealand Government even before the establishment of the United Nations. Success would require co-operative action in many spheres and by many of the specialized agencies, and all that work had to be co-ordinated by the Economic and Social Council in the first place, and supervised by the General Assembly itself. That was most important and urgent, and New Zealand hoped to play a full part in committee discussions on that subject. The emphasis, however, should be put upon the examination of the numerous problems to be solved before full employment policies on an international level could be made effective.

66. Sir Carl Berendsen wished next to emphasize the importance of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They marked a very important step forward in man's development, but there again Members should not deceive themselves. The drafting of conventions did not in itself effect anything; it merely pointed a way. The conventions would mean little or nothing in practice unless and until the nations of the world adopted them. Even then they might be largely ineffective unless they were implemented. It could scarcely be suggested, for example, that a people which could sink to such a depth of turpitude as to be guilty of genocide was likely to attach any meticulous importance to its pledged word on a convention. The mere signing of a convention did not necessarily lead to the elimination of the horror of genocide; it must be enforced. Human rights could not be preserved for all time merely be-

cause the nations declared that they should be enforced.

67. The fundamentally important functions exercised by the United Nations in the promotion of understanding among its Members and in the field of conciliation must not be overlooked. It was of the utmost importance that the world should possess such a forum as the United Nations, where all the nations of the world could gather to discuss their mutual problems and endeavour so to adjust matters that the common welfare of all might be achieved. There had been many examples of such success.

68. The United Nations therefore deserved and might demand the fullest encouragement and support from every honest citizen in every country in the world. That support must be accorded, continued and increased.

69. The representative of New Zealand believed that unless at that very time and in the years immediately to come the United Nations was successful in preventing war, the soaring hopes of mankind would fall broken to the ground. The preservation of peace, the prevention of war, was the first and most fundamental problem on the solution of which everything else depended. The United Nations had been established to prevent the unlawful use of force in international affairs. The primary purpose of the United Nations had been the establishment of a system of collective security; in that primary purpose—and there should be no attempt to conceal the fact—it had not been successful. It was a disservice to the United Nations and to the cause of peace to pretend that the Organization represented an effective system of collective security when every informed man or woman knew by then that it was not so. It was true, as the Brazilian representative had pointed out in his opening speech, that the United Nations had been singularly unfortunate in the international climate in which it had had to operate. It was also true that the world-wide clash of ideologies between those who believed in the supremacy of the individual and those who believed in the supremacy of the State. In other words, between those who believed in democracy and those who believed in authoritarianism; between those who desired to implement the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and those who had too often appeared to desire the stultification of the Organization, had placed a strain, not clearly foreseen, on a young organization which had proved beyond its strength. Much of that was undoubtedly true, but the plain fact of the matter was that the structure which had been approved in San Francisco had never been adequate to support an effective system of collective security.

70. Sir Carl Berendsen did not wish to inflict upon the Assembly another exposition of his country's views on the veto power which had so crippled the United Nations as a means of enforcing peace. Those views, however, remained unaltered. It must be emphasized once again that as long as each of the five great Powers insisted on retaining to itself not only the right to say whether it would itself take action, but also—incredible as it might sound—the right to prevent the United Nations from taking action, even if that one great Power was in a minority of one, the United Nations could not have an effective system of collective security. He did not presume

to tell the five great Powers that they should relinquish that great and pregnant privilege—that was their business—but he did say that unless and until they relinquished that privilege there could never be an effective system of collective security.

71. He believed it would be generally admitted that what he had said was true. It was proved by the necessity of establishing, for purposes of self-defence, two separate and limited systems of collective security, one on the American continent and the other among the North Atlantic community. He had nothing to say against those thoroughly justifiable and non-aggressive agreements for self-defence. They were—most unhappily—essential in existing circumstances. They were indisputably justifiable if and as long as they met, as they did at that time, the following three conditions: first, that they did not represent any threat to any peace-loving State; secondly, that they constituted a real and not merely a verbal reinforcement of security for the parties thereto, for the smaller countries in the groups concerned as well as for the greater; thirdly—and that was of primary importance to a country such as New Zealand—that they were not regarded as an excuse for non-participation in more general action by the United Nations in the case of acts of aggression or threats to the peace which were not covered by the terms of the particular arrangements. But no one could possibly suggest that the peace of the world could in the long run be

maintained by such limited and partial arrangements. He agreed wholeheartedly with what the representative of the United States had said in his opening address (222nd meeting) namely, that the problem of peace was a universal problem which could be solved only on a universal basis.

72. In short, while the world had in the United Nations something very precious, something, indeed, that was worthy of all support, it did not have the one thing, the means of defeating aggression, which, in the long run, man must achieve or perish.

73. He believed that if the world had the good fortune to enjoy a long enough period of peace, the United Nations would prove itself able to preserve the peace; that, if it had sufficient time, it would find means to free itself of the shackles of the veto and to establish an effective organization of all peace-loving and liberty-loving nations determined to protect themselves, all for one and one for all, against any aggression. But did it have the time? No one knew. One thing, however, was clear: the problem was not only fundamental and vital, it was pressing and insistent, it was on the very door-step of the United Nations, it was in every home. Man must solve the problem—and solve it in time—or perish.

74. The PRESIDENT announced that the list of speakers for the general debate would be closed at 6 p.m.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 23 September 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

General debate (continued): speeches by Mr. Stikker (Netherlands), Mr. Viteri Lafronte (Ecuador), Mr. Schuman (France), Mr. Belaúnde (Peru)

1. Mr. STIKKER (Netherlands) spoke of the necessity, in the troubled modern era, for a Foreign Minister to spend a considerable part of his time away from his country, being called upon to attend in person one international conference after another. There had been truly revolutionary changes in the exercise of the function of Foreign Minister in the preceding decades. Early in the twentieth century, personal contact between Foreign Ministers had been a great exception. Meetings in which those responsible for the foreign policy of their country gathered in great numbers and at regular intervals had been totally unknown, as had been the frank discussion of matters of international interest which was at the moment taking place.

2. The plenipotentiaries of fifty-nine States were assembled at Flushing Meadow in order to settle together the many important items of a lengthy agenda; mankind was indeed witnessing a profound change in international practice. That change would be considered salutary in its effects, provided always that the deliberations of the Assembly were measured by the criteria of justice and international law. Decisions should not be based on political considerations either of a purely

national character or serving the interests of groups of States; if they were, then all the smaller and weaker nations would have to submit to pressure from larger and stronger Powers.

3. Even more than the League of Nations in former days, the United Nations, comprising fifty-nine countries, had become the forum of the world where the vital interests of those countries were discussed. It must not be forgotten that each of the Governments represented at the Assembly acted as the exponent of its people, large or small, and that the interests of those peoples were peace and security, freedom from want and from fear, all of which subjects figured prominently in the debates. Hence hundreds of millions were directly concerned with the results of the Assembly's work and it was thus the duty of its Members to accomplish their task as effectively as possible.

4. Unfortunately, the ideal of a universal body, comprising all nations, had not yet been achieved. The Netherlands delegation would welcome the attainment of universality and would favour the admission of countries which were at the moment barred by what it considered an excessive use of the veto. In particular, the Netherlands delegation would be gratified if all Members of the United Nations were to be guided by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which had declared that the refusal to admit new Members could not be based upon considerations other