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AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (*continued*)

1. Mr. ROGERS (United States of America): Mr. President, I should like first of all to associate myself with the previous speakers who have congratulated you on your election to the high office of President of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. The United States is confident that you will pursue the ideals of the Charter with the same dedication as your distinguished predecessors.

2. The United Nations is an important instrument of peace. It is also the repository of many of the world's hopes. We must ensure that it is true to those hopes; that we here assembled—the representatives of 130 nations—meet our high responsibilities not only to our own world but to the world of the future.

3. Building a structure of peace—a structure that will stand—requires patience, dedication and realism. Working at peace—working at it seriously—means more than long hours of careful deliberation. It means putting aside preconceptions; it means weighing carefully what our real interests are, not only as citizens of our own countries, but also as citizens of the world. It means proceeding with urgency, but without impatience; steadfastly, but not stubbornly. And it means recognizing that differences exist, and will continue to exist—differences of view, differences of interests, different systems and different values—and that one of the functions of a structure of peace is to protect and accommodate those differences, not to destroy them.

4. It is appropriate, I think, to take note of the fact that, by any objective standard, the world is a more peaceful place than it was just a few years ago.

5. In Africa, the conflict in Nigeria is now long over. Because of recent developments, prospects in the Far East seem more hopeful. Fighting in Indo-China, though it continues, has been substantially reduced. The cease-fire still holds in the Middle East. The division of Europe is less

threatening because the first stage of agreement has been reached on Berlin. Concrete agreements have been achieved on the periphery of the arms race, and encouraging progress is being made at its centre.

6. Yet there are areas—above all, in South Asia—where political instability has tipped the balance toward greater tension. There, man's ancient enemies—poverty, hunger and disease—gain headway, nurturing within themselves seeds of further unrest. And even in areas where recent progress has been made, tensions remain, and the threat of renewed or increased hostilities continues.

7. That is why we must accelerate our efforts for peace. The achievement of a peaceful world will depend, not just on the efforts of a handful of powers, but on the efforts of all Governments.

8. In recent years we have seen a new diversification of power and influence among the nations of the world. Most colonial States have won their independence and now exert a marked impact on world affairs. Japan has found remarkable new strength. The movement towards cohesion in Western Europe has quickened. This diversified and interdependent world is clearly preferable to the bipolar world which emerged from the Second World War. Nevertheless, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States—both large, continental States, both nuclear States and both dynamic States—are of fundamental importance.

9. Nothing could better serve the cause of peace than a further relaxation of tension between our two countries and the elimination of its by-product—the arms race.

10. The foreseeable future cannot, of course, be expected to bring an end to the differences between the Soviet and United States political systems or to the competition between us. But it can bring important and beneficial changes in our relations. Many agreements have been achieved in recent years between us. The success of those agreements has stimulated the effort to negotiate still others. Collectively they could promote not just “co-existence” but—if we proceed to build on durable foundations—“co-operation” as well.

11. Our desire to lay the foundations for such co-operation is in no way lessened by our policy of seeking to improve relations with the People's Republic of China. And we have taken due note of the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement that the Soviet Union regards the normalization of our relations with the People's Republic of China as a “natural development” [1942nd meeting, para. 118].

12. Though efforts at improvement in Soviet-United States and in Soviet-European relations have assumed many

forms, the two most important have been the negotiations on strategic arms and on Berlin.

13. A Berlin agreement will be a milestone along the road to a more peaceful and co-operative Europe. Pivotal in the portion already agreed¹ to is the firm commitment to unrestricted transit traffic of civilian persons and goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. Particularly significant is the obligation the Soviet Union has undertaken to ensure that this traffic will be unimpeded, that it will be facilitated and that it will receive preferential treatment.

14. The value of this agreement will depend, not on how the obligations have been formulated on paper, but on how they will be carried out on the ground. Truly unhindered movement to and from Berlin would greatly reduce tensions and remove one of Europe's most dangerous flash-points. Half-hearted or grudging implementation of the agreement would only perpetuate fears and suspicions. The willingness of the German Democratic Republic, in its discussions with the Federal Republic of Germany, to translate general obligations into specific commitments and subsequently to put those commitments into actual practice will be the crucial test.

15. The achievement of a final Berlin agreement and its effective implementation could lead to broader progress. It would, for example, make more realistic the prospects of a European conference with United States and Canadian participation. It would accelerate the movement—desired by the people of Eastern as well as of Western Europe—towards the reduction of tensions on the continent.

16. It is to this end that the United States is pursuing the possibilities of negotiation on a mutual and balanced reduction of military forces in Europe.

17. Two years ago President Nixon pledged to the General Assembly that the United States was determined to limit, and then reverse, the build-up of strategic arms. He said we intended to conduct our negotiations with the Soviet Union "soberly and seriously . . . seeking to reach agreements rather than to make propaganda" [1755th meeting, para. 69].

18. In May of this year the United States and the Soviet Union announced their intention to achieve agreement on both defensive and offensive strategic arms, initiating a new stage of intensive work. As a result, although no agreement has yet been reached, we have come closer together on the concepts and details of an agreement to limit anti-ballistic missile systems. On 20 May we made an announcement that contemplates that agreements to limit defensive and offensive weapons will be reached "together". When talks resume in Vienna next month it is therefore agreed that discussions in greater detail will be undertaken on the limitation of offensive weapons.

19. Meanwhile, these negotiations have already produced two valuable agreements, one on preventing nuclear accidents from leading to war and the other on improving "hot

line" communications between Washington and Moscow by use of satellites.

20. There has also been encouraging movement in multilateral negotiations. Here, too, the United States intends to work constructively for further concrete results. In particular, we urge this session of the General Assembly to seek broad ratification of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction [A/8457-DC/234, annex A].

21. The Soviet Union has suggested the creation of a periodic world disarmament conference to be established outside the United Nations [1942nd meeting, paras. 158-159]. Frankly, we are sceptical that such a generalized approach would produce specific accomplishments. All post-war experience indicates that a concrete, step-by-step approach offers better prospects for success than more grandiose schemes, which tend to generate many words but few results.

22. At a time when the prospects are promising for participation in the United Nations by the People's Republic of China, and perhaps others as well, there would seem to be no reason for establishing still more world disarmament machinery outside the United Nations framework.

23. Accommodations among the stronger nations of the world are vital elements of a lasting peace. But the road to enduring peace is no short cut, passing only through the capitals of the strong. The road to peace must traverse every region where there are human beings who aspire to a better condition of life.

24. In Africa, where the right to a freer existence is still denied to many, we are constant in our support of practical and peaceful means to achieve self-determination and end racial discrimination. That is the policy which President Nixon and I were pleased to confirm to the President of Mauritania and the distinguished delegation from the Organization of African Unity in Washington last week. Consistent with that objective we have decided to accept the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences for States of South Africa's continuing occupation of Namibia.²

25. In South-East Asia, as we proceed with an orderly military withdrawal from Viet-Nam, we will continue to make substantial efforts to aid the region's economic progress.

26. In this hemisphere, we are moving towards a relationship of equal partnership in which rights and responsibilities are shared. We are conscious that such a relationship requires economic growth, greater opportunities for trade, and closer economic co-operation among us.

27. I especially wish to emphasize our undiminished concern for the economic health of the nations of Latin America and other nations of the developing world at a

¹ Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed at Berlin on 3 September 1971.

² *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

time when the new economic policy of the United States may have raised certain questions.

28. Our objectives have not changed. We are not adopting a policy of economic nationalism. We have not abandoned our efforts to assist developing countries—through trade, through aid and through investment. Our faith in a free and open system of economic relations among States has not diminished.

29. We seek a stronger economy at home. We seek also a more equitable international economic system which meets present-day conditions and thus gives even greater encouragement to the flow of goods and capital across borders. Such a system would contribute to the prosperity of all the world's people, in developing and developed countries alike.

30. This Organization, during this session, faces a decision on the China question—a decision with major consequences for the United Nations.

31. In our interdependent world, no significant segment of the world's population and of the world's power should be isolated. It was this consideration which led President Nixon to alter the China policy of the United States. To pursue a policy which did not respond to present realities would risk the future for the sake of the past. On the other hand, to seek to improve relations with the People's Republic of China, and to contribute to its greater contact with the international community, could foster prospects for a stable peace in years to come.

32. Thus, President Nixon began over two years ago, unilaterally and at first without response, to improve bilateral relations. Recently, he resolved to move decisively into a new era of relations by accepting an invitation to visit Peking before 1 May 1972. And he decided to support the seating of the People's Republic of China in the General Assembly and as a permanent member of the Security Council.

33. The United States wants to see the People's Republic of China come to the Assembly, take its seat, and participate. We want to see it assume, as a permanent member of the Security Council, the rights and responsibilities which go with that status. On the seating of the People's Republic of China there is widespread agreement in this body.

34. This Assembly does, however, face a related and momentous issue. It could become the first Assembly in United Nations history to take action to expel a Member—an action which would have the effect of expelling 14 million people from its councils. The path of expulsion is perilous. To open it for one would be to open it for many.

35. So the United States and 16 other countries have introduced a draft resolution [A/L.633] which would seat the People's Republic of China as a permanent member of the Security Council, while providing representation both for it and for the Republic of China in the General Assembly. That resolution is based on political reality and on basic equity.

36. It is only realistic to recognize a factual situation which has persisted for more than 20 years: that two Governments now exercise authority over territory and over people who were given representation in the United Nations when China ratified the Charter in 1945 as an original Member.

37. It is only realistic that all the Chinese people who were once represented there should again be represented—and represented by those who actually govern them.

38. It is only realistic that the Security Council seat should be filled by the People's Republic of China, which exercises control over the largest number of people of all the world's Governments.

39. It would be unrealistic to expel from this body the Republic of China, which governs a population of Taiwan larger than the populations of two-thirds of the 130 United Nations Members.

40. Further, it would be unjust to expel a Member which has participated for over 25 years in the world of this Organization with unfailing devotion to the principles set forth in the Charter.

41. The proposal that both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China should be represented in the United Nations should commend itself to Member States of varying national policies.

42. It would assure that the long-prevailing *de facto* situation in China is reflected in United Nations representation; but it does not ask Member States to alter their recognition policies or their bilateral relations.

43. It would provide representation for the people concerned by those who actually govern them; but it does not divide China into two separate States; after all, we all know that Byelorussia and the Ukraine are not separate States.

44. The dual representation draft resolution is founded on the reality of the current situation; but it does not seek to freeze that situation for the future, as it expressly provides that the present decision is without prejudice to a future settlement.

45. In short, the dual representation draft resolution asks simply, and only, that the United Nations take account of the situation as it exists today, and give all the people of China representation in this Organization. As the Charter has accommodated practical solutions of other unusual situations in the past, so it is flexible enough to accommodate the realities of this one.

46. The other proposal before this Assembly—the draft resolution advanced by Albania and others [A/L.630 and Add.1]—is punitive in substance and in intent. It does not seek to deal with facts, but to excoriate and condemn. Its essence is not to admit the People's Republic of China, but to expel the Republic of China and to expel it “forthwith”. That draft resolution would exacerbate, not harmonize, relations in Asia. And it would weaken, not strengthen, the moral and political fibre of this Organization.

47. The issue, then, before this body is the issue of expulsion. That is why we have proposed a draft resolution, which we refer to as the "important question draft resolution" but which more properly should be referred to as the "non-expulsion draft resolution" [A/L.632]. This draft resolution requires a two-thirds vote to expel a present Member of the United Nations. It is consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

48. Some Members have argued that, whatever the equities and realism of our proposal to maintain the representation of the Republic of China, it should not be supported because they feel that the People's Republic of China would refuse to take its seat. Such predictions are hazardous. Certainly the People's Republic of China may be expected to oppose the proposal so long as there is any possibility for a draft resolution that meets its maximum demands. But just as certainly, after a General Assembly decision providing the People's Republic of China with the status of a permanent member of, and with a seat on, the Security Council but not expelling the Republic of China, a new situation would exist. In any event, I submit, in deciding how to vote we should look more to what the United Nations should do.

49. It is ironic that, just as the sentiment for universality in the Assembly is growing, many of those who have long extolled it now seek to violate it. If the United Nations is to embrace universality—as some have suggested—then surely the admission of one Member should not be accompanied by the expulsion of another.

50. Our task here, it seems to me, must be to make a decision that is reasonable, that accepts the realities of the existing situation, that does not prejudice the ultimate outcome and that provides for representation of all the people concerned. Thereafter, our efforts should be to convince those directly involved to take advantage of the decision we have made. The cause of peace has been greatly benefited in recent years by greater pragmatism in many capitals. It would be served by the same pragmatism on this issue.

51. As the United Nations becomes a more universal body it will be better able to deal with the lengthening list of global issues confronting it: in conciliating political differences, in reducing the world's armaments, in curbing the epidemic spread of narcotics addiction, in protecting the environment, in assuring the exploitation of the oceans for the benefit of mankind.

52. In meeting those responsibilities the United Nations must during this session deal with two important matters.

53. It must choose an outstanding successor to our most able and distinguished Secretary-General, U Thant, to whose dedication and idealism we all pay a tribute. And, as I pay respects to the Secretary-General, I am sure my colleagues will understand if I also single out for special attention two United States citizens who are now retiring—Paul Hoffman, the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, who has devoted himself so effectively to the economic welfare of the developing countries, and Ralph Bunche, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, and a Nobel Prize winner, who has contributed so markedly to the cause of peace.

54. The Assembly must also arrest the continuing deterioration of the United Nations financial position, which, as the Secretary-General has pointed out [A/8401/Add.1], has eroded its fiscal credit and undermined confidence in its potential. Responsibility for halting that decline rests primarily on those who fail to pay their share. Given assurances of adequate contributions by others, the United States will be prepared to assist towards an over-all solution. Meanwhile we find it hard to understand why the membership should continue to recommend and approve budget increases beyond those necessary to meet inescapable cost increases.

55. In two parts of the world in which the United Nations has been particularly active—South Asia and the Middle East—urgent progress is needed.

56. In South Asia, renewed and more widespread violence is an ever-present possibility. The events in East Pakistan are internal events with which the Government and people of Pakistan must deal. But their consequences—the flight of refugees into India, the danger of famine, the threat to peace in South Asia—are of grave concern to all nations.

57. To restore peaceful conditions and to save human lives it is clear that restraint must be exercised in the sub-continent; that the international assistance programme must be expanded to avert famine and to create conditions to encourage the return of refugees; and that efforts towards an effective political settlement in East Pakistan must be actively pursued. We are working to those ends.

58. The United States strongly supports the efforts of the United Nations to organize an effective international relief programme. We have made available over \$200 million for relief in East Pakistan and for emergency assistance for the refugees in India—well over 50 per cent of the total contributions from all foreign contributors, public and private. Last week, President Nixon asked Congress to appropriate an additional \$250 million to sustain a high level of relief assistance. A much wider response from other countries is clearly required. We urge the major powers and others with substantial financial resources to contribute generously.

59. The other place where progress is urgently required is the Middle East. Over several years the United Nations has made determined and persistent efforts to achieve a lasting peace in that critical area. None the less the opportunities for success and the risks of failure remain in precarious balance.

60. Security Council resolution 242 (1967), establishing the principles for a durable peace, was the first major step towards reason after 18 years of belligerency and a fragile, often violated, armistice.

61. The cease-fire along the Suez Canal, now nearing its fifteenth month, was the second major step away from war.

62. It is time for a third major step towards peace.

63. For four years Ambassador Jarring has worked diligently to secure the agreement called for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We support his efforts. We

believe his mission remains the best path to an over-all settlement and to lasting peace. Our views on such a final peace settlement remain those expressed in President Nixon's foreign policy report earlier this year and in my statement of 9 December 1969.

64. Both sides to the conflict are committed to the fundamental and reciprocal principles to which the Jarring mission is dedicated: living in peace with each other and withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict as set forth in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Despite those commitments a deep gulf of suspicion and distrust remains.

65. Each side is convinced of the justice of its cause. Each is concerned about its future security. A political settlement based on mutual accommodation could assure both. An attempt to achieve these ends by force will destroy all possibilities for either.

66. That is why we believe a third major step towards peace is essential—a step that can be taken now; a step that is practical; a step that could help create the confidence and trust which are now lacking; a step towards full and complete implementation of resolution 242 (1967).

67. That step is an interim Suez Canal agreement. That is why the United States has welcomed the interest of both Egypt and Israel in such an agreement. That is why, at the request of the parties, the United States has undertaken to play a constructive role in the process of arriving at an agreement.

68. In order to explore the positions of each side, we have discussed concrete and specific ideas designed to meet the legitimate needs and concerns of both sides. Those ideas, given willingness and good intentions on both sides, could become the basis for a breakthrough. They require further quiet discussions with the parties, an undertaking we now hope can be expedited along the following lines.

69. A first point is the relationship between an interim agreement and an over-all settlement. A fair approach should be founded on two basic principles:

—That a Suez Canal agreement is merely a step towards complete and full implementation of resolution 242 (1967) within a reasonable period of time, and not an end in itself—that has to be clearly established in any agreement; also

—That neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim agreement, complete agreement on the terms and conditions of an over-all settlement—if it could, there would be no necessity for an interim agreement.

Those final terms and conditions will have to be worked out through negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. And we would hope that if an interim agreement was reached, active negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices could be renewed.

70. A second point is the matter of the cease-fire. Its maintenance is in the interest of all of us, of everyone concerned, of everyone in this room, in fact in the interest

of the whole world. The ultimate objective, of course, is a permanent end to belligerency, as part of a final, binding peace agreement. But such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement. Neither would a cease-fire of short duration be realistic. With goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to find common understanding between the parties on this issue.

71. Third is the zone of withdrawal. There are, of course, very important strategic considerations involved in this key point. However, based on our discussions, we believe it should be possible to meet the principal concerns of both sides. Without going into the details, I would merely say that I believe that in the long run the most significant aspect of an interim agreement might prove to be that it established the principle of withdrawal looking to an over-all settlement as a fact rather than as a theory.

72. Fourth is the nature of the supervisory arrangements. Both sides must have confidence that the agreement will not be violated and that adequate machinery will be provided for prompt detection of any infractions. We are confident that ways reassuring to both Israel and Egypt can be found for altering and strengthening the supervisory mechanisms that have existed in the area for the past two decades.

73. Fifth is the question of an Egyptian presence east of the Suez Canal. The reopening and operation of the Suez Canal would require Egyptian personnel east of the Canal. It is understandable, too, that normal activities should be pursued in as much of the zone evacuated as possible. The question of an Egyptian military presence east of the Canal is one on which the parties hold opposite views. But here too, based on our discussion, we believe that there are possibilities for compromise on this issue.

74. Sixth is the use of the Suez Canal. The United States has long held that the Canal should be open to passage for all nations, without discrimination. This principle is clear in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). What is at present at issue in considering an interim agreement is principally the timing at which this right could be exercised. We believe an accommodation on this point is quite possible.

75. With those six points in mind, let me say this: because the parties have asked us, we intend to continue our determined effort to assist them in arriving at an interim agreement. This effort, we believe, is imperative because—and I think it is important to keep this in mind—there is no more realistic and hopeful alternative to pursue.

76. There are risks to peace: but the greater risk is inaction, unwillingness to face up to the hard decisions. A practical step now—an interim agreement—would make the next step toward peace less difficult for all the parties to take. It would restore the use of the Suez Canal as a waterway for international shipping. It would re-establish Egypt's authority over a major national asset. It would separate the combatants. It would produce the first Israeli withdrawal. It would extend the cease-fire. It would diminish the risk of major-power involvement. It would be an important step toward the complete implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

77. I submit that the logic for such an agreement is overwhelming. If the leaders of the area would grasp this opportunity, they would give new hope to their peoples for tranquillity, for progress and for peace.

78. In all of our efforts, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, we should recall that nothing we do matters so much as the legacy we leave to those who follow, the bridge that we build between the past and the future. There is a tendency, especially when tensions are high and tempers short, to regard the present as the focal point of all of man's history. But ours is only the latest generation, not the last generation; and nothing we leave to future generations will matter so much as a structure of enduring peace.

79. Peace must be achieved and maintained, not by the decree of a few, but by accommodation among many. Each Government, in upholding its people's particular interests, must also advance the world interest in a peace which will endure.

80. To that interest the United Nations, from its creation, has been dedicated.

81. To that interest the United States pledges anew its best efforts.

82. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I am happy to address you on behalf of my country, the Republic of the Ivory Coast, extending to you my warmest congratulations on your election to the Presidency of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. We are bound to recognize that our work will be carried out in a sombre atmosphere because of the imminent departure of our Secretary-General, U Thant. Nevertheless, the delegation of the Ivory Coast believes that, more than ever before, our Organization needs a man of his stature and his philosophy who, more than once, has saved the United Nations during acute crises. We therefore express the hope of seeing the Secretary-General—although we understand the reasons which inspired his decision—consent to continue his task in the interest of mankind.

83. To address this Assembly is not only to manifest faith in the United Nations; it is also to contribute to the attainment of its humanitarian projections towards the objectives the Organization has assigned itself, that is to say, to preserve future generations from the scourge of war. My country does so because we feel co-responsible for this noble mission. Thus we shall endeavour to express ourselves in accordance with the laws of maturity for a positive co-operation, all the more so since, while war or violence may be a domestic necessity for certain régimes, a national industry for others, the Ivory Coast can find no cause or explanation for this phenomenon which would enable us to rationalize it or to integrate it in an intelligible system.

84. Almost six years ago Mr. Ian Smith proclaimed the illegal independence of Rhodesia. World public opinion was roused to indignation and took a collective decision: economic sanctions decreed by the Security Council. Six years have gone by; the sanctions have failed. The reason for them, which was a *casus belli* yesterday, no longer seems to be so important in the minds of people. During

that time, with an almost total disregard for public opinion, Great Britain and the Rhodesian régime resumed their negotiations like members of a family. Rhodesia would make concessions, promises rather, and taking these promises on faith, independence is to be granted it in the most legal way in the world and the game will be played out. Some decolonizations were not properly carried out and already create problems for the world or will create them in the future. We hope that Rhodesia will not be added to the ranks—we hope that Great Britain, with its experience, will manage to spare Africa the situation which exists in Palestine and in Cyprus and the fate reserved for the Indian Union. The Ivory Coast is a country of dialogue, and dialogue requires faith. The Rhodesian question is the responsibility of Great Britain, the British Government has stated. We shall continue to place our confidence in it to safeguard the interests of 4 million Africans which it colonized. But our regional organization—as well as the Security Council—should maintain its relations with Great Britain so as to establish contact with it in order to be informed of the course of the negotiations.

85. As for Portugal, it lives a legal fiction and we hope that it will participate fully in destroying the myth. Decolonization is an inevitable event, its rate can only be more or less accelerated. Portugal must turn to the future with serenity and lucidity. Portugal wanted assimilation, and that ideal, far from being condemnable, could well be the link that will in due course bind the new African States to the former metropolis. Because, in fact, there is no acceptable course today other than self-determination and independence. We have stated this in the past from this rostrum and we affirm it again: it is not too late. Portugal can still play the role which history expects; it can free itself from the system which holds it in bondage; it can lead the Territories which it maintains under its domination to independence and enjoy the friendship and the recognition of people who will then be greatly indebted to it. Today, as never before, Portugal faces its future. We must assist Portugal and, like the Arab States in regard to France when the Algerians were courageously fighting against France, we must not be content with Platonic resolutions but must establish contacts with Portugal with the purpose of starting and accelerating the inevitable process of negotiation between the latter and the fighters so as to shorten the suffering of our brothers and preserve, between Portugal and its former colonies, the relations imbued with friendship which exist between the countries that have acceded to independence and their former metropolises.

86. In regard to Namibia, the International Court of Justice pronounced a clear-cut Judgment. But, alas, our institutions, like every human endeavour, are imperfect. The advisory opinion of the Court³ cannot be binding unless we declare that we accept it; South Africa will certainly not make such a declaration. And we run the risk that for a long time to come we shall continue to administer Namibia from New York. The United Nations is not prepared to raise troops for the purpose of protecting and escorting the United Nations Council for Namibia to that Territory to govern it.

87. In the final analysis, in the Ivory Coast we come back to our only weapon, dialogue. The South African Govern-

³ *Ibid.*

ment proposed a referendum which the Court quite rightly rejected because the problem is a political one and rests with political authorities. But why should our Organization not discuss with South Africa, which is a State Member of our Organization, the purpose of that referendum within the framework of self-determination as defined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolution 1514 (XV)] and how the referendum would be carried out? The referendum would be preceded by amnesty for political prisoners and with freedom of action for political parties so as to enable the entire population of Namibia to decide, in the presence of neutral observers and by means of universal suffrage, its future status?

88. Indeed, the Namibians must enjoy the right to self-determination. That was the purpose of the Mandate; current international law confirms it. All the other countries which were under the Mandate of the League of Nations have acceded to independence. Consequently, it is the duty of South Africa, a Member of the United Nations, to comply with that interpretation. This referendum must be not on a choice between administration by South Africa or by the United Nations, but on accession to independence. And Namibia must accede to independence in its territorial integrity as entrusted by the League of Nations to Great Britain and by the latter to South Africa.

89. I now come to the problem of *apartheid*. This is so painful a question as to appear as a veritable mental epidemic; it blocks our judgements and our critical faculties and makes us impervious to reasonable solutions. It prevents us from perceiving the essence: the tragic march of Africa towards an ideological division, with the misfortune of seeing superimposed upon it a political-religious division.

90. The Ivory Coast is against every kind of violence. Violence means armed struggle, war-mongering verbalism, but also structural violence, which causes the oppression of man, which prevents him from being free and acceding to human progress.

91. Despite the malicious insinuations of some of its friends and despite the accusations of being a traitor to Africa hurled against it by some of its brother countries whose régimes give the outside world a distorted picture of African humanism, the Ivory Coast not only denies these oppressive régimes, which are a shame to Africa, the right to inveigh against its positions but also asserts with firm conviction that only through dialogue can an armed clash between our States and the disastrous consequences of structural violence within each of them be averted.

92. To those who recommend a dialogue between whites and blacks in South Africa, the Ivory Coast expresses its complete agreement because we reaffirm that it is only a dialogue which can prevent the disastrous consequences of structural violence within each of our African countries, including South Africa.

93. In response to those who claim that we want to negotiate on the backs of our unhappy brothers in South Africa, the Ivory Coast rejects, not with scorn but with indignation, these fallacious accusations. Indeed, we repeat that it is only a dialogue which can prevent an armed

struggle between our States, including South Africa, and which is able to contribute to the establishment of an atmosphere which will promote or facilitate the indispensable dialogue among the citizens of South Africa.

94. My country and its Government have no intention of either becoming resigned to the perpetuation of the system of *apartheid*, or of seeing extinguished in the ashes of resignation the flame of legitimate indignation of black Africans in South Africa. True, they insistently extoll the dynamic ideal of non-violence, but fully understand that, through the accumulation of deceptions, the threshold of tolerance is broken and brings violence in its wake, driving some to fight or to accept death in order to satisfy their fundamental aspirations to freedom and dignity. But that is only a distress solution for a distress situation.

95. It is therefore incumbent on those who are not immediately involved in this tragedy to endeavour to analyse these events, to dissect the components, to interpret them, to seek solutions so that those mainly responsible, namely, colonialism and racist government, will discover the morality of freedom, of equality, rather than to encourage by deeds and words the terrible logic of violence which leads opponents to greater reciprocal violence.

96. There are so many divergencies in assessing the methods of approach because the categorical judgements that we arrive at do not take into account the essential elements of reality, that is to say, do not place the problem in its true context: the situation of Africa with regard to peace or war. Obviously the use of force will be abhorrent. The great Western Powers will not accept an invasion of South Africa by African armies. The armed power of South Africa is such that one cannot foresee how long a war would last. Our armies would be fighting on several fronts. Our continent would be reduced to a vast field of ruins where hunger and epidemics would cause millions upon millions of dead. Our youth, our hope for tomorrow, would be sacrificed and, without winning the war, we would lose a precious peace.

97. A similarly conceived masked war was implanted in the Middle East and has enabled the great Powers to project their problems there and the profound impetus of their quarrels and to issue proxy invitations to our brothers in that region of the world to fight against one another.

98. Africa, because of its sociological and ethnic pluralism and the need to devote itself to a harmonious development on the economic, cultural, scientific and social levels, must safeguard itself against bloc rivalry. It can only do so if vigilance brings about an internal and external conduct which excludes hatred, even vengeance in the most tragic cases, and establishes a will for dialogue and a permanent policy of negotiation.

99. Indeed, to think of our struggle against *apartheid* since 10 years ago is to take the measure of the evolution of that phenomenon and of the conduct of the world, of which Africa is an integral part. The ethics and philosophy of our decisions have tended toward an economic and diplomatic boycott of South Africa, in order to halt its economic expansion, isolate it and compel it to surrender.

100. Every year South Africa is condemned because of the system it practices, appeals are made and then sanctions are imposed upon it for non-compliance with those appeals. The United Nations will not fail in its task; this year again it will adopt resolutions of condemnation and sanctions. As long as those sanctions remain at the level of the General Assembly, votes will be cast in favour with no opposition—excepting Portugal and South Africa. The sympathies for the victims are many, convictions are unanimously reiterated. Any attempt to have the Security Council endorse resolutions under Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter so that they will become binding decisions has suffered from the veto of the great Powers—the fourth veto of the United Kingdom and the first veto of the United States since the creation of the United Nations.

101. As a general rule, the 10 great Powers which provide South Africa with three quarters of its imports and purchase two thirds of its exports will, like almost all the other Powers, not only not make the necessary effort to impose sanctions but will never make such an effort. The reduction of gold and other mineral deposits, whose expansion is so useful to the world economic structure and the structure of their economies, would cause a crisis in international liquidity, so that each one, given the complexities of economic laws, plays a subtle game of self-satisfaction which consists in voting in favour of a resolution first and then being deceptive about its implementation. Who would dare to propose abandonment of the gold standard for any currency, let alone the dollar? The International Monetary Fund has just purchased gold from South Africa in the amount of \$137.55 million so as to enable States to use the special drawing rights to acquire currencies. All these realities mean that, far from suffering from the decisions taken, economic expansion continues and South Africa increases its income by 6 per cent, which reveals how uncertain are the methods advocated. Thus the possibility for an internal revolution is based on nothing; what is more, within the context of the present world, it seems impossible, if not inconceivable for us, to set up a joint force to fight South Africa, beside the victims, machine-guns in hand.

102. Our support can only be verbal, laden with affection, in a romantic way, bewitching for our peoples, but not in accord with the realities of the situation. Our effort, apparently active, is in fact passive; and we are among those who become exasperated and find it more and more difficult to support it. The Ivory Coast has no great merit in making this affirmation, because we are simply stating a truth known to all. What we denounce is that no one wishes to draw the consequences of this blocking in the United Nations.

103. Three elements command that, while maintaining moral pressure on South Africa, we study new methods of approach. The big businessmen, grouped around large financial institutions which invest even in certain African countries, are liberal; while the racism of the old, who grew up after the Boer war, is pathological, the young are inspired only by the fear of revenge from the blacks. There are therefore differences in motivation which enable us to believe that it will be possible, through technology, frequent contacts and the influence of communications, to disseminate among the vast majority of white and black

citizens of that country the ideals of an egalitarian and brotherly society, to strengthen standards and the social and human values of our time, and thus bring about a peaceful evolution towards a multiracial society.

104. It is true that the thinking and training of some do not predispose them to such a conception. But it is arbitrary to group all attitudes in the struggle under the single word "violence". The Ivory Coast reaffirms its conviction that contacts, the creation of conditions necessary for a dialogue, can, without hampering or discouraging the struggle of the victims, bring about changes through evolution.

105. Diplomatic isolation has also failed. None of the Powers in question has broken relations with South Africa. While South African Airways does not transit our countries, the other airlines and the shipping companies which go to South Africa come to our ports and airports; at the same time the South Africans of Dutch, German, British and other descent maintain contacts with their cousins in Europe and other continents, despite our resolutions. Those contacts between whites certainly do not speed up the solution of the problem; whereas, in the opinion of the Ivory Coast, contact between blacks and whites would in itself constitute a crack in the wall of *apartheid*. Our black brothers, South Africans, also need to circulate, to know the black citizens of the independent countries of Africa—their habits, their customs, their way of life—and their relations with the whites who have remained in those countries in friendship, or who have been liberally welcomed after independence. Finally, it is no mere chance that harmonious relations between whites and blacks in America have been developed increasingly since 1960, the period of independence of African States and their mass arrival in the United States.

106. That is why, in acting against the current of a collective delirium, we affirm that it would be an illusory satisfaction to try to liberate our brothers through war. Our warlike attitude runs the risk of setting off a deadly chain of events, triggered by blind external forces and by our just fury, and would lead our beloved Africa—which has already suffered so much—to the hecatomb desired by some. Thus the well-understood interests of our continent compel us to risk peace rather than war.

107. In this connexion President Felix Houphet-Boigny said the following in March 1968 before the Tunisian Parliament:

"We must once and for all renounce the idea of harnessing our plough to the clouds. We must give proof of being serious and realistic in every field, whether it is a matter of our own affairs, of our struggle against those who persist in wanting to scorn Africa, or whether it is a matter of our relations with our African brothers and the methods used to try to reach unity. What does this consist of? It is to refuse uselessly sentimental and chivalrous attitudes in this century of realism; to reject demagoguery and vain improvisations; it means admitting that words and skills count but little when facts are faced; it is to propose reasonable solutions, that is to say, solutions that one can and wants to apply; it means remaining faithful to principles, but at the same time

being able to exercise the necessary flexibility to ensure their triumph.”

108. The singlemindedness of Africans in regard to the objective elimination of *apartheid* stands intact. Only the methods may vary after 10 years of no success.

109. The situation in the Middle East is a permanent danger for world security. At the fifth emergency special session of this Assembly, I said that the political instability within certain States of the area, the bloody events and the grave disturbances which periodically have broken out in that part of the world, have as their cause, directly or indirectly, the problem of Palestine. We must recognize that the picture is sombre. Yet, I would wish to believe that, today, a ray of hope has lifted some of the shadows from that picture. On both sides, it seems that, finally, they wish to free themselves from the politics of doom and embark on the very difficult course of negotiations—yes, difficult because intransigence confronts intransigence.

110. The Jarring mission, whose noble efforts have been appreciated by both sides, with which his prestige remains intact, may be called upon to pursue his task. Those countries which are friendly with both the Arab States and Israel must assist both parties to adopt an attitude favourable to a dialogue, on the basis of mutual understanding, which in turn is born of mutual good faith. The basis for the discussions exists: Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The terms were carefully weighted both in the preamble and in the operative part. It advocates evacuation from the occupied territories and the recognition of Israel's right to exist.

111. In truth peace will not be made up of either rights or claims, but more simply of mutual concessions. Without them, there is neither negotiation nor dialogue, and therefore no peace. There is no conflict which does not lend itself to a peaceful solution unless minds are closed to every suggestion. Be that as it may, in the end solutions which were initially rejected indignantly are found to be plausible and acceptable. The cease-fire must become permanent and every recourse must be set in motion so as to find arrangements for the reopening of the Suez Canal.

112. The Chinese question is governed by two facts: the national fact, which is reflected in the feeling of each Chinese Government that it is the legitimate representative of China; and the international fact, which, without daring to be definite, leads the other countries of the world, at the whim of world political events, to recognize either *de jure* the Republic of China, or *de facto*, the People's Republic of China, and vice-versa.

113. But the Sino-American ping-pong games have launched the United States “bomb”, and it was logical to discover in its fall-out the specific form of the international fact of two Chinas. Nobody doubts that this solution would win many votes if both were likely to accept a compromise formula. But in fact positions are irreducible and a compromise non-existent. The problem stands in its entirety. There are no nuances in positions taken, and that would lead us to believe that there is a greater interest in the question than in the solution. If the Organization were to take the decision to expel the Republic of China, it

would not emerge morally greater. The Ivory Coast will always be objective whenever this question is debated. Quite obviously, any proposal to expel the Republic of China from the United Nations should continue to be considered an important question.

114. As for the Viet-Nam war, its extension to the entire peninsula is to be deplored and its continuation is not warranted. It would be desirable to encourage the participants in the tragedy to pursue their negotiations in a spirit of sincerity.

115. The peoples of the third world hunger and thirst for economic justice. The problem of peace is also tied to the redistribution of wealth. Redistribution does not mean that the “haves” would have to distribute their goods, but to seek a balance between income we derive from our raw materials and the price we pay for manufactured goods. It has long been thought that the solution to the underdevelopment of the countries of the third world lay in aid given by the rich countries to the poor ones.

116. The disappointing United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964⁴ did nevertheless make it possible for us to see that this conception was cramped, that trade was the primary instrument for the poor countries to accede to general prosperity, and that therefore the development possibilities for the third world were governed by the evolution of the general framework of world trade. Hence the importance of expanded trade, economic co-operation and regional integration as elements of an international development strategy. But the deficiencies and barriers to maximizing international trade are still many and very difficult to surmount.

117. The share of the developing countries in world exports, which was 27 per cent in 1953, fell to 18 per cent in 1969; it even fell from 52 per cent to 42 per cent for primary products, which represents the main part of their exports. These figures reveal the weakness of the structure of exports in the developing countries, which are too dependent on commodity goods.

118. But the organization of markets for commodities and international agreements will not enable producing countries to derive enough income from their products to ensure the accelerated rate of development they need.

119. Moreover, serious import barriers subsist in the advanced countries for these processed or semi-processed commodities. Unfortunately, we observe that the developed countries often still follow a rather pronounced protectionist policy: import duties, surcharges, quotas or subsidies for national producers—whereas in fact the only real solution that will enable the developing countries to improve their situation and to ensure their economic growth would be to export more of their manufactured or semi-finished goods to the wealthy countries.

120. Expansion of international trade should not be sought solely between the rich and low-income countries; trade between the developing countries should also in-

⁴ First session of UNCTAD, held at Geneva from 23 March to 16 June 1964.

crease. Unfortunately, the barriers to this increase in trade are many and often cannot be overcome by developing countries alone without international aid or contributions. Transport and communications between these countries are often inferior to those which link them to the wealthy countries; the quasi-monopoly or the preponderance of foreign shipping companies which service those poor countries places them at the mercy of any freight rates policy which is unilaterally decided in the wealthy countries. The financial institutions, the payments systems and the sales organization have been devised, often for historical reasons, more in terms of trade with the developed countries; products manufactured in the developing countries are often competitive with one another instead of being complementary. Finally, trade in agricultural goods between low-income countries is often hindered because wealthy countries give their farmers assistance in kind or export subsidies. It follows that a serious effort has to be made by the developing countries to institute multilateral payment agreements and regional arrangements among themselves in order to intensify their trade.

121. In reviewing these difficulties and these obstacles to the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, which was adopted at the last session of the General Assembly [resolution 2626 (XXV)], we can but feel overwhelmed at the volume of effort, work and goodwill which must still be amassed to achieve our goal, even though we retain our full confidence in the solidarity, the good sense and wisdom of the world community. Yet we must recognize that the recent crisis in the international monetary system gives cause for the developing countries to despair. They bear no responsibility for the present crisis and yet they suffer the rebound effects of an incoherent management of the international payments system by the developed countries. The present trends toward protectionism and withdrawal which is the pattern in the trade policy of the wealthy countries cannot fail to be detrimental to the hopes of the developing countries for an expansion of international trade.

122. The fluctuation of currencies and, as a consequence, the ensuing uncertainty in the value of the exchange reserves which have been painfully accumulated by the developing countries can but jeopardize and disturb all the programmes and plans for the economic development of the disinherited countries. It is therefore a matter of urgency to set up a new international monetary system which will finally take into account the interests of the developing countries.

123. The rules of the game have so far been defined by the developed countries among themselves. We, the developing countries, because we are realistic, do not claim to challenge their preponderant role, but we do hope that, since we ourselves observe those rules, they will not change them, or, if they do, we should not have to suffer the consequences.

124. The Ivory Coast believes that henceforth we should move towards a polycentric world economy, with several strategic poles, so that the economies of our young countries will not depend on a single pole of attraction, the decisions of which might dash all our hopes. The present

financial crisis which threatens the world gives us this redoubtable example.

125. "The new name of peace", said His Holiness Pope Paul VI, "is development". Thus the problem of peace cannot be solved by philanthropy; it must be solved by a mental transformation leading to an equitable structural organization for international trade. This transformation can be achieved only by means of education: the education of the third world in mastering technology and science, the education of the "haves" to give them a realistic view of underdevelopment so that their main concern will not be "get rich and have no other worries".

126. The work for peace is for each of us an effort at understanding one another. It is a labour of every day, of every instant in all circumstances. Peace is in the hands of men where it is as little secure as a crystal vase in the hands of a child.

127. Mr. GAYE (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): I am happy, Mr. President, to address to you the congratulations of the delegation of Senegal on the occasion of your election as President of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In entrusting to you the heavy task of leading its work, our Assembly—I am deeply convinced—wanted to pay a tribute first to your country, Indonesia, to the lucidity of its people and its realism, your country which, as you said, Mr. President, keeps the privilege of being faithful to dignity in diversity. But your election is also a tribute to your personal activities, to your qualities as an open-minded man and a wise negotiator, to your role as head of the Indonesia delegation which you have been leading at the United Nations since 1967.

128. May I, Mr. President, on this occasion address the congratulations of the delegation of Senegal to Mr. Edvard Hambro, whose experience, knowledge of the law and of men greatly contributed to the success of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations.

129. The Government and people of Senegal, at the same time, welcome the admission to the United Nations of the States of Bhutan, Qatar and Bahrain, whose presence among us is well in keeping with the universalist character which must remain one of the essential characteristics of our Organization.

130. The activities of the twenty-sixth session, which is now beginning, will possibly mark a turning-point in the life of the United Nations. We shall have been the attentive witnesses of an evolution in Asia, which can remain one of the most important events of the last 10 years. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have given an example of that evolution: they have started moving towards a rapprochement of peoples in conformity with the ideal of our Charter.

131. It appears more clearly today to the international community that the admission of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations could not be delayed much longer. We must admit that in the final analysis it would strengthen the character of universality of this Organiza-

tion, whose purpose is to gather together all the nations of the world, large and small, and who knows if we may not after all be led to seek in this universality, if not their immediate reunification, at least an answer to the question raised by all the divided countries?

132. Are we not entitled to believe that the thaw in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China brings with it renewed hope for the restoration of peace in the Far East for the sufficient reason that neither peace nor solidarity can be divided?

133. How can we imagine that the peoples of Asia, who have remained true to themselves through upheavals and isolation, do not feel the need to remain united after the storm has blown over? We must recognize that it is more propitious for the cause of peace, as for that of peace of mind, for each people to be master of its destiny inside its borders. That is the ardent wish of the delegation of Senegal for the peoples of Asia, so unjustly immersed in fratricidal war, especially for the people of Viet-Nam whose martyrdom for over 25 years is well known. It is certainly also the will of all the young States, impatient at the same time to discover the secret which would enable them to be realistic towards events while remaining true to principles. These young nations know that their salvation—that is to say, their survival, their progress, their development and their prosperity—is predicated upon international peace and security. For these young nations, our Organization is in duty bound to redouble its efforts to ban from relations among States any resort to violence or war in whatever form.

134. That is why they have been happy to welcome the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed at Berlin on 3 September 1971, which they interpret as a new contribution to the easing of tension and as the prelude to an understanding which is more than ever necessary for the strengthening of peace.

135. But our Organization must also, we believe, carry out the mission which it undertook to discharge with the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolution 1514(XV)]. Our Organization must achieve in fact the implementation of the right to self-determination of all the peoples which are still enslaved. It must obtain respect for the obligation of the administering Powers to restore sovereignty to the peoples placed by history under their domination in the past.

136. The triumph of such principles in Africa and elsewhere is the same as that of the principles upon which the international community must build its cohesion. It is in the name of that policy that great countries have led to national independence, in accordance with their own procedures, peoples which their flags had covered for a long time. And yet it is precisely that which Portugal and South Africa refuse to the populations of Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

137. H.E. President Moktar Ould Daddah, current President of the Organization of African Unity, hardly a week ago opened the debate on the case of Namibia in the Security Council at its 1583rd meeting. But did not the

General Assembly itself as long ago as 1966 put an end to the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia in resolution 2145 (XXI)? It did so because South Africa had "failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of" its Mandate and "to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the inhabitants of" the Territory. That is why the Security Council, as long ago as 1969, invited the Government of South Africa to withdraw from Namibia in its resolution 264 (1969).

138. Today it is the International Court of Justice that has taken a decision. It formally states

"that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory".⁵

139. It is up to the United Nations—to use the excellent formula of the Head of State of Mauritania—to study the ways and means to take up the challenge which South Africa is hurling at the international community.

140. I shall abstain from raising the case of Rhodesia because it is in everybody's mind and because it is well known that it involves very clear responsibilities and causes great concern to those who place their trust in the United Nations.

141. The international community continues to be confronted with the practice of racial discrimination and of *apartheid* by the Salisbury authorities and even more by the Pretoria régime.

142. The Organization of African Unity, for which freedom and justice, equality and fraternity are objectives in keeping with the aspirations of all peoples, proposed a solution in a document, which one should never tire of recalling. I am speaking of the Manifesto on Southern Africa,⁶ to which, I am deeply convinced, we will have to come back one day in order to found on harmony the coexistence of human communities living in the Union of South Africa. The Manifesto declares that when the objective and the foundation of the foreign policy of States are misunderstood there is a certain lack of harmony among the nations.

143. The Manifesto states that the necessary harmony between peoples and men implies respect for the human person and human dignity, and respect for the equality of their rights. It considers that all men are entitled and are in duty bound to take part in the organization of their own society and, therefore, in the government of their country. But what has to be particularly stressed is that the manifesto recognizes that provisional measures may be necessary in order to carry out without any disruption the mutations which would make it possible to pass from the inequality of groups to the equality of persons.

⁵ See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 58.*

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/7754.*

144. What the Manifesto and all other States basically expect of the Union of South Africa is the acceptance of the principle of the equality of men and of respect for human beings and not an absolute and immediate perfection of institutions.

145. The Manifesto considers that all those who have established their homes in the countries of southern Africa are Africans without any distinction as to race. The Manifesto is not hostile to the South African administration because it is controlled by white men; it is hostile to that administration because it is in the hands of a minority and because its system is founded on the alleged inequality of men based exclusively on racial origin.

146. Those are the ideas on the basis of which the African States think that it is possible to build up in South Africa a coherent multiracial community which would be reconciled with itself. I hope that the representatives of South Africa soon will come to be as astonished as we are that the Manifesto on Southern Africa has not been better understood.

147. I also hope, without the slightest passion, that the Government of Lisbon will become convinced that there can be no lasting peace if injustice prevails and that there can be no true fraternity with domination. Let the Government of Lisbon become convinced of that and thus rethink its relations with the peoples forced to fight, with weapons in their hands, against its presence on their lands.

148. But the United Nations must not only oppose the Portuguese presence in Africa, condemned by everything—history, events and developments—because the Organization is the every-day witness of attacks launched by Portugal against African States every time the territories bordering on those countries prefer armed struggle to Portuguese occupation.

149. Thus the Democratic Republic of the Congo was to complain to the Security Council about two violations of its Territory by Portuguese troops, in 1966 and 1967. Zambia, for the same reasons, had to seize the Security Council of its complaint, in 1969. And there is no need, I think, to recall the recent aggression against the Republic of Guinea by the Portuguese forces.

150. The Government of Senegal, because its villages had been victims of Portuguese attacks, had to call on the Security Council as early as 1963. The Security Council was to reconvene three times more—in 1965, 1969 and in July of this year—because of the gravity of the acts of violence committed by Portuguese forces on Senegalese territory.

151. There has been no year, since 1963, that the Government of Senegal was not compelled to seize the Security Council and world public opinion of Portuguese violations of the borders and air space of Senegal; of bombings and arson in its villages; and of premeditated murders and kidnappings carried out on its territory by Portuguese troops.

152. However, despite all those infringements of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Senegal, President Léopold Sédar Senghor did not hesitate to propose publicly

a peace plan to Portugal in order to put an end to a situation which is destroying Guinea (Bissau) and whose appalling burden Senegal has had to bear for over 10 years.

153. Those proposals are as follows: a cease-fire; then negotiations on internal autonomy, the modalities, limits and duration of which would be discussed between representatives of the Portuguese Government, on the one hand, and representatives of political movements in Guinea (Bissau), on the other hand, granting them independence as the last stage.

154. Those proposals were confirmed to the Secretary-General; they received the agreement of the liberation movements. I offer them today for meditation to the Members of our Organization, because the true problem is to recognize to the people of Guinea (Bissau) its own identity.

155. The problem will always be to treat the nationals of Guinea (Bissau) like all other men, as our Charter prescribes: in other words, the problem consists in turning away from colonial dependence, and in establishing relations to create links of sounder co-operation among free partners—partners free to choose their own destinies.

156. The Security Council recently decided to dispatch a commission of enquiry to Senegal. That Special Mission of the Security Council has just presented its report.⁷ My Government thinks, like the members of the Commission, that there is no other solution, to restore peace in Guinea (Bissau), than to make its people master of its present and its future.

157. The celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations was the occasion for our Organization to reaffirm, in solemn Declarations, certain principles of the Charter. This goes for the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*] and, especially, the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*]. President Hambro said of the latter that it was one of the most important and constructive documents ever adopted by an international organization or a diplomatic conference.

158. At its twenty-fifth session, the General Assembly, among other positive merits, stressed the interest of safeguarding the sovereignty of developing countries over their natural resources, which, for some, are their fishing resources. It becomes obvious that such countries are directly concerned with questions involving the conservation of its marine resources, the definition of the limits of the continental shelf, the territorial sea and adjacent zones. One cannot forget this if one wishes to promote a legislation on the law of the sea which is adapted to present-day realities.

159. The Assembly, at the same time, thought it necessary to advocate liberalization in international trade; but the elimination of some tariff barriers proposed to developing countries, through the setting up of a system of generalized

⁷ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 4 (S/10309/Rev.1).

preferences, was rendered null and void in advance by the on-coming monetary crisis and the present restrictions on trade.

160. That confirmed the risks entailed for developing countries in a generalized preference system before the establishment of mechanisms offering guarantees for the marketing of their produce, for the prices of their commodities, and other compensations.

161. The International Strategy for Development cannot attain its objectives merely by defining relations between industrialized and developing countries. If we wish to attain those objectives, there must be a full awareness of the solidarity among all and of the determined will to create in their economies conditions favourable to their respective growth.

162. The developing countries, by the force of things, are more vulnerable than others to protectionist measures around a large market such as that of the United States of America. That makes it easier to understand why many African countries have always expressed preference for a regional marketing organization along the lines of their association with the European Economic Community. Experience shows that it will be difficult to avoid these aspects of the problem at the next United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

163. It is up to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session to take both new and constructive decisions in the economic and social fields. Machinery must be defined that will make it possible to assess the progress achieved in attaining the objectives of the International Development Strategy.

164. But actually we must redefine, together with the Director-General of the ILO, Mr. Wilfred Jenks, an economic policy in which investments and rural development, industrialization, infrastructures and trade will be dealt with as inseparable components of a strategy for economic growth and social progress, as well as for the mutual development States.

165. We must consider the matter of trade between the rich countries and the developing countries as an equal exchange of services among the members of one single community to grant more advantageous and more stable prices to the primary commodities of the countries of the third world.

166. We can never insist on that enough:

“The setting up of prices on the world market is based not only on intrinsic realities, but also on the free will of men. What the nations of the third world expect from the rich countries is that they consider the foundations of international trade not in terms of relations of strength, but as relations of co-operation and solidarity necessary between the rich countries and those of the third world. They must be considered by them as relations founded on the peace of the heart and on the solidarity among men.”

167. You have seen that I have spoken at length about President Senghor and his statement to the International Labour Conference at its fifty-sixth session held in Geneva in June last.

168. You will also have noticed, maybe with wonderment, my silence on the problem of the Middle East. This only shows the deep desire of my country, Senegal, and of States entrusted with a well-known mission better to contribute to the advent in this part of the world of “relations based on the peace of the heart”.

169. Mr. HARMEL (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, in welcoming you as President of our Assembly, I merely wish to say one thing. Studying the introductory statement you made on 21 September [1934th meeting], we were happy to find a vision of the world which was both truthful and prophetic. It is the statement of a statesman, a wise and courageous statesman. We are also happy to see in you the initiator of the project of regional co-operation in five countries of south-east Asia. My country, Belgium, thanks you for having accepted to preside over our work.

170. May I also address to your eminent predecessor, Mr. Hambro, the expression of our deep appreciation for the effective manner in which he guided the work of the historic twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

171. Now, the choice of questions that my country wishes briefly to deal with is predicated upon our awareness of the specific duties befalling the non-permanent members of the Security Council during their two-year tenure of office. This is why I shall speak first of the crisis of the Middle East and the problem between Pakistan and India.

172. The choice of these problems, of course, is not exclusive of the interest shown by my country in other important problems that we shall deal with when they come up either in the plenary meetings of the Assembly or in the various committees, such as economic development and African problems. We shall at that time remind our colleagues that we believe in resolutions which must give life to the Second United Nations Development Decade—and may I say in passing that our contribution to the United Nations Development Programme in 1972 will go beyond the average requested increase.

173. Almost four years ago the Security Council took a decision on the crisis of the Middle East. Over a year has elapsed since, happily, on 9 August 1970 a cease-fire was established. We felt it our duty to take part in the efforts for pacification which have constantly intensified since then. We were encouraged to do so by Belgium's traditional bonds of trust with the Arab States of the area and the State of Israel. Finally, I would like to say that the countries of the European community are trying to harmonize their views in order to resolve a conflict affecting peace in the Mediterranean.

174. All these reasons have led us to ascertain as precisely as possible the views of the leaders of the main States concerned. We should like to tell them publicly of our gratitude for the confidence they have shown in us and we wish to express in turn the conviction we have reached that it is not only necessary but also possible to establish a reign of peace in the Middle East, to deal with all the controversial problems. It is necessary and possible to build up a situation radically different from that prevailing before

1967, which was so precarious, as we clearly saw, that the slightest accident could place peace in jeopardy.

175. This peace, in our view, must be built on three inseparable pillars: the conclusion of a peace treaty, guarantees offered by the community of nations and the establishment of stable and recognized frontiers.

176. The conclusion of a peace agreement would constitute a fundamental change in the relations that existed prior to 1967 between Israel and its neighbours, because it would include explicit recognition of the State of Israel, of its independence, a mutual refusal to interfere in domestic affairs, the commitment to oppose all acts of violence initiated from each country's territory, the acceptance of freedom of movement in the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal: thus an entirely new body of rules on coexistence would be established which we would wish to see gradually developing into regional co-operation.

177. We are also convinced that the mere existence of a treaty, after 25 years of confrontation, would not be enough unless it was accompanied by guarantees offered by the community of nations as an international pledge to uphold the provisions and commitments of the peace treaty concluded between the parties and to ensure its observance.

178. In our opinion, there would be double guarantees. When the peace treaty is signed, the Security Council would guarantee its provisions and set up a task force, under its jurisdiction, to ensure compliance with the treaty. The force's terms of reference, based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and providing *inter alia* for demilitarized zones and probably zones where United Nations forces would be stationed, would be defined by the Security Council and could be changed, adjusted or terminated only by a new decision of the Council. Under its terms of reference, the task force's operations would be, in some way, autonomous and automatic.

179. At the same time the international community would undertake to carry out a vast programme for facilitating the return to normal economic and social life of the population which have suffered so grievously from the war and its consequences. The European Economic Community will make a substantial contribution to such a programme.

180. The conclusion of such a treaty and the provision of such guarantees would dispose of several problems deriving from the necessary establishment of secure and recognized boundaries, if there were no doubts about its conclusion, because, in this new context, the security of States would not depend either exclusively or principally on a strategic device based solely on a particular carving of boundaries.

181. We, for our part, have realized that Israel could not agree to the exclusion of the specific problems pertaining to the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries from the negotiations, but we also realized that the Arab States will be unable to enter into any peace commitments unless Israel forthwith confirms its acceptance of one of the essential elements of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), namely, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. After thinking about it at length, we believe that these two positions are not irreconcilable.

182. What we saw and heard this summer, during a visit to the States of the Middle East, convinced us that on the threefold bases just described—namely, those underlying resolution 242 (1967)—negotiation was not only a matter of urgency but also possible at this very moment. No time up to the present has been more favourable, but everything points to the fact that the time available for concluding an agreement is short. We therefore believe that Ambassador Jarring's mission—as his proposals of 8 February [A/8541, annex I] bear witness—is more necessary than ever. The public support given to him by "the Big Four" must be a further encouragement to the Secretary-General's Special Representative.

183. The speedy conclusion of the diplomatic procedure initiated through Mr. Rogers's efforts of over a year ago would be useful in this context. The impact of a preliminary agreement under which the Suez Canal would be reopened would demonstrate that yesterday's adversaries can conclude meaningful agreements. It would give us ground to hope, in an atmosphere of restored calm, for the early conclusion of the general agreement which we most sincerely desire. One initial specific step forward would be the preface to over-all negotiation; it would demonstrate its possibility and strengthen the will of all those who cannot admit a deadlock when peace is at stake.

184. It is our feeling that, in such a context, the other problems existing in the Middle East—that of Jerusalem and that of the refugees—would become easier to solve.

185. Whether it be by the mission of Ambassador Jarring, or the initiatives of Secretary of State Rogers, or the conciliatory measures taken by four Heads of State, Mr. Senghor, Mr. Ahidjo, Mr. Mobutu and Mr. Gowon, as requested by the Organization of African Unity—all of them should lead to a negotiation among the parties. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said the other day [1944th meeting]—and I am also convinced of this—that parties to this dialogue must meet.

186. Our membership in the Security Council has compelled us to reflect on another drama—that affecting East Pakistan.

187. It is difficult to summarize in a few words the horrible sequence of afflictions that accompany the exodus of seven million people; the dispersal of their belongings, exile, hunger and death have compounded in this region the ravages inflicted by a natural disaster of exceptional magnitude which struck it last November.

188. Our first duty is to respond to the appeals of our Secretary-General and the Governments of Pakistan and India. My country responded immediately and has just recently announced further contributions. We therefore fully endorse the humanitarian action taken by the Secretary-General. We also approve of the steps he has undertaken to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to all aspects of the situation in East Pakistan. We have noted the conclusion in his communication to the effect that no fundamental solution to this problem can be found unless there is a political reconciliation and unless humanitarian principles are respected.

189. We are fully aware that the diplomatic actions of the community of nations are impeded, in cases of this kind, by obstacles of a legal nature. Full compliance must be ensured with Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter signed at San Francisco, which does not authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. But neither can our Organization remain inactive when the fundamental principles of the Charter concerning human rights are challenged or likely to be so. Several of our colleagues have asked relevant questions during this debate—among them, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada [1944th meeting], when he wondered at what time an internal conflict involves too many countries for it still to be considered an internal conflict.

190. That is why we welcomed with interest the suggestion made by the Government of Pakistan on 11 August 1971 to send to that region a committee consisting of members of the Security Council to establish contact. By taking this decision, the Government of Pakistan demonstrated its understanding of the fact that, when a domestic political dispute leads to such a sequence of distress and spills over into the territory of other States, it is necessary to involve the international community in the action to be taken to end it. Obviously, our world Organization would forfeit much of its credibility if it remained indifferent to the magnitude of the human tragedy which these displaced populations are experiencing. We must seek and find political and constitutional solutions based—as Mr. Schumann said a few days ago [1942nd meeting]—on the consent of the Pakistani people and enabling the populations to return home after their confidence in the future has been restored and they have been assured that human rights will be respected.

191. Such a result cannot come about without concerted measures: first, those of the Government of Pakistan, as it is that Government which is affected by a domestic dispute; then the co-operation of the Government of India because of the presence on its territory of the many millions of refugees; and, lastly, the assistance of the international community. Without taking sides, without amending the text of the Charter, how can we here encourage the parties involved to seek a peaceful solution? Can we not make committees of inquiry, liaison and good offices available to them? Cannot our Organization invite the parties to accept conciliation or arbitration? Must this pacification procedure be conceived at the regional level at which the community of peoples of the same part of the world may have a better understanding of the nature of events affecting it more directly, or must we, on the contrary, involve States which would obviously have no personal interests in that part of the world?

192. These different questions are before us, and the world expects from us specific replies which will make it possible not only to assuage the pain and human misery, but also, and above all, to solve the problems which gave rise to these disasters.

193. The Belgian people and Government are anxiously following the deteriorating situation and hope they can participate in any pacification measures that may be adopted.

194. We are confident that the Governments of Pakistan and India, which are directly affected by these problems, will display the requisite moderation and understanding and that the necessary action will be initiated without delay. The United Nations, and especially our Secretary-General, must help them in this. That is the specific hope which I express today on behalf of my country. We hope that all the questions thus raised, and especially those concerning the contribution of the United Nations to the improvement of relations among States, will be pursued.

195. All eyes are focused on the tragic martyrdom of so many Pakistanis, and we hope that the peace-seeking institutions too are conscious of the need for imaginative studies on the development of pacification procedures in domestic disputes.

196. And this leads me to recall that every year for the past six years, in support of the proposals made by the Secretary-General in 1966, we have drawn the attention of the Assembly to the need to seek a strategy for peace. A new science has arisen in the meantime, called “polemology”. Over a hundred institutions throughout the world are dealing with it and each year present a considerable number of reports which should be studied by the United Nations.

197. Many times we have proposed that the Secretary-General should be requested every two years to submit to the General Assembly a review of the studies produced by these international research centres. We should, of course, choose those that are of particular relevance to our peace-keeping obligations. The purpose should not be to analyse these studies because that might betray their spirit; nor should there be, notwithstanding what some people have thought, any co-ordination and systematization of these studies, the initiative for which must continue to lie entirely with each institution dealing with peace research. The review, which we should like to be of an informative nature, would be a concise one and therefore necessarily inexpensive. The mere fact of having it submitted to the Assembly would, however, enable each of our states and the competent United Nations services to refer to it if they so wished. And if a short debate were to follow the submission of that report it might provide an opportunity for bringing up subjects not yet covered which might be requested by our Organization or any one of our States.

198. Accordingly, we are submitting this year a draft resolution⁸ setting forth the proposal I have just described to the Assembly. The question is on the agenda [item 39], and we should be grateful to all States that have already shown interest in this project if they would support and vote for it.

199. And now I should like to draw the Assembly's attention to a series of recent and crucial facts that are very impressive and demonstrate that all around the world political behaviour is becoming increasingly realistic. I would mention the following: the prospect of the imminent participation of the People's Republic of China in the life of the United Nations; the announcement by the President of the United States of a readjustment of United States

⁸ Subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/L.234.

positions in some key sectors; the admission of the United Kingdom and the three other friendly States to the European communities in the very near future; the long-awaited agreement concluded between the four major States, which improves the situation in Berlin; the confirmation given by Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Brandt that one of the most important steps towards the general normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will be the admission of those two States to membership in the United Nations in the context of the *détente* in Europe.

200. Those facts are important not only because they reflect some fundamental changes that have occurred since the end of the Second World War but also because they herald and call for new balanced situations. Mr. President, in your introductory statement you yourself stressed "the gradual transformation of the international order from the rigid, bipolar constellation of contending forces . . . to the new, multicentred power configuration" [1934th meeting, para. 30]. On the new bases, a policy better adjusted to realities and needs can be developed, and the effectiveness of our Organization should be enhanced thereby.

201. Belgium draws some of its own conclusions from this.

202. First, the universality of the United Nations, a fundamental aim of our Organization, prompts us to recommend strongly that the People's Republic of China should occupy the seat reserved for China under our Charter. In the name of the same universality we think that logic and policy require us to seek to bring about the conditions whereby the divided States that are not yet Members could be admitted without ousting those that are already Members provided they abide by the Charter.

203. A second conclusion comes to mind. One year ago we already had occasion to point out from this rostrum [1856th meeting] that the aims of the Charter can be achieved concurrently with the action of the central institutions of the United Nations through agreements and regional organizations created on the spontaneous initiative of countries grouped in a given zone. Each year that movement becomes more evident in the world, and today the significance of this vast regrouping and restructuring trend seems to be increasingly decisive in establishing a new world balance based no longer on hegemony but on co-operation.

204. The linkage of various and better-structured regional groups can remove some of the difficulties deriving from the disproportion in terms of area and power between the different protagonists in the international debate. The regroupings can, of course, imply the waiver of national sovereignty only to the extent that Governments and peoples expressly agree to do so, but they must permit the various regions of the world to reach the level of political effectiveness that will enable them to shape their own future.

205. Lastly, the third conclusion which we draw for our country from these facts, as we have mentioned, both within and outside the European continent, confirms the need for Europe's political and economic unification, which

Belgium is pursuing with increasingly stronger conviction and determination.

206. More than ever, three major goals useful to Western Europe but also to the world at large must be reached.

207. First, the Europe of the six, and soon of the 10, united countries must become itself, that is, it must acquire a power commensurate with its responsibilities. It is the ambition of the constituent States to organize among themselves a new and original form of co-operation as regards both institutional structures and the aims pursued.

208. Europe, of course, already appears as a major economic and commercial power. But consideration of world realities leads it to intensify and expedite the process of its political unification. The United States, which has done so much to help Europe to find its way, is readjusting its position. China, as we have said, is anxious to put forward its position. All this obliges Europe to determine and to play its role on the world stage. What role? Mr. Schumann put it very well the other day: "... refusing to accept any kind of hegemony is the best contribution a country can make to the birth of a truly international community" [1942nd meeting, para. 37].

209. That is true of Europe. Its role will not be one of hegemony. Europe has renounced that temptation. It will, of course, have sufficient dignity to contribute its share of security in its own area, but without engaging in external adventures. It is not spending its resources on inter-continental weaponry. The Europe of realities will therefore be a Europe that is active at the world level but a moderate and non-belligerent Europe whose sole ambition will be to be a moderating, conciliatory, or, to put it in a nutshell, pacifying authority.

210. At the European-continent level, Western Europe is not just seeking to consolidate its internal peace. It has already resolutely opted for a policy of *détente* and co-operation between all European States, both committed and non-committed. Over the past six years a long road has been travelled despite painful accidents. What we expressed then as a hope is taking shape and becoming a reality today.

211. Now that the obstacle of Berlin is more than half overcome by the agreement of the four guarantor States, active preparations must be made for the two-fold step of the balanced reduction of the forces in Europe and a conference on European co-operation and security. Those two aims derive from the same spirit. We aspire to both, and we hope very particularly that the Berlin agreement will soon enter into force and allow us to meet again soon at Helsinki.

212. But that is not yet enough. Western Europe, based on common convictions and traditions, well realizes that the prosperity it has achieved and the privileges it enjoys cannot always be only to its own advantage. It is an exceptional achievement to have doubled Europe's national income in 14 years. But the redoubling of that effort would be ridiculous were Europe to limit its action to that goal. It must find its deep-lying meaning, a further legitimacy, by taking on another original mission: that of contributing decisively towards solving, in co-operation, the problems

created by the inequality of wealth among the different regions of the world.

213. Europe must contribute imagination, a sense of justice and generosity in a specific dialogue with the States of the southern hemisphere. Europe must persuade those States that its regional regrouping is not selfish. Europe knows it can deserve the friendship of peoples only to the extent that it shares with them a concern for their economic, social and human future. In order to meet that expectation it will, of course, be necessary gradually to reformulate the rules of trade and industry. We, for our part, are ready to do that.

214. Western Europe is confronted in these years with crucial problems. Now is the time for its new face to appear. It must find, and it will find, both internally and in its outward-directed action, the structures and attitudes which will give it its own stature and enable it to play a renewed role. To that extent only will it become an effective tool for pursuing the fundamental aims of our world Organization: the maintenance of security, development and co-operation.

215. And now, Mr. President, I should like to ask you to transmit to the Secretary-General these final comments which I shall now make.

216. On other occasions when our Secretary-General announced his wish to retire from the eminent post he occupies, we were among those who asked him to stay. Today we are afraid that he will no longer yield to our

urging, after having fully devoted, for 10 years, all the resources of his personality to peace and co-operation among peoples.

217. Our Sovereign, King Baudouin, his Government and all the Belgians have always placed their trust in the person and the actions of the Secretary-General, held them in high esteem and given them their support. We are gratified that his visits to Belgium and our actions in the United Nations have borne ample witness to this fact.

218. Among the immense services he will have rendered us, I would like to mention one in particular: the admirable report in which he has just presented to us his views on the political responsibilities of the Secretary-General [*see A/8401/Add.1, paras. 124-137*]. We, for our part, fully support this conception, and we would like the choice of his successor to be made with serious consideration given to the political responsibility, unique in the world, of the Secretary-General.

219. We know that a world Organization conceived in very different circumstances a quarter of a century ago cannot continue to be enlivened and regenerated without the talents of his successor. We intend to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General, during the vote for his successor, by trying to bear in mind the noble conception of the Secretary-General's function that U Thant has so well incarnated and described.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

