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*President:* Mr. Carlos SOSA RODRIGUEZ  
(Venezuela).

## AGENDA ITEM 9

### General debate (continued)

1. Mr. ADOULA (Congo, Leopoldville) (translated from French): The dedication with which your predecessor, Mr. President, discharged his duties makes it incumbent upon us to pay him a just tribute. We are convinced that you are actuated by the same feelings, and we are gratified at the choice the General Assembly has made in electing you.

2. There are situations in which words do not adequately render feelings. I cannot find terms sufficiently strong, sufficiently warm, to express my country's gratitude to the United Nations, to which it largely owes the very fact of its existence today. The significance of this undertaking, unique in the history of our Organization, extends beyond my country's borders. It is a fact that progress, in bringing us closer together, has made us more sensitive to events, no matter where they may take place.

3. The Cuban crisis caused the world to tremble; the Moscow Treaty<sup>1/</sup> has restored the world's confidence. The Congo, which has come to appreciate that peace is the primary condition for progress, immediately acceded to that Treaty. The Congo hopes that this first step will be followed by others and that the world will eventually be freed from the haunting fear of destruction. It is because of this hope that we welcome with the greatest interest the suggestions made from this rostrum by President Kennedy [1209th meeting] and Mr. Gromyko [1208th meeting] with a view to continuing our progress towards this objective.

4. But peace will be threatened as long as injustice exists and man is oppressed by man. To abolish injustice means to struggle for peace. Although facing many problems, my country has never failed in its duty in this regard. It is fully aware of the mission imposed upon it by its geographical situation. It is

aware of the hopes placed in it by those countries of our continent which have not yet been liberated. I wish to affirm from this lofty rostrum of human conscience that we shall never shirk our task or disappoint those hopes.

5. At our borders, Angola is the scene of a colonial war, with its toll of affliction, blood and tears and its trail of refugees. Our country is not unaffected by this war. The situation is all the more deplorable as the true representatives of Angola, those who are leading the fight, are prepared, as they continually emphasize, to make peace even today if necessary, provided the desire of their people to be masters of their own fate is satisfied. No one can deny that this is a legitimate claim.

6. We, for our part, have unfailingly done everything in our power to bring peace closer. That is why we recognized the revolutionary Government of Angola in exile. We wished by this gesture to affirm the personality of that African brother country, which today is passing through a phase we have all, in varying degrees, experienced.

7. In spite of the intransigent statements of the Portuguese authorities, we have not lost hope that wisdom will prevail and that a solution will be found to shorten the sufferings of both peoples. This hope is matched only by our resolve to give our brothers who are fighting for their freedom every support.

8. Our attitude towards Angola is also our attitude towards all the Territories under Portuguese domination. Our support is assured to all who are fighting for their independence, without any exceptions.

9. Nevertheless, I should like to deal in particular with two questions to which the Organization has turned its attention: Southern Rhodesia and the policy of apartheid. We are strongly opposed to the view that the solution of these problems should be postponed because they do not constitute an immediate threat to the peace. Should the fire be left to smoulder under the ashes until a conflagration breaks out? We cannot remain indifferent in the face of a persistent policy which raises racial discrimination to the level of a State institution. This policy strangely recalls nazism, and everyone knows the tragedy to which that movement led.

10. The only solution to all these problems lies in self-determination, which is a fundamental principle of the Organization's Charter. We shall reject any solution departing from that principle and designed to perpetuate racial or colonial hegemony in some sort of disguise.

11. I should also like to stress the importance for the problems of decolonization of the historic Conference of Addis Ababa.<sup>2/</sup> The hope of those who are

<sup>1/</sup> Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963.

<sup>2/</sup> Summit Conference of Independent African States, held from 22 to 25 May 1963.

fighting has been strengthened by the resolve of the African countries to unite their efforts to support them. The Addis Ababa Conference and more recently that of Dakar,<sup>3/</sup> will thus have been landmarks in the life of our continent.

12. Does not even what has been called "the Congolese problem" represent one of the aspects of decolonization? The efforts made by the international Organization to help our country have opened up a new road and offer the countries still fighting for their independence a new opportunity for realizing their people's wishes. This precedent is sufficient in itself to justify the magnitude of the effort which has been made to assist our country. But the fight has been a hard one, costing many lives and demanding many other sacrifices.

13. May I be permitted once again to pay a tribute to the memory of those heroes of international solidarity, of whom Dag Hammarskjöld is the most outstanding example. May I also be permitted to express our gratitude to all the nations which have come to our aid and also to the Secretary-General for the dedication which he has displayed in our country's cause.

14. The importance of the work done by the United Nations in the Congo makes it imperative for us to safeguard the results achieved. Although our country's territorial integrity has been restored and national unity has been re-established, there is one threat which still persists and to which the Secretary-General has appropriately drawn attention in his report on the situation in the Congo.<sup>4/</sup> This threat, which weighs upon our southern borders, is maintained by two colonialist régimes. Documents which have fallen into our hands corroborate this and show that those who are dreaming of a new secession have not laid down their arms. They maintain liaison with their agents still stationed on our borders who are waiting for a favourable moment to act.

15. In these circumstances, the retention of the United Nations Force is imperative. The importance which the Congolese Government attaches to this point is indicated by the fact that it has delegated its Prime Minister to explain to the General Assembly the reasons for its actions. I am gratified by the interest which the General Assembly has taken in this matter, and we have noted with satisfaction that considerable attention has been given to it by the majority of speakers who have come to this rostrum. I am also gratified that a substantial majority of the Assembly has come out in favour of our request, but we would like to see unanimity on this matter, particularly as it actually involves nothing more than the continuance of an operation whose duration the Security Council has left it to the Congolese Government to determine.

16. The operation cannot, of course, continue indefinitely, and we fully agree with the Secretary-General when he suggests a progressive disengagement. What our request amounts to in fact is a modification of the rate of such disengagement, so as to allow our own police forces, which are at present being trained, gradually to relieve the United Nations Force.

<sup>3/</sup> Conference of the Organization of African Unity, held from 2 to 11 August 1963.

<sup>4/</sup> See Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5428.

17. We are fully aware of the financial difficulties that this involves for the international Organization. My Government is not seeking to evade its responsibilities in the matter, and I can assure you that if we were able to bear the financial burden of this operation, we would certainly have done so. We hope that a decision will be reached soon because continued discussion might jeopardize the operation itself. Let us not forget the old adage about leaving well enough alone.

18. I should also like to point out that the Congolese question is a test of the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace, for if, today, our Organization suffered a set-back in this task for which it was created, might it not for the same reasons tomorrow be prevented from intervening in a conflict elsewhere in the world? Our attitude today must close the door to such a possibility.

19. For us, the strengthening of the peace which the Congo has now regained is not an end in itself; it is rather a means of achieving what our people really hope to gain from their independence, namely, social betterment. The full import of this problem can only be understood by recalling the special circumstances of our country at the time of its attainment of independence. The Congo was on the front pages of the newspapers, but it was rarely mentioned that out of 15 million inhabitants on 30 June 1960, only some fifteen were university graduates with a master's degree and 132 with a bachelor's degree. Thanks to United Nations technical assistance, which is of vital importance to us, we have been able to improve this situation to a considerable extent. Today the Congolese have taken over in several sectors, and the results fully justify the continuation of this assistance. We are well aware that we are not the only nation in need of such assistance, but the paucity of bilateral aid compels us to ask for it.

20. As regards education, for example, bilateral assistance has provided us with only 1,200 teachers, whereas 30,000 teachers are supplied to other countries having a population only four times greater than ours. These examples could easily be multiplied. The situation is similar with regard to physicians of whom only some fifty are supplied through bilateral assistance, and with regard to agronomists of whom we have only about a dozen for a country the size of Europe. I think these facts call for no further comment.

21. Another reason justifying United Nations technical assistance to the Congo is our country's economic potential and possibilities of development. The training of key personnel in our country should be pursued in harmonious fashion. Our most cherished hope is, in fact, to man all sectors, and our ambition is to pay off the debt which we have incurred by assisting those who may need help in the future. That would be the best return our country could make and the best tribute to the work of the international Organization.

22. The United Nations is now eighteen years old. During this period the world has undergone many changes. Many countries have joined the great family of the United Nations. All these changes must find their counterpart in our Organization and faithfully reflect the hopes that millions of persons in the developing countries place in it. If this is to be achieved, the principle of convening a conference for the review of the Charter must be accepted, and the sooner the better. The new forces which have emerged must be

equitably represented in all United Nations organs. This concern stems from our attachment to the United Nations and our wish that its prestige should grow to new heights and its principles triumph everywhere. From this rostrum we reaffirm our resolve to do everything in our power so that this may be achieved.

23. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call on the representative of Indonesia who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

24. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia): In exercising my right of reply to the statement of Dato' Ong of Malaysia, made last Friday, 4 October [1228th meeting], I shall take the opportunity of also answering Sir Garfield Barwick, the representative of Australia who gave his statement the day before [1226th meeting].

25. The long debate on Malaysia has not, I am afraid, been conducive to clarifying the issue. This is therefore, I believe, the right moment to give a short description of Indonesia's stand regarding the establishment of Malaysia, in answer to much that has been said in the statements of my opponents.

26. On 20 November 1961, my Foreign Minister, Mr. Subandrio, indeed informed the sixteenth session of the General Assembly that "we had no objections to such a merger"—that is, into Malaysia—"based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned" [1058th meeting, para. 194]. I repeat, "based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned". The representative of Malaysia was kind enough to remind us of this statement.

27. I can assure the Assembly that we have not changed our opinion one iota. "The will for freedom of the peoples concerned" remains for us the criterion. The wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak remain our guide.

28. Now, what happened after my Foreign Minister's statement before the sixteenth session of the General Assembly? A revolution for complete independence, and against the idea of Malaysia, broke out in Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. Dato' Ong wisely ignored it in his statements. Yet the revolution was successful, particularly in Brunei. Large contingents of troops from Britain's military base in Singapore, aided by Malayan armed police, were needed to suppress it.

29. This revolution naturally raised doubts in our minds as to whether the Borneo territories really want to join Malaysia. It was natural also that the Philippines should have shared our suspicions. Hence the Philippines and Indonesia required a reliable ascertainment of the wishes of the people in these Borneo territories; without it, we were not prepared to recognize Malaysia.

30. But the representative of Malaysia has another explanation for our reservations, and a very glib and easy one at that. A resolution adopted by the Indonesian Communist Party describing Malaysia as "the formation of a new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of our country", which Dato' Ong mentioned in his statement on 4 October 1963, is for him sufficient proof that it was Indonesian communism that was the real culprit. This is a rather cheap argument. The representative of Malaysia, of course, knows that to cry communism is usually a successful method for gaining the support of Western nations. But what about the Philippines, our common neighbour? Its Government has also withheld recognition of

Malaysia. Is there communist pressure in this case as well? Is there anyone who would believe that?

31. Dato' Ong cannot have been unaware that the Indonesian military has always raised even stronger objections at the prospect of the establishment of what they consider to be a neo-colonialist federation on our very territorial borders. It is the military in Indonesia which has always been regarded by the Western world—wrongly, I must say—as the chief factor that holds in check the power of the Communist Party. Why did my friend ignore it? As it happens, all the parties in my country, without exception, have declared themselves against the formation of a British-sponsored federation on our borders. It is not without significance that President Sukarno chose the Seventh Congress of the Indonesian Catholic Party in July 1963 as the appropriate platform to deliver his major policy statement on Malaysia. But this is evidently not important to Dato' Ong.

32. Once again, I should like to emphasize that it was mainly doubt, genuine doubt, about the real wishes of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak, that caused Indonesia and the Philippines to withhold recognition of Malaysia. And it was this doubt which was the reason why the Manila Agreement demanded a fresh approach for the ascertainment of those wishes. The fresh approach was considered necessary by the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya; I repeat, and by Malaya.

33. Now what does this demand imply? It was undeniably a disqualification or at least a recognition of the great insufficiency of the findings of the Cobbold Commission<sup>5/</sup> and of the findings of the colonial authorities who carried out the recent elections in Sabah and Sarawak. This need for a fresh approach, endorsed by Malaya, is the answer to a large part of my opponent's statements describing and praising the findings of the Cobbold Commission and the results of the elections in Sabah and Sarawak.

34. The Secretary-General was then requested to send United Nations teams to make the necessary assessment on the basis of a new approach. In my previous interventions, I already explained at length why the Philippines and Indonesia were, respectfully, not able to endorse the findings of the United Nations teams.

35. Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya—Malaya included—found it necessary, and therefore agreed at Manila, to send their own observer teams to witness the carrying out of the assessment. It is obvious now that Malaya sent its observers exclusively to witness the activities of the United Nations teams. We have confidence in the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But bitter experience of colonial practices convinced us that it was imperative to send observers to witness the activities of the colonial authorities—not the United Nations teams, but the colonial authorities—and the manner in which they influenced the hearings and provided facilities. Let me repeat again what I said in my first intervention, on 27 September 1963:

"Anyone who has lived under colonial conditions knows that it is not difficult for the authorities to make people answer questions exactly in the way required. Very often the mere presence of armed soldiers or police will suffice . . . In general, only those who are members of a militant freedom move-

<sup>5/</sup> Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962; London, H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 1794.

ment dare to defy the intimidation of a show of force. With this in mind, the investigators, in adopting a fresh approach towards ascertaining the wishes of the people, should have tried to make reasonably sure ... that the persons questioned were relatively ... free from official pressure. And then they should also have tried to see that the hearings took place without any colonial authorities, troops or police present." [1219th meeting, para. 107.]

36. Ambassador Dato' Ong did not deny that there were strong expressions of opposition during the hearings and that this compelled the colonial authorities to use and show force. He went on to say, however, that this use of force did not intimidate the opposition or inhibit the free expression of opinion during the hearings. I wish we could be so naive and gullible as to accept the truth of this statement. However, how could Ambassador Dato' Ong explain the sudden cancelling, at the very last moment, of the appearance of certain groups of people in Kuching, and the rather monotonous parrot-like expressions of those who did appear? Ambassador Dato' Ong tried to convince us that the riot police and the military forces were used only to maintain law and order. How familiar these assurances sounded to us, ex-colonies. We would not have been surprised had they come from the spokesmen of the colonial Powers.

37. And if those in the Assembly who are not members of former colonies find our concern in this matter hard to understand, let them think back to their history lessons about the conditions that led older democracies to establish the principle of the secret ballot in the first place.

38. Malaya and the United Kingdom chose to announce on 29 August 1963, while the United Nations team was still at work, that 16 September was the date for the formation of Malaysia. This, as I said in my first reply, on 30 September, made the work of the Secretary-General meaningless. The Secretary-General himself regretted the action; and it was, moreover, entirely contrary to the spirit of the Manila Agreement. I notice, and consider it significant, that in his statement on 4 October the representative of Malaysia did not make a single reference to our comments on this premature announcement. Nor did he explain the statement given by Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Press that the Manila Agreement on Malaysia had made Malaysia Day of 31 August 1963 "flexible", and that the formation of Malaysia should be cancelled if the outcome of the ascertainment proved negative. I would like to repeat that: that the formation of Malaysia should be cancelled if the outcome of the ascertainment by the United Nations proved negative. In spite of this interview, 16 September 1963 was announced, on 29 August, as the date of the formation of Malaysia, regardless of the findings of the United Nations teams. This announcement made the work of the United Nations meaningless, as I said, and must certainly have influenced the outcome of the assessment.

39. Ambassador Dato' Ong, in an earlier intervention, tried to explain away the inconsistency of that announcement by constitutional arguments which did not convince us at all. But could the arrival of the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys in Kuala Lumpur a few days before the announcement, and the doubt the Malayan Government might have had concerning the outcome of the ascertainment of the wishes of the people, have induced the Malayan Government to

look for those handy constitutional arguments to gloss over this inconsistency?

40. I should now like to deal with the question of the extension of the existing military agreement between Britain and Malaya to embrace the whole of the new Malaysia. For it is in the military aspect of the new Federation that the concept of neo-colonialism is more clearly in evidence. In my earlier statements I have painstakingly tried to distinguish between Prime Minister Rahman's concept of Malaysia and the British neo-colonialist concept. This is why I formerly said that the concept of Malaysia, as laid down in the Rahman-Macmillan Joint Statement of November 1961, was not the Tunku's original concept. However, after listening to Ambassador Dato' Ong's statement on 4 October 1963 [1228th meeting], I am now, regretfully, in doubt. I am afraid that in order to make my point absolutely clear I shall have to quote extensively from his speech. Here is the relevant passage in full:

"... the representative of Indonesia has played up the question of military bases in Malaysia to support his charge of neo-colonialism. In his statement on 30 September, my friend read a passage from paragraph 6 of the London Joint Statement of November 1961, signed by my Prime Minister and Prime Minister Macmillan. In the context of the passage he read, Ambassador Palar asked the question—and I quote him:

"... how could Malaya justify its commitment made, *a priori*, almost two years ago, that Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah would also be bound to the United Kingdom by a military agreement at the moment they were to be granted independence?" [1221st meeting, para. 188.]

"This was the passage he quoted:

"The Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain bases at Singapore for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence ... and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia."

"This passage was taken out of context, with a view presumably to presenting a distorted picture of the situation. Perhaps I might read the beginning of paragraph 6 of that Joint Statement, which reads:

"In regard to defence matters it was decided that in the event of the formation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia—and I repeat those words: 'in the event of the formation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia'—the existing Defence Agreement between Britain and Malaya should be extended to embrace the other territories concerned." [1228th meeting, para. 140.]

"In view of the declared intention that the peoples of the territories concerned were to be fully consulted on every aspect of the Malaysia proposal, this understanding obviously was conditional upon its acceptance by the people. When the popularly elected Governments of Sabah and Sarawak passed the Malaysia Bill they did so with full knowledge of the defence agreement, which they themselves agreed was in the best interests of Malaysia's defence—and I repeat 'defence'." [*Ibid.*, para. 141.]

41. That is what Ambassador Dato' Ong said, as written in the verbatim record. I have to say at once that I strongly object to the imputation that I took a passage out of context with a view to presenting a distorted



picture of the situation. Friends who oppose each other should be fair to each other. Moreover, when we study the context with which Ambassador Dato' Ong has now supplied us, it is difficult to see what possible advantage I could have gained by leaving it out. Ambassador Dato' Ong, for instance, stressed the words "in the event of the formation of Malaysia". Well, obviously it would have to be in that event, if it is an extension of an existing agreement that is being considered. Then again, he stressed the defence aspect of the agreement and its extension. Who ever heard of a publicized military agreement being for the purpose of aggression? I know of no military agreement that is not stated in terms of defence; which is not by any means to imply that it has not been truly conceived for that purpose. But what Ambassador Dato' Ong significantly did not stress in the very part of the quotation from the Joint Statement that he himself supplied was the fact that "it was decided" and definitely not that "it was understood". It was not an "understanding" as Ambassador Dato' Ong tried to prove so desperately. No; it was a decision—a decision made by Prime Minister Macmillan and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, without the participation of Sarawak and Sabah, almost two years ago. The condition of its being subject to the acceptance of the people in the territories, which Ambassador Dato' Ong mentioned in his speech last Friday, was not written into the actual Joint Statement itself. For this reason, it must be regarded as being nothing more than a mere convenient *post facto* interpretation of the Statement, for the purpose of presenting the decision in more acceptable terms.

42. It is, then, this *a priori* decision of 1961 which gives me the right to say as I did in my earlier statement: "Who gave Malaya the right to determine the destiny of the peoples and territories not belonging to it?" I have never at any time claimed the "right to question the freely determined wishes of the peoples of the same territories to achieve independence through Malaysia"—which is what Ambassador Dato' Ong seems to believe I claimed. Nor did I at any time permit myself the statement, which Ambassador Dato' Ong also attributed to me, that "Malaya, Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore were forced into Malaysia". I never said that. The exact passage in the verbatim record of my statement on 1 October which Ambassador Dato' Ong was thinking of when he made such an unfortunate allegation reads as follows:

"I made it clear in my statement that Sarawak and Sabah had been decolonized but, at the same time, bound to the United Kingdom by a military agreement already decided by the United Kingdom and Malaya almost two years before Sarawak and Sabah were granted independence. We call neo-colonialism what Malaya, Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore were forced to accept, namely, that Malaysia would allow the United Kingdom to use its military bases in Singapore to preserve *Pax Britannica* in South-East Asia, a large part of which is Indonesian territory." [1222nd meeting, para. 161.]

43. In other words, I then contended not that Malaya, Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore were forced into Malaysia but that in joining Malaysia these countries were forced to accept an extension of existing military agreements. However, according to Ambassador Dato' Ong's most recent statement, it now seems that they voluntarily accepted the extension. So it is with great regret that I now have to say—although it is difficult to believe—that the countries of Malaysia know-

ingly and willingly accepted the intrusion of *Pax Britannica* into Indonesian territory. If this is indeed a fact, why should Malaysia be surprised when Indonesia's General Nasution says, "We must have a policy of confrontation", or when Dr. Subandrio, our Foreign Minister, declared on 20 January 1963, as has been quoted by the representative of Malaysia:

"We cannot but adopt a policy of confrontation against Malaysia because at present they represented themselves as accomplices of the neo-colonialists and neo-imperialists pursuing hostile policies towards Indonesia."

44. We in Indonesia have always been reluctant to believe that Malaysia was a willing accomplice. In fact, we still refuse to believe it. We still believe and will continue to believe in Maphilindo. But if the representative of Australia meant to say in his intervention on 3 October 1963 [1226th meeting] that his Government would assist Malaysia in its policy of co-operating with the United Kingdom to preserve *Pax Britannica* in Indonesian territory, with all its implications—and I stress, with all its implications—then of course my Government and my people are in duty as well as in honour bound to accept the challenge. And I cannot think of any other country that would not act likewise.

45. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

46. Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): I have asked for the floor to reply to the Foreign Minister of the Philippines. The representative of Indonesia has, of course, just finished speaking, and many of my remarks will be relevant to what he said, although I consider that the substance of his case was adequately disposed of by Lord Home on the evening of Friday, 27 September 1963 [1219th meeting].

47. First, I should like, if I may, to apologize to the Foreign Minister of the Philippines for not having been present this morning [1233rd meeting] when he delivered his speech. This was, as I explained to him personally before the plenary meeting opened, because I was committed to speaking in the Second Committee. I know he appreciates that my absence was unavoidable. I have, in the meantime, however, read his speech with considerable care and I should like to congratulate him on his lucid survey of world affairs.

48. I exercise my right of reply in relation to parts of the second part of his speech, and my purpose in doing so is simple. It is to explain to the Foreign Minister of the Philippines and to this Assembly why my Government, as the then Administering Authority for Sabah and Sarawak, followed a course of action on the admission of observers to these territories which appears to have caused misunderstandings in the Philippines. I should like to start by saying how much I welcome Mr. López's statement that the Government of the Philippines has chosen not to be a party to confrontation and that it intends to help in moderating the situation in South-East Asia.

49. That, with respect, is what I would have expected from Mr. López.

50. It is my earnest hope that the explanations which I shall give to the Foreign Minister of the Philippines today will help persuade his Government to go still further and to welcome the independence that Sarawak and Sabah have found in Malaysia.

51. Nevertheless, although the Government of the Philippines was not a party to confrontation, Indonesia both was and is, as is clear from the statement we have just heard. It is against this background that my Government's action over observers must be viewed.

52. As the Administering Authority for Sabah and Sarawak, our responsibility under Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations was plain. This was to develop self-government in these territories and to prevent outsiders from obstructing this process. Let no one be in any doubt that such attempts at obstruction were being made.

53. Quite apart from the torrent of abuse and threats which flowed from Djakarta, Sabah and Sarawak had, during the last six months of British administration, been subjected to repeated armed incursions from Indonesia, incursions which were directed and supplied from that country. These incursions had resulted in death and injury to the peaceful inhabitants of the border areas of Sarawak and Sabah.

54. My Government's clear duty was to protect these people against this kind of senseless violence to the best of its ability and to ensure that their right to determine their own future was not destroyed by alien influence and interference.

55. It is in this context that I ask the Foreign Minister of the Philippines to understand the limitations which we were forced to place on the activities of observers from his country. To be brutally frank, the trust which we were prepared to place in the Government of the Philippines, which ranks amongst our best friends and allies in Asia, could not be extended to Indonesia. This was a risk we were not prepared to take. Nor would public opinion in Sabah and Sarawak, both of which were suffering from Indonesian intervention, have tolerated it. Against this background, I hope that the Foreign Minister of the Philippines will accept that our actions did not imply any reflection on the motives and integrity of his Government.

56. Having set the matter of observers in this context, I should now like to remind the Assembly that, as the Secretary-General has himself remarked in his conclusions, the arrangements for observers were no part of his responsibility.

57. Equally, there was no provision in the Manila Agreement for four separate and independent investigations to be carried out: one by the Secretary-General's teams; and the other three by representatives of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya.

58. Any difficulties which may have arisen over observers did not therefore affect the Secretary-General's conclusions, nor were they in any sense an essential part of his investigation.

59. On reading the speech of the Foreign Minister of the Philippines, I find that some confusion exists about the precise part which my Government played in the negotiations on the admission of observers. This is, of course, quite understandable, and I believe that it is my duty to inform the Foreign Minister of the Philippines and this Assembly about exactly what happened.

60. At the request of the Malayan Government, the British Government agreed on 10 August to allow Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines each to send one observer to Sabah and one to Sarawak, making a total in each territory of three observers watching four of the Secretary-General's investigators.

61. The Government of Indonesia countered almost immediately by announcing its intention of sending up to twenty observers and ten secretarial staff in its own military aircraft. The Government of the Philippines indicated that this was also its intention.

62. If the Government of Malaya had made the same demand we would have been faced with the ludicrous situation where ninety observers watched the work of nine men in the Secretary-General's teams.

63. The Secretary-General then informed my Government that it might sometimes be necessary for his two teams in Sarawak and Sabah to split up, making a total of four groups of investigators.

64. My Government accordingly agreed to accept a total of four observers from each of the three Manila countries, even though this meant that the twelve observers would now outnumber the nine United Nations investigators they were supposed to observe.

65. The Indonesian Government refused to accept this compromise but demanded a total of nine observers.

66. The Government of the Philippines also did not accept this compromise.

67. The Secretary-General then suggested on 20 August 1963 that Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines should each be allowed to send a total of four observers plus four clerical assistants.

68. My Government agreed to make this further concession on certain conditions, the principal one being that the assistants should be genuinely clerical and not just extra observers under a new name.

69. The Indonesian and Philippine Governments accepted the Secretary-General's proposal in principle. Nevertheless, they nominated as assistants senior officials incapable by any stretch of the imagination of being considered of clerical grade.

70. It may be, of course, that there was a genuine misunderstanding. I shall say no more about it except to comment that in any indirect negotiation where the parties are not dealing directly with each other, such misunderstandings are by no means uncommon. My Government was, however, quite clear about the conditions which it had attached to its acceptance of the Secretary-General's proposal.

71. In the circumstances, therefore, it was obliged to withhold visas until on 29 August 1963 the Indonesian Government conceded our position and replaced the two intelligence officers, which it had nominated as clerical assistants, by persons more nearly approaching clerical status. My Government accepted this Indonesian proposal together with the corresponding compromise offered immediately afterwards by the Philippine Government.

72. On 1 September, therefore, Indonesian and Filipino observers at last reached the Borneo territories. I am bound to say that they could have been there from the very start of the Secretary-General's investigation if their Governments had not endeavoured to inflate the status of observers from witnesses to judges, and to suggest numbers wholly disproportionate to the size of the Secretary-General's teams.

73. Nevertheless, the absence of these observers through no fault of ours during the early part of the investigation does not in any way detract from the authority of the conclusions reached by the Secretary-General. I was glad to note that, in spite of the criti-

cisms which the Foreign Minister of the Philippines has made, he does not challenge the conclusions of the Secretary-General.

74. I sincerely hope that as a result of the explanations which I have given today the Foreign Minister of the Philippines will understand why we acted as we did, and will accept that, in the context of the policy of confrontation which was being actively pursued by the Government of Indonesia at that time, we were bound to follow the course that we did.

75. I hope, in short, that I have provided him with a full and satisfactory answer to the criticism which he has directed at my Government. Other criticisms which he may have made are, of course, for others to answer. We wish his Government well as we wish the Government of Malaysia well, as indeed we wish the Government of Indonesia well. I am sure that it is in the interest of everyone that they should compose their differences.

76. It is with that wish and on that note that I should like to end my intervention.

77. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The representative of Malaysia had also recorded his wish to speak in exercise of his right of reply, but he has subsequently stated that he would do so at tomorrow's meeting, at the end of the general debate. We have accordingly come to the end of the list of speakers in the general debate this afternoon, and we shall go on to consider the second item on the agenda.

#### AGENDA ITEM 77

The violation of human rights in South Viet-Nam  
(continued)\*

78. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call on the representative of Canada on a point of order.

79. Mr. TREMBLAY (Canada): I wish to move, under rule 78 of the rules of procedure, a suspension of the

meeting for twenty minutes. My delegation feels that it would be desirable to have further consultations before this item is discussed by the Assembly.

80. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Assembly has just heard the proposal of the Canadian representative. According to rule 78 of the rules of procedure, the motion to suspend the meeting for twenty minutes must be put to the vote immediately, without debate. We shall therefore proceed to vote on the proposal of the Canadian representative.

*The proposal was adopted by 81 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.*

*The meeting was suspended at 4.20 p.m. and resumed at 5.35 p.m.*

81. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I must beg the Assembly to forgive the delay in resuming the meeting, which was caused by circumstances entirely beyond my control.

82. We shall pursue our consideration of item 77, but before doing so I have the following statement to make: I have been informed that the delegations of Costa Rica and Chile have agreed to withdraw the draft resolution [A/L.425 and Add.1]. As a result, we have before us only the letter dated 4 October addressed to the President of the Assembly by the Special Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the United Nations, the text of which I read out to the Assembly at the 1232nd meeting.

83. The Assembly has heard the statements that were made yesterday. Since there are no formal proposals to hand, may I take it that the Assembly wishes the President to take action on the basis of the said letter of 4 October? There being no objections, I shall act accordingly.

*It was so decided.*

84. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The debate on agenda item 77 stands adjourned.

*The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.*

\* / Resumed from the 1232nd meeting.