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*President: Mr. Carlos SOSA RODRIGUEZ*  
(Venezuela).

## AGENDA ITEM 9

### Opening of the general debate

1. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil) (translated from Spanish): I should like first of all to express, Sir, my personal satisfaction and that of the Brazilian delegation at your election as President of the eighteenth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and to convey to you our pleasure that this important office has been conferred upon your country and yourself, whom we have long regarded as an embodiment of intelligence, culture and integrity and a model of experience in everything relating to the United Nations. Your election, honouring Venezuela and through it all the Latin American countries, is an honour to my country also.

*[The speaker continued in English.]*

2. Eighteen years of intense diplomatic and parliamentary activity mark the existence of the United Nations. Today, as in the days of San Francisco, the objectives of the Charter, designed to build a healthy, brotherly and peaceful community, continue to guide all States collectively and each one individually. However, today, as at the time of the founding of the Organization, Member States, individually or in groups, continue to differ in the conception of the ways and means of implementing the objectives of the Charter.

3. This difference in concepts has its roots in the specific historical and social development of each Member State. Yet, the Charter—reflecting the reality of this fact—has from the very outset not only recognized this difference in concept, but moreover has acknowledged the need for the United Nations to operate efficiently in the very climate of conceptual differences. The world in which we live is fertile in ideas, theories, conceptions and schools of thought and the United Nations was not created to proclaim either the everlasting validity or the final rejection of any of them. Our unity of peaceful purpose must necessarily be based on the inevitable diversity of our opinions. If the United Nations is to keep its universal character, it will have to continue to be representative of all the ideas and conceptions of mankind.

4. It cannot be overlooked, however, that differences and divergencies in the concept and the practice of

achieving the aims of the Charter, from the very first days of the Organization, were situated in terms of ideological struggle, which were not only contradictory but, in fact, antagonistic to each other. The years we have lived through, here and in the world at large, in the shadow of this conceptual struggle carried to a Manicheistic split, do not appear to have been particularly rewarding to anyone. And, what is even more disquieting, power-politics have launched our world into the costliest armaments race in history and into an even more catastrophic prospect for the whole human race—collective thermo-nuclear destruction, ironically graded to distinguish between those who shall perish in the first minutes and those who are to succumb months or years later to the worst forms of degeneration of life. This would be indeed an absurd price to pay for intolerance and obduracy. Absolute truth cannot be proclaimed over the ashes of nuclear desolation. We must show more humility, if we want to save our lives. Inflexibility and fanaticism are extremely dangerous in the atomic era.

5. The world of 1963 is not the pre-atomic world of 1945 and it is not in vain that we have been living through eighteen years of history in the nuclear age. The accession to the Organization of a large number of new Members, mainly from Africa and Asia, was from every point of view profoundly beneficial to the whole of international life. By reason of their problems, their aspirations, their needs and their aims, these new Member States, objectively situated outside the two poles of the cold war, by the impact of their presence, their number and their arguments compelled all Member States to live and to interpret the reality of the international scene in a completely new light. It is therefore legitimate to affirm that, on the international scene and within the Organization which is its reflection, there is a relative obsolescence of the polarization of the world into two great ideological groups. Ideas are important but no idea can survive the spirit which inspired it.

6. Not all is East or West in the United Nations of 1963. The world has other cardinal points. These words, which have dominated international politics until quite recently, may eventually be referred back to the realm of geography. The waning of the ideological conflict and the progressive removal of political implications from the expressions "East" and "West" have also had certain consequences—both political and semantic—with regard to the concepts of neutralism and non-alignment. These concepts have weakened in their consistency as the poles which supported them became less and less rigid. We must not lose sight of how much the world has changed since last October and we must explore all possibilities of negotiation which have been opened with the recent signing of the limited nuclear test-ban treaty.<sup>1/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Signed at Moscow, 5 August 1963.

7. Let us cast a look about us in this hall and ask ourselves whether the world represented here can really be adequately described by such hasty generalizations and rigid classifications. Three broad categories cannot cover the whole range of ideas, concepts and trends of the whole of mankind. Mankind is richer and far more complex than its classifiers. The realization of this fact may complicate political problems and make it necessary to revise certain books and pamphlets of political propaganda, but we also are allowed to hope that the world in which we live will thus become less dangerous and less explosive. Sociologists and political theoreticians will have more to do, but statesmen and diplomats may possibly work within a climate of increased trust.

8. In the contemporary world and in the United Nations we are witnessing the emergence not of neutral or non-aligned blocs, nor of a third political ideological Power, but of affinities—affinities less stable perhaps, but more effective in terms of tactical objectives shaped on the basis of common demands. What we are witnessing is in fact the emergence of a parliamentary grouping, within the United Nations, of small and medium Powers which unite, beyond or outside the scope of ideologies or military alliances, to conduct a continuous struggle around three fundamental themes: disarmament, development and decolonization. It is easy to define the meaning of the terms of this triunity. The struggle for disarmament is the struggle for peace itself and for the juridical equality of States that strive to place themselves beyond the bounds of fear or intimidation. The struggle for development is the struggle for economic emancipation and social justice. The struggle for decolonization in its broader sense is a struggle for political emancipation, for freedom and human rights. This is the great movement which unfolds itself here, a movement launched by small and medium Powers which can no longer accept the anachronistic Manichean method of analysing world problems. On the contrary, they want the United Nations to adapt itself to the world of 1963, a world in which they must live, under the stress of great dangers but on the threshold of wonderful prospects. This parliamentary grouping, though still in the process of defining itself, transcends the terms of the old division of the world into West, East and neutral. This movement, initiated under the sign of disarmament, development and decolonization demands only the fulfilment of the promises already contained in the United Nations Charter.

9. Each nation, large or small, will always be the best judge of its own defence and security requirements. My country, for example, has never accepted the label of neutralism for its independent foreign policy. Our position is perfectly clear. Brazil belongs to no bloc, but is an integral part of a system, the Inter-American system, which we conceive as an instrument of peace and understanding among all members of the community of nations. Brazil, like most Latin-American and African-Asian countries, cannot however remain alien to that parliamentary grouping which embraces a great majority of the 111 Member nations and thus provides the Organization with a renewed impetus. And yet, in a spirit of sheer political realism, we must admit that the recommendations of this majority, with regard to each one of these three fundamental themes, are left, with noticeable frequency, unimplemented.

10. The armament race goes on unchecked despite reiterated resolutions of the world Organization. An

immense part of mankind is still vegetating under humiliating conditions incompatible with human dignity, and millions of human beings are still deprived of freedom and human rights under degrading forms of political or colonial oppression. This is due—let us have the courage to say it—to the existence and survival of a power of veto, of an invisible veto, in the General Assembly. This invisible veto, of which very little is said and heard, may prove, in important questions such as disarmament, development and decolonization, even more frustrating and dangerous than the negative aspect of the principle of unanimity which has hampered the functioning and impeded the effective action of the Security Council. It is this invisible veto which prevents the adoption of certain draft resolutions or, as is much more often the case, which prevents the implementation of resolutions already adopted. And it is against this invisible veto that the efforts of the nations which have common aspirations and claims, aspirations to peace, to development and also to freedom, must be directed. Because in the struggle for peace and development, man cannot jeopardize freedom.

11. In the fulfilment of the mandate of mediation which was entrusted to it by the General Assembly, Brazil has acted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with the strictest realism. Disarmament, as we have stated in Geneva, is a central problem, and all the other political issues are contained and reflected in this problem. Compared to the problem of disarmament, any other problem, difficult though it may appear—and we mentioned the Berlin problem as an example—seems to be relatively easy to solve, because whatever its solution may be, each party has an approximate idea of what it can gain or lose, and also because this solution may not necessarily be final and irrevocable if the means and the possibilities to alter it remain available. Disarmament is the problem of power, and traditionally problems of power have been solved by the use of power itself. The challenge of Geneva consists precisely in attempting to solve this problem of power by negotiation and by means of persuasion. This is no easy task, and an elementary sense of reality induces us to admit that we are still far removed from the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. With regard to the text of that treaty, we have hardly gone beyond the first paragraphs of its preamble. And in the meantime enormous resources which could have been utilized in the fulfilment of a better existence, appear as factors of threat and destruction. The present arms race, which proceeds at a mad pace, is primarily responsible for the scarcity of resources available for the great tasks of economic development. How can one speak seriously of cultural progress when the human race is engaged substantially in preparing and perfecting the means of its own destruction? The only technology worthy of respect is the one that leads to life and freedom.

12. The eight mediating countries in Geneva—Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic and Sweden—bear a great diplomatic responsibility in this question of disarmament. These countries were not acting as a "political bloc", but as a "diplomatic group" which, in a spirit of mediation, was trying tenaciously to broaden the sparse areas of agreement between the two Power blocs. Acting always in response to world public opinion, these nations have made a decisive contribution through their efforts which allowed the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to secure its first major positive step, the

treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, recently concluded in Moscow. Brazil has always upheld the view that the nuclear Powers, without waiting for the conclusion of a treaty for general and complete disarmament, should proceed to formalize agreements whenever views are found to coincide. For this reason we have always given priority to the question of nuclear testing, the non-dissemination of nuclear arms, and the prevention of war by accident. It was in this context that, perceiving the continuing difficulties in the matter of detection and verification of underground tests, Brazil addressed the following question to the nuclear Powers:

"It has been implied that a nuclear test ban is difficult to attain because the great Powers cannot or do not wish to agree on the intricate question of control, a problem which is based on confidence. It is well known, however, that the main divergencies and discrepancies do lie in the problems of detection and identification of underground tests, as the international control required for atmospheric and outer space tests does not appear to present so many insurmountable difficulties. Why, then, not concentrate our efforts on this question of atmospheric and outer space tests which are the most dangerous, actually and potentially, and the ones which have a most disturbing effect on mind, body and nerves? Why not, along the lines of the eight-nation joint memorandum, further explore the possibility of an agreement on the question of control of atmospheric and outer space tests and, at the same time, start a discussion on the adequate methods of detection and identification of underground tests?"<sup>2/</sup>

This question, first formulated on 25 July 1962 and reiterated on 17 August 1962 met at first, however, with nothing but silence on the part of the three nuclear Powers which constituted the Sub-Committee of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It was only on 27 August 1962 that the great Powers began to move forward with the submission of the joint Anglo-American proposal on the partial banning of nuclear tests.<sup>3/</sup> I mention this fact here not to enhance the contribution of my country to the cause of disarmament, but to indicate that, in the fulfilment of their mediation role, the eight non-aligned Powers at Geneva must run the risk of misunderstanding and criticism that often result from tactical motives prevailing at a given moment.

13. My country has welcomed with enthusiasm the signature of the Treaty of Moscow, and my President, João Goulart, in his message to President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Macmillan, expressed Brazil's gratification at the constructive spirit in which the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union had conducted the negotiations. My Government was one of the first to sign the treaty which has been submitted for ratification by our Congress. For Brazil the partial treaty has not only the great merit of immediately eliminating the deadly effects of radiation, but also the symbolic value of demonstrating that a common effort of the great Powers to resolve their differences is always possible and viable. In that sense Brazil has welcomed the partial treaty as one of the most auspicious events since 1945 and as a starting point for agreements ever

more far-reaching and creative. The words which I am about to add must therefore not be interpreted as indicating any lack of enthusiasm in respect of that treaty.

14. Without wishing to attenuate the impact and the high significance of the limited test-ban treaty, which reflects an idea which we have defended since the very first days of the Geneva Conference, we cannot refrain from regretting that the Moscow meeting was held outside the province of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We see no logical or plausible reason for this development, since we cannot admit the possibility that the nuclear Powers had wished to segregate the remaining members from the solution of a question which was a matter of common interest. Inasmuch as there existed in Geneva a Sub-Committee on Nuclear Tests made up solely of the three nuclear Powers, that Sub-Committee, under the rules of the Conference, could have met in any place and at any level of representation; why, then, did the three nuclear Powers not wish to give the Moscow Conference the character of a meeting of that Sub-Committee? This would have had the great merit of placing the subject matter within the context of general and complete disarmament and of serving as a starting point for the future work of the Committee. World peace and security cannot be the object of exclusive negotiations of a directorate of great Powers, no matter how great and powerful they may be. To a common danger of death and destruction, common responsibility must be the counterpart. And it is this responsibility that the non-nuclear Powers wish to assume.

15. Just as we formulated our question on 25 July 1962, Brazil is formulating today, from this rostrum, the following questions addressed to the three nuclear Powers: What are the real difficulties which keep us from a final solution on underground tests? Why not recognize that, with reference to this question, the opposing viewpoints have been narrowed down to a point where any one of the parties could accept the opposing point of view without making, in fact, great concessions? Why not explore, by common agreement, the possibility of broadening immediately the area of agreement reached at Moscow by the additional banning of underground tests above an established range of detectability?

16. The Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, when it meets again, could perhaps explore immediately the possibilities of a gradual and successive treatment of the question of placing nuclear testing under a ban. It is possible to envisage, for example, in a first stage, the immediate prohibition of underground tests to a limit currently detectable by the monitoring systems of the parties concerned and, in a second stage, to commence, within a maximum period of one year, to suspend those tests above a certain limit of, say, 4.75 kilotons, or the most technically feasible limit on that occasion. This scheme, of course, involves technical and scientific aspects that can be revised and modified during the discussions to be held by the nuclear Powers, which certainly are technically better qualified through their well-known familiarity with explosions.

17. It is evident that in all these cases a meeting of minds is indispensable on the part of the nuclear Powers which, on the other hand, cannot continue to ignore the reiterated manifestations of the General Assembly. In advancing these suggestions, I am aware

<sup>2/</sup> Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, document ENDC/PV.61, p. 36.

<sup>3/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex P.

that we may face again some instances of the lack of understanding encountered in the past.

18. Brazil, jointly with Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, will continue its efforts aimed at the conclusion of a unanimous agreement bringing into effect the "de-nuclearization" of Latin America, while we formulate the hope that similar agreements may be concluded elsewhere to cover as great an area of the world as possible. With regard to the "de-nuclearization" of Latin America, my delegation, which has submitted this question as a specific item on the agenda, would like to indicate that we are not proposing that Latin America be declared a de-nuclearized zone by the General Assembly. Brazil proposes that Latin American nations, as sovereign nations, should consider the possibility, by the most appropriate ways and means, of concluding a treaty under which they would commit themselves not to manufacture, store, receive or test nuclear weapons. This is the sense which we attach to the proposal of the five Latin American countries, recently reaffirmed by a joint declaration of 29 April 1963, signed by the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico. In this matter, my delegation will maintain the closest contact with all Latin American delegations.

19. In the same spirit, the Brazilian delegation to the Disarmament Committee recently aired in Geneva the idea of a multilateral non-aggression pact which would establish a reciprocal machinery linking the greatest possible number of States parties to that pact, under which they would pledge not to commit aggression against any other State, regardless of its geographical location. This idea seems to us much more reasonable and dynamic than the previous idea of a non-aggression pact between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Charter is universal in spirit. Peace should prevail among all members of the international community and not only among those States that are committed to specific military alliances. The idea of a pact limited to a certain category of States is founded on the old East-West patterns, the predominance of which, as I have said, appears to be on the wane.

20. Brazil continues to favour the idea that a technical committee be established within the framework of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to study solutions for the problems of control, without which it will not be possible to advance decisively towards general and complete disarmament. We continue to believe that political discussions cannot permanently move within a technical void. We do not conceive of disarmament without control.

21. The second series of considerations which the Brazilian delegation deems necessary to submit is related to economic and social development. The problem of economic development—in the present demographic and economic condition of the world—tends to become, in our opinion, of an urgency equal to that of disarmament, with a fundamental difference: that while disarmament will become a process prolonged in time, its inherent dangers diminishing with the gradual conquest of each step towards peace, economic development will generate pressures more and more unbearable to the structure of human societies unless urgent measures are taken to intensify and to speed it up. Just as we are bound to link collective security to general and complete disarmament under international control, by the same token we are compelled to join together, as twin concepts, the ideas of

collective political security and collective economic security.

22. Under present conditions, two-thirds of mankind are living at a subsistence level and suffer all the social and economic hardships inherent in under-development. Alongside those two-thirds of mankind, the minority of the world population, beneficiary of the increased productivity resulting from industrialization, has attained high levels of economic prosperity and social well-being.

23. The key to the understanding of the problem that confronts us—the international community—is not, however, merely the existence of the income gap between developed and developing countries. The crucial factor is the widening of this gap, which will be increasingly more difficult to bridge if present trends are not reversed. It is within this context of gloomy facts and prospects that we must endeavour to understand the efforts of the developing countries to meet the requirements of social progress and economic justice. These requirements, that correspond to the most legitimate human aspirations, cannot be repressed indefinitely, and it is with a view to fulfilling them that the domestic efforts of each developing country must be supplemented by those of the international community.

24. While the struggle for economic development has to be conducted on several fronts, the United Nations, by the universality of its scope and in conformity with the letter and spirit of its Charter, has a vital role to play in redeeming the great majority of the world population from the sub-human conditions in which they are submerged. In the view of my Government, the activities of the United Nations in the field of economic development must concentrate on three main priority areas: industrialization, mobilization of capital for development, and international trade.

25. Without wishing to minimize the importance of integrated economic development, there is today a unanimous conviction that industry represents the most dynamic sector of the economy of the developing countries and that most capable of ensuring, in a brief historical period, both the diversification and economic emancipation of these countries. The classical doctrine of international specialization of labour, that condemned the countries in the periphery to the immutable position of suppliers of primary products, is already obsolete and has been replaced by a theory that is more compatible with the realities of the present-day world. Conceived, however, in an epoch in which this doctrinal evolution was not yet fully crystallized, the United Nations family has for a long time occupied itself marginally with the problems of industrialization and given almost exclusive emphasis to other sectors such as agriculture and public health. It is true that resources devoted to industrialization have shown some increase in recent years. The rate of growth of these resources is nevertheless minimal when compared with the needs of developing countries and the financial capabilities of advanced nations, as was clearly indicated by the Advisory Committee of Experts<sup>4/</sup> that has recently examined the United Nations activities in the field of industrial development. According to the report of the experts, the current institutional framework is inadequate and must be urgently replaced by a new framework more in harmony with the general aspira-

<sup>4/</sup> Advisory Committee of Experts on the Industrial Development Activities of the United Nations System.

tions of developing countries for accelerated industrialization. The Brazilian Government considers that the establishment of a specialized agency for industrial development would contribute decisively to the fulfilment of that aspiration.

26. The second priority area is the transfer of capital to the developing countries from the developed countries, where such capital is abundant. The mobilization of international financial resources is one of the essential prerequisites for the gradual attainment, by developing countries, of levels of welfare comparable to those of developed nations. Nevertheless, the flow of financial assistance should be genuinely geared to the needs of developing countries both from the quantitative point of view, in the sense that the total volume available be proportional to their capital requirements, and from the qualitative point of view, in that the condition of loans must take into consideration the structural difficulties in the balance of payments of these countries. The significance of soft loans has been convincingly emphasized by the former President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Mr. Eugene Black, who stated that unless the aid mixture had a larger component of funds on concessionary terms, "the machinery of economic development would be loaded with foreign debts until it sputtered to a halt amid half-built projects and mountains of discarded plans". The inadequacy of international finance in terms consistent with the economic peculiarities of developing countries may compel these countries to adopt emergency solutions of an unorthodox nature if economic stagnation or retrogression and wide-spread social unrest are to be avoided.

27. It is now universally acknowledged that economic assistance should not involve any non-economic element. Assistance granted in this manner has the advantage of clearing the political atmosphere, both nationally and internationally, of a needless ingredient of controversy. Furthermore, it is entirely in harmony with the long-term interests of all sovereign countries, both capital-exporting and capital-importing, and should be encouraged in every possible way by the increasing utilization of multilateral channels. In this connexion, regional programmes of assistance play a prominent role, and all efforts should be made to intensify and enlarge the scope of these programmes. As a decisive step in this trend towards multilateralization, and while giving due importance to all existing sources of assistance, it is essential that the United Nations be endowed with its own financing body, thus enabling the Organization to enter the field of capital assistance to developing countries.

28. It has been with this in mind that the Brazilian delegation has advocated in the past and continues to advocate the establishment of a United Nations capital development fund, open to all Members of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The new organ, already established in principle, would be capable of extending loans and grants and would be administered in such a way as to give each Member country equal voting power irrespective of the size of its contribution. A substantial portion of the resources released by general and complete disarmament could be diverted to the capital development fund. So long as comprehensive disarmament, so anxiously desired by mankind, is not forthcoming, a small percentage of current military outlays should be placed at the disposal of the fund. The diversion of only 1 per cent of the resources at present devoured by the armaments race would represent not less than \$1,200 million

annually, a sum that would enable the fund to start operations on a scale surpassing current expectations. We fervently hope that the \$120,000 million spent on armaments every year will never be actually utilized in war. We fervently hope that future generations may be in a position to say that those were wasteful expenditures for senseless purposes. Why, then, would it be too bold to request the sacrifice, or the saving, of 1 per cent of human folly for the social redemption and development of all mankind?

29. Furthermore, in order to mark the presence of the United Nations in the field of capital development and in order to permit the Governments of Member States to keep under continuous and systematic review the total flow of capital to developing countries, the General Assembly might envisage the establishment of a standing committee of the Economic and Social Council similar to the Committee for Industrial Development and other subsidiary bodies.

30. The third priority area—which, at the present stage, is also the most important one—must receive special attention in the context of the economic and social activities of the United Nations. It is an unfortunate fact of life that international trade has contributed so far only marginally to the economic development of low-income countries, especially in recent years. In some cases, it has actually worsened the relative position of developing countries and, through the mechanism of the deterioration of the terms of trade, widened the gap of income levels between developed and developing countries. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has been called precisely because the present structure of international trade is adverse to developing countries and is based on a set of principles and operational rules that in most cases are geared principally to the interests and peculiarities of industrialized countries. This Conference means the living presence of the United Nations, with the universality of its outlook and its concern with the problems of development in the field of international trade that so far have been outside the scope of the world Organization. It means the political will to revise what must be revised, to reformulate obsolete principles, to set up new rules of international behaviour, to create conditions for a new international division of labour based on the correlation of trade and development, and finally to bring into existence the institutional framework required to implement the decisions of the Conference. The disappointment of those expectations would represent one of the most painful failures in the history of the United Nations. The Conference must justify the legitimate hopes of all under-developed countries which are counting on the understanding of the advanced countries that have by far the heaviest responsibilities for bringing order and purpose into the inchoate universe of international economic life.

31. At the close of the Conference, and as a crystallization of a long process of political decision and extensive interaction of ideas, the Brazilian Government believes that a declaration on the achievement and preservation of collective economic security should be proclaimed. The declaration, which has already been foreshadowed by the joint statement of developing countries in Geneva, would be a political act of great significance, perhaps one of the most important events ever to take place under the aegis of the United Nations. The declaration would no doubt find its place beside the two other documents of which we are so justifiably proud: the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. This declaration would not propose ideal solutions for establishing collective economic security. On the contrary, it would involve proposing, on the basis of clear-cut and objective premises, a set of principles which would serve as long-range goals to be reached by the United Nations in this sphere. Consequently, it would involve defining a common ground for certain economic notions about international economic life, from which easier chances of agreement may be derived when discussing practical problems or objectives related to the economic organization of the international community. The analogy which lends itself best to the definition of these objectives is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In a synthetic body of basic precepts related to the most complex theme of all—the human being—we find a concentration of a whole programme for the future aimed at shaping the human being of tomorrow out of the human being of today. Would it, then, not be possible to add to this Declaration yet another one which would deal with the second most controversial topic in the social world of our day: economic relations among nations?

32. In proposing this declaration, the Brazilian delegation does not overlook the difficulties to be overcome. Our task is all the more difficult as we do not have in mind a mere rhetorical document. General agreement around vague propositions is no substitute for a sincere willingness to co-operate in the promotion of the social and economic advancement of developing countries. A grandiloquent text unrelated to the practice of international economic relations would serve no useful purpose and indeed might have detrimental effects. For the preparation of this document the Conference should draw upon the valuable legacy of ideas that the United Nations family has been building up over the years, including the draft declaration on international economic co-operation, now under study by an *ad hoc* Working Group of the Economic and Social Council. The very concept of collective economic security was born out of this network of studies, explorations and cogitations. This complex system must now be codified in a declaration that would represent a collective expression of faith in a comprehensive ordination of the international economic process which would provide guide-lines for international action against under-development. The Brazilian delegation wishes to express its sincerest hope that we may, when we celebrate the jubilee year of the United Nations in 1965, have already proclaimed the declaration on the establishment and preservation of collective economic security.

33. After this survey of the tasks facing the United Nations in the promotion of economic development, one point should be stressed. This high degree of development achieved by a small number of countries does not necessarily imply the perpetuation of under-development elsewhere. It is obvious, on the contrary, that the economic and social security achieved by some is in danger if all do not attain this economic and social security. We are on the verge of the reconstruction of a new international community, where the continued existence of economic and social under-development will be a risk for all. We live within a system made up of reciprocal causes and effects. Just as peace is indivisible—because peace involves an element of interdependence and its consolidation requires the co-operation of sovereign entities—so the economic and social development of mankind, which is the condition and expression of peace, should be indivisible. We are

not dealing with abstractions. We are confronted with hard realities that require prompt and decisive action.

34. It may be stated without exaggeration that mankind has reached the final stage of the colonial process with the same features which have characterized it during the last five centuries. And, consequently, it may be acknowledged that the colonial process is a historical and sociological archaism the remnants of which are sources of tensions and political friction in the contemporary world, which can and must be finally eradicated and liquidated.

35. What is most striking, however, in this comprehensive process is the fact that, until completely liquidated, the remnants of colonialism constitute the main obstacle of the economic development of the former colonies which have now become sovereign States. With very few exceptions these sovereign States have been encountering enormous obstacles in their development as a result of a trade pattern which has vitiated the economic means available to the former colonies; their semi-colonial economic status has perpetuated itself.

36. The liquidation and eradication of the historical and sociological anachronism of colonialism is, accordingly, a process of the highest interest for the defence of the economies of all former colonies, irrespective of the various phases of their political emancipation and of the continents where they may be located.

37. It is generally accepted today that total decolonization is the essential objective pursued throughout the world, wherever territories or peoples are involved which are dependent to any degree. This objective, within the context of the United Nations, does not stem only from a quantitative element, namely, the voting predominance of the new Member States, but also from a qualitative factor: the fact that the anti-colonial thesis has in its favour all the ethical, economic, demographic, social and political motivations. Only reasons of power and state relations can explain postponements, since the so-called technical motivations, such as cultural development, capacity for self-government, national viability, lack of preparation of leaders and other related arguments, militate in fact against the colonial thesis, because whatever was left undone during the past decades can hardly be expected to be accomplished in the few remaining years. And if nothing was done, this was due to the willingness to do nothing intrinsically related to the colonial problem.

38. As early as the eighth and until the fifteenth session of the General Assembly in 1960—the African Year of the United Nations—decolonization was making enormous strides ahead, year after year, in a growing and cumulative movement, the theoretical preparation of which was due, to a large extent, to the action of Latin-American delegations. This movement received an extraordinary impetus as a consequence of the Second World War, when the peoples of the dependent territories in Africa and in Asia played a very important role, not sufficiently emphasized to this day. The Second World War generated conditions for national independence which, if impeded, would have jeopardized the precarious peace of the world. Within the Organization of the United Nations, after resolution 1514 (XV) containing the Declaration for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples had been approved in 1960, the Organization began to fail in its determination to implement the principles embodied in the Declaration for the liquidation of colonial-

ism, which, though verbally required as immediate, met with difficulties previously foreseen by some observers, if not yet officially mentioned in the debates.

39. Brazil recognizes that the residual elements of colonialism are still offering resistance and still require, for a certain time, concentrated efforts and great wisdom. Nevertheless, the decolonizing movement can be peacefully completed within the framework of the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolutions. The Special Committee of Twenty-Four on the implementation of the Declaration deserves the support of all the Members of the United Nations. The Powers which in the past had possessed a colonial empire have all heeded, almost without any exception, the voice of the new times. The remaining points of resistance to this process require increased efforts on the part of the United Nations in order to achieve its rational and harmonious solution. This is, therefore, an appropriate moment for the Special Committee, at the resumption of its work, to pass in systematic review each one of the continents, without omitting the American continent and its territories dependent on extra-continental powers. As long as there remains a dependent territory, there will be a source of international misunderstanding inherent in this type of international relations which is both obsolete and anachronistic. Such is the lesson of our times.

40. Brazil views the struggle for decolonization as comprehending all the aspects of the secular fight for freedom and human rights. Brazil stands against every form of colonialism, be it political or economic. For the same reason, Brazil regards with extreme caution the emergence of alternative forms of political colonialism already defined as neo-colonialism. It would thus be desirable that the organs that are now entrusted with the problems of decolonization within the framework of the United Nations turn their attention to this new phenomenon of the modern world, the dangerous implications of which I have no need to emphasize.

41. The United Nations would be one more failure and the most bitter one in the long history of the hopes of the human race, and would betray its purpose and destiny if it does not face, with all the urgency and determination required by our times, these three sources of vital international problems: disarmament, development and decolonization.

42. However, as we are advancing towards the attainment of those objectives, we recognize the inescapable need of strengthening this Organization so as to allow it to adapt itself to the tasks resulting from its own duties and commitments. This task of regeneration has been dynamically stimulated by the insight and wisdom of our Secretary-General, U Thant, whose qualities of thought and action are complemented by an exact comprehension of what the United Nations ought to be in this world of nuclear dangers and under-development, of great challenges and yet of great prospects.

43. The positive achievements of the Organization cannot be challenged, no matter how sceptical its critics. However, the mere acknowledgement of these achievements does not suffice in itself, because the process and the pace of history are being accelerated and along with that the urgency of the collective needs. The Organization reflecting the pressures of these collective needs, and as a tool devised to deal with them, cannot allow them to reach the critical explosive point. It is therefore necessary continuously to infuse

vitality into the Organization, first by considering what should have been done, and then considering what should be done.

44. Here it is appropriate to formulate certain questions in the light of the text of the Charter itself. Why were so many Articles of the Charter never applied? Why, for example, was Article 26 not applied? Why was Article 43 never institutionalized in connexion with Articles 45, 46 and 47? Why was no action taken as outlined in Articles 57 and 63 and why was it not recognized that, despite the expenses involved, it would have had considerable advantages in respect of the organic structure of the existing specialized agencies as well as of those which it would be appropriate to set up by reason of superior collective interests? Why, on the other hand, are we not endeavouring to supersede completely Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter by the fulfilment in toto of its explicit objectives?

45. There is no reason to keep silent on the causes which produced these impediments. The Charter—apart from the enormous merits which accord to it the character of the most lofty diplomatic instrument so far devised by mankind—carries the marks of the historical conditions which gave it life, namely the heritage of the Second World War. It reflects those conditions as an instrument of big-Power policy, a residue of the struggles terminated in 1945, so that its true objective, the establishment in a disarmed world of peace based on universal justice, was jeopardized by certain inherent imperfections in its origin, inevitable at the time but which today should be corrected and overcome. What can be said, for example, about Article 107 of the Charter today?

46. The effective application of the Charter is obstructed by the effective directorate exercised by the great Powers. Their action none the less could be deemed positive if it were kept within the real and literal limits of the Charter itself. Today, we all feel the urgency of a modernization and an adjustment of the Charter to the conditions of the present-day world, in the very form outlined in Articles 108 and 109. None the less, certain perfectly justified claims, such as the immediate increase in the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council, the possible creation of new councils, the setting up of an effective machinery for the maintenance of peace—objectives supported by an overwhelming majority of the Member States—suffer defeat at the hands of the directorate of the great Powers, which insists upon conditioning the action of the United Nations to the unyielding play of power politics or of specific political solutions to a given question.

47. It was in this manner that the vicious circle was created in which the revision of the Charter was frustrated, as was the possibility for asserting the presence of the United Nations in the most significant acts of contemporary diplomacy. Indeed, is it not true that the nuclear test ban agreement was recently concluded in Moscow outside the framework of the United Nations?

48. There is no doubt that if this vicious circle is not broken and the invisible veto is not overcome with the co-operation and goodwill of all nations, including the great Powers of necessity, the Charter, though dynamic in character, will tend to come to a standstill. It is necessary that all Powers, all Member States, all States not yet Members but aspiring to membership in the United Nations, that all, in short, be imbued with what they claim to possess: the desire for peace. It is necessary for us to be able to overcome all the

obstacles opposing human progress and freedom. For on our march towards progress, we are not prepared to forsake freedom.

49. The fundamental co-ordinates of the important task of revitalizing the Charter can, in our opinion, be outlined as follows: first, today the concept of security is inseparably linked to the concept of peace: without peace there will be no security for any nation, no matter how great the number of nuclear weapons it has in stock and the number of tests it has conducted. Therefore, the concept of security is truly collective and conditioned by collectively disarmed peace. The Charter, which was based on the concept of an absolute and individual security for each country, must reflect the new thermo-nuclear reality. Secondly, the economic concepts—which were practically absent from the Covenant of the League of Nations, where there was but one single paragraph Article 23, paragraph e which referred to the "freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League"—appear in the Charter also at a level of extreme generalization, even though this represents a stride forward in the recognition of an international responsibility for the promotion of economic development. Today's world with its urgent needs certainly requires much more than these very broad generalizations. The efforts made in recent years to establish such international responsibility must be materialized within this Organization, which demands a Charter forcefully expressing the requirements of a world which must become dynamic in order to survive. Thirdly, the concept of colonial emancipation and the self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter is today a reality so firmly imbedded that it is necessary to speed up its ultimate practical effectiveness. The process of its application had indeed created the Organization we behold today, and its Charter, approved by fifty-one original signatory Member States, imposes itself upon the sixty new Members, who never had the opportunity to state their views on the new features required by the realities of the present-day world. It is not possible to delay any longer the right of sixty States admitted since 1945 to express themselves on the nature and the objectives of an Organization of which they are a part and to which they bring a great creative force. This consideration makes it imperative to revise the Charter, in order to adjust it to the reality of the nuclear era.

50. At the San Francisco Conference, where the structure of the Organization was first built, Brazil was one of the first and most persistent defenders of the principle of the flexibility of the Charter, maintaining the thesis that its provisions had to be continuously subject to an organic process of revision. In that sense, the Brazilian delegation submitted an amendment under which the General Assembly was to proceed to a mandatory examination of the basic statute of the Organization every five years, in order to embody all the modifications suggested by experience. After citing an opinion according to which the revision of constitutional provisions is a question of experience rather than of logic, my delegation proceeded to say:

"Once a legal institution is created, it acquires a life of its own. Given sufficient time, the Organization will reveal the virtues and the defects of its structure, and indicate what adjustments are necessary to make survival possible and to bring about peace and justice." 5/

5/ United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I, 24 June 1945, vol. 6, pp. 179 and 180.

As may be seen there is nothing new or revolutionary in the idea of revising the United Nations Charter. The concept of the need of revision as well as of its process are provided for in the Charter itself.

51. My delegation, in conformity with the ideas just expressed in respect of the various questions pertaining to our organizational collective life, shall maintain, in the course of the period of work we are about to initiate, the closest liaison with all the other delegations. On the basis of such consultations and conversations, the Brazilian delegation reserves its right to submit, either individually or in association with other Member States, certain draft resolutions incorporating these ideas and geared to a new concept of the United Nations—the United Nations of today. I repeat, it is not in vain that eighteen years of history have been lived through a nuclear era. Disarmament, development, decolonization, these are the only alternatives to death, starvation and slavery. Because, in everything and above everything, the essential goal is to secure human freedom. In the final analysis man will have gained nothing if he loses his freedom—freedom to live, to think and to act. For progress and economic development my country will make every sacrifice, yet it will not sacrifice freedom. No idea will be acceptable to us if it brings with it the suppression of human freedom. But as security is today linked to peace, so is the concept of freedom linked to those of social progress and economic development. And we must advance rapidly for time is running short, both for the United Nations and for mankind.

52. Mr. PEARSON (Canada): I wish first of all, Mr. President, to congratulate you on your election to the high office you now hold. As one who has himself occupied that Chair, I know that it is always a demanding, often a difficult and occasionally an uncomfortable one, but your record and your personal qualities assure us that you will fill it with satisfaction to the Assembly, distinction to yourself, and honour to your country.

53. Some years have passed since I last had the honour to represent my country at the United Nations. My first words on my return must be to reaffirm Canada's strong and continuing support for our world Organization and our desire to do what we can to help to realize the ideals of its Charter.

54. From this rostrum, I am happy to recognize many old friends and respected colleagues. But I am also conscious of the fact that the eighteenth session of the General Assembly of 1963 reflects the great changes that have taken place in the Organization since I was here and which, in turn, reflect changes that have taken place in the world. Not the least of these changes is the admission of many newly-independent States whose distinguished representatives now add their wisdom and influence to the Assembly's deliberations.

55. Their presence is a reminder, which we should not need, that there can be no enduring peace and security in the world until all men are free, with the right to determine their own form of political life and the duty to display the responsibility that alone gives meaning to freedom.

56. For eighteen years now, the United Nations has continued the search for effective ways to promote the Purposes and Principles of its Charter. In the broad balance sheet the credit column remains favourable, even if limited by international fears and misunderstandings. Our task remains—as it has always been—to reduce and ultimately to sweep away those limitations.

57. Of all the changes of the past few years, none has been more dramatic than the emergence of new and free nations in Africa. This emergence has had a profound effect on the political evolution of the United Nations and on international affairs generally. It has also added heavy responsibilities to our Organization in many fields of activity. Finally, it has given new and urgent emphasis to two major questions of our time, colonialism and racial discrimination; both of which, we should not forget, can exist in many forms and have no common political pattern.

58. New States have brought United Nations membership closer to the goal of universality. They have also brought inescapable problems of growing pains. This process of growth and adjustment is bound to be difficult. How could it be otherwise? It requires patience and tolerance and understanding on the part of all Members, new and old.

59. There are new Members that are small States with large problems of political, economic and social development. There are older Members that are big States facing new and gigantic problems. Many of these result from their own great strides in science and technology. These advances have given entirely new dimensions to the threat of war and even to human survival, but they have also made possible a new era of progress and plenty surpassing any previous human achievement. The challenge to the world community, then, is a dual one, both negative and positive.

60. The problem of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, must be solved before scientific advances move it beyond man's reach. The disparity in economic and social development among nations must be corrected before it creates an unbridgeable gulf between "have" and "have-not" nations. It is the duty and interest of all Members of the United Nations to see that this swift march of science and technology does not lead either to the universal destruction of war or to intolerable differences among nations in human welfare and social progress. Only through constructive and co-operative international endeavour can these two grim results be avoided.

61. The Congo crisis, about which I would like to say a word, has once again shown that these two things, security and welfare, are interrelated, parts of the same problem. That operations in the Congo were sustained in the face of great odds and obstacles is a stirring tribute to the courage and devotion of the servants of the United Nations. It is a witness also to the determination of the majority of its Members that the United Nations should not fail in its Congo mission. This mission, broadly stated, was to cushion the transition from dependent to independent status—a pattern which may again be needed in other colonial situations not yet dealt with.

62. The Congo mission has raised in an acute form the main problems of peace-keeping of the United Nations—problems of political control, executive direction, financial means and administrative co-ordination. From the Congo, new experience, not yet fully assessed, has been added to that gained from earlier peace-keeping operations. Canada does not share the doubts which have been raised about the nature and purposes of this United Nations action. We felt that intervention in the Congo was a test which this Organization had to accept and a duty which it could not shirk. We believe that this kind of important, if necessarily limited, peace-keeping activity has now moved beyond the stage of first experiment. We believe

that it has become a practical necessity in the conduct of international affairs, and should be provided for as such.

63. A main task of our Organization, therefore, should now be to strengthen and improve its capacity in this field, learning from the failures and successes of the past and seeking more effective ways to perform this function in the future. There will, of course, always be some situations in which the United Nations should not be asked to intervene either because the intervention would be outside the Charter, contrary to the Charter, or because it would be beyond the United Nations capacity and therefore bound to fail. But there will be other situations where its intervention will be important, perhaps even essential, for keeping the peace, or preventing small conflicts from developing into big ones; for these there surely should be the advance international planning and preparation without which no national Government would dream of acting.

64. I am of course aware that a few Members disagree categorically with this peace-keeping concept of the United Nations and that they argue that most of the peace-keeping operations of the past have been illegal. They would have us believe that the most stirring and compelling phrases of the Preamble to the Charter are hollow, that the first Purpose enunciated in Article 1 has no practical application. There are other Members who are doubtful or indifferent or cynical regarding this aspect of our work. Both categories reflect attitudes which have forced the Organization to improvise in carrying out tasks which have been imposed on it by the decisions of the Assembly or the Security Council. Those who are responsible for the necessity of such "crash" action are often the first to criticize the United Nations when the results are disorderly, delayed or inadequate.

65. The Secretary-General in a recent speech—I believe it was at Harvard University—has emphasized the advantage it would be "if countries would, in their national military planning, make provision for suitable units which could be made available at short notice for United Nations service and thereby decrease the degree of improvisation necessary in an emergency."<sup>6/</sup>

66. I believe we should now support this appeal by putting into effect those arrangements, which are increasingly becoming necessary, including a compact planning team of military experts which would provide the advice and assistance which the Secretary-General should have for organizing emergency peace-keeping operations.

67. National Governments can also improve their own arrangements for assisting such operations. My own country now maintains forces, trained and equipped for the purpose, which can be placed at the disposal of the United Nations on short notice for service anywhere in the world. In case we are required to do more in the future, we have recently given the Secretariat detailed information on what we can most readily provide to meet further requests for assistance.

68. In this co-operative peace-keeping activity we have been associated with many States and in many places far removed from Canada—in Kashmir, in Palestine, in Gaza and Sinai, in Lebanon, in the Congo, in West New Guinea and in Yemen. Each situation has

<sup>6/</sup> Speech before the Harvard Alumni Association at Cambridge, Mass., on 13 June 1963.

posed its own problems and suggested its own solutions. But always, running through it all, our own experience has taught us one thing: the importance of advance planning and organization, both within our national establishment and within the international Organization. We would be happy to share our experience with others who have participated with us in the past in United Nations peace-keeping operations, as well as with those who might wish to do so in the future. To this end we propose that there should be an examination by interested Governments of the problems and techniques of peace-keeping operations. This could lead to a pooling of available resources and the development, in a co-ordinated way, of trained and equipped collective forces for United Nations service to meet possible future demands for peace-keeping or police action under the blue flag of the world Organization and at the request of that Organization. The Scandinavian Member States, in their formation of a composite Nordic contingent for United Nations police and peace duties, have shown the way. We should now, I believe, try to make further progress along those lines, and my country would be proud to initiate steps for this purpose.

69. There are other fundamental United Nations questions to be dealt with: questions of constitutional reform, organization and administration; of financing and procedural methods. A comprehensive reappraisal should, I think, be made of certain basic questions, such as Charter reform, which have been pushed into the background of our thinking because of recurring tension in international relations leading to the fear that the questions themselves might contain the seeds of possible further friction. I am not proposing that this Assembly should decide that the Charter should now be reviewed with a view to making drastic changes and reforms. That, of course, would not be possible, and perhaps not desirable at this moment. But I am suggesting that at this session, in order that the United Nations can act more effectively in its various fields of responsibility, we should make a conscious effort to deal with certain problems which we have been avoiding.

70. I have already mentioned the need for adequate and balanced representation in the main organs of the United Nations. Since the membership first began to expand in 1955, we have recognized that there had to be some adjustment and enlargement in the composition of the Councils and of the Secretariat to reflect the changed geographical pattern of membership. To be fully effective, United Nations machinery and organization should adequately reflect the present membership, without giving undue weight to any single factor, whether it be military or industrial strength, population or financial contribution, politics or race or geography.

71. To this end, I believe that the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council should be enlarged in order to permit a better balance in their composition. We should not, however, confine our interest to representation. We should be even more concerned about powers and functions.

72. I am thinking particularly of the Security Council. Its record in recent years, for reasons which we all understand, has been one of diminishing returns. We are all aware of the main reason for this—the lack of the essential unanimity among the great Powers. That unanimity is still lacking; but this year, for the first time in the post-war period, we can perhaps begin to

hope that improved political relations between the great Powers may make possible the restoration to the Security Council of the high executive function which it was designed to fulfil.

73. We might also consider how to modify the Council's function to make it more effective as the instrument of political action for the United Nations. Indeed, the time may be at hand for a Security Council which can keep continuing watch on the affairs of the Organization as a whole in much the same way as the executive committees operate in the specialized agencies.

74. If the enlarged Security Council were given a properly balanced composition, with sufficient safeguards as regards voting rights, it could conceivably become the main arena for political decision on questions which require urgent action. It could assume responsibility for many of the items which now lie heavily on the agenda of every session of the General Assembly. Such a Council could be in session virtually throughout the year and make it possible to cut drastically into the excessive time and energy now consumed by Assembly proceedings.

75. There is another change that might be considered. The United Nations will inevitably remain the central world forum for international discussion and recommendation on a wide range of subjects. We already have, in addition, regional groupings of States—in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Other groupings conceivably may be formed. The time may soon come to correlate the activities of these regional groupings more closely with those of the United Nations. It is possible to envisage a stage in the evolution of the United Nations when regional assemblies may be used to deal with regional problems in search of local solutions or in the preparation for broader treatment at the full United Nations.

76. The United Nations, however reorganized to become more efficient, can never function effectively unless it has adequate financial resources. Far from possessing these, it faces a financial crisis. But the basic problem, arising largely out of the refusal of some States to pay their share of peace-keeping expenses of which they did not approve, remains untouched. I am aware of the explanations of their negative attitude to this problem given by the Members concerned. But most of the arguments advanced have little to do with the real issue which is that, if the United Nations decides in accordance with recognized and legal procedures to engage in peace-keeping operations, the expenses should be borne collectively by the whole membership in accordance with Assembly decisions on apportionment. There is surely no other acceptable way. If we do not give the Organization the financial support which it needs for discharging its responsibilities, its very existence will be endangered. In particular, the efforts of the United Nations and the specialized agencies to render economic and social assistance might be brought to an end.

77. The first concern of the United Nations, I know, is the keeping of the peace. If we were to fail in that, the whole brave human experiment would have failed; we would go down for good. But, second only to the keeping of peace, the great purpose of international statesmanship today must be to improve the living standards of all the world's peoples and to make possible a better life for all. The role of the United Nations in this field is necessarily limited. But if we wish, and if we will, it can be one of great and lasting significance.

78. Experience is more and more underlying the central significance and compelling urgency of economic and social questions in these years, rightly named the Decade of Development, and our concern in that field is at the moment focussed on the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; we have been honoured to serve on the Preparatory Committee for that conference.

79. The problems of economic development and those of trade expansion are fundamentally the same. But the purpose of development is to raise the level of real incomes, from which the main impetus to expanding trade must come. Higher incomes within a country, however, do not automatically improve a country's ability to trade. The improved incomes must be related in the long run to increased earnings through exports. Aid programmes, essential as they are, are only a means of bridging a gap until export incomes increase.

80. For this reason, and for many others, we should do all we can in this Assembly to lay foundations for the success of next year's economic conference. That conference will be concerned, obviously, with recommending practical ways of raising and stabilizing the earnings that the less developed countries derive from exports of primary products. It is hardly less important to enlarge the earnings open to all countries through trade in manufactured goods. For that purpose, as has already been pointed out by the first speaker in this debate, barriers to trade must be reduced and, in order to make this effective, measures may be needed to improve international currency arrangements and lessen the exposure of so many countries to balance-of-payments troubles.

81. In the complex structure of the world economy today, trade and aid are tightly linked. No amount of aid will create permanent, stable growth unless it is soon accompanied by developing means of increasing exports. Accordingly, all the Members of the United Nations—developed and developing economies alike—have a common interest in seeking mutual aid and economic co-operation which will be of mutual benefit. The success of this and other similar efforts, essential for peace and prosperity in the world, will depend largely on freeing economic and technical co-operation to the maximum possible extent from political controversy.

82. The specialized agencies, the functional and regional commissions, the other bodies dealing with economic and social problems, should be given the opportunity to concentrate on the special tasks which they were set up to perform. Recently, their work has been diverted and delayed by the injection of controversial political questions into their deliberations. There have been attempts to achieve political aims at the expense of the economic and social benefits which would accrue from the vigorous pursuit of the technical programmes.

83. I believe that the specialized agencies and other functional bodies of the United Nations should leave political matters to the bodies designed and intended for political debate and political decision: the General Assembly and the Security Council. If a moratorium on political controversy in the specialized agencies could be accepted, it would enable those agencies to get on with their practical projects of co-operative assistance, and I think the developing countries would have the most to gain from that result.

84. Some members directly and immediately concerned with certain political issues involving human

rights and fundamental freedoms sincerely, and indeed passionately, believe that their cases should be aired whenever and wherever the opportunity occurs. We can understand and fully appreciate the depth of feeling aroused by racial and colonial issues, without necessarily accepting the desirability of all the methods proposed for dealing with such issues.

85. The Charter does not require or even authorize sanctions, such as expulsion, to be applied merely because one Member of the United Nations follows policies, such as apartheid, considered abhorrent and degrading by others. Quite apart from the practical and legal arguments against such action by majority vote, where will this course lead us? There may be—indeed there are—other Governments represented in this Organization which follow policies and adopt practices that are considered by many other Members to be discriminatory and to violate human rights. But are voices to be raised by those other Members of the Assembly for the imposition of extreme sanctions, such as expulsion? I hope not.

86. The fundamental aim of this Organization should be to hold the nations together in an international system as nearly universal as we can make it—and perhaps for that reason we should be seeking to increase the membership, not to decrease it.

87. Today the world around us is filled with uncertainties and dangers from a wide and worrying variety of unresolved issues. Many of them do not appear on our agenda. Some may no longer be susceptible of United Nations treatment and can best be dealt with, at least for the time being, by the parties most directly concerned. In its approach to international affairs, the United Nations has to take into account the reality of world politics, which in some cases makes direct negotiations preferable to United Nations involvement.

88. There are certain questions, however, which are the direct concern and responsibility of this Assembly. There are old questions such as disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament; the elimination of racial discrimination; freedom for peoples who have never had it and for others who have lost it. There are also new questions raised with each passing year. But, whether old or new, they have their place in United Nations priorities and they all pose the question, with a compelling urgency: how can this collective United Nations response to international challenge best be fitted into the pattern of world affairs?

89. We must soon find the right answer to this question, for time may be running out on us. While most Members recognize the proven value of the United Nations and want it to continue in effective being, with a substantial role in our world, there are signs of decline and deterioration which we would be foolish to ignore and which could threaten the future use of our Organization, indeed its very existence.

90. Fortunately, however, there are also signs now of improvement in relations between the super-Powers, which could give the United Nations new hope and new opportunity. There is a little more benevolence and a little less bitterness, and the cold war is a little less frigid. The United Nations is, among other things, a unique political mirror reflecting, often magnifying and occasionally distorting, the dreams and the distresses of men. So I wonder what the eighteenth session of the General Assembly will show.

91. The picture could be a brighter one. The feeling today of crisis and collision is not as oppressive as

it has been in the recent past. There is an encouraging contrast between the international climate at the opening of this session of the General Assembly and that which hung like a dark shadow over the last or the one before that.

92. I know that none of the great issues has been resolved. There is recurring tension in and around Berlin, in Laos and Viet-Nam, in parts of Africa, along the Sino-Indian frontier, in the Middle East, in the Caribbean and elsewhere. But there seems now to be more of a will, more of a desire, to seek peaceful settlements to stubborn problems. This improvement may soon fade before the test of policy and action. But it exists now, and we should take full advantage of it.

93. Its most striking evidence, as has already been pointed out by the representative of Brazil, is the recent limited nuclear test-ban treaty between three nuclear Powers, since adhered to by more than ninety States. Even by itself, that treaty is immensely valuable in putting an end to the poisoning of the atmosphere which sustains all life on our planet. But it must be viewed beyond its own terms. It showed that great Powers were able to agree on something important in spite of the fears and tensions of cold war. The global sigh of relief that followed that treaty was due not only to the ending of atmospheric pollution, important as that was, but to a feeling of hope for further progress towards peace. In particular, the time seemed closer when the long frustration of disarmament negotiations might be replaced by some positive measures of agreement, with priority given to atomic disarmament.

94. It would be intolerable now if our hopes for some positive steps to remove the fear of universal destruction were once more to be dashed. I cannot believe that this will happen. I cannot believe that there are not sensible solutions which will be found to the problems of the relations of 700 millions of Chinese with their neighbours, or to those of a divided Germany, a divided Korea, a divided Viet-Nam. I do not accept the permanence of the Berlin Wall as a symbol of a divided world. I reject the theory that Arabs and Jews must for ever be hostile. I do not believe it is the destiny of Cuba to be permanently alienated from former friends and neighbours in this Western Hemisphere, or for Whites and non-whites to be permanently embittered in Africa because of racial policies which are bad and bound to fail.

95. I do not claim that there are quick and easy solutions to these problems. There are no such solutions, and there never have been. But there is a better atmosphere in which to begin the earnest and persistent search for solutions. And in this search, I repeat, the United Nations can play an effective role—but only if it puts its own house in order. It is not the sole instrument for international co-operation. It has no supra-national authority. It is no substitute for national foreign policy or bilateral diplomacy. The Charter rightly recognizes that there are other peaceful means of solution, regional and limited collective arrangements outside the United Nations but consistent with its principles, which Member States can employ, and which they do employ. Nevertheless, the United Nations alone serves us all. It provides the only world assembly to protect and advance human rights and freedoms and human welfare, to reduce and remove the causes of conflict. It can lead us out of the post-war wasteland into greener pastures of a creative and secure peace. It can. But whether it does, whether it discharges that great role and fulfills its great responsibilities, de-

pends on us. When the United Nations fails, its Member Governments fail. When it succeeds, all the plain and good people of all the world succeed.

96. We are eighteen years old now. The League of Nations was eighteen years old in 1938. That was the year of appeasement, of unawareness, of failure of heart and nerve. The eighteenth year of the United Nations opens in a climate of greater hope. We can make it the beginning of the end of the situation where a man can communicate with a missile a million miles away, but not with another man whom he watches warily over a curtain of fear and suspicion.

97. Shortly before his premature and greatly lamented death, Albert Camus wrote: "Since atomic war would divest any future of its meaning, it gives us complete freedom of action. We have nothing to lose except everything. So let's go ahead."

98. Well, I say: let's go ahead. This is the Assembly of opportunity. We can make it, if we will, the Assembly of action for peace.

99. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The work of this session of the United Nations General Assembly is starting in more auspicious conditions than that of many previous sessions. One might say that the eighteenth session of the Assembly is weighing anchor with a light but at any rate a favouring wind.

100. Two events in the interval between this session of the General Assembly and the last have generated this favouring wind: the weathering of the crisis in the Caribbean region, and the conclusion of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It is difficult to overestimate the influence of these events on the policies of States and the minds of men. The crisis in the Caribbean region showed all who face reality the dangers with which the present world situation is still fraught. That was a steep, a very steep pass in international affairs. However, by restraint and the correct choice of the paths leading to the desired goal—the prevention of war—it was negotiated successfully. The well-known obligations assumed by the Soviet Union and the United States of America were the basis for an understanding between the parties, and made it possible to eliminate this international crisis, the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War.

101. Another pass in international affairs, but this time one with a gentler slope, was the conclusion of the nuclear test-ban treaty.

102. As a result, one can today see more distinctly the new frontiers still to be reached in order to achieve a further relaxation of international tension and lessen the danger of an outbreak of hostilities.

103. If the work of this session of the Assembly is to fulfil the hopes of the nations, the correct lessons must be drawn from both these events. The chief lesson is that only a course aimed at the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of peace is in the interests of the nations, if the word "peace" is not just a resounding phrase but means specific actions and agreements directed towards the improvement of relations between States.

104. The second and no less important conclusion is that, in order to prevent recurrence of a situation in which tension in any area of the world again reaches boiling point, threatening to end in a head-on collision of the great Powers, it is necessary to remove the

causes of that tension and, above all, to forbid interference in the internal affairs of other States, as each Member of the United Nations is bound to do by the Charter.

105. Today people see still more clearly the dangers of the "cold war" policy, and are voting for a start—even a small one—towards the strengthening of peace, rather than marking time and apathetically watching the threat of war grow darker. But how can this threat be completely eliminated, and what are the avenues leading to the road in international relations along which we may progress with hastening steps towards a future without war? The Soviet Government gives a clear reply to this question: these avenues are marked by a signpost reading "To the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems".

106. The need to affirm in international relations the principle of the peaceful coexistence of the two social systems—socialist and capitalist—has been consistently upheld by the Soviet Union since the time of the great founder of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin. The importance of peaceful coexistence, particularly in an age of nuclear power and space exploration, has been demonstrated most fully and convincingly in the speeches of the head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, including the speech he delivered here at the United Nations. The importance of this policy, which is in the interest of each State individually and of mankind as a whole, is year by year becoming more obvious, with the unprecedented destructive capacity of modern means of warfare and the increasingly profound awareness of the fatal consequences which would befall nations if such a war were unleashed.

107. Two decades ago people thought, looking at the ruins of cities and the ashes of villages and mourning their dead relatives, that this was the limit of the calamity of war. Today everyone knows that there are weapons of which one single blast vastly exceeds the force of all the explosives used, not only during the Second World War, but throughout the history of mankind. We also know that the numbers of hydrogen and atomic bombs are no longer counted in single units and are steadily increasing. Everyone understands that now the alternative to peaceful coexistence is destructive war. This alone obliges all those who cherish the future of nations to uphold firmly the banner of the struggle for peace, determinedly rejecting attempts to attach to the concept of peaceful coexistence a meaning contrary to this great humanist idea.

108. For the socialist countries, because of the very nature of their social system, it is as unnatural to direct their energies to conquest, to the diffusion of their views by force and to war as it would be for a worker to desire the destruction of all that was created by his labour, or for the ploughman to want his crops to die.

109. We believe many Western statesmen understand that it is one thing to uphold their ideals of the organization of society by demonstrating their advantages and fighting for the hearts and minds of men, but quite another thing to conduct relations between States standing at opposite ideological poles by inculcating these ideals with arms.

110. Yes, we who represent the countries of socialism have waged and will continue to wage a relentless struggle for the triumph of the ideals of socialism and communism. We shall accept no ideological compromise, any more than we demand that our ideological

opponents shall renounce their own ideologies under threat of force. We are appealing for something else: the weapons in the struggle between the two philosophies should be not divisions of soldiers but legions of books; not nuclear bombs but the ability to produce more benefits and distribute them more fairly among the people. In the age of thermo-nuclear weapons, progress and world war are, in the words of the great Russian poet A. S. Pushkin, just as incompatible as genius and villainy.

111. To the question of what views and what ideals will ultimately triumph in a particular country and how this will come about, we Communists give a direct answer: the people of each country—and they alone—must themselves determine their fate and decide which system they prefer. The Soviet people are imbued with the unshakable belief that the example given by the Soviet Union and other countries building socialism and communism is convincing and will increasingly convince nations that this is the system which offers man the best opportunities to develop his abilities and be completely free from any kind of exploitation and oppression, want, or fear for his future.

112. However, this does not mean the imposition of one's own systems on other States, but peaceful competition, competition by example and by force of conviction, competition which completely excludes the use of force to affirm one's own views. It is on this foundation, according to the profound conviction of the Soviet Government, that relations between States should be built.

113. For forty-six years now—from the first days of the birth of the Soviet State and even before, since the very inception of Marxism as an ideology—torrents of slander have continually been poured on the advocates of a transformation of society along socialist lines. There is nothing of which they are not accused from various rostra, high and low! And, although on each occasion events have merely revealed the spiritual poverty of those who sought to smear the ideals of socialism, the same thing is continuing decade after decade.

114. Even those initiatives in international affairs which are universally recognized to be useful, taken by the great Western Powers together with the Soviet Union, are not immune from such treatment. For example, we were probably not the only one to notice that discussion of the nuclear test-ban treaty was accompanied in some seemingly respectable institutions by a tattoo of belligerent statements and attacks on the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.

115. To those who continue to ascribe to us intentions which are alien to the policy of the socialist countries, we reply: no, it is the societies in which the slave-owner oppresses the slave, the landlord oppresses the serf, and the capitalist oppresses the worker that have created and handed down to each other as though by relay a baton of international relations whereby not conviction but force resolves ideological differences and dissenters are converted by fire and sword.

116. Do not try to hand us this baton! We have started off a new relay-race in which the runners—the socialist countries and the capitalist countries—can compete on the roads of history and yet maintain peaceful relations with each other.

117. In the West they often argue along lines something like this: of course, one must willy-nilly coexist with a State belonging to a different social system, if

it is powerful and well-armed. Better coexist with it and save one's skin than bring matters to a military conflict, since in such a conflict there are no winners, only losers. However, as soon as the question arises of peaceful coexistence between a strong capitalist Power and a small country, particularly a neighbouring one, there is an immediate and marked decline in willingness to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence, and the long-outmoded methods of dictatorship and blackmail are brought into play.

118. These methods are dangerous to the cause of peace, very dangerous. They have been dangerous wherever attempts have been made to use them. It is far from superfluous to emphasize this at this time. The Soviet Government is doing so in the hope that no one will attempt to change by force the order in another country, even a small one, and that all States will strictly observe the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

119. The Soviet people, who are engaged in the production of the most complicated machines and instruments, in the tilling of fields and gardens, in the construction of power stations and dams, and in the laying of canals and oil pipelines, want to live in peace with all countries and peoples. The Seven-Year Plan for the development of the national economy, which our country is successfully implementing, and the long-range targets for the development of the economy of the Soviet Union in the next two decades, established in the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, are a translation into the language of figures and production quotas of the policy and plans of peaceful construction. These are the plans of peace.

120. But let no one confuse the Soviet people's hatred for war with non-resistance to the scheming of the aggressors, or with sickly pacifism. The people of our country have more than once proved on the battlefield their steadfastness and their indomitable will to victory. Our people have the kind but robust and powerful arms of workers, which can force any aggressor to his knees should he dare to encroach upon the frontiers of our homeland. The Soviet people succeeded in upholding their honour and freedom when they had to fight in the years of civil war and of armed foreign intervention launched by fourteen States. They broke the backbone of Hitler's Germany and crushed its military machine. And if the names of those who started that machine are forever accursed, and perhaps remembered only when someone wants to compare the criminal plans for the preparation of a new war with the situation some twenty years ago, this too is primarily to the credit of the Soviet people, who bore the brunt of the struggle against the fascist aggressors. Their hands will not tremble should the need again arise to defend their socialist achievements and the freedom and independence of their friends and allies.

121. The Soviet Union is invariably on the side of those who defend themselves, arms in hand, against aggression perpetrated on them, and who react to the flouting of their rights and to colonial oppression by fighting for their liberation and national independence. Many peoples know from their own experience that in their hour of trial they can always rely on firm support from the Soviet Union.

122. We cannot but rejoice that the ranks of the followers of the policy of peaceful coexistence are swelling each year, and that this policy is bearing fruit. Its main result is obvious to all: people no longer hear the blast of rockets or the explosion of nuclear bombs, and

their hopes for a future without war are gaining strength.

123. It is not by accident that the more perspicacious minds of the capitalist world, including statesmen, public figures, representatives of business circles, scientists and military men, are all speaking out more and more often in favour of a policy of peaceful coexistence between the two social systems: capitalism and socialism.

124. The Soviet Government addresses this appeal to all Governments: let us develop the relations between States so that international disputes shall be settled at the conference table and not on the field of battle, and no State shall be able to use force against another whose internal structure it does not like. Let us agree on closer co-operation, including an expansion of economic and trade relations, which constitute the firmest foundation for the development of political relations between States, and on widening cultural exchanges.

125. Today it is no longer possible to imagine international life without that clear and specific objective which was stated from this rostrum on 18 September 1959. On that day [the 799th meeting] the Head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, put forward a programme for general and complete disarmament under strict international control. If the Western States had supported that appeal by deeds, there might have been nothing left to do today except to take some final steps towards the final elimination from the world of the last vestiges of State military machines. If there has been no agreement on disarmament up to now, the fault does not lie with the Soviet Union.

126. Our side proposed a draft treaty which would have ensured that this problem should be solved in the interests of all States. In order to bring the positions closer, the Soviet Union took a number of important steps to meet the Western Powers: it agreed to the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a limited number of missiles until the end of the second stage; it accepted the United States proposal for a percentage cut in conventional armaments and armed forces; and it agreed to postpone the time limit for general and complete disarmament.

127. It appears, however, that to solve the problem of disarmament successfully it is not enough merely to make sound proposals and take reasonable steps to bring the opposing positions closer. Such proposals already exist and such steps have been taken. But look at the results of the labours of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament after a year and a half of work! At first there was no shortage of assurances about the devotion of the Governments represented on the Committee to the idea of general and complete disarmament. A great many compliments were lavished on the programme of general and complete disarmament submitted for the Committee's consideration. But hardly had the process of agreement on the specific obligations of the parties begun, when those Western States upon whom the implementation of disarmament largely depends began to talk a completely different language.

128. Instead of a businesslike discussion around the conference table, there began to gush forth a fountain of speeches, which, if they conceal anything, conceal only the unwillingness of the Western Powers to proceed to any genuine disarmament. This is how it has come about that there are, figuratively speaking, two

fountains flowing in Geneva; the real one in the Lake, and the fountain of speeches in the conference-room of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The difference between them may perhaps be that the Swiss, who are thrifty people, do not switch on the Lake Geneva fountain needlessly. But the stream of speeches in the Eighteen-Nation Committee flows almost without ceasing. This is of course ironical, bitterly ironical. But the real point is something that preoccupies humanity more than anything else, and cannot fail to do so: can the arms race be stopped and turned back, or will it pave the way to disaster?

129. The Soviet Union has not spared and will not spare any effort to open people's eyes to the danger of continuing the arms race, and to show the great advantages of a disarmed world.

130. Guided by a desire to consolidate the success resulting from the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to produce a break-through in the disarmament negotiations, the Soviet Government makes the following proposal: to convene in the first quarter or first half of 1964 a conference of States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with the participation of political leaders at the highest level. In the Soviet Government's view this conference should discuss both general and complete disarmament and separate measures for a further reduction of international tension.

131. If it is true, as it certainly is, that the arms race is spiralling, then it is all the more necessary that efforts to check it should spiral even more: that they should outrun the arms race, obstruct it, undermine it and eventually reduce it to nothing. This is the purpose of the Soviet Government's proposal to convene the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at the summit.

132. Such a conference could be convened at any place convenient to its participants. The Soviet Government for its part would be prepared, for the purpose of holding such a conference, to receive the Heads of Government or State of the countries taking part in the Committee, should they so desire, in Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union.

133. The Soviet Government is submitting one further proposal in order to do its utmost for the success of the disarmament negotiations.

134. As all representatives present here will undoubtedly recall, at the last session of the General Assembly the Soviet Government agreed to exclude from the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles during the first stage a strictly limited and agreed number of nuclear missiles in the possession of the USSR and the United States only and situated on their own territories. It was intended at that time to preserve these vehicles until the end of the second stage of disarmament, when nuclear weapons were to be eliminated.

135. What were the motives for this step by the Soviet Union? It was prompted by the apprehensions expressed by the representatives of the Western Powers, primarily the United States, during the negotiations. Suppose, they said, during the process of disarmament and before all weapons were eliminated, someone suddenly goes and starts an aggression; might it not be better in that case to keep in store a certain number of nuclear missiles? The Soviet Government considers this apprehension to be on the whole artificial. Nevertheless, because it wished to facilitate the

preparation of a disarmament treaty, it submitted to the Assembly's last session a proposal which, one would think, should have reassured the Western Powers.

136. In reply we heard: "Yes, the nuclear umbrella is a good thing, but to keep it only during the first two stages of disarmament is not quite enough. Would it not be better to carry out the final stage of disarmament under its protection?" If this were the only point at issue, and if retention by the USSR and the United States of a limited number of nuclear missiles offered better prospects for successful negotiations, then the Soviet Union would naturally be prepared to go even further to meet the desires of the Western Powers, in the hope that this would provide a way out of the present deadlock.

137. The Soviet Government states its readiness to agree that a limited number of intercontinental anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles should remain in the hands of the USSR and the United States on their own territories not only until the end of the third stage: that is, until the completion of the whole process of general and complete disarmament. Accordingly we propose that, in eliminating all nuclear weapons during the second stage, an exception should be made for nuclear warheads in missiles left for the end of the third stage. At the end of that stage, the missiles retained on both sides, together with their nuclear warheads, should be eliminated. From the very outset of the second stage, control should be established over the remaining missiles, and also over their nuclear warheads.

138. If the Soviet Union and the United States retained a limited number of missiles, the problem of confidence during the disarmament process would be solved even if Western sceptics who are extremely resourceful in erecting barriers to the disarmament process adopted the most suspicious possible attitude. We hope that our partners in the negotiations will examine the Soviet Government's new proposal in the spirit of desire to reach agreement.

139. The Soviet Government refuses to admit that mankind cannot solve the disarmament problem, and rejects the belief, often expounded by the opponents of disarmament, that human nature has implanted in it an urge to kill, burn and fight. Unfortunately, echoes of such views are very often heard from Western statesmen, even at the disarmament negotiations in Geneva.

140. If we imagine a sort of geological cross-section of the history of mankind, our mind's eye will behold layer upon layer of armaments, and of graveyards for the hundreds of millions of people they have slain. Generation after generation has passed from the stage of history, taking its weapons with it into oblivion; but each time those weapons have been replaced by others even more powerful and destructive. Nevertheless, the socialist States reject the fatalistic concept that wars are all but natural calamities.

141. For States to disarm, naturally great efforts are required; but the most important need is the desire of Governments and statesmen to achieve this goal. If it is true that man's mind and hands have created weapons, then it is doubly true that they can also destroy them.

142. It seems that, however carefully the military chapters of State budgets are calculated, it is still impossible to get a complete picture of the enormous

resources thrown to the winds in the arms race. Just as nuclear fission releases gigantic forces, so would disarmament release colossal human energies and wealth which might be directed towards the development of the economy and of science, culture, education and health for the benefit of all nations.

143. At the last session of the General Assembly the Soviet Government submitted a proposal concerning an economic programme for disarmament, and submitted a draft declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament.<sup>2/</sup> The response made to this proposal strengthens our conviction that it is the duty of the Members of the United Nations to take an active part in preparing this programme.

144. We freely admit that disarmament, and especially general and complete disarmament, would be beneficial to our people and the peoples of the socialist countries. We believe, indeed we are sure, that disarmament would also render an inestimable service to the countries which have just embarked on the road of independent development and are engaged in building up their national economy. It would be no less beneficial to the socialist States than to those States which are now accelerating the arms race.

145. Everyone who speaks from this rostrum will probably advocate disarmament. But who can fail to understand that at times those speeches flagrantly contradict the deeds of the Governments on whose behalf they are made?

146. Sad as it is, it must be admitted that there is a great discrepancy between the greatness and nobility of the task of the general and complete disarmament of States, and the role played by the United Nations in its fulfilment. However unpleasant this truth may be, it is nevertheless true.

147. To a dispassionate observer, the incredible speed of the build-up of armaments which make all means of destruction used in the past seem like children's toys, must seem a crime against the world and its peoples. The military budgets the reduction of which the Soviet Union and other socialist States are advocating this very day, are being considered and approved before the eyes of all Governments and parliaments. They are endorsed, not by remote political figures, but by men whose names appear on election posters and who are voted for by the people against whom these weapons are being forged and upon whom they will fall with their full force in the event of a new war.

148. Who should be the first to raise a voice of protest against this monstrous situation in which from year to year, or even from day to day, the military machine of States is more and more lavishly lubricated with funds extorted from the people in taxes? You will agree that the United Nations, if it were properly doing its duty as a guardian of the peace, should not be the last to make that protest. Unfortunately it is not yet doing so. No one could ever remove from the United Nations the burden of responsibility for all the woes that would befall the nations if a new war were allowed to break out.

149. We should wish all Members of the United Nations to display more concern about the present state of the disarmament talks. They should regard the situation as an alarm signal.

150. Whoever wants peace cannot be afraid of progress in disarmament, but should rather strive to find a common language with the Soviet Union, with all the other socialist countries, and with all the champions of disarmament.

151. That is the picture that should be borne in mind during the debate on the disarmament problem in the United Nations. This is how we see the task of disarmament which faces the United Nations. This is how we evaluate ways and means of fulfilling one of the greatest of tasks: general and complete disarmament.

152. The same profoundly humanitarian aims—to assure the peaceful coexistence of States and to avert the threat of hostilities—also determine the Soviet Government's approach to the problem of strengthening security in Europe.

153. Both world wars originated in Europe. The shot in Sarajevo was echoed by the din of many cannon and machine-guns on the fronts of the First World War. The provocation by the Hitlerites on the German-Polish border, prepared by a policy of revenge and the thirst for conquest, was echoed by the clank of tanks and the roar of dive-bombers on almost all the continents in which fighting took place during the Second World War.

154. Whereas in the past the wars which originated in Europe have not always begun with a clash of the most powerful States, the situation is now much more complicated. In central Europe there face one another point-blank the armed forces of the two largest military and political groups, including the forces of all the nuclear Powers. This situation alone holds great danger: some spark might start a clash between the Powers with weapons of an unprecedented destructiveness.

155. Apart from the plans being hatched on the banks of the Rhine, and the extent to which the West German revanchists consider the possible consequences to themselves of unleashing a nuclear missile war—I repeat, even apart from these—the danger of a new military explosion exists and will continue to exist until the Second World War is at last wound up. So long as the borders which have come into existence in Europe, including those between the two German States, are not legally settled by a peace treaty, so long as unbridled propaganda continues in Western Germany for revision of the results of the victory over Hitlerite Germany and redrafting of the political map of Europe, the spectre of a new war will loom at the door of every house, for violation of borders means war.

156. The maintenance in West Berlin of the occupation régime almost two decades after the end of the Second World War is like the application of fertilizer to a political soil which, in West Germany, has generously nourished revanchism and ideas of militarism differing but little from those that inspired Hitlerite Germany on the eve of the Second World War.

157. One of the main reasons for the present tension in Europe is that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is doing its utmost to torpedo a German peace settlement, while at the same time pursuing a policy of enmity towards the other German State, the German Democratic Republic. It has no scruples in its choice of methods to enlist, in direct or indirect support of its claims with their threat to peace, anyone proving susceptible to Bonn's blackmail. Thus the strain which, through Western Germany's fault, exists in its relations with the German Demo-

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 33 and 94, document A/C.2/L.646.

cratic Republic is transferred to international relations as a whole, to the relations between the principal military groups of States and between the great Powers. And this is precisely what fills the revanchist leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany with joy, since they clearly bank on setting the great Powers at loggerheads.

158. Chancellor Adenauer's Government has long since won a stable and quite definite reputation: wherever proposals are made that might lead to relaxation of international tension, Bonn will inevitably try to put a spoke in the wheel to prevent them from being carried out.

159. Take, for instance, the proposal to withdraw, or even to reduce, foreign troops in Central Europe: the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is against it.

160. Take the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization: the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is against this too.

161. Take the proposal of Poland, supported by Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and later by many other States, that a denuclearized zone should be established in the centre of Europe: again the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is opposed.

162. But when measures are discussed which aggravate international tension, such as the compilation of plans for the establishment of a multilateral or multinational NATO force giving the Bundeswehr access to nuclear weapons, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is found in the very forefront, even ahead of those of its allies in the NATO camp which are closest to its aspirations.

163. To no other State, probably, has the Soviet Government addressed so many proposals for an improvement of relations based on good-neighbourly principles as it has to the Federal Republic. We have consistently stressed the need for the Federal Republic to participate actively on an equal footing with the German Democratic Republic, and with West Berlin after its conversion into a free city, in international affairs and to make its contribution to the development of international co-operation and the strengthening of peace. What we have opposed and shall continue to oppose is Western Germany's present militaristic and revanchist course and its attempts to poison relations among States and prevent agreement on the most vital international problems.

164. By maintaining that a German peace treaty should be signed, not by the two German States which do exist, but only by a united Germany which does not exist, the Federal Government proves that it desires neither a German peace settlement nor the unification of Germany.

165. Of course, now that the Government of the German Democratic Republic has taken protective measures on its borders with West Berlin, the problem of the conclusion of a German peace treaty, viewed in the light of the socialist countries' immediate interests, presents itself differently from the way it did before these measures were adopted. But in the light of the fundamental need to safeguard peace and security in Europe, the conclusion of a German peace treaty has lost none of its urgency.

166. To gaze indifferently upon the present uneasy situation in Europe caused by the incomplete German

peace settlement would almost mean an abject surrender to the revanchist demands of the West German militarists. We cannot, of course, speak of our former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition; but the Soviet Union's position is that Hitlerite Germany, not the members of that coalition, signed an act of unconditional surrender, and that the Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition proclaimed as their common purpose the eradication of German militarism and Nazism and the adoption of all measures required to prevent German militarism from ever again threatening its neighbours or the preservation of peace throughout the world.

167. The Soviet Union will take care to safeguard its security and the security of other States which also pursue a policy designed to root out the aftermath of the Second World War and to strengthen peace in Europe by the conclusion of a German peace treaty. It will not allow the German militarists to push Europe into an abyss and go scot-free; and if once again they brandish their weapons over the world, the Soviet Union will take all necessary measures to protect its security and to safeguard peace in Europe.

168. It is also in the interests of the German people themselves to see that the groups which determine the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany do not treat the Soviet Government's repeated warnings with the same nonchalance with which the rulers of Hitler's Germany threw millions of Germans into the crucible of war. The future of the German people does not lie in guns and bombs, but in factories, construction sites and ploughed fields. Only in a policy of peace, of which the other German State, the German Democratic Republic, is setting a good example, will the Germans on both sides of the Elbe find a better future for themselves.

169. The fact that two sovereign German States have arisen on the ruins of Hitler's shattered Empire, one of which is a socialist State, is perhaps not to everyone's liking. But even people who have hitherto failed to understand the historic significance of this fact will, we are convinced, increasingly come to appreciate that the German Democratic Republic is a reliable stronghold against aggression in the centre of Europe.

170. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to emphasize once again from this rostrum of the United Nations that the preservation in Europe of the after-effects of the Second World War is fraught with serious danger to peace, and that a German peace treaty would therefore meet the interests of all States and of all peoples.

171. The "cold war" vice in which the nations have been gripped for many years has to some extent relaxed through the signing of the test-ban treaty, and they have begun to breathe more freely. The immediate practical result of the treaty—an end to pollution of the atmosphere, the oceans and outer space by radioactive deposits harmful to human health—is itself proof that States with different ideologies and often with contrary views on many aspects of international life have found it in themselves to perform a truly humane act. Nevertheless, if we consider the test-ban treaty in broad historical perspective, in terms of the objectives by which the United Nations must be guided in its activities—to do everything possible to help to consolidate peace and banish the threat of war—it is a good beginning but only a beginning.

172. It is clear to everyone that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests in the three environments does

not yet mean the end of the arms race, and that consequently this measure does not in itself reduce the danger of war. The nations want to have firm guarantees of their security; and they cannot rest content with the test-ban treaty alone. The Soviet Government therefore considers that the more propitious opportunities arising as a result of the treaty should be utilized to the full for the settlement of other pressing international problems.

173. The General Assembly would not be doing its duty to the nations and would fail to justify the hopes reposed in it if, for its part, it did not call upon the Governments of all the world's nations to utilize this more propitious atmosphere in order to reach agreement on further measures to reduce international tension. There is no doubt that such measures would in turn facilitate solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

174. There are a number of possible steps which relate both to disarmament and to European security and which at the same time are of great international importance in their own right. They are well known, and the Soviet Government has repeatedly drawn attention to them. They are the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of the Warsaw Treaty organization and the countries belonging to the North Atlantic bloc, measures to prevent surprise attack and to reduce the number of troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, reduction of military budgets, and the creation of denuclearized zones in various areas of the world.

175. It would be a grave miscalculation to suppose that, because the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries advance a proposal aimed at reducing international tension, such as the proposal for a non-aggression pact, it would be on that account more advantageous for them than for the Western Powers. No; to execute such proposals would benefit all countries, including the great Powers of the West, to exactly the same degree, neither a milligramme more nor less. The chief gain for all would consist in the strengthening of international confidence, a new warmth in the international climate. The only circles which could regard this as in some way detrimental to themselves are those who, to suit their own narrow interests, want to see the nations go on living in a world where they can look at one another only from the entrenchments of the "cold war", through the observation slots of tanks, through artillery sights and submarine periscopes. But we reject such a militaristic angle of vision.

176. Every human being, whether he lives under a tropical sun or is buffeted by the north winds, whether he lives in a great city or in a remote village, feels a particular anxiety at anything which increases the probability of nuclear war.

177. Until very recently one might have had the impression that there was a sort of taboo on nuclear weapons, that States would never bring themselves to make these weapons the subject of an agreement. One significance of the test-ban treaty is that it is the first international agreement that has borne any relation to nuclear weapons.

178. What are the measures which, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, could have a positive effect in reducing the danger of nuclear war even before the complete destruction of nuclear weapons and the abolition of their stocks?

179. One such measure might be the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The plans to bring nuclear weapons, through the military alliances of the Western Powers, within the reach of States which do not at present possess them, particularly Western Germany, remain a major obstacle to such an agreement.

180. As one of the Powers possessing nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union is also ready to make its contribution to the settlement of questions related to the creation of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world. It has no objection to giving, jointly with the Western Powers, the necessary guarantees banning the use of nuclear weapons in any denuclearized zones concerning which regional agreements may be concluded, or in individual countries declaring their territories to be denuclearized zones.

181. In recent years humanity has enriched itself by highly important discoveries the remarkable consequences of which are still difficult to appreciate properly. For the first time men have succeeded in breaking away from the earth and are confidently blazing trails into the Universe. Humanity pronounces with admiration the names of the pioneers of space flight, among them the first woman cosmonaut, Valentina Tereshkova. The conquest of the virgin tracts of outer space has begun, but these are only the first steps.

182. The Soviet Union and the United States of America are persistently working towards a solution of still more complex and tantalizing problems in this field. And the nations have a right to expect that the new environment in which man has now set foot—the limitless ocean of outer space—will never become yet another springboard of war, destruction and death. With its gaze bent upon the distant stars, mankind is full of hope that the conquest of space will serve only peaceful ends.

183. The Moscow Treaty has banned nuclear tests in outer space. Now there is another question on the agenda.

184. The Soviet Government is prepared here and now to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space, and desires to create the best possible conditions for the utilization and exploration of space for the good of all peoples. It therefore considers it necessary to agree with the United States of America to prohibit the placing in orbit of objects carrying nuclear weapons.

185. We know that the United States Government is also willing to settle this question. And we assume that the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of America will continue their bilateral exchange of views regarding a ban on the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit. It would be a very good thing if an understanding could be reached on this important question and an agreement concluded. The Soviet Government is ready to do so.

186. The United Nations may be justly proud that the historic Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)) was adopted in this hall. The solemn appeal of the Declaration to bring to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations has sped to the remotest corners of the earth. For the colonial peoples the Declaration has become a guiding light in their struggle for freedom and independence.

187. Until quite recently the political map of Africa and Asia was marked predominantly in three or four colours which coincided with the cartographic colours of a few Western States. Today the national flags of independent States have been raised in the overwhelming majority of the former colonial possessions.

188. The achievements of the national liberation movement are great, but the objectives set by the Declaration have not yet been fully attained. The peoples of the Portuguese colonies—Angola, Guinea and Mozambique—are waging a hard and stubborn struggle for their freedom. The African population of the Republic of South Africa is seething. The just struggle of the peoples of other territories which have not yet received independence is gaining momentum. To this day over 50 million human beings still languish in colonial slavery.

189. That is why the liquidation of colonialism must occupy a central place in the General Assembly's work at its present session. The Assembly's duty is, basing itself on the Declaration, to draft and approve decisions directed towards the prompt elimination of colonial régimes in those territories where they still persist.

190. The elimination of colonialism does not end with the destruction of the bulwarks of slavery which have been erected around entire countries and peoples. The colonial régimes are doomed, but the system of inequitable political, economic and military relations between the former colonial Powers and the newly independent countries lives on. Even the politicians of the Western Powers are forced to admit that there is absolutely no comparison between the so-called "assistance" extended by these Powers to the underdeveloped countries and the income which they derive from them. Harold Wilson, the leader of the Labour Party, recently observed that the entire expenditure of the Western Powers on "assistance" to the underdeveloped countries over the past ten years had been more than offset by the reduction in their export earnings through the fall in raw-material prices. And we may take it that the British know how to count and are good judges of profit and loss.

191. In 1965 the United Nations will celebrate its twentieth anniversary. Its honour compels it to do everything to ensure that by then the shameful colonial system has completely vanished from the face of the earth and that every people, great or small, in Africa or Latin America, is free and independent.

192. Everything that strengthens the foundations of peace makes the United Nations more viable and more efficient in widening the sphere of international co-operation. Conversely, outbreaks of "cold war" paralyse it and prevent it from rising to the needs of the times and to the nations' demands.

193. In this connexion it should be emphasized with all clarity that the authority of the United Nations and its capacity to perform the tasks which lie before it are gravely jeopardized by the continuing violation, year by year, of the rights of China, one of the permanent members of the Security Council and a founder-State of the United Nations. The Government of the People's Republic of China, and that Government alone, represents China in the international arena, and only the Government of the People's Republic of China can speak on behalf of China in the United Nations. Today, as yesterday, the Soviet Union considers that the rights of the People's Republic

of China in the United Nations should be restored without delay and the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which represents no one, removed from the United Nations. Taiwan is an integral part of the People's Republic of China, while the Chiang Kai-shek clique which has established itself there is sustained only by foreign bayonets. Everyone understands that the day is coming when truth and law must triumph and Taiwan be reunited with the People's Republic of China.

194. As the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated, it is of vital importance for the better functioning of the United Nations that its structure, at present completely unsatisfactory, should be improved. Since our position on this matter has been set forth on numerous occasions, there is no need to repeat it. But this question will have to be settled sooner or later, Gentlemen, if we wish to observe and not mock elementary justice.

195. Amid all the diversity of States' interests the main channel of development of international events is quite clearly discernible. It is to be found where the two opposing currents in international politics meet: the one aimed at reducing international tension, the other at maintaining or even intensifying it.

196. The higher the mountains of atomic weapons, the more worthless appear those who do not wish to destroy them.

197. The deeper in the earth or beneath the surface of the seas men seek safe shelters for missiles and from missiles, the more obvious becomes the danger which menaces mankind.

198. The wider the sphere of preparations for nuclear war, the narrower the circle of States which are prepared to condone them.

199. The higher military budgets soar, the sharper becomes the peoples' awareness of their wants and of the need to end the burden of armaments.

200. The louder the bellicose speeches of those who support the arms race and the heightening of international tension, the greater is their isolation and the more firmly should they be rebuffed.

201. On the other hand, even a small glimmer of light on the international horizon kindles the light of hope in a thousand million eyes. Even a modest success at the conference table evokes wide and justified support.

202. Two months ago the representatives of three Powers which fought side by side in the greatest of all wars met in Moscow in order to work out an agreement on a sore subject in international life. There were varying estimates of the possible outcome of this meeting. There were the sceptics, and there were people who pinned certain hopes on it. And what did the Moscow negotiations between the Governments of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom show? They showed that the gulf between the complex and in many ways dangerous situation which has come about in the world, and the agreement whereby this situation may be improved, is not unbridgable. They showed that when the sober calculation of common interests prevails, agreement becomes a reality. If the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty is to teach us anything, it is above all that the great Powers, and indeed all States, can move forward—though the ways be devious and not always even, yet forward and in the right direction—towards the consolidation of peace.

203. The Soviet people categorically rejects the fundamentally unscientific notion of another war as some-

thing inevitable. This is a concept of the doomed. It cannot inspire people. If people come to feel that they have no future, that before them there lies only the abyss which can in no wise be avoided, then in the name of what will they live, in the name of what will they contribute their toil, their knowledge, their searching intellects to the cause of creation and progress? In the face of such a prospect, how can the nations be inspired to struggle against militarism, against the arms race? No; this is not our philosophy, not our idea; it contradicts the nations' vital interests, and we reject it.

204. The denial of the fatal inevitability of war, the possibility of banning it for ever from the life of society, the possibility of preventing another world war, of not allowing it to break out—these are the very ideas and conclusions which underlie the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Socialism, communism with its life-affirming and

profoundly humanistic world view, are by their very nature inseparable from peace. Belief in the strength of the nations and an optimistic view of their morrow strengthen the will and multiply the forces of those who do not want the disaster of war, who see in tomorrow not the twilight of human history but the dawn of a better future for the nations.

205. The fair wind favouring moves to reduce international tension, whose breath the nations are now feeling, can add new strength to efforts to save this and succeeding generations from the scourge of war, the efforts to consolidate peace. The States Members of the United Nations may rest assured that the Soviet Union will continue, as hitherto, to place its whole influence as a great Power, its whole international authority, at the service of peace among the nations.

*The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.*