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**CONTENTS**

*Page*

**Agenda item 55:**

**Question of Cyprus:**

- (a) Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus;
- (b) Complaint by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus.... 215

**Chairman:** Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

**AGENDA ITEM 55**

**Question of Cyprus (A/3120 and Add.1, A/3204 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.168 to A/C.1/L.170):**

- (a) **Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus;**
- (b) **Complaint by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus**

1. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) stated that it was his duty to enlighten the Committee regarding the essential aspects of the question of Cyprus, which, during the last two years, had passed from the insular sphere into the domain of international politics.

2. His Government would present its views on the question in a constructive, and not an aggressive, spirit and wished to appeal to the General Assembly to apply the principles of the Charter to the suffering people of Cyprus struggling for their freedom. The policy of the United Kingdom Government towards the people of Cyprus, and the methods it employed to enforce it, obliged him occasionally to mention certain harsh facts since those facts involved the moral responsibility of the parties concerned. In doing so, he did not overlook the fact that the great majority of the British people were just and liberal, even when the policy of their Government was not.

3. The brochure entitled *British Opinion on Cyprus*,<sup>1</sup> which had been compiled by the Greek delegation, contained nothing but relevant British testimony to the effect that the majority of the British people disapproved of the Government's policy towards Cyprus and the cruel methods used in its enforcement. Reactionaries were now accusing very influential organs of the British Press, British statesmen, scientists and men of letters of forging arguments for the use of the Cypriots; they were actually, however, bent on saving the honour of the British liberal tradition and on preserving the bonds of friendship between Greece and the United Kingdom.

<sup>1</sup> Royal Greek Embassy, Information Service, *British Opinion on Cyprus* (Washington, Progress Printing Co., 1956).

Greece proposed to fight against the impenitent colonialism of the present Government of the United Kingdom and hoped that it would be supported by the United Nations in that regard.

4. Nothing durable or sound could be based upon hatred and bayonets. It was possible to dislike the era of the United Nations, but impossible to ignore it. Something in the world had changed—something which the nostalgia for an imperialist past could not modify. Even those who relied on power to justify their actions had to realize that there was nothing more fragile than violence, and that violence always occurred when the use of force was not determined by justice and liberty.

5. He wished to refute the arguments that the Cypriots were not Greeks but Levantines, that the island geographically was a part of Asia Minor, and that it had never been Greek. History proved that for 3,000 years the ethnic character of the island had remained Greek. Foreign occupations established by force had been nothing more than episodes which had not seriously altered the ethnic composition of the population. Neither the Frankish, Venetian and Ottoman dominations, nor the British domination of eighty years had brought about a change in that regard. The latest British census of November 1946 indicated that 80.2 per cent of the population of Cyprus was Greek, 17.9 per cent was Turkish and 1.9 per cent was of other nationalities. The presence of such small minorities only affirmed the permanence and importance of the Hellenic ethnic element in the island.

6. Greece did not claim Cyprus for itself, but supported the right of the Cypriots freely to choose their destiny. That right did not depend upon either the race or the ethnic consciousness of the people; the Cypriots surely had the right to live in freedom.

7. The argument that the island lay near to the coast of Asia Minor and that it, consequently, belonged to Asia Minor constituted a strange theory of political geography and one which could hardly strengthen the case of the United Kingdom. If the right of domination over foreign peoples were an attribute of geographical propinquity, the United Kingdom would have no excuse for its presence in Cyprus, Malta, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Seychelles and many other places. The significance of distance was less in the case of an island than in the case of a mainland. Cyprus was situated in the midst of several Mediterranean coastal States at distances entailing little difference in the cost of transportation. Consequently, if geography were to afford a valid political argument, the claims of Syria and Lebanon were equal to those of Turkey and after those came the claims of Greece and Egypt. The only people who, on the basis of that theory, would have no right to the island would be the present owners of Cyprus. The adoption of that theory would at the same time raise the question of which areas of the eastern Mediterranean should rather belong to the Arab nations and which areas in the whole world ought to change owners

and pass to their neighbours. That would certainly constitute a dangerous upheaval in the concept of international law.

8. On the other hand, if it were recognized that distance was an element affecting security, then it was hardly right to consider the security of one party and ignore the security of others. Indeed, the status of Cyprus raised a question of security which was of interest to the whole Middle East and if that question was to be discussed, all should participate in the discussion, taking into account the viewpoint of the Cypriots. Recent events in the Middle East forcefully accentuated that aspect of the problem. However, the real determining factor was not geography but the human element, that is, the people of Cyprus, who were the rightful owners of the island.

9. Turning to the argument that Cyprus had never belonged to Greece, that it had belonged to Turkey until 1878 and that it should revert to Turkey if and when it ceased to belong to the United Kingdom, he contended that, indeed, Cyprus had never belonged to Greece, for it belonged to none other than the Cypriots. It was not the property of Turkey, which had ceded it to the United Kingdom in 1878, nor of the United Kingdom, which had transformed it into a colony in 1914. The Assembly was not a slave market; there was no question of establishing titles of possession over alien peoples. Greece did not advance claims to the possession of the island or its people, but was interested only in the liberation of the Cypriots from the colonial yoke.

10. Regarding the question whether the application of the right of the Cypriots to self-determination entailed a modification of international treaties, he contended that no international treaty, least of all the Lausanne Treaty,<sup>2</sup> was opposed to the desire of the Cypriots to free themselves from colonial servitude and to achieve self-determination. Greece respected and would continue to respect the international engagements to which it was a signatory, including the Lausanne Treaty. In supporting the aspirations of its brothers in Cyprus to freedom, Greece was fully conscious that it in no way infringed the terms or the spirit of the Lausanne Treaty.

11. By the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878,<sup>3</sup> Turkey had recognized the occupation and administration of Cyprus by the United Kingdom. Subsequently, the United Kingdom had annexed Cyprus by a unilateral act, the Order in Council of 5 November 1914.<sup>4</sup> By the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, Turkey had recognized that act. Therefore, as far as Cyprus was concerned, Turkey had relinquished nothing in the Lausanne Treaty that it would be entitled to take back, even if the peculiar thesis were adopted that a State ceding a territory by treaty could still retain the right to determine at will the future of that territory. British sovereignty, usually sensitive with respect to the liberty and rights of peoples living under its domination, conceded an offensive servitude in favour of Turkey.

12. Regarding the allegation that Greece, in signing the Lausanne Treaty, had recognized British sove-

reignty over Cyprus, he maintained that Greece had had nothing to relinquish or to recognize with respect to Cyprus. British sovereignty had been an accomplished fact since 1914; it was on the basis of that fact that the United Kingdom Government had in 1915 offered to cede Cyprus to Greece if it joined the Entente Alliance.

13. In brief, the Lausanne Treaty had not stated that the people of Cyprus would live eternally in colonial servitude. It was clear from the United Nations Charter, on the other hand, that the Cypriots had the right to self-determination. The Charter was also a treaty, and according to Article 103, prevailed over any other international agreement. Greece therefore demanded that the United Kingdom Government respect the Charter which it had signed.

14. Thus, the source of British domination in Cyprus did not lie in the Lausanne Treaty, but in a unilateral act of the United Kingdom Government. Even if one were to recognize the contractual nature of that source, that would not be a reason to perpetuate that domination against the will of the people. Once the slave owner might have had titles of ownership over his slaves, but the day that slavery had been abolished, such titles had become null and void.

15. Lastly, the argument that the Lausanne Treaty had established a *status quo* which should be considered permanent was untenable. The state of affairs established by the Lausanne Treaty had already changed several times; examples of such changes were the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1939 and of the Dodecanese to Greece in 1948, as well as the permission to refortify the region of Adrianople given by the Montreux Convention in 1936.

16. While Greece believed that to bring up the question of Cyprus did not imply revision of any treaty, it had done nothing to create the question and it had scrupulously avoided encouraging the Cypriots, even at the risk of running counter to the sentiments of its own people. The question of Cyprus had existed for many years, particularly since the Ottoman domination had been succeeded by that of the United Kingdom.

17. History proved that the liberation movement in Cyprus had never been artificial, but was of a deep and permanent character. If that movement had not demonstrated itself in active fashion earlier, that had been due to the two world wars and to the close ties which existed between Greece and the United Kingdom and which had led the Cypriots to expect from the United Kingdom a spontaneous gesture in the direction of a restoration of their freedom. Nevertheless, outbursts of violence had occurred, such as the one in 1931, when the people had set fire to the Government House at Nicosia. After the end of the Second World War and the subsequent emancipation of other former British colonies, the Cypriots had awaited their turn.

18. In 1945, the Cypriots had solicited the intervention of the Greek Government with a view to obtaining an amicable settlement of the question. The Greek Government, however, had been unable, at that time, to offer its support. In 1946, a Cypriot delegation had gone to London to claim the right of self-determination. In 1947 the Cypriots had rejected a colonial draft constitution. In 1950, another delegation had gone to London and, having been unable to contact the authorities, it had continued its freedom pilgrimage to Washington and the United Nations. Therefore, the election by the people in August 1950 of Monsignor Makarios as head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus was

<sup>2</sup> Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and Turkey, signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 117 (1923), pp. 543 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed at San Stefano on 10 February 1878. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 69 (1877-1878), pp. 732 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Order in Council relative to the Annexation of the Island of Cyprus to His Majesty's Dominions, London, 5 November 1914. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVIII (1914) (Part II), pp. 165 ff.

clearly in the nature of a political mandate: to liberate the island from colonial domination.

19. The Greek Government had repeatedly tried to get the United Kingdom Government to consider a friendly and equitable solution of the question. However, that Government had refused to recognize that the liberation of the Cypriots had become an extremely pressing problem. Despite countless endeavours, it had been only later—when it had become evident that the United Kingdom Government was ignoring the demands of the Cypriots and that the people of Cyprus were fully determined not to yield and were prepared to seek the support of another power—that Greece had decided to bring the problem before the United Nations in order to avert disaster and to place the problem within the field of international legality. Greece had given proof of moderation and good sense. It had done everything in its power to spare the world one more international difficulty. If it had not succeeded, the fault lay with others.

20. It often had been alleged that in the question of Cyprus, Greece, in fact was not striving for the liberation of a colonial people but for a transfer of sovereignty and that it was making a territorial claim at the expense of the United Kingdom. That was a monstrous falsification of the real facts. However, since the argument seemed to have made some impression on some friendly delegations, he felt obliged to make the following clarification.

21. That the Greek Cypriots had always desired to unite with Greece was hardly surprising. It had to be added, however, that for them *enosis* (union with Greece) had always been the symbol of liberation from the colonial yoke, the abolition of the arbitrary authority of a foreign Government, and the achievement of self-determination. It was significant in that connexion that Greece was asking not for the union of Cyprus with Greece, but for the freedom of the Cypriots. Countries which nurtured designs of territorial expansion did not address themselves to the United Nations.

22. Greece demanded for the Cypriots the right of self-determination, which was a fundamental human right, and officially declared that it would respect the result of a plebiscite, whether the people decided to continue to be a British colony or to form an independent State. It would indeed be monstrous to contend that the Cypriots must forever live under the colonial yoke because of the possibility that they might one day unite with Greece. That would be not only playing into the hands of the colonialists but a complete negation of the Charter as well.

23. At the ninth session of the Assembly (750th meeting), the representative of Turkey had described the Cypriot liberation movement as an *Anschluss*. That term, however, was applicable to the union of a free and independent country with another independent country, the former imposing its will by force. In the case of Cyprus, the term would be valid only if Cyprus were independent, and that point had not been reached. In any case, the logical conclusion of the Turkish representative's reasoning was that either one should condemn a whole people to perpetual servitude or one should decide to recognize the guaranteed independence of the island of Cyprus. He wondered whether the Turkish representative was ready to subscribe to the inescapable logic of that conclusion.

24. The General Assembly could demand the abolition of the colonial régime in Cyprus. Cyprus as a con-

centration camp of human torture and degradation was a disgrace to the civilized world and should be replaced by a Cyprus which would be the peaceful hearth of a free people living in close collaboration with all the other free peoples of the area. The true destiny of Cyprus was to become a point of contact, a rallying place, for all without being a menace to any.

25. He recalled that the Cypriots had missed no opportunity to defend their claims, although they had met with continual disappointment. He recalled that, whereas only a few Cypriots had heeded the United Kingdom invitation to enlist under the British flag in 1939, at the beginning of the Second World War, all the Greeks of Cyprus had done so in 1940, when Greece had entered the War, in response to the British slogan "Fight for Greece and freedom". That was not only characteristic of the spirit of the population, but it also afforded proof of the Cypriots' devotion to their ideal.

26. It must be assumed that the Cypriots had become convinced that, in view of their sacrifices during the war, their desire would be finally fulfilled. However, after long years of war and hope, in 1947 they had been offered merely the draft of a colonial constitution, which they promptly rejected. Considering that Monsignor Makarios had not yet been elected Archbishop of Cyprus, it had been, obviously, the people of Cyprus, who had rejected that formula of continued British colonialism. The people had manifested their will when, in 1950, a plebiscite throughout the island had been organized under conditions of complete peace, for 99.7 per cent of the Greeks of Cyprus—that is, 80 per cent of the total population—had voted against the colonial régime. It should be noted that the Greek Government, consistent in its counsels of patience and continuing its role of moderator, had, at that time, refused to accept the volumes containing the signatures relating to the plebiscite which had been presented to it.

27. The United Kingdom authorities, on the other hand, had continued to pursue a policy which tended to become less and less liberal. Each new refusal, however, provoked a deeper reaction on the part of the Cypriots. The exasperation of the oppressed had steadily increased to the point where, between 1952 and 1953, it had become evident that the Cypriots were no longer disposed to yield to the advice of the Greek Government. Clearly the Cypriots would in any event, through the intercession of other countries, appeal to the United Nations. Faced with the expression of so manifest a will, and having been disappointed in all its efforts to negotiate, Greece could not have remained indifferent. He wondered who, in a similar situation, would have refused to support on the political level the just cause of a brother nation. Surely Greece could not have shirked that duty without dishonouring itself. Thus in adopting the cause of the Cypriots, Greece had acted like any other liberal, self-respecting country.

28. He recalled that the question of Cyprus had been included in the agenda of the ninth session of the General Assembly (477th plenary meeting) through his country's efforts, with, however, no tangible results. During the Assembly's tenth session, the United Kingdom delegation had argued (521st plenary meeting) that the solution to the question could be found through direct and friendly negotiations. Many delegations had taken those explicit promises at their face value, and it had been decided (521st plenary meeting) by a very slight majority not to include the item in the agenda. By avoiding public debate, the Assembly had wished to afford the promised negotiations every chance of

success. That decision, however, had caused the United Kingdom Government to believe that it had a free hand to strike at the people who had the temerity to defy its domination. It had used the respite granted by the United Nations to crush the people of Cyprus by force. The conduct of war against the Cypriots and their legitimate aspirations had been entrusted to Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, whose name would henceforth be written in the history of the people of Cyprus in letters of blood and tears.

29. In the tragic interlude during which the so-called negotiations had been carried on between Archbishop Makarios, who was the universally acknowledged spiritual and political leader of the Cypriots, and the British Field-Marshal, the latter had insisted on holding the discussions on the basis of a master-and-servant relationship. The Archbishop had refused to obey, but had made successive concessions. The Field-Marshal's only contribution had been to propose a series of allegedly liberal formulae designed to conceal and guarantee the permanency of British domination. Since, however, the Archbishop had refused to fall into the traps set for him and had demanded precise explanations, the Field-Marshal had lost his patience and had caused the arrest and deportation of the Archbishop. Thus the world had been treated to an object-lesson in negotiations conducted according to the spirit and the rules of British colonialism.

30. Turning to the accusations levelled by the United Kingdom against Greece, he recalled that the United Kingdom, after reproaching Greece directly for having turned to the United Nations, had thought fit to do likewise in order to accuse Greece of aiding the active resistance of the Cypriots.

31. On 12 October 1956 the United Kingdom delegation had requested (A/3204) that the United Nations include in its agenda an item entitled: "Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus" and had submitted to the Secretary-General an explanatory memorandum (A/3204/Add.1). The memorandum contained nothing but vague allegations, such as the accusation against Athens Radio for inciting rebellion and the accusation against Greece for supplying the Cypriot resistance forces with arms and ammunition.

32. His delegation had voted for inscription of the item in the agenda. It had, however, hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would submit a more detailed document setting forth more concrete data. His delegation could then have examined the basis of the accusations and could have replied to them in full knowledge of what was involved. Indeed, to formulate such accusations without substantiating them was indicative of a lack of fair play. He wondered whether specific cases were lacking, or whether the United Kingdom intended that Greece should be forced to give hasty and improvised answers to complaints presented at the last moment. He believed that his delegation was able to defend itself even under such unfavourable conditions. In any case, it wished to answer the vague charges contained in the United Kingdom memorandum.

33. While it was true that the Greek radio was owned by the State, it was administered by an independent corporation. Government intervention was not impossible, although very difficult. Radio Athens had transmitted, since the beginning of its special broadcasts to Cyprus, for the most part what the Athenian Press wrote on the Cyprus question; thus the voice of the Greek radio was not the voice of the Government, but that of public opinion. If the charge was that the Greek

Government was unable to abolish the freedom of speech, Press and thought of the Greek people, he accepted the charge. The Greek people would continue to remain equally free in the future by its own will and by the will of its Government. His Government had already done everything that it was able to do and had gone to the limit of possible action: it had obtained a reduction in the time allocated to the broadcast to Cyprus and had insisted that the broadcasts assume a generally narrative character. While there might have been certain broadcasts that could perhaps be considered as too violent, they could hardly be held responsible for the action of the Cypriot resistance movement since the British jamming service appeared to be completely efficient.

34. If the Cypriots could not receive encouragement from Greece through the Greek radio and Greek newspapers, they knew what illustrious men of the United Kingdom thought of their struggle. They had access to British documents and newspapers which carried statements by prominent British statesmen in support of the Cypriot struggle for freedom and in condemnation of the United Kingdom Government's policy of suppression. Quoting from texts of such statements, he contended that they paid tribute to those who fought for an ideal without reservations. He wondered how, then, the voice of the Greek people, which could not penetrate to Cyprus and which was moderate in comparison with those texts, could be considered responsible and how the Greek Government could be taken to task when it controlled its own proven indignation, but did not always succeed in restraining the indignation of Greek public opinion. Those who accused Greece could not really be so naive as to think that the Cypriot war of liberation, which had lasted for almost two years on an island in a state of siege, was the result of a few verbal incitations to revolt. Such a war could only be attributed to what had already been recognized by distinguished statesmen of the United Kingdom: to the fact that their Government had exasperated the Cypriots by refusing to recognize their right to self-determination within a reasonable time.

35. But people who did not want to acknowledge their own responsibility sought to fix responsibility upon others; thus it was that Greece was considered responsible for placing arms at the disposal of the Cypriot patriots. That charge, which was far graver than the one concerning Radio Athens, was formulated in only two lines in the explanatory memorandum. He wondered whether it was permissible to formulate such a charge without any accompanying evidence, and whether that was not the most patent proof that such a charge could not be substantiated. To that charge he would reply with the explicit declaration that the Hellenic Government had never dispatched arms to the patriots of Cyprus and had even gone so far as to take all possible measures to prevent Greeks from sending arms to their Cypriot brethren. The Hellenic Government had supported the Cypriots only on the political level. Armed resistance was a matter which concerned the Cypriots themselves, and if some of them were heroic enough to fight the well-equipped forces of the United Kingdom, that did not involve the responsibility of the Greek Government.

36. He would refuse to call the patriots of Cyprus terrorists, since he could not go counter to the truth. He would merely reiterate that the Hellenic Government had no part in the war of liberation in Cyprus and that any contrary affirmation was false and deliberately

tendentious. There was no reason to discuss the point further since the United Kingdom charges, as they were presented, could not be considered to have been made seriously and therefore could not harm the Hellenic Government.

37. Turning to the Greek complaints against the United Kingdom Government with respect to the arrest and deportation of Archbishop Makarios, he observed that the Cypriots considered the Archbishop their sole representative and leader. The fact was that the Cypriots revered Archbishop Makarios as a churchman of great stature, of vast learning and of determined, though reasonably moderate, spirit. That view was supported by many members of the United Kingdom Parliament.

38. The Archbishop's only crime had been his refusal to bow to the arbitrary requirements of a colonial policy which even refused to guarantee an intermediate period during which a sincerely democratic autonomous régime would be allowed to function. It had been that refusal which had provoked the rupture of negotiations and the deportation of the Archbishop.

39. Quoting from various speeches made in the United Kingdom House of Commons to substantiate his contention, he asserted that it was to the honour of the British people that it had taken such a stand against the totalitarian measures of its Government.

40. Indeed, there was no evidence to justify any serious suspicion that the Archbishop was the leader or organizer of the Cypriot liberation army. His only crime had been his refusal to obey the arbitrary will of the tyrant—a crime all the more serious since he was indisputably the democratically elected spiritual and political leader of his people.

41. Regarding the role and privileges of the Church in that part of the world, he explained that the Arabs had been the first to grant to the heads of the Churches of the Christian populations under their administration, the status of representatives of the people in the political as well as in the religious domain. That system had been later adopted by the Ottoman Empire and had been continued by the United Kingdom, notably in Cyprus. It had been therefore by virtue of long tradition as well as because of his moral stature that the Archbishop was the representative of the immense majority of the Cypriots.

42. All the foregoing proved that not only a great injustice, but also a great error of judgement had been perpetrated by the worst colonialist methods. It seemed very doubtful that a solution to the question of Cyprus could be achieved without the liberation of Archbishop Makarios.

43. The case of the Archbishop had been one—but by no means the only one—of the complaints of Greece against the United Kingdom Government.

44. Greece considered the United Kingdom Government responsible for denying freedom to a people of a great and ancient civilization. To those people, who, even in moments of tragic difficulty, had been its friend and ally, the United Kingdom denied the most elementary rights. All it had offered them had been the 1947 proposals, which had been unanimously rejected, and, more recently, the constitutional proposals of Lord Radcliffe.<sup>5</sup> Working under very restrictive terms of reference, Lord Radcliffe had submitted proposals which were even less liberal than those

enjoyed by the American colonies before their revolution. According to the Radcliffe proposals the British Governor of Cyprus would, in the last analysis, be all-powerful, and his decisions would be practically without appeal.

45. Over a long period the United Kingdom had, in order to annihilate the Cypriot liberation movement, employed the most horrible methods of repression, to do away with which the British people, along with others, had sacrificed so much during the Second World War. The United Kingdom was now resorting to similar methods. Persons were arbitrarily arrested and were being held without trial; heavy collective fines were being imposed upon whole towns and villages; the whipping of children was regularly carried out, and the cutting down of orchards and setting fire to forests had become a regular feature. Curfew was now being imposed, not only at night but during the day as well, and hardly gave the people sufficient time to attend to important business. Once a curfew had been imposed upon 18,000 persons for a continuous period of eight days. Thus, the war against the patriots was being extended to the whole civilian population. That was something which violated the most elementary laws in peacetime, laws which were respected even in times of war.

46. His Government also held the United Kingdom responsible for having fomented the animosity of the Turkish minority in Cyprus against the Greek majority and of having poisoned the relations between Greece and Turkey. Relations between Turkey and Greece, before the present bitterness, had been so cordial that in 1952 there had even been talks concerning establishment of a Greco-Turkish Chamber of Deputies. British policy had had more disastrous consequence on the relations between the majority and minority elements of the population of Cyprus. In pursuance of that policy, the police of Cyprus was composed in great majority of Turks; the auxiliary police was entirely manned by Turks. While the Greek rebels had been attacking the British colonial régime, they had never before attacked the Turkish population. Now in extremely rare cases they were inevitably led to attack policemen who were both British and Turkish. The British encouraged the growth of a Turkish organization for reprisals. Consequently, in the town of Nicosia, seventy Greek stores had been set ablaze to avenge the death of one British policeman of Turkish origin. The following day, a warning had been issued that that would be the way in which vengeance would be exacted for the death of Turks and their British "brothers". It was evident that the British policy of "divide and rule" was bearing fruit, and the omens for the future were most inauspicious.

47. The Greek Government also considered the United Kingdom responsible for the economic exploitation of the people of Cyprus through antiquated colonial methods. The representative of the United Kingdom might say in reply that the island was enjoying an economic boom. That might be true inasmuch as a boom was no doubt existing around the military bases. But the general economy had been neglected. Erosion in the mountains had caused grave anxiety even in the United Kingdom House of Commons. Because of the stagnation in the island's economy, many thousands of young Greeks had had to emigrate. Comparing agricultural and industrial production in Cyprus with that of Greece, which unlike Cyprus had undergone a great deal of destruction during the war, he said that in every domain

<sup>5</sup> Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Cmd. 42.

Greek agriculture had shown an increase of 100 to 300 per cent and the industrial production had doubled during the period between 1950 and 1955, while in Cyprus both agricultural and industrial production was practically at a standstill. The only reason for such a situation was that, while Greece was a free country, Cyprus was under colonial government. The economy of the island was indeed so neglected that the *Manchester Guardian*, in its issue of 23 January 1957, had stated that what Cyprus needed was a New Deal in the sense of the one expounded by former President Roosevelt and that Lord Radcliffe, instead of drawing a draft constitution, should in fact have drafted a five-year plan for the island.

48. The United Kingdom Government was also responsible for failing to respect the principles of the United Nations Charter in the case of Cyprus. Those principles were the finest principles of humanity, for which the Greek and British people had made tremendous sacrifices.

49. Referring to paragraph 11 of the explanatory memorandum (A/3120/Add.1) submitted by his Government on 12 June 1956, he stated that, since May 1956, the United Kingdom Government had developed a new theory concerning the Cyprus question. According to that theory, British control over Cyprus was necessary for strategic and political reasons, and especially in order to permit the United Kingdom to meet its international obligations in the area and defend its petroleum interests. Quoting from the explanatory memorandum, he said that, according to certain statements of British policy, the United Kingdom wanted to prolong its control over Cyprus in order to use the island as a spring-board for action in the Middle East in the interest of safeguarding British oil interests and political prestige. It must be remembered that the Greek memorandum had been submitted at a time when there had as yet been no premonition of the Suez crisis. Thus, Greece had warned the United Nations far in advance of the new dangers in the Middle East. It was unfortunate that that warning had not been heeded properly at that time. In view of what had happened since then, the General Assembly could not ignore that crucial aspect of the Cyprus problem. It would be impossible to restore the confidence and the sense of security in the area so long as Cyprus could be used as a spring-board for aggression.

50. His Government hoped that the British Government would realize soon that its legitimate interests could not be safeguarded by maintaining a colonial police station, but could be served better by the re-establishment of confidence, by international guarantees and by maintaining good relations with its allies through the adoption of a purely defensive policy. At that time the United Kingdom Government would itself acknowledge that it was no longer in its interest to keep Cyprus under colonial domination.

51. Like all other peoples, the people of Cyprus should enjoy the right to determine their future in accordance with the principles of the Charter. The United Kingdom must fulfil its obligations towards the people of Cyprus and to the Charter in that respect. Unfortunately, it had done nothing so far to show that it was alive to its responsibility. In fact, the United Kingdom Government had tried to liquidate the Cyprus question in 1955 by calling the Tripartite Conference on Eastern Mediterranean Problems and the Cyprus Question, at which the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece had been represented, but not the Cypriots. At that conference

the United Kingdom had tried to impose upon Greece the acceptance of permanent British colonial rule in Cyprus. Events in the Middle East had, however, shattered all arguments in favour of continued British rule over Cyprus. They had revealed the reason why the United Kingdom had repeatedly refused to cede its bases on Cyprus to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

52. In spite of the tragic situation prevailing on Cyprus, the Greek Government had so far followed a policy of moderation in order to arrive at an amicable solution. It had counselled patience and moderation to the Cypriots; it had not asked for an immediate plebiscite and had declared its willingness to abide by the result of the plebiscite when it was held. It had also declared that full guarantees must be given the Turkish and all other minorities under United Nations auspices and that all other legitimate interests must also be fully protected. Despite those assurances and that moderation, a solution had not yet been found. Under those circumstances, the Greek Government felt that, without the assistance of the United Nations, a solution of the question of Cyprus was not possible.

53. Unfortunately, at the ninth session, the General Assembly had postponed taking a decision on the substance of the question (resolution 814 (IX)). At the tenth session, the question had not been placed on the Assembly's agenda because it had been considered that negotiations which had been promised by the United Kingdom might produce results. But, instead of starting any negotiations, the British Government had appointed Field-Marshal Sir John Harding Governor of Cyprus. Sir John Harding was supposed to start negotiations with Archbishop Makarios. The result, and present status of Sir John's mission, were well known. The Cyprus question, indeed, required decisive action by the Assembly so that it might enter upon the right course. Liberty was one and indivisible for all men, and the Cypriots had as much right to freedom as any other people.

54. The Greek delegation was hopeful that the Member States, working together in the name of the equality of mankind, in the name of the fundamental principles of democracy and in the name of peace in the Middle East, would try to find an equitable solution of the question of Cyprus and would vote in favour of the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.168 and A/C.1/L.170).

55. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom), after referring to the influence of the traditions of classical Greece on British life, said that a century and a quarter ago his country had contributed not a little to the birth of the modern Greek State, which it had supported and upheld ever since. He recalled that in 1944, during the Second World War, Greece had been liberated from the Germans by British troops, and at the same time it had been with the help of the Commonwealth alone that Greece had been saved from Soviet imperialism. The United Kingdom delegation regretted that, in spite of those traditions of close friendship with Greece, it had to submit before the United Nations a most serious complaint against that country. It also felt distressed at the charge of tyranny and hypocrisy that the representative of Greece had felt necessary to make against the United Kingdom. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, had also made a complaint that the United Kingdom had sent a soldier to Cyprus, but it should be remembered that Sir John Harding, a former Chief of the Imperial General Staff,



had already given proof of the qualities of a statesman. Eminent military men had occupied high places in other countries without introducing policies of a militaristic nature.

56. There were many other ties linking Greece and the United Kingdom. Both were members of NATO, of the Organization of European Economic Co-operation and of the Council of Europe. Greece and Turkey were also partners in the Balkan Pact, a pact which had been welcomed and supported by the United Kingdom Government. It was the pursuit by Greece of its policy of union with Cyprus, which was commonly known as *enosis*, that had strained the relations between Greece and the United Kingdom and which had led to the weakening of the defences of the free world in south-east Europe.

57. Cyprus, lying off the south coast of Turkey and covering the approaches to the ports along that coast, notably Iskenderun, was of the greatest possible strategic interest to Turkey. Throughout its history, the island had been subjected to numerous influences. Of its population of about 500,000, about four-fifths were now Greek, and one-fifth Turkish. The present legal status of the island was unchallenged. In 1878 Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire had signed a convention<sup>6</sup> whereby the former had undertaken to join the Sultan in defending his Asian possessions against the Russian imperialism of that day; for that purpose the Sultan had assigned Cyprus to be occupied and administered by the United Kingdom Government.

58. On the outbreak of the First World War, Cyprus had come directly under the British Crown. Turkey had recognized that fact in 1923 under the Treaty of Lausanne, to which Greece had also been a signatory. Thus, British sovereignty over Cyprus had been recognized both by Turkey and by Greece. It should be remembered that, while signing the Treaty of Lausanne, the Government of Greece had made certain reservations in regard to the islands of the Dodecanese, but none at all in regard to Cyprus. Furthermore, in 1931, the great Greek statesman Eleutherios Venizelos had stated that there was no Cypriot question between the Greek Government and the United Kingdom. He had made that statement in direct reference to the question of *enosis*.

59. The complaint of his Government against Greece (A/3204 and Add.1) related to the support given from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus. The terrorist campaign had begun in April 1955. One of its principal objectives had been to create conditions in Cyprus which might give colour to the Greek case before the United Nations. Major acts of terrorism had been deliberately timed to coincide with consideration by the United Nations of the Cyprus question. The fact that the United Nations had been about to consider the item proposed by Greece had been specifically used by Athens Radio as a reason for urging the Cypriots to greater acts of terrorism.

60. The Greek Government was well aware that it would have received no sympathy or support at the United Nations if it had declared that it was aiming at the annexation of the island of Cyprus. Any such claim would have been summarily rejected by the United Nations. The Greek Government had therefore decided to base its claim on the principle of self-determination. The United Kingdom Government recognized the prin-

ciple of self-determination and accepted it as a guide for its policy towards its Non-Self-Governing Territories. It had repeatedly reaffirmed its faith on that question. It had specifically affirmed its recognition of the principle in regard to Cyprus. The Greek Government had, however, tried to make out that the United Nations was under an obligation to secure self-determination irrespective of the circumstances. The application of self-determination without any regard to circumstances would be subversive of established government everywhere and could only lead to chaos. There were in every part of the world examples which would prove how disastrous would be the consequences of applying the principle of self-determination without qualification. That was bad enough, but it would be worse if it were to be recognized that one State could claim the right of self-determination, and United Nations support for that right, in respect of part of the territory of another State. The Charter, however, offered no such support. Under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, the General Assembly was precluded from intervening in matters falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a Member State. The question of the circumstances in which the principle of self-determination could be applied in any of the territories of a Member State was clearly an internal matter for that State itself. Any infringement by the United Nations of that fundamental principle would be regarded by the United Kingdom Government as *ultra vires* and completely unacceptable. For that reason, his Government also felt that the Greek complaint, as it had been formulated, was one which fell exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom Government and with which the General Assembly was in no way competent to deal. It was, however, well known that the real aim of the Greek Government was not self-determination for Cyprus, but rather the union of that island with Greece.

61. The Greek Government, recognizing that fatal flaw in its legal case, had recently started to proclaim that it had been interested only in securing independence for Cyprus. The United Kingdom delegation asked what there was in the Charter that entitled one Member State to make a claim for independence for a part of another Member State. But the Charter precluded that completely. The whole United Nations Organization was based on the fundamental principle of the respect for the territorial integrity of all its Members. Indeed, a country, by pursuing a claim on the territory of another State, would create a situation which would have to be dealt with by the United Nations in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

62. After referring to the struggles that had divided south-east Europe in the years before the First World War and thereafter, he said that if a Government in that area were openly to start to advance one of its territorial claims, as the Greek Government was doing in respect of Cyprus, it would entail the grave risk of reviving that extreme nationalism which had poisoned the whole of that area for so many years. It was plain that the Greek Government was attempting to upset the Lausanne settlement. It was a dangerous thing to do, for it was hard to state where the matter might end. Moreover, a treaty freely entered into should not be treated so lightly. The sanctity of treaties was recognized in the Charter, and many Member States regarded it as fundamental to their own interests.

63. The situation was even more serious when, in pursuance of a territorial claim, a Government actually

<sup>6</sup> Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, signed at Constantinople on 4 June 1878. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 69 (1877-1878), pp. 744 ff.

encouraged and supported subversive activities and terrorism in the territory of another Government. Under those circumstances, the injured party might feel obliged to refer the situation to the United Nations. It was for that reason that the United Kingdom Government, following the rejection of all its attempts at conciliation, had had to submit to the General Assembly its complaint against Greece (A/3204 and Add.1). It hoped that the Committee would support the draft resolution submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/L.169).

64. It was a serious matter to state that terrorism in Cyprus had been encouraged and supported from Greece, but there was evidence to support that charge. Some of that evidence would be circulated in an Assembly document.<sup>7</sup>

65. Speaking of the terrorist campaign in Cyprus, he said that the latest figures for the victims of that campaign were 265 killed and 599 wounded. Of the 265 killed, no less than 131 were Greek Cypriots, 119 of whom were civilians; of the other 134 killed by the terrorists, 101 were citizens of the United Kingdom; 85 of those being British soldiers and 16 civilians. Most of the remainder among the fatal casualties were Turkish Cypriots, of whom 9 belonged to the police forces. From those statistics, one very significant fact emerged: the large number of fatal casualties of Greek Cypriots. That was no accident because the object of terrorists was to create a total atmosphere of fear and suspicion among the Greeks of Cyprus by their brutalities, with the aim of intimidating all those who opposed *enosis* of their methods.

66. In detailing some acts of terrorism, he showed that the terrorists aimed to make it plain that no one who did not co-operate with them was safe. Their victims had included women and priests. Civilians from the United Kingdom had also suffered.

67. Another of the facts about terrorism in Cyprus was the cynical exploitation of children by terrorists. If any action was taken by the security authorities with respect to those children, then such actions were used for purposes of propaganda. The United Kingdom delegation wondered how other Member States would react if school children in their countries were to be encouraged to commit, or to connive at murder, for that was what had happened in Cyprus.

68. It might be asked what was Greece's part in that campaign. In 1954 the Greek Government had begun to campaign actively for *enosis*, and Athens Radio had accordingly started to incite the Cypriots to violence. On 19 August 1954 the United Kingdom Government had made its first protest to the Greek Government about those broadcasts and had warned it that their continuance might irreparably damage British-Greek friendship.

69. As far back as January 1953, arms and ammunition had been smuggled into Cyprus from Greece. The terrorist stocks had been built up during 1954 by further consignments. On 9 November 1954 Grivas, the leader of EOKA, the terrorist movement, had landed secretly in Cyprus from Greece. Terrorists were secretly trained, both in Cyprus and in Greece, and in March 1955 Archbishop Makarios had told them to begin action.

70. The arms used by the terrorists had also come from Greece. In January 1953, three times in 1954 and then again in January 1955, Greek ships had landed arms and ammunition secretly in Cyprus. He described in detail the voyage of the *Hagios Georgios* in 1955 as

an example. The ship had been used in an attempt to smuggle arms from Greece to Cyprus with the full knowledge and support of a number of Greek officials.

71. A certain amount of the evidence given in the document which would be submitted to the Assembly by his delegation came from the Grivas diaries and other papers of the terrorist leader which had been captured in Cyprus. The Greek Government had attempted to claim that those papers were forgeries, but Grivas had himself admitted having kept the diary and the testimonial of a leading handwriting expert left no doubt that those documents had in fact been written by Grivas.

72. There were other ways in which Greece had materially supported the terrorists. A number of Cypriot students who had been studying in Greece had been trained by Greek army officers as saboteurs and terrorists. Some of them had succeeded in returning to Cyprus and had put their training into practice. Another facility afforded by the Greek Government to the terrorists was the use of the Greek diplomatic pouch to the Greek Consulate-General at Nicosia for correspondence between Grivas and his contacts in Athens. The authorities in Athens had also helped the EOKA terrorists by giving them special visa facilities and by informing them of the character and movements of Cypriots in Greece.

73. Funds for terrorists had been also forthcoming from various sources. Archbishop Makarios had given 105 million drachmas to finance the voyage of the *Hagios Georgios*, which had been smuggling arms to Cyprus. The Pan-Hellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus with Greece had also contributed money for the purchase of arms and ammunition. Grivas had also received a considerable sum of money from the Greek Government through the Greek Consul in Cyprus. Those and other actions of the Greek Government fully established the fact of its support to the terrorists in Cyprus. The United Kingdom Government wondered whether such conduct was compatible with the Charter of the United Nations.

74. He then referred to the part which was being played by Athens Radio in the campaign for the annexation of Cyprus. Athens Radio had been the main instrument employed by Greece in creating an atmosphere favourable to terrorism and intolerance. The Greek representative had claimed that Athens Radio was not under the control of the Greek Government. However, in a formal note addressed to the British *Chargé d'Affaires*, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated on 28 June 1955 that Athens Radio was an institution under State control. Moreover, the Greek Law No. 2312 of 1953 stated that the Minister to the Prime Minister should supervise Athens Radio in all aspects except technical matters.

75. Giving examples of commentaries from Athens Radio, he said that one of their special features was to demand the assassination of any Cypriot who opposed *enosis*. When a Greek Cypriot journalist had been assassinated by terrorists, Athens Radio had stated that Wideson (the journalist) had opposed *enosis* and his death, although a hard blow for his family, was the payment of the necessary price of purification. The terrorists in Cyprus attached great importance to broadcasts from Athens Radio, and that could be attested by the fact that Grivas had complained that, despite all that Athens Radio had done, it had not been enough.

76. It was the view of the United Kingdom Government that the terrorist movement in Cyprus had been

<sup>7</sup> Subsequently distributed as document A/C.1/788.



organized and financed with Greek help; that it had been encouraged and even guided by Greek propaganda, in particular by Athens Radio; and that it had been supported and exploited by the Greek Government in

the international field in order to further the campaign for *enosis*.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.