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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 62

**Question of Algeria (A/3197, A/C.1/L.165)
(*continued*)**

1. Mr. MAGHERU (Romania) felt that it was a step forward for the Algerian question to have been placed on the General Assembly's agenda and for the debate to be taking place in the presence of the French delegation. The Romanian people were closely interested in everything that had to do with the defence of peace and the principles of the United Nations Charter, and any conflict that might lead to international friction was a source of concern to them. Such a conflict had been going on for years in Algeria. The figures given by the French delegation on the losses in lives and property, though lower than those cited in Algerian publications, were none the less alarming. The large number of troops involved showed the scale of the resistance offered by the Algerian people, who were fighting for progress and independence within the limits of their legitimate rights under the Charter.

2. The Algerian question was a consequence of the nineteenth century policy of colonial conquest; for over a hundred years, Algeria had been the scene of constant warfare, but it still had not yielded to conquest. The development of national consciousness was an historical process whereby different nations reached maturity at different times. When a people clamoured for its right of self-determination, that was a sign of maturity. Recognition of that right to independence, which most subjugated peoples had been compelled to obtain by force, was now set down in the Charter in Articles 1 and 55, which referred to that principle, throughout Chapters XI and XII, which dealt with the Non-Self-Governing Territories, and also in Article 14, which as a corollary conferred upon the General Assembly the necessary powers to take action when circumstances made it imperative.

3. To refuse that right to the Algerian people would be not only illegal but futile, for the course of history could not be arrested. No one could deny, whatever the terms used, that there was a war going on in Algeria. The daily list of people killed was evidence of that fact. It was further established that the Algerian population was being subjected to the racial discrimination common to colonial régimes. Unequal representation, lower wages, illiteracy—that was the lot of the Algerians. Only the French population and a few Algerians benefited by the financial investments and various forms of social progress. Lastly, the conditions imposed at the

outset of the negotiations, as well as the history of previous negotiations amply demonstrated that the French intended to settle the Algerian problem unilaterally. Yet, as had been said, the consequences of the conflict could already be felt in international relations. The close connexion between the war in Algeria and the war in Egypt could not be disregarded: the French representative himself had spoken of a future Eurafrican community (831st meeting) whose members would obviously be anxious for a settlement of the Algerian conflict.

4. In that connexion, it should be noted that there was no question of participation by the whole of Europe in that community, but only by the Western European bloc whose objectives had nothing in common with the interests of peace and security. In the light of that fact, it might well be asked whether, by curbing the normal development of the Algerian people towards freedom, an attempt was not being made to subject it to the political and economic rule of a group of States and their allies, which were eager to convert Algeria and other countries of Africa into an economic and military hinterland. Confronted with that danger, the Algerian people were all the more justified in taking their future into their own hands.

5. Nobody disputed the complexity of the Algerian situation or the existence of French interests in Algeria. However, those interests could be protected only by entering into negotiations on the basis of the full and effective recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. In that spirit, the Romanian delegation would vote in favour of any draft resolutions which took account of the principles of the Charter and satisfied the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian people.

6. Begum IKRAMULLAH (Pakistan) believed that the function of the United Nations was primarily to restore and consolidate peace wherever it was threatened. In that spirit, and without seeking to determine whether or not the question of Algeria was within the domestic jurisdiction of France, the delegation of Pakistan had co-sponsored the draft resolution before Committee (A/C.1/L.165). Pakistan's attitude was not anti-Western, but her country stood for the right of peoples to self-determination. That cardinal principle of democracy had always been strongly defended by France, traditionally the champion of the philosophy of liberalism.

7. The Pakistan delegation understood perfectly that the national aspirations of a non-self-governing people could be fulfilled by the free association of the territory with the metropolitan country: but no such association would be valid without the consent of the population concerned. It was for the Algerians to settle their future themselves. What primarily determined the existence of a nation as an entity was not the ties of blood or religion, or geographical contiguity, but the feelings and the will of the population.

8. History had proved that the urge for freedom could not be suppressed. The Algerians would win their freedom. But if they won it after too much bloodshed, the ties between France and Algeria would be irretrievably broken.

9. It was in order to avoid such a break that the sponsors of the draft resolution, among them many friends of France, had joined their efforts. The plan presented by the representative of France for the economic development of Algeria and of the Eurafican association was very bold and imaginative, but it was essential for peace to be restored before it could be put into effect.

10. Mr. ALDUNATE (Chile) said that the Algerian question involved important principles and had at the same time interesting humanitarian, political and social aspects. The settlement of the conflict in Algeria would require a maximum of goodwill, wisdom and far-sightedness. The spiritual unrest of the Algerian people and their sporadic displays of violence showed that the minds of the population were obsessed by the need to change the rules of coexistence. The Algerian people were claiming rights which could not be restricted, for they touched upon the very essence of their condition as human beings.

11. The Chilean delegation would accuse no one. All that it wished to do was to help to create an atmosphere of calm and understanding which would permit an equitable solution that would impair the dignity of no one and infringe none of the rules of democracies. At the basis of the Algerian question, as stated by those who had taken it upon themselves to bring it up, lay two principles related to the objectives and to the basic principles of the Organization: the right of peoples to self-determination and the sovereignty of States. The history of Chile was sufficient guarantee that it would defend those two principles without flinching.

12. However, as it happened, the signatories of the United Nations Charter had found protection in a rule of law, which forbade the Organization to intervene in the domestic affairs of any State. Not to respect the legal and political status of a State at the time at which it had joined the United Nations would be to open the door to a series of revisions which might transform an organization set up for peaceful purposes into a source of international discord and hence of war. Any Member might be accused of having separatist groups within its territory. If such a criterion was to be applied, it might be said, for example, that Indonesia should allow Sumatra to secede on the grounds that a separatist, rebel chief had claimed the right of Sumatra to decide its own fate. Moreover, to subordinate the principle of sovereignty to that of the right of peoples to self-determination might encourage foreign interference and promote the rise of ambitious and unprincipled partisan leaders.

13. The French representative accused the hidden forces of a specific political persuasion of being behind the rebellion. Whether that statement was corroborated by the facts or not, the Organization should bear in mind what the results would be of applying the principle of self-determination injudiciously and of undermining the principle of the sovereignty of States. It should act with prudence and avoid demagoguery when the desire of a particular group of mankind for emancipation had to be satisfied. The Organization should not lightly encourage bids for freedom which might be legitimate and sincere, but which might also spring from the desire to dominate and enslave a people and

which might be intended to satisfy unworthy ambitions cloaked by the standard of freedom.

14. The Chilean delegation did not suggest that that was the case in Algeria, and it was precisely because it believed that the Algerian crisis deserved the closest attention that it had hoped that the discussion might be free of recrimination and accusations, which would merely inflame the problem by encouraging violence and intransigence and by inviting the action of those who seized on all such circumstances to spread chaos and to stifle the liberty which they pretended to defend.

15. The draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.165) was generously worded and enabled it to heed the aspirations of a people. Nevertheless, it might serve to increase tension and to make Algeria the scene of a struggle for influence between the forces of one part of the world and those who sought an opportunity to supplant Western civilization. Moreover, the draft resolution was couched in compulsive terms which did not take into account the principle of sovereignty. Its implementation would create a regrettable situation. Its non-implementation would give the impression that a Member of the United Nations had failed to observe the Organization's recommendations, and it was the Organization which would be weakened by it.

16. The Chilean delegation could therefore not support the eighteen-Power draft resolution. It hoped that a formula of agreement could be found that would facilitate the settlement of the conflict. A great nation was involved for which Chile had the deepest regard, as well as the people of Algeria, who deserved the greatest sympathy and understanding for their manifest desire to improve their present conditions.

17. Mr. KIZYA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that it would help to strengthen the peace in the Mediterranean if energetic action was taken immediately to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem.

18. The French delegation had no justification whatsoever for claiming (830th meeting) that the General Assembly was not competent to discuss the question. The situation was a potential source of major international difficulties. France had been waging a war against the Algerian people since November 1954. That conflict with all its victims and destruction, constituted a threat to the peace of the Middle East. Under Article 14, Article 1, paragraph 2, and Article 55 of the Charter, the General Assembly was obliged to take up the Algerian question. The Member States of the United Nations had undertaken to respect the principle of the right of self-determination of peoples and the principle of equal rights of peoples, whether they were sovereign or whether they wished to achieve their nationhood. That was how Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter had been interpreted when it had been drawn up at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco in 1945.

19. All attempts to thwart the efforts of an enslaved people to achieve their independence were violations of the Charter. That was why the situation in Algeria had attracted the attention of world opinion, which had expressed itself in particular at the African-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955 and subsequently at the tenth session of the General Assembly. But the French Government had not only ignored the moral recommendations designed to satisfy the legitimate claims of the Algerian people; it had in addition taken steps to solve the problem by force. Repressive and

destructive measures had continued on an increasing scale, and the situation had grown worse day by day.

20. In voting for the inclusion of the Algerian question in the agenda of the eleventh session of the General Assembly, Member States had shown their sympathy with the Algerian people, who had been subjected to a colonial régime for almost 126 years. The representatives of Syria (831st to 833rd meetings and 840th meeting) and the representative of Morocco (834th meeting) had given an accurate picture of the situation in Algeria where French rule had brought the indigenous population to the lowest depths of poverty and slavery. In an extremely rich country, 3 million people went continuously hungry. United States newspapers, and even the statements by the French Prime Minister admitted the lamentable conditions in which the Algerian people were living. But the Algerian people were suffering even more from injustice than from material hardships. Denied the most elementary democratic rights, the Algerian people were demanding their freedom and independence. Conscious of world developments and of the collapse of colonialism, they wanted their right of self-determination to be respected. They would not accept the half-measures proposed by the French Government, but what they would accept even less would be the replacement of outdated French colonialism by United States monopolies which were driving out the French imperialists and wanted to take over the great natural resources recently discovered in Algerian territory. Under the imperialist plan, Algeria was to serve as a strategic base and as a source of raw materials. The Algerian people, intent on achieving their national independence, would not accept the plans of new colonizers. They did not need strategic bases, foreign troops, or business companies coveting their natural resources; what they wanted was their full freedom and independence.

21. On many occasions the Algerian National Liberation Front had submitted proposals for negotiations with the French Government, but that Government preferred to extend its military activities rather than to seek a peaceful settlement. Thus, under the cover of pacification, colonial warfare was raging in all its horror; villages were destroyed, countless arrests were made, these were mass executions; operations in Algeria had never been carried out on such a scale or with such cruelty.

22. The Ukrainian people, who had always opposed all forms of slavery, felt the deepest sympathy for the struggle of the Algerian people. France, which had been the first country in Europe to challenge feudalism and tyranny, ought to understand the aspirations of the Algerian people. The day would come when the Algerian people would be free. The Ukrainian delegation was anxious that the bloodshed should come to an end and that peaceful solutions should be found, which took into account the historic bonds linking France and Algeria and the legitimate rights of the Algerian people. It would therefore support the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165).

23. Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand) said that at the tenth session of the General Assembly his delegation had opposed the inclusion of the Algerian item in the agenda because it had grave doubts about the competence of the Assembly and the usefulness of a discussion of the question. Those doubts remained. However, he welcomed France's action in giving the Committee a full account of French policy towards Algeria (830th and 831st meetings).

24. He noted with satisfaction France's unconditional offer of a cease-fire to be followed by free elections with a single electoral college, in the presence of observers from other democratic countries. He also noted that the negotiations contemplated by France with the elected representatives of the Algerian people were to be based on the four principles of the full equality of rights for all the inhabitants of Algeria and the coexistence of the two Algerian communities, the emergence of an Algerian entity with the retention by France of a power of arbitration, and the continuation of economic aid for Algeria.

25. Any survey of the question must take into account the fact that French policy was a forward-looking policy of drastic reform designed to bring about a substantial degree of autonomy for Algeria. Nor must it be forgotten that there were in Algeria more than a million European settlers, whose position must be taken into account in the constitutional evolution now envisaged.

26. During the discussion of the questions of Morocco and Tunisia, his delegation had taken the view that France deserved the Organization's confidence and that peaceful solutions would be more easily reached if the Assembly refrained from intervening between France and those two countries. The Assembly had so refrained; the negotiations had been successful. In the case of Algeria, there was even less justification for United Nations intervention, and the New Zealand delegation must therefore oppose the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165).

27. Moreover, the draft resolution mentioned the right of the people of Algeria to self-determination according to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. There was no reference in the Charter to a "right" of self-determination. Furthermore, operative paragraph 2 of the draft spoke of immediate negotiations. That appeared to imply that the indispensable step of free elections proposed by France should be by-passed. The main objection to the draft, however, was the fact that it sought to interpose the authority of the United Nations between France and the inhabitants of a French territory. Still less could his Government agree that intervention by individual foreign Governments was permissible.

28. The Syrian delegation had scarcely troubled to conceal the fact of such intervention or its motive, which was not Algerian independence but the incorporation of Algeria in what he had called the Arab nation. Mr. Zeineddine had said in a press interview that Algeria would, like Syria, be a component of a national Arab State. Sir Leslie Munro wondered whether Syria, in its desire that the Arab nation should speak with a single voice in international affairs, would be willing to agree that it should have but one vote in the General Assembly.

29. It was the policy enunciated by France, rather than the proposals of those who had requested the inclusion of the item, which offered a just and democratic solution. As the United States representative had said (835th meeting), progress could only be made on the spot, without outside interference.

30. Heated debate in the Assembly was not conducive to a settlement. What was needed was a peaceful atmosphere, undisturbed by external pressure, and a process of gradualism, whereby the negotiations envisaged by France could achieve lasting results.

31. Mr. KETRZYNSKI (Poland) said that the Algerian drama had lasted too long not to be a threat to peace and international security. A people was

suffering and fighting and it looked to the United Nations for help in gaining recognition of its right of self-determination. Poland, whose national history had been particularly troubled, readily understood the emotion of the representatives of Morocco and Tunisia, whose countries had so many connexions with Algeria. It believed that France, too, could not remain insensitive to the will of the Algerian people.

32. Everything which could be said about the legal aspect of the problem had already been said, and the United Nations had established its competence in the matter at the tenth session of the General Assembly. The historical aspect of the matter, for its part, ought to be left to the historians. It was, however, important to observe that the Algerian problem, which went beyond the limits of the relations between France and Algeria, constituted a serious threat to peace throughout the Middle East. Moreover, the Algerian people had the right of self-determination. For those two reasons a constructive debate was necessary.

33. Poland had always upheld the principle of national independence, while refusing to interfere in the domestic affairs of other States. It was to be noted, however, that all situations resulting from colonialism sooner or later gave rise to tension between the metropolitan country and the people struggling for its independence. Such tensions were, then, no longer essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned. It was noteworthy that wherever such a situation had occurred, the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter had been invoked, but that ultimately the peoples who were fighting for their independence had won their case and they were now Members of the United Nations. It appeared, therefore, that the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of States ought not to be extended to the point of depriving the peoples of the right of self-determination.

34. The Algerians had, through their struggle, proved that they wanted independence. The United Nations ought to be able to help them. It was in fact purely a matter of chance that Algeria was legally a part of the French nation while Morocco and Tunisia had remained separate. The Algerian people were undoubtedly convinced that their future lay with that of Morocco and Tunisia. The many incidents taking place every day in Algeria and the plots fomented by certain elements of the European population showed that the time for compromise solutions was past. It was therefore in the interest of France and its civilizing influence to allow the United Nations to play a political role in the settlement of the conflict. It was necessary, first, that hostilities should cease. The insurgents must be given guarantees regarding their future security and the prospect of a just solution. The security of the European minority must also be guaranteed. The best solution obviously lay in the collaboration of France and the Algerian people with the United Nations. The Polish delegation would approve any solution recognizing the right of self-determination of the Algerian people and clearing a way for negotiations which would lead to a peaceful settlement and which would make progress possible, taking into account the civilizing mission of France.

35. Mr. KHOMAN (Thailand) said that the Algerian question was particularly complex. But he thought that a discussion of it would help to relieve the tension and lessen the threat to peace and security in North Africa. Caution must be exercised, however, even while the

right of peoples to self-determination was being upheld in principle.

36. It was gratifying that France had not opposed the discussion of the question. That meant that the problem of competence had been relegated to the background. It was clear that there was a general consensus of opinion that the United Nations had both the right and the duty of examining the Algerian question.

37. Among the principles which lay at the very foundations of the United Nations, that of the protection of Member States against any violation of their organic constitution was of primary importance. Another fundamental principle was that of the right of self-determination of peoples. It was not always easy to apply those two principles concurrently. In particular, it was sometimes hard to decide which should have precedence. But the right of self-determination of peoples was inherent in nature itself, and its only limit was the limit of man's will. Europe was in a better position than any to know that no legal barrier could withstand the claims of a people determined to decide its own future. With regard to the question under discussion, the best way to reconcile the two principles would be to trust that the liberal and generous traditions of France would enable that country to find a constructive solution on the basis of co-operation. The United Nations ought to facilitate that solution. It could hardly, in fact, close the Algerian case without running the risk of being accused of indifference.

38. Without interfering in Algerian affairs, the First Committee should make it clear that the United Nations desired to see an end to the strife and negotiations set on foot with a view to finding a solution through co-operation. His delegation reserved the right, at the appropriate time, to join with other delegations in submitting a draft resolution to that effect.

39. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) said that his delegation would join with those which had recommended moderation. Like other American States, Brazil had been established through rebellion, so that it could not but feel sympathy with peoples which were struggling to achieve their independence. But those were reasons of the heart, which the mind must overlook.

40. When all the various regions of the world had been isolated units, independence could be achieved overnight. But States had now become more or less interdependent. That was the case, for instance, with Algeria and France, which would very certainly have much to gain by continuing to live together. It was hard to see how anyone could fail to have confidence in France, which had decided to meet the needs of the Algerians and to succour them in their present difficulties.

41. With regard to the technical problem, Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter was the corner-stone of the United Nations. As the Brazilian jurist Raúl Fernandes had said, it was the right and the duty of France to refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of the United Nations in the Algerian question. By so doing, it would be rendering a notable service to everyone, for it was essential that the principles upon which the Organization had been founded should be upheld.

42. France had set an example of political tolerance by taking part in the discussion. The counterpart would be for the Committee to desist from further discussion. Brazil was prepared to support any draft resolution to that effect.

43. Mr. NAJAR (Israel), exercising his right of reply, wished to make some observations on the statements of a number of Arab delegations. In his statement (838th meeting), the Egyptian representative had claimed that on 29 October 1956 Israel had attacked Egypt—which was pure, innocent and respectful of the rights of all—without any provocation and in order to serve foreign interests. The truth was quite different.

44. On 15 May 1948, the members of the League of Arab States had, in violation of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, declared war on Israel in order to destroy it. That adventure had ended in the military defeat of the Arab States. The Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949 (S/1264/Rev.1) had put an end to the hostilities. That Agreement between the two Governments had been intended to terminate all belligerency and to serve as a transition to the conclusion of peace. In May 1949 Israel had become a Member of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 273 (III)), and had thereby been bound to Egypt by a second agreement, the Charter of the United Nations, which excluded all belligerency and required of its signatories mutual respect for each other's sovereignty. In spite of that double contractual link, Egypt had still asserted that a state of war—a war started by Egypt—continued to exist, and had acted accordingly.

45. In reply to Mr. JAMALI (Iraq), Mr. MAHMOUD (Egypt) and Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria), who had spoken on points of order, the CHAIRMAN said that the representative of Israel was exercising his right of reply. At the same time, he requested that representative to show restraint and to keep his comments strictly within the limitations of his right of reply.

46. Mr. NAJAR (Israel), continuing his reply, said that the large-scale purchases of ultra-modern weapons made by Egypt since September 1955 had transformed the international and physical dimensions of the Egyptian danger for Israel. After thirteen months of exceptional tension, further aggravated by the Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry in Jordan, the military agreement of 25 October 1956 between Egypt, Syria and Jordan, the express purpose of which had been to destroy the State of Israel, had on Israel the same effect as the 1939 Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union had on Europe. On 29 October 1956, Israel had reacted, in pursuance of the sacred right of self-defence accorded to each nation by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

47. On the question of Algeria, he said that the confidence which the General Assembly had expressed in France in connexion with the Tunisian question (resolution 813 (IX)) and the Moroccan question (resolutions 812 (IX) and 911 (X)) had resulted in the attainment of independence by those two countries, following direct negotiations. Few problems in the world had been solved with such understanding. When France stated that the Algerian problem was different, in form and substance alike, from the two others, the most careful consideration should be given to its statement.

48. The French representative's assertion that the United Nations had no jurisdiction in the matter (830th meeting) raised a real problem. For over a century Algeria had legally been part of French territory; and the territorial status of France was an integral part of United Nations law. Those who had called for the inclusion of the question in the agenda of the General Assembly were seeking to detach the territory in question from France, and to make the United Nations

an active instrument in that operation. It was hard to imagine a situation to which the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter more exactly applied.

49. The fact of the lack of jurisdiction of the United Nations did not mean that there was no Algerian problem. France was making a constructive effort and had under study a democratic plan designed to open up to Algeria real possibilities of development, both individual and collective. It would be a political mistake not to recognize the sincerity of the French effort; and it would be a violation of the Charter to act otherwise than with respect for the sovereignty and Constitution of France.

50. The fact that a majority of Members could vote the inclusion of any item in the agenda in order to discuss it did not mean that the Charter was a worthless document; and efforts made to broaden the interpretation of the Charter must not have the ultimate effect of negating it. Important Articles of the Charter had already been nullified; thus, the Security Council had been weakened in relation to the General Assembly, and the latter had been enlarged by the admission of the new Members. That did not mean to say that the Assembly was free of all constitutional checks. If it were, the United Nations would sink into the morass of majority dictatorship and permanent violation of the fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of Member States. It was therefore more than ever necessary to ensure respect for Article 2, paragraph 7, which was the surest guarantee of the sovereignty and equality of the States signatories to the Charter. It was absolutely essential to prevent any possibility of the Charter being set up in opposition to recommendations of the Assembly, or of the law of the United Nations not being the same for all States.

51. In order to reconcile the international interest taken in certain questions with the tendency to disregard Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, it might be well to follow the middle position suggested by the Israel delegation at the General Assembly's eighth session (449th plenary meeting, para. 20), namely, to make a distinction between the discussion of a question and the adoption of recommendations or measures which would constitute an intervention inconsistent with the principle of national sovereignty.

52. The General Assembly should be grateful to the French Government for having afforded it so close an insight into its ideas and its intentions. France's unconditional offer of a cease-fire, to be followed, three months after the restoration of order, by free elections still held good. The French Government would enter into discussions with the representatives thus elected in order to decide on the future organization of Algeria. The General Assembly would have found it difficult to suggest any arrangement more consistent with the tradition of the United Nations and with the spirit of the Charter.

53. Opponents of the French plan urged that certain leaders of the Arab insurrection in Algeria should be recognized by the French Government at once, without any prior elections, as the sole rightful representatives of the Algerian peoples. Such an idea was unacceptable, for three different reasons. In the first place, it tended to give the impression that the Moslems alone constituted the legitimate population of Algeria. That might have been true in 1830, but it certainly did not reflect the true situation in 1957; and the 1.2 million non-Moslems in Algeria were not inclined to let themselves be forgotten. Secondly, it was objectively impossible,

without prior elections, to know to what extent the Moslem communities placed their confidence in any given clandestine chief, particularly in the atmosphere of terrorism which now reigned in Algeria. Finally, the Algerian rebels were undoubtedly receiving support from Egypt and other Powers, and it was not outside the bounds of possibility that their leaders had come to the fore because of their relations with those countries. The General Assembly would certainly have refused to run the risk of being the instrument of a veritable foreign-supported seizure of power in Algeria. Prior elections were therefore essential.

54. The French representative, looking beyond the present difficulties had described (831st meeting) the limitless prospects which would be opened out given extensive co-operation between Europe and Africa. The plans he had outlined might well find their place among the key events of the twentieth century, and they were fully in keeping with the Mediterranean tradition of trade and co-operation between the peoples of the region. Israel fervently desired to see the development of such co-operation in the Mediterranean area.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.