



Saturday, 9 February 1957,  
at 10.30 a.m.

**New York**

**CONTENTS**

Page

Agenda item 62: Question of Algeria ( <i>continued</i> ) .....	163
---	-----

**Chairman:** Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

**AGENDA ITEM 62**

**Question of Algeria (A/3197, A/C.1/L.165)  
(*continued*)**

1. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) recalled that his delegation had undertaken to reply to the statement which had been made (835th meeting) by Mr. Soustelle, representative of France, after consulting its own specialists on Algerian questions. Its reply was as follows.

2. In the ancient times to which Mr. Soustelle had referred when explaining that Algeria had not existed as a nation before the French conquest, few modern nations had existed as such, not even France. The representative of France, indeed, had not indicated the sources of his historical information and in any case had not refuted any of the views expressed by the representatives of Syria (831st to 833rd meetings) and Morocco (834th meeting). The representative of France was a historian and was certainly aware that one of the essential aspects of historical teaching was that of comparison. In that connexion, he noted that, at the times when Algiers and other cities of Algeria had been attacked or bombarded by foreign Powers, the same thing had occurred to European cities, including cities in France. Thus in the seventeenth century at the time of its bombardment of Algiers, England had been at war with France, and Spain had also been fighting other European countries when it intervened in the Algerian coastal zone. In any case, such actions could not justify the invasion of Algeria by a third country. Moreover, many of the attacks on Algiers had been justified on the ground that non-Christian nations were outside the pale of the law.

3. As for the references made by Mr. Soustelle to the international law prevailing at the time, he noted that before 1830 relations between France and other European countries had been as much *sui generis* as, according to the French representative, the sovereignty of the Dey of Algiers had been. Mr. Tarazi out of courtesy refrained from terming the French corsairs of the Napoleonic era pirates, but that period had seen many thrones overturned and had at least witnessed *sui generis* relations between France and the other States of Europe which it was rending hungrily.

4. The French declaration of 4 February 1830 that France wished to do away with slavery in Africa and to re-establish freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean appeared to be but a continuation of the policy of conquest started at the beginning of the century. The pretext of re-establishing freedom of navigation had

recently been used by France to justify another aggression, which the civilized world, better organized than in 1830, had been able to stop and condemn. As was shown by the Treaty signed at Bardo in 1881, which established a French protectorate over Tunisia, protectorates had always been established after the conquests had been completed.

5. The representative of France had asserted that the Dey had had no power and no sovereignty over Algeria. But, as had been pointed out, the French Ambassador in Constantinople had declared in 1830 that the Regency was an independent State which set up its chief, declared war and made and broke treaties at will. Of course, at that time, it had served the imperialistic purposes of France to prove the existence of an Algerian State. Mr. Soustelle had noted that what he called pirate chiefs had expelled the representative of the Sublime Porte and set up their puppet instead. In that connexion, he noted that that remark was an unhappy one to come from a Frenchman who, in company with other Frenchmen—whom some called rebels if not pirates—had expelled a Marshal of France, had replaced him by a General elected by themselves, and had later imprisoned him as the agent of an enemy Power. As for the assassination of the Dey, Mr. Soustelle need not be reminded of the death of Louis XVI. Likewise, it was scarcely appropriate for the representative of France to refer to governmental stability. Although there might have been armed disputes between tribes in Algeria, they had been much earlier than 1830—during a period when France frequently had not possessed a government with real authority.

6. The fact remained that the Algerians, despite their disagreements, had continued to fight the French armies for eighteen years after 1830 and had consistently opposed the invaders. They would scarcely have done so, and would scarcely be doing so now, if they were not united. He wondered against whom the French Army had been fighting if there had been a vacuum of power in Algeria and against whom its latest pacification, following so many others, was being carried out.

7. It had been said that the Dey had not transferred sovereignty because it did not belong to him, but in noting that fact, the representative of France had neglected to mention that under Islamic law and Algerian custom, sovereignty belonged to the people of Algeria. It was the people who fought then, as now, for the ideals enshrined by the French Republic, but denied by it to Algeria.

8. The French representative had argued that, while in modern times and particularly since the Second World War, the acquisition of sovereignty in a territory by occupation, in the absence of legal sovereignty, was no longer considered a normal method of acquisition and that, if the frontiers and territorial composition of existing States were called into question by reference

to their origins, vast overturns of the structure of many States would result. That argument of prescriptive sovereignty was certainly an innovation without support even in French doctrine, and overlooked the fact that the subjugation of Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and Czechoslovakia, for example, had not deprived those people of their sovereignty; they had been reborn, conquering their independence by force, as the Algerian people were now doing.

9. When the French representative asserted that after 1847 the presence of the French had been accepted by the population, it might well be asked how the Algerian people had indicated its acceptance of the French occupation. Mr. Soustelle had refrained from citing any plebiscite or referendum by which the Algerian people had expressed that view, and he appeared to forget that the successive revolts which had bloodied Algeria were an obvious proof of the unwillingness of the Algerians to accept the condition imposed upon them. It certainly could not be denied that, from 1 November 1954, the people of Algeria had fought fiercely.

10. It was true that the Algerian soldiers had fought faithfully and loyally beside the French and their allies in two world wars. But that faith and loyalty had been to the freedom and justice in which they believed and which they had been promised, although the promise had not been fulfilled. Their true heroism had nothing to do with the fact that they had also been used as cannonfodder in more doubtful enterprises, such as the Madagascar, Syrian and Indo-Chinese expeditions, on behalf of French colonialism.

11. The French representative himself, by distinguishing between nationality and citizenship, had recognized that nationality imposed unilaterally upon the Algerians had not necessarily granted them citizenship and the rights inherent in it until the Constitution of 1946. They had remained second-class citizens. The parallel with certain North American territories mentioned by the French representative was inaccurate, since the inhabitants of the latter had accepted the legislation in force. The French representative had asserted that the indigenous inhabitants of Algeria enjoyed all the rights and privileges of French citizens and that there was no discrimination; in that connexion, he had said that the taxes paid by the Algerians were lower than those in metropolitan France and were decided upon by the Algerian Assembly, elected by all the Algerians. Mr. Tarazi would not again review how that Assembly was elected, although Mr. Soustelle himself had admitted in his writings that the elections were manipulated. The first electoral college consisted of sixty representatives of the 1 million European inhabitants. The second electoral college, also consisted of sixty representatives, in principle representing the other 9 millions. That system of parity gave predominance to the European population, because those elected to the second college were frequently in the pay of the members of the first. The budget of Algeria contained certain obligatory expenditures because it was drawn up by the French administration and because the Assembly was forced to adopt it. The indigenous inhabitants did not occupy the position they should have in the public service. The French Government had admitted as much by its recent proposals to open the public service more widely to Moslem elements.

12. With regard to the budget of Algeria, 75 or 80 per cent came from taxes on consumers, nine-tenths of whom were Moslem Algerians. A report of 28 June

1955 by Mr. Robert Delavignette to the French Economic Council<sup>1</sup> — one of the essential organs of the French administration provided for in the Constitution in order to advise the Government on all proposed laws bearing on the French economy — had stated that the proportion of indirect taxation was still extremely high and even tended to increase, whereas the figures for capital tax showed a decrease. The representative of France was thus scarcely entitled to contend that the Europeans in Algeria paid the lion's share of the taxes. An article cited in that report established the average Algerian income at about 40,000 francs a year, about one-fifth of the income of the inhabitants of France. Agriculture, in which three-quarters of the population was engaged, obtained only one-third of the national income, and that third was distributed unequally; their average annual income was less than 20,000 francs and hardly higher, according to the report, than that of the Indians. The income from other activities averaged about 100,000 francs per person per year. The farmer's income, therefore, was one-fifth that of the city dweller. Those statistics did not represent a social phenomenon, Mr. Tarazi added, but a national one resulting from the colonial régime imposed on Algerians by the French administration.

13. Dealing with the distribution of land, he noted that, according to the same report, 25,795 European landowners owned 2,040,000 hectares divided as follows: small properties, 1.81 per cent; middle-sized, 24.72 per cent; large tracts of land, 73.47 per cent. According to the *Union algérienne des sociétés algériennes de prévoyance* (Algerian Union of Algerian Provident Societies), 25,000 Europeans owned 2,750,000 hectares — about 110 hectares *per capita*; 15,000 Moslems using up-to-date methods owned 750,000 hectares — 50 hectares *per capita*; and 500,000 Moslems using traditional methods worked 2,500,000 hectares — 5 hectares *per capita*. If it were noted that the land was for the most part poor, it was easy to understand why the average income of the indigenous inhabitants was so low.

14. The representative of France had said that property had been gained by Europeans, not by expropriation or confiscation, but by concessions. But the public domain which had granted those concessions had been established only by the expropriation of land from the indigenous inhabitants and the seizing of the assets of the religious foundations. In order to permit the settlement of refugees from Alsace-Lorraine in Algerian territory, in 1871, after the rebellion led by Moqrani, 2,639,000 hectares had been taken from the inhabitants unable to pay the tribute imposed upon them for their rebellion. Land had to be found in one way or another for the *colons*. That was the doctrine of colonization which had been urged by Marshal Bugeaud in a speech of 14 April 1840 as alone justifying the Algerian war. Marshal Bugeaud had said that European settlers must be placed only in the more fertile areas without bothering to find out who owned the land. That argument was indeed more logical than the French representative's implausible claim that settlement had taken place on bad lands and in swamp areas. He wondered who would believe that warriors hungry for wealth, and colonists to whom a new promised land had been offered would have been content with unhealthy swamps. In fact, from the very beginning of the conquest, the French administration had taken over all assets and all

<sup>1</sup> *Situation économique et sociale de l'Algérie, Journal officiel, Avis et rapports du Conseil économique, No. 10 (5 July 1955).*

lands and that seizure was legalized by the law of 16 June 1851. Only European settlers could receive concessions of land. The indigenous inhabitants could not even purchase land from European settlers which the latter had received as a concession. Those drastic provisions had only disappeared a few years ago.

15. The French representative had talked about the export of surplus grain from Algeria, but had given no authority to support his assertions. According to the Delavignette report to the Economic Council, the production of barley was irregular because of drought; wheat production did not satisfy domestic requirements; and the average production of grain showed a disquieting stagnation. A distinguished French economist, Mr. Jacques Chevallier, stated that whereas in 1871 there had been five quintals of wheat per year for each inhabitant, in 1955, when the harvest was good, the figure was only two quintals.

16. During the same period, the growing of grapes, cultivated on about 2,000 hectares in 1830, had increased to 400,000 hectares. Although Moslems did not drink wine, Algeria was the third-ranking producer of wine in the world. It was proper to ask whether the feeding of Algerians should not be given preference over exports, the profits from which went principally to swell the capital of the European growers. He need not dwell on the fact that France, the main buyer of Algerian wine, was forced by overproduction to distil most of it into alcohol purchased at high cost by the State and then stored or burned.

17. The French representative had pointed out that the French Government had set the price of grain in Algeria at the same level as in France, namely higher than that on the world market, and had asserted that the Moslems, as the most numerous producers, benefited. But the French representative had not referred to the cost to Algeria of the customs union with France; thus, the Algerian consumer had to pay one-third more than the normal world price for sugar. As for manufactured products, everyone knew that the customs union, by prohibiting the industrialization of Algeria, had maintained it as an ideal market for French production and had assured a supply of abundant and cheap agricultural labour. It was true that there were guaranteed minimum salaries: even in the industrial field where half the workers were European, those salaries were already appreciably lower than in France. In the agricultural field, where about 98 per cent of the workers were indigenous inhabitants, the best pay amounted to about \$1.10 per day. For the same type of work in France, basic salaries were over twice as high. Moreover, not all Algerians received the same advantages from French law. Although there was a social security system in industry — with lower benefits than in France — the agricultural workers did not receive sickness and family benefits and only permanent workers received benefits at all. It should also not be forgotten that, as pointed out by Professor M. M. Knight of the University of California, about 2 million were partly unemployed and about 1 million were unemployed.

18. The representative of France had said that only financial help from France permitted the social security system to function in Algeria at all. In that connexion, however, it should be noted that, although employer and employee were obliged to make the same social security payments as workers in France, the benefits were far less than the latter received.

19. Continuing his point-by-point examination of the statement by Mr. Soustelle (835th meeting), the representative of Syria observed that, with regard to public health, it would suffice to cite the official French figures concerning the distribution of doctors. Algeria had 1,851 doctors of whom 1,145 lived in the coastal cities, Oran, Algiers, Constantine and Bône, where about 80 per cent of the European population lived; the other 600 were practising in rural parts with about four to eight doctors for every 100,000 inhabitants.

20. Concerning the growth of population of which the French representative had made so much, Mr. Tarazi cited the finding of Mr. Josué de Castro, in his book entitled *Géographie de la faim*,<sup>2</sup> that the poorest people were the most prolific. Having sought to show that there had been no Algeria, the French representative could similarly attempt to show that there had been no Algerians. Against the claim by the representative of France that there had been only 1.5 million inhabitants in Algeria at the time of the French settlement was to be placed the speech of Marshal Bugeaud in the *Chambre des Pairs* (House of Lords) in 1845 in which he had said that it was believed that the French had under their domination about 4 million Arabs and that of that number 500,000 to 600,000 were brave and able warriors. The figure of 4 million, Mr. Tarazi added, could not have included the two Kabylas which had been conquered only in 1853 and 1857, nor the southern territory, occupation of which had begun in 1858.

21. The remarks of the representative of France regarding the renaissance and flowering of Arab culture under French rule were not justified by the facts. The Syrian people might believe otherwise if the representative of France would list the Algerian savants who had flowered in the shade of the French cultural tree. Indeed, those few who had been able to safeguard the splendour and tradition of a language and a way of thought which had played a role in the history of humanity had been the victims of the French police, which had prohibited them from speaking in the mosques, had incarcerated them, and had forced them into exile.

22. The official recognition accorded Arabic as an official language of the French Union by article 57 of the Statute of 20 September 1947 merely revealed that it had been considered a foreign language a short time before. Moreover, that Statute had never been applied. He also pointed out that decrees prohibiting the teaching of Arabic, especially that of 18 October 1892, had never been repealed.

23. Recalling that the representative of France had cited French expenditures on behalf of the Moslem religion in Algeria as proof of his Government's respect, for that religion, Mr. Tarazi stated that such proof was astounding in the case of a Republic based on the separation of church and state. But France had committed itself to the maintenance of religious services after having confiscated the assets of all religious groups since 1830 and after their incorporation, for the purposes of control, in the domain of the State in 1843. Whereas Algiers had had fifty mosques in 1830, there were only six standing today. The most ancient and beautiful mosque had been converted into a cathedral. The Syrian delegation would have preferred from the French representative brutal but truthful frankness rather than the attempt to turn black into white.

<sup>2</sup> Paris, Editions ouvrières, 1949.

24. Turning to the question of education, Mr. Tarazi reminded the Committee that it had been told by the representative of France that 350,000 Moslem children attended school. However, that did not represent an accurate picture because the Committee had not been told that there were 2.4 million other children of school age who ran about in the streets. After 127 years of French civilization, Algeria had an illiteracy rate of 86 per cent. The University of Algiers had approximately 500 students of indigenous origin and more than 5,000 European students.

25. The dimensions of that "cultural renaissance" were hardly in keeping with French traditions. What was serious was the open racial discrimination exhibited with regard to education. Alongside the huge mass of unschooled Arab children were the European children, all of whom went to school. The education of Europeans involved a budget of 83 million francs, while for the education of Moslems, ten times more numerous, only 43 million was spent.

26. Mr. Tarazi also sought to correct another statistic, one relating to infant mortality. He pointed out that the rate of infant mortality in Algeria was probably the highest in the world: 284 per thousand.

27. Of the accusations that Algerian forces had been burning schools, he stated that the reason was that the schools in question had been taken over by the French for military purposes. The same use of the schools had been made by the French in Syria in 1945.

28. Turning to Mr. Soustelle's comments regarding the European minority in Algeria, Mr. Tarazi observed that the battle-cry of the Europeans who fell with impunity upon the disarmed Algerians was "Long live Soustelle!". Their slogans for Mr. Guy Mollet, Prime Minister of France, and Mr. Robert Lacoste, Minister residing in Algeria, were not so courteous. The representatives of the European minority had been described by Mr. Soustelle himself as "Obsessed by clan, race and caste hatred". Nevertheless, the Syrian delegation felt that that was the attitude of a minority within a minority. The Algerians did not wish to look upon the Europeans as foreigners. They were ready to include them within the national Algerian community with equal rights and duties — something which France had never done for the indigenous population of Algeria.

29. The meaning of the term "*moujahid*", which Mr. Soustelle had contested, was really "freedom fighter". The Algerians could very well call their fighters *moujahidin* because they were fighting for a sacred cause, the cause of freedom. The word "*fellagha*" had acquired a certain nobility as applied to those who were resisting France's control.

30. Regarding the French denial that there were regions in Algeria under the authority of the National Liberation Front, the representative of Syria cited, *inter alia*, American television broadcasts showing national liberation camps in Aurès. If the Front was not in control of the north of Constantine, Kabylia, and the frontier regions in the west, he wondered why it was necessary to have the support of a military column to go there.

31. With respect to the argument that Algerians had been executed by the patriots, he pointed out that Mr. François Mitterrand had told the French National Assembly that during the German occupation of France, the French resistance had executed 10,000 of their compatriots without trial. As to Mr. Pineau's allegation that Mr. Yazid, a representative of the National Liberation Movement, had declared at a meeting of the

American Committee on Africa that "to ensure Algerian unity one should not hesitate to kill and to crush any opposition", Mr. Tarazi read a *communiqué* from that organization interpreting Mr. Yazid's remarks as follows:

"He indicated, in answer to a question raised in his discussion group, that there had been a few unfortunate clashes between the disciplined troops of the armies of national liberation and some individual Algerians who were bent on following an irresponsible, independent course of resistance to the French. Such regrettable clashes were not, he said, to crush opposition to the National Liberation Front, but to create a disciplined, discriminating and effective resistance."

32. Turning to the argument of alleged Communist infiltration in Algeria, he observed that if one accepted the theory that those who were supported by the Communists were themselves Communists, one would have to conclude that the government of Mr. Guy Mollet was itself Communist. French propaganda should decide once and for all whether the Algerians were agents of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) — the representative of which had been expelled from Algeria — or of the Communists. In that connexion, he read a telegram from the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers addressed to the delegations from countries of the new world; the telegram repudiated the "fraudulent, ridiculous charges of being under Communist control made against the Algerian General Federation of Labour (UGTA)". Moreover, the Algerian General Federation of Labour had been admitted to membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, a well-known anti-Communist group counteracting the activities of the World Federation of Trade Unions. He also observed that, prior to the establishment of the Algerian National Liberation Front, the principal organization accepted in Algeria by the French authorities was the *Confédération générale du Travail*, which had links with the Communist Party. He emphasized that he did not mention those facts in order to state his preference for one trade union organization or another, but to give the Committee the true picture.

33. A striking proof of the Algerians' unanimous support of the National Liberation Front had been given between 1 and 6 February 1957 when an unprecedentedly successful general strike had been carried out.

34. He wished to dissipate any doubts concerning the elections proposed by France. In a revolutionary period, such as that in Algeria, elections never preceded a political settlement as a whole. Recalling that General Charles de Gaulle's provisional French Government in 1943-1945 had been set up first and elections had followed, he declared that no one had contested the legitimacy of the de Gaulle government, which represented the aspirations of the French people. The Algerians asked nothing more. They did not want the elections to take place exclusively under French authority. Furthermore, France was not proposing a solution, but a procedure which was itself unacceptable. Indeed, the French Government asked the Algerians to agree to an unconditional cease-fire and to elections to the French Parliament, to be held under its authority. The Algerians continued to believe that the cease-fire must be preceded by a general political agreement recognizing Algeria's right to independence. The pro-

cedure of an over-all settlement must be discussed between the French Government and a provisional Algerian Government, established with the agreement of the National Liberation Front.

35. Turning to the question of the competence of the United Nations in the Algerian question, he singled out for reply the remark by the representative of Cuba (836th meeting) that Algeria formed a constitutional part of France at the time that France had signed the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Tarazi refuted those arguments by indicating that France had had no constitution when the Charter had entered into force, on 24 October 1945. The French Constitution had been promulgated more than a year after the Charter had come into force. There were no French departments overseas before the Constitution of 1946. The reference to Algeria in the North Atlantic Treaty was contained in an annex, where it was not mentioned as forming part of the territory of France.

36. He recalled that mention had been made in all seriousness of acts of genocide committed either by French officials or by French settlers. The allegations could be submitted for consideration by the General Assembly under article VIII of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

37. Turning to Mr. Soustelle's allegations concerning "Arab imperialism", Mr. Tarazi wondered whether they represented an attempt to make world public opinion believe that Arabs alone had been responsible for the failures of the French Government in its war against Algeria. He declared that, though French and British imperialists were determined to break the spirit of the Arab peoples, the Arab countries were determined to unite. To the accusation of imperialism the reply was that Syria would not forego its concern over the fate of Algeria. He cited a speech by the President of Syria, Mr. Shukri al-Kuwatly, of 6 December 1956 to the effect that the objectives of France, the United Kingdom and Israel in the Middle East had been to permit them once again to divide between them zones of influence in Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

38. Reminding Mr. Soustelle of the repeated support by the French Government for the nineteenth century nationalist movements in Europe, the Syrian representative asked whether he meant to limit the application of the principle of nationalism to Europe alone. If so, that would represent, not Arab imperialism, but a kind of European imperialism, the aim of which would be to keep the countries of Asia and Africa as sources of raw material, for otherwise they would represent a danger for Europe.

39. In conclusion, he said that the independence of the people of Algeria was extremely important to the people of Syria and that the Syrian people would fight in peace for the liberation of the Algerians. But the Syrian people would be the first to rejoice over an arrangement between France and Algeria which the people of Algeria would accept.

40. The true France was not a France of imperialism, colonization and banks, but a France of the people and of the great figures of French culture. It was for the French Government to re-establish the prestige of French culture by renouncing its dream of force and recognizing the right of the Algerian people to life, happiness and existence.

41. Mr. NAJAR (Israel) reserved his right of reply in order to answer those who had utilized the debate to carry out a campaign of slander against Israel.

42. Mr. STRATOS (Greece) stated that it was only when the problem of colonialism was before the United Nations that the French and Greek delegations followed different paths. Without wishing to criticize anyone, he wished to explain the two factors which motivated Greece on the problem of colonialism.

43. The first factor was the attachment of Greece to the principles of justice, equality and freedom for all peoples without distinction. That was a natural attitude for a small country. The second factor stemmed from the fact that nothing could save colonialism in the world: it stood condemned. Every new age produced its own political formulas. The formula of colonialism belonged to the past. That was why the Greek delegation deplored as sheer waste of blood and treasure the sacrifices made in order to continue the colonial system for even a short period. The Greek delegation felt that the abolition of the colonial system should be ensured by means of political solutions in order to minimize the suffering of the peoples concerned. The United Nations had the principal role to play in seeking those solutions and in attempting to guarantee the peaceful evolution of the situation whenever a colonial conflict arose. That was the fundamental premise for the Greek opposition to the position of the French delegation. It was that principle which made Greece speak in favour of the Algerian people without being, in thought at least, against France. He further observed that it was not the opposition of the French delegation to the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination that had determined the Greek position on Algeria. The Greek attitude was determined by the conviction that the Algerian people had a right to live its own life on the basis of its own aspirations. He emphasized that colonialism could not be identified with the true image of France.

44. Turning to the French claim that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter excluded the Algerian problem from the competence of the United Nations, he felt that it was unjustifiable to claim that Algeria was a part of France because Algeria was inhabited by a people that was not French, did not share the rights of the French, and — most important of all — did not consider themselves French. The Greek delegation did not believe valid the constitutional argument according to which Algeria was considered a part of metropolitan France. He observed that a State possessing sufficient force to occupy a territory could very easily grant the latter its own nationality, and then claim that questions relating to the territory fell within its domestic jurisdiction by virtue of Article 2, paragraph 7. In that case he wondered what would become of the subject people and of the principles of the Charter. In the opinion of the Greek delegation, the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, were absolutely clear; they concerned the internal affairs of a State. But the destiny of a population whose national consciousness was distinct from that of the dominant Power could not be considered as an internal affair of the latter. The Algerians constituted a distinct ethnic entity.

45. Concerning the assertion of Mr. Pineau that the Statute of 1947 guaranteed to all inhabitants the full enjoyment of rights stemming from French citizenship (830th meeting), Mr. Stratos observed that in the French National Assembly only fifteen deputies represented Algeria, a country of 9.5 million inhabitants, whereas the 43 million inhabitants of France were represented by more than 600 deputies.

46. The essence of the problem was not that at the time of the French conquest Algeria did or did not enjoy full sovereignty — a point the relevance of which he did not grasp, since one could hardly claim that only a State fully sovereign at the time of foreign occupation had the right to free itself. The essential thing was that the Algerian people had risen to claim their right to be free and, within their own territory inhabited by them, to form a free and independent nation. The essential fact was that — however important the job of civilization accomplished by France — Algeria was occupied by aliens. It was unfortunate that fire and blood were the perennial price paid by people in their search for freedom. To some people, those who struggled for freedom were heroes; to others, bandits, terrorists, assassins and outlaws.

47. One should not speak only of the struggle against colonialism, for it was not only in countries under colonial domination — in Africa, Cyprus and Asia — that people wanted to be free.

48. Recalling Mr. Pineau's admission that the social and economic measures of 1956 to improve the lot of the Algerian population should have been taken earlier, the representative of Greece observed that France was too late by a century, since it was in 1789 that it had proclaimed the slogan "liberty, equality, fraternity".

49. He considered it unfortunate that the French delegation had announced (830th meeting) that it would be unable to accept any recommendation by the General Assembly concerning Algeria. France was not the first country to make such a declaration. That fact constituted an ill omen for the future of the Organization and would oblige each Member State to ask what its own role in the United Nations was. He asked whether, resolutions were to be binding only when they applied to small States which had no alternative but to abide by them. He asked whether they were to be ignored when they constituted applications of fundamental principles of the Charter.

50. It was in order to prevent struggles for liberation from becoming a menace to the peace that the United Nations had been established. On its pediment had been inscribed the sacred principle that every people had the right to be free. A procedure had been instituted for the peaceful implementation of that right. That was why peoples struggling for freedom applied to the United Nations to set the procedure in motion which would allow them to become free by peaceful means. If no way was found to ensure the implementation of the principles of the Charter, the situation might become worse and endanger world peace. The powers granted the General Assembly by Article 14 of the Charter constituted the procedure for peaceful resolution of that danger.

51. The refusal to acknowledge that another people had the right to be free was a violation of the Charter. Recalling the principles for which both Greece and France had many times fought side by side, he stated that the Greek people were surprised that the French Government had abandoned them when Greece had tried to help the Cypriots in their claim for freedom and independence. They were surprised when the French Government no longer supported peoples who wished to recover their liberty. The Greek people still maintained their admiration and friendliness for the French people, but, remaining loyal to their principles, the Greek people would always fight for their ideals because life had no value if one could not live it in freedom.

52. Mr. KASE (Japan) recalled the contention of the French representative that the situation in Algeria was a purely domestic question and that the United Nations was not competent to deal with it (830th meeting). However, the international Press had been amply reporting the mounting casualties in Algeria, thus demonstrating that the conflict had become a matter of grave international concern. Obviously the events in Algeria were a source of justifiable anxiety for the United Nations.

53. He expressed gratification at the active participation of France in the debate and found the presentation of the French case by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (830th and 831st meetings) lucid. Some of the statements made in the debate had been rather heated and imbued with emotion. The graver the situation, the more restrained should be the tone of the debate. Rather than accuse France, the Committee should concentrate on facilitating conciliation. Indeed, moderation was the key to the solution of the tense situation which confronted the Committee.

54. The problem of Algeria was that of the implementation of the principle of self-determination of peoples which was stipulated in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. Japan fully subscribed to the Charter and upheld that principle as unassailable. The African-Asian Conference, held at Bandung in April 1955, had supported the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence, and had urged the French Government urgently to effect a peaceful settlement of the issue. Japan, one of the participants in the Conference, supported the Bandung Declaration, because it had consistently supported the principle of racial equality and, consequently, the emancipation of the so-called dependent peoples. Self-determination, though admittedly difficult to define precisely, had become an irresistible movement because it involved basic human rights. Colonialism was in retreat before it.

55. However, self-determination could not be indiscriminately or capriciously applied to all the dependent peoples. In some cases it was necessary to move forward with cautious and gradual measures which would not aggravate the stern realities of the situation, but would prove conducive to an early attainment of the desired goal. However, it was necessary also to beware of the aggravating effects of a policy of mere procrastination.

56. His delegation wished to express respect for the impressive achievement of France in Algeria. Those achievements were a credit to France. It was a warrantable hope that, in view of the traditional liberalism of France, it would courageously embark upon a constructive policy regarding the Algerian people and would promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

57. He believed that the heart of the whole matter was contained in the following proposition: Not peace through the medium of war, but peace sought in the spirit of peace, through conciliation and compromise. Force engendered hatred, was a temporary expedient, and destroyed the very thing to be preserved. A peaceful settlement of the Algerian question would redound to the benefit of France.

58. France was being bled white in Algeria while the rebellion appeared to continue vigorously and while casualties mounted steadily on both sides. If the situation were allowed to persist, the results would be ruinous for both France and Algeria. France was a great country with grave responsibilities in the preservation of international peace. Were it to save itself the precious energy which it was currently expending



on the African desert, it would surely enhance its position as a leading Power. A peaceful settlement of the Algerian issue thus became a great concern of all who wished to see the glory of France increase.

59. The first step toward a peaceful settlement was clearly the cessation of hostilities. It was impossible to hold negotiations without effecting a cease-fire, and a peaceful settlement was impossible without negotiations. To attempt negotiations while fighting raged was idle and useless. An amicable parley was possible only in a favourable moral climate. Whatever might be done in the United Nations, the ultimate solution could not be achieved without the goodwill of the parties directly concerned. Hence, it was imperative to develop a situation which would enable France and Algeria to negotiate a political solution quietly, calmly and reasonably.

60. He was aware of the contention advanced by some Algerian leaders that to accept a cease-fire might mean the quick subjugation of the country by superior French arms. Those leaders maintained that a cease-fire was nothing less than a French trap. He found it saddening that France was so deeply suspected by the Algerians.

61. He interpreted the statement by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that France offered an unconditional cease-fire (830th meeting) to mean that it did not intend to exploit a cease-fire wilfully in such a way as to bring about the virtual surrender of the Algerians. His delegation welcomed that timely assurance, but urged that it be carried out in mutual good faith. What was needed was a cease-fire with reasonable protection for both parties — one that would prevent the recurrence of bloodshed.

62. Good faith was involved also in the negotiations which would follow the cease-fire. The Algerians seemed to doubt that France would accord them self-determination, which they claimed as a right. Hence, they insisted that France must definitely promise them self-determination prior to a cease-fire, a proposal which France refused. An impasse and the prolongation of bloodshed were the result of that fear, which was very real and which France must dispel not by word, but by deed.

63. He sympathized with the difficulties described by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had contended that the United Nations lacked competence in the matter because Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter laid down the principle that the United Nations could not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. With that principle, the principle of self-determination, also enunciated by the Charter, was often in conflict, and the views of various delegations differed sharply. Algeria was a case in point. The United Nations could do nothing but seek an appropriate course of action designed to suit individual cases best in the light of the two principles.

64. Reconciliation always implied concessions. Not only France, but also Algeria should make concessions. In that connexion, he would counsel moderation to the Algerian leaders and the maintenance of morality to both France and Algeria. He hoped that both parties would triumph ultimately by upholding morality.

65. In conclusion, he appealed to both France and Algeria to arrange an immediate cease-fire, followed without delay by amicable negotiations for the peaceful solution of the Algerian question. Japan trusted the wisdom of France, advised patience to Algeria, and urged both parties to display a spirit of conciliation.

66. Mr. PINEAU (France) observed that many allegations made by adversaries of his country showed little regard for verisimilitude. The repetition of an error did not make it true; it served only to distort history. The texts and figures cited against France were not drawn from Algerian sources, but always from certain French newspapers opposed to the French Government. None of the arguments which had been submitted by his delegation had been refuted and none of the figures denied, especially those with regard to foreign interference.

67. Indicating that he would not reply to the entire historical argument of the representative of Syria, Mr. Pineau observed that history threatened to become neither a science nor an art, but a sport of selective quotation. The Syrian representative, while quoting portions from the book by the United States Consul-General in Algiers in 1826<sup>3</sup> which supported his views, had left out a great many (some of which Mr. Pineau read), which supported the contrary view. Discussion of Algeria's history could go on endlessly in that way, each representative choosing the truncated quotation which best served his interest.

68. The Syrian representative had made irrelevant allusions to the domestic policy of France; Mr. Pineau would not reciprocate by referring to conditions in Syria, which were too fluid to permit anything known one day to be true the next. He would rather respect Article 2, paragraph 7. The statement of the Syrian representative had at least given him the satisfaction of hearing a speech in excellent French made by a man imbued with French culture.

69. He also preferred not to answer other attacks on France which gave him the impression that certain countries lacked the desired objectivity in their consideration of the question. That strengthened his conviction that it would have been much easier for the French to find common ground with the Algerians if they had not been incited to become intransigent for reasons which had nothing to do with their true interests.

70. He did not regret his statement of 1955 concerning the impossibility of finding a military solution to the Algerian problem, which had been quoted in the hope of embarrassing him. The whole Algerian policy of the present French Government had been inspired by the conception implicit in that statement. The Prime Minister had called for a cease-fire, and all the people of France deplored the fact that that appeal had remained unheeded.

71. He asked the Committee whether France should have allowed insecurity to develop in Algeria, or permitted the massacre not only of the European population, but also of the Moslem one, which preferred French rule to anarchy and terrorism; and whether France should have allowed the Algerian economy to become paralysed and a country, already poor in natural resources to be ruined.

72. A country was often confronted with imperatives which had to be faced without considering as ends in themselves the means which it was obliged to employ. He did not believe that the Algerian problem could be solved by military means, but he also wished that the Algerian rebels would have a similar attitude towards the problem. Many representatives had dealt with the question as though it were up to France alone to make

<sup>3</sup> William Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers* (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard and Co., 1826).

the peaceful gestures. For a year France had been proposing a cease-fire which involved no surrender but, on the contrary, would carry with it every guarantee for the life and security of the interested parties. Surely that was the just and humane prerequisite for any peaceful and democratic solution of the problem.

73. He wondered whether to attribute the fear of free elections in Algeria, noted by certain delegations, to the fear on the part of the rebel movements that they would not be successful in the elections and, in the case of the National Liberation Front, that it would be shown that it was not the exclusive representative of the Algerian population — which would be a striking confirmation of the French reservations — or whether that fear should be attributed to a justified mistrust of the way in which the future elections might be conducted. In that event he wondered how was it possible to explain the fact that the French Government had taken the initiative of inviting certain foreign Governments to send observers, without limit of numbers, to verify the election proceedings. No mistrust was justified in that connexion, for in the French view it was important to avoid pressure from any quarter. While determined to keep its promises, the French Government would not agree to the falsification of the elections by threats or violence on the part of rebel organizations. Moreover, if all French proposals were to be suspected, he wondered how a settlement could ever be reached.

74. He could not see any principle which could oblige France to recognize terrorist groups as representatives of the people of Algeria for the purpose of negotiation. A genuine election would be a much more democratic way of finding spokesmen for the negotiations on the future political structure of Algeria, which would have to be original in character.

75. He could not agree with the contention on the part of various representatives that the French presence in Algeria had contributed to the reduction of the standard of living of the Moslem population. Algeria was admittedly a poor country and could not live without external assistance. He wondered whether there was any country besides France which would purchase all the products of Algeria at prices above those of the world market and invest 150,000 million francs a year to strengthen the Algerian economy.

76. He wondered whether any delegation was convinced that moral support for the rebellion and the supply of weapons to the terrorists constituted the best method of helping the Algerian nation. There could be no true freedom in poverty. No one in the Committee had the right to consider the economic and social future of Algerian peasants, officials and workers unimportant.

77. He had been willing to admit the inadequacy of the not inconsiderable efforts of the past in Algeria, but he wondered who had done more than France, in any region of the world, and who proposed to do more for Algeria than France was prepared to do. To advocate revolt was easy, but it was surely better to offer bread and health.

78. Certain representatives had interpreted France's attitude and understanding of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter as signifying a lack of respect for the United Nations. He would refute such allegations by pointing to the active participation of the French delegation in the debate. His delegation had given the Committee useful information, had replied to numerous questions, had corrected many errors, and had listened with patience to statements calculated to try it.

79. Indeed, France had never shown disrespect to the United Nations. It had given many proofs of that fact, some of which had been costly, but it could not be reproached for invoking the terms of the Charter when it had the right to do so. His delegation believed that it was serving the best interests of the Organization when it warned it against the temptation to abuse its powers.

80. In conclusion, he hoped that the resolutions of the United Nations would receive the scrupulous attention of the interested countries. For that, it was necessary that the Member States should not find in the Charter itself valid reasons for not observing those resolutions. The resolutions of the Organization must try to solve problems in a realistic and practical manner rather than to affirm positions inspired solely by political passion.

81. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) emphasized the importance for the United Nations of solving the Algerian problem in order to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security.

82. Quoting from the explanatory memorandum (A/3197) of the Powers which had proposed the inclusion of the Algerian item in the agenda of the United Nations, he contended that the situation in Algeria was a cause for growing concern, that it constituted a violation of legitimate rights of the population, and that it was a threat to the peace in the Mediterranean area. He agreed that the contents of the memorandum fully corresponded to the facts.

83. The Algerian liberation movement constituted a part of a general struggle in the Arab world to effect the complete liquidation of the colonial system. That movement was understandable against the background of the great historical process which characterized the gradual decay of the imperialistic, colonial system.

84. The peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries had acquired a real possibility of attaining their independence inasmuch as they had fought with the peoples of the United Nations against the fascist tyranny. Many such countries had managed to throw off the colonial yoke. They now struggled to liquidate the remnants of the measures of subjugation in the economic and cultural fields. A new period had now arrived in which those peoples were struggling actively to ensure their independence. They now spoke for themselves, but the attainment of economic independence was subject to the attainment of political independence. Having thrown off the colonial yoke, those countries had been able to develop their own industries, to raise their standards of living, and to develop their ancient cultures.

85. There were, however, many States in Asia and Africa which still were maintained as agrarian and raw material appendages of colonial States. Their standards of living were still low, and their industrial and other development was still hampered. The colonial Powers were still bent upon using force to ensure the re-establishment of their colonial domination. A clear example of that policy was to be seen in Algeria.

86. The contention of France that the Algerian question was within its domestic jurisdiction was ill-founded. As a matter of fact, at the very beginning, the Algerian issue had been within the domestic jurisdiction of France; it would have remained so if French policy had recognized the aspirations of the Algerian people and had not allowed matters to develop into a military conflict, thus making it necessary to have the question



discussed at various international conferences, and, finally, at the General Assembly. Under the circumstances, to insist that the matter fell within the domestic jurisdiction of France was to ignore the facts. It was sufficient in that connexion to refer to the Bandung Conference of twenty-nine Asian and African States which had whole-heartedly supported Algerian independence. Only those who openly supported colonialism backed the French argument of domestic jurisdiction.

87. The French representative had represented the Algerian people's struggle for independence as a movement inspired and organized outside Algeria, and in particular, as a Communist conspiracy. The fact was that there existed in Algeria an organized and powerful movement fighting for independence.

88. Citing examples to demonstrate that his view had supporters also in France, he contended that sober-minded French political leaders were fully aware of the true state of affairs in Algeria.

89. France and some other colonial Powers had managed to prevent a discussion on the Algerian issue during the tenth session of the General Assembly on the grounds that the French Government would thus be enabled to achieve a successful and equitable solution of the problem. The general situation in Algeria had gone from bad to worse, as a result of the numerous repressive measures and restrictions adopted thereafter by the French authorities. In fact, such measures had been designed to strengthen the position of the colonial Government, thus running against the interests of the Algerians and counter to the promises given by the French Government.

90. Citing statistics on the increase of French troops and arms in Algeria, he maintained that the struggle in Algeria had grown more intense. He emphasized that France had received those military supplies in its capacity as a member of NATO. That fact, coupled with the authorization from the high command of NATO to move a considerable number of troops into Algeria, once again proved the aggressive nature of that bloc, rather than its alleged defensive nature.

91. Quoting figures on the number of Algerian victims of French aggression, he declared that the General Assembly could not fail to condemn terroristic measures against the peaceful population of Algeria.

92. Having embarked on a policy of military suppression of the nationalist movement in Algeria, the French Government paid no attention to the initiatives of the Algerian leaders who were trying to settle the problem and who had declared that representatives of the Algerian people were ready to conduct negotiations with the representatives of France.

93. It should be recalled, however, that only within the framework of the recognition of Algerian independence and national sovereignty could a real settlement be achieved. In view of the undeniable historical ties between France and Algeria, everyone would welcome an agreement between them in the interests of their respective peoples. The Soviet Union would wish that settlement to be made within the framework of Franco-Algerian relations, but the fact could not be ignored that the present French Government wanted no such settlement. Negotiations conducted the previous year in Belgrade between the two sides had been undermined by the French, who had not gone beyond proposals for administrative reforms. As a result the negotiations had broken down.

94. In addition, the French Government had intensified its measures against the liberation movement and, what was more, when signs of a union of the peoples of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco appeared, had committed a direct act of provocation by arresting five Algerian leaders on their way to Tunisia for a conference called at the initiative of the Sultan of Morocco. One object of that act was to prevent the conference and undermine the solidarity of the three peoples. Another objective had been to create confusion between the various groups struggling for Algerian independence. The French attempt to undermine the negotiations for North African solidarity and the arrest of the five leaders showed that France aimed at preventing a peaceful settlement of the Algerian issue.

95. The reason that the French Government placed obstacles in the way of the Algerian people's struggle for independence and found backing from certain States in the United Nations was that the French Government and its supporters wished to retain their colonial assets. Having lost its position in Tunisia and Morocco and suffered defeat in Indo-China, as well as in its recent action against Egypt, the French Government was bent upon maintaining its colonial position in Algeria. The discovery in the Sahara Desert of a new area of tremendous mineral treasures and uranium deposits attracted the interests of the French as well as the United States monopolists. In order to ensure access to those strategic raw materials, the United States had adopted a policy of economic and political penetration into such areas.

96. All the colonial Powers were connected with NATO; with the help of the Powers which had colonies in Africa, the United States had received important bases in Africa on which it intended to build strategic facilities. It was obvious that United States strategic and military interests in North Africa had no connexion with the national interests of the North African peoples, including the Algerians, nor of the French people. Moreover, the United States monopolies were exerting special efforts in order to push out of their way their own partners, the British and French colonialists. An example was the United States feat in South Vietnam in placing its own agent at the head of the State.

97. Many people in France were therefore truly concerned about the state of affairs in Algeria. They foresaw a further intensification of the conflict in Algeria, a lack of friendship and the absence of the possibility of a peaceful settlement in Algeria. They felt that the problem of Algeria must be settled by taking into account the actual situation, as had been done in Morocco and Tunisia. A decision which would also serve the interests of France could be achieved by taking into account the interests of the Algerian population.

98. The colonial system was bankrupt. The current situation in Algeria required that the General Assembly, in conformity with Article 14, consider how to secure independence for the Algerian people in a just and equitable manner. His delegation would support any proposal seeking that objective in conformity with the Charter.

99. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) observed that national movements in nearly all countries deprived of political and economic independence were nothing but legitimate efforts for emancipation from all foreign domination. The problem was a distinctive characteristic of the present time. Recognition of the true meaning of that legitimate and heroic cause and the rapid concession of

the justified demands of the peoples who were struggling for their independence meant creating the conditions necessary for faithful and sincere collaboration between nations and assuring the maintenance of peace, which was the ultimate aim of the Organization.

100. Mr. Entezam recalled that he had said the same thing originally in connexion with the question of Tunisia during the seventh session (538th meeting). The reason he was recalling that statement was that France, which had then made use of the protection of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, had taken account since of the sincerity of the advice of its true friends and had in the end followed the path they had indicated. In doing so, France had won the admiration of the world and could congratulate itself on having new friends in the Organization. France was now asked to show the same comprehension towards the people of Algeria as it had shown to those of Tunisia and Morocco.

101. The hesitations of previous French governments regarding colonial questions had cost the country a great deal. By avoiding the mistakes made in Morocco the French Government could assure the sincere co-operation of Algeria and France. Each passing day increased rancour and hate; to get to the end of the road, it was necessary to leave aside historical and juridical considerations and to weigh the Algerian problem in its true aspect, the humanitarian one. The historical discussions which had taken place had been an interesting but academic exercise suitable for doctoral dissertations.

102. The duty of the United Nations was, however, quite different. The United Nations was confronted by a situation which showed clearly the legitimate and manifest desire of a nation to achieve its independence. That desire was legitimate since the Algerian people had achieved a maturity which no longer justified the continuation of the colonial régime. Despite the French Constitution, it was clear that the relations of France and Algeria were those of metropolis and colony. The Charter recognized only one barrier to the right of self-determination, namely, lack of maturity. The record of French achievements in that country clearly proved that the Algerians were more advanced than other peoples who had already achieved their independence. The desire for freedom was also manifest. Surely one could not doubt the desire for freedom of a population which fought with such fervour against one of the best equipped armies in the world. To invoke in the face of the tragic situation in Algeria, an exception of competence and to ask that the United Nations be paralysed would surely shock world public opinion. It was not with articles and paragraphs that the national uprisings of a people struggling for liberty and independence would be stifled.

103. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter excluded the intervention of the United Nations only in matters that fell essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. He challenged anyone to try to say what the authors of the Charter meant by the word "essentially". But it was certain that by the addition of the word "essentially", the drafters of the Charter had meant to place a limitation upon national jurisdiction. The Organization showed an increasing tendency to adopt a liberal interpretation of the concept, and to exclude from national competence respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination.

104. The full participation of France in the current debate was the best proof of the tendency towards a more liberal interpretation of the paragraph. That interpretation was not only in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, but it also had a solid juridical basis. No one could deny that, on signing a treaty and assuming an international obligation, a State could no longer invoke the exception of domestic jurisdiction in respect of that obligation. Respect for the principles contained in the Charter constituted an international obligation, and the right of peoples to self-determination was one of those principles.

105. It would paralyse the United Nations to push the objection of domestic jurisdiction to the extreme and prevent the Organization from taking up situations that presented a danger to world peace. He wondered how could one explain to the man in the street, whether in Budapest or in Algiers, that the Charter contained an Article that prevented the Organization from taking a stand whenever human rights were violated, or the life of a people and the very existence of a country were placed in danger. Such an erroneous interpretation would deal a fatal blow to the prestige of the Organization and the hopes which peoples had placed in it.

106. Algeria was not a French *département* because the community of language, religion and national aspirations, which constituted a nation and made the unity of France, were lacking in Algeria. It was France which wanted to make of Algeria a French *département*, without consulting the people of Algeria. He agreed with the statement of the representative of Tunisia (836th meeting) that only Algerians of European origin enjoyed a status similar to that of the French in France. He urged that the French Government recognize the value of that argument and follow the path to an equitable solution which would reconcile the rights of the Algerian people with the interests of France and its citizens in Algeria before it was too late.

107. Without expressing the least doubt of the impressive data provided by Mr. Soustelle, representative of France (835th meeting), he would ask the following question: If Algeria was indeed the paradise that had been described, how was it possible that people were willing to die to escape from it? By replying to that question and discovering its cause, the problem would be solved.

108. An equitable and just solution would put an end to the troubles of the past and turn a new leaf for the future. Only thus would it be possible to establish a new relationship between France and Algeria.

109. In conclusion, he said that in co-sponsoring the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165), Iran had been prompted by the wish to be as moderate and as realistic as possible. The draft resolution avoided all mention of anything which could even appear to wound France. His delegation claimed no monopoly of wisdom and was ready to examine with sympathy and understanding any other, better proposals that might be submitted.

110. He was convinced that, with or without a resolution by the Assembly, France, under the pressure of world public opinion and of public opinion in France itself, would ultimately arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem. As a true friend, he urged that France do now with good grace what it might be forced to do thereafter despite itself.

The meeting rose at 2.10 p.m.