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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 62

**Question of Algeria (A/3197, A/C.1/L.165)
(*continued*)**

1. Mr. LOUTFI (Egypt) said that, in commenting on the question of foreign interference in Algeria raised by the French delegation (831st meeting), he must emphasize that that subject was not the one which the Committee was discussing. In raising the question, the representative of France had been trying to make the Committee forget the item on the agenda, namely, the complaint submitted by the African-Asian group concerning the actions of France in Algeria.

2. However, some observations were necessary on one of the points which the French delegation had raised within the framework of the Algerian question, the question of the ship *Athos*, which figured in the agenda of the Security Council.¹ The French delegation's allegations were completely unfounded; in fact, they were inconceivable from the point of view of the logic of the events. The *Athos* had left Alexandria on 4 October 1956 and been stopped only on 16 October. The ship could easily have called at another port *en route* and taken on a cargo of arms. Furthermore, the arms which were found on the *Athos* were not of Egyptian origin; that was quite evident even from the annex to the French complaint to the Security Council (S/3689). That list of the arms and munitions seized on the *Athos* made no mention of weapons of Egyptian origin, a surprising circumstance, to say the least, if the vessel had been loaded with arms in an Egyptian port. The statements of the commander and owner of the ship were not supported by any proof whatever. He had very serious doubts concerning the methods used by the French police in Algeria to obtain statements from individuals who fell into their hands.

3. In a memorandum on the question of foreign assistance in Algeria, the National Liberation Front had stated that the principal source of arms for the National Liberation Army was the French Army. Moreover, the Prime Minister of France himself, speaking in the National Assembly, had recognized that the ship *Athos* had been stopped outside Algerian territorial waters. Thus, the French Prime Minister had acknowledged that the procedure carried out by France with regard to the *Athos* was contrary to the rules of international law, which forbade the stopping of a ship on the high seas. The ship, furthermore, was not an Egyptian ship.

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eleventh Year, 747th meeting.*

No one had claimed that it was, not even the French delegation in the letter circulated to the Security Council on the question.

4. The conclusion to be drawn was that the Government of France, in order to accuse Egypt of a violation of the rules of international law concerning non-interference in the domestic affairs of another State, was relying on an action which the French Prime Minister himself had acknowledged was not in conformity with the rules of international law. The French Government wanted to establish before world public opinion the responsibility of the Egyptian State for the distressing events which were now taking place in Algeria. Such a situation was not new. French propaganda, especially since the situation had grown worse in Algeria, had been seeking in every way possible to establish Egyptian responsibility for the war.

5. The reason why the French leaders had adopted that line of attack was quite clear. They could find no explanation for the fierce resistance which they encountered from the Algerian nationalists who, in spite of the bloody repression which had caused general indignation even in France, continued to oppose the efforts exerted by the French armed forces to achieve what the French called "pacification". The explanation was easy. The whole Algerian people, without exception, was fighting for its independence and was prepared to sacrifice everything that was dear to it in the defence of its ideals of liberty and justice.

6. France had another aim as well in having the question of the *Athos* included in the agenda of the Security Council. At that time, the Government of France which had already decided, with the help of the United Kingdom and Israel, to commit aggression against Egypt, had considered that the inclusion of that question in the agenda of the Security Council and the allegation that Egypt was helping Algeria in its movement for independence might justify the unprovoked aggression which it had decided to commit in violation of the United Nations Charter and international law. He felt obliged to emphasize the striking conjunction of dates. The French delegation, which by its letter of 25 October 1956 (S/3689), had requested the inclusion of the question of the *Athos* on the Council's agenda, had insisted on having a discussion of the question on 29 October. It had perhaps imagined that by so doing, and by claiming that Egypt was contributing military help to the so-called "rebels" in Algeria, it might be able to justify before world opinion the aggression which it had decided to commit, in collusion with the United Kingdom and its instrument, Israel. It was on 29 October 1956 that the aggression had been launched against Egypt, and it was on 30 October² that France and the United Kingdom had cast their vetoes against the United States draft resolution (S/3710) which was designed to stop the hostilities. What followed was known.

² *Ibid.*, 749th meeting.

7. The other allegations made by the representative of France were not backed up by any proof, and it seemed pointless to discuss them in the Committee.

8. The question in which the Committee was interested was that of Algeria. Fifteen Member States of the United Nations had requested (A/3197) the inclusion of the question of Algeria in the agenda of the eleventh session of the General Assembly. At the tenth session the Members which had requested the inclusion of the item in the agenda (A/2924 and Add.1) had finally agreed that the matter might be postponed instead of being discussed at that session. That decision had been taken "in the hope that France would be guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and would seize this opportunity to negotiate with the true representatives of the Algerian people a peaceful settlement securing their legitimate rights to self-determination and independence". (A/3197, para. 3). During the year 1956, representatives of the African-Asian countries had on several occasions expressed their grave concern at seeing that the situation in Algeria was not improving. The African-Asian group had brought the question before the Security Council by its letter of 18 June 1956 (S/3609). The Council had decided not to include the question in the agenda,³ but several delegations which had voted against its inclusion explained that in their view examination of the question by the Council would not lead to a satisfactory solution. It was for that reason, and not because of Article 2, paragraph 7, that they had voted against inclusion of the item.

9. The request which had been made by the fifteen Member States of the United Nations for the inclusion of the question of Algeria in the agenda of the eleventh session of the General Assembly did not therefore proceed from a hasty decision. It was only after many other steps had proved unsuccessful that the African-Asian group had been compelled to request the inclusion of the question in the agenda of the eleventh session. He quoted at length from the explanatory memorandum which had accompanied the request to show the reason for it, which was the intensified use of force by France to repress the Algerian nationalists.

10. The French delegation continued to oppose consideration by the United Nations of the question of Algeria, maintaining that Algeria was an integral part of France and arguing that the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter prevented the United Nations from intervening in affairs essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.

11. Before taking up that legal objection, he wished to remind the Committee that Algeria, before 1830, had been an independent country, and had even maintained diplomatic relations and concluded treaties with many States. It was impossible to maintain that such a State was not a recognized, sovereign State, and it was undeniable that Algeria possessed a recognized international personality before the French conquest. The treaty of peace and friendship, signed on 5 September 1795, between the United States of America and the Dey of Algiers, was identical with other treaties of friendship which States used to sign at the time. The fact that the Government of Algiers at that time had been decentralized did not mean at all that Algeria was a country over which no sovereignty was exercised and which was therefore capable of being dominated by the first occupier.

³ *Ibid.*, 730th meeting.

12. After the conquest of Algeria by France, the French Government had decided that Algeria was an integral part of France; the Algerian people, however, had never had the opportunity to pass on that unilateral decision taken by France, nor to exercise their right of self-determination. Moreover, it was necessary to recall that the Algerian people were very remote from France in language, customs, origin, race and religion, and that integration was therefore difficult, according to the French themselves.

13. Furthermore, it appeared from recent statements of French statesmen, particularly that of the Prime Minister of France in the National Assembly, that even French leaders no longer considered Algeria really to be an integral part of France. Mr. Mollet had said: "It is ruled out that Algeria could be a French province like the others. Assimilation, which was a generous idea, is now an obsolete idea." He had recognized that Algeria possessed an identity of its own.

14. The French Government itself did not appear to be convinced that the question of Algeria fell within its domestic jurisdiction. By signing a *communiqué* with the Soviet Union on 19 May 1956, in which there was a passage on the settlement of the Algerian question, France had accepted, at least tacitly, the idea that the Algerian question could not be regarded as essentially a French concern. Otherwise, it would not have consented to mention it in an international instrument. The *communiqué* signed on 11 May 1956 by the head of the French Government and the President of Yugoslavia could be cited in the same sense.

15. The French delegation had maintained (830th meeting) that Article 11 of the Charter allowed the General Assembly to study and to make recommendations only with regard to the purposes enumerated in Article 1, paragraph 1; that Article 13 gave it powers only with respect to the purposes enumerated in Article 1, paragraph 3; and that the authors of the Charter had failed to give the Assembly such powers with respect to the right of peoples to self-determination.

16. The French delegation had failed to read Article 11, paragraph 4, from which it clearly followed that the Assembly was permitted, in conformity with Article 10, to discuss the question of the right of peoples to self-determination. It was by virtue of Articles 10 and 14 that the Egyptian delegation had asked for a discussion of the Algerian question by the General Assembly. Articles 10 and 14, and above all the former, clearly defined the functions and purposes of the General Assembly.

17. The French authorities refused to allow the Algerian people to exercise a right provided for in the Charter, particularly in Article 1, paragraph 2, namely, the right of peoples to self-determination—a right which was, moreover, consecrated in various United Nations resolutions, such as General Assembly resolutions 545 (VI) and 637 (VII).

18. In addition, there was no doubt that the continuation of the situation in Algeria and the refusal of the French authorities to find a satisfactory solution with the Algerian nationalists impaired the friendly relations which should exist between France and many other Member States of the United Nations. Moreover, from the point of view of the international status of Algeria—whether it was an integral part of France or a French colony over which French sovereignty was exercised—the situation remained the same as far as the competence of the United Nations was concerned.

19. The United Nations had declared itself competent when questions such as the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa and the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa were raised. The competence of the United Nations had been upheld, although there was no doubt that the Union of South Africa was exercising its sovereignty on its own territory. The United Nations had adopted the same stand when the questions of Indonesia, of West Irian (West New Guinea), and of observance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania of human rights and fundamental freedoms had been raised.

20. When the question arose of human rights, of which the right of peoples to self-determination was one of the fundamental principles, the General Assembly had always stated that it was competent on the ground that human rights and respect for them could no longer be considered as matters falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. Consequently, no one could object to discussion of a question concerning violation of human rights, of which the right of self-determination was one, if it affected the friendly relations which should prevail between Members of the United Nations. That point had been very well expressed by General Romulo, the representative of the Philippines, on 15 November 1950,⁴ when he had stressed that the authors of the Charter, having included Articles 55 and 56—which imposed on all Member States the obligation to co-operate with the Organization to take joint and separate action to ensure universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedom—could not have turned about and declared that there was no such obligation because Article 2, paragraph 7, forbade intervention in matters which, like respect for human rights, were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States.

21. On the other hand, he wondered how one could say that the consideration of a question and a recommendation by the General Assembly constituted interference in matters which fell essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. The word "intervention" used in Article 2 had been defined by Professor Rousseau as follows:

"Intervention is the action of a State which is carrying out an act of interference in the internal or external affairs of another State to require the performance or non-performance of a specific thing. The intervening State acts in an authoritative way, seeking to impose its will, to exercise pressure in order to make its views prevail."⁵

22. The act of including the question of Algeria in the agenda of the Assembly, the act of discussing that question or making a recommendation could not in any case constitute intervention or interference in the internal affairs of France. Moreover, United Nations practice had always upheld that interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7, particularly in the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, the question of race conflict in the Union of South Africa and the question of West Irian (West New Guinea). That interpretation had been accepted in the writings on the subject; it had been supported

by Professor Hersch Lauterpacht. In that connexion, Mr. Loutfi quoted from an article by Mr. Henri Laugier, a former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, in *Le Monde* of 23 January 1957 which contained the observation that the precedents in favour of the competence of the United Nations to deal with the Algerian question were overwhelming.

23. The conclusion which the Egyptian delegation drew was that the United Nations was competent to deal with the Algerian question. His delegation could not subscribe to the arguments raised by the French delegation concerning that question, particularly when France continued to maintain (830th meeting) that it could in no way accept the adoption by the First Committee and the General Assembly of a recommendation concerning Algeria, and that if such a recommendation were made, France would in no way consider itself bound to apply the resolution.

24. The Committee had heard the statement (831st meeting) made by the representative of France on what he called the declaration of intentions of his Government. That declaration had not produced a favourable reaction on the part of the Algerian nationalists, who did not approve the position which France had adopted on the solution of the Algerian problem.

25. The Algerian nationalists considered that a peaceful solution of the problem was possible as soon as the essential element, the right of peoples to self-determination, was taken into consideration. France should recognize that right of the Algerians under the Charter and should undertake direct negotiations with the representatives of the Algerian people. The Algerian nationalists suggested the setting up of a provisional Algerian government with the agreement of the National Liberation Front. That government would negotiate with France concerning the ways and means for the accession of the Algerians to independence and concerning future Franco-Algerian relations. That government would also negotiate with France the question of the cease-fire, which could not be isolated from its essentially political content. Guns would be silenced in Algeria when a political agreement had been reached.

26. With regard to the question of the European minority, the Algerians had a democratic formula inspired by the principle of individual equality of which Mr. Mollet had spoken in his declaration of 9 January 1957. They recognized the right of the European settlers in Algeria to choose individually and freely either to be Algerian citizens or to keep their original nationality. If they wanted to remain French, their interests, if not their privileges, would be safeguarded. If they agreed to join the Algerian national community, they would enjoy complete equality of rights without distinction of race or religion.

27. It was not only the Algerian nationalists who had not reacted favourably to the French proposals; other Algerians, who were called moderates, had indicated in a letter to the French Prime Minister published in *Le Monde* of 16 January 1957 that they could not agree to the measures proposed in the declaration of a January, which amounted to a demand for unconditional capitulation by the Algerian patriots. Even the French Press was divided on the value of the declaration.

28. The French declaration of intentions, in the view of the Egyptian delegation, could have value only if it were compared with the intentions of the Algerian nationalists. It was through negotiations between the two parties that a solution of the question might be

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 43rd meeting.

⁵ Charles Rousseau, *Droit international public* (Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1953), p. 321.

found. The Egyptian Government had always encouraged the contacts which had taken place between the representatives of the French Government and the Algerian nationalists. The first contact had occurred in Cairo, thanks to the mediation of the Egyptian Government, after talks with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. They were continued during the summer of 1956 in Belgrade and in Rome, as the representative of France had acknowledged. The method of negotiation, in the view of the Egyptian delegation, was the only practical way of finding a solution to the Algerian problem.

29. Negotiations had continued until the day when, again in violation of international law, the Algerian negotiators had been arrested. That act had had serious repercussions on the relations between France and Tunisia and Morocco.

30. The Egyptian delegation, together with seventeen others, had submitted the draft resolution before the Committee in document A/C.1/L.165. That draft, while recognizing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination in conformity with the Charter, invited France and the Algerian nationalists to solve their differences by peaceful means in conformity with the Charter. It should have the support of members of the Committee because it was moderate, precise and clear, and envisaged a solution to the Algerian problem only by negotiations.

31. If no resolution was adopted, he wondered how the United Nations could explain to the Algerian nationalists, who were fighting for their independence, that it did not even wish to make a recommendation concerning the Algerian problem. It would be really difficult to make that understood, not only by the Algerian nationalists, but by the peoples of the African-Asian countries, whose Governments had brought the Algerian question before the General Assembly. The Algerian nationalists, who were fighting with inferior means against French forces equipped with all modern arms and all modern means of destruction, could not be abandoned to their fate. The United Nations could not abandon the Algerian nationalists, who were fighting to the death for the defence of an ideal of liberty and justice which the United Nations constantly proclaimed.

32. Mr. DE THIER (Belgium) said that, however great might be the desire of the General Assembly that the problem be resolved as soon as possible in a manner satisfactory to all parties, the fact remained that the Member States were bound by the principles of the United Nations Charter. In a debate on a matter which aroused so much emotion and passion, legal principles sometimes seemed to lose their force. However, it was necessary to recall that, in adhering to the Charter, the Member States had undertaken specific and limited engagements. In particular, they had agreed to refrain from interfering in matters falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. That principle, embodied in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, was a fundamental provision, which overrode the others. It was an essential condition of the obligations imposed by the Charter, and many States would not have agreed to become Members of the United Nations if that provision had not been included in the Charter. In subscribing to Article 2, paragraph 7, the Members of the United Nations therefore intended to preserve intact the sphere of domestic jurisdiction, and they undertook to respect the domestic jurisdiction of other States.

33. The intentions of the authors of the Charter were clear on that point. At the United Nations Conference

on International Organization, held at San Francisco in 1945, the authors had eliminated from the text of Article 2, paragraph 7, anything which appeared to them to restrict unduly the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction and had shown themselves more jealous of the sovereignty of States than the authors of the Covenant of the League of Nations, notably by substituting the word "essentially" for the word "solely" and thus enlarging the sphere of domestic jurisdiction. All proposals to give the Organization a power like that of the League of Nations to decide whether a question fell within its competence had been rejected, as were proposals to fix an obligatory objective criterion for determining the question.

34. No doubt laws must be adapted to new realities in a changing world, but laws could be changed only in accordance with procedures provided for that purpose. As long as the Charter had not been amended, it remained unchanged as the law and the justification for the deliberations and the activities of the Organization.

35. It had been said during the debate that, despite Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, the United Nations had already intervened in matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of States, for example in the case of Hungary. But the case of Hungary could not be compared with that of Algeria. What was involved in the former was the intervention of the armed forces of the Soviet Union on territory over which the Soviet Union had never claimed sovereignty. Moreover, at the time when the aggression had taken place, the Hungarian Government had appealed to the United Nations for help. Algeria, on the other hand, had for more than a century been a legal part of French territory, and the French Government had brought before the United Nations only the question of foreign intervention in Algeria.

36. With regard to the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, and the question of the policy of *apartheid* followed by that Government, the Belgian Government considered that, in dealing with those matters, the United Nations had acted illegally. The commission of one mistake did not justify making another. He wondered how it could reasonably be argued that the Algerian question did not fall essentially within the jurisdiction of France. Algeria had been a legal part of French territory for more than 100 years and, during that time, international recognition had been given to that status of Algeria. Algerians were French citizens; they were represented in the public bodies of the French State. It was not possible to discuss the Algerian question without touching on the structure of the French State, nor perhaps to resolve it without amending the French Constitution or certain organic French laws. He asked whether one could conceive of an area more directly within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.

37. The French government had submitted to the French Parliament a broad programme of reforms. It had also announced its intention to organize free elections on the basis of a single electoral college within three months after the return of peace and order, and its intention to open discussions with the representatives thus elected in order to determine the future organization of Algeria.

38. The Algerian problem was how to assure the coexistence of two communities of different origin and culture while bearing in mind their respective aspirations. Algeria was not the only area in the world where that problem arose. It arose elsewhere, particularly in

various countries of America and Asia. In several Asian countries, it provoked secessions, uprisings requiring armed intervention, violence and bloodshed. He wondered whether the United Nations claimed, in each case, to determine how the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination was to be exercised and whether the United Nations ought to become the instrument for the dismemberment of States. The danger to the cohesion of the Organization from such a course was clear. It was precisely that danger which the Charter sought to avert by the imperative provision embodied in Article 2, paragraph 7. An intervention on the part of the United Nations would be contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Charter and would therefore constitute an illegal act. It would, moreover, be ineffective because the Algerian problem could be resolved only by the French and the Algerians.

39. The French declaration of intentions was the basis for a solution which was in line with the liberal traditions of France and with democratic principles. Anything which might frustrate the attainment of such a solution was to be carefully avoided. It was equally important that hostilities end and that order be re-established in Algeria.

40. During the course of the debate on Algeria, very significant statements had been made which confirmed one singularly disturbing aspect of the Algerian problem, namely, the intervention of foreign Governments in Algeria in contravention of the rules of international law and the principles of the Charter. The United Nations could not have a double standard of weights and measures: it could not require some Members of the Organization to carry out its principles and laws and tolerate their violation by other Members.

41. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq) quoted two remarks of the Caliph Omar: the first, which he addressed to the French delegation, was, "How could you enslave people when their mothers gave birth to them free?"; and the second, which he addressed to the Committee, was, "He who keeps silent defending right is a dumb devil." The situation in Algeria was a cause for sadness and deep concern because, besides being a human tragedy, it was also a great danger to peace and international harmony.

42. A story in *The New York Times* of 24 January 1957 showed the magnitude of the calamity in Algeria: nearly 5,000 assassinations had taken place since the rebellion had begun in November 1954; most of those killed had been Moslems who had worked with the French. French forces had lost more than 2,000 men, and nearly 20,000 Moslems had been killed in military and police operations. He commented on the general insecurity which marked the country, the sabotage, the arrests, and the summary executions of prisoners. Algeria had been turned into a furnace, since goodwill and brotherhood had been replaced by the spirit of vengeance, because the people of Algeria, according to the French authorities, were criminals for asking for their freedom and for self-determination.

43. The people of Algeria had been subjected to ruthless oppression and suppression by the French ever since the conquest of the country 125 years earlier. France had applied "the third degree" method of colonialism in Algeria. The first degree had been conquest in 1830. The second, subjugation, had been imposed after eighteen years of struggle against the people of Algeria, and the third, had been assimilation. The latter had utterly failed, and now the Algerian

people, like other peoples in Asia and Africa, had awakened and were demanding their freedom.

44. He refuted the French claim that the principle of self-determination was not applicable to the people of Algeria because Algeria, according to the mythical French theory of assimilation and legislation adopted unilaterally by the French Assembly in the 1870's, was part of France, and the Algerian people were French. That claim took no heed of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious individuality of the Algerian people. French legislation and logic were employed to turn Algeria into France, and Algerians into Frenchmen, though the same logic found it possible to treat nine Moslem Algerians as equal to only one Frenchman in political rights. The situation in Algeria was all the more tragic when it was considered that the country responsible was one of the founders of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council.

45. An objective view showed that Algeria was not France. Algeria, like Tunisia and Morocco, had a distinct individuality. It was part of North Africa and was inhabited by 9 million Moslems—whose language and culture were different from those of France—and less than a million European colonists. It had been a distinct political and geographical entity before its conquest by France. Its people had fought valiantly against the French for eighteen years and had never asked for, or recognized the legality of, annexation by France. Algeria had remained a colony despite its annexation. French administration in Algeria exhibited all the marks of colonialism, against which the Algerians had repeatedly revolted. In 1945 the Algerians had once again risen against France and were subdued only after having suffered the loss of 45,000 people.

46. Recalling the renewal of the Algerian nationalist movement in 1926, and the subsequent formation of other political parties, he observed that at the present time the National Liberation Front represented the union of almost all Algerian parties. The reforms contained in the statute of 20 September 1947 had not been implemented and a new uprising had begun in 1954. Disregard for the spirit of nationalism, which had swept Asia and Africa in the post-war period, had resulted in a grave tragedy.

47. Since the General Assembly had condemned the atrocities in Hungary, he could not conceive how French atrocities in Algeria could be condoned. Mr. Kadar in Hungary had at least the excuse of acting within the framework of a dictatorship. Mr. Lacoste, the Minister residing in Algeria, on the other hand, was the representative of a free and democratic régime which appeared to have forgotten the meaning of freedom and democracy in Algeria.

48. He had listened carefully to the statement of Mr. Pineau, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France (830th and 831st meetings), in the hope that Mr. Pineau would submit a plan which, by applying the principles of the Charter and of the French Revolution, would grant Algeria freedom and independence and permit of the establishment of friendly relations between France and a free Algeria. Instead, he had heard a speech based on old colonialist logic.

49. Taking issue with the French contention that the General Assembly was not competent to deal with the question of Algeria, he made the following points. First, the situation in Algeria was not only an internal human tragedy, but was a cause of international friction among nations. French collusion with Israel in the

attack upon Egypt and France's defiance of the Charter by voting against the withdrawal of Israel behind the armistice lines, had been, he felt, induced by a spirit of vengeance on the part of France against Egypt and other Arab States which had expressed sympathy for the Algerian struggle for independence.

50. Secondly, there were international implications in the fact that France had deployed in Algeria about half a million troops of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was waging a war at a cost of approximately \$1 million a day. It was most unfortunate that NATO forces and arms, intended for the defence of world freedom and democracy, were being used to crush the movement for independence in Algeria.

51. Thirdly, Israel's decision to invade Egypt and defy the United Nations had been made possible by France's support.

52. Fourthly, the decision taken at the African-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955 by twenty-nine nations concerning the right of the Algerian people to freedom and self-determination pointed to the international significance of the question.

53. He appealed to all Western European nations and others which had political and cultural bonds with France to prevent the division of the United Nations into two camps—oriental and occidental—and to uphold the principles of the Charter by recognizing the right of the people of Algeria to freedom and self-determination. France should be persuaded that a free and friendly Algeria, like Tunisia and Morocco, would serve its interests best and would, moreover, serve the interest of international peace and harmony.

54. Reiterating his objections to the French thesis that the Algerian question was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, he declared that acts of genocide committed within a State, racial prejudice and discrimination, and destruction of the national sentiment of a people, could never be considered as domestic issues of the colonial Power. The United Nations was not only entitled, but in duty bound, to end the bloodshed in Algeria and to call upon France to respect the right of the Algerian people to freedom and independence. To speak of Algeria in terms of internal jurisdiction and to consider debate on the question as interference in the domestic affairs of France was to follow an ostrich-like way of avoiding having to see the truth. France could not continue to disturb the peace and harmony of the world by its actions in Algeria because of a colonialist interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations.

55. He did not wish to contest the material achievements of France in Algeria. He noted, however, that they mainly benefited the European population. In any case, France had done nothing to uplift the mind, the spirit and the culture of the Algerian people.

56. He also rejected the French assertion that the liberation movement in Algeria was not supported by the people, but was conducted by a handful of men with outside support. He knew from personal experience that the nationalist movement included virtually all the political parties, particularly those comprising the National Liberation Front, and that there was unanimity of purpose among the leaders as well as an articulate Algerian opinion behind the movement for freedom and independence. He agreed, however, that the movement had received support from outside in the same way as the United States war for independence had received the support of France. In their sympathy and readiness

to help the Algerians, all the Arab world was Egypt and all Arab statesmen were Nassers.

57. He could not join Mr. Pineau in attributing to the Communists an influential role in the liberation movement of Algeria. He realized that the Communists might profit from the situation by offering to co-operate with the nationalists; however, it was well known that their motives were quite different from the objectives pursued by the nationalists. The national movement in Algeria was a genuine movement for independence. The best way to make communism flourish in a country was by social injustice from within and foreign domination from without. The problem of the Palestine refugees and the subjugation of the people of Algeria were factors favouring communism in the Middle East.

58. The French charges of nationalist excesses had been very adequately answered for the revolutionaries by the representative of Ireland (833rd meeting). He would not dwell upon the behaviour of French troops as revealed in many documents.

59. With regard to Mr. Pineau's statement that nationalism should be replaced by integration, the Arab countries would welcome such integration provided, however, that it was preceded by freedom and independence. Tunisia, Morocco and an independent Algeria should be integrated. There could be no objection if those countries, when freed, chose to become integrated with France. Independence and equality were requisites for integration. The principle of interdependence accepted in the present world was, however, based on individual independence. No scheme for integration was effective unless it was based on the free choice and the free will of those who were integrated. Thus, the integration advocated by France must follow, and not precede, Algeria's freedom and independence.

60. He supported the idea of coexistence between Moslems and Europeans in Algeria, but thought that such coexistence could take place only within the framework of an independent Algeria. He cited examples of the coexistence of different populations in Canada, Iraq, Lebanon and Switzerland. The need for coexistence was present not only in Algeria, but also in all the continent of Africa, in Europe and in the world at large.

61. Mr. Pineau's plan for Algeria—a cease-fire, elections and negotiations, in that order—would not lead to peace unless it was preceded by French recognition of Algerian independence. In his view, the order should be: first, declaration by France of the Algerian right to independence; secondly, negotiations for a cease-fire; and thirdly, final negotiations to regulate French-Algerian relations. Morocco's independence set a good example for settling the Algerian question.

62. In conclusion, he declared that the French attitude and the French rule in Algeria were illegal and inhuman. France was ruling a country by force against the wishes of the people. It had no legal basis for such rule except the right of conquest and its military power. To speak of military action as pacification was a mockery of peace. The French policy in Algeria had been denounced not only by the freedom-loving people of the world, but also by many French thinkers and humanists. That policy was not to the credit of France, which had always been respected and admired for its tradition of freedom and its culture. He hoped that French logic and reason would prevail over emotion. The tide of nationalism in Algeria, as elsewhere, could not be resisted; it should instead be channelled towards a relationship of friendship and co-operation.

63. It was the moral and legal duty of the United Nations to persuade France that the solution of the Algerian question along the lines followed in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia would cement the alliance of France and North Africa on the political, economic and cultural levels, would remove the misunderstanding between France and the Arab world, and would be a positive contribution to world peace and harmony. It was in that spirit that his delegation appealed to France to recognize the right of the Algerian people to freedom and independence.

64. Mr. PICCIONI (Italy) said that his country had an obvious interest in all problems concerning the Mediterranean area, particularly in those which were likely to increase international tension and aggravate situations already delicate. It was, however, the human and tragic aspect of the Algerian problem that most deeply stirred the Italian people and guided the Italian delegation in the Algerian debate and in its desire for a solution to the question.

65. The historical background of the conflict had already been dealt with by previous speakers. He stressed, however, that the acts of terrorism and sabotage committed in Algeria had not contributed to solving the problem. The tragic futility of terrorism was only too clear. Practised by irresponsible and fanatical elements, terrorism could never lead to a satisfactory solution. The first step, therefore, was to break the unhappy chain of violence and to end the spiral of hatred and violence in order to avoid ever more painful suffering on both sides. On the other hand, it was also necessary to prevent, at all costs, the Algerian drama from becoming the tool of an insidious, foreign, Communist manoeuvre to poison the minds of men and push them to more violence and destruction.

66. Only when the fighting had ceased in Algeria and foreign intervention had stopped, would progress towards a solution of the problem be possible. In fact, the solution must be sought in an atmosphere transcending that created by local conditions, in new forms of understanding between the two peoples; only within such a broad and comprehensive accord could the spiritual and material forces of Algeria flourish.

67. The delegation of Italy was aware of the difficulties in achieving such an over-all and final solution of the Algerian question—difficulties which had so far hindered the sincere efforts to pacify Algeria. It was impossible to contest or forget the achievements of France in Algeria. As the representative of France had pointed out (831st meeting), France's desire was to be in a position to proceed with the social, economic and political reform which it envisaged. The French Government had clearly outlined its plans, and the French representative had wisely informed the United Nations fully in that connexion (830th and 831st meetings). France had offered an unconditional cease-fire, followed by free, general elections on a basis of complete equality. France had stated that it was prepared to invite countries to observe the elections which, like itself, were guided by the principle of the free expression of the popular will. Once the representatives of the Algerian population were selected on the basis of free elections, they would be called to consider with the French authorities a definitive settlement of the problems of the territory on the basis of the principles of democracy and liberty which were essential for the life of all peoples.

68. He wondered why those who were fighting in Algeria—unless they were only terrorists—should

not take advantage of the French offer and put an end to the futile and tragic insurrection and why they should not avail themselves of the proffered opportunities for negotiation and agreement. The time was ripe for a practical and effective solution, provided that the goodwill on the one side was met with a corresponding sense of responsibility on the other. Naturally, it would be necessary to go through various stages before reaching a new juridical status for Algeria, but the important consideration was that in Algeria normal and prosperous life, based on a system of popular representation, justice and mutual goodwill, would be in sight.

69. He asked what the United Nations could do to assist and facilitate such a solution. France had contested the competence of the United Nations with sound arguments. From the juridical point of view, there were well-grounded reasons to consider that the Algerian question, relating as it did to a territory which was an integral part of the French State, was an internal question and was therefore excluded from the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

70. Nevertheless, the French Government had placed its record in Algeria before the First Committee and was entitled to expect a word of understanding and conciliation to help it in achieving the objectives it had set for itself in Algeria. Above all, care should be taken to prevent the debate in the Committee from having unfortunate repercussions, which would only add to the present difficulties. It was important to see to it that events in Algeria should not serve interests alien to those of the Algerian people. Care should be taken that the sincere words of the majority of the members of the Committee should not be misinterpreted by fanatic elements in Algeria to bring about renewed agitation.

71. In his opinion, the debate had afforded an opportunity to clarify ideas and to give thorough study to all aspects of the problem. It was now time to assess the problem from a practical standpoint. The main task was to try to restore peace in Algeria as soon as possible. That could not be done merely by recalling general principles and drawing from them consequences which were possibly logical, but in fact were extremely abstract. For that reason, his delegation did not think that the draft resolution proposed by the eighteen African-Asian Powers (A/C.1/L.165) could make a positive contribution to a real and definitive solution of the Algerian problem.

72. A concrete solution must be based on the facts of the situation. It must take into account the aspirations of all the peoples in Algeria, and it must, above all, create conditions which would enable the Algerian people in a democratic manner to elect their representatives who, in negotiations with the French Government, would later determine the framework for the final solution of the question. That, he noted, was exactly what the French Government wished to achieve. To that end a climate favourable to pacification should be created. It was the task of the United Nations to assist in promoting mutual understanding among people. Once again the voice of France had called for peace and for a new understanding, and had drawn attention to the means by which they could be achieved. It was necessary to give all men of goodwill time to heed that voice so that mutual trust might be revived.

73. He expressed the hope of his delegation that peace would be restored in Algeria and that all sectors of the population, regardless of their racial and cultural differences, would unite in a common destiny of prosperity and freedom with the spiritual and material assist-

ance of France. He added that he was not being excessively optimistic in that respect because there was an age-old Mediterranean tradition of co-operation and friendship between the Latin and the Arab peoples. He hoped that Algeria would become in the future an example of renewed collaboration between Europeans and Africans. Europe was gradually becoming an integrated, but not a closed, complex, which would make possible the solution of its most pressing economic and social problems. Europe was most anxious to give to the people of North Africa a very important and active place in that community.

74. Mr. MENEMENCIÖGLU (Turkey) said that the people and the Government of Turkey were following with great anxiety the tragic developments in Algeria and were dismayed at the bitterness which had ensued from the discussions aimed at finding a solution to the struggle in Algeria.

75. The problem was complex and difficult to solve. His delegation shared the fears expressed by many that by adding bitterness and further inflaming passions the hopes for an early and satisfactory settlement of the problem in Algeria might be dangerously jeopardized.

76. For over one thousand years, the Turkish people had close ties with the Arabs. Many cultural, religious, social and other influences had contributed to a greater understanding and sympathy among the Turkish people for the Arabs, with many of whom they shared the same geographical region; hence, Turkey's interest in the independence and prosperity of its Arab neighbours. That was not a new attitude on the part of Turkey. He recalled that at the end of the First World War when the very existence of the nation was in danger, Turkey had, in the National Pact of 28 January 1920, proclaimed self-determination for the territories of the

former Ottoman Empire inhabited by Arabs which, during the war, had been placed under foreign occupation. Also, at the Lausanne Conference on Near-Eastern Affairs in 1922 and 1923 and later in the League of Nations, Turkey had refused to recognize the system of mandated administration established in the Arab countries, which had now achieved their independence. As for North Africa, Turkey was linked to that region by close ties. Some of the founders of the Turkish Republic, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, had before the First World War fought shoulder to shoulder with the people in that region against invading forces. Turkey had hailed Tunisian and Moroccan independence; the solution of those two questions had greatly enhanced the international prestige of France, to which Turkey was linked in an alliance for the preservation of their common ideals.

77. Although the Turkish delegation had been in favour of a rapid solution of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions, it had not shared the view that the General Assembly should attempt to specify the details of how the parties concerned were to proceed with their negotiations; nor should the Assembly dictate the steps that should be taken to reach a final settlement. As the representative of Ireland and other representatives had pointed out, such an attempt on the part of the United Nations might impair the prospects for a settlement of the Algerian question and would only add to the existing difficulty.

78. The Turkish delegation believed that the cessation of the fighting in Algeria followed by direct negotiations between Algeria and France offered the best hope for a satisfactory solution. The attitude of his delegation with regard to proposals submitted to the Committee would be guided by the foregoing considerations.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.