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Chairman: Mr. Víctor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 22

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/3366, A/3470, A/C.1/783, A/C.1/784, A/C.1/L.160, A/C.1/L.161, A/C.1/L.162) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN read out the list of speakers on the item under consideration.
2. Mr. TARAZI (Syria), on a point of order, stated that, since it had been his understanding that the deadline for submission of names to the list of speakers, Friday, 18 January at 6 p.m., had been set on the assumption that the Committee would meet the preceding Thursday, which had not been the case, he suggested that the list of speakers should be closed at the present meeting.
3. The CHAIRMAN recalled that when he had announced that the list of speakers would be closed on Friday he had also said that that date would stand whether or not another meeting was held. However, out of courtesy to the representative of Syria, he would make an exception and include his name on the list of speakers.
4. Mr. ULLRICH (Czechoslovakia) observed that, in order to evaluate the situation which had developed in the course of the negotiations on disarmament, the following question must be answered: What had been realized of the comprehensive programme set forth in the two resolutions unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 (resolution 1 (I)) and in 1954 (resolution 808 A (IX))? The components of that extensive disarmament programme had been the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and effective international control. A further question which must be answered related to the real reasons hindering the realization of that programme.
5. It was the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation that, in considering the disarmament problem, it was not possible to overlook the fact that the ruling circles

in the Western countries, above all in the United States, were in ever-increasing measure fomenting the "cold war" and proclaiming again the policy of "positions of strength", which had in the past caused so much harm and had prevented the attainment of any disarmament agreement.

6. Among the events which made the solution of the complex problem of disarmament still more urgent were the armaments race, preparations for war or overt violations of peace. Such events included the armed aggression by the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt, the so-called Eisenhower doctrine which envisaged military intervention in the Middle East area, and the recent attempts to disturb peace in central Europe, which had been repelled. A dangerous development was taking place in Western Germany, to which a special role had been assigned in the plans of the ruling circles of the United States.

7. It was certainly not by mere coincidence that the Government of the United States was now increasing its expenditure on armaments. The budget estimates of the United States for 1958 envisaged an increase of 2,000 million dollars for expenses on armaments. From the message of President Eisenhower to Congress it appeared that, of each dollar in the United States budget, 63 cents went to armaments and military aid, with added emphasis being given to atomic armaments. In his message, President Eisenhower stressed that the military strength of the United States represented the bulwark of world peace and freedom. Those words meant a new confirmation of the policy of maintaining a position of strength and of interference and attempted domination of the world. That policy was incompatible with the desire for disarmament shared by the peace-loving peoples of the world. In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, that policy of the United States, supported by the Western Powers, was the main reason for the present unsatisfactory state of negotiations on the question of disarmament.

8. The documents of the recent disarmament discussions in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee testified to the fact that the Western Powers were retreating from the proposals which they had submitted previously and were thus making progress in the disarmament question impossible.

9. The recognition that the negotiations on the question of disarmament were encountering obstacles—a fact that should not discourage the untiring search for all possibilities of making progress towards a solution—had recently led to a new approach to the disarmament problem. If it was not possible to achieve the realization of a comprehensive disarmament programme, it was necessary to seek partial solutions and thus endeavour to reach step by step an ultimate agreement on all important disarmament problems. Partial steps towards disarmament would undoubtedly strengthen confidence among nations and create better conditions for the realization of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

The Soviet proposals of 27 March 1956 (DC/83, annex 5), 14 May 1956 (DC/84), 12 July 1956¹ and 17 November 1956 (A/3366) included a number of measures which made it possible for the parties to agree, first of all, to take steps on which there prevailed a conformity of views.

10. In that connexion it should be stressed that limited measures for disarmament must not disregard any of the three basic components of the solution envisaged in General Assembly resolutions 1 (I) and 808 A (IX), namely, the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of effective control. It was surely not possible to include among limited measures of disarmament efforts aiming only at the establishment of control and inspection and having no connexion whatsoever with disarmament. Such limited measures were, for instance, those proposed by the United States. The fact that the United States proposals (A/C.1/783) omitted completely the question of prohibition of weapons of mass destruction could not be considered otherwise than as a step backward. That essential shortcoming of the United States proposals was the more serious in view of the fact that one of the most pressing issues of disarmament was precisely that question.

11. One of the reasons why it had not been possible up to now to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme was the fact that the Western Powers, and notably the United States, had originally categorically rejected the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Later, they had declared that they were ready to consent to the prohibition of those weapons, but only at the ultimate stage of a comprehensive disarmament programme, only after the agreed reduction of armed forces and armaments had been effected to the extent of 75 per cent. When the Soviet Union had acceded to this demand, the Western Powers had gone back on their own proposals. Nor had the Western Powers accepted a further Soviet proposal to the effect that the great Powers should undertake a solemn obligation to refrain in their international relations from the use or threat of force, and not to resort to the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons.²

12. To avoid the danger of a continued deadlock, the Soviet Union had advanced a proposal to solve, independently of each other, the two fundamental problems of disarmament, namely, the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. It was in that spirit that the Soviet Union had submitted its proposals of 17 November 1956. As a first step towards achieving the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons from national armaments, the Soviet Union had proposed the immediate cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The Czechoslovak delegation fully supported that proposal. Leading scientists, politicians and organizations of various countries were continually, and ever more urgently, pointing to the concrete danger threatening mankind if the atomic tests were continued.

13. Control of the prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons was, in the present state of science, feasible without any difficulties. Modern technical means could without difficulty discover and locate tests of nuclear weapons in any part of the world.

14. Czechoslovakia had repeatedly supported the demand for banning tests of nuclear weapons. The

National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic, in its declaration of 1 August 1956, had expressed its full support of that demand. The Czechoslovak Government had continued its efforts to see that prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons became a reality.

15. It was to be regretted that the new proposals submitted by the United States (A/C.1/783) did not contain that demand, but provided only for a certain limitation of the tests of nuclear weapons and subordinated those inadequate measures to preliminary conditions, thus impeding the speedy conclusion of an agreement on a matter so vital for all mankind. It was also regrettable that the conclusions flowing from the statement made by the representative of Japan (823rd meeting) regarding the immediate discontinuance of the tests of atomic weapons had not been reflected in the draft resolution co-sponsored by Japan (A/C.1/L.162).

16. The Czechoslovak delegation welcomed the fact that during 1956 the negotiations on the question of disarmament had brought the different positions on some points closer together as, for instance, on the vital question of the reduction of armed forces and armaments, and in particular the question of the levels to which the armed forces should be reduced. It wished to believe that the Western Powers would not again retreat from their position.

17. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the different positions had been brought closer together also on the question of control, which had been the subject of considerable controversy in previous years. The proposal for control measures to provide against a surprise attack which had been submitted by the USSR was gaining ever wider support. In its most recent proposal, the United States accepted the principles underlying the Soviet proposals for establishing a system of ground inspection and control.

18. Steps had also been taken to break the deadlock caused recently by the insistence of the United States upon the aerial survey plan as a preliminary condition for achieving agreement on disarmament, although that proposal by itself solved neither the problem of control nor that of preventing aggression. In the interest of facilitating the speediest possible conclusion of an agreement on disarmament, the Government of the Soviet Union had expressed its willingness to consider the question of employing aerial photography within the area of Europe in which the principal armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Warsaw Treaty countries were stationed, to a depth of 800 kilometres east and west of the demarcation line between those forces, provided, of course, that the states concerned agreed. The area of aerial surveys would embrace the whole of the territory of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government had stated on 1 December 1956 that it supported the USSR proposals of 17 November and that it was fully prepared to express its consent, recognizing that the reduction of armaments would considerably lessen the danger of war and make possible the adoption of such measures without compromising the interests of the security of the Czechoslovak Republic.

19. The people of Czechoslovakia were deeply interested in seeing to it that Europe should cease to be a focus of tension and that permanent conditions for a calm and peaceful life should be ensured to the peoples of Europe. The security of Czechoslovakia had always been closely connected with the security of Europe. The reaching of an agreement on some questions of disarma-

¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 57th meeting.

² *Ibid.*, 52nd meeting.

ment would favourably affect the stabilization and further strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

20. The policy of remilitarizing West Germany, arming the West German armies with atomic and nuclear weapons and integrating them into the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the existence of a broad network of military bases on the territory of States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, made measures in the field of disarmament in Europe particularly pressing. The implementation of the present proposals of the Soviet Union for a reduction of the armed forces stationed in the territories of the NATO countries and of the countries signatories of the Warsaw Treaty, for the liquidation of military bases on the territory of other States and for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, would contribute substantially to the tranquillization of the atmosphere in Europe and would also create favourable conditions for the peaceful unification of Germany on a democratic basis.

21. The Czechoslovak Government attached great importance to the question of disarmament. Guided by the will to contribute concretely to the solution of the problem, it had reduced its armed forces in 1955 by 34,000 men and in 1956 by 10,000 men. In 1956 it had also reduced its expenditures for national defence by 7.9 per cent compared to 1955. Such steps, which had been undertaken by some peace-loving countries, if followed by a similar initiative on the part of other countries as well—and in the first instance by the three Western Powers—would lead to the relaxation of tension in the world and would create favourable conditions for the successful settlement of the disarmament question as a whole.

22. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the task of the General Assembly on the question of disarmament was now to establish appropriate conditions in order to enable the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee to make a careful study of all proposals which had been put forward. To that effect it was necessary to enlarge the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. In discussing disarmament problems, it was necessary to strengthen the voice of Asia and that of other unrepresented or under-represented areas. The Czechoslovak delegation further believed that both the existing possibilities and the importance and urgency of the problems of disarmament required the General Assembly to devote one of its sessions exclusively to those problems.

23. The nations expected and ever more urgently demanded that the United Nations make all possible efforts for reaching the goal upon which the hopes of peace-loving people all over the world were fixed, namely, the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the restoration of confidence among nations.

24. Mr. BRYN (Norway) noted that in the disarmament problem, which had created a sense of frustration each time it was discussed, there was now a new element. There was a growing realization throughout the world, in all countries, on all sides of "curtains" of this or that description, that the time had come to show progress, to act, and to act now.

25. The Norwegian delegation was very much aware that the question of disarmament was primarily the responsibility of the great Powers. With regard to the statement of the representative of the USSR (821st

meeting), he hoped that it was not the final word, but perhaps meant for the opening skirmish. For the introduction of new elements in the situation, for fresh and vigorous thinking, he thought that thanks were due to President Eisenhower and the United States Government more than to anyone else. His delegation regarded very highly the statement of the United States representative (821st meeting), not only for its specific proposals, but also for its general tone and spirit and its obvious intention of avoiding controversial and acrimonious debate.

26. Having studied with care the five main points of the United States proposals (A/C.1/783), he wished to comment briefly on some of them. The Norwegian delegation viewed as sound the United States suggestion that, when the production of nuclear materials had been put under control, information would be available that might render possible and acceptable, as the next step, the reduction of existing stockpiles. That suggestion was, so far as was known, the first one to point a way out of the dilemma of the inability to control the stockpiles, a dilemma which during the preceding two years had seriously hampered progress in the disarmament discussions.

27. The offer by the United States Government that under such circumstances generous, progressive transfers of fissionable material would be made to peaceful uses held out a promise that the tremendous accumulation of potential destructive power would be turned into an equally tremendous power-reserve to be used for the progress and well-being of mankind.

28. Since the principal parties concerned seemed to have agreed in principle that strict international control must be established over the fulfilment of the disarmament obligations, the immediate task in that sphere would be to concentrate on working out the details of the control measures required for the first, and limited, stage of the disarmament process. His delegation was hopeful that elements from all the existing proposals concerning control measures could now be combined in such a way that they would be acceptable to all for the purpose of effecting the first stage of disarmament.

29. He was sure that the aim of achieving an ultimate ban on all nuclear test explosions was common to all nations. In that connexion, he expressed appreciation of the willingness voiced by the representatives of several great Powers to work out promptly and as a first step methods for advance notice and registration of nuclear tests. The Norwegian Government had examined carefully what the prospect might be for isolating the question of test explosions from the general context of disarmament problems. The primary purpose of such a move would be to break the deadlock in the disarmament talks. It deemed it likely that agreement to limit, control or even only register such future explosions would have a beneficial effect on the disarmament discussions. Furthermore, a special preoccupation of the Norwegian Government was the increase of nuclear radiation registered in Norway as well as in other parts of the world. The figures published in that connexion had caused concern in Norway and had also drawn some international attention. The draft resolution sponsored by Canada, Japan and Norway (A/C.1/L.162) was directed to that problem. That draft would enable the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which kept under observation the facts of the radiation and fall-out situation in the world, also to estimate, to a certain extent at least,

future radiation and fall-out. The Norwegian delegation had no doubts that the States concerned would pay attention to those data and estimates, based on the best available scientific methods, and adjust their testing programmes accordingly. The data themselves and the fact that world public opinion knew of them would in that particular case be good enough as a control system.

30. The fact that the three-Power draft resolution did not contain any recommendation for limitation of or a ban on future tests did not indicate that the sponsors were not as anxious as other nations to see such agreements ultimately established between the great Powers. The sponsors respected and understood, however, the reasons given for wanting to reach those ends by a step-by-step method. They asked for support for their draft resolution, even from those who did not think it went far enough, because it represented, they believed, the constructive spirit of not discarding what was attainable even though not quite satisfactory, for what was obviously not acceptable at present to those immediately concerned. One step forward was better than continued deadlock.

31. The sponsors had originally intended to suggest that only such nuclear test explosions as would cause measurable radio-active fall-out outside the country concerned should be registered, the word "measurable" to be taken to mean measurable by means of the methods for collecting such data as recommended at the time by the Scientific Committee. That formula would have the obvious advantage of eliminating conflicts about what types and sizes of explosions should be registered. It could also avoid the argument that tests which had no effect outside the country that conducted them were really not an international problem.

32. However, it seemed that some, maybe all, of the Powers directly involved would be willing to make unconditional the obligation to record tests in advance. There would, of course, be no way to check up on compliance with regard to those tests which had no international effect, except through an on-the-spot international observation system. On that problem the sponsors wished to reiterate their belief that a possible lack of agreement about on-the-spot control should not be allowed to prevent the establishment of the registration system.

33. The proposed registration should give at least the following data: (1) the upper limit of the total quantities of fissionable products which were expected to result from the tests; (2) a rough indication of the period during which the maximum fall-out was expected; and (3) a rough indication of the geographic area which was expected to be most exposed.

34. In conclusion, he wished to stress his belief that the early establishment of a system for registering future nuclear test explosions would be beneficial for the security and well-being of mankind and would also constitute an important factor in breaking the deadlock in the disarmament negotiations. He also hoped for an early indication on the part of the Soviet Union that it accepted the proposal of the United States that the establishment of control over future nuclear production for purely peaceful purposes must have priority over any plan for reducing existing stockpiles. Lastly, he hoped that the Powers directly concerned would now be able to work out the details of a control system for the first stage of disarmament and would not let disagreement and uncertainty about later stages prevent the first stage from being implemented. The setting up and getting into motion of disarmament machinery would in

itself be an important factor towards creating that mutual trust which was indispensable for carrying planned disarmament to a successful conclusion.

35. The Norwegian Government, bearing in mind the fact that public opinion, which had a curious tendency to assert itself in the end, could be disregarded by statesmen and governments only to their own detriment, looked with real expectation to the coming deliberations of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

36. Mr. SAWADA (Japan), in introducing the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162), stated that the danger of nuclear explosions was partly known, but mostly unknown. It was a fact that the deposit of radio-activity from fall-out, detectable in human bodies and foodstuffs, had been increasing in recent years. Scientists and medical experts warned that fall-out on the ground got into the food-chain, thereby accumulating in human bodies. Even though it might be contended that the current level of the amount of deposits did not cause any direct injury to human health and safety, no one could tell for certain the ultimate effects of increasing deposits of radio-activity on future generations. Moreover, from the genetic point of view, what mattered was that the whole population of the world was exposed to increasing fall-out.

37. Whatever the political circumstances, the current situation could not remain unrestrained. To protect, to the best of one's ability, the safety and well-being of future generations was an ordained duty. The joint draft resolution was the absolute minimum as an immediate step for the sake of the existence and welfare of mankind.

38. The registration envisaged in the joint draft resolution should be made well in advance, and relevant information should be supplied to the fullest possible extent. The observation referred to in paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution should be based both on accurate information on the amount of fall-out ejected into the stratosphere, the protosphere and the sea, and on a study on the general level of radio-activity throughout the world. It was important that the United Nations should study both the short-term and long-term aspects of the problem. Only on the basis of accurate information and authentic study could the United Nations and the States concerned proceed with whatever preventive measures were deemed fitting to a particular occasion.

39. The joint draft resolution had been submitted as a provisional proposal, pending an over-all agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It contained nothing more than the duty of each nation in the civilized world. With the support of moral pressure behind it, it would, he trusted, be upheld by all the Members of the United Nations.

40. Mr. WEI (China) said that, because of the progress being made in nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and in long-range guided missiles, disarmament had become the most compelling problem of the world. As the United States representative had told the Disarmament Commission at its 61st meeting on 16 July 1956, when the long-range guided missile became a standard weapon, no nation would have more than fifteen minutes to get ready to defend itself and to hit back. It was imperative to act before those deadly missiles were poised and before the problem of nuclear control became too diffuse and too unstable to handle.

41. Despite the strenuous efforts of the United Nations, the world had lost a rare opportunity for the

complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the years following the Second World War. Now stockpiles of fissionable materials had been built up in a number of countries and were beyond any international technological control. One way to remove the danger of those stockpiles was to transfer them voluntarily to peaceful uses. In that connexion, he welcomed the announcement made on 26 October 1956 at the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency by the United States regarding its contribution to the Agency. If other countries made similar offers, the existing stockpiles of fissionable materials might be progressively reduced. Since control of future production of such materials was technologically feasible, his delegation supported the United States proposal that all such production should be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision (A/C.1/783, para. 2). That was a sure way of limiting the arms race in the nuclear field. It would make possible the estimation of stockpiles from past production and the establishment of international control over them. It would also strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. In that connexion, he noted that atomic activities assisted by the Agency and nuclear materials produced thereby would be subject to international control.

42. At the Conference on the Statute, his delegation had advocated international control of all fissionable material related to the Agency. It was significant that the Agency's Statute had been unanimously adopted at the 15th plenary meeting of the Conference by the eighty-one participating countries. It was the first time in history that a system of international inspection and control had been accepted on such a comprehensive scale. He appealed to the atomic Powers, all of which had voted for the Statute, to accept for themselves the same measures of international inspection and control that they considered necessary for other countries.

43. The potentialities of guided missiles and earth satellites were manifest. His delegation hoped that through international co-operation those objects would be developed for scientific and peaceful purposes. Agreement on international control should be possible at the current stage of development, and efforts to reach agreement should be made before it was too late.

44. In the disarmament negotiations, first priority should be given to measures to prevent the possibility of great surprise attacks such as those that China had suffered in 1931 and the United States in 1941. Any agreement on such measures and on their implementation would create the mutual confidence necessary for disarmament. The people of the world certainly feared an atomic or thermo-nuclear surprise attack more than anything else. But the control of any one type of weapon would not eliminate the threat of such attacks. The best insurance against them was to devise a system of international inspection, including comprehensive aerial and ground inspection, and to put it into effect. In that connexion, he noted that the USSR had expressed at least some interest in aerial inspection. The confidence-building measures envisaged in General Assembly resolution 914 (X) should, however, be pursued without delay.

45. He did not attach any great significance to the mere reduction of the numerical strength of armed forces. Such reduction might in fact be used for rearmament instead of disarmament, since the men released could be placed in the reserves and could be mobilized rapidly; and reserves could be used to increase the

labour force by producing weapons or building up war potential.

46. No practical results had been produced by the debate that had gone on for over ten years in the United Nations. The principal difficulty was the problem of control. Unless the USSR was willing to accept necessary measures of international control, there was no hope for any agreement on either general or partial disarmament. There did not appear to be any change in the position of the USSR in that respect; he had only been able to find one sentence in the recent USSR proposals dealing with the subject. That sentence called for the establishment of strict and effective international control over the fulfilment of disarmament obligations (A/3366, para. 26). All agreed with that objective, but the measures of control acceptable to the USSR in the past were neither strict nor effective.

47. As for the USSR proposal to convene a special session of the General Assembly for the solution of the disarmament problem (A/C.1/L.161), his delegation regarded the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee as the proper forum for examination of the various proposals, at least for the near future. One great difficulty in disarmament debates was the injection of propaganda into a complex and serious subject. That indeed was precisely why the Assembly had created the Sub-Committee with the hope that its deliberations, being private, might be freed from such propaganda.

48. In conclusion, he pointed out that science and technology did not wait for statesmen to reach agreement on disarmament. Military science was advancing at an ever-increasing rate. If the world, and especially the free world, was to survive, immediate steps must be taken to adopt the necessary measures against surprise attack and for the control of modern weapons. National pride and sovereignty should not be permitted to prevent the establishment of a world community in which science, technology and all resources would be used for the betterment of human livelihood. Two proposals deserved special consideration: the proposal submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States (DC/87), and the set of proposals submitted by the United States (A/C.1/783). Both had the general support of his delegation.

49. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden) remarked that it was, of course, unrealistic to expect a solution of the disarmament problem as a result of the Committee's deliberations. But the debate offered an opportunity of stressing the necessity or embarking upon disarmament and perhaps of indicating the general character of some initial steps in view of the failure of policies of "all or nothing". He hoped that, in the forthcoming efforts towards compromise, the necessary concessions might coincide both regarding items and timing.

50. Something had to be done about the continuation of tests of nuclear weapons. The situation was not as harmless as it was usually portrayed. Apart from measurement difficulties resulting from the delayed effects of fall-out from the stratosphere, there could be considerable local differences in such effects, as had been shown by recent measurements in Scandinavia. From the genetic point of view there was unanimity among scientists that every increase in the sum of radiation was harmful, and it was the sum that counted. In that field, the most important thing known was that one did not know. Pointing out that all too little was known about the genetic consequences of exposure to radiation, he wondered what could be done tomorrow, at a time when more was known, to undo the possible

harm done today. There was ample reason for a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons until the General Assembly had acted upon the findings of the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.

51. He reiterated his suggestion that research work on the problem of discovering hidden nuclear stockpiles should be concentrated, at an appropriate time, in a technical organ of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Committee.

52. In order to implement any planned reduction—large or small—of conventional armed forces, measures must be taken to ensure the effective collaboration of China, as had been pointed out by the representative of Yugoslavia (823rd meeting).

53. A substantial reduction of conventional forces raised the question of the kinds of armaments to which it should apply. Were the reduced forces to be equipped with atomic artillery and other nuclear weapons, and, if so, what countries would be so equipped? The answer might in due time require rather difficult technical consideration.

54. While fully approving as necessary the establishment of a feasible control system, he repeated his view that the so-called “other weapons of mass destruction”, which were still waiting for a concrete and agreed definition, must be taken into account more seriously in a realistic, controlled plan.

55. The United States proposal to act at once to secure utilization of outer space missiles for peaceful purposes only (A/C.1/783, para. 11) was most welcome and was of special urgency in view of the rapid and most dangerous development in that domain.

56. The urgency of taking some initial steps covering both conventional and nuclear armaments had manifested itself in the so-called “fourth country problem” which could in the near future become a “many countries problem”. From a balance of terror man might then enter an age of terror without balance.

57. Mr. PICCIONI (Italy) said that his country, which loved peace above all else and had so often given proof of its desire for peaceful co-operation with all peoples, considered rearmament of the West a sad but inevitable sacrifice which was necessary to safeguard the independence of the free world and to maintain peace by discouraging aggression. That was a great and painful sacrifice for a country which needed to devote all its resources to the solution of its economic and social problems. His delegation therefore could not fail to regard most favourably any serious proposal granting a respite from the armaments race and which would gradually bring total elimination of a grim necessity. Within that framework, Italy would wish, in the first place, for the achievement of any serious measure which would do away with the frightening threat of nuclear weapons.

58. But superficial disarmament, concealing bad faith, would give rise merely to new and even greater dangers. Real disarmament could not be based exclusively on the exchange of diplomatic documents, but must find its source in a revival of human conscience and in the development of mutual understanding. His country was convinced that the perilous arms race was not in itself the cause of international tension. On the contrary, it was tension, due to the policy of threat and intimidation practised by the USSR, which had made necessary a defensive organization for the protection of freedom.

59. Consequently, in order to achieve disarmament, the nations must first of all uproot the causes of political

tension by reaching a fair and gradual solution of the major outstanding political problems. To do otherwise would be to leave the solution of those problems at the mercy of those who would have concealed their aggressive designs. One such problem, of special importance to Italy, was that of German reunification. How could it really be believed that there could be serious and effective disarmament unless that problem was solved fairly? It was incredible that, after twelve years, justice could not be rendered to the German people, which had made so many sacrifices and which was therefore entitled to reunification. It was obvious that that flagrant injustice was in itself a grave source of international tension. The solution of the political problems left over from the Second World War was clearly difficult, but with good will, acceptable solutions for all problems could gradually be achieved. His delegation, therefore, had confidence in a gradual disarmament achieved by successive stages, each stage being accompanied by a solution of certain political problems, and thus by an increase of mutual confidence.

60. The question of control was closely related to such confidence. Since disarmament was hardly conceivable without control, his Government believed that control should be as effective, as realistic and as extensive as possible and that it should be put into effect gradually, parallel to and synchronized with disarmament. Acceptance of the broadest possible inspection, both by land and air, would constitute the best possible proof of good will and sincerity. In that connexion, he noted that experiments carried out by his country with regard to air inspection had shown that, on a technical level, it could give very effective and valuable results.

61. A further requirement was that negotiations should not be transformed into an arena for one-sided propaganda. In that respect, he had been discouraged by the statement of the USSR representative at the 821st meeting. He hoped, however, that a more profound and thorough study of the USSR proposals in the Sub-Committee might reveal a few positive elements. All chances of an agreement must be followed up and encouraged so long as they were not contrary to fundamental principles.

62. His delegation had been encouraged by the fact that its views were largely shared by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and by the majority of participants in the work of the Disarmament Commission. Referring to the United States proposals (A/C.1/783), he agreed that a gradual approach was realistic because it was the only one which would enable the United Nations to do a good job. The United States proposal regarding transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses would, if implemented, be an unprecedented success and would make the International Atomic Energy Agency a formidable instrument of social well-being, prosperity and world peace. Those proposals also included immediate gestures of good will, such as an exchange of information on nuclear experiments, which would serve to create rapidly the atmosphere required for a progressive disarmament programme. In connexion with the United States proposal for a first-stage reduction, his Government was prepared to give favourable consideration to any proposal entailing limitation of armaments, within the framework of a general agreement and taking into account the particular geographical and strategic circumstances of Italy. Although not a member of the Disarmament Commission, Italy would always be glad to support efforts to promote the common endeavour.

63. The problem of disarmament was one of the most compelling ones facing the United Nations, and it was only within the United Nations that it could be solved in a universal manner, giving all countries the necessary safeguards. He hoped that the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee would lead to such rapid progress that it would justify a special session of the Assembly, as suggested by the USSR. But unless there was adequate preparation, such a session could give rise to false hopes, serve the cause of tendentious propaganda and thus harm the cause the Organization sought to promote. Indeed, it was necessary above all to strengthen the authority and prestige of the United Nations, which were fundamental elements for the building of mutual confidence. So long as the urgent recommendations of the Assembly remained unanswered and certain countries refused to attend its meetings, uncertainty and concern remained justified.

64. Mr. JAKOBSEN (Denmark) said his country was fully aware of the very limited role it could play in the great problem of disarmament. Since the Nazi occupation, it had been clear to Denmark that the defence of the ideals which made life worth living must be built on the principle of collective security. Because of obstruction by some countries, it had not yet been possible to establish such a system, including all the countries in the world, through the United Nations. It had therefore been necessary to do on a regional scale what his people would have preferred to do for all the world. His country therefore saw in the North Atlantic Treaty a part of the United Nations going further than it had so far been possible for the United Nations as a whole to go.

65. His country wished only to live in peace and therefore longed for disarmament, but not at the cost of freedom. He regretted that the hope for a *détente* in the world was a little more slender than it had been a few months before. Since his country hesitated to advise those without whose help it could not defend its freedom he was sure that his people would welcome whatever the great Powers could agree upon in the question of disarmament. Judging by the proposals made, it should not be impossible to find common ground. The world indeed would be much richer without the unproductive military burden weighing upon the West and the East, quite apart from the fact that all-out war might mean the final destruction of mankind. He regretted the tone adopted by the USSR representative, which he contrasted with the rather constructive proposals made by the USSR.

66. While no decisive steps could be expected to result from the current debate, and the new, constructive proposals would have to be studied more thoroughly in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, it was possible that a small step in a very limited field could be taken. Indeed, he agreed with the view that the need was for such small and modest steps of the kind envisaged in the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162), which he fully supported. Everyone must be concerned about the question of radio-active fall-out, the consequences of which were too little known to science. The fact that science knew still less about genetic effects of such radiation was a reason to be more, not less, careful. Mankind was not so brilliant that one could afford to make it less so.

67. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) commented that it was clear from the third report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (DC/83) that, despite the new elements in the disarmament proposals presented to the Sub-Committee during the previous year,

the deadlock continued on the key issues of control, phasing and nuclear disarmament. The situation was not merely unfortunate; it posed a great peril to stability and peace, as recent events in the Middle East and central Europe had made only too clear. In the Middle East, at least, prompt action by the General Assembly had stemmed the tide of war. But the United Nations should not entertain the illusion that a small conflict would not turn into general war with all its horrors.

68. Three factors contributed to the growing sense of urgency in the search for a solution to the problem of disarmament: first, the crushing weight of armament expenditures which, if released for constructive and peaceful ends, would bring abundance to millions of people in the world; secondly, the tremendous pace of scientific development in nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, which was rapidly bringing the world to a "point of no return" in the armaments race; thirdly, the fear that the existing tensions in various parts of the world would by some unforeseen or unfortunate development lead to a world conflagration. The combined effect of those factors should bring to all nations, and particularly to the great Powers, the realization that disarmament must succeed, for there was no alternative.

69. Turning to the course his delegation wished to follow as a member of the Security Council and the Disarmament Commission, he said that it would attempt to encourage mutual trust, to pave the way for a fresh approach to intractable issues, and to help build a climate of confidence in the discussion of specific proposals. If any appreciable progress was to be expected, the Powers principally involved should attune their renewed efforts to the following criteria derived from the experience of the past ten years: (1) the discussion and submission of proposals should be made in good faith and realistically, without acrimony and propaganda; (2) proposals should be examined objectively and with a view to possible and progressive reconciliation of divergent views; (3) possibilities of agreement should be assessed and evaluated by stages, from the minimum to the maximum, so that the confidence gained on initial and limited agreements could provide the basis for gradually increasing areas of agreement; (4) while the impasse on the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons continued unresolved, the settlement of political questions could proceed hand in hand with the gradual reduction of conventional armaments and military expenditures. That procedure rested on the principle that if no immediate prospects existed for removing weapons of mass destruction, the security of the world must temporarily be maintained by eliminating the existing sources of tension, so that such weapons would find no cause for application.

70. Turning to the USSR draft resolution regarding discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.160), he noted that one view on the matter was that, unless an effective system of control of production of nuclear weapons could be found, termination of thermo-nuclear tests would expose the country observing the agreement to grave peril, to the advantage of the country that could continue them in secret. Another view was that the cessation of such tests was perfectly feasible, as they could not be conducted anywhere in secret. Unfortunately, there was no consensus of expert opinion on the truth of that claim. Since immediate cessation of atomic tests did not appear feasible at present, the possibility of agreement on other aspects of the issue could be explored. The Western Powers and the USSR might agree on a common testing ground outside which experimental explosions by any of them

would be banned. Tests within the common area might be made subject to previous notice and registration and might be limited or proportioned amongst them. The Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency might constitute part of international machinery to ensure that such tests were conducted within the area and in conformity with the conditions agreed upon. That international machinery might also be entrusted with the responsibility of minimizing the effects of radiation and possibly of converting the disclosable results of the tests to peaceful uses.

71. The menacing events of the past few years which had strained relations between the great Powers almost to breaking point had fortunately also brought a sense of realism in dealing with disarmament problems which was reflected in limited proposals designed to build mutual confidence on the basis of which it would be possible to proceed to larger areas of agreement. Into that category fell the technical exchange missions and demonstration test areas proposed by the United States, also the "open skies" plan of President Eisenhower accepted in somewhat vague terms by Prime Minister Bulganin.

72. An area other than the one suggested by the USSR might be explored for possible agreement in connexion with aerial reconnaissance, provided that genuine parity existed as far as the depth of the area and the quality and extent of military subjects of aerial photography were concerned. The advisability of considering an exchange of blueprints as a necessary concomitant of such inspection was also a matter for the great Powers. The choice of site was clearly a matter for negotiation between the United States and the USSR. It could, of course, be assumed that it should be a less sensitive area than central Europe. He emphasized that the initial steps would be crucial and could determine whether or not future stages could be undertaken with any confidence of ultimate success.

73. The deadlock which had existed from the beginning between the Western Powers and the USSR on over-all proposals for disarmament remained as obstinate as ever. Although considerable approximation of

views was discernable on the question of a ceiling for armed forces and on the principle of reduction of conventional armaments by stages, the major issues, especially in connexion with nuclear weapons, remained intractable. It could only be hoped that the Powers principally involved would give new impetus to attempts to narrow their differences and explore new avenues of approach.

74. The existing situation of peace dictated by mutual fear was neither a happy nor an easy one. The danger lay in the possibility of miscalculation and in the temptation to strike first. But even the present equilibrium of fear between the United States and the USSR appeared to be threatened by new scientific developments with regard to earth satellites, intercontinental ballistic missiles and space platforms. He welcomed the United States proposal to subject those new experiments to international inspection and control with a view to devoting them exclusively to peaceful purposes. At that early stage of developments, in contrast to the field of thermo-nuclear weapons, a meeting of minds might be more feasible. He therefore hoped that that proposal would be considered separately from the problem of over-all disarmament in nuclear weapons and would meet with the prompt affirmative response of the USSR.

75. Recapitulating the position of his delegation, he suggested the revival of the Australian-Philippine plan of 1954 (A/C.1/L.101/Rev.1), which had called for preparation of a statement summarizing in objective and methodical form the various disarmament proposals, leaving it to the Committee to determine whether the statement should be prepared by the Secretariat or by the Disarmament Commission itself. He also suggested that a non-voting member should be added to the Disarmament Commission, so as to introduce a neutral and conciliatory element which could help facilitate agreement on certain aspects of various disarmament proposals. The Secretary-General, enjoying as he did the trust and confidence of all Member Nations, fitted that description and would be the ideal person to preside over the deliberations of the Commission and its Sub-Committee.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.