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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

The problem of the independence of Korea : report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Relief and rehabilitation of Korea : report of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction (A/1881¹, A/1884², A/1935 and Add.1, A/1972, A/2038, A/C.2&3/101, A/C.1/713-A/C.2&3/104 and A/C.1/714-A/C.2&3/105) (concluded)

[Items 17 and 27]*

1. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia) considered that the course advocated in the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/713-A/C.2&3/104) was the wisest one which the United Nations could follow in the present circumstances where, on the one hand, the fighting continued in Korea while, on the other hand, negotiations for an armistice agreement were going on. The first duty of the Assembly should therefore be to avoid any steps which might confuse the issue by re-opening military questions already settled in the field, or introducing political matters which could only usefully be discussed after the fighting had ended. Certain representatives had attempted to open a debate along such lines, on the basis of the assertion that the negotiations had broken down. This assertion had been denied by the Unified Command, and the communiqués of the last few days showed that there was hope of a happy outcome.

2. The First Committee had decided recently to defer its discussion of the Korean item³ and the situation had not changed since then. A debate on the political issues regarding the future of Korea at present could at the best only be futile and might in fact hinder the achievement of an armistice.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 12*.

² *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 3.

* Indicates the item numbers on the General Assembly agenda.

³ *Ibid.*, First Committee, 486th meeting.

3. The political objectives of the United Nations in Korea were the establishment of a unified state under a democratically elected and independent government, as clearly established by earlier United Nations resolutions. Any useful political debate could only be concerned with the ways and means to achieve those objectives. Such a discussion would only be possible when the fighting was over and the chief purpose of the three-Power draft was to provide for this at the appropriate time.

4. Other developments might make a consideration of the Korean question by the United Nations necessary and it was therefore wise that the joint draft resolution provided that the notification of an armistice should not be the only condition for the calling of a special session of the Assembly.

5. He thought that the Committee, while not entering into a discussion of the report of the UNCURK, should regard the report as a useful source of information and a basis for discussion at the special session. Similarly, the Assembly would at that session have to consider whether continued political representation by the United Nations in Korea was necessary and what form it should take. Until then, the Commission should, of course, continue its work.

6. The Australian Government would continue to support the United Nations programme for assistance to the people of Korea and for the building up of the Korean economy, to which ends it had pledged last year the equivalent of almost 4,500,000 dollars in Australian goods and services. The three-Power draft resolution contained the essential provisions for the continuation of the UNKRA programme in Korea.

7. In conclusion, the representative of Australia wished to stress that the best course for the United Nations would be, first, to do all to bring the fighting in Korea to an end, and, when that had been achieved, to consider ways of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

8. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the discussion of the question of the competence of the Committee to discuss the Korean question had clearly shown that the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had undertaken a manoeuvre designed to prevent the General Assembly by all possible means from discussing the question at the present stage. That manoeuvre constituted a flagrant violation of the Charter and of the rules of procedure of the Assembly. When it had proposed to defer the consideration of item 17 in the First Committee, the United States delegation had been unable to adduce any appropriate rule of procedure in order to account for that arbitrary action. The calling of the present meeting constituted a second and irregular act which the United States representative had committed because he relied on the mechanical majority which his delegation controlled. Here again was a violation of the Charter and of the rules of procedure.

9. The representative of the United Kingdom had not succeeded in denying the odious character of the three-Power draft resolution and was unable to produce any serious arguments in its support. It was obviously the purpose of the sponsors to shunt the United Nations and its main organs away from the consideration of the Korean problem at the present time, so as to prevent discussion concerning the activities of the American aggressors in Korea. Their wish was to enable the American Command in Korea to persevere in the barbarous bombing and strafing of the Korean people, of densely populated towns and cities, and to destroy hospitals, schools and other institutions.

10. The manoeuvres of the United States and its two partners likewise betrayed the unwillingness of the Government of the United States to attain peace in Korea. It relied on the expansion of aggression to encompass not only Korea but all of the Far East. That had been further revealed by the decisions taken at a recent meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Powers in Washington and during the recent conversations between Prime Minister Churchill and President Truman.

11. The argument to the effect that the consideration of the Korean question at the present time could hamper the armistice negotiations in Korea had been utterly refuted and its inconsistency had been completely revealed by the Head of the Soviet delegation at the First Committee meeting on 9 January 1952.⁴ The representative of the United Kingdom had referred to the fact that the Assembly could not discuss the question of the building of airfields in Northern Korea. But who had proposed that the Assembly should discuss such matters? Nobody.

12. On the other hand, the discussion of measures designed to lend assistance toward a successful conclusion of the negotiations in Korea was within the province of the General Assembly. It would expedite and facilitate those negotiations, which had been protracted because of the attitude of the American Command. But it was that type of discussion of the Korean question in the Assembly which the American aggressors feared: they feared to have to answer before the bar of world public opinion for their aggressive and barbarous actions in Korea, for having sabotaged the negotiations in Korea. The endeavours to shift the blame for the lack of success

experienced in these negotiations to the Korean or Chinese party were obviously artificial.

13. The representative of the United States had also distorted the facts when he had alleged that the negotiations in Korea had begun on the initiative of the United States. Those negotiations had commenced after a statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union on 23 June 1951. The essence of that speech had also been distorted by the representative of the United States when he had asserted that it had made mention of certain intentions of the Korean party to the conflict. Obviously, no such mention could have been made in view of the fact that the Soviet Union was not a party to the Korean conflict. That could be readily checked by reading the text of the speech which had been delivered over the radio in the series entitled "The Price of Peace", organized by the Department of Public Information of the United Nations. That text shows clearly that negotiations were to be based on the notion of withdrawal from the thirty-eighth parallel. At the very beginning of the negotiations, however, the representatives of the United States had objected to that notion and had applied all sorts of pressure, military and political. The Korean party, anxious to obtain peace in Korea, had agreed to establish the demarcation line, not along the thirty-eighth parallel, but along the actual front line. That had been interpreted throughout the world as a token of the sincere desire for peace of that party. That agreement, however, had awakened the fears of the ruling circles of the United States that it might lead to a rapid agreement on the cease-fire as a whole. That appeared clearly from the speech made in the First Committee on 17 November 1951 by Mr. Acheson.⁵ His statement made it manifest that the Government of the United States was determined to delay the negotiations by digging up new pretexts. That attitude was also being reflected in the Press of the United States. The Pentagon, the White House and the General Staff in Tokyo were afraid of peace. If the international tension abated, how would it be possible to make universal military training acceptable in the United States, how would it be possible to set up a 145 group Air Force? How could France and the United Kingdom be induced to lower their levels of consumption and to increase their levels of armament? How could they be induced to accept Japanese and German rearmament? General van Fleet stated recently that "the Korean war was a blessing". As far as the American monopolists were concerned, the war in Korea was nothing but a blessing. That was why they were afraid of putting an end to that war and of seeing the General Assembly consider the Korean question because that might actually expedite the attainment of peace in Korea.

14. The United States representatives at Panmunjom had resorted to threats and blackmail, in their attempt to impose ridiculous demands in connexion with the repair and building of airstrips in northern Korea and in connexion with the exchange of prisoners of war. Violations of the neutral zone, bombing and strafing of the peaceful population and military pressure on the battlefield had been resorted to by the United States Command in order to elicit concessions, to delay the negotiations, and, in the meantime, to replenish their arsenals in preparation for further aggression.

15. The brutalities engaged in by the American aggressors were exemplified by a report emanating from the

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 446th meeting.

Korean Central Telegraphic Agency, according to which on 9 January American airplanes had strafed the Korean village of Ul-nim in the Kangwon province with toxic explosive projectiles, wounding 50, poisoning 83 and burning down several peasants' huts. That village was in a mountainous region far away from any urban community or military objective. Those methods were resorted to by the Americans in Korea because their purpose was to exterminate the Korean population. That was why they were afraid of the consideration of the Korean question in the Assembly.

16. However, the Assembly could not ignore the problem, for it was the most acute one facing it at present. The conclusion of negotiations in Korea would constitute the settlement of a basic international problem which at the present time prevented the achievement of agreement on the important questions such as the prohibition of atomic weapons, the institution of international control of atomic energy, the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the conclusion of a peace pact among the great Powers, the convening of a world disarmament conference and other questions, the settlement of which would create the proper conditions for putting an end to the armaments race and to the preparation for a third world war.

17. The representative of the Soviet Union therefore demanded that the Committee reject the three-Power draft resolution and proceed without delay to the consideration of items 17 and 27 of the agenda of the Assembly. Decisions should be adopted with a view to assisting in the conduct of the negotiations in order to help in the achievement of their successful outcome.

18. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) thought that a political discussion at the present juncture would, far from leading to agreement, further enhance the divergencies of opinion in the Committee and thus also among the negotiators in Panmunjom, to whose present differences political differences would be added. An armistice depended on two factors: the one ethical, being the will for peace, and the other realistic, being military balance. One should therefore not add a political element as a third factor.

19. If no further consideration were given to the matter, the decision taken by the First Committee to defer consideration of the Korean problem would have led to a postponement of the problem to the next General Assembly. The three-Power draft was, however, necessary to take care of any unforeseen situation by convening a special session of the General Assembly. Of course, Members could always request the holding of an extraordinary session, but it was of great importance that the Assembly should show its interest in the question by deciding now that such a session would be held when conditions made it desirable. The interest which the Soviet Union appeared to show in having the Korean problem examined should, in fact, lead it to support the proposal for the holding of a session immediately after the signing of an armistice or as soon as it was known that a crisis had occurred.

20. The signing of an armistice depended in fact upon the will to peace of the Soviet Union, but there seemed to be no such will, and it was therefore easy to imagine where discussions in the First Committee at the present juncture would lead. The Soviet Union could do no greater favour to the people of Korea and to mankind than to use its influence so that an armistice was signed quickly, rather than to insist that the Korean question

be discussed in all its bitterness now at the present session of the General Assembly.

21. Mr. BIRECKI (Poland) considered that the representative of the United States, in concert with those of the United Kingdom and France, after having requested the postponement of the consideration of the Korean problem in the First Committee, now wished to eliminate it entirely from the agenda. The reason why they had not asked for such an elimination in the first place was only that such a request at that time would have raised a storm of protest. The present draft resolution was a conclusive proof of the fact that the United States considered Korea its exclusive preserve. However, it was the duty of the Assembly to deal with the question, particularly at the present time, when the three Governments in question, were preparing aggression against the People's Republic of China.

22. The argument, according to which discussion of the Korean problem in the Assembly at the present time would hamper the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, showed the cynicism with which the United States played its role in the Korean conflict. The United States Government wished the United Nations to serve as a smokescreen for its aggression. If it was seriously interested in the independence of Korea, then it could demonstrate its interest by agreeing to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country. The United States Government, being unwilling to do that, considered that discussion of the present item would be premature because the independence of Korea did not fit into its plans.

23. The report of UNCURK sought essentially to justify the conditions of terror which prevailed in Korea under the American occupation régime. Despite the intentions of the authors of the report, it clearly established the responsibility of the Government of the United States for conditions in Korea. That responsibility could not be hidden from world public opinion despite the attempt now made to eliminate the items relevant to that matter from the agenda of the present session. Paragraphs 155 and 174 of the report illustrated what kind of assurances apparently satisfied the Commission. It was far from premature for the Assembly to deal with the problem of the independence of Korea. On the contrary, light should be cast on American doings in that country.

24. The representative of the United States likewise proposed postponement of the discussion of the problem of the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea. In fact, American airplanes were destroying that country. It was premature, indeed, to discuss that question, because the Government of the United States did not want Korea to be reconstructed. The cynicism of the American Government appeared fully in the last paragraph of the draft resolution calling for "voluntary contributions" for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

25. The draft resolution did not stipulate who would be empowered to determine when the time had come to convene a special session of the Assembly. The arbiter of the situation would be the so-called Unified Command and the Assembly would thus find itself entirely in the hands of that Command. That Command again, as revealed by General MacArthur in a testimony before the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate of the United States, was dependent on the War Department and the State Department, so

that the Assembly would be convened at the behest of the Pentagon.

26. Despite the principles of international law, the United States Command continued to press for the exchange of prisoners on a one for one basis, and likewise tried to impose a condition under which the reconstruction of facilities destroyed by Americans would be forbidden. That showed the difficulties raised by the American Command in Korea to prevent the conclusion of an armistice.

27. The American Press itself, as evidenced by the special correspondent of *The New York Times* in Korea as early as November 1951, had admitted that the American army was weary of the Korean war. That newspaper had stated: "the Communist negotiators are regarded by numerous American soldiers as partisans of peace". The armistice depended on the United States General Staff and on the Government of the United States, but the United States did not want any cessation of hostilities. They wished the extension of the conflict into Chinese territory. President Truman, in his State of the Union message for 1952, had made it clear that military action in Korea would continue until an armistice had been signed, provided that the armistice embodied the acceptance of all American conditions.

28. As regards the words "other developments in Korea" in paragraph I of the draft resolution, everybody knew the American preparations for the expansion of the Korean conflict. One needed only to recall General Bradley's mission, in September 1951, designed to assess the risk implicit in such an expansion. Mr. Dean Rusk was now continuing the work of Mr. Dulles in Tokyo, aimed at the remilitarisation of Japan for future war against the People's Republic of China, which the Japanese militarists, according to the plans of the American aggressors, were supposed to wage in concert with the survivors of the Kuomintang in Formosa. The United States, the United Kingdom and France had been plotting against the People's Republic of China for a long time. Their last steps in that connexion had been taken during the recent meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of those three Powers in Washington and during the conversations between President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill. Those Powers wished to have the Korean question removed from the agenda of the Assembly because they did not want the United Nations to hamper those preparations. American methods were revealed in the interview with the United States chargé d'affaires in Rangoon which had appeared in the *New York Herald Tribune* on 29 January 1952, in which the chargé d'affaires had declared that Kuomintang bands operating in Burma were armed not by the United States Government but by American adventurers. It was hardly possible to believe that American adventurers, however great their spirit of enterprise, could actually equip whole divisions.

29. Experience showed that in connexion with the Korean question the United States always adjusted itself to the United Nations when it felt that the United Nations could serve its purposes and objectives. It could thus be expected that the United States wished to reserve the possibility of convening a session of the Assembly at a time which, in its judgment, would be deemed convenient.

30. In view of those considerations, the representative of Poland would vote against the three-Power draft

resolution and in favour of the procedure advocated by the representative of the Soviet Union.

31. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) thought that it might be asked whether the most important events upon which the fate of the world depended were not perhaps taking place outside the orbit of influence of the United Nations. That was a question which should be reflected upon by all governments and by all peoples of the world. There was no doubt, however, that the United Nations could not be required to do what, by virtue of its constitution, it could not do. Korea was the most shining example. He believed that the States which had military forces in Korea as a result of the collective action taken against aggression, particularly the United States of America, were there merely because of a mandate given to them by the United Nations to defend the victim, and that they were sincerely seeking peaceful solutions. Any premature discussion of the problem might upset the armistice negotiations and his delegation would therefore vote for the three-Power draft resolution.

32. If the United Nations, in future, did not tackle the basic problems of the world, it would admit its incapacity to fulfil the functions conferred upon it by the Charter. On the other hand, by not allowing the armistice negotiations to be complicated, it was fulfilling its mission and it was for that reason alone that his delegation would support that draft resolution.

33. Mr. HRSEL (Czechoslovakia) said his delegation regarded the three Powers that had sponsored the draft resolution as trying to prevent a discussion of the Korean question despite the desire of the peace-loving peoples of the world for a contribution by the General Assembly to the solution of the bloody struggle. There had been manoeuvres from the outset to prevent debate on the Korean question. First of all, the United States had demanded that discussion be deferred to the end of the session on the grounds that it might have embarrassed the armistice negotiations. It was, however, the duty of the Assembly to facilitate those negotiations. At the present stage, the United States proposed that there be no debate whatsoever. The United States having unleashed war in the Far East, did not desire to have its criminal acts discussed but rather wished to enlarge its aggressive adventure.

34. The reason for the absence of any settlement as yet was the policy of the United States which was directed towards arousing hatred against the People's Republics of Korea and of China. The United States refused to recognize the Central People's Government of China and consistently rejected proposals for a peaceful settlement in Korea. It had only been after the initiative of the Soviet Union that the State Department had been forced to begin negotiations. However, it would not bring them to a conclusion because it sought not peace, but new military operations in the Far East.

35. The United States had failed to enter with the necessary spirit of goodwill into the negotiations at Kaesong. When the Korean delegation had made concessions, the United States had raised new obstacles. Eventually, the United States had succeeded in making negotiations impossible in Kaesong by violations of the neutral zone. Since the beginning of negotiations at Panmunjom, United States actions had been no more than part of a campaign to pretend that a peaceful solution was impossible and that the only solution was a world war.

36. The militaristic nature of the United States policy had been revealed in the First Committee. In the discussion of the Kuomintang slanders, the United States had indicated its readiness to engage in new aggressive acts. Their plans, for example, on the frontiers of Burma were quite transparent.

37. The three-Power draft resolution was not a serious approach to a solution but an attempt to secure indefinite postponement. The reference to "premature consideration" of such a fundamental question was mere cynicism. The issue was the maintenance of peace and the proposal was merely a reflection of the policy of undermining the negotiations which could bring an end to the war.

38. The Czechoslovak delegation protested against the procedure which had been followed in the consideration of the proposal at the dictates of the Anglo-American bloc. It rejected the draft resolution and supported the Soviet motion that the First Committee should examine the question of the independence of Korea.

39. Mr. GARSON (Canada) said his delegation would vote for the joint draft resolution. It obviously was good sense to avoid adding difficulties to the armistice negotiations. In striving to aid Korea to independence, the United Nations had met and contained aggression. It seemed essential to defer political discussion on the long-term solution until the negotiations had led to an armistice. The statements made by the Soviet Union Foreign Minister could leave no doubt that consideration of the matter would only make negotiations more difficult. It might have been possible to contribute to progress by a calm and dispassionate discussion, but the Soviet Union representatives had limited their contributions to abuse and propaganda.

40. The three-Power draft resolution proved how wrong the Soviet Union Foreign Minister had been on several occasions. On 12 January, he had charged that the United States and United Kingdom representatives wished to postpone consideration of the Korean question *sine die* and to remove it from the agenda. The draft resolution proposed postponement only until the conclusion of an armistice in Korea or when other developments made consideration of the Korean question desirable. The proposal would have the matter considered only when something positive could be achieved.

41. With regard to part II of the draft resolution, Mr. Garson recalled that under the terms of resolution 410 (V), the General Assembly had shown the intention of aiding Korea to restore its economy. 205, out of 250 million dollars had already been pledged. The Canadian Government had given its support from the start and had paid out \$7,250,000. Mr. Garson expressed confidence that the remainder would be provided by other States. His delegation would support that part of the draft resolution.

42. With regard to the remarks made by the representative of the United States regarding the deferment of that part of agenda item 11 which related to chapter VII, section I of the Economic and Social Council's report, Mr. Garson suggested that in his report the Rapporteur should note the point concerning the deferment, since it was not covered in the draft resolution.

43. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said it was clear from the draft resolution that the three Powers did not find it convenient to discuss the Korean question in view of the political and military

situation. Behind the screen of the United Nations, the United States was determined to prosecute the war further. The unwillingness to seek a solution either at Panmunjom or in the General Assembly, revealed the true attitude of the United States towards the Korean people. The war in Korea had resulted from the aggressive policy of the United States which was directed towards the preparation of a new war. Everything possible was being done to suppress Korean demands for deliverance from the colonial yoke. The communiqué on the Truman-Churchill conversations had announced a community of views regarding the Far East and full support for the war in Korea.

44. The United States disseminated lies about atrocities on the part of the North Koreans and the Chinese volunteers. But under the flag of the United Nations, the United States was indulging in every sort of brutality. Full reports had been given on the tortures and massacres in the prisoner of war camps which were aimed at forcing the prisoners to disclose military secrets. The American air pirates scattered napalm and high explosives on peaceful populations, while the warships bombarded fishing villages. Those massacres resulted from the failure of the American imperialists in Korea who had resorted to terrorism in order to force the population to accept the United States conditions.

45. Mr. Kiselyov quoted newspaper reports to indicate, on the one hand, that the Anglo-American bloc was prepared to extend the war, while blaming the Chinese and North Korean Governments for the failure of the negotiations and to show, on the other hand, that world public opinion demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

46. The three-Power draft resolution would circumvent the Security Council which had been given certain responsibilities under the Charter. The United States regarded the Security Council as an obstacle to its aggressive policy and attempted to substitute the General Assembly for it where it could wield its mechanical majority. The goal of the draft resolution was to ignore the Security Council in violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations.

47. The representative of Canada had asserted that the Soviet Union representatives had resorted to propaganda. However, the representative of Canada had produced no facts or evidence and it was incontestable that a war was being waged and United States troops were participating, while there were no troops from the Soviet Union or the People's Democracies. The world knew that the United States could end the war in Korea immediately, but its ruling circles were terrified lest a cease-fire hamper the armaments race that was the sole prop of its economy.

48. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR believed that they should reject the three-Power draft resolution and proceed to consider the Korean question.

49. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) said that the debate had taken a form which made it difficult to study calmly the considerations advanced by the sponsors of the joint draft resolution. Despite the importance of the issue, they were being required to give their views very rapidly. The Chilean delegation had been prepared to examine the item seriously, but could not judge the merits of the situation so rapidly. The Chilean Government believed that the nations best qualified to judge the desirability of a political discussion were those which had undertaken the primary military responsibility. Although

the reasons which had been advanced for a deferment were not fully shared, the Chilean Government believed that those nations had been right in assuming the responsibility of making a judgment.

50. Mr. Trucco recalled that he had forecast in the First Committee that a discussion on postponement would lead to a situation where the Soviet Union would propagandize and enter into substantive matters, while others sat by in embarrassed silence. That had in fact happened. The representatives of the Soviet Union had posed as the initiators of the armistice negotiations. In fact, the Soviet Union proposal laid down the same terms as those which had been previously proposed by the United Nations and rejected by the Peking régime. Those omitted political matters which had previously been urged on various occasions as essential prerequisites. In the interval between the last presentation of the United Nations proposals and their repetition by the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of lives had been lost. In view of the difficulties encountered in the negotiations, it could be asked whether the Soviet Union had been sincere in stating that it favoured first a solution of the military problem or whether it had just been making propaganda. The essential point was that the negotiations were in no way due to the initiative of the Soviet Union.

51. Having been the Chilean representative on UNCURK, Mr. Trucco was aware of many urgent problems which had to be attended to. He believed it would still be possible to examine the reports and the activities of the Korean Reconstruction Agency. A technical analysis of the report need not lead to dangerous political discussions. A study of the needs of Korea and of the action taken by the Agent General could ensure the success of the Negotiating Committee referred to in part II of the draft resolution. Mr. Trucco believed that UNCURK should have sought means for the General Assembly to examine the functions and powers of an organ that had been established in different circumstances than existed at the present time.

52. Public opinion expected constructive and resolute action to stop aggressive adventures. The action taken in the case of Korea would determine the attitude of other small nations which found themselves in similar situations. The Chilean delegation would, however, abstain on the joint draft resolution in view of the considerations it had stated.

53. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) noted that the USSR and its supporters had repeated the falsehood that the United Nations or the United States was guilty of aggression in Korea. In addition to the evidence of the report of UNCURK to which he had already referred, he wished to draw attention to the report the United Nations Commission had adopted on 4 September 1950 which stated, in the section containing its analysis and conclusions, that the invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea carried out by the North Korean authorities on 25 June 1950 had been an act of aggression initiated without warning or provocation in execution of a well prepared plan designed to secure control of the whole of Korea either by undermining the Republic of Korea from within or by direct aggression.

54. Mr. Malik had described his statement of 23 June 1951 as "an initiative" on the part of the Soviet Union, but Mr. Gross wished to repeat the view he had already expressed, that on 23 June, the world had received an indication, too long deferred, that the

aggressors in Korea were at last seeking to begin armistice negotiations. From the beginning, the United Nations had maintained the initiative for peace and his Government had loyally supported the United Nations to that end.

55. Reviewing the many instances of United Nations and United States attempts to negotiate in Korea, he recalled that the United Nations Commission had been requested by the Security Council on 25 June 1950 to establish contact with the North Korean authorities so as to obtain an immediate cessation of hostilities⁶, but had been unable to do so. On 27 June 1950, the United States Ambassador had requested the USSR Government to use its influence to secure the withdrawal of the invading forces of the North Korean authorities. The USSR had replied recalling its traditional principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. The USSR had then vetoed a United States draft resolution in the Security Council⁷ calling on all States to use their influence with the North Korean authorities to secure a withdrawal. The USSR had voted against the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950⁸. In November 1950, it had vetoed the six-power draft resolution in the Security Council, calling on all States to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities⁹. Again, as part of the efforts made at the fifth session of the General Assembly to negotiate a cease-fire, the Unified Command had at once sent representatives to discuss specific points with the cease-fire group appointed by the Assembly; that group had subsequently reported the refusal of the Peking régime to enter into a cease-fire agreement except on impossible conditions.

56. Where had been the initiative of the USSR in those and other instances? The record showed the real motives animating the United Nations and the United States. In contrast, the USSR proposed a four-point programme supposedly designed to facilitate the negotiations in Korea, including: (a) the introduction of political issues such as the withdrawal of forces from all of Korea; (b) the proposal for an armistice line on the thirty-eighth parallel, a matter already settled by the negotiators in Korea; (c) the discussion of military questions in Paris; and (d) insult of the United Nations negotiators. In contrast, the United Nations sought a just and honest armistice as soon as possible, and would proceed immediately thereafter to a sober consideration of the problem of Korea.

57. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that throughout the current session the United States and others had attempted to prevent the General Assembly from considering the Korean question, though that question had been included in the agenda by the United States. His delegation and others, however, would not bow to the dictates of the United States and followed the peace-loving position of the USSR, which was gaining increasing support in the United Nations.

58. The United States representative had again repeated the fabrication that aggression in Korea had originated from North Korea. The whole world knew that that

⁶ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, 473rd meeting.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 482nd meeting.

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 294th meeting.

⁹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, 524th meeting.

aggression had in fact been started by the United States as part of its plan for world domination, and a repetition of the falsehood would merely produce the opposite of the effect intended.

59. Pointing out how right the USSR had been in declaring that the United States wished to prevent consideration of the Korean question by the General Assembly, Mr. Baranovsky said that a new procedure had been devised to circumvent the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. An illegal new Main Committee had been set up and had established its own competence to deal with matters which had not been referred to it. Why was the General Assembly now not to consider the report of a commission established at the previous session by the United States? Had it been thought that the matter was not political at the time of its inclusion in the agenda? The answer was to be found in the existing military state of affairs in Korea. American military circles had hoped to discuss the question in the General Assembly after securing victory so as to be able to dictate what would happen next. The heroic resistance of the North Koreans and of the Chinese volunteers had thwarted that hope.

60. In that connexion, Mr. Baranovsky cited a recent article by Hanson Baldwin which had made a pessimistic appraisal of the prospects facing a new United States offensive and had concluded that the present bargaining must be continued. Similarly, Admiral Joy had recently admitted that the United States relied upon a favourable change in the military situation. It was clear that the United States negotiators, despite the great concessions made by the North Koreans and Chinese volunteers, had never intended that the negotiations should be successful, and had raised new conditions to that end, such as those concerning the prisoners of war and airfields. Such conditions were of the kind imposed only on a defeated enemy, and had been presented to enable the United States to break off negotiations and start the war again when it was ready.

61. The United States and its friends regarded Korea as a testing ground for expansion in the Far East. Their objective was now China and other Asian countries, and, in the first place, Burma. They wished to prevent consideration of the Korean question in the General Assembly to avoid exposure of United States policy and plans.

62. Turning to the joint draft resolution, Mr. Baranovsky said that the ostensible aims set out in the preamble would logically call for directives to the United States Command to cease hostilities. That however, was not the case. It was impossible to state a problem in a resolution and not propose a way of resolving it. The second part of the preamble revealed the real purpose, namely, the desire to avoid consideration at the current session. As Mr. Vyshinsky had pointed out, the United States evaded consideration in order to block a peaceful settlement and because of the fear that discussion would undermine the whole United States position and would reveal United States responsibility for the war in Korea. In that connexion, Mr. Baranovsky cited a recent statement in the French newspaper *Liberation* to the effect that Washington opposed the desire of the small Powers to continue the current session in Paris because it deemed the climate unsuitable.

63. The joint draft resolution provided for the convening of a special session in a manner completely contrary to the Charter and would represent a further infringement on the powers of the Security Council in that a special

session was to be convened illegally by the Secretary-General. There was no reason to postpone consideration of the important question of the independence and the unification of Korea, which brooked no delay, and he therefore supported the USSR proposal.

64. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) said that he had been made most aware of the difficulties besetting endeavours in pursuit of peace in an atmosphere of bitter recrimination. He hoped that the Soviet bloc did not underestimate the importance, already stressed throughout the current session, of lowering the temperature of international debate. He denied the allegation that the calling of the current meeting had been due to behind the scenes manoeuvring. There was nothing in the rules of procedure to prevent such a meeting. It was easy to say, as the USSR representative had said, that no arguments had been submitted. He would, however, repeat that the purposes of the United Nations were to secure an armistice, to reach a political settlement and to rehabilitate Korea.

65. As for the repetition of the USSR allegation as to the origin of the hostilities in Korea, Mr. Lloyd said that such repetition was an insult to the intelligence of those who had any acquaintance with the facts. In connexion with the question as to who had raised the matter of airfields, he pointed out that Mr. Vyshinsky, apart from calling for a return to the thirty-eighth parallel, had wanted to discuss anything which had held up the negotiations in Korea. That would naturally include the matter of airfields. The USSR statement that the issue of airfields represented interference in the domestic affairs of North Korea was a direct example of the political arguments to be expected from discussion of the question of Korea, arguments which might well make the negotiations go on for ever. How did the statement that the United States was preparing for more and better aggression assist the negotiations in Korea?

66. With regard to the Ukrainian SSR's representative's question as to why the matter had been put on the agenda if it had not been intended to discuss it, Mr. Lloyd answered that it had been believed that the negotiations would have been successful long before the time the General Assembly concluded. He reiterated his belief that the discussion of the question in the First Committee had been in part responsible for the difficulties encountered. He considered that it was the United Nations, rather than the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists, who had made the concessions in the negotiations. In any case, could not the negotiators be allowed to get on with the job, leaving the General Assembly to sketch a blue-print for future action following the armistice? The Chinese Communists and the North Koreans must realize the dangers involved. Any small fire could easily become a large one, and statements such as those that had just been heard from representatives of the Soviet bloc amounted to pouring fuel on the flames. The world was longing for peace, and the constant public emphasis on the hostilities and differences that existed alarmed everyone. He considered that there was nothing in the joint draft resolution to which exception could be taken, or which would in any way commit nations which wished to avoid taking sides.

67. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the joint draft resolution called for action to be taken only after the ostensible aims of that proposal, namely the facilitating of negotiations and the conclusion of an armistice had been achieved. That was a contradiction, which resulted from the fear that discus-

sion would produce criticism and that discussion in the General Assembly would indeed facilitate the negotiations. Since the war in Korea was supposedly that of the United Nations, why was the United Nations to be regarded as an outsider who must not interfere? That sort of argument implicitly admitted that the war was not that of the United Nations, and corroborated the USSR thesis in that respect.

68. The United States representative had repeated the allegation that the aggression in Korea had originated from the North Korean side, and had referred once again to the notorious report of the United Nations Commission. That report had long since been exposed in the Security Council as a MacArthur fabrication, signed, *inter alia*, by the Kuomintang representative, and had never been considered seriously. The reference to it showed the dearth of facts at the command of the United States representative. The head of the USSR delegation had recently quoted an article by General Willoughby revealing that the South Korean armed forces had been in full battle array before the beginning of hostilities. That officer had presumably been better informed than the Commission. The recently published secret report of General Wedemeyer on his visit to Korea, in which he advocated the transformation of Korea into a buffer state to be effected by United States troops occupying it, had served, as was clear from subsequent events, as the basis of United States policy. The imperialistic thesis of Wedemeyer had recently been endorsed by Walter Lippman in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 3 January to the effect that the United States should seek recognition of the whole of Korea as a buffer state between the great Powers. It was sheer hypocrisy to speak of the independence of Korea against that background.

69. In the Senate inquiry into the relieving of General MacArthur of his Command, it had been revealed that the United States position in the United Nations had required it to agree to negotiations without any intention of securing a successful conclusion. The world knew of the efforts of the USSR to settle the Korean problem peacefully. It knew that the USSR had taken the initiative towards a peaceful settlement. Generalissimo Stalin had thus called for a peaceful solution of the matter by the Security Council in July 1950. The USSR proposal in the Council, however, had been rejected by the Anglo-American bloc, who had prevented North Korean participation in the Council's work. The USSR proposals, at the fifth session of the General Assembly, providing for immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and for participation by representatives of North and South Korea had also been rejected by that bloc. All the manoeuvres witnessed at the sixth session had been designed to permit continuation of the aggression in the Far East.

70. Referring to the conference of the Chiefs-of-Staffs of the three Powers in Washington during the Churchill-Truman talks, Mr. Malik said that he had been instructed to declare that responsibility for any expansion of aggression in the Far East, and for the consequences thereof, would rest entirely upon the United States and its followers. The United States attitude and actions revealed the intention to continue aggression in Korea and to expand aggression in the Far East. The facts adduced showed that the Anglo-American bloc sought a third world war, which had already started in the war against the peoples of Africa and Asia. Though the representatives of that bloc wished to avoid discussion

of vital and important questions, they would not be able to cover up their true designs.

71. The CHAIRMAN stated that a vote would be taken first on the joint draft resolution as that proposal had been submitted first.

72. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), pointing out that adoption of the USSR proposal would exclude the need of a vote on the joint draft resolution, called for a vote on the USSR proposal first.

73. Mr. AL-GHOSSAIN (Yemen) requested that the vote on the joint draft resolution be taken paragraph by paragraph.

74. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) requested a roll-call vote on the joint draft resolution as a whole.

75. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the USSR motion to vote first on the USSR proposal.

The USSR motion was rejected by 44 votes to 5, with 9 abstentions.

76. The CHAIRMAN then put the joint draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (A/C.1/713-A/C.2&3/104) to the vote in parts, as requested.

The preamble was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

The first operative paragraph was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

The second operative paragraph was adopted by 52 votes to none, with 6 abstentions.

77. The CHAIRMAN then called for a vote on the joint draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call as follows :

Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour : Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba.

Against : Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Abstaining : Chile, Yemen.

The joint draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

78. The CHAIRMAN then put the motion submitted by the USSR to the vote.

The USSR motion was rejected by 52 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

79. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel), explaining his vote, considered the resolution adopted by the Committee to be a procedural one. The clear declaration of policy in the preamble could be opposed by no one who sincerely wanted peace. Though he had understood that facilitation of the negotiations in Korea was a common goal, the violent language used by those opposing the resolution led to anxiety. His country had had occasion

to note the relationship between violent public expression and hostile political aims. In supporting the resolution, his delegation had been guided by the objective of the speedy restoration of peace in Korea. Discussion of the future of that country, while fighting was still going on, would not facilitate the conclusion of an armistice. Expressing confidence that such an armistice would be reached, he trusted that no such exigencies as contemplated in paragraph 1 (b) of the resolution would arise

if all those who had any direct influence on the situation in Korea would join forces to ensure the will of the United Nations, which was so widely supported all over the world.

80. The CHAIRMAN in the absence of further comments, stated that consideration of the items before the Committees was thus concluded.

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.