



Tuesday, 29 January 1952, at 10.30 a.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

CONTENTS

Page

Agenda item 23: Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (A/C.1/711) (continued)....	275
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Chairman: Mr. Finn Moe (Norway)

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Carlos Blanco (Cuba), the Vice-Chairman, presided.*

**Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (A/C.1/711) (continued)**

[Item 23]\*

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that under rule 114 the right of reply would be accorded to the representatives of the United States and France.
2. Mr. COOPER (United States) stated that at the 503rd meeting he had given on behalf of the United States a categorical denial of the charge made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union at the 477th meeting that the United States was transporting troops of the Chinese Nationalist Government to Thailand and Burma for aggressive purposes.
3. The representative of the Soviet Union had, however, distorted the denial and repeated the false charges. Mr. Cooper again categorically and specifically denied the charges.
4. In view of the repetition of the accusations he was prompted again to ask whether the Soviet Union was trying to pave the way for aggression in South East Asia. Mr. Cooper repeated the view of the Government of the United States that such an event would be a matter of direct and grave concern to the United Nations and would call for urgent and earnest consideration.
5. The representative of Burma, when he had stated (504th meeting) that the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma had arrived in 1942 and in 1949, had in effect contradicted the assertion of the Soviet Union representative. The Burmese representative further said that there was no evidence of any connexion between the United States and that body

of Chinese and that he accepted the statement that there was none.

6. Mr. Cooper wished to make it clear that the United States policy in this regard was not limited to South East Asia. Aggression anywhere would be a matter of concern to the United Nations. Mr. Cooper added that United States policy did not seek territorial aggrandisement anywhere but was directed towards peace and freedom.

7. The Soviet Union representative had attempted at the preceding meeting to cast doubt upon the authenticity and reliability of the evidence submitted by the United States to show that there had been violations by the Soviet Union of its treaty obligations. Mr. Cooper recalled his statement (503rd meeting) that the looting of Manchuria at the end of the Second World War by the Soviet Union had been a blow at China and a violation of the treaty. The Soviet Union representative had only attacked the members of the Pauley Mission sent to Manchuria by the United States and had not denied the charges. Indeed, it had been the position of the Soviet Union at the time that it had removed Japanese booty.

8. In connexion with the point that the Soviet Union had been bound to give aid only to the Nationalist Government but had assisted the communist régime, the Soviet Union representative had merely asserted that there had been no evidence of Soviet Union equipment but only of United States equipment. It should, however, be noted that no reply had been given to the charge that the Soviet Union had permitted the Communist régime to secure large stocks of Japanese war equipment.

9. Mr. Cooper emphasized the authenticity of the evidence that had been given and the failure of the Soviet Union representative to reply to the charges. The United States believed that the facts supported a finding that the Soviet Union had violated the solemn obligations of the treaty of 14 August 1945. The First Committee and the General Assembly should make a pronouncement on the side of international law and order.

10. Mr. LACOSTE (France), referring to the question asked at the preceding meeting by the representative of Burma, said that the answer to that question was obvious. He wished to declare that the French Government was opposed to all forms of aggression everywhere.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

11. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that the statements made by the representatives of Cuba, Peru and the United States reflected views which the world would eventually appreciate as serving the cause of peace.

12. The speakers of the " Soviet bloc " had drawn attention to changes in the attitude of the United States and had explained them on two grounds: the plans of the United States for war and imperialism in south-east Asia and the influence of the Chinese lobbyists in Washington. Both those factors were non-existent. The change which had taken place in public opinion in the United States had been caused by the events of the last two years which had shown the true meaning of developments in the Far East since the Second World War. A similar change was to be expected in other nations and for the same reasons. The mistakes and aggressive plans of the enemies of the peace would lead to the conclusion that communism was the great danger.

13. With regard to the statement of the representative of France, Mr. Tsiang recalled the passage in the memoirs of Paul Reynaud concerning the handling by France and the United Kingdom of the Ethiopian question in the League of Nations. At the time there had been a statement in the House of Commons by Colonel Wedgwood to the effect that those two Powers could not be relied upon except when their own interests were at stake. Mr. Tsiang feared that the attitude of France in the question under consideration would lead to a repetition of the failure engineered by Laval at the time of the examination of the Ethiopian question.

14. With regard to the statement of the representative of Burma, Mr. Tsiang wished to point out that General Li Mi, mentioned by the representative of Burma, had been sent to southern Yunnan three years previously and had assumed the character of a Garibaldi. The troops in that area were inaccessible to the Chinese Government and the general had become independent of the government. The Government had sent no reinforcements of troops to General Li Mi and had no intention of making Burma a military base. Since the speech of the Soviet Union Foreign Minister at the 477th meeting of the First Committee and reports in certain British newspapers, the Chinese Foreign Minister had formally denied those baseless charges.

15. The statements of the " Soviet bloc " had evaded the charges. The Soviet Union representative had glorified the role of the Soviet Union army in the defeat of Japan although its contribution, a mere formality and of only five days' duration, began after the Japanese Government had already decided to seek peace. The Soviet Union representative had also repeated the threadbare story that the Chinese communist troops had used United States equipment. Mr. Tsiang recalled that in this statement at the 502nd meeting he had exposed that myth.

16. One of the main themes of the " Soviet bloc " had been that the Nationalist Government of China was the tool of western imperialists and particularly of the United States. The record of the Nationalist Government however, was clear. Beginning in the twenties after the First World War as a revolutionary government, its first aim had been to abolish the unequal treaties and rid China of imperialism. In the course of fifteen years it had been successful in ridding China of all the unequal treaties which had deprived China of control of her tariffs, granted extraterritorial rights to foreigners and established foreign settlement and concessions. Only the Soviet Union did not relinquish its special rights and privileges in Manchuria.

17. The Soviet Union representative had asserted at the 504th meeting that there had been inaccuracies in the Chinese representatives description of the provisions in the

1945 agreement relating to control of Manchurian railways. Mr. Tsiang recalled that he had asserted only that the Soviet Union had control of the two main trunk lines. The Soviet Union representative had claimed that the arrangement was an equal one and that in fact on the board of directors China had had a majority. However, he had omitted to state that decisions could not be taken by the six votes held by China, nor had he admitted that the agreement provided that the general manager should be a Russian. In practice, that was a most important point for when the board of directors was deadlocked the general manager ran the railroad. Even supposing that the equality had been real rather than nominal, it was a strange form of equality that gave the Soviet Union the same footing as China in the control and management of a Chinese railroad. The nations of the East expected more than the nominal equality offered by the Soviet Union.

18. The Soviet Union representative had contrasted the treaty of 1945 with that of 1950 between the USSR and communist China. It might be noted that the former treaty contained provisions for its abrogation, and a unilateral declaration that it was invalid was itself a violation of the treaty. But the reason why the treaty of 1950 compared favourably with that of 1945 was that the régime in the three eastern provinces of China was an instrument of Soviet policy and it made no difference who had the nominal control of ports and railroads.

19. Instead of facing those facts, the statements of the " Soviet bloc ", continued to speak of the imperialism of the United States. However, in the course of a hundred years the United States had neither asked nor received any Chinese territory or port or the control of any railways or mines. Lend-lease aid during the Second World War and post-war assistance from UNRRA, which had largely been furnished by the United States, had been given without any political or economic conditions. At the present time the United States had neither sought nor received any political or economic concessions on Taiwan (Formosa).

20. While the Nationalist Government of China had always opposed imperialism, it had different views from the communist theory that capitalism was necessarily imperialistic and that a socialist system could not be. Mr. Tsiang recalled that neither the Mongols nor the Manchus, both of whom had established great empires, were far from being capitalistic. Russia itself, even at the end of its period of expansion at the end of the nineteenth century, could not be regarded as a capitalist nation. History showed that any system was capable of imperialism. Capitalism could be imperialistic but it assumed different forms. The capitalism of the United States depended mainly on the domestic market and the Wall Street bankers fully realized that the basis of prosperity was the purchasing power of the people who were the prospective customers. That was a lesson not yet learned by the Soviet Union which tried to grow fat on the miseries of Asia.

21. The Nationalist Government had been opposed to imperialism but nevertheless it sought to renew relations after the abolition of the unequal treaties. It had believed in co-operation, not in isolation and hostility. The three principles of Sun Yat-sen were national independence, democracy and the people's livelihood. To achieve only nationalism was to fail in two-thirds of the task.

22. The people's livelihood was a real problem for under-developed nations. Their own resources were inadequate to furnish both social services and capital for industrial development. If those two matters were to proceed together, the technical knowledge and the capital of more developed nations should be used on a co-operative basis. The

Nationalist Government of China would not allow its nationalism and anti-imperialism to prevent it from seeking co-operation as an equal. That was why the Soviet Union had been unable to accept a free and independent China.

23. The attitude of the Nationalist Government towards imperialism had been reflected by its stand in the United Nations. The Chinese representative had advocated the freedom of Indonesia and had also expressed the hope that independence would be followed by friendly relations with the Netherlands. Similarly, in the Iranian dispute the Chinese representative had hoped that the nationalization of the oil industry would be followed by good relations between Iran and the United Kingdom. Imperialism should be opposed but co-operation should not be rejected.

24. The other main theme of the "Soviet bloc" was that the Nationalist Government was reactionary, incompetent and corrupt. Nevertheless the Soviet Union in 1945 had entered into a thirty-year partnership with that Government for the important purpose of fighting against Japan and preventing the resurgence of Japanese imperialism. In the years from 1935 to 1937, the official views of the Soviet Union, as stated on numerous occasions in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, were that there was no alternative to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek to lead China in the struggle against Japan.

25. Japan had attacked China in 1937 not because the Government was reactionary but because of fear that that Government could put China on a modern basis and end the Japanese oppression. Similarly, since 1945, the Soviet Union had obstructed that Government because of the fear that it would lead China to independence. No other Government in the past fifty years had the record of withstanding unaided the onslaught of a major Power. Even when the more developed half of China had been occupied, the Government had continued the war from the western part of the country although it had no surplus to devote to defence purposes. The inevitable result was inflation which undermined civil and military morale.

26. The Nationalist Government had been the first to organize a ministry of agriculture which had developed better rice and cotton. Even during the war irrigation projects in the north western part of the country had been continued. It had instituted one of the first state public health services. In transportation, finance and industry there had been extensive nationalization. In effect, it had been a socialist type of government and the charge that it was reactionary was no more than libel.

27. The quotation from the former Acting President of China concerning the objectives of Chiang Kai-shek had been extracted from a campaign speech which had not been too accurate. The facts were that China had participated in the first two world wars but had derived no benefit from them and had no share in the war guilt. China would never seek salvation through a world war. There were, however, 400 million Chinese suffering on the mainland and it was a duty to give them moral and material aid in their struggle. There was no thought of reconquering the mainland from Taiwan but only the Chinese people could save China.

28. In bringing the problem under consideration before the United Nations no material aid had been requested by the Chinese Government. That Government had asked the United Nations to tell the world the real cause of those events. The voice of the United Nations on the moral issue would be of great help to the Chinese people.

29. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the United States representative, who had been made uneasy by the disclosure of certain plans for aggression in south-east Asia, had attempted to deny the facts adduced in that connexion.

The United States representative had also said at the 503rd meeting that adoption of the draft resolution submitted by the Kuomintang would not in itself undo what had been done. It might be asked, therefore, what else was being prepared.

30. Mr. Katz-Suchy also asked the United States representative whether it was true that United States planes were dropping supplies to the 93rd Kuomintang division stationed in eastern Burma, and that Americans were serving with that division. Was it true that those forces had been reinforced by United States planes? Was it true that the United States had decided to bomb bases in Manchuria and to open full-scale war against China, plans in which the United Kingdom had been persuaded to join?

31. Clarification of those questions, and of the report on the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on 11 January 1952 in Washington would be much more helpful than the denial made by the United States representative.

32. Mr. LACOSTE (France), referring to the last statement of the representative of China, felt that the allusion to France was hardly an appropriate one with regard to a country which had undertaken such disinterested sacrifice for the cause of peace as had France in Indo-China.

33. Mr. V. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the United States representative had not refuted a single fact in the USSR statement (504th meeting). The United States representative had explained that the Kuomintang forces had been in Burma for a long time, though the Kuomintang representative had pointed out that they had been there for three years. In any case, how did the length of time change the situation?

34. Had the facts and the statements of official political leaders in Burma, referred to by the USSR delegation, concerning the United States assistance to the six Kuomintang divisions in Burma been refuted? Those forces provided a centre for a possible new act of aggression by the United States. They were virtually under United States command and could at any time be used as an aggressive weapon and transform Burma—as the Burmese representative feared—into a battlefield.

35. Had the United States representative denied the fact that the recent conference of the Chiefs of Staff of the three western Powers in Washington had drawn up plans for aggression against south-east Asia? The question asked of the USSR by the United States representative was obviously provocative. Mr. Malik asked the United States representative whether he denied the Burmese statement concerning the presence of the Kuomintang divisions and whether he denied the presence of United States army officers with that division. If the Burmese statement was true, why were those forces there, and why had the United States not taken any steps to liquidate them? The Burmese representative had referred to the threat presented by Kuomintang troops which were preparing aggression against the Chinese people. The facts indicated that the United States was helping and training Kuomintang troops for activities directed against the Chinese People's Republic.

36. In accordance with its policy of peace, the USSR had drawn attention to Press reports to the effect that the United States was sending Kuomintang troops to various parts of south-east Asia to prepare new aggression against the People's Republic of China. Calling for a clear statement by the United States representative, Mr. Malik declared that no reference to the requirements of United States defence or to alleged aggression by the People's Republic of China could enable the United States to evade responsibility for the situation.

CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY CHINA (A/C.1/711) AND THE AMENDMENTS THERETO.

37. The CHAIRMAN declared the general debate closed.

38. He invited the members of the Committee to explain their votes on the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of China.

39. Mr. RESTREPO JARAMILLO (Colombia) said that if the General Assembly were to disregard permanently the Chinese complaint, it would allow a *fait accompli* to cover all sins. That could not be permitted. The United Nations had from the very beginning suffered under the handicap of having accepted such *faits accomplis* as the occupation of the Baltic States by the USSR. The United Nations had been set up in order to oppose solutions based on force, but if it allowed *faits accomplis* to pass unnoticed, it would be starting down on a slope which would result, in the last analysis, in the resort to force.

40. Facts such as the USSR assistance to the communists in the civil war in China, the North Korean aggression against South Korea, and the Chinese communist participation in that aggression, must be faced. The representation of Colombia therefore supported the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/711).

41. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) considered that the complaint under discussion, which had been before the General Assembly for several years, was really one of academic importance and referred to a period of history which had been particularly confused. While he had no desire to draw a veil over the past, it did not seem that the future course of events could materially be influenced by adoption of the Chinese draft resolution. His delegation felt it desirable to concentrate on positive proposals for allaying the current tension, and he would therefore abstain from voting on the Chinese draft resolution.

42. Referring to the Polish representative's remarks concerning Mr. Lloyd's statement on the Burmese issue, Sir Gladwyn pointed out that Mr. Lloyd had actually said at the 503rd meeting that the charges were not to be believed for one moment and that they were to be regretted not only because they were "not true" but because they did not "help to relieve the tension".

43. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand) said that his delegation was in agreement with the last paragraph of the preamble of the Chinese draft resolution and would consequently agree that the USSR had failed to carry out the treaty of friendship of 1945. He would have to reserve his position regarding the implication of the words "violated the Treaty".

44. He had therefore submitted an amendment (A/C.1/715) to replace those words in the operation paragraph by the words "failed to carry out the Treaty".

45. Mr. WILSON (New Zealand) would abstain from voting on the Chinese draft resolution.

46. He had been instructed to state that his Government was disturbed lest the charges made by the USSR be used to cover up plans for future communist aggression in south-east Asia. The United Nations must be constantly on the alert when freedom was threatened.

47. The New Zealand delegate therefore associated himself with the declarations made in that connexion by the representative of the United States.

48. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines) said that the representative of China had submitted specific evidence in support of the charges made against the USSR. That evidence had not been refuted by the USSR representative,

who had preferred to deal with irrelevant matters. That fact strengthened the belief that the charges were true and could not be disproved.

49. The USSR representative asserted that the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Government had been due to its internal weakness. Even assuming that to be true, there was no justification for having given aid and comfort to the opposition.

50. Mr. Macapagal welcomed the statements of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France regarding Mr. Vyshinsky's speech at the 477th meeting. His Government would support any initiative which the United Nations might take to thwart any new aggression in south-east Asia.

51. There was no doubt as to the General Assembly's right to take the action asked of it in the Chinese draft resolution. Pointing out that the wrong committed could not be regarded as academic, he stated that the need of a pronouncement by the General Assembly was inescapable because of the importance of the parties involved in the treaty in question, and because of the USSR's record of disregard for treaties.

52. The delegation of the Philippines would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by China.

53. Mr. DE PIMENTEL BRANDAO (Brazil) supported the Chinese draft resolution.

54. The case of China differed from that of other victims of USSR imperialism in that physical resistance was still continuing on Formosa. China was therefore in a position particularly fitted for exposing the nature of that imperialism.

55. Mr. HRSEL (Czechoslovakia) said that the provocative character of the Kuomintang libel had been clearly exposed.

56. The United States statements had strengthened the conviction that the United States was preparing systematically for aggressive action in the Far East against the People's Republic of China, and he therefore called for a clear answer to the questions put by the representatives of the USSR and of Poland.

57. The Chinese people had close bonds with the USSR. They were aware of the danger of intervention by the United States; they were also aware of who had oppressed them in the past. Friendship with the USSR was not the kind of friendship manifested by the imperialist Powers, as his country, which rejoiced in that friendship, could testify.

58. He rejected the private Kuomintang complaint which should not be entertained under any circumstances.

59. Faris El-KHOURY Bey (Syria) would abstain from voting on the Chinese draft resolution.

60. The Interim Committee had unfortunately left unaltered the position which had obtained during the consideration of the same question at the fifth session of the General Assembly. At that session the Syrian delegation had proposed that the matter be referred to the Interim Committee—because there had been insufficient evidence to form a basis for judgment—in order that that committee might gather more evidence and information relative to the question.

61. There were two aspects to the question: in the first place, the proposed condemnation of the USSR would not help alleviate the prevailing tension and, in the second place, there was no proof of the charges levelled against the USSR. In that connexion, the representative of Syria

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee*, 402nd meeting, para. 20.

said that it was not the duty of the USSR to disprove the charges, but it was the duty of China to prove them.

62. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the so-called draft resolution of the Kuomintang representative consisted of fabrications and did not deserve serious consideration.

63. Article 1 of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 had given expression to the fundamental undertaking, assumed by the USSR at the Yalta Conference, to assist in the liberation of China. The USSR had strictly complied with the treaty and had co-operated with the Chinese Government of that time. It had done all that was required of it by the treaty. The USSR had not, however, assumed any responsibility to assist the Kuomintang in the internal conflict in China. In accordance with the provisions of the treaty, the USSR had not interfered in the internal affairs of China and, unlike the United States, had not taken sides in the civil war.

64. The fabrications on which the Kuomintang libel had been based had been exposed and denied : only those who slavishly followed the United States could continue to credit them. Indeed, those fabrications were supported by those who had remained silent in the face of United States violations of international law and agreements such as the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The " American bloc " was setting a dangerous precedent in supporting the slander submitted by a person who represented a mere political faction which had been expelled by the Chinese people.

65. The representative of the USSR would vote against that draft resolution and also against the amendment submitted by Thailand since there was no reason to say that the USSR had violated or had failed to carry out the Treaty of 1945.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.