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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (A/1944, A/1947, A/C.1/698 and A/C.1/699) (continued)

[Item 67]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) said that there were three essential parts to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698).
2. Regarding the first, which would term membership in the North Atlantic Treaty incompatible with the Charter, he stated that the peaceful nature and aims of that treaty were so obvious—it was so clearly a defensive agreement of the nature contemplated by Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter—that it was hard to understand how such a proposal could be made. The intention of the North Atlantic Treaty was the same as that of the Charter, and he could not oppose one without opposing the other as well. He would therefore vote against paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution.
3. The second main section of the USSR draft resolution referred to the Korean question which the Committee had decided not to discuss for the time being in order to avoid facing obstacles in the way of the negotiations in Korea. It was difficult to see how discussion in two places at once could fail to create such obstacles, and he therefore opposed paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.
4. As to the part of the USSR draft resolution relating to the question of atomic energy and armaments, that question had already been examined by the General Assembly, which had established a Disarmament Commission. That Commission would be the appropriate organ to study that part of the USSR proposal. The idea of a one-third reduction was unacceptable since in the absence of full information it would be impossible to know what it would mean in practice, and indeed, such a reduction seemed likely to be unjust.
5. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that there had been a number of incorrect interpretations of the USSR draft resolution. It was universally conceded that great tension prevailed at the present time in international relations. The United States was pressing forward with its plans for unleashing a new war: it was waging war

against the Korean people in the Far East, it was creating military blocs of an aggressive nature, it was remilitarizing West Germany and Japan, and, in so doing, it was ruining the economies of numerous countries. The main cause of tension was to be found in the preparations for an aggressive and imperialistic war against the USSR and the countries of the peoples' democracies. The United States was conducting propaganda on an unprecedented scale to that end.

6. Following the Second World War, the peoples of the world had placed their hope in the unity among the great Powers which had permitted victory in that war. The United States and others, however, had soon violated that principle of unity, and had commenced preparation for a new war. The report of Mr. Kenneth Royall, United States Under Secretary of War, on the period from the middle of 1945 to the middle of 1947 showed that the War Department had undertaken long-range preparations for that purpose and disproved the claims of the United States representative. Indeed, the whole pattern of post-war United States policy showed that the latter had been subordinated to war preparations, from the elaboration of the Truman doctrine, under which the United States had established military bases and occupied territory throughout the world, thereby infringing upon the sovereignty of other States, to the Marshall plan, by which the United States had gained control over other States, which had subsequently been forced into the "aggressive Atlantic bloc".

7. The North Atlantic Treaty had been represented as being compatible with the Charter, but there could be no doubt that it was both aggressive and incompatible with that Charter. The States participating in the treaty had violated Chapter 1 of the Charter and in particular paragraph 2 of Article 2, which called upon Members to carry out their obligations in good faith, and paragraph 4 of Article 2, which called upon them to refrain from the use or threat of force against any State. Since the alliance, with the inclusion of Turkey, would include territory on four continents, it could not be regarded as a regional arrangement in the sense of Article 52. The treaty was a violation both of the spirit and of the letter of the Charter. Its aggressive and expanding nature was shown by the recent proposal for a Middle East Command and by the enactment of Act 165 by the United States Congress to furnish funds for diversionary activities and sabotage in the countries against which the treaty was directed.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

8. The nature of the North Atlantic Treaty was further confirmed by the fact that the United States, in violation of its obligations, was reviving the German *Wehrmacht* and placing Nazi generals at its head. The Bonn Government talked openly of membership in the Atlantic Pact on the basis of equality and partnership. The *communiqué* on the Churchill-Truman talks had shown that that demand would not be rejected. In view of all those facts, it was necessary to recognize, as the USSR draft resolution did, that membership in the aggressive pact known as the North Atlantic Treaty was not compatible with membership in the United Nations.

9. The building up of a ring of bases by the United States for the purpose of aggression against the USSR and other countries was likewise obviously incompatible with the Charter. On 28 September 1951, President Truman had signed legislation appropriating 5,800 million dollars for the construction of military bases, including a ring of secret air bases around the USSR. Citing further details concerning the bases established in many countries, despite popular protests, Mr. Wierblowski said that all such details were insufficient to present a full picture of the feverish activities of the United States to build up a network of bases for the unleashing of a new war.

10. In his State of the Union message to Congress on 9 January 1952, Mr. Truman had cited the increase in numbers of the United States armed forces and in arms production. The United States had also imposed heavy armaments burdens on other countries whose economies were unable to bear the strain. Thus Belgium had recently opposed, because of the effect on its economy, the recommendations of the committee of the North Atlantic Treaty called the "Standing Group".

11. The theory of the beneficial effect of war preparations on the country's economy was now an official doctrine in the United States, which was therefore far from interested in securing a cease-fire in Korea. It was doing everything it could to hold up the negotiations in Korea, while continuing its destruction of the country. The attitude of the United States towards the proposal for periodic meetings of the Security Council to assist the negotiations in Korea and the postponing of the discussion of the Korean question *sine die* were characteristic. The United States had consistently held that only it could decide whether or not to end the war, without considering the views of its allies or the views of the United Nations, in whose name it was supposedly fighting. The termination of hostilities in Korea and the withdrawal of foreign troops from that country were indispensable for peace.

12. Failure to prohibit the atomic weapon involved the risk of a repetition of the destruction visited upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which had been intended to cow the rest of the world, as the later Baruch plan had been intended to secure for the United States control of atomic energy all over the world. The USSR had always called for an unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon. But the question had remained unsolved because the United States wanted to be able to use that weapon for its aggressive purposes—but the peoples of the world regarded the danger of an atomic war as the greatest threat to the existence of mankind.

13. The course of the Committee's debates had revealed the concern of the world regarding the future prospects of peace. What had been done to meet that justified concern, however? The most momentous question on the Committee's agenda—that proposed by the USSR—had been placed near the bottom of the list, despite the opposition of several delegations. In the same way, discussion

of the important and urgent question of the independence of Korea had been postponed *sine die*.

14. Now, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, in their draft resolution (A/C.1/699) were proposing to relegate to the Disarmament Commission the USSR proposals, although—unlike the draft resolution of the western Powers (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) which had led to the establishment of that Commission—the draft resolution of the Soviet Union would permit the solution of the problem. Nevertheless, the representative of France wished to minimize the importance of the USSR draft resolution, and the United Kingdom representative, who had previously opposed a Polish proposal to the effect that all proposals which had been made on the question of disarmament be referred to the Disarmament Commission, now wished to transmit the proposals to the Disarmament Commission without the appropriate recommendations and directives of the General Assembly.

15. The Polish delegation supported the USSR draft resolution, which, by providing for simultaneous putting into effect of the prohibition of atomic weapons and control of the application of that prohibition, removed all doubt as to whether a solution was possible. The control organ would be able to carry out inspection on a continuing basis, and the fact that it would not be able to interfere in the domestic affairs of States meant that its duties would be confined to ensuring that there was no production of atomic weapons.

16. The representative of Poland also supported the proposal for a reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the great Powers. Although that proposal would not solve the problem completely, it would represent a first step toward saving enormous sums of money and strengthening the confidence of the people.

17. The restoration of co-operation among the five great Powers, recognized by the United Nations Charter to be mainly responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, would be a guarantee for the removal of the threat of a new war. It was the duty of the great Powers to conclude a peace pact as proposed by the USSR. It was baffling that those who supported aggressive pacts should oppose a peace pact, which was demanded by an appeal signed by more than 600 million people throughout the world.

18. In the current tension created by the reckless policy of the United States, the Organization must seize every chance of bringing about peaceful coexistence and co-operation among all States. His delegation was deeply convinced that war was not inevitable. The USSR draft resolution covered the whole field of the fundamental problems involved in peace. It constituted a unified whole from which the individual sections could not be extracted without distorting the meaning of those proposals.

19. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) said that his delegation would vote against the principle contained in the first part of paragraph 1 of the USSR revised draft resolution (A/C.1/698) since it did not consider participation in the North Atlantic Treaty as an aggressive act nor as being incompatible with membership in the United Nations. It would, however, abstain on the second part of the paragraph, since it did not believe that, taken by itself, the construction of military bases was incompatible with such membership. It might be so in certain cases, if for example, it constituted an act of aggression against a third State or if bases were constructed without the previous consent of the State concerned—in which case there would be infringement of the sovereignty and integrity of that State.

20. He did not believe that the military bases available to the United States were for aggressive purposes since the Government of that country had stated that they would be used solely for defence purposes and not for aggression. Similarly, the mere existence of military bases which might be available to the USSR in countries allied or associated with it would not necessarily be incompatible with the Charter.

21. The delegation of Ecuador would abstain on paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution since the Committee had already decided to postpone the discussion of the Korean item.

22. Despite the fact that Ecuador had expressed a desire for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, it would be obliged to abstain on sub-paragraph *a*, owing to the lack of adequate information regarding the withdrawal of forces to the 38th parallel. Moreover, that paragraph could be interpreted in various ways. It was not made clear whether all of the armies, or only the North and South Korean armies, would remain in their present lines, or to what point the armies which were presumably on the 38th parallel would withdraw.

23. His delegation would also abstain on sub-paragraph *b* because it did not know whether the requested withdrawal would take place before or after a final settlement was negotiated. If it took place before, Korea would be at the mercy of further aggression or invasion.

24. If the First Committee approved the three-Power resolution (A/C.1/699), it would be illogical to vote on paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution. But if those paragraphs were put to the vote, he would abstain except in the case of paragraph 4, which he would vote against. Although paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution was a step towards agreement, it was counterbalanced by paragraph 4 which, if put into effect, would put the USSR and its partners in a position of military supremacy. The western advantage in atomic weapons would disappear and the superiority of the communist countries in conventional armaments and military forces would be increased. It was not reasonable to agree *a priori* to reduction by a fixed percentage. It would be more logical to advocate total disarmament.

25. His delegation believed that paragraphs 5 and 6 referred to procedures to be applied to the questions of the prohibition and control of atomic energy and the reduction of armaments. In view of what it had said in that connexion, it would abstain on those paragraphs.

26. With regard to paragraph 7, the delegation of Ecuador doubted the possibility of preparing within the short period of a few months a successful disarmament conference, especially if the great Powers did not first succeed in reducing international tension.

27. With regard to paragraph 8 which called for a peace pact among the big Five, although his delegation had listened attentively to the USSR representative's arguments, it did not feel that the necessary facts had been laid before the Committee so as to enable his delegation to make a considered decision regarding the contents and scope of the proposed pact; nor had it been explained what the relations would be between the pact and the Charter of the United Nations and regional agreements. He would therefore abstain although his delegation had urged agreement between the great Powers.

28. On the other hand, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/699) since it was in accordance with the General Assembly resolution adopted at its 358th plenary meeting. In supporting the

draft resolution his delegation hoped that the USSR proposals would not be shelved but, on the contrary, that they would receive in the Disarmament Commission the attention they deserved in view of their nature and importance.

29. Mr. GARSON (Canada) said that, if Mr. Vyshinsky considered his proposals to be as important as the Soviet Union representative had claimed at the 487th meeting, he was at a loss to understand why these proposals were presented to the Committee in a shabby setting. Moreover, he could not agree with the central thesis of the USSR representative, that at the bottom of the free world's defence preparations lay the United States' ambition for world hegemony.

30. Mr. Garson believed that, when free nations differed, the powerful should always try to understand the viewpoints of the smaller nations and meet it by compromise and conciliation. However, this conciliation on the part of the powerful should not be taken as a sign of defeat, since only under this principle could the less powerful nations retain their freedom and their genuine sovereignty.

31. Mr. Vyshinsky declared that the Soviet Union wanted peace and that it feared the aggression of the United States and its supporters. But the free nations themselves feared Soviet aggression and their fears were solidly based upon the present fate of nations that had so recently been free. Moreover, in order to avoid such a fate, they had engaged themselves most reluctantly in either defence preparations or purely defensive alliances.

32. Mr. Vyshinsky claimed that his proposals concerning atomic control, inspection and prohibition were really new, alleging that they would remove all obstacles towards an agreement and understanding. In the circumstances, Mr. Garson wished to ask the Soviet Union representative the following questions.

33. The first question concerned the simultaneity of the proposed prohibition and control. Would one be correct in assuming that Mr. Vyshinsky meant that an effective system of international control would enter into operation at the time that the prohibition of the atomic weapons had come into operation? In other words, did it mean that all the mechanics and organization for the system of international control would have to be prepared in advance and ready to operate in all the countries concerned as from the time agreed upon for prohibition to come into effect?

34. The second question concerned the meaning of the phrase "inspection on a continuing basis". Would Mr. Vyshinsky agree that the system of international control and inspection should be permanent?

35. If he agreed that the international control authority should be organized on a permanent basis, that would lead to the third question, namely: would the inspectors of that authority be able to go wherever and whenever they wished in the discharge of their functions? Or would they first have to ask permission or allege suspicion of illegal activities or establish a *prima facie* case that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion of illegal activities?

36. If Mr. Vyshinsky agreed to the freedom of the inspectors, this would lead to the fourth question, namely: if the international control authority decided that it was necessary to do so, could it station its inspectors all the time at key points in the processing from raw materials to fissionable products?

37. The fifth question concerned the meaning of "strict international control". What did Mr. Vyshinsky mean, in addition to his definition of inspection, when he spoke

repeatedly of "strict international control"? Did he mean anything more than inspection? If so, what?

38. If Mr. Vyshinsky was able to answer in the affirmative, would he not agree that the reference in the draft resolution to the non-intervention of the control organ in the internal affairs of States could be interpreted to upset, at any time, the operation of any kind of inspection system, however extensive and adequate it might be in other respects? For his Government had always taken a broad view of what constituted interference in its internal affairs.

39. In the circumstances, it was worthy to note that the whole conception of an international authority was bound to founder unless all the nations agreed to use some small portion of their national sovereignty for the broader international purpose of peace.

40. In conclusion, Mr. Garson believed that the detailed examination of paragraphs 3 to 7 of the Soviet Union draft resolution should be conducted in the Disarmament Commission, as proposed in the draft resolution of France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/699) which his delegation would support.

41. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines) said that the USSR proposals revived questions, such as the international control of atomic energy, the reduction of armaments and the Korean question, which had been carefully considered and acted upon by both the Committee and the General Assembly. In proposing the simultaneity of prohibition and control, the USSR representative attempted to prove the willingness of the Soviet Union to advance towards a common meeting ground in the work for peace through deeds.

42. The Philippine delegation believed, however, that that proposal was substantially the same as the one already rejected by the Committee, and served the same purpose of paying lip service to the cause of disarmament and peace.

43. In the first place, the Soviet proposition involved a contradiction in terms. While the prohibition of atomic weapons was to be unconditional, it was yet subjected to the principle of simultaneity with control. This circumstance betrayed two facts, namely, the difficulty of relying on the sincerity of the Government of the Soviet Union and the fact that the prohibition of atomic weapons could not be unconditional but must be subjected to essential conditions, such as the effective operation of an international control system.

44. Another virtual contradiction in terms was the acceptance of inspection on a continuing basis, while a condition was being attached regarding the interference in domestic affairs, a condition which could be used at any time to nullify any effective inspection.

45. Moreover, one might wonder how to interpret exactly the word "institution", as employed in paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution where it is proposed that the prohibition of the atomic weapon should be made simultaneous with the "institution of international control". Did that term mean the effective operation of a foolproof system of control? If so, the Soviet Union should accept the western formula, as envisaged in the General Assembly resolution setting up the Disarmament Commission (A/L.25). However, if it meant the formulation in writing or the

initiation of a system of control without a previous effective test, then there was no new proposal.

46. If the western Powers could be persuaded to agree on an advance declaration for prohibition, and if the effective operation of the control system broke down due to Soviet Union obstacles, the USSR could then utilize as a formidable weapon of propaganda the charge that the western Powers, after having declared themselves in favour of prohibition, had refused to comply with such declaration.

47. If the Soviet Union were eager to reach an agreement on the vital problem of prohibition, it was all the more incomprehensible that the so-called "new" proposal should have been buried among multiple subjects such as the North Atlantic Treaty, Korean war, the disarmament question and the conclusion of a five-Power peace pact. Some of the proposals contained in the draft resolution encouraged the belief that there was no genuine desire on the part of the USSR to reach agreement. For instance, the deadline of 1 June 1952 for the completion of a draft convention concerning the prohibition and control of atomic weapons could hardly be accepted as feasible in view of the existing fundamental differences. Similarly, the setting up of the deadline of 15 July 1952 for the convening of the Disarmament Conference was a trick used by the Soviet Union to prove to the world its desire to reach an accord.

48. Another circumstance negating the Soviet profession of a desire to reach agreement was the inclusion in its draft resolution of certain principles utterly unacceptable to many countries. Among these were the propositions that membership in NATO and the existence of foreign military bases in one's country were inconsistent with membership in the United Nations. In that circumstance, Mr. Macapagal found it necessary to deny such contentions and to declare that American bases in the Philippines constituted a part of the Philippine-American system of common defence established in accordance with the Charter. The act of allowing foreign bases in one's country under an agreement freely entered into was clearly implied by the express sanction given in Articles 52 to 54 of the Charter relative to regional security arrangements.

49. Finally, the attempt in the Soviet union proposal to discuss the Korean question would amount to a nullification of the Committee's decision to postpone discussion of that item (486th meeting). The mere insistence of the Soviet Union to discuss that question betrayed their purpose of wrecking the negotiations being carried on in Korea.

50. The USSR, likewise, repeated its proposal for the one-third reduction of armaments and the calling of a Disarmament Conference; the sophism of such a proposal was clear enough and did not warrant any further discussion.

51. Similarly, another proposal was for the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace. In this connexion, it should be noted that the world did not need another declaration paying homage to peace, but agreement on the many questions which threatened that very peace.

52. In conclusion, Mr. Macapagal stated that the proper place for the consideration of the Soviet draft resolution was in the Disarmament Commission, as proposed in the draft resolution of the three Powers (A/C.1/699).

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.